While advocates of vigilante groups have groups of vigilante advocates While Faso. in Burkina of violence perpetrators main the have become homeland’ of the defence for the ‘volunteers sanctioned state- new and the rougas the dozos, the koglweogos, The initiatives. security of informal issue the on a spotlight have put koglweogos of the expansion and emergence the Faso, in Burkina phenomenon anew not is vigilantism Although initiatives. security state non- increasing and insurgency jihadi of growing pressures twin amid the votes their casting be will Burkinabe the year this Faso, in Burkina common been never has violence electoral largescale assembly.national Although of 127 the and the members president next the elect to polls the to go will Burkinabe the 2020, November 22 On Background antithetical to the rule of law. rule the to antithetical as (re)-emergence their see simply opponents their structures, security formal into incorporation for their called violence but also could pose a threat to the country’s nascent democracy. nascent country’s the to athreat pose could also but violence of electoral seeds the carries only not it as problem vigilante simmering country’s the with deal properly should class political Burkinabe The hinterlands. in the vigilantes by wielded control social and influence political growing and the state Burkinabe of the capacity eroding in light of the –particularly reduced be could risks such in which ways and suggests groups vigilante by violence election-related of risks the scrutinises brief policy This rougas. and the dozos the koglweogos, the as such groups self-defence and community-based groups armed both by activity elections. and legislative presidential joint hold will Faso Burkina 2020, November 22 On groups in the 2020 elections 2020 in the groups over polls? the Burkina Faso: Casting ashadow MAY 2020 The Burkinabe will cast their votes amid the twin pressures of increasing of increasing pressures twin amid the votes their cast will Burkinabe The The role of vigilante role The 2 1 this Beyond influence. state’s the under them keep to attempts government’s central and structures security local independent up as set to willingness their between of politics’, ‘dirt the from themselves distance to sought frequently have vigilantes While control. state (relative) under activities vigilante keep to institutions official to resort to hesitate not does but areas’ in remote enforcement of law form a‘cheap as vigilantism and views tolerates It groups. self-defence with relationship collaborative an unofficial favoured has in Ouagadougou government central the debate, public ongoing the Beyond Faso’, Burkina in movements self-defense Koglweogos and Dozos the of study acomparative politics: Violence Anthropological Perspectives on Justice and Hagberg, S. (2019) ‘Performing tradition while doing doing while tradition ‘Performing (2019) S. Hagberg, (2007) A. Sen, D. and Pratten, African Studies Review Studies African . Hurst. London, 2 there is a tension atension is there 62, no. 1: 173–93. no. 62, Global Vigilantes: 1

Wendyam Hervé Lankoandé CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

tension, the emergence and expansion of were to be indecisive, political entrepreneurs these irregular local forces keeps out of sight might be tempted to use other means, another looming threat to Burkina Faso’s including violence, to influence the contest. emergent democracy: political vigilantism and the associated destruction of properties, This year, elections take place in a context gross human rights violations and loss of the state’s weakening administrative of lives. capacity as well as the erosion of social cohesion.4 The ongoing insurgency has This policy brief aims to assess the risks seriously exposed deficiencies in the of election-related violence by vigilante government’s capacity and resilience. groups. As the central government in Despite ongoing counter-insurgency Ouagadougou seems to be overwhelmed operations and the development projects by the ongoing rural insurgency, vigilante initiated in 2017, the central government has groups have popped up and have been largely been unable to improve security nor acting as surrogates in the provision of has it effectively re-deployed services in areas everyday security in rural areas. These where state presence has been nominal – and groups can constitute a force for good, as the chances of doing either of those before they can help to contain violence and extend November are slim. Worse still, civilians the reach of the state in peripheral zones have fled their municipalities as a result of often untouched by national affairs. However, the mounting and indiscriminate violence in fragile settings like Burkina Faso, these in Burkina Faso’s centre-north, northern groups are not immune from partisan politics and eastern provinces. The two major and can easily morph into uncontrollable plans devised by the independent electoral militias. This brief scrutinises the rising commission to allow internally displaced political influence of vigilante groups, and the persons to cast their votes clearly indicate that (destabilising) role they are likely to play in the upcoming elections will not be national in the upcoming general elections. Accordingly, scope; some areas in eastern and northern I will suggest ways in which Burkinabe Burkina Faso may be excluded, which could stakeholders and their international result in electoral disputes. Excluding a counterparts can minimise and avert risks of municipality from the voting process means election-related violence by vigilante groups. depriving a party of its stronghold – hence the necessity of finding a consensus before redefining the electoral map. On Burkina Faso’s electoral process Moreover, the current security landscape does not contribute to dissipating risks of election- related violence. Following the ousting of In Burkina Faso, the president is elected Compaore’s regime and the loss of the state by absolute majority popular vote in two monopoly over peacekeeping in under-policed rounds (if needed). Members of the rural areas, alternative security arrangements national assembly are directly elected have (re)-emerged. Apart from the dozos,5 to a five-year term under a proportional who have prevailed in western Burkina Faso, representation system. In the 2015 legislative elections, the ruling party won just 55 of the 127 seats and had to form a coalition in order to rule. Of the 99 parties that had 4 Hervé Lankaonde, W. (2020) Burkina Faso’s rocky fought the contest, 14 managed to win road to democratic consolidation. CRU Policy Brief. seats. Patronage networks still remain a The Hague: Clingendael Institute. Available at: core feature of politics in Burkina Faso.3 https://www.clingendael.org/publication/burkina- In a close race, if the result of the election fasos-rocky-road-democratic-consolidation. 5 The Dozo are a transnational brotherhood of traditional hunters living in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Senegal 3 Kouléga, J.N. (2013) Le Burkina Faso de 1991 à and Sierra Leone. Beyond their hunter-gatherer, nos jours: entre stabilité politique et illusionnisme herbalist or diviner identity, over the last decades démocratique. Science politique. Université Dozo have also come to assume a security role in Montesquieu – Bordeaux IV. some rural areas.

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the koglweogo self-defence movement, Two sides of the same coin which has emerged over recent years, mainly operates in the eastern, central and northern Vigilantism and party politics are intertwined provinces. Acting simultaneously as police in Burkina Faso. Even if vigilantes have and judges, the koglweogos have incurred portrayed themselves as apolitical, it should the wrath of law professionals and human be emphasised that such portrayals co-exist rights organisations. In municipalities where with their entanglement in national political they have taken hold, another vigilante group processes.8 Although the loyalty of vigilante known as the rougas, and dominated by the groups towards the political class fluctuates, Fulani ethnic group, has emerged in eastern most leaders of these groups have often and northern Burkina Faso to counter allied themselves with strong men in central koglweogo activities by dealing specifically government. Under Compaore’s rule, these with cattle theft and extorsion that groups were part of a (informal) network pastoralist communities often experience. on which government relied to neutralise Vigilante groups are not only growing but rivals and maintain a semblance of peace also characterised by rivalries that have and cohesion in rural areas. Until October occasionally proved deadly in some areas.6 2014, most vigilante leaders had supported the then-ruling Congrès pour la Démocratie Although it is the increasing crime and et le Progrès (CDP). With the collapse of banditry in the hinterlands that has pushed the CDP, they switched their allegiance to local communities to take the law into Roch Marc Christian Kaboré’s Mouvement their own hands, the (re)-emergence du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP). This of vigilantism also remains tied to the proximity has allowed them to make the most expanding security industry. Groups like the of material benefits coming from the ruling koglweogos mostly live on fines imposed on administration’s entourage and the private thieves that they capture while conducting sector.9 In addition to securing the loyalty of their operations. Most of the vigilante groups the dozos who, for a while, were part of the have also been privatising their services.7 CDP’s network, the current ruling party has For instance, with the retreat of the state also allowed the expansion of koglweogos as in some mining sites, it is not uncommon a way to counter the activities of the former. to see the dozos or the koglweogos being employed as security forces in those areas Despite the documented human rights in exchange for monetary benefits. As some violations perpetrated by some vigilantes, analysts have highlighted, the processes of most political parties have refrained from institutionalisation and bureaucratisation calling for their dissolution – at least which some vigilante groups have embarked publicly. These groups have managed to upon requires substantial finance, forcing build a strong social base in rural areas and them to resort to donations from wealthy could serve as reliable powerbrokers for traders and to align themselves with political actors. It should be recalled that powerful local elites to benefit from existing when the debate about the legality of the patronage networks. koglweogos was making headlines in the newspapers in 2016, with some segments of the judiciary and the civil society calling for its suppression, the then-Minister of Security Simon Compaore and current chairman of 6 Dofini, R. (2018) Commune de Karangasso- the ruling party discarded such an option. Vigué: Après le drame, l’heure est aux discours d’apaisement. Lefaso.net, 15 September. Available at https://bit.ly/2Nhazx6 [Last accessed 26 April 2020] 7 Leclercq, S. and Matagne, G. (2020) ‘“With or 8 Hagberg, S. (2019) ‘Performing tradition while doing Without You”: the governance of (local) security politics: a comparative study of the Dozos and and the Koglweogo movement in Burkina Faso’, Koglweogos self-defense movements in Burkina Stability: International Journal of Security and Faso’, op. cit. Development, 9(1), p.4. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/ 9 International Crisis Group (2020) ‘Burkina Faso: sta.716. stopping the spiral of violence’, Africa Report N°287.

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Instead, stressing the limited power of the yet officially communicated on the issue. state, he favoured a strict state monitoring Vigilantes in general, and more specifically of vigilante activities. Despite occasionally the koglweogos, enjoy widespread support taking a hard stance on these groups, in the ruling party’s electoral strongholds Simon Compaore managed to cultivate a and this puts the government in a delicate pragmatic and cordial relationship with situation when they commit abuses and the group, hence his nickname ‘father largescale massacres, as they did in Yirgou, of the koglweogos’. Beyond the case of Arbinda and Barga. Burkina Faso’s electoral koglweogos, other senior political actors map does not indicate any specific area of from the former ruling party, namely the CDP, contention, but given the current volatile have strong connections with the dozos.10 security landscape, electoral disputes will Far from constituting an autonomous entity, revolve around access to constituencies in vigilante groups should be viewed as the northern and eastern Burkina Faso. In some instruments of elite power pacts. of these municipalities, access to electoral constituencies will depend on the scope This is not a new development. The and strength of each politician’s network. central government in Ouagadougou has Within the political class, there are some always ruled over its hinterlands through a concerns that vigilantes could be exploited patchwork of informal institutions, namely by the hardline wing of the ruling party to traditional authorities. To operate and secure electoral gains.11 This could push thrive in a given locality, vigilante groups other parties from the political opposition to need the backing of traditional rulers and mobilise the rivals of the koglweogos in the notables. While the dozos remain a highly Great West, namely the dozos. decentralised institution, the koglweogos are a hierarchical organisation strongly linked Vigilante groups could fan the flames of to the traditional chieftaincy institution. electoral disputes and violence. As local For instance, in some areas, it is common for governance actors, vigilante groups the village chief to also be the local leader contribute to ensuring social control and of the koglweogos. Where their actions could be seen by the political class as are supported by traditional rulers, the reliable power brokers to be mobilised in koglweogos have been able to consolidate local communities. By taking on the mantle their legitimacy, benefit from patronage of foot soldiers for political parties, vigilantes resources and emerge as critical governance are likely to disrupt the electoral process, actors in controlling or limiting violence. for example through voter suppression and Not losing sight of the crucial role of the intimidation in some districts. Although ‘crowned heads’ (i.e. traditional rulers) in largescale electoral violence has not local and national politics in Burkina Faso, very often occurred in Burkina Faso, it politicians will manoeuvre to get their should be remembered that the 2016 local backing and, indirectly, that of vigilante elections resulted in a bloodbath in some groups to augment their chances of ruling. municipalities, leading to postponement of the election. Vigilantes were not at the forefront of that deadly episode but with The role of vigilantes in the their increasing political influence at local electoral process level, politicians might not go shy from using their services if violence were to be used as an electoral strategy in November 2020. Vigilante groups are among actors that will be significant in the upcoming election. Fundamentally, vigilante security is How they will contribute and what role exclusionary and tends to identify certain they will play remain the Gordian knot to segments of society as undesirable. untie, as the Burkinabe government has not Members of vigilante groups often share the

10 Hagberg, S. (2019), op.cit. 11 International Crisis Group (2020) op cit.

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same ethnic or political identity as well the crime, and lauded at the time as a viable same collective interests. In the 2015 general answer to instability, has slowly been elections there were some attempts by morphing into identity-based vigilantism politicians to instrumentalise ethnicity and with the tragedies associated with it. religion for electoral purposes. But these attempts did not thrive. However, this time, As the country heads towards the the eroding social cohesion could contribute November general elections, the political to resurrecting ethno-regional cleavages and class should take Burkina Faso’s vigilante create a favourable soil for identity politics. problem seriously. Disbanding vigilante Despite the heterogeneity that characterises groups, as some political commentators them, the koglweogos are viewed by other have suggested, could backfire. Worse, local self-defence groups, namely the it could trigger a rural popular uprising dozos, as contributing to expansion of the given vigilantes’ embeddedness within hegemony of the Mossi that represents local communities and the legitimacy they almost 50% of the population.12 Therefore, enjoy in rural areas. Protests linked to the if vigilantes were to align themselves with arrest of one of the koglweogos leaders political entrepreneurs during the campaign, in the city of Boulsa in the framework of this would give an ethnic dimension to the the Yirgou massacre, gives an advance process in a country where ethnicity does taste of what could happen should this not fundamentally define voting patterns. group be dissolved. Instead of dissolving This will leave no room for dissenting voices them, the ruling coalition and the political and opinions in ethnically mixed villages opposition should open discussions on where vigilantes’ electoral preference and vigilante groups, and both should pledge that of local communities are not necessarily not to resort to such actors for electoral congruent. Whatever happens, politicians purposes. This clause should be part of a should bear in mind that if vigilantism can general code of conduct for political parties contribute to electoral victories, it can also with strong penalties for the perpetration pave the way to defeats and even undermine of electoral violence. In this regard, the the country’s nascent democracy. international community could exercise coercive diplomacy through the Burkinabe political class. Conclusion With less than seven months until the This year’s national elections take place in elections, central government has no a context marked by the proliferation and more time to initiate reforms. It must expansion of vigilante groups, namely the rather invest its efforts in promoting a dozos, koglweogos and rougas. Already peaceful climate. From this perspective, coping with a patchwork of malevolent the government should initiate a dialogue non-state armed actors, vigilante groups gathering electoral stakeholders such as constitute another problem for the current political parties, civil society organisations, administration. At times, vigilante groups the defence and security forces, traditional have contributed to enhancing security rulers as well as self-defence groups to and undertaking dispute resolution in create an agreement on the prevailing rules their communities. At other times, they of the game. Such a dialogue could serve as have created a security dilemma and the basis for initiating a mediation process contributed to exacerbating tensions to solve local conflicts, which have been between communities in rural areas. exacerbated by community-based armed In fact, what began as the protection of groups. Vigilante groups have thrived on local communities against banditry and local conflicts in eastern and northern Burkina Faso and resolving most of those before the elections could prove to be beneficial for the country. Additionally, civil society organisations should undertake civic education activities in the aforementioned 12 Hagberg, S. (2019) op.cit. administrative regions.

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Finally, it should be highlighted that participation in the implementation of Burkina Faso’s vigilante issue will persist community policing. Placing vigilantes beyond November’s general elections. under the responsibility of the national Rather than giving free rein to these police would constitute a big gain in groups as the current state of affairs resolving the issue. Assuming that seems to reveal, the next administration vigilante groups will not go away once should consider absorbing these groups the threat justifying their existence is over, into state institutions. There has been could be a deadly mistake. These groups ongoing debate about implementing have already left a long-term legacy the 2016 law on neighbourhood police, that could turn sour for Burkina Faso’s which defines the modalities of citizen democratic experiment.

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About the author

Wendyam Hervé Lankoandé is a research consultant at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). Prior to re-joining IPSS, he worked in research and analytical capacity for a wide range of organisations including Clingendael, Swisspeace, Interpeace and the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security. Wendyam holds a BA in European and International Studies from Sorbonne Nouvelle and a MA in Strategic Studies from Paris 13 University. His work has largely focused on issues pertaining to peacebuilding, governance and nation building in West Africa, with a particular interest in their interrelation and connection to state fragility.

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