Strengthening Democracy Promotion: Understanding Conceptions of Democracy and Their Effects Among Arab Publics

The Dubai Initiative

Policy Brief STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR EFFECTS AMONG ARAB PUBLICS

Michael Robbins

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR EFFECTS AMONG ARAB PUBLICS

Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief

Michael Robbins Research Fellow, Dubai Initiative Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School

August 2010 2 | Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 3

SUMMARY

This policy brief argues that Arab citizens tend to subscribe to the social democratic tradition, understanding democracy as being more related to economic outcomes, rather than the classic tradition of liberal democracy in America. Second, it demonstrates that, on the individual level, there are important differences in perceptions of existing regimes’ levels of democracy. As a result, increasing the likelihood of the success of its democracy promotion efforts requires U.S. administration leaders to consider these differences, recognizing that for many Arab citizens there is more to democratic development than simply holding free and fair elections.

Introduction

On average, consolidated democracies are more stable and richer than authoritarian countries, in addition to providing greater civil rights to their citizens. As a result, it is not surprising that surveys demonstrate that support for democracy is over eighty percent in most non-democratic Arab countries (see Table 1) for which data are available. In light of these numbers and the fact that liberal democracy was said to represent the “end of history”,1 some policymakers believed that Arab countries could be transformed into democratic societies simply if an opening was created, an ideology that helped pave the way for the invasion of Iraq.2

Table 1. Percentage of respondents who support or oppose democracy

Algeria Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Palestine Yemen Support 82.9 85.8 88.4 91.9 91.8 82.6 78.1 Oppose 17.1 14.2 11.6 8.1 8.2 17.4 21.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Arab Barometer 2006/7

In the aftermath of the invasion, it remains unclear whether democracy will take root in Iraq. On balance, the region may have moved further away from democracy in recent years.3 The costs, both human and monetary, of Iraq and the uncertainty that it will be able to institutionalize its incipient democratic developments combined with the election of Hamas in free and fair elections in the West Bank and Gaza have caused some to question the wisdom of promoting democracy in this region.4

Yet, opinion polls show that stated support for democracy has not significantly declined across most Arab countries.5 However, within the Arab world, many insist that, when saying they support democracy, they are referring to “Arab” rather than “Western” STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 3

democracy. While details of what exactly is meant by this claim are often not fully speci- fied, there is evidence to suggest that when Arab citizens speak about “democracy,” they are not necessarily envisioning a system identical to what exists in many Western countries.6

If the Obama administration is to successfully further democracy in the Arab world, as was stated in the president’s speech in Cairo on June 4, 2009, then it is necessary to better understand two related phenomena. First, what do Arab citizens mean when they state that they are supportive of democracy? Second, how do these beliefs affect citizens’ understandings of the need for democratic reform within their societies?

Differing Conceptions of Democracy

Building a durable democracy is more than simply creating the formal institutions that are necessary to ensure that government reflects the will of the people; public opinion must also have reached a consensus that democracy is the best system of governance as well as regarding the manner in which the system will operate. Some analysts have likened the institutions of democracy to a computer’s hardware, while the values of the citizenry are akin to the software.7 Unless both systems are working properly, the machine does not function effectively.

When using terms such as democracy and democratization, policymakers in the U.S. and elsewhere generally seek to export the Western tradition of democratic governance. This traditional liberal conception of representative democracy places a focus on the ability of citizens to choose their elected officials in regular elections. Beyond this basic concept of citizen choice, there is also a strong tradition of freedom of speech and the ability to criticize those in power. While the product of this form of government has resulted in the rise of the welfare state in most Western societies, economic outcomes are generally less prominent if at all present in a strict definition of liberal democracy.

Within the Arab world, it is clear that democracy is understood in somewhat different terms. In fact, evidence from the Arab Barometer — a public opinion survey con- ducted in seven Arab societies in 2006 and 2007 — demonstrates that, in some countries, only a minority of respondents believe that either of these conceptions is the primary characteristic associated with democratic governance.

In one question, respondents were asked to identify the characteristic that they most associate with the word democracy from the following list of four items:

1) the opportunity to change the government through elections 2) the freedom to criticize the government or those in power 4 | Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 5

3) A small income gap between rich and poor 4) the provision of basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter for everyone

The results are shown in Table 2:8

Table 2. The concept respondents most associate with the word democracy

Algeria Jordan Lebanon Palestine Elections 27.6% 19.6% 33.8% 34.0% Criticize 21.6% 18.5% 15.7% 24.2% Gap 29.8% 29.6% 21.1% 12.5% Necessities 20.9% 32.3% 29.4% 29.4% Source: Arab Barometer 2006-07

As can be seen, a slight majority of respondents in both Algeria and Lebanon believe that the most important element of democracy is economic in nature. In the case of Jordan, nearly sixty-two percent of respondents believe that the primary characteristic of a democracy is either economic equality or the provision of basic necessities. Among Palestinians, over forty percent of respondents cited an economic characteristic.

Considering this concept of democracy, it is understandable why ordinary citizens tend to rate Arab countries as being more democratic than most academics do. Although the Freedom House ratings for 2006 and 20079 classify no country in the Arab world as being “free,” with only six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Ye- men) being “partly free,”10 on average Arab citizens believe that the level of democracy in the region is higher. In fact, when respondents to the Arab Barometer survey were asked to rate the level of democracy in their own country11 on a scale of one (complete dicta- torship) to ten (complete democracy), the average rating in four of the seven countries included was over five (see Table 3).

Table 3. Comparison of democratic rating

Algeria Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Palestine Yemen Arab Barometer 4.8 6.6 5.9 4.1 5.1 5.4 4.3 Rating (1-10) Partly Free/ Freedom Not Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free House Rating Not Free Sources: Arab Barometer and Freedom House STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 5

Further analysis reveals some evidence suggesting that differences in conceptions of democracy, based on economic or political definitions, affect how ordinary citizens- per ceive the level of democracy in their own societies. In the Arab Barometer, in addition to being asked what the most important characteristic of a democracy is, respondents were asked what they believed the second-most important characteristic to be. Respondents can be categorized into those who cited political characteristics for both, those who cited economic characteristics for both, and those who cited one of each. Table 4 presents a summary of the average democratic rating by respondents disaggregated by their conception of democracy in this manner.12

Table 4. Mean democratic rating of the regime by perception of the nature of democracy

Algeria Jordan Lebanon Palestine Both Economic 4.69 6.77 4.54 5.21 Political and 4.89 6.44 4.03 5.52 Economic Both Political 4.71 6.12 3.36 5.60 Average 4.85 6.55 4.08 5.44

First, both Jordan and Lebanon reveal a similar trend: individuals who believe that economic outcomes are the primary characteristics of democracy believe regimes to be more democratic than those who believe democracy is related to political outcomes. What is somewhat surprising about this is the fact that Jordan and Lebanon have numer- ous differences. First, Jordan has by far the highest democratic rating by respondents and Lebanon the lowest of the seven societies surveyed by the Arab Barometer. Second,L ebanon has a tradition of democratic governance under Western definitions while Jordan does not.13 Yet, despite these differences, a majority in each country believes that democracy is more related to economic characteristics than political characteristics, and that the regime is more democratic, on average, than the rest of society.

In the case of the Palestinian Territories, the trend is actually the opposite. Likely, this is due to the fact that the survey was taken less than six months after the parliamen- tary elections of January 2006, which, by most accounts, were free and fair.14 Given this context, it is logical that respondents who define democracy in political terms would be more likely to rate the regime as being democratic. Yet, given the rarity of this type of election in the Arab world, the Palestinian Territories likely represent a significant outlier in this respect.

In Algeria, this disaggregation reveals no discernable trend, perhaps due to the fact that Algeria has the highest unemployment rate in the Arab world which, at nearly thirty percent, is more than twice the rate in nearly all other Arab countries.15 It is there- 6 | Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 7

fore possible that, because Algeria represents an outlier in this regard, Algerians who define democracy in economic terms believe that the regime is democratic at the same level as those who define it in political terms.

However, this finding from Jordan andL ebanon could help shed light on why public pressure for political reform seems limited at times. Over the last forty years, the Arab world has had some remarkable economic accomplishments. While economic growth has generally been limited during this period,16 the Arab world has gone from having one of the greatest rates of income inequality in any world region in 1970 to one of the lowest today.17 Additionally, only one Arab country (Yemen) is classified as a low-income country with a gross national income per capita of $975 or less.18

Therefore, individuals who define democracy primarily in terms of economic equality likely view the track record of Arab regimes more favorably. Indeed, in multiple countries these individuals tend to rate regimes as being more democratic compared to those who conceive of democracy in primarily political terms. Given that the majority of respondents in most countries surveyed view democracy in economic terms, this lack of public pressure for reform is unsurprising.

Policy Recommendations

While some citizens in the Arab world are making calls for democratic governance in the traditional liberal sense, many of their fellow countrymen and women appear to be hoping for the creation of a more equal society that provides economically for all citizens. Additionally, the fact that the majority of citizens in most Arab countries surveyed think democracy is primarily associated with economic outcomes could help explain why there have not been greater public pressure for political reforms.

U.S. efforts to promote democratization must be sensitive to this call, perhaps placing a greater emphasis on economic rather than simply political benefits. However, as noted at the outset, empirical evidence suggests that democracies tend to be both wealthier19 and have less inequality20 than authoritarian states. Thus, becoming more democratic would likely benefit both those who understand democracy in political terms and those who understand it in economic ones.

While American democratic traditions place less emphasis on economic equality compared to some European democracies, it appears that if stable democracy were to take hold in the Arab world, citizens would more likely demand a system that reflects the social democratic model whereby economic equality becomes entrenched in the social contract. As a result, efforts at democracy promotion should take into account the broader definition of democracy among Arab publics, and therefore emphasize reforms STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION | 7

promoting economic equality, in addition to calls for political reform.L inking the two con- cepts together is likely to build a broader coalition that might place greater pressure on governments to pursue both political and economic reforms.

U.S. democratization efforts should also seek to emphasize that political reform generally leads to improved economic outcomes and lower inequality. Thus, even those who believe that greater economic equality is associated with democracy should take a greater interest in political reform. In sum, democracy promotion efforts should seek to demonstrate that supporters of both “economic” and “political” democracy can realize their goals through a common system.

ENDNOTES

1 Fukuyama 1992. 2 Boix 2006, 3. 3 Freedom House, 2006; Freedom House 2010. 4 CFR 2008. 5 Tessler and Jamal 2008. 6 Sadiki 2004. 7 Rose et al., 1998. 8 This item was not asked in Kuwait and Morocco. In the case of Yemen, a different coding scheme was used and, as a result, it is not included. 9 These years are used because they correspond to the dates the Arab Barometer survey was taken. 10 Freedom House 2006 and 2007. 11 While some might argue that due to fear of oppression by the regime these ratings are bi- ased, it is worth noting that in six of the seven cases the mean democratic rating exceeded the mean satisfaction rating with the regime. In the seventh (Palestine), regime satisfaction was higher by a mere 0.024. While it is possible that fear of the regime would bias these results upward, one would expect this effect to be greater for satisfaction with the regime. Given that regime satisfaction is significantly lower in all but one case, it seems unlikely that fear of the regime is overly biasing the results for democratic rating. 12 As noted above, these two questions were only asked in five of the seven societies while the coding scheme in Yemen differed. Therefore, only four cases could be used for this analysis. 13 Hudson 1968; Lucas 2005. 14 Pina 2006, 10. 15 World Bank 2004, 72. 16 World Bank 2004. 17 Adams and Page 2001. 18 CIA 2010. 19 Lipset 1959. 20 Boix 2003. 8 | Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief

REFERENCES

Adams, Richard H Jr. and John Page. 2001. “Holding the Line: Poverty Reduction in the Middle East and North Africa, 1970-2000. Washington, DC: World Bank. Arab Barometer. 2006/7. Available at: http://www.arabbarometer.org. Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. “The Roots of Democracy.” Policy Review 135 (February/March 2006), 3-21. Central Intelligence Agency. 2010. World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/li- brary/publications/the-world-factbook/. Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. “The Candidates on Democracy Promotion in the Arab World.” Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/14754/candidates_on_democ- racy_promotion_in_the_arab_world.html. Freedom House. 2006. Freedom in the World. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Freedom House. 2007. Freedom in the World. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Freedom House. 2010. Freedom in the World. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Hudson, Michael. 1968. The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon. New York: Random House. Lucas, Russell. 2005. Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan. Albany: State Uni- versity of New York Press. Pina, Aaron. 2006. “PalestinianE lections.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Regimes. Baltimore: Johns HopkinsU niversity Press. Sadiki, Larbi. 2004. The Search for Arab Democray. New York: Columbia University Press. Tessler, Mark and Amaney Jamal. 2008 “Attitudes in the Arab World.” Journal of Democ- racy 19:1 (January), 97-110. World Bank. 2004. Unlocking the Employment Potential: Toward a new social contract. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

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