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The Presidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government

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The Presidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government American University International Law Review Volume 8 Article 19 Issue 2 Vol 8. #2/3 Winter/Spring 92/93 1993 The rP esidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government Thomas O. Sargentich Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Sargentich, Thomas O. "The rP esidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government." American University International Law Review 8 no. 2/3 (1993): 579-592. This Symposium or Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY MODELS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT Thomas 0. Sargentich" One of the major topics for contemporary drafters of constitutions involves the structure of government at the national level.' Two primary models have emerged: those of the presidential and the parliamentary systems. In this discussion I will first clarify the key differences be- tween these models. Second, I will address overgeneralizations often encountered in discussions of the two models. Third, I will consider the situation in the United States with reference to debates carried on be- tween advocates of presidential and parliamentary-style arrangements. I. TWO MODELS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT There are, of course, a variety of constitutional structures of national government throughout the world. Despite this variety, the most fre- quently noted distinction involving national structures in democratic systems is between "presidential" and "parliamentary" arrangements. What are the central characteristics of each of these models? Among the most important variables are the methods of selecting and removing the head of government.' In general, in a presidential system the head of government-the president-is popularly elected, either directly by the people or by means of an electoral college system such as in the United States. By contrast, the head of government in a parlia- * Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University. A.B., Harvard College; . Phil., Oxford University; .D., Harvard Law School. Pro- fessor Sargentich served in the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Depart- meat of Justice before joining The American University law faculty. 1. This topic is commonly referred to as involving the "horizontal" division of powers at the national government level, as opposed to the "vertical" division of powers between national and subnational governments. 2. See PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERMENT 2-5, 31-47 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992) (discussing the differences between the presidential and parliamen- tary systems by comparing the methods of selecting and removing the head of gov- ernment). 579 580 AM. UJ. INT'L L & POLY [VCOL.[ 8:579 mentary system-often called the prime minister or premier-is selected by the legislature. This process of selection can involve actual election by members of parliament or selection by the majority party, or a coali- tion of parties, followed by appointment by a head of state. The crucial point is that the head of government in a parliamentary system is cho- sen by members of the national legislature. For this reason, in a parlia- mentary system there is no true separation of powers between the legis- lature and the executive, at least in the sense in which there is in a presidential system. In the latter, the president has his or her own elec- toral base, and thus the president is separate from the legislature. In addition, in a presidential system the head of government is elected for a fixed term of office. For example, in the United States the president's term of office is for four years. In normal circumstances, the president cannot be removed during the term of office except by a spe- cially prescribed, politically exceptional process of impeachment. Under the United States Constitution, impeachment can occur only when the House of Representatives votes to impeach a president for "high crimes and misdemeanors" and the Senate votes to convict the president of such dereliction. It has been established that the impeachment of a presi- dent cannot occur simply as a result of political disagreement between the branches of government? By contrast, in a parliamentary system the head of government and the ministers of state depend for their continuation in office on the confidence of the legislature. The executive officials can be removed from office as a result of a no-confidence vote by the legislature, and such a vote can be premised on mere political disagreement with the government. Moreover, a prime minister depends either on the support of his or her party if it has a majority in the legislature, or on the sup- port of a coalition of parties if it has been necessary to develop a coali- tion to form a government. These different methods of selecting and removing the head of gov- ernment have been widely seen to support certain basic distinctions between the two systems of government. In particular, the parliamentary system involves a certain fusion between the legislative and executive branches of government." Also, the supremacy of parliament is often 3. See WHLLAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS (1992) (examining the im- peachment trials of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in the early 1800s and President Andrew Johnson in the 1860s, neither of whom was ultimately impeached). 4. See DOUGLAS V. VERNEY, THE ANALYSiS OF POLMCAL SYSTEMS (1979), excerpted as Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government, reprinted in 1993] MODELS OF GOVERNMENT 581 viewed as characteristic of the parliamentary system. After all, if the parliament can select and remove the head of government, it would seem to follow as a logical matter that parliament is supreme. However, this latter expectation is not always borne out in reality. The real power of the parliament versus the head of government will depend on a number of variables other than the formal constitutional structure. Two factors of tremendous significance include the nature of the parties in a particular state and the electoral system. For example, in Britain with its strong tradition of two dominant parties and a winner- take-all electoral system, there has tended to be majority support in parliament for the prime minister. The prime minister has become the dominant political authority in the nation, for party discipline and ma- jority rule have generally guaranteed that whatever the prime minister desires will in fact be enacted!5 In sharp contrast, in multi-party parlia- mentary systems, there often have been weak governments with very little stability or strength. Classic examples of such governments include Italy as well as France during the Third and Fourth Republics. Accordingly, one cannot make determinate conclusions about the relative power of the executive or legislative branches simply on the basis of a nation's formal type of governmental system. Once again, key PARtiENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMT, supra note 2, at 31, 33 (noting that "parliamentary government implies a certain fusion of the executive and legisla- tive functions .... "). 5. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Leave the Constitution Alone, excerpted in PARLIuAmENTARY VERsus PRESIDEIIAL GOvERNNtENT, supra note 2, at 90-94 (dis- cussing the role of the prime minister). As Schlesinger wrote: Parliament's superiority over Congress in delivering whatever the executive requests is a function of weakness, not of strength .... Thus, the prime minister appoints people to office without worrying about par- liamentary confirmation, concludes treaties without worrying about parliamentary ratification, declares war without worrying about parliamentary authorization, withholds information without worrying about parliamentary subpoenas, is rela- tively safe from parliamentary investigation and in many respects has inherited the authority that once belonged to absolute monarchy. Id. at 91. These observations about the British system are meant to draw sharp contrasts with the situation in the United States. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Centrality of Political Culture, J. DEMOCRACY, Fall 1990, at 80-83, reprinted in PARIUA.tENTARY VERSUS PRESIDmENTIAL GOVERNMENr, supra note 2, at 208 (noting that "much of the literature wrongly assumes . that a president is inherently stronger than a prime minister" and that "[a] prime minister with a majority of parliament behind him has much more authority than an American president"). 582 AM. UJ.INT'L L & POL'Y [VOL. 8:579 empirical phenomena like a government's basic stability will depend on a number of political factors in addition to the constitutional arrange- ment that has been chosen. II. OVERGENERALIZATIONS ABOUT THE MODELS OF GOVERNMENT Discussions of presidential and parliamentary models frequently in- clude generalizations that need to be qualified in ways in which they often are not. Partly, this is a result of focusing single-mindedly on constitutional structure, which can only partially explain any given polit- ical system. In addition, one should bear in mind that the literature on parliamentary and presidential governments has become a battleground for advocates of different constitutional
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