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Presidential Legislative Powers Presidential Legislative Powers International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 15 Presidential Legislative Powers International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 15 Elliot Bulmer © 2017 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) Second edition First published in 2015 by International IDEA under the title Presidential Powers: Legislative Initiative and Agenda-setting International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members. The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial- ShareAlike 3.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it, provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence visit the Creative Commons website: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/> International IDEA Strömsborg SE–103 34 Stockholm Sweden Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00 Email: [email protected] Website: <http://www.idea.int> Cover design: International IDEA Cover illustration: © 123RF, <http://www.123rf.com> Produced using Booktype: <https://booktype.pro> ISBN: 978-91-7671-120-0 Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 3 Advantages and risks ................................................................................................ 3 2. Content and scope.................................................................................................. 4 3. What is the issue?................................................................................................... 6 4. Proactive presidential legislative powers ............................................................ 8 Proposing and introducing legislation ...................................................................... 8 Exclusive powers over financial legislation................................................................ 9 Convening the legislature and setting its agenda..................................................... 10 Decree laws ............................................................................................................ 11 Fast-track legislative procedures.............................................................................. 15 5. Other aspects of presidential–legislative relations ..........................................17 Vetoing legislation.................................................................................................. 18 Presidentially initiated referendums........................................................................ 18 Cabinet ministers in the legislature......................................................................... 19 Dissolving the legislature........................................................................................ 21 6. Avoiding hyper-presidentialism .......................................................................... 22 Getting the balance right........................................................................................ 22 Government powers: legislature confirmation, scrutiny and oversight .................... 23 The judiciary and ‘fourth-branch’ institutions........................................................ 24 Federal systems and decentralization ...................................................................... 25 7. Contextual considerations ................................................................................... 26 Party system and electoral rules .............................................................................. 26 Norms and expectations of presidential power ....................................................... 29 Public outreach ...................................................................................................... 29 Stability and risk of regime collapse........................................................................ 30 8. Decision-making questions................................................................................. 31 9. Examples ............................................................................................................... 33 References ................................................................................................................. 38 Annex.......................................................................................................................... 40 About the author.................................................................................................... 40 About International IDEA ..................................................................................... 40 About this series ..................................................................................................... 41 1. Introduction 1. Introduction In addition to strictly defined executive powers, presidents in presidential and semi-presidential democracies typically possess certain powers of legislative initiative and agenda-setting powers. These enable them to exercise political leadership, for example, by proposing legislation, controlling the legislative agenda and issuing decrees with legal force. All presidential and semi-presidential constitutions invest the president with some agenda-setting and legislative initiative powers. Newer presidential constitutions, especially those in Latin America, tend to give more explicit legislative initiative powers to presidents. Ceremonial presidents in parliamentary systems typically do not possess legislative or agenda-setting powers, or possess them only to a very limited degree. This reflects the fact that prime ministers, rather than presidents, are expected to exercise policy leadership in such systems. Advantages and risks Elected presidents are increasingly expected to act as ‘chief legislators’ as well as ‘chief executives’. They are expected to set a strategic vision for the country, make an active contribution to the development of policies and provide leadership to other institutions, such as legislatures. To do this, presidents need adequate powers at their disposal. However, the excessive concentration of powers in the presidency may result in a hyper-presidential regime, in which the president is subject to few effective constraints, undermining both democracy and good government. International IDEA 3 Presidential Legislative Powers 2. Content and scope This Primer concerns presidential leadership and proactive legislative and agenda-setting powers in democracies where the president is popularly elected and has substantial governing powers, either as a chief executive in a presidential system (as in Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and the United States) or as a head of state in a semi-presidential system (as in France). In such countries, presidents are typically entrusted with a range of leadership powers, which may include: • the right to propose or to introduce legislative bills; • exclusive power to draft and propose the budget; • the right to summon special sessions of the legislature and to control the legislature’s agenda; • the right to issue decrees that have the force of law; • the right to address the legislature; and • the right to initiate referendums. This Primer considers the constitutional design issues surrounding these powers. It discusses the constitutional architecture necessary to sustain a workable and responsible political system that can meet public expectations for effective leadership, on the one hand, without allowing the president to become autocratic, on the other. Since the way in which these constitutional powers are likely to be used in practice will depend on the political situation, and especially on the nature of the relationship between the president and the political parties in the 4 International IDEA 2. Content and scope legislature, a large section of the Primer is devoted to an analysis of the political contexts that constitutional designers need to consider. On presidential powers in situations where the president is a ceremonial figurehead or non-executive constitutional guardian see International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer No. 6, Non-Executive Presidents in Parliamentary Democracies. On the veto powers of presidents see International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer No. 14, Presidential Veto Powers. International IDEA 5 Presidential Legislative Powers 3. What is the issue? The classical model of the separation of powers, as developed in the USA in the late-18th century, regards the president primarily as a chief executive official. The president appoints and directs cabinet members, presides over the cabinet, commands the armed forces, conducts foreign relations, leads the administration and issues regulations to implement laws. Meanwhile, the power to make laws, including the power to approve budgets, is entrusted, along with other deliberative and oversight functions, to a separately elected legislature (a congress or parliament). In practice, however, executive presidents rarely if ever act as merely administrative chiefs whose duty is simply to ‘execute’ (implement) the laws made by others. Executive presidents are above all democratic political leaders, with electoral promises
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