Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited Author(s): David M. Estlund, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 1317-1340 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961672 Accessed: 21/07/2009 16:57

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http://www.jstor.org DEMOCRATICTHEORY AND THE PUBLICINTEREST: CONDORCET AND ROUSSEAUREVISITED

Bernard Grofmanand Scott Feld argued in the June1988 issue of this Review that lean-JacquesRousseau's contributions to democraticpolitical theory could be illuminatedby invoking the theorizingof one of his eighteenth-century contemporaries,the Marquisde Condorcet,about individualand collectivepreferences or judgments.Grofman and Feld'sclaims about collectiveconsciousness and the efficacy of the public interestprovoke debate. One focus of discourselies in the applicationof Condorcet'sjury theoremto Rousseau'stheory of the generalwill. In this controversy David M. Estlundand JeremyWaldron in turn raisea variety of issuesof theory and in- terpretation;Grof man and Feld then extend their argument,and propose clarifications.

V hile few it is a problem for that model, which things are more controversial than the becomes clearest in Arrow's (1963) natureof democracy,there is nonetheless masterfulelaboration. Condorcet'sother something of a received view, namely, landmark result, the jury theorem, is a that a proper democraticvote expresses positive resultfor the other conceptionof the voter's preferencesabout the social democracy,what we might call the episte- choices in question and that these are to mic conception (following Cohen 1986; be combinedin an outcomethat pleasesas Colemanand Ferejohn1986). It is surpris- many individuals as possible within the ing that the epistemic conception of bounds of fairness.The consensusaround democracyhas not been pursuedand de- this model of democraticvoting is an odd veloped in light of this promise,while the thing, stemming as the model does from preferenceconception has come to domi- Arrow'swell-known proof that no way of nate democratictheory despite (or, per- combiningsuch votes can simultaneously versely, because of?) its long-known satisfy several apparentlyreasonable cri- problems. teria, a theoremrooted in the work of the The imbalance is beginning to be re- Marquisde Condorcet,who first demon- dressedin two ways. In the first place, re- strated the possibility of cyclical major- searchershave recently rediscoveredand ities. Condorcet,however, also produced vastly extendedCondorcet's jury theorem an equally stunning but less well-known results. In the second place, there is a result, namely, that majority rule can growingappreciation of the contributions make a group more likely to give correct to an epistemicconception of democracy answersthan the averagemember or even that were made by Condorcet'sgreat con- than the most competentmember. temporary,Rousseau. These two lines of These are landmarkresults, each perti- work have been recentlybrought together nent to a differentmodel of democracy. in a fascinatingCondorcetian reading of But Condorcet's famous result about a Rousseau by Grofman and Feld, "Rous- preferenceconception of democracy, the seau's GeneralWill: A CondorcetianPer- paradoxof cyclicalmajorities, is negative; spective" (1988). I wish to raise some

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOLUME 83 NO. 4 DECEMBER1989 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 83

questions about their interpretationof dureis the same as it would be with all in- Rousseau and then consider whether the dependent voters, group competence is epistemicmodel of democracycan easily reduced. avoid the Arrowian difficultiesfaced by But if, instead, the "partyline" within preferencemodels. groups is determined by majority rule within the faction, the Condorcet jury theorem can perhapsbe brought to bear Rousseau and Condorcet to show that group competence can ex- ceed the average individual competence. Grofmanand Feld's central interpretive For example, the opinion leader may be point seems indisputable.Rousseau con- chosenby majorityrule, in which case the ceivedvoters as giving theiropinion on an opinion leader may, on average, have a independentmatter of fact-the content higher-than-averagecompetence for Con- of the general will-and held that the dorcetian reasons. Indeed, the faction answer receiving a majority of votes need not even choose to deferto one of its under certain circumstanceswas guaran- members; and under certain conditions teed to be correct. This feature of Rous- and in relatively small groups, the seau criesout for a Condorcetianinterpre- faction'scompetence can even exceedthat tation. However, the issue ariseswhether of the most competentmember (Grofman more of Rousseau'sviews can also be cov- 1978). Would this situation still reduce ered by the Condorcetianumbrella.1 group competence? For example, Grofmanand Feld inter- On the contrary, it might seem that pret Rousseau'sworries about factionali- group competence must simply be in- zation as owing to the Condorcetiancon- creased. After all, the competence of siderationof reducingthe effective num- every individualbecomes just that of the ber of voters. If individuals vote in group itself; and this is higher than aver- blocks, the effective number of voters is age or even higher than any individual's reduced from the number of individuals competence. So many or all individuals to the numberof blocks, and this reduces increase their competencein such cases, the competenceof the group, other things and no one's competence is decreased. being equal. In particular,the reduction Apparently, then, the average com- of group competencedepends on the as- petencewithin each faction-and so in the sumption that the competencesof block group as a whole-is increased.Since the voters will not be greaterthan their com- numberof voters is unchanged,the Con- petencesif they had voted independently. dorcet theorem should say that group Forexample, if a faction choosesto follow competenceis higher than it would have an opinion leader rather than vote inde- been without these democraticfactions. pendently,the assumptionis that the com- However, this line of reasoningneglects petence of the opinion leader is either the fact that block voting, where there is always or on averageno higher than the correlation among individual votes averagecompetence of the othermembers beyond what would normallybe expected of the group if they were independent. simply from similar independentcompe- Condorcet's theorem shows that group tences, effectively reduces the numberof competence increases or decreases with voters (Owen 1986). The problem is in the numberof independentvoters if aver- determining whether this competence- age competenceis the same. If the opinion reducingfactor is more powerfulthan the leadersof all factions are, in effect, made competence-increasingfactor of the higher the only voters, then if the average com- competenceof such democraticfactions. petenceof the voters in the generalproce- Whichgroup is more competent:one with

1318 Democratic Theory and the Public Interest a larger effective number of voters of a against Grofman and Feld's interpreta- certaincompetence or one with a smaller tion. The problem is not-at least not effectivenumber of voters of highercom- solely-that the numberof voters is effec- petence?Obviously, it dependson the dif- tively reduced. It is at least as important ferencesin numbersand the differencesin that factionalizedvoters are not address- competences,but this questionhas not, to ing the proper issue. This is clear in the my knowledge,been thoroughlystudied.2 words "generalin relationto its members, Until there is furtherstudy of democratic and particularin relation to the state." factions, it cannot be assumed that fac- Elsewhere Rousseau discusses the ad- tionalization,as such, reducesgroup com- vanced stages of factionalization and petence. All that can be said is that non- decay: "Everyone, guided by secret democraticfactions tend to reducegroup motives, no more express their opinions competence. as citizensthan if the statehad never exist- Now this would be enough for Grof- ed; and iniquitousdecrees having as their man and Feld'sinterpretive purposes if the sole purposethe private interestare false- factions Rousseauis concernedwith were ly passed underthe name of laws" (Social internally nondemocratic. Are they? Contract4.1). And in the extremecase of Rousseausays, "Whenintrigues and par- deferenceto another,selling one's vote for tial associationscome into being at the ex- money, "The error he commits is that of pense of the large association, the will of changing the thrust of the question and each of these associationsbecomes gener- answering a different question from the al in relation to its membersand particu- one he was asked. Thus, insteadof saying lar with in relation to the state" (Social throughhis vote it is advantageousto the Contract2.3). If the factions have their state, he says it is advantageousto this own general wills, as he says, then his man or that party that this or that view view must be, as it is with a whole com- should pass" (4.1). The dichotomous munity, that the general will is best dis- choice between states of affairsS and T is covered by majority rule. This might not sufficientto determinewhat judgment seem to favor the mini-democracyview of is expressedby a vote. S is not a judg- factions over the Grofman-Feldinterpre- ment "S is in the common interest"is a tation of deferenceto opinion leaders. judgment.If a jury model, that is, a Con- However, the minidemocracyversion dorcetmodel, is appropriate,the dichoto- presentedabove dependedon everyone's mous choice voters face is between judg- addressinghim- or herself to the issue of ments. Rousseauclaims that the judgment the common interestof the whole society. choice that factionalizedvoters addressis Only then can the faction's deliberation different from that faced by others. raisethe faction'scompetence on the com- Where most are addressing "S is in the mon interest of the whole society above common interest of the whole society" the averagemember's. Rousseau's view of versus "Sis not in the commoninterest of factions is clearly different.The question the whole society," membersof faction F factionalized voters address is, What is are addressing"S is in the common inter- in our [the faction's] common interest? est of F' versus "S is not in the common And when a party line is drawn and toed interest of F." Clearly,where individuals in the generalvoting procedure,the same are not addressingthe same issue, Con- interpretationof factionalizedvotes is ap- dorcetian considerations do not apply, propriate:"X is in the commoninterest of and there is no pooling of wisdom. The my faction." This counts against inter- problem is not mainly the reducednum- preting Rousseau in the minidemocracy ber of effective voters; it is the failure of way discussed above, but it also counts the voters to address the same issue. At

1319 American Political Science Review Vol. 83 least this is the most defensibledifficulty much because it is not demandedby the with factionalizationuntil the effects of text. Rousseausays only that if therewere democratic factions are better under- no communication(and other conditions stood.3 are met), the procedurewould be infalli- Still, Rousseaudoes mentionthat under ble. This does not imply that noncom- factionalization "there are no longer as munication is a necessary condition for many voters as there are men" (Social discovery of the general will. In fact, it Contract 2.3). Its relevance, however, does not even imply that it is necessary may be that since there is a pervasive for infallibilityof the discovery process, tendencyto err in the directionof particu- though Rousseau may well believe this. larity-to bias one's vote in the direction We saw above that there is no Condor- of one'sprivate interest-these smallerrors cetianbasis for the claimthat factionaliza- can be overwhelmedby large numbersof tion is detrimentalbut only for the claim others with countervailing biases.4 Fac- that a certain kind of deferenceis. Simi- tionalization, especially at an advanced larly here, deference is the culprit, not stage with only a few factions, precludes communication.The notion of deference this correctiveinfluence.5 is hard to make precise;but wherethere is no communication,there certainly can be no deference nor any of its ill effects. Public Deliberation However, if deference can be avoided, Grofmnanand Feld'sclaim that the effec- communicationwould seem to have ad- tive reductionof the numberof voters re- vantages from a Condorcetianperspec- duces group competenceought to be lim- tive. Increasing the information of a ited to (internally) nondemocratic fac- nondeferentialvoter would tend to in- tions, as I have argued. This adjustment crease the voter's competence, and this calls for a furtheradjustment in their in- can only increase the chances of the terpretationof Rousseau. Grofmnanand group's ascertainingthe general will. A Feld seem to misinterpretthe following Condorcetian reading would be embar- remark of Rousseau's:"If, when a suffi- rassed if Rousseau had criticized public ciently informedpopulace deliberates, the deliberationabout voting. Fortunatelyfor citizens were to have no communication Grofmanand Feld, these commentsabout among themselves,the generalwill would communicationare not such a criticism. always result" (Social Contract 2.3). As mentioned,it is not entirely clearhow Rousseauis held by Grofmanand Feld to Grofmanand Feld read Rousseauon this see "the 'deliberativeprocess' as one tak- point. In fairness, they do once gloss him ing place within individualsrather than in in an unobjectionableway: "Thus, each termsof a processof groupdebate" (1988, voter is seen as seeking to reach an indi- 569). And they say, "Eachvoter is polled vidual and independentjudgment about about his independentlyreached choice, alternatives"(p. 569, emphasis added). without any group deliberation"(p. 570). Admittedly, a Rousseauiantheory must Their text is not entirely determinateon place great weight on individualindepen- this point, but there is some reason to dence; but if it is to remainRousseauian, think Grofmanand Feld may have taken independencemust be distinguishedfrom Rousseauto be claimingthat voters ought asociality.7 not to have any communicationamong themselves regarding the issues to be Rousseau and Arrow's Conditions voted on. This would seem to concedetoo much to the totalitarian,anti-civil liber- Grofman and Feld point out that the ties, interpretationsof Rousseau.6 Too Condorcet-Rousseau interpretation of

1320 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest

votes as judgments rather than expres- ply. More particularly,if the function in sions of preferenceis an importantalter- questionis the common interestfunction, native to the dominanceof preferencein- Arrow's conditions are likely to be vio- terpretationsof voting at least since Ar- lated in the fact that no matterhow "inS's row (1963). One might legitimatelywon- interest"is interpreted,some sets of indi- der, then, whether Arrow's proof about vidual interest rankings will not exhibit the impossibilityof an acceptableaggre- any common interest, in violation of the gation procedurecan be avoided on this Arrowian condition of unrestricteddo- alternative view. Grofman and Feld main. This, then, is an applicationof Ar- believe that the common view that Ar- row's theoremnot to a voting procedure row's work casts doubt on claims involv- but to an account of the relationbetween ing such conceptsas the common good or the common good and individualgoods. the general will "is simply wrong. Our The generalwill, the common good, and position, like Rousseau's,is that the gen- so on are not insulated from Arrow's eralwill may exist but that the outcomeof problem unless they are not defined as any voting process is but an imperfect functions of individual rankings; but reflectionof it" (1988, 574, n. 17). Grofman and Feld have not made any Their view seems to be that Arrow's such case. problem affects only voting procedures; It would be hasty to disabusepolitical so that while attemptsto constituteor dis- thought of these notions on that basis cover a common good, generalwill, and alone, however, since there is room for so on through voting procedures are debate about whether Arrow's condi- renderedproblematic, the notions of com- tions must be acceptedin this context. For mon good, general will, and so on are example, suppose certainprofiles of indi- not. However, the applicationof Arrow's vidual rankings were inconsistent with work is not limited to voting procedures. theirall being membersof a genuinepolit- There is no function from individual ical community. Then it would be non- rankings to an aggregate ranking that sense to say that the difficultyof aggrega- meets Arrow's conditions. Therefore, ting profiles of noncommunityrankings doubt is cast on those notions insofar as shows that there is no such thing as the they are taken to be functions of individ- good of a community. This is just an ex- ual rankings. ampleof how the applicationof Arrow to Rousseauiantheory in particulardoes the common good itself rather than to not take the generalwill to be a function voting proceduresmight open new chal- of actual individual votes, but it may lenges to the conditions he imposes. In yet-and I believe does-take the general this hypothetical case, the challenge will to be a function of individual rank- would be to the condition of unrestricted ings, namely, interest rankings. It is not domain, which requires that a function necessaryto take up the issue of Rousseau returnan outcome for absolutely any set interpretation here. The point can be of individualrankings. Why supposethat made by merely raising this possibility. the notion of the common good depends Supposethe content of the generalwill is on the possibility of a procedure that the common interest (on socially signifi- could aggregateany profile, even a non- cant issues). Surely the common interest community profile of individual rank- must be some functionof individualinter- ings? Of course, this is not a substantial ests, probably representingwhat is in the challengeunless some account of the dif- interest of every citizen.8 The general ferencebetween community and noncom- point is that if it is any function of indi- munity profiles has been provided. It is vidual rankings, Arrow's argumentsap- meant here only as an example.

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While my remarks have been largely relationbetween member competence and critical, I have only offered them because group competence:if the averagecompe- of the promiseof Grofmanand Feld'sap- tence of members of a group is greater proachto democratictheory. The work of than .5, the competence of the group these two authors and others along Con- deciding by a simple majority (majority dorcetianlines is potentially momentous competence)approaches 1 as the number for democratictheory; and the Condor- of membersincreases. cetian reading of Rousseau is, I believe, I want to point out one or two difficul- accuratein importantrespects. The recent ties in the use of Condorcet'stheorem as elaborationsof Condorcet'swork on the an interpretationof Rousseau'stheory of competenceof groups is a significantad- the generalwill, and indicatehow that in- vance toward Rousseau'sgoal of govern- terpretation might be supplemented to ing communities according to the truth provide a more realisticand attractiveim- despite the absence of any philosopher- age of Rousseau'spolitics along Condor- king to reveal it. cetian lines. Though I shall be pointing out some DAVID M. ESTLUND featuresof Rousseau'stheory that are not Universityof California,Irvine especially congenial to this approach, I should emphasizethat this should not be taken as a criticismof Grofinanand Feld's suggestion. Social Contractis a complex Grofmanand Feld (1988)have outlined and paradoxicalwork, and there is prob- an exciting and illuminating interpreta- ably no chanceof fitting everythingRous- tion of Rousseau'stheory of the general seau says into the frameworkof a single, will. They argue that many of the things coherent theory. We can only examine Rousseau says in Social Contract about whether the features of Rousseau's how the general will can emerge from thought that are independentlyattractive popular voting may be understoodalong and theoretically important are best the lines of Condorcet's jury theorem. understoodalong the lines that Grofman That theoremholds that if voters are ad- and Feld suggest. In other words, the dressinga common questionwith two an- questionto ask is whetherthe Condorcet- swers, one correctand one incorrect(e.g., ian suggestionhelps us to interpretRous- whether someone is guilty or innocent or seau's theory of politics by making it the which of two alternativesbetter promotes best it can be (see Dworkin 1986, 52-53). the generalgood) and if the averageprob- The first thing to note about the Con- ability of each voter choosing the correct dorcet theorem is the importanceof the answer is greaterthan .5, the probability assumption that average voter compe- that the answer chosen by a majority of tence is greaterthan .5. The theoremdoes them will be the correct one increasesto not make group competencean increasing certaintyas the size of the groupincreases function of average member competence (Condorcet1976, 33-70). for any value of the latter. The same rea- For brevity of discussion,I define com- soning that yields Condorcetianoptimism petence as follows: the competence of a about the generalwill also yields the con- person or group with regardto some pair clusion that if average voter competence of answersto a question(one correct,one dips below .5, majoritycompetence tends not) is just the probability that given a towards zero as group size increases. In choice, the person or the group will other words, the theoremis one that faces choose the correct alternative. So the two ways: it provides reason for opti- theorem simply asserts a mathematical mism about voting if individualvoters are

1322 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest on averagemore likely to be correctthan large and populous societies (Social Con- not; but it provides reason for pessimism tract 2.9). Thereare good reasonsfor this if on average they are more likely to pessimism. choose incorrectly. First,the more populous a country, the It may be thought odd that a voter's more complexthe issues that ariseand the competencecould be less than .5. After less clear and evident the solutions. The all, even a voter who chooses at random point made earlier about preconceptions should choose correctlyhalf the time. Un- obviously applies more acutely the more fortunately,as Condorcethimself pointed complex the social problemsthat have to out, randomnessis not the worst we can be faced are. expect: "Ineffect, when the probabilityof Secondly, Rousseausuggests that an in- the truth of a voter's opinion falls below crease in size may make it difficult for 1/2, there must be a reason why he voters to identifywith the generalgood in decides less well than one would at ran- such a way as to prevent their decision dom. The reasoncan only be found in the making from being distortedby bias and prejudicesto which this voter is subject" self-interest:"Each individual, having no (1976, 62). It is a well-knowntheme in the taste for any other plan of government critiqueof democraticpolitics that correct than that which suits his particularinter- decisions are often those that seem est, finds it difficult to realize the advan- counterintuitiveor run contrary to the tageshe mighthope to drawfrom the con- preconceptionswith which the common tinual privations good laws impose" man approachesordinary decisions (e.g., (Social Contract2.7). Plato, Republic487b-502c). So it is quite It is no use, by the way, respondingto possible for unenlightenedpeople, who this that the Condorcet theorem already (naturallyenough) employ their precon- presupposes that citizens are voting for ceptions and intuitions in political deci- the generalgood as they see it and not on sion making, to do worse than random- the basis of self-interest.The disjunction izers. between the generalgood and the interest Now although Grofmanand Feld men- of individualsis too easily exaggeratedin tion Rousseau'sbelief that popularvoting Rousseauexegesis. The generalwill really on matter of the general good will occa- is supposedto will a good that is common sionally be mistaken (Social Contract to all, a good that servesthe individualin- 2.3), they offer Condorcet'stheorem as an terest of everyone. That is the basis of interpretationof what they take to be his Rousseau'scontractarianism (Social Con- confidencethat in most cases the vote of a tract 1.7, 2.4). Moreover, distortion popular assembly will coincide with the caused by uninformedself-interest is, on general will (1958, 569). But since, as I the Rousseauianview, one of the prime have pointed out, the Condorcettheorem causes of voter incompetence.A compe- faces both ways, it cannot by itself pro- tent decision maker is guided by the vide an interpretationof this confidence aspects of personal interest that corre- unless thereis reasonto attributeto Rous- spond to the interestsof everyone else in seau an independently grounded belief society; an incompetentone is guided by that averagevoter confidencein a citizen aspectsof personalinterest that are social- assemblywill be higher than .5. ly dissonant. If increasingpopulation size As a matterof fact, it seems that Rous- makes it more difficult for voters, with seau did not hold such a belief. Certainly, the best will in the world, to discern he was pessimistic about the chances of which of their interests are common to citizens' being able competently to ad- their fellow citizens and which are not, it dress questions of the general good in is all the more likely that they will come

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up with incorrect answers when they given a fair level of averagecompetence, (think they) are addressingthemselves to tends also and independentlyto reduce questionsof the generalgood. average competence. The first two points suggest that voter Thereare good reasons, then, for being competencemight be inverselycorrelated pessimistic rather than optimistic about with the size of the populationwhose in- the applicationof the Condorcettheorem terests are to be taken into account in to a political assemblyin a society of any answering questions about the general size. And, in fact, Rousseau did not ex- good. A third reason looks more closely hibit the wholehearted optimism about at the compositionof the decision-making majoritarianoutcomes that Grofmanand body itself. Fora countryof a given popu- Feld impute to him. By definition, the lation, it is likely that the largerthe popu- general will is always correct; but even lar assembly, the lower the averagelevel when they turn their attention purely to of educationand enlightenmentamong its that end, the people, on Rousseau'sac- participants.This is not an a priori truth; count, are unlikely to get it right: it rests, however, on the politicallyrealis- tic assumption that those who have the The people, being subjectto the laws, ought to vote in a restrictedfranchise are likely to be their author: the conditions of the society be more educatedthan those admittedto ought to be regulated by those who come togetherto form it. But how are they to regulate it when the franchise is extended (Mill them? Is it to be by common agreement,by a 1975). The point is one that Rousseau suddeninspiration? ... How can a blind multi- hinted at in his remarksabout 'the com- tude, which often does not know what it wills, mon herd' (Social Contract2.7). Intrigu- becauseit rarelyknows what is good for it, carry ingly, it is also a point that out for itself so great and difficultan enterprise Condorcetem- as a system of legislation?Of itself the people phasized in his presentation of the wills always thegood, but of itselfit by no means theorem: alwayssees it. The generalwill is alwaysupright, but the judgmentwhich guides it is not always This conclusionleads first of all to a ratherim- enlightened.(Social Contract 2.6, emphasisadd- portantobservation. A very numerousassembly ed) cannotbe composedof very enlightenedmen. It is even probable that those comprising this The sentence makesit I assemblywill on manymatters combine great ig- emphasized clear, norancewith manyprejudices. Thus there will be think, that the source of erroris not that a greatnumber of questionson which the prob- voters are asking themselves the wrong ability of the truth of each voter will be below question (and thereforecoming up with, 1/2. It follows that the more numerous the say, the will of all ratherthan the general assembly,the more it will be exposedto the risk of makingfalse decisions.(1976, 49) will), they are asking themselvesthe right question (What is for the generalgood?). This, of course, is most interesting.The But Rousseau simply has no confidence Condorcet theorem states that where that real-world voters addressing this averagevoter competenceexceeds .5, the question will come up with the right more numerousthe assembly, the greater answers. the probability that a majority decision How mightthis difficultybe dealtwith? will be right. But the presentobservation Does this Rousseauianpessimism about tells us that the morenumerous the assem- voter competence not undermine the bly, the lower the competenceof voters theory of the general will precisely on on averageis likely to be. Although there Condorcetiangrounds? To mitigate the is no reasonto think that mathematically, pessimism we have to consider whether the two factorsexactly cancelone another there is any way voter competencemight out, still, it is worth noting that the very be enhancedin a Rousseauianpolity. Four thing that enhancesmajority competence, possible strategiesspring to mind.

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The first is to limit the range of ques- to choose, as the most enlightened,one of those whose opinions will have a large enough prob- tions that are put to a popular vote: the ability of being true. Thus a numerousassembly larger the population, the more limited who are not very enlightenedcould be usefully the range of questions.This was Condor- employedonly to choose the membersof a less cet's solution: numerous assembly to whom the decision on othermatters would thenbe entrusted.(1976, 61) Now since these prejudicesand this ignorance can exist in relationto very importantmatters, it Of course, even this will work only if the is clear that it can be dangerousto give a demo- masses can be relied on to choose repre- craticconstitution to an unenlightenedpeople. A sentatives more enlightened than them- pure democracy,indeed, would only be appro- priateto a people muchmore enlightened,much selves and not to be induced to vote for freerfrom prejudices than any of thoseknown to those who share the prejudicesthat con- history. For every other nation, this form of stitute their own incompetence. assembliesbecomes harmful, unless the assem- In any case, Rousseauwould have no blies are limitedin the exerciseof theirpower to truckwith such a strategy,given his well- decisionsdirectly relating to the maintenanceof security, liberty, and property: matters upon known opinion that representationis the which a direct personalinterest can adequately end of freedom and that 'every law the enlightenall minds. (1976, 49) people has not ratified in person is null and void' (Social Contract3.15). As we noted earlier, the competenceof a This makes it surprisingthat the third voter on an issue of the general good is strategy (which Rousseau does propose) likely to be greaterin cases where thereis seemsto involve an even more substantial a direct and evident connection between derogation from participatory politics the general good and personal self- than the choice of representativeswould interest. involve. The solution he favors is the in- Somethingrather along theselines is in- troductioninto politics of "a superiorin- volved in Rousseau'sinsistence that it is telligence... beholdingall the passionsof the task of the government(i.e., the mag- men without experiencingany of them,"a istry, the administration),not the sover- "sublime reason" with recourse to "an eign (i.e., the people), to make decisions authoritycapable of constrainingwithout about particular persons and events violence and persuadingwithout convinc- (Social Contract 3.1). The people as a ing"-a lawgiver on the model of Moses whole are to deal only with mattersthat or Solon or Lycurgusto set the agendafor are universalin characterand that there- legislationand organizethe people into a fore touch them all because in the state's state (Social Contract2.7). This is not the dealings with any particular person or place to comment on Rousseau'sinterpo- event, the competenceof everyonebut the lation of such a deus ex machina save to party immediatelyaffected is likely to be say that it seems to move his theorizing limited (2.6). into a mythic dimension where it is no The second strategy (also proposed by longer clear whether he is genuinely at- Condorcet)is less likely to be congenialto tempting to address the issue of citizen Rousseau.It is that the politicalparticipa- competence as a problem in real world tion of the commonpeople shouldbe lim- politics. ited to the choice of representatives: The fourth strategy is one that Rous- But it can be observed that in the majorityof seau toys with. It is very prominentelse- matterssubmitted to the decisionof an assembly, where in the tradition of participatory the same voters whose opinions have such a democracy, but its relation to the Con- small probabilityof being true can be enlight- ened enough-certainly not to pronouncewith dorcet Theorem is not very well under- some probability of truth as to which man stood and is misstated,in my opinion, by among a great numberhas the most merit-but Grofman and Feld. This is the role that

1325 American Political Science Review Vol. 83 may be played by debate and discussion (4.2). But this can be read in context as a among the citizens in enhancingthe com- pathology of dialecticintractability rather petence of those who participate. than as a pessimism about discussion as The Condorcet Theorem requiresthat such. Elsewherehe talks happily enough the votes cast by participatingcitizens be of "public deliberation"(1.7) and "com- independentof one another. (If they were mon deliberations"(2.4); and it is hard to not, one would, roughly speaking, have see why an actual assembly of the people to multiply voters' competencesto calcu- in one place (as opposed to a poll that late group competence, diminishing the might be conducteddoor-to-door) would probabilityof a correctmajority decision be thought necessary if discussion were for any average competenceless than 1.) dangerousor unimportant(3.12-15). Grofmanand Feld interpretthis indepen- Moreover, if the Condorcetian ap- dence condition as follows: "A group of proach precludesdiscussion, it is entirely size N chooses between any two alterna- at odds with the spiritof the participatory tives by means of a majority vote in tradition in which Rousseau's political which each voter is polled about his or her theory is usually located. SinceAristotle's independently reached choice, without dictum, "Nature... does nothingwithout any groupdeliberation" (1988, 570). They some purpose; and for the purpose of maintain that this correspondsto Rous- makingman a political animalshe has en- seau'sview of "thedeliberative process as dowed him alone among the animalswith one takingplace within individualsrather the power of reasoned speech" (Politics than in terms of a process of group 1253), the participatory tradition has debate"(p. 569). placed great emphasison dialogueamong In fact, Rousseauis ambivalenton this. citizensboth as an intrinsicgood and as a The passage they cite is translated as way of improvingthe likelihoodthat they follows: "If, when the people, being fur- will decide wisely on the issues they are nished with adequate information, held addressing.In fact Aristotle provides an its deliberations,the citizenshad no com- early version of the Condorcettheorem in munication one with another, the grand what he calls 'the argumentof the collec- total of the small differences would tive intelligenceof the masses, so long as always give the generalwill, and the deci- they do not fall below a certainstandard. sion would always be good" (Social Con- Each individually will be a worse judge tract 2.3). But communicationhere may than the experts, but when all work to- not mean what we understandby partici- gether, they are better, or at any rate, no patory dialogueand debate. In the imme- worse' (1282a). diately following sentence, deliberation How does discussion among citizens without communicationis contrastednot enhance voter competence?More impor- with discussionas such but with intrigues tantly, can it do so in a way that does not and the formation of factions. In other underminethe independencecondition of words, communication in this passage Condorcet'stheorem? may mean something akin to what con- There are various ways in which the versation means in phrases like criminal first question might be answered. One conversation-a suspect and unhealthy answer rests on an optimism about the connection of selfish interestsrather than impact of those who are enlightened. high-mindedpolitical dialogue. It is true Even if the average competence of the that later in the work Rousseau suggests membersof a group is below .5, it is likely that "long debates, discussions, and tu- that there will be some memberswhose mult proclaimthe ascendancyof particu- competence is much higher. If so, they lar interestsand the decline of the State" may be able to persuade those of lesser

1326 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest competence to abandon their prejudices and independence are, in this context, and show them why (for example)an ap- mathematicalideas; and not everything parently counterintuitiveproposal is not we call interactionor lack of interaction as inimicalto the generalgood as it might in politics can be taken as an interpreta- seem. Their argumentsmay be accorded tion of them. The sort of interactionbe- some respect by the less-competent, in tween voters that would compromisein- part for the reasons Condorcetidentified dependencewould be interactionin which in the second strategy (representation): voter X decidedin favor of a given option people can often recognize others more just because voter Y did. Grofman and competent to solve a problem than they Feld rightly recognize that the formation are. Condorcetthought this an argument of factions and retinues-a process Rous- for isolating the more competent in a seau deplored (Social Contract 2.3)- special assembly. But exactly similarrea- would have this effect (1988, 571). ButX's soning yields the possibility of theirbeing being persuaded by Y in argument or able to improve the average competence holding itself open to such persuasion of those who would be at least sufficiently does not in itself involve X's deciding to enlightenedto choose them as representa- vote one way ratherthan anotherbecause tives. of the way Y is voting. That apart, there is also the possibility Grofmanand Feldsuggest that indepen- that if one source of average incompe- dence is vitiated by any positive correla- tence is unfamiliaritywith the range and tion among individualchoices beyond the complexityof a problem,bringing citizens correlationto be expected from similari- togetherin an assemblywhere they can be ties in competencealone (1988, 571). That exposed in discussion to a range of per- is ambiguous.It is too strongif it requires spectives other than their own may make the individualcompetences to be indepen- it more likely that reasonrather than prej- dent of one another (nothing in Condor- udice will prevail as they address the cet's reasoningpresupposes that). But if it problems of a large society (Mill 1975, categorizes the impact of one person's 197-88). arguments on another as a (developed) Finally, there is simply the optimistic similarityin competence,it does not pre- assumptionthat prejudicefares less well clude the possibility of mutual enhance- than reason in open debate. If people are ment of competencethrough discussion. at all open to argument,we would expect It does not matter, for Condorcet's discussionto diminishthe probabilitythat argument,whether or not individualcom- voters would subsequentlydo less well in petences are independentof one another. choosing between alternativesthan they His theorem makes group competencea would if they chose randomly. (But ad- function of average individual compe- mittedly, this is optimistic;we are equally tence irrespectiveof how the latter is gen- familiar with the way prejudicescan be erated.There is an obvious sense in which confirmed and compounded in discus- the competencesof individualvoters can- sion). not possibly be independent of one If there is a chance that discussion another if they are membersof the same among the citizenry enhances average society. They read the same newspapers, competence,does that neverthelessunder- argue in the streetsand coffee shops, and mine the Condorcetresult by compromis- so on. What matters, for the purposesof ing its condition of voter independence? independence,is what happenswhen the Unlike Grofman and Feld, I think the competenceis exercised.In orderto apply answer is no. Condorcet'stheorem to predict majority We must remember that dependence competence, we are going to have to

1327 American Political Science Review Vol. 83 decide the point at which the average In the light of the issues raised by Est- competence will be calculated. For best lund and Waldron,we are pleasedto have results,it is obvious enough that it should the opportunity to clarify and expand be calculated at the moment just before upon our discussion (Grofmanand Feld the vote is taken. Now it is almost trivial- 1988) of what has been called the "episte- ly true that if we allow discussionto take mic" concept of democracy(Cohen 1986; place between the time average compe- Coleman and Ferejohn1986) and of the tence is calculatedand the time the vote is links between the views of Rousseauand taken, our application of the theorem those of Condorcet. We share with Est- may go awry. But that has nothingwhat- lund and Waldronthe view that the prop- ever to do with independence.It is simply er questions to address are not esoteric that average competencemay change in points about textual exegesis but rather the meantime,and we will have to do our fundamentalquestions central to political calculationsof majoritycompetence over theory, such as, What is the public inter- again using new values for the variables. est and how can we design institutions Independenceis a condition on the way that will serve it? competenceis expressedin voting, not a We, Estlund,and Waldronare in agree- condition on the way competenceis gen- ment on many other points. In particular, erated.If averagevoter competenceis cal- we agree that-in Estlund'sphrasing- culatedafter a discussionin the assembly "Rousseau conceived voters as giving has taken place, one cannot object to a theiropinion on an independentmatter of Condorcetian prediction based on that fact, the content of the generalwill, and calculationon the grounds that the com- held that the answer receivinga majority petence of some voters was affected by of votes under certain circumstanceswas that of others. guaranteed to be correct"; and these I conclude, then, that Grofman and authors agree with us that the Condorcet Feld have exaggerated the atomism of jury theorem can be used to provide in- voter deliberationrequired for a Condor- sight into how and when majority deci- cetian interpretationof Rousseau'spoliti- sion making can be used to ascertainthe cal theory. By misinterpretingthe inde- general will. We are also in agreement pendencecondition, they make Rousseau- that membersof the group majority can ian politics, on this interpretation,look go wrong in two ways: by addressingthe much less attractive as a conception of wrong question (i.e., concerning them- collectivechoice than it has to. The back- selves with their own particularizedinter- grounddifficulty remains, of course:even est ratherthan the generalinterest) or by though competence-enhancingdiscussion lacking sufficient competence to discern is not ruledout, thereis no guaranteethat the general will despite the best inten- it will carryaverage competence to a level tions. where majority voting produces positive Estlund emphasizes the difficulties results. Still, I think it a happy coinci- posed for a Condorcetianview of Rous- dencethat restoringthe interactivedimen- seau's generalwill posed by the first type sion of participationoffers the best hope of error;Waldron emphasizes the need to that the Rousseauiantheory of politics clarify the circumstancesunder which er- may get the benefit ratherthan the detri- rors of the second type can be avoided. ment of Condorcet'stwo-faced theorem. Both Estlund and Waldron provide a number of salient quotes from the writ- JEREMYWALDRON ings of Condorcetand Rousseauthat help Universityof California,Berkeley to clarify the relationship between the ideas of these two figuresof the enlighten- ment. Both call attention to areas where

1328 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest the discussionin our earlieressay needs to as nonsensical. For Buchanan, the only be more clearlystated and elaborated.We legitimacy that can be attached to social see this responseless as a rebuttalthan as institutionsarises from theirbeing instan- an expansion of points that were either tiated as part of a package (constitution) omittedor left obscurein our previousar- that has been given unanimousconsent. ticle. After the work of Paul Samuelson(1947) The Estlundessay makes three impor- economists(with the possibleexception of tant claims: The first is that an epistemic those in the cost-benefit tradition) have concept of democracy (i.e., one that is eschewed interpersonal comparisons of judgment-basedrather than preference- utility and opted for an ordinalistfounda- based) does not avoid the problem of tion to social welfare theory. Advocates potentialinconsistencies in group decision of the criterionof (Pareto)efficiency often makingposed by Arrow'sfamous impos- reject any attempt to choose among sibilitytheorem. The secondis that the ex- points on the Pareto frontierin terms of istence of cohesive subgroups (factions) other normativestandards. actuallymight, undersome circumstances, However, it is Arrow's impossibility improve the reliability of group decision theoremthat is widely seen as the finish- makingrather than making it worse. The ing blow to the claimthat the publicinter- third is that group deliberation might est can be meaningfullydefined. Roughly make group decisionmaking more accur- speaking,Arrow (1963)demonstrates that ate than what would be expectedfrom the no rule for the resolutionof conflictingin- purely "statistical"effect of the Condorcet dividual preferencesamong a set of three jury theorem, which is a variant of what or more alternativesthat is based on or- in probabilitytheory is known as "thelaw dinal preferencerankings and is respon- of large numbers." sive to changes in individual preferences Waldron, like Estlund,raises the issue in a sensible(monotonic) fashion can guar- of the effect of group deliberation on antee that group preferencesamong the group judgmentalaccuracy, but he also alternatives will be transitively ordered raises an important fourth question not unless we impose constraints on what consideredin our earlier essay: Can we preferenceorderings voters are allowed to specify the conditions under which have. (Fora clear and relativelynontech- (mean)group competencecan be expected nical introduction to Arrow's theorem, to be above one-half?We find Waldron's see Riker1982; see also Plott 1976.) observations about this question to be Estlundasserts, "Surely the commonin- both useful and provocative. Moreover, terestmust be some functionof individual he closely ties his discussionof this ques- interests,probably representing what is in tion to points raised by Rousseau and the interest of every citizen. The general Condorcetthemselves. point is that if it is any function of indi- vidual rankings, Arrow's argumentsap- The General Will Revisited ply." In note 8 Estlundcalls attentionto a relevantquote from Social Contract(2.1), The concept of the public interest has a quote we also cited: "Were there no come undercritical challenge from econo- point of agreement among all these mists in the past severaldecades. Buchan- [private]interests, no society could exist." an and Tullock (1962)make the claim for Similarly,Waldron asserts, "Thedisjunc- a methodological individualism within tion between the generalgood and the in- whose frameworkthe idea of a public in- terest of individualsis too easily exagger- terest distinct from some aggregationof ated in Rousseauianexegesis. The general individualpreferences can only be viewed will really is supposedto will a good that

1329 American Political Science Review Vol. 83 is common to all, a good that serves the types of choices, namely, those dealing individualinterest of everyone." "withmatters that are universalin charac- This line of argument,which treats the ter" (Social Contract 2.6). Barry (1964, public interest as the interest that is in 14) correctlypoints out that in Rousseau's common among individuals,is very simi- view, "if only some are affectedby a mat- lar to the Runcimanand Sen (1965) ap- ter the GeneralWill cannot operate."As proach, which looks at the public interest Waldron reminds us, Rousseau insisted as the cooperativesolution to an n-person that "itis the task of government(i.e., the prisoner's dilemma game. While we magistracy, the administration),not the regardthis as a plausibleinterpretation of sovereign(i.e., the people), to make deci- the generalwill, we do not regardit as the sions about particular persons and whole story (as we noted in passingin our events" (Social Contract3.1). previous essay) for three main reasons. Of course, in practice, it may be very First, the public interest may be other difficult to distinguishbetween rule crea- than the commonalityof interestsamong tion and rule application, since few rules the particular set of individuals who (laws) are apt to cover all eventualities. presently comprise a society. We take And as was evident in the last revision of seriously Burke'sremark about society's the income tax code, rules that seem gen- being a contract "betweenthose who are eral may in fact be tailor-madeto apply living, those who are dead, and those who only to one individual(or corporation)or are to be born." a handful of individuals (or corpora- Second, and even more importantly, tions). Nonetheless,it seemssensible to us we believe that it is possible for individ- to emphasizethe connectionbetween the uals to addressthe question, What is the public interest, constitutionaldesign, and common good? not by Thinking about the rule of law (see Redford1958) but to consequencesfor themselvesbut ratherby rejectthe claim that the publicinterest can focusingon the abstractproperties of sys- be defined in all choice situations. tems of rules (or equivalently,systems of As yet, however,we have not addressed institutions). This, for example, we take the heart of Estlund'sclaim that appealto to be the heart of the Rawlsian enter- a publicinterest, however defined,cannot prise.9In this contextwe would, however, really get us out of the problemsfor social emphasize that the search for a general choice posed by Arrow's impossibility will presupposesa minimalcommonality theorem. To do so we must explicatethe of basic values as well as what we might link between our notion of the public in- normally think of as common interests. terest and transitivecollective choice. Withoutsuch commonalitythe questfor a For situations in which we can posit common Rawlsian "reflective equilibri- that individualsare by and large seeking um" is doomed to be futile. Moreover, to implementsome commonnotion of the Barry(1964, 14) remindsus that in Rous- public good (or some other widely held seau's view there were "a number of re- value) in decidingamong alternatives,we quirementsthat had to be met before it specify propertiesof a matrix of margins (the general will) applied at all: political that are likely to arise even if individuals virtue (reinforced by a civil religion), differin theircompetence at correctlyper- smallness of state, and rough economic ceiving which of any two alternativesis equality among the citizens."10 higher on the criterionvariable. For rea- Third, and relatedly,we agreewith the sons of space we only sketchthe natureof point made by Rousseau (and reiterated the argument.When these matrix condi- by Waldron) that the general will may tions are satisfied, choice will be transi- only be defined for certain (very limited) tive.

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A matrix is said to satisfy Borda a theoreticaland an empiricalmeaning to marginsif thereis a way of orderingalter- the idea of "judgmental"decision making natives such that in every row, above the even in contexts where relatively few main diagonal, margins increase (or at voters can be viewed as exclusively ori- least do not decrease)as we move to the ented toward a search for the common right and such that in every column, interest. This work parallels our earlier above the main diagonal, margins in- efforts to define a notion of collective crease (or at least do not decrease)as we ideological consistency that is distinct move from the entry in the bottom row from simply countinghow many individ- upward. We expect the Borda margins uals see the world primarilyin ideological condition to be (approximately)satisfied terms (Feld and Grofman 1986a; 1986b; in situationsinvolving judgmentsbecause 1988).13 the greater the differencein "value"be- tween two alternatives, the greater, on average, the plurality of voters who will Factionswithin Groups and the preferone to the other. When a matrixsatisfies the Bordamar- Search for the GeneralWill gins condition, groupmajority choice will Estlund suggests the possibility that be transitive, and alternatives will be especially when each subgroup'svote is ordered in accordance with their Borda decidedby a majorityvote within the sub- scores. Moreover, in a group whose pref- group, it may be preferablefor a group to erences satisfy the Borda marginscondi- allow subgroupsto influencethe votes of tion, as long as the group'smean compe- their members. "Afterall," says Estlund, tence is above .5, the Bordawinner can be "the competenceof every individual be- takento be an indicatorof the generalwill comes just that of the [sub] group itself; for that group (or to representthe prob- and this is higher than average, or [per- able highest value on whatever other cri- haps] even higher than any individual's terion variable the group's memberscan competence."Estlund is raisingan impor- be taken as trying to implement [see tant point: underwhat circumstanceswill Young 1986, 1988]). When the Borda some other rule than a simple majority margins condition is satisfied we avoid decisionmaximize the group'sjudgmental the intransitivitiesthat are the heartof the competence?This is a complicatedtopic Arrowian impossibilityresult."1 about which we have written extensively In work now in progresswe are looking (Feldand Grofnan 1984; Grofman1975, at data on voter preferenceorderings in 1978, 1979; Grofman and Feld 1984, single transferablevote elections in labor 1986; Grofman, Feld, and Owen 1982; unions and other organizationsto deter- Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983; and mine whether votes satisfy either the Shapleyand Grofman1984; see also Nitz- Bordamargins condition or the condition an and Paroush 1982, 1985; Owen 1986; of ideological margins.12 It is our belief Urken and Traflett 1984; Young 1986, that in many voting situations, it is rea- 1988). Herewe will summarizethe practi- sonable to treatvoters as if they were, on cal import of some little-knowntechnical balance, trying, albeit imperfectly,to find resultsand work out a nine-voterexample the choice that is "best"with respect to in detail. some shared set of values. This can be The key resultis one due independently true even if some voters completely lack to Shapleyand Grofman(1984) and Nitz- this motivation and no voters have only an and Paroush (1982, 1985) but mathe- this motivation. Our ongoing work on maticallyidentical to a well-knownresult Bordamargins is intendedto provideboth in the electricalengineering literature. Let

1331 American Political Science Review Vol. 83 the ith voter have competence p., then Other forms of subgroupdecision mak- (amongthe very largeclass of voting rules ing fare even worse than the division of that can be representedas weighted vot- groupsinto three-membersubgroups con- ing games)the decisionrule that optimizes sidered above. In particular,if there is a group judgmental competence when (democratic)majority faction, the judg- voters are choosing independentlyis one mental competenceof the group becomes that assignsweights to each voter propor- identical to that of the majority faction. tional to the log-odds of that voter's com- Especiallyfor small groups, cuttingthe ef- petence (i.e., if p is the probability of a fective size of the group nearly in two can correctjudgment, the log-odds ratio is log have substantialconsequences. For exam- [p/l - p1). (This can result in negative ple, for p = .6, in a nine-membergroup weights for those with competence less the differencein competencebetween sim- than .5, but we shall act as if everyonehas ple majorityrule and rule by a (democrat- at least a chanceprobability of being cor- ic) majority faction is .051 (.7334 - rect.) .6826), while for p = .8, the gap is .04 We considerthe effects of factions, first (.9814 - .9420). in terms of groups whose membershave However, the worst effect of factional- identicalvoter competence,then in terms ism comes when there are cabals within of groupswhose membersvary in compe- cabals, pyramiding to majority control. tence. We focus on one particulartype of In this worst-case scenario, a group of factional decision making within sub- two can control a subgroupof three that groups, an internalmajority rule process in turn controls a subgroup of size five within subgroups, that is, situations that can control a group of size nine, and where subgroups use majority rule for so on. Here the majority competenceof decisions within the subgroup and then the group is reducedto the average com- subgroupmembers vote as a bloc. petence of its members, no matter how Considersituations with all voters hav- large the group. ing identicalcompetence, p, with p > .5. If For the case where all voters have iden- there are nine voters, divided into three tical p values, our discussionemphasizes subgroups,Estlund would suggest that in the competence-reducingpossibilities of this situation, because the three-member fictionalization. In addition, we strongly subgroups have increased their compe- agreewith the point made by Estlund(cit- tence, this gain in competence may be ing Rousseau) that, to the extent that enough to compensatefor the reduction there are subgroups,the focus of decision of the "effective" number of decision makingmay shift from the generalwill to makers from nine to three. By using the the will of parts of society. Even if these Shapley-Nitzan-Grofman-Paroush log- parts are large-indeed even if one of odds theorem, we can see that Estlund's them is a majorityfaction-subgroup in- proposition is necessarily false. For terestsand those of the largersociety need groups whose members have identical not coincide (as Madison pointed out in competencies,if p > .5, simple majority Federalist10). We also share Waldron's rule (i.e., equal weighting) is optimal. view that the worst evil of subgroupdeci- However, the reductionin overall compe- sion making is that it is likely to shift the tence that comes from using what Owen focus of concernfrom the generalwill to (1986)refers to as "indirect"majority rule the will of all.15 (i.e., majority rule both within and be- As noted above, when a group'smem- tween subgroups)will, in this example,be bers have identical values of p, if p is relatively small-a maximum difference greater than one-half, simple majority of slightly over two percentagepoints.14 rule will always be preferredto any form

1332 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest of subgroupvoting. The situationis more Group Deliberation complex when the membersof the group differin their competencies.The Shapley- When group members differ in their Nitzan-Grofman-Paroushlog-odds result competencies, simple deference to the tells us that simple majorityrule is gener- most competentmember or membersof a ally not the optimalrule for groupswhose groupmay not be appropriate(as we have membersvary in theircompetence. None- seen), in that a weighting of votes that theless, the optimal group decision rule is gives some (reducedbut nonzero) weight likely to be only a slight improvementon to the less-competentgroup members may simplemajority except for smallgroups in actuallyyield a higheroverall competence which there is a considerablevariance in for the group. These examples bring us the competenceof the group'smembers. naturallyto the question of the effects of One such example is a nine-member group deliberationon group judgmental group, three of whose members have a accuracy.16 competenceof .9 and six of whom have a Deliberationcan have a number of ef- competenceof .6. In this example, simple fects. It provides informationabout who majority rule has a competenceof .91- holds what preferencesand diffusesinfor- considerablylower than the .97 compe- mation about why people hold the prefer- tence of the group under the optimal rule ences that they do. In the process of dis- that assignsa weight of 2.20 (lnf.9/.1]) to cussion, motivations toward either a the members with .9 competence and a public-regardingor a private-regarding weight of .41 (ln[.6/.1]) to the members ethos can be enhanced. From discussion with .6 competence. Only a unanimous we may learn that others are (or are not) vote of the six memberswith .6 compe- looking primarilyto their own self-inter- tence should be allowed to overturna 2-1 est, which may motivate us to do like- vote of the memberswith .9 competence. wise. Learningwhich preferencesgiven Of course, if the most competentmem- individualshold, we may use this infor- ber of the group is much more competent mation as a cue to what is truly in our than the average member, deference is own (or the common) interest (see Grof- often sensible. For example in a nine- man and Norrandern.d.). member group with eight members of Group deliberationraises a number of competence.6 and one of competence.9, questions that take us into empirical the eight should defer to the one unless at issuesbeyond what we can deal with here. least six of the eight feel otherwise. To what extent are individualperceptions In general, a multistage process will of their own competence accurate? To lead to better choices only under the what extent can individualsidentify those special condition when it leads to (effec- who are more knowledgeablethan them- tively) greater weights for more compe- selves?Are thereparticular types of issues tent individuals.In the next-to-lastexam- in which judgment-improvingforms of ple above, if the threemost competentin- deferencesare more likely On decisions dividuals formed a majority coalition where individuals see themselves as not with two of the others, the overallcompe- competent to judge, how likely are they tence of the group would be .94, better simply to abstain? Is there an optimum than simplemajority. However, most fac- size for deliberating groups?17 and tional arrangementswould only hurt the perhaps most importantly, To what ex- group competence.For example,if five of tent can the sharing of information the less-competentmembers form the ma- through the process of group discussion jority coalition, the group would only led to improvementsin individual accu- have a competenceof .68. racy'8and are thereways to structurethe

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deliberativeprocess (e.g., via a "Delphi"- to be both motivated and competent to type interactionlike that investigatedby discern the public interest or (following Dalkey and his colleagues at RAND, Rousseau)that we might limit the sover- [Dalkey 1969a, 1969b] or related proce- eign to mattersthat are universalin scope dureslike the nominal interactivemethod where particularizedinterests will have [Gustafson, Lebeq, and Walster 1973]) least play (as we have previously noted). that can significantlyimprove the accur- We find these suggestionsquite plausible. acy of group decision making? The one Also, Waldron believes that delibera- thing that we can be sureof is that thereis tion may improve individualjudgmental a broad social consensusthat deliberation accuraciesto the point that assuming a is desirablein the democraticprocess, al- mean competence of .5 may not be un- thoughwe must also recognizethat some- reasonable.While we, too, find this line times group deliberationis only a charade of reasoning quite plausible, we have to (as it often is when legislatorspontificate expressour fears that thereis only limited before empty chamberssolely for the rec- empirical evidence that deliberationim- ord or witnessestestify at hearingsbefore proves outcomesbeyond the purelystatis- legislators who have already made up tical effect produced by the law of large their minds).19 numberswhen initialmean competencein the group exceeds one-half. As noted above, deliberationcan have a variety of Mean Group Competence effects, some positive and some negative.20 Waldron correctly points out that the Anotheroption consideredby Waldron more-heads-are-better-than-oneexpecta- to improve judgmental accuracy (also tion that can be drawn from the Condor- suggestedby Condorcet)is to use the vot- cet jury theoremis tied to the assumption ing process not to make choices among that (mean) group competence is above alternativesbut to select a subgroupof in- .5. Competencevalues above .5 are im- dividualsmore competentthan the voters portantmore generally.Implementing the themselves.Certainly, it seemsreasonable Shapley-Nitzan-Grofman-Paroush op- to believe that in many circumstances timal weights requires us to be able to voters can identifyothers more competent specify the competencies of the group's than themselvesto judge certainissues.21 members with the expectation of higher A fourth line of attack is to emphasize weights for the more competentmembers the need to train citizens to make in- of the group. Even if exact competencies formedjudgments on public issues and to are unknown, as long as negativeweights be loyal to certainshared values and iden- are prohibited, we would optimally be tity. As noted in our previous essay, assigning positive weights only to those Rousseau'sview that voting could lead to believed to have a competence value the generalwill was dependenton (1) the above .5. What reasons do we have to voters being informedand (2) voters sub- believe that groups will have mean com- ordinatingtheir self-intereststo a search petenceabove .5 or, indeed, any members for what is in the common interest. Al- with competencesignificantly above .5? thoughno one would wish to rely on civic Waldron offers a number of different virtuealone, few (evenamong economists) plausible solutions to this problem. For would wish to live in a society whose example, he suggests (following Condor- membershad been raised with no moral cet) that we might limit the operationsof beliefs other than the belief that no moral sovereign democraticdecision making to (or patriotic)claim should be permittedto areas where individualsmay be expected outweigh self-interestnarrowly defined.

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Both Rousseauand Condorcet,in their based notion of social choice that is writings, expressedgreat concernfor this reflectedin Arrow'stheorem and the vast moral dimensionof citizenship.Rousseau literaturethat has sprungup from it, all of discussesthis topic in Emile as well as in which can trace its lineage back to Con- his essay The Government of Poland; dorcet's 1785 Essay and the paradox of Condorcetdoes so in a numberof essays, cyclical majorities there first identified. some of which have not been yet translat- We have argued that a judgment-based ed into English.Shklar 1969 is a usefulref- notion of choiceis an appropriatecomple- erence for a discussion of Rousseau's ment to the preference-basedperspective. views on this point, while Kintzler1984 is We certainly do not wish to make the devoted entirely to explicating Condor- absurdclaim that the interestsof individ- cet's views about public education and uals in a society never conflict or that all, citizenship. Both Rousseau and Condor- or even most of, politics is about the cet (especiallythe former)can be thought search for the public interest. Rather, of as advocatesfor what has been called a much of the normal process of govern- "civil religion." ment deals with the reconciliationof con- flicting preferences (see Mansbridge 1980, 1981). However, we do wish to Justifying Representative rebut the claim that politics is only about the searchfor power or advantage.A vi- Democracy sion of politics (and politicians) that is While representativedemocracy can be blind to the sharedvalues in a society can justifiedin terms of the practicalimpossi- never hope to explain the course of his- bility of a pure democraticform or by the tory.22 sorts of fears about mob rule that moti- BERNARDGROFMAN vated many of the founding fathers and led them to devise a governmentwhose Universityof California,Irvine powers were divided, limited, and bal- Scanr L. FELD anced, our approachleads us to empha- size the benefitsof bringingthe specialized State Universityof New York, skills of knowledgeable individuals to Stony Brook bear on society's problems. In Condor- cetian terms-in some situationsthe most Notes useful voting that can be done by a large assembly is to select a smaller and more 1. Grofmanand Feldbroach the subjectof possi- competent subgroup to decide matters. ble historical influences between Condorcet and Even if we conceive of the public interest Rousseau.They point out that Condorcet'sEssay on the Application of Mathematicsto the Theory of as some aggregation of the interests of Decision-makingmakes no mention of Rousseau society'sparts, it may still be the case that and suggestthat Rousseaumight have had accessto judgmentis neededto ascertainthose sub- Condorcet'sideas by way of their mutual friend group interestsas well. D'Alembert.But there is evidence Rousseauinflu- As Estlund enced Condorcetrather than the otherway around. correctly points out, the The doctrineof the generalwill, includingthe cen- "receivedview" of democracy is "that a tral respectsin which it is susceptibleof Condor- proper democratic vote expresses the cetiananalysis, was presentin Rousseau's1755 arti- voter's preferences about the social cle in Diderot's Encyclopediaon the subject of choices in question, and that these are to moral and political economy (known now as the Third Discourse or Discourse on Political be combinedin an outcomethat pleasesas Economy). The relevant doctrines are scattered many people as possible within the throughoutthat article, but much can be found in bounds of fairness."It is this preference- paragraph23. It impliesthat the generalwill can be

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known in the right conditions by assemblingthe cancel each other out" passage of Rousseau's (1988, people. Eventhough Political Economy contains no 572). explicitdiscussion of voting (and so none of major- 5. Grofman and Feld are aware of this point about ity rule), we may presumethat that would be the factions' addressing the wrong question (1988, 573, point of such public assembliesand their "delibera- n. 5, 12), but they underemphasize it. They interpret tions." The same paragraphincludes the doctrine Rousseau's worries about fictionalization wholly in that the decision of the assemblycan fail to be the Condorcetian terms when the failure of factionalized general will; and elsewhere in Political Economy voters to address the common good is at least as (esp. par. 16) the reason is said to be that citizens good an explanation. often substituteprivate or partial interestsfor the 6. Grofman and Feld rightly criticize certain tradi- common good in their deliberations.This suggests tional interpretations of Rousseau which hold that that the correct answer is objective in the way a he subordinates the importance of individuals to the Condorcetiananalysis would require.The relevant greater social whole. There is an explicit text that Condorcetianelements are, then, alreadypresent in supports Grofman and Feld's position in this impor- this early article. tant long-standing controversy: Rousseau's Social Contract appeared in 1762. Rousseaucould not have known of Condorcetvia Is the welfareof a citizen any less the commoncause D'Alembertuntil those two became associated in than the welfareof the entirestate? If someonewere to 1765, threeyears after the appearanceof Social Con- tell us that it is good that one personshould perish for tract and ten years after PoliticalEconomy (Baker all, I would admirethis sayingwhen it comes from the lips of a worthy and virtuous patriot who dedicates 1976, xxix). himselfwillingly and out of duty to die for the welfareof Condorcet,on the other hand, definitelyknew of his country. But if this means that the governmentis Rousseau'swork by 1785 at the latest. In that year permittedto sacrificean innocentperson for the welfare (or before)he publishedsome anonymousnotes and of the multitude,I hold thismaxim to be one of the most an introductionto a speechhe had given in 1781 ac- despicablethat tyranny has everinvented, the mostfalse ceptinginduction to the FrenchAcademy. In those that one mightpropose, the most dangerousone might notes he mentionsRousseau with approval,though accept, and the most directly opposed to the funda- he cites no specificdoctrines (see his note E in Con- mentallaws of society. (PoliticalEconomy 31) dorcet 1976, 20). Seventeeneighty-five is also the year of the Essay, 30 years afterRousseau's Political 7. Beyond the fact that the passage does not re- Economy, 23 years after Social Contract, 7 years quire that reading, there is some positive evidence afterRousseau's death, and 4 years afterthe appear- that Rousseau advocated prevote discussion in 1764 ance of the Confessions,whose posthumousappear- in "Letters from the Mountain." (I am grateful to ance inspireda popularcult in France(see Miller). Joshua Cohen for suggesting that support could be An activeintellectual like Condorcetwas most likely found there.) For example, aware of the Social Contractwell before the 1785 notes, but by themselves the notes establish the In a republicanstate whereFrench is spokenit is neces- possibilityof Rousseau'sinfluence on the Essay. sary to make a separatelanguage for government.For SinceRousseau could not have knownof Condor- example,to deliberate,to opine, to vote, are threevery cet throughD'Alembert before the Social Contract, differentthings that the Frenchdo not sufficientlydis- since Condorcetalmost certainly knew of the Politi- tinguish.To deliberateis to weighthe prosand cons. To opine is to state one's view [dire son avis] and give cal Economyand the Social Contractlong beforethe reasonsfor it. To vote is one's suffrage,when nothing Essay and absolutelycertainly knew of his work in remainsbut to count the voices. One beginsby putting the year of the Essay, and since there is an extra- the matterunder deliberation.The first time around, ordinaryaffinity between the Social Contractand one opines;finally, one votes. (Rousseau1964, p. 833, the Essay (demonstratedby Grofmanand Feld), it n.; translationmind, with help from Meg Denton) seemshighly likely that Rousseauwas an important influenceon the topic and argumentof the Essay. It is unclear whether deliberer means collective or in- 2. See, however, Grofman1975 for some discus- dividual weighing of pros and cons. Like the English sion of relatedissues. deliberation, it can mean either. Notice that Rous- 3. In Estlundn.d. I argue that interpretationsof seau does not say that one begins by deliberating, votes as expressionsof individualpreferences fail to which would be the closest parallel to one opines account for the requirementof the idea of demo- and one votes. Instead, he says "one begins by put- cratic voting that all addresssome single issue. So ting the matter under deliberation," suggesting that the desirabilityof addressingthe same issue stems the deliberation is not individual but collective. In not just from Condorcetianconsiderations but also any case, he explicitly says that one states and moti- from constraintson what should count as demo- vates one's view before voting, enough to constitute craticvoting. pre-vote communication. Still, it is a central chal- 4. This may provide an alternativeto Grofman lenge for a Rousseauian philosophy of democracy to and Feld'sreading of the vexing "plusesand minuses account for public discussion and majority rule in a

1336 DemocraticTheory and the Public Interest way consistentwith individuals'thinking for them- come of indirectmajority rule. But this can occur selves, one of Rousseau'scentral and persistentcon- only when the votes within the threesubgroups are cerns. 2-1, 2-1 and 0-3. The probabilityof this split occur- 8. See Social Contract2.1: 'Were there no point ring if indirect majority rule reaches the wrong of agreementamong all these [private]interests, no answer is 27p4 (1 - p)5; the probability of this split society could exist. For it is utterly on the basis of occurringif indirectmajority rule reaches the correct this common interest that society ought to be answeris 27 (1 - p)4p5.Thus, aftersome arithmetic, governed." we see that the advantageof simple majorityrule 9. Thereis, however, a questionof whetherRous- over indirectmajority rule (threegroups of three), seau would permitconsideration of the publicinter- for the nine-voter case with identical p values is est to takeplace behind a Rawlsianveil of ignorance. simply27p4 (1 - p)4 (2p - 1). Forp greaterthan one- Accordingto Barry(1964, 13) Rousseauinsists that half this expressionwill be positive, but it will be the policy's effect on the voter "mustactually be in relativelysmall (equallingzero, of course,if p equals prospect." one-halfor if p equalsone). Forp = .6 the value of 10. However,we, like Barry,believe that a mean- this expressionis .017;for p = .7, it equals .022;for ingfulconcept of public interestcan be definedeven p = .75, it equals .016; while for p = .9, it equals in the contextof the large, modernnation-state, not .002. just for a city-statesuch as Rousseau'sGeneva. This example may provide some insight into 11. It is well known that Arrow (followingBlack SupremeCourt decisionmaking when the Court is 1958)proved a possibilitytheorem for single-peaked seekingto "interpret"statutory language or the lan- preferences.Sen (1966)specified a set of restrictions guageof the U.S. Constitutionitself, or if we look at on individual preferenceorderings necessary and cases where the SupremeCourt has attemptedto sufficientto guaranteetransitivity of social choice. enunciatea notion of the public interest(see, e.g., Gaertnerand Heinecke (1978) and Feld and Grof- FederalPower Commissionv. Hope Natural Gas man (1986a, 1986b) have, in effect, restatedthose 1944 and discussionin Redford1958). conditionsin termsof what the latterrefer to as "net 15. Effectivelythis is the mainpoint madeby Ted preferences."In the Gaertnerand Heineckeand Feld Lowi (1964)in his attack on "interestgroup liberal- and Grofmanapproach, it is not necessarythat any ism." type of preferenceordering be excluded. What is 16. The view that Rousseauwas antideliberative, necessaryis that preferencesover any set of three whichEstlund wrongly attributes to us, does seemto alternativescancel each other out so that the only be held by Walzer(1983). The "intentof Rousseau's preferencesorderings that remain (the net prefer- argument"that the citizens would always reach a ences) give rise to a transitiveordering. good decisionif, "beingfurnished with adequatein- Feldand Grofman(1986a, 1986b, 1988) show that formation, . . . [they] had no communicationwith voter preferencesover a set of four possible presi- one another,"Walzer states, is to "eliminatemeet- dentialcandidates in 1980satisfied the net preference ings altogetherand ban the clubs and parties that conditionand gave rise to orderingsthat were single- politiciansorganize to make theirpersuasiveness ef- peakedwith respectto an underlyingleft-right con- fective.... Then, each individualwould think'only tinuum:Kennedy-Carter-Ford-Reagan. A sufficient his own thoughts.'There would be no room for per- conditionfor what we call "netsingle-peakedness" is suasion or organization,no premium on speech- the ideological marginscondition. It requiresthat makingand committeeskills, insteadof an aristoc- the matrixshowing the marginby which alternative racy of orators, genuine democracy of citizens i would defeat alternativej in a paired contest be- would take shape"(p. 306). But Walzerthen goes to tween only those two alternatives(negative if j loses rejectthis view as impractical,noting that informa- to i) has the propertiesthat there is a way of ordering tion adequatefor judgmentcannot be providedex- alternativessuch that in every row, above the main cept by allowingcommunication. "Even if we don't diagonal, margins increase (or at least do not talk with one another, someone must talk to all of decrease)as we move to the right and such that in us, not only supplyingfacts and figures, but also every column, above the maindiagonal, margins in- defendingpositions" (p. 306). crease(or at least do not decrease)as we move from 17. The claim is frequentlymade that above or the entry in the top row downward.This line of re- below a certaingroup size, group processestend to search on ideologicalmargins parallels, for prefer- break down. This is a claim made by Madison in ences as opposed to judgment,our work on Borda Federalist55 (see also Federalist58). margins. 12. See n. 11. Sixtyor seventy men may be more properly trusted with 13. Also see n. 11. a givendegree of powerthan six or seven.But it does 14. The only circumstanceunder which the out- notfollow that six or sevenwould be proportionately a come of majorityvoting among the threegroups of betterdepository. And if wecarry on thesupposition to threeand simplemajority among the nine voterscan sixor seventhousand, the whole reasoning ought to be differis when fewer than five voters shape the out- reversed.The truth is, thatin allcases a certainnumber

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at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of legislators, administrators,or jurists may remain free consultation and discussion, and to guard against strong. Forsuch individuals,knowledgeable pursuit too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on of the public good remainsthe norm even if only the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept observedin the breach. within certain limits in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.

A related argument can be drawn from the logic of References the free-rider problem (Olson 1965). If shirking falls off more than linearly with group size, the gain in Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individ- competence with group size identified in the Con- ual Values. New York: Wiley. dorcet jury theorem may be outweighed by other Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach social-psychological effects (cf. Grofman 1974). to Norms." American Political Science Review 18. One relevant model is that for tasks where dif- 80:1095-1111. ferent actors possess different pieces of knowledge or Baker, Keith M., ed. 1976. Condorcet: Selected different types of skills. In such circumstances, delib- Writings. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. eration and coordination is needed. Without com- Barry, Brian. 1964. "The Public Interest." Proceed- munication, groups will fail. Metaphorically, in this ings of the Aristotelian Society 38:9-14. model, we may think of the public interest as a kind Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees of jigsaw puzzle. We do need to clarify one point, and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- the meaning of the term independent choices. As we sity Press. use that term, it has a technical meaning, namely, Bordley, Robert F. 1986. "Review Essay: Bayesian that the probability that voter i makes a correct Group Decision Theory." In Information Pool- choice will not be affected by whether or not voter i ing and Group Decision Making, ed. Bernard has made (or will make) a correct choice. It does not Grofman and Guillermo Owen. Westport, CT: mean what it might mean in ordinary usage, to wit, JAI. that members of the group lack a shared background Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The of knowledge or values. Nor does independence, per Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of se, imply the absence of communication. Our dis- Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: Univer- cussion of voter independence was not as clear as it sity of Michigan Press. might have been. We do not actually hold some of Cohen, Joshua. 1986. "An Epistemic Conception of the views Waldron takes us to task for. Democracy." Ethics 97:26-38. 19. There is a literature in social psychology that Coleman, Jules, and John Ferejohn. 1986. "Democ- touches on these questions. A useful review is found racy and Social Choice." Ethics 97:6-25. in Hastie 1986. Bordley (1986) and Dalkey (1986) Condorcet, Marquis de. 1976. Condorcet: Selected review modeling issues related to these questions, as Writings. Ed. Keith Michael Baker. Indianapolis: does Grofman (1980; see esp. the references to the Bobbs-Merrill. work of James Davis and associates on models of Dalkey, Norman C. 1969a. The Delphi Method: An conformity and persuasion in jury decision making). Experimental Study of Group Opinion. Santa The general problem of optimizing judgmental ac- Monica: Rand Corporation. curacy of groups in situations where voter choices Dalkey, Norman C. 1969b. "An Experimental Study are nonindependent is beyond our scope here. For of Group Opinion: the Delphi Method." Futures some efforts along that line see Owen 1986, Shapley 1 (5):408-26. and Grofman 1984, and Grofman 1980. Dalkey, Norman C. 1986. "Information Pooling As 20. For the special case where the formal voting the Composition of Inquiry Systems," in Infor- rule is supramajoritarian, Grofman (1979) has mation Pooling and Group Decision Making, ed. shown that group deliberation can reduce group Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. West- judgmental accuracy if it takes the group away from port, CT: JAI. de facto majority rule. See also n. 11. Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire. Cambridge: 21. We do not dispute Waldron's claim that Rous- Harvard University Press. seau was hostile to indirect democracy. There are Estlund, David. N.d. "Democracy without Prefer- important parallels between the views of Rousseau ence." The Philosophical Review. Forthcoming. and those of Condorcet, but certainly their views of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas. democracy are not identical. 1944. 320 U.S. 591, 127. 22. If there are widely endorsed norms of citizen- Feld, Scott L., and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. "The ship, we do not need to rely solely on internal moral Accuracy of Group Majority Decisions in imperatives to motivate their implementation. Groups with Added Members." Public Choice Social processes can provide private incentives to 42:273-85. reinforce norms (Axelrod 1986). Also, in a represen- Feld, Scott L., and Bernard N. Grofman. 1986a. "On tative democracy, even if norms of citizenship the Possibility of Faithfully Representative Com- weaken, norms of what is appropriate behavior for mittees." American Political Science Review

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80:863-79. Feld. 1983. "Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Feld, Scott L., and Bernard N. Grofman. 1986b. Truth." Theory and Decision 15:261-78. "Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and Gustafson, David H., R. K. Lebeq, and G. W. Clarification." Public Choice 51:71-80. Walsten. 1973. "A Comparative Study of Differ- Feld, Scott L., and Bernard N. Grofman. 1988. ences in Subjective Likelihood Estimates Made "Ideological Consistency As a Collective Phe- by Individuals, Interacting Groups, and Nominal nomenon." American Political Science Review Groups." Organizational Behavior and Human 82:64-75. Performance 9:280-91. Gaertner, W. and Heinecke, A. 1978. "Cyclically Hastie, Reid. 1986. "Review Essay: Experimental Mixed Preferences-A Necessary and Sufficient Evidence on Group Accuracy." In Information Condition for Transitivity of the Social Prefer- Pooling and Group Decision Making, ed. Ber- ence Relation." In Decision Theory and Social nard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. Westport, Ethics, ed. Hans W. Goltinger and Werner CT: JAI. Leinfellner. Dordrecht: Reidel. Kintzler, Catherine. 1984. Condorcet: L'instruction Grofman, Bernard N. 1974. "Helping Behavior and publique et la naissance du citoyen. Paris: Group Size, Some Exploratory Stochiastic Minerve. Models." Behavioral Science 19:219-24. Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. End of Liberalism: Ideol- Grofman, Bernard N. 1975. "A Comment on Demo- ogy, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority. cratic Theory: A Preliminary Mathematical New York: Norton. Model." Public Choice 21:99-104. Mansbridge, Jane J. 1980. Beyond Adversary De- Grofman, Bernard N. 1978. "Judgmental Compe- mocracy. New York: Basic Books. tence of Individuals and Groups in a Dichoto- Mansbridge, Jane J. 1981. "Living with Conflict: mous Choice Situation: Is a Majority of Heads Representation in the Theory of Adversary Better Than One?" Journal of Mathematical Democracy." Ethics 92:466-76. Sociology 6:47-60. Mill, John Stuart. 1975. John Stuart Mill: Three Grofman, Bernard N. 1979. "A Preliminary Model Essays. Ed. Richard Wollheim. Oxford: Oxford of Jury Decision Making As a Function of Jury University Press. Size, Effective Jury Decision Rule, and Mean Nitzan, Shmuel, and Jacob Paroush. 1982. "Optimal Juror Judgmental Competence." In Frontiers of Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Economics, vol. 3, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow and Choice Situations." International Economic Seppo Honkapohja. Review 23 (2):288-97. Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. "The Slippery Slope: Nitzan, Shmuel, and Jacob Paroush. 1985. Collec- Jury Size and Jury Verdict Requirements-Legal tive Decision Making: An Economic Approach. and Social Science Approaches." Law and New York: Cambridge University Press. Politics Quarterly 2 (3):285-304. Olson, Mancur, Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Grofman, Bernard N., and Scott L. Feld. 1984. Action. New York: Shocken. "Group Size and the Performance of a Compos- Owen, Guillermo. 1986. " 'Fair' Indirect Majority ite Group Majority: Statistical Truths and Em- Rules." In Information Pooling and Group Deci- pirical Results." Organizational Behavior and sion Making, ed. Bernard Grofman and Guiller- Human Performance 33:350-59. mo Owen. Westport, CT: JAI. Grofman, Bernard N., and Scott L. Feld. 1986. Plott, Charles R. 1976. "Axiomatic Social Choice "Determining Optimal Weights for Expert Judg- Theory: An Overview and Interpretation." ment." In Information Pooling and Group Deci- American Journal of Political Science 20:511-96. sion Making, ed. Bernard Grofman and Guiller- Redford, Emmette Shelburn. 1958. "The Never-end- mo Owen. Westport, CT: JAI. ing Search for the Public Interest." In Ideals and Grofman, Bernard N., and Scott L. Feld. 1988. Practice in Public Administration, ed. E. S. Red- "Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Per- ford. Alabama: University of Alabama Press. spective." American Political Science Review Riker, William. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. 82:567-76. New York: Freeman. Grofman, Bernard N., Scott Feld, and Guillermo Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1964. Oeuvres Completes. Owen. 1982. "Evaluating the Competence of Ex- Ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond. perts, Pooling Individual Judgments into a Col- Paris: Bibliotheque de la Pleiade. lective Choice, and Delegating Decision Respon- Runciman, W. G., and Amartya K. Sen. 1965. sibility to Subgroups." In Dependence and In- "Games, Justice, and the General Will." Mind equality, ed. Felix Geyer and Hans van der 74:554-62. Zouwen. New York: Pergamon. Samuelson, Paul Anthony. 1947. Foundations of Grofman, Bernard N., and Barbara Norrander. N.d. Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard "Efficient Use of Reference Group Cues in a University Press. Single Dimension." Public Choice. Forthcoming. Sen, Amartya K. 1966. "A Possibility Theorem on Grofinan, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, and Scott L. Majority Decisions." Econometrica 34:491-99.

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