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Home , Common good, Common good (economics), Public interest

C o m m o n G o o d of the community. He begins by asking what sort of people we want to produce, Amitai Etzioni moving then to the question of how we should structure society to achieve this end (1941: § 7, O v e r v i e w ch. 1). This question presupposes that a society has a shared end that both is separate from and The (alternatively called “the actively shapes the good of the individual. ” or “public ”) denotes Thus, and present a vision of the those goods that serve all members of a given common good that cannot simply be reduced community and its institutions, and, as to the sum of all private interests, but whose such, includes both goods that serve no iden- promotion is nonetheless conducive to those tifiable particular group, as well as those that interests – virtuous, fulfilled citizens and har- serve members of generations not yet born. monious communities are both consequences It is a normative concept with a long and of the pursuit of the good life. contested history. Philosophers, theologians, The ancient Roman philosophers had a sim- lawyers, politicians, and the public have ilarly robust and inherently political concep- arrived at distinct understandings about what tion of the common good. (1928 : bk. 1 the common good entails, how it should be ch. xxv), writing around 50 bce defined a balanced against individual goods, and if and “people” or “” as “not any collection of by whom it should be enforced. Though there human beings brought together in any sort of are many critics of the notion of the common way, but an assemblage of people in large num- good (as will be discussed below), it has sur- bers associated in agreement with respect to vived as a meaningful concept for well over justice and a partnership for the common two millennia, and continues to serve as a good.” very significant organizing principle of civic and political life. Christian thought The Common Good in History Often drawing on Greek and Roman tradition, Christian theologians have also explored the Greek and Roman common good (at least since the time of The common good has deep roots in the his- Augustine). In City of God Augustine takes up tory of philosophical and religious thought. Cicero’s definition of a republic as a people For Plato (1968 : 185) “the good” was objective, joined by their pursuit of the common good defined as that which “every soul pursues and and specifies the content of that good from a for the sake of which it does everything.” Christian perspective: the good is none other Arriving at knowledge of the good within a than God, and to pursue the common good is community would create unity, which is “the to render unto God the love and worship that is greatest blessing for a state.” In this conception His due. maintains a similar there is no tension between the private and theological conception of the common good: , as individuals are thought to “God’s own goodness … is the good of the attain happiness (a ) through the whole universe.” The Christian formulation of pursuit of justice (a public good). For Aristotle the common good also differs from its Greek ( 1941 : 1188–9) “a polis exists for the sake of a predecessors in its acknowledgment of the good life,” and human beings, as political ani- tension that exists between the private and mals, lead a good life by contributing to the public good. Aquinas (1972 : 107) wrote that

The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0178 2 qualifies as a tyranny when “it is good is here conflated with the well-being of not directed to the common good, but to the the individual. private good.” Moreover, private interest is Given the proper conditions (i.e., a free often associated with and sin, the market economy) individuals reveal their antithesis of righteous action done in the ser- self-interested preferences in the marketplace vice of God and the common good. at which point supply and demand calibrate Without breaking from these early concep- prices such that these private ends are effi- tions, modern Christians have incorporated ciently met. That is, the common good – the the language of individual rights into their def- summation of all private goods – arises inition of the common good. The Second naturally from the market and no state efforts Vatican Council (Vatican n.d.) defined the are needed to promote it. Indeed, attempts to common good as “the sum total of social con- guide the preferences of individuals towards a ditions which allow people, either as groups or common goal are seen as, at best, paternalism, as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more and at worst, the first step on the road to total- fully and more easily.” And David Hollenbach itarianism, as was famously argued by Friedrich (1989 : 93), a Catholic scholar, concludes that A. Hayek ( 1944 ) in The Road to Serfdom . “the historically achievable common good will Economists have introduced exceptions to demand that the pluriformity of human this rule for situations in which the invisible community be respected, and such respect hand is unable to provide “public goods” that should be institutionalized politically, legally benefit society at large. The market’s inability to and economically.” That is, even if the ultimate produce such goods reflect what economists call good has a single, absolute definition – God – a “” (an instance where the market pursuing that good need not entail imposing is unable to achieve an efficient allocation of Christian and practice on all people. ) and thus government intervention in the production of these goods is tolerated. In Social Science and Law Examples of public goods include defense, basic research, and public health (e.g., fluoridation and vaccinations). Thus, Kenneth J. Arrow The place of the common good in modern (1962 : 619) wrote that “we expect a free enterprise (neoclassical) economics has its origins in economy to underinvest in invention and the Enlightenment conception of society as research (as compared with an ideal) because it is existing “in order to further the goals of indi- risky, because the product can be appropriated viduals, neither asking where the goals of indi- only to a limited extent, and because of increasing viduals come from nor inquiring into the returns in use. This underinvestment will be processes by which individuals are formed in greater for more basic research.” society” (Yuengert 2009 : 5). In neoclassical economics the common good is not an I n l a w objective goal to be discerned and pursued but In public debates in the west, and in rather the aggregation of individual goods. particular in the USA, concern for the common This idea was first articulated by good tends to be overshadowed by a legal par- ( 2001 : 288), who posited that man, in pur- adigm that grants primacy to individual rights suing his own personal gain, unwittingly “pro- and liberties. Subscribers to this school of motes that of the society more effectually than thought include both economic conservatives when he really intends to promote it.” The seeking legal protection from government reg- so-called “” of the market guides ulation and “legal liberals” who – motivated in selfish interests to maximize the common part by a desire to curb state-sanctioned good, which is defined as the efficient and violence (e.g., war, police brutality, the death maximal creation of wealth. The common penalty) – embrace legally codified rights and 3 broad constraints on state power as the best individualized suspicion have repeatedly been means to that end. Thus, in the USA there has upheld by the courts if there are good reasons been vocal opposition to the various security for them, whether these reasons are said to fall measures that have been introduced following under a “special needs exception” or a “public the 2001 attacks on the American homeland safety exception” to the Fourth Amendment. on the grounds that such measures violate Sobriety checkpoints that stop all or randomly individual rights. Similarly, many object to the chosen drivers, rather than only those whose fact that individual privacy is often violated driving shows signs of being intoxicated, are both by the government and by corporations legally permissible, as is the use of metal detec- and hold that the purpose of the law is to tors in airports and public buildings to search restrict such abuses. the belongings and persons of millions of The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), people each day. Even the First Amendment which defines itself as an institution dedicated has been judged by the Supreme Court to allow to defending individual rights and liberties for a number of restrictions on speech for the (while making little mention of the common sake of the common good, including the bar- good), champions this line of legal thought. ring of incitement, obscenity, threats, slander, The ACLU has a history of mounting legal and child pornography. challenges against what it considers to be Although the US courts have done much to incursions into individual liberty, includ- recognize the value of the common good, ing sobriety checkpoints, Transport Security striking the right balance between the screening, drug testing for interest and individual rights can prove diffi- people charged with maintaining public safety, cult. Communitarians have weighed in on this pilots, train engineers, and HIV testing for question by providing a of balancing cri- pregnant women. teria to determine whether or not a given right The prioritization of individual rights over can be overridden in order to promote the the common good is codified to some extent in common good. To illustrate, in the study of US law, most visibly in the Bill of Rights, where privacy four criteria are provided for deter- protections of individuals are often enshrined mining whether privacy or the common good in exceptionless language: “Congress shall make should yield. First, a free society will limit pri- no law respecting an establishment of , vacy only if it faces a well-documented and or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or macroscopic threat to the common good (such abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; as public safety or public health), not merely a or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, hypothetical danger. Tampering with ethical, and to petition the government for a redress of social, and legal traditions – and with the grievances” (emphasis mine). However, US law public that underlie them – also includes many toeholds for those who endangers those traditions’ legitimacy. Once would use it to promote the common good. The tradition is breached it is difficult to prevent it Fourth Amendment, for example, uses less from unraveling, the problem of the so-called absolute rights language. By banning only slippery slope. Changes, therefore, should not unreasonable searches and seizures it recog- be undertaken unless there is strong evidence nizes that there are reasonable ones – those in that either the common good or privacy has the public interest. been significantly ignored. Furthermore, US courts have historically Second, after determining that the common recognized the importance of balancing good needs shoring up, one should examine individual rights with the common good. whether that goal can be achieved without Court interpretations of the law often limit recalibrating privacy. For instance, when individual liberties to safeguard the public medical records are needed by researchers, interest. For example, searches lacking personally identifying (such as 4 names, addresses and social security numbers), among interest groups – which reveal and are should first be removed. Third, to the extent guided by the preferences of individuals (i.e., that privacy-curbing measures must be intro- private goods) – gives rise to a duced, a free society makes them as minimally that maximizes general welfare. The represen- intrusive as possible. For example, many agree tative function of such a is that drug tests should be conducted on those preserved both because all individuals are free directly responsible for the lives of others, such to associate with any number of these groups as school bus drivers. Many employers, how- and because each group can only exercise ever, resort to highly intrusive visual surveil- pressure equivalent to its popular support. lance to ensure that the sample is taken from Political scientists in the pluralist tradition the person who delivers it when in fact the readily criticize top-down notions of the public less intrusive procedure of measuring the tem- interest and the common good as inviting perature of the sample immediately after authoritarianism at the expense of procedural delivery would suffice. Last, measures that . Thus Frank Sorauf ( 1962 ) and treat undesirable side-effects of necessary others have argued that the tug of war between privacy-diminishing measures are to be private interest groups produces public policy preferred over those that ignore these effects. superior to anything that would be reached by These measures are required both to protect the state enforcing its own formulation of the people from unnecessary injury and to sustain public interest. public support for the needed . Thus, if The pluralist approach amounts to an more widespread HIV testing and contact tracing are deemed necessary to protect public understanding of in terms of autono- health, efforts must be made to enhance the mous and isolated individuals and their inter- confidentiality of the records of those tested. ests. It is the vision of politics as an arena … Application of the four balancing criteria [which] makes impossible within contemporary any credible notion of a public helps to ensure that correctives to a society’s interest or a common good … because there is course are both truly needed and not excessive no public or community other than the (Etzioni 1999). Granted, even when these aggregation of individuals and special interest criteria are applied, one cannot pinpoint with groups which they form. (Cochran 1974 : 328) complete precision the proper or optimal course to follow. have rather crude Critics argue that discrepancies in wealth, guidance mechanisms, and may need con- power, and position give groups varying stantly to adjust their course as they oversteer degrees of leverage over the government, and first in one direction and then in the other. as a result public policy does not maximize However, the criteria do provide a basic mea- social welfare (i.e., that aggregation of sure of the imbalance between individual rights individual goods), much less reflect a robustly and the common good, and the direction and defined common good, but rather preserves nature of the necessary corrections. the interests of the politically and economically powerful. These opponents hold that select The public interest aims and values constraining the democratic The pluralist tradition of political science, process are necessary for there to be meaningful which largely adopts the assumptions of neo- (rather than a rout), and also for , has little room for a robust ensuring that causes that are marginalized or notion of the public interest, and in some cases underrepresented – but intrinsically worthy – criticizes such a notion as implicitly antidemo- find expression in public policy. cratic. Pluralist thinkers, drawing upon their However, such criticism still neglects the theory’s economic underpinnings, argue that larger point that interest group pluralists fail to in a free and robust democracy competition properly incorporate notions of the public 5 good into their normative framework. One ulterior, self-serving motive. For everyone else, might very well concede that a constrained examples of such common goods are readily democratic pluralistic process is better than a apparent: in addition to national defense and laissez-faire one while denying that there is any basic research, discussed above, public health such notion as the common good. Rather, one and environmental preservation are widely might simply hold that a constrained pluralism accepted examples of common goods. The is the best means for advancing individual nonself-interested nature of these measures self-interest. Thus, it is worth turning now to a stands out especially when serving the common more communitarian understanding of politics good entails not merely some costs to the that places the common good at the front and individual (e.g., ) but as the existential center of normative analysis. risks of certain forms of service such as fighting for one’s country. Communitarian versus Liberal Protecting the environment, preventing Conception of the Common Good climate change, and developing sustainable energy sources are all costly projects that will In less individualistic societies – many of them only pay off over the longer run, and then only nonwestern – the value of the common good is to unknown, unpredictable beneficiaries. The rarely questioned. However, the normative millions of people who are working towards status of the common good – unlike that of these goals today cannot be sure that they will rights – is far from self-evident to many in the be alive to see the full impact of their work. west. The use of the term “the common good” Self-interest-maximizing individuals would is contested on a number of fronts. First, there gain a much better rate of return on their are those who argue that it does not exist at all. money if they invested in readily available Philosopher Ayn Rand (Rand & Branden financial instruments such as stocks and bonds, 1986 : 20) wrote in Capitalism: The Unknown and then used the dividends to purchase air Ideal that conditioners and sunscreen. there is no such entity as “the tribe” or “the In response to this account of the common public”; the tribe (or the public or society) is good, libertarians have developed elaborate only a number of individual men. Nothing arguments that explain why people invest in can be good for the tribe as such; “good” and these common goods that do not necessarily “value” pertain only to a living organism – to benefit them, without giving up on their an individual living organism – not to a dis- assumption that people are rational utility embodied aggregate of relationships. maximizers. For example, , Communitarians counter that the common Gordon Tullock, and William Riker all won- good does not merely amount to an aggregation dered why a rational actor would bother to of all private or personal goods in a society. vote. These social scientists assume that “the Contributions to the common good often offer voter calculates the expected utility from each no immediate payout or benefit. It is frequently candidate’s victory, and naturally votes for the impossible to predict who the beneficiaries will candidate whose policies promise the highest be in the long run. Still, members of commu- utility” (Mueller 2003 : 304). Yet the probability nities that support the common good invest in that any one voter’s ballot will affect the out- it not because it will necessarily or even likely come of all but the closest is virtually benefit them personally, or even their children, zero. As always imposes at least some but because they consider it a good that ought costs (such as time lost waiting in line to vote, to be nurtured. They consider it the right thing the price of the gasoline needed to drive to the to do – by itself, for itself. This explanation sur- polling station, etc.), those costs almost always prises only those who claim that, even when we outweigh the expected benefit. Downs and act in clearly altruistic ways, we always have an others tried to argue that people do, in fact, 6 vote because they believe that the results will be political temperament, calls to serve the close and hence their one vote could decide the common good hark back to the days of – a personal benefit that would offset enforced conformity under authoritarian the individual cost of their effort. However, it regimes, an overbearing church, and oppres- turns out that many millions vote even when sive Salem-like communities (Gutmann 1985 : elections are known not to be close. 319). Many libertarians and some liberals hold, Actually, the evidence shows that the most instead, that each person should decide for important factor that explains whether a person herself what constitutes the good and that will vote is the extent to which the person con- society ought to then base its public policies on siders voting his or her “citizen’s duty.” André the aggregation of these individual choices. Blais (2000 : 137), a professor of political sci- Michael J. Sandel and Charles Taylor, among ence, finds that “about half the electorate … other academic communitarians, have criti- vote out of a strong sense of moral obligation, cized the philosophical underpinnings of this because they believe it would be wrong not to liberal/libertarian . They vote; they do not calculate benefits and costs.” argue that contemporary and liber- A second commonly voiced criticism of the tarianism presuppose an incoherent notion of common good comes from those on the left the individual as existing outside of and apart who hold that the concept – as manifested, for from society rather than embedded within it. instance, in the call to serve the “fatherland” or Because individual identity is partly consti- “mother church” – serves to conceal class differ- tuted (or “constructed”) by culture and social ences in economic interests and political power relations, there is no coherent way of formu- so as to keep those who are disadvantaged from lating individual rights or interests abstracted making demands on the community. Indeed, from their social context. In particular, these these critics are correct in asserting that this communitarians argue that there is no point concept can be abused, as when the fear of ter- in attempting to derive from rorism is drummed up to justify curtailing the principles that individuals would choose in individual freedom. However, the fact that a a hypothetical state of ignorance of their social, concept is abused – a common fate for any economic, and historical circumstances (i.e., compelling concept – does not mean that it is from behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”), necessarily without merit. Otherwise we would because such individuals cannot exist. have to do away with such concepts as science, Academic communitarians draw upon rationality, and community, all of which can be Aristotle and the German Idealist philosopher misappropriated. That said, one would be well Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel to argue that served by paying mind to whether these terms any conception of the good must be formulated are used as originally defined or distorted and on the social level and that the community exploited for ideological purposes. cannot be a normative-neutral realm. Unless Finally, there are those who oppose the pur- there is a social formulation of the good, there suit of the common good on the grounds that it can be no normative foundation for resolving is inherently threatening to individual and conflicts of value between different individuals minority rights. Liberals and libertarians tend and groups. Such an overriding good (e.g., the to shun robustly communal definitions of the national well-being) enables persons with dif- good because they fear that if such formulations ferent moral outlooks or ideological back- are embraced, even if initially only on norma- grounds to find principled (rather than merely tive grounds, government will be tempted to prudential) common ground. coerce people into involuntary service. This in Communities are the most likely source of turn would diminish individual liberty – the particular specifications of what is good for its good that, for libertarians and many liberals, members. Some have argued that the term trumps all others. For individuals with such a “community” is so vague it cannot even be 7 defined. In contrast, communitarians hold R. Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of that community can be clearly defined as a Inventive Activities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton group of individuals that possesses two charac- University Press . teristics. The first is a web of affect-laden Aquinas , T. (1972 ) Summa Theologiae , vol. 35, relationships which often crisscross and rein- Consequences of Charity . New York : Cambridge University Press . force one another (rather than merely Blais , A. ( 2000 ) To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits one-on-one or chain-like individual relation- and Limits of Rational Choice Theory . Pittsburgh : ships). The second characteristic shared by the University of Pittsburgh Press . individuals of a community is some commit- Cicero , M. T. ( 1928 ) De Re Publica , trans. ment to a core of shared values, norms, and C. W. Keyes . Cambridge : Loeb Classical Library. meanings, as well as a history and Cochran , C. ( 1974 ) “ Political Science and ‘the identity – in short, a particularistic moral Public Interest ,’” Journal of Politics , 36 ( 2 ), culture. Responsive communitarians hold that 327 – 55 . community is basically a major common good Etzioni, A. (1999) The Limits of Privacy. New York: in itself as well as a major source of other Basic Books. common goods; “basically” because like all Gutmann , A. ( 1985 ) “ Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 14 ( 3 ), goods, community can take on dysfunctional 308 – 22 . forms, especially when its social bonds, culture, Hayek , F. A. ( 1944 ) The Road to Serfdom. London : or political structure are oppressive. Hence the Routledge . special import of balancing the community as a Hollenbach , D. ( 1989 ) “ The Common Good value with commitments to rights. Revisited ,” Theological Studies , 50 ( 1 ), 70 – 94 . An important facet of communities is their Mueller , D. ( 2003 ) III . Cambridge : ability to provide informal social controls that Cambridge University Press . reinforce the moral commitments of their Plato. ( 1968 ) The Republic, trans. A. Bloom . members, that is, they promote the common New York : Basic Books . good. This helps to make for a largely voluntary Sorauf , F. ( 1962 ) “ The Conceptual Muddle .” In social order. The most effective way to rein- C. Friedrich (Ed.), Nomos V: The Public Interest . New York : Atherton Press , force norms of behavior is to build on the fact pp. 183 – 90 . that people have a strong need for continuous Rand , A. and Branden , N. ( 1986 ) Capitalism: approval from others, especially from those The Unknown Ideal . New York : Penguin with whom they have affective bonds of attach- Books . ment, such as members of their community. Smith , A. ( 2001 ) Wealth of Nations , ed. C. J. Bullock . New York: Collier . SEE ALSO: Aristotle (384–322 bce ) ; Vatican. (n.d.) “ The Common Good ,” Catechism of Civil Liberties; Communitarianism ; Community ; the Catholic Church , § 1906, http://www.vatican. Ethics ; Individualism ; Interest Groups ; Plato va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c2a2. (429–347 bce ) ; Public Goods ; Sandel, Michael htm (accessed January 16, 2014). J. (1953–) ; Taylor, Charles (1931–) Yuengert , A. ( 2009 ) “ The Common Good for Economists ,” Faith and Economics , 38, 1–9 .

References Further Reading Aristotle. ( 1941 ) Politics , trans. B. Jowett . In R. McKeon (Ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle . Etzioni, A. (1996) The New Golden Rule. New York: New York : Random House. Basic Books. Arrow , K. ( 1962 ) “ Economic Welfare and the Etzioni , A. ( 2004 ) The Common Good . Cambridge : Allocation of Resources for Invention .” In P o l i t y .