sign in sign up
<<
Home , Emergent democracy, National Assembly

1 troublesome the Despite before). was it as be will (nothing avant’ comme plus sera ne ‘rien motto popular the by epitomised governance, and accountable development economic towards Faso’s march in Burkina era anew as regime of Compaore’s collapse the saw ‘insurgés’ of the Most (CDP). and Progress for Congress party, then-ruling the by limits term presidential and remove constitution the amend to attempt acontroversial followed resignation The uprising. in apopular resign to forced was years, for 27 Faso Burkina over had ruled who Compaore, Blaise President history. political independence post- of its points turning critical of the people’ upright 2014, of ‘land the of October end the At Background spoken in the country. the in spoken languages different three the from stems name The Sankara. Thomas President by 1984 August in Faso Burkina renamed was country the Volta, Upper of the as known Initially Faso. Burkina This is an expression generally used to refer to to refer to used generally expression an is This the country’s democratic institutions. and consolidate safeguard to addressed be to need that challenges key of the some overlooking risks agenda counterterrorist the on focus A too-overt issues. governance and resolve address to administration ruling current of the (in)ability the as well as process, electoral the affect that displacement, and internal insecurity rampant fragmentation, (system) party deficits, governance unrest, civil as such challenges, key of the some highlights brief This . these affect will that concerns structural some overshadows and partly causes partly situation security current The elections. and parliamentary presidential hold will Faso Burkina 2020, November 22 On to democratic consolidation ’s road rocky 2020 APRIL 1 was going through one one through going was 2 have jihadiattacks then, Since attack. profile in ahigh- Maghreb Islamic in the Al-Qaida to loyal fighters by targeted was Ouagadougou, city, 2016, capital the InJanuary terrorism. namely of his presidency, challenges critical of the one be would what by confronted was he of grace, period the after weeks of poverty. issue the tackle and reforms democratic further pursue corruption, fight to address in his inaugural pledged Kabore President Faso, Burkina new for a demand popular the Acknowledging December in president-elect new in the as sworn was (MPP) for Progress Movement People’s of the Kabore Christian Marc Roch (RSP), Security of Presidential Regiment notorious Compaore’s by attempt coup afailed by punctuated transition, political of the nature https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article68881 Kaboré’, Christian Marc Roch Président du LeFaso.net (2015) ‘Discours d’investiture d’investiture ‘Discours (2015) LeFaso.net 2015. 2 However, afew

Wendyam Hervé Lankoandé CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

increased in scope and intensity and the worrying turn when mutinies erupted within patchwork of responses have the ranks of the defence and security forces. failed to reverse the spectrum of instability. Even Compaore’s loyal guard rebelled, compelling him to temporarily leave the Yet looking upon Burkina Faso only from presidential palace. In 2014, it was by linking the angle of counterterrorism would socioeconomic grievances to political be insufficient to address the country’s demands that the political opposition and difficulties. Although insecurity remains a social forces managed to oust the regime. hard nut to crack for central government, democratic governance in Burkina Faso Current President Roch Marc Christian also faces a number of structural hurdles. Kabore assumed office in a context of With an increase in civil unrest and the pressing social demands. Most of Burkinabe erosion of social cohesion, the stakes of the expectations were that the regime change November 2020 general elections are high. would translate into tangible socioeconomic A few months ahead of the joint elections, dividends, with civil servants in particular this policy brief aims to highlight some expecting that central government would of the key challenges that will affect the significantly improve their socioeconomic electoral process, as well as the (in)ability welfare. To undertake a structural of the current ruling administration to transformation of the economy, and foster address civil unrest and key governance good governance and human capital issues. The window of opportunity for the development, the Kabore regime crafted consolidation of democratic governance is a development policy framework known slowly closing. This policy brief offers some as the Plan National de Développement recommendations on how the international Economique et Social. community could support Burkina Faso to address these challenges. Yet as the outcomes promised by the national development plan took time to materialise, there was a series of strikes across different Civil unrest is outpacing sectors of the administration – initially by the government’s response magistrates. After months of sit-in protests, their demands were met by the government. However, by not linking the magistrates’ Burkina Faso has a strong legacy of social claims to that of other public sector units activism.3 The first president of the Upper to propose a coherent and standardised Volta (as the country was named before response, the government opened a 1984) was toppled in January 1966 following Pandora’s box. Despite its incessant calls massive protests by the labour unions. Since for a truce in a context of increased military then, there have been some attempts by spending and pressing social demands, the successive regimes, including the Compaore government has not succeeded in containing regime, to bargain with the unions and sit-in protests. In 2019, Burkina Faso’s wage contain protests. Burkina Faso was among bill was estimated at 48% of total tax revenue, the African countries where protests against largely above the 35% West African Economic the high cost of living in 2007-08 were Monetary convergence criterion.4 intense. The regime barely survived a quasi- insurrectionary episode in 2011. Following Overwhelmed by the proliferation of sit-in the suspected death of a school pupil in protests, the government has resorted to custody in the western city of Koudougou, a series of initiatives, including legal action thousands of Burkinabe took to the streets to contain social unrest. It brought the case to demand justice and protest against of sit-in protests before the Council of State the rising costs of living. Protests took a

3 Engels, B. (2015) ‘Trade unionism in Burkina Faso’, 4 International Monetary Fund (2019) Burkina Faso, Revue Tiers Monde 2015/4 (No 224), p. 67-82. IMF Country Report No. 19/15.

2 CRU Policy Brief

to seek advice on their legality.5 Moreover, it Officially, decentralisation was designed to convened a conference of all stakeholders devolve political decision making to local in June 2018 to discuss the necessity authorities and to make central government of revising Burkina Faso’s current wage more responsive to local needs. However, structure. Nevertheless, while the process the benefits associated with decentralised of standardising wages across government governance structures such as economic agencies is still ongoing, magistrates have performance, political participation and formally declared that they will not make any service delivery still remain tenuous to many concessions on their salaries and benefits.6 Burkinabe.9 In an emergent democracy like Burkina Faso, legitimacy through ballots makes sense only when coupled with Larger governance deficits legitimacy through performance.

The sit-in protests are but one example of In terms of economic management and the the wider process of the erosion of state fight against impunity, the government’s capacity and authority.7 As regards authority, record is not convincing to many citizens. the Burkinabe state’s ability to project and Although Burkina Faso’s economic growth maintain its power over all its territory is put has been steady over the last 15 years, its to the test by a wide range of malevolent economic structure remains largely based non-state armed groups. Crippled by the on natural resources, namely cotton and lack of adequate equipment and not immune gold. Many jobs created to absorb the from corruption, the bureaucratic and expanding labour force are insecure, unsafe administrative capacity of the Burkinabe or low paid.10 state is severely limited countrywide.8 The small pool of qualified civil servants has On the level of transparency and the fight been reluctant to accept positions outside against impunity, it is true that the trial of Ouagadougou or other major urban centres. the main protagonists of the 2015 coup is This has an effect on the ability of state nearing the end. The investigation into the officials to implement and deliver assassination of President Thomas Sankara is public goods, which constitute critical ongoing. However, corruption is still rampant symbols of statehood and nationhood in at different levels of the state and in the a given political setting. business sector, although it is below the average in Africa.11 The extractive industries sector, the and the public health 5 Whereas the Council of State declared sit-ins sector are all vulnerable to corruption. illegal in its ruling, another legal opinion given by the International Labour Organization Stating that bold socioeconomic and upon the government’s request reaffirmed the political reforms are needed in Burkina Faso legal character of sit-ins as far as they are not would be a truism. However, in a political prejudicial to public order. system still dominated by clientelism and 6 Le Faso.net (2019) ‘Rémunération des agents patronage networks, the ruling elites will de l’Etat : L’Intersyndicale des magistrats met always ensure that reforms are kept to a bare en garde le ministre de la Fonction Publique’, minimum. Overall, Burkina Faso is heading https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article89313. to the polls in a context of weakening state 7 The notion of street power implies a penchant for demonstrating in the streets to resolve certain capacity and authority. This situation is political issues. For more details see Somda, S. (2015) Polémique sur la “ruecratie”: “On peut regretter qu'en quelques mois, Michel Kafando oublie d'où il vient”, propos du Secrétaire général 9 World Bank Group (2018) Country Partnership confédéral de la Confédération générale du Framework for Burkina Faso for the Period FY18- travail du Burkina Bassolma Bazié, in: Lefaso.net, FY23. www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article62736. 10 Weber, Michael (2018) Jobs Diagnostic Burkina 8 Mahieu, S. and Yilmaz, S. (2010) ‘Local government Faso, The World Bank. discretion and accountability in Burkina Faso’, 11 Ardigo, Iñaki Albisu (2019) ‘Burkina Faso: and Development, 30(5):329– Overview of corruption and anti-corruption’, 344. U4 Anti-Corruption Helpdesk.

3 CRU Policy Brief

further compounded by the current political standing for office if they had supported landscape, which remains fragmented and the constitutional amendment to scrap term characterised by low programmatic capacity. limits. Consequently, serious candidates from political parties like the CDP, the Alliance for Democracy and Federation–African Anatomy of Burkina Faso’s post- Democratic Rally and the New Alliance transitional political landscape of Faso among others were banned from taking part in parliamentary and presidential elections. Additionally, the MPP inherited Burkina Faso’s post-transitional political most of the CDP’s old networks of supporters landscape is marked by the fragmentation and managed to co-opt some of the party’s of the party system and party organisations. political elites after Compaore’s downfall. Out of the 170 political parties, only a few However, the demise of a kingmaker like – such as the MPP, the CDP and the Union Salifou Diallo,12 who had contributed to the for Progress and Change (UPC) – display quick territorial outreach of the MPP, will not a strong organisational capacity with be without consequences for party unity, substantial national electoral bases. In the stability and performance. If performance 2015 parliamentary elections, 14 out of 99 were to determine the outcome of November’s political parties managed to win some seats elections, an opinion poll conducted in the in the . Although most first quarter of 2019 reveals increasingly political parties have not officially designated popular disillusion with the Kabore regime on their candidates for the upcoming elections, issues of security, social services and the fight incumbent President Kabore has already against corruption.13 announced that he will be a candidate for his own succession. The political opposition has its own vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. In 2015, the current ruling party’s candidate At its creation in March 2010, few political was elected in the first run. Given the current analysts would have taken the UPC call for political configuration, the outcome of this political change seriously. Yet when the party year’s presidential elections will largely entered the political scene, the then-ruling depend on the ability of political parties to CDP party was facing a fragmented and weak build solid and stable electoral coalitions. political opposition with no substantial ability A few months before electoral consultations, to undermine its rule. By taking a gradual Burkina Faso’s political landscape is approach to the conquest of power,14 the likely to witness the proliferation of small parties, often centred around well-known public figures but devoid of substantial organisational structure. Therefore, imposing 12 With his impressive network, Salifou Diallo was one discipline and maintaining cohesion within of the big men who contributed to the consolidation their ranks remain the key challenges for the of Compaore’s regime. He defected from the ruling different political parties. party in January 2014 along with other major political figures like Simon Compaore and Roch Marc A quick glimpse at the most significant Christian Kabore to set up the MPP. In August 2017, parties, such as the MPP, UPC and the CDP, he suddenly passed away. shows that each has its own wounds to heal 13 Diallo, A. (2019) ‘Burkina Faso: avec le Présimètre, to optimise their chances of occupying the les Burkinabè notent Roch Kaboré’, Jeune Afrique, Kosyam Palace. Despite the comparative https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/767724/ advantage that the ruling party could have politique/burkina-faso-avec-le-presimetre-les- over its rivals in terms of control and access burkinabe-notent-roch-kabore/ 14 Created in March 2010, the UPC refrained from to media and resources, repeating the 2015 taking part in the presidential elections of 2010. electoral performance would prove difficult Instead, in the first two years of existence, it devoted for the presidential party. In 2015, the MPP its efforts to the organisation of the party throughout was one of the few political formations the country. This strategy paid off, as it managed to that benefited from a controversial piece win 19 MPs and 1,615 municipal counsellors in the of legislation banning politicians from 2012 legislative and municipal elections.

4 CRU Policy Brief

UPC not only managed to position itself has been working towards this aim.15 On the as a credible opposition party but also domestic level, the revision of the electoral contributed to crystallising tensions roll has already started.16 However, taking around Compaoré’s old and decaying into consideration the current security regime. In the 2015 presidential and parameter, some political parties have parliamentary elections, the party came cast doubts on the ability of the electoral second, receiving almost 30% of the administration to make the November 2020 vote and winning 33 parliamentary seats. ‘rendez-vous’ happen.17 Despite being one of the heavyweights of the political opposition platform Security dynamics will severely affect the (‘Chef de File de l’Opposition Politique’), electoral process. Since 2016, attacks however, the UPC witnessed the perpetrated by non-state armed groups have emergence of a dissident faction within become frequent and have targeted both its parliamentary group at the national unarmed civilians and the security forces. assembly. This is not without any electoral Twenty out of 25 provinces are currently implication for countries like Burkina Faso, confronted by security challenges and where a personality-based rather than a (parts of) six out 13 regions are under states party-based vision of prevails. of emergency.18 Lessons from neighbouring tell us that voter turnout may be low The CDP, which dominated Burkina if large sections of the population refrain Faso’s political landscape for decades, from casting their votes due to fear of is still struggling to recover from the violence. In addition, assaults and threats 2015 popular uprising. Frictions around of assassinations throughout the electoral leadership positions have left the party process may prevent some candidates from weakened and its social base alienated. meeting the electorate. Divided as it currently stands, the CDP could jeopardise its chances of ruling again. Moreover, the party will need to work hard to convince the Burkinabe 15 LeFaso.net (2020) ‘Elections 2020 au Burkina Faso: citizens that it has learned from its past Nous avons un challenge important qui consiste mistakes. It seems unlikely that this à amener le fichier électoral à être conforme à fragmented party landscape will produce l’état de la population’, annonce Newton Ahmed an electoral result that can take a firm Barry, Président de la CENI, https://lefaso.net/spip. stance with regard to the crucial issues php?article94166 of institutions and identities, state and 16 Moreover, the CENI will be organising the diaspora nation building. vote for the first time in Burkina Faso’s . For some political commentators, the extraterritorial vote of two million potential voters Why are these elections abroad was seen as one of the key factors that could affect the electoral outcome. However, fraught with fragility? despite the media hype, as of 21 January 2020 (i.e. one week before the end of enrolment) the number of Burkinabe who had enrolled themselves Next to dynamics within political parties, was estimated at 14,185. LeFaso.net (2020) the necessity of having a solid electoral ‘Processus Electoral: Faible taux d’enrôlement chez infrastructure will be critical for a les Burkinabé de l’étranger’, https://lefaso.net/spip. free, open and transparent electoral php?article94484 process. Contrary to the 2015 elections, 17 Burkina 24 (2020) ‘Le CDP souhaite que where the international community les “élections se tiennent à la date établie”’, was mobilised behind Burkina Faso to https://www.burkina24.com/2020/02/09/burkina- make the popular uprising a success le-cdp-souhaite-que-les-elections-se-tiennent-a- la-date-etablie/. story, this time the Burkinabe will have 18 Although the northern, centre-nord and eastern to rely on themselves. The Independent regions remain the most vulnerable to non-state National Electoral Commission (CENI) armed group activities, the Boucle du Mouhoum, has reaffirmed that elections will be held the Centre-Est regions and the Hauts-Bassins on 22 November 2020 as scheduled and region have also witnessed some sporadic attacks.

5 CRU Policy Brief

The vote of internal displaced persons (IDPs) Recommendations is another conundrum to deal with. Since the crisis broke out, at least 780,000 people have First, central government should devise fled their homes as the result of mounting a national strategy to resolve conflicts violence.19 Two options have been proposed around resources in the hinterlands by the electoral administration to allow IDPs that have often been exacerbated by to cast their votes. The first scenario would jihadi groups. While committed to the be to link the voter to his or her municipality stabilisation of rural areas, in the long of departure. In the second scenario, the run central government will need to displaced person would be enrolled where undertake deep administrative reforms she or he has been received and his or her and rebuild the coercive capacity of the vote will be counted for the constituency state. Burkina Faso’s emergent democracy in which she or he lives. The second will not prosper if socioeconomic despair scenario could significantly impact Burkina and insecurity continue to take root. Faso’s electoral and administrative map The international community should take as municipalities under threat will be left care to adopt these dimensions in any without elected officials. counterterrorist agenda.

Portrayed by analysts as one of the freest Second, as previously mentioned, the and fairest elections ever, the voter turnout November 2020 elections are fraught of the 2015 presidential elections was with fragility. Some political actors could around 60%. With the expansion of the perceive the weakening state capacity as IDP community, which constitutes a major well as the eroding social cohesion as an portion of the rural electorate, risks of a opportunity to capture power at all costs. low voter turnout are not to be ruled out. The emergency measures put in place A low voter turnout would diminish the next in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic government’s legitimacy both at home and could also be garnered towards this end. abroad. This would probably make it even As occurred in the 2015 joint elections, the harder to enact bold socioeconomic and international community could promote political reforms while pursuing the fight the adoption of a code of (good) conduct against jihadi groups. prohibiting violence and hate speech, and regulating the activities of political parties throughout the process should be adopted Conclusion by the different stakeholders.

Burkina Faso continues to face a many Third, the current volatile security context significant challenges in the run-up to the requires strong safety measures to November 2020 elections. What initially ensure a minimum standard of electoral started as a new dawn with the downfall integrity. Central government should of the Compaore regime has given rise to allocate close protection to all presidential disillusion among a large section of the candidates. In order to ensure the security population, in both rural and urban areas. of electoral agents, polling stations and The geography of attacks testifies to a other critical infrastructures throughout crisis of governance in the hinterlands. the elections, Burkina Faso could well During Compaore’s time in office, central use assistance from the international government was able to exercise a degree community. of social control over local populations through a network of intermediaries. The November 2020 joint parliamentary The collapse of his regime has been and presidential elections constitute a followed by a crisis of rural governance. critical test for Burkina Faso’s democracy. A too-overt focus on the counterterrorist agenda risks overlooking some of the key challenges that need to be addressed to 19 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/bfa safeguard and consolidate the country’s Last updated 29 Feb 2020. democratic institutions.

6 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Institute of – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip , businesses, and in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world. www.clingendael.org/cru  @clingendaelorg [email protected]  The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84  The Clingendael Institute  Newsletter

About the author

Wendyam Hervé Lankoandé is a research consultant at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). Prior to re-joining IPSS, he worked in research and analytical capacity for a wide range of organisations including Clingendael, Swisspeace, Interpeace and the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security. Wendyam holds a BA in European and International Studies from Sorbonne Nouvelle and a MA in Strategic Studies from Paris 13 University. His work has largely focused on issues pertaining to peacebuilding, governance and nation building in West Africa, with a particular interest in their interrelation and connection to state fragility.