Freedom House policy brief

July 2018

Dealing with the New Turkey: Recommendations for US Policy after the Elections Nate Schenkkan Director for Special Research, Freedom House

Source: Kayhan Ozer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

The victory of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the June elections has cemented the long-term trend of democratic decline and authoritarian con- solidation in Turkey. Although the two-year state of emergency was lifted on July 19, the vast purge of the public sector, civil society, and the media that the state of emergency facilitated will not be reversed, and many of the most restrictive emergency measures are expected to be codified into law. President Erdoğan is already using his expansive new constitutional powers to restructure the state around his office. This authoritarian consolidation has coincided with, and contributed to, a sharp divergence from Turkey’s traditional strategic alignment with the United States. This divergence seems to be pre- mised on the assumption that Turkey needs to hedge against a collapsing regional or even interna- tional order. With the elections now completed, the United States should take this opportunity to reexamine its Turkey policy in its own right. The US should maintain its goal of keeping Turkey in “the West,” and reevaluate its Syria policies with an eye to their consequences for the relationship with Turkey. But it must prepare for the possibility that Turkey under Erdoğan is pursuing a durable strategic realignment, in part by establishing a sliding scale of consequences that will fall into place if Ankara continues down its current path. The United States should draw redlines around its priorities: protecting US citizens, upholding the rule of law, and opposing a closer military relationship between Turkey and Russia. Washington has already begun to lay down these redlines through sanctions and other legislation. It should complement such efforts by investing in long-term support for Turkish civil society, independent journalism, and expert exchanges for Turkish citizens inside and outside the country. The “New Turkey” is just beginning, and the United States should prepare to deal with it for the in- definite future. 2 policybrief ernment without any parliamentary confirmation process, chairs the National Security Council, and issues and Council, Security National the chairs confirmationparliamentary anyprocess, without ernment confidence,no or even questions pose ministers. to As president, Erdoğan the heads and names gov both of vote a hold government, the form to ability the semiconsultative body, of a stripped to parliament the reduced amendments constitutional The republic. parliamentary a longer importantly,no TurkeyMore is possibility isgone. able to check some of Erdoğan’s consolidation. With the AKP-MHP coalition be firmly in would control, parliament even opposition-led that slim an that vote the to prior thinking wishful some was There elections. these followingpowers of division a longer no Turkishsociety,however,is of there pluralism the Despite his holdonpower really is. contingent how conditions—indicates distorted these under Erdoğan—even against voted again country ofthe half almost that The fact association. and of assembly freedoms for environment a hostile flecting re arrests, and bans official to cuts electricity and roadblocks from obstructions, of variety a faced rallies coverage. Opposition campaign their in coalition his broadcasters,privatefavoredheavilyand Erdoğan all trolover a mediasector that wasalready cowed bystate interference. the stateof All channels, and nearly totalcon presidenthas Erdoğan,the supports companythat holding Demirören,the a togroup media Doğan of year this earlier sale the With crime. a of convicted being not and parliament of member a being despite 2016 November since held been has he where prison, from ran (HDP) Democratic Party Peoples’ democratic presidentialits left-wing the The of candidatesystem shambles. of and are in Kurdish-oriented The results have grim implications for democracy in Turkey. The country still has voting, but all other aspects in control through tactical cooperation withotherpartiesonspecificissues. comfortablyremain will it that majority a to AKP,enough the close with is basis party hoc ruling ad the an cooperatetoon decides only MHP the Evenif 49. MHP the and seats 295 taking AKP the with parliament, 600-seat in the amajority constitute easily to seats enough won (MHP) Party Action Nationalist the and presidency decisively in the first round, with the 52.59 percent. What won is more, Erdoğan the electoral vote, coalition of the the AKP into going confidence and energy relative opposition’s the However,despite one another. just signs of life, but signs of acommoneffort challengeto the president’s power rather than clashing with not showed parties opposition the which in era Erdoğan the of elections first the also were they result, a systemwere tocomeintoset forcea momentous air. the campaign lending elections, after the asuperpresidential as Perhaps to create 2017 in April passed amendments Constitutional blocs. multiparty large of legal a new framework that features simultaneous within parliamentary and presidential held votes and encourages first the formation the were They ways. several in unusual were 24 June of elections snap The Elections overview of July2016. attempt coup the after momentum new gained but 2014 in began that media the society, and civil tions, has taken on more sinister overtones as the president has directed a comprehensive purge of state institu Erdoğan’sself-createdin politicaldate mythology.symbolic Fora years, Erdoğanand and therepublic AKPTurkish have promised the a “New of Turkey,”founding the of a anniversaryterm that 100th the term 2023, a second in for run to able be will Erdoğan health, good in still is he Assuming role. semiconsultative a to reduced been has parliament the which in party,and his of head remain to allowed also is he while term, his first under a new superpresidential system that makes him head of state and head of five-year government a serve will Erdoğan Turkey’ssystem. political over control his consolidated has TayyipErdoğan Recep President 24, June on elections parliamentary and presidential simultaneous the in victories With Introduction - - - - policybrief 3 - - - - - In addition, new legislation being discussed by the parliament as of July 18 would put into law a number of a number law into put would 18 July of as parliament the by discussed being legislation new addition, In personnel state dismiss to power the of extension three-year a including features, emergency’s of state the without adequate due process protections, furtherrestrictions onfreedom of assembly, and expanded of over 1,400 associations and more than 175 media outlets, and theexpropriation of nearly 1,000 busi of emergency. state of the the expiration by $11 billion—will not be altered nesses worth major working his with president, the prevent to little is there lifted, now emergency of state the with Even constitutional new his testing already is Erdoğan actions. of sorts same the taking from parliament, the in ity as discussed above. of the state, the organs restructuring by powers As promised during the campaign, on July After 18 Erdoğan however. allowed purges, of round the a final after state only came of decision The expire. to emergency attempt that coup the since has force been in the elections, another 18,601 public servantswere fired by decree, bringing the total to at least 130,000 least at (İHOP), Platform Joint Rights Human Turkish the by monitoring to according addition, In 2016. since 2016. October since operations “antiterror” of part as detention pretrial in placed been have people 80,000 closure the as well arrests—as and dismissals These prison. in workers media and journalists 178 are There der the Defense Ministry. Although the lawmaking capacity der parliament’s is the Ministry. superiorconstitutionally toDefense the power president’s to issue decrees, there is little chance that it willoverhaul challenge of Erdoğan’s state functions. emergency of state the long live is dead, emergency of The state Even more important than the cabinet, the president’s first decrees over the last two weeks are a reminder a are weeks two last the over decrees first president’s the cabinet, the than important more Even that his executive pronouncements will give shapeto the entiresystem ofgovernment. Theseconsisting of hundreds of decrees, pages issuedby unilaterally the office, lay president’s out detail in the roles and responsibilities of dozens of newgovernment councils dependent on the presidency, give the president appointment powers for everything from high-ranking military officers to university rectors to the central bank forand president, basic entities, by instance restructure state placingStaff the General un military’s indicated by the appointment of the former chief of the military’s general staff, Hulusi Akar, as defense min defense as Akar, Hulusi staff, general military’s the of chief former the of appointment the by indicated military had already Turkey’s been largely ister. brought under civilian control through a series of political trials beginning in the has2000s; usedsince thethe Erdoğan ranks toopportunity coup itsattempt, purge again and promote his Turkey’s in chosen officers. minister Akar, who defense as wasserve to famously officer taken military active-duty hostagefirst duringthe is the cooperate, coup to attempt refused he when modern history. Mehmet Şimşek—who had attempted to stem Erdoğan’s worst economic instincts and reassure investors. economicworst instincts investors. andMehmet reassure Şimşek—who tohad stemattempted Erdoğan’s In Şimşek‘s place is son-in-law Erdoğan’s and former energy minister Berat Albayrak. While Albayrak has policycontinued Şimşek’s of promisingstructuralreforms, higher rates, and interest the independence of the central bank, these are statements hardly the credible. lira Already, Turkish and markets have Turkish assurances. government’s the do not believe investors that slide, suggesting their preelection resumed Another notable change in the new cabinet is the direct subordination of the militaryto the president, as party, and the president will dominate the judiciary and the media even more than before. more the judiciary even and the media will dominate president and the party, Turkey new the of government The new The first weeks of the system new revealedhave the ing extent his Erdoğan’s cabinet, of the president removed the personal last prominent technocrats—including Deputy control.Prime Minister In appoint decrees with the force of law. The parliament will follow the direction set by Erdoğan as head of the largest largest the of head as Erdoğan by set direction the follow will parliament The law. of force the with decrees powers allowing governors (who are appointed by Ankara) to control movement and residence in their ter- ritories.

The economy brief While Erdoğan is hastily putting in place the even more centralized state he promised, Turkey’s economy is reeling thanks to years of mismanagement at his behest. The government has long encouraged borrowing, including from foreign sources, to pump up national growth rates, which also had the effect of pouring money into the construction and real-estate sectors that Erdoğan favors. A downside to this pattern has been high inflation and a weakening lira, resulting in increased pressure to raise interest rates. policy

The president has consistently said that he thinks high interest rates cause high inflation, despite all evidence to the contrary. He has often commanded the central bank to keep interest rates low, but its slim measure of policy independence has allowed it to raise them at key moments, including before the elections when it looked like a run on the lira was building.

After years of stalling, Erdoğan is at a decision point: He can allow the central bank to do its job and continue to raise interest rates, which will cause a short-term but probably manageable slowdown, or he can insist that rates stay relatively low in order to bolster growth, which will push the reckoning further down the road but make it even worse when it comes. Whether they begin sooner or later, serious economic setbacks will play a major role in determining Turkey’s course in the coming years.

US-Turkey relations in tatters

The election outcome and the consolidation of a personalized, authoritarian system on its way to an econom- ic meltdown is black news for US-Turkey relations, which have already been in a downward spiral for some six years. In a hoarse victory speech to supporters on election night, Erdoğan made a point of saying that the plotters of the 2016 coup attempt had fled to America, and that the votes from America had therefore backed the opposition. Given his victory, and the strong performance of nationalist parties that are skeptical toward the United States, it is hard to see Erdoğan abandoning the anti-American rhetoric he has leaned on so heavily over the last several years. However, the rhetoric is only a sign of deeper rifts.

Although President Barack Obama embraced Erdoğan as a model democratic Muslim leader early in his first term, the two hardly spoke during the second term. The split opened over Middle East policies following the Arab Spring, widened over Turkish treatment of protesters and journalists, and, since the coup attempt of July 2016, exploded over Turkish accusations of official US complicity and Ankara’s alignment with Russia on a number of strategic issues—especially through the planned purchase from Russia of the S-400 air de- fense system. A series of incidents in which Turkish presidential bodyguards attacked protesters in the United States, and Turkish prosecutors imprisoned American citizens and diplomatic employees in Turkey, drove the relationship to new lows.

After 2013, the Obama administration had largely given up on Erdoğan, attempting to change his behavior by freezing him out diplomatically. The policy approach principally sought to defer addressing problems in the relationship and to focus instead on destroying the Islamic State (IS) militant group in Syria in partnership with the local Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG), even as the spillover from that policy increasingly alienated Turkey, which regards the YPG as an organic part of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist group. The Obama administration arrived at its decision to cooperate with the YPG for logi- cal reasons: IS was advancing rapidly across Syria and Iraq, and Turkey, which supported other Islamist rebel groups in Syria, had failed to show that any alternative force could confront the IS militants effectively. But the result was that from approximately mid-2014 through 2017, the United States’ Turkey policy was subordinate to its Syria policy.

Viewing the war in Syria through the narrow window of the fight against IS, and Turkey primarily as it was re- flected in that window, caused the Obama administration to disregard deep changes in Turkish foreign policy. In the years since the Arab Spring, Turkey’s approach appears increasingly premised on the assumption of a

4 policybrief 5 - - - - - As detailed above, decision-making about decision-making above, As detailed US plans for its military operations in the Middle East. A US withdrawal from northern Syria and shift away Syria northern in from andUS away its A theEast. shift plans military operations Middle USfor withdrawal from supporting the YPGwould provide an opportunityto reset security the of parameters the US-Turkey policy only the also is It countries. two the between problems major several of one defuse and relationship ship, depends on Ankara’s own approach toward the alliance. toward approach own ship, depends on Ankara’s There is an opportunity now for a long-overdue reexamination of the UnitedTurkey States’ policy in of Syria. lens the through principally than rather right, own its relationship. US-Turkey the affecting decisions policy in role outsized an played have IS on war the and Syria rejection of US in operations northerninto Syria in account determining must long-term be taken Turkey’s Keeping Turkey in “the West” is a reasonable goal, but the question is, at what cost to the West? Given the Given West? the to cost what at is, question the but goal, reasonable a is West” “the in Turkey Keeping deep changes in foreign policy Turkish over the last two years, it is not clear whether Ankara stillregards and or as if regional part it of sees a the collapsing alliance instead of its security, as the cornerstone NATO against? hedged to be risk a it or is posture, strategic Turkey’s of backbone the NATO Is order. international value as a partner Turkey’s to the United States, and the analysis ofcost-benefit in investing that partner Politically, there seems little reasonPolitically, not toErdoğan at take his word whenhe repeatedly claims to believe that is the behind him, to West conspiracies overthrow and then acts on by imprisoning those statements the of dismantling The Turkey. in missions diplomatic American of employees foreign and citizens American separation of powers has created a highly and personalized system that autocratic makes a deeper politi lies Turkey along cal the frontieralignment where with the United difficultStates to imagine. Strategically, and Russian influenceNATO meet. In the framework the has administration articulated, the countrymust from Russia. threat geopolitical thinking about the strategic role in a substantial play therefore was—indicates a lack of willingness to take even basic steps to restore normalcy to the relationship. normalcy to restore to basic steps even take a lack of willingness to was—indicates The Trump administration hasstated itsgoal askeepingTurkey “pointed towards aWestern future both politically as and Assistantstrategically,” Secretary of Statefor Europe and Eurasia A.Wess Mitchell said recently. Opportunities for the Trump administration and Congress administration the Trump for Opportunities The US government has been seeking to put the relationship back evidence onthat is Turkey better eager footing, to reciprocate. The butdecision thereon July 18 is little to continueto hold American tor pas Andrew Brunson—which should be as understood political, just as the initial decision to imprison him It will remain an occupying power in Syria for the foreseeable future. It has reached a rapprochement with a rapprochement It reached has future. the foreseeable for in Syria power an occupying It will remain proj energy strategic two refreshed or restarted influence, of sphere this over regime Assad the and Russia ects with Russian cooperation, and agreedto purchase theS-400 airsystem defense despite increasingly and American blunt warnings. NATO It has pursued its perceived opponents outside its including borders, by conductingrenditions from sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and it Europe. has Lastly, used various forms US taking and Europe to refugees send to threatening by including allies, its against blackmail diplomatic of chips. as bargaining hostage citizens and European the Islamic world as a whole, arguing that it was perfectly positioned to act as a pivotal power for adjoining for power pivotal a as act to positioned perfectly was it that arguing whole, a as world Islamic the regions and for Muslim republics globally in a time of democratic and capitalist ascendance. In the dark outlook is that instead vision, perched has on Turkey replaced the Davutoğlu’s edge of chaos, surrounded solutions. revisionist demand that threats terrorist and powers, hostile civil wars, by YPG. the off stave to order in Syria northwestern of districts border several occupied has Turkey end, this To Russia’s Russia’s occupation ofCrimea, and the EuropeanUnion’s institutional crises combined formto image an of a region sliding toward chaos. The 2015–16 wave of andterrorist attacksTurkey, in thecoup attempt, perspective. this pessimistic solidified put worldview optimistic the of image mirror a is anarchy against sheltering as Turkey of self-perception The Un office. in years his during Davutoğlu Ahmet minister prime and minister foreign AKP former by forward and even Europe, Southeastern of the Middle East, itself the rising force proclaimed Turkey der Davutoğlu, collapsing regional or even global order. The failures of the revolutions in Libya and Egypt, the war in Syria, Syria, war in the and Egypt, in Libya of the revolutions The failures global order. or even regional collapsing policybrief defenders and journalists. They communicate in deed and not just in word to Turkishwordto in justpolicymakers connot the and deed communicatedefendersin They journalists. and Iran systems, weapons Russian rights human persecution the of Turkish and of Americans, unwarranted the of detention violations, sanctions procurement the on redlines American reinforce could policies These • • • • • The following elements ofsuchanapproach are already underway oravailable for use: down itscurrent path. communication should specifically, this More consolidation. authoritarian its and employees, and citizens American of prisonment im its S-400, the of purchase its through realignmentstrategic apparent an pursuing of consequences the Turkey to communicate to continue must Washington Syria, on shift a such make to able is US the if Even or interests. shift toward the Turkish position available to the United States that does not infringe on core American values society groups working inTurkey andinexile. civil and journalism for funding provide benefits and citizens, that Turkish work governance and democracy conducting not of policy long-standing its drop should USAID addition, In projects. of kinds these for press rights. branch human should invest in of exchanges, educationprotection programs, and outreachand to the tolerance,law, Turkish public; Congress should of rule the to return a see to want who doned. to them for hard it combine made their efforts, andhas the repressiongroups they face hasthese made it difficultof to mobilize,diversity they should not the be aban While country. the taking is Erdoğan which in inconstituencies direction huge are there again, the Lastly, have shown Turkey oppose elections that the as lations, and to identify additionalactions that may be required. US-Turkey the in re on crisis adeeper of order relationship impact on the potential to attention in focus may understandably be reluctant to engage in this conversation in public, but for the withdrawal of the US military presence at Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey. The executive branch time when history seems to be moving at a faster pace. This should include reviewing and preparing options a at eventualities all for ready be must US Cyprus—the northern occupying after even member a remained Turkey. mind, in this With Turkey’s government doesnotwant it. continues.it if However, be not expected should and policies to cannot these restore the strategic if alliance realignmentdeeper a of sequences away from NATO—which whatis Ankara’s current trajectory achievewill Use the sanctions authority under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) ra goes aheadwiththepurchase oftheS-400 airdefense system from Russia. As approved in a Senate measure in mid-June 2018, block Turkey from obtaining F-35 fighter jets if Anka 2018 willpresent anotheropportunity. December in list Magnitsky Global next the of release expected the imposed, been yet have sanctions (P.L.114-328),Act Magnitsky Global throughthe individual no While means. other or legislation, special violations, especially rights be implemented human can sanctions These serious employees. and citizens American of unwarranted for detention the responsible officials against sanctions targeted Issue HalkBank. and US government the between negotiations of protracted subject the already are fines These tities. en by Iranian sanctions-busting of facilitation its for HalkBank state-owned against fines steep Impose ing dualcitizens) andlocal employees oftheUSmission to Turkey. (IFC) until the United States can confirm that Turkey is not arbitrarily detaining American citizens (includ Corporation International Finance the and (EBRD) Development Reconstructionfor and Bank European the for Turkey financing from oppose administration to the oblige 19, July on senators by proposed As firmed inJunethat such consequences hadbeenclearly con communicated to Mitchell Turkish officials. Secretary Assistant system. the provides that entity Russian sanctioned the from S-400 the purchase to chooses it if sanctions secondary harsh Turkeyunder place would(P.L.115-44), which The US should use a variety of instruments to sustain contacts with and support Turkishcitizens support and with contactssustain to instruments of variety a use should US The While the prospect of Turkey crashing out of NATO still seems improbable—this is a country that country a is improbable—this seems NATOstill of out Turkeycrashing of prospect the While the US needs to undertake a thorough reconsideration of its own strategic on own reliance reconsideration its thoroughundertake of toa needs US the establish a sliding scale of consequences that will fall into place if Turkey continues Congress should hold hearings The executive The ------Conclusion

There will be many debates over the coming months about the New Turkey and its significance. The most important question for the United States is whether Turkey’s major foreign policy shifts over the last several years—to embrace cooperation with Russia on several issues, to occupy part of northern Syria, and to threat- en its allies—represent a strategic change or tactical maneuvering. Turkey’s relations with the US and NATO have gone through decades of ups and downs; once tempers cool, this may prove to be yet another flare-up in a history filled with them. But especially at a time when geopolitical competition from Russia in the region is more overt and aggressive, the US must be open to the possibility that Erdoğan is realigning Turkey stra- tegically, take measures to prevent that realignment, and prepare for even more substantial ruptures in the relationship in the future.

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