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Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Constitution-Building Primer No

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Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Constitution-Building Primer No Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Constitution-Building Primer No. 21 Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi- Presidential Democracies International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 21 Adem Abebe and Elliot Bulmer © 2019 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance This publication is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members. The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it, provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence visit the Creative Commons website: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-sa/3.0/>. International IDEA Strömsborg SE–103 34 Stockholm Sweden Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00 Email: [email protected] Website: <http://www.idea.int> Design and layout: International IDEA Cover illustration: © 123RF, <http://123rf.com> <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2019.30> ISBN: 978-91-7671-267-2 Created with Booktype: <https://www.booktype.pro> International IDEA Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 6 Structure and content .............................................................................................. 6 2. What is the issue? .................................................................................................. 8 The role of the president ......................................................................................... 9 Representative and responsible government ............................................................. 9 Insiders and outsiders ............................................................................................ 10 3. Who is eligible to be president? ......................................................................... 11 Citizenship and franchise qualifications ................................................................. 11 Age qualifications .................................................................................................. 12 Nomination procedures ........................................................................................ 12 Additional qualifications or requirements .............................................................. 13 Conflicts of interest ............................................................................................... 15 Anti-dynastic provisions ........................................................................................ 16 4. How is the president elected? ............................................................................ 17 Plurality system (‘first-past-the-post’) .................................................................... 18 Majoritarian system (‘two-round’ system) ............................................................. 20 Alternative vote (also known as ‘instant run-off’ or ‘ranked preference’ voting) ..... 21 Hybrid (modified run-off) systems ........................................................................ 23 Presidential primaries ............................................................................................ 24 Turnout requirements ........................................................................................... 26 5. Timing of presidential elections ......................................................................... 27 6. Alternatives to direct popular election .............................................................. 29 Election by an electoral college .............................................................................. 29 Assembly-independent systems .............................................................................. 30 Legislative run-off ................................................................................................. 30 Combined executive–legislative elections ............................................................... 30 7. Special provisions for divided societies ............................................................ 32 Supermajority rules ............................................................................................... 32 Double-majority rules (geographical distribution of votes) .................................... 32 Alternating presidencies ......................................................................................... 33 The representative role of vice-presidents .............................................................. 34 Multi-member presidencies ................................................................................... 34 8. Decision-making questions ................................................................................ 36 9. Examples .............................................................................................................. 38 References ................................................................................................................ 42 Further reading ..................................................................................................... 43 Online knowledge sources ..................................................................................... 44 Annex ......................................................................................................................... 45 About the authors ................................................................................................. 45 About International IDEA .................................................................................... 45 About this series .................................................................................................... 46 Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies 1. Introduction This primer discusses the constitutional rules for choosing presidents in countries where the president exercises significant governance powers. This includes both: (a) countries where presidents perform the functions of both head of state and chief executive (as in Kenya, the Philippines and the United States); and (b) countries where presidents, although required to share power with a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature, nevertheless have an active role in governance and more than merely formal or ceremonial powers (as in France, Romania and Tunisia). In a democracy, presidents with such powers must be chosen by a process that confers upon them a democratic mandate and legitimacy —the norm being direct popular elections. In contrast, in countries where the president is a non-executive head of state, who acts mainly as a ceremonial figurehead with few if any powers over day-to- day governance, indirect presidential elections are common (e.g. Germany, India and Mauritius). These cases are excluded from this primer, but for more information see International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primer No. 6, Non- Executive Presidents in Parliamentary Democracies (Bulmer 2017a). Structure and content Constitution-builders considering presidential elections have to make a number of structured choices. Commonly occurring issues include qualifications, eligibility and nomination of presidential candidates (discussed in Section 3), the mechanics of the electoral system (discussed in Section 4) and the timing of elections (discussed in Section 5). In some contexts, alternatives to direct popular election might be considered (discussed in Section 6), or there may be a demand for additional rules that promote inclusivity and power-sharing (discussed in Section 7). 6 International IDEA 1. Introduction Issues concerning the tenure of office of presidents, term limits and the removal of presidents are also of paramount importance, but these are discussed in an accompanying International IDEA primer, Presidential Term Limits, Tenure and Removal (International IDEA, forthcoming). International IDEA 7 Electing Presidents in Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies 2. What is the issue? One of the main functions of a constitution is to provide a framework of rules by which power can be acquired, transferred, regulated, restricted and legitimated. In democracies where the president holds significant governing powers, the election of a president is one of the most important, decisive, potentially divisive political events. The constitutional rules regulating these elections are of vital importance to the health and stability of the polity as a whole. For this reason, the rules governing the election of the president are nearly always constitutionalized. Having clear, workable and generally accepted rules can help those on the losing side to accept the procedural legitimacy of an election, even if they are disappointed in its outcome’. Such rules can reduce conflict: they ensure that power flows along democratic, constitutional channels, and that contests for power are determined by free, fair and regular elections, not by coups, rebellions and assassinations. The constitutional rules regulating presidential elections should, above all, be impersonal and not subject to easy manipulation. They should apply equally, for example,
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