Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

ORSAM Report No: 24 / December 2020

INVESTMENTS IN ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF EGYPT IN THE AL-SISI PERIOD

GÖKTUĞ SÖNMEZ, GÖKHAN BATU, ZEYNEP DURAN ORSAM

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Report No: 24 ORSAM REPORT

INVESTMENTS IN ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF EGYPT IN THE AL-SISI PERIOD

About the Authors

Göktuğ Sönmez

Dr. Göktuğ Sönmez got his BA in International Relations from Bilkent University, his MBA in International Relations from London School of Economics (LSE) and his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). His research areas are radicalization, violent extremism, international relations theory and Turkish foreign policy. Over the years, he conducted research for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Global Strategy Institute and ORSAM. He currently serves as a faculty member at Necmettin Erbakan University and as the Director of Security Studies Departmentof ORSAM. Gökhan Batu

Gökhan Batu completed his bachelor’s in Bussiness Administration in Gazi University. He went to Israel and studied in University of Haifa-Land of Israel Studies Department for his masters and graduated from this department in 2019. Currently, he is doing another masters in Intelligence Studies in Turkish Police Academy. He worked in ORSAM in scope of "Expert Training Program" from 2018 to 2019 November. He currently works in ORSAM as a research assistant in the Security Studies Department. He speaks English, Arabic (good) and Hebrew (intermediate). His research interests are Security, Intelligence, Israeli National Security and Poli- tics. Zeynep Duran

Zeynep Duran got her BA in International Relations from Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. She worked as an intern at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Researche(SAM), at the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA), and at the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM). She is currently a scholarship holder at the Security Studies Department of the Center of Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). She is interested in Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, international relations theories, radicalism and non-state armed actors.

December 2020

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CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 3

1. Egypt’s Arms Procurements, Supplier Diversification Policy and Infrastructure Investments During the Al-Sisi Period ...... 3

Efforts to Reduce Military Dependence on the USA (Diversification) in the Al-Sisi Period and Its Reasons ...... 3

Arms Procurement as a Tool of Multilateral Foreign Policy ...... 7

2. Arms Procurement and Infrastructure Investments ...... 9

A) Arms Procurement ...... 9

B) Developments in Infrastructure and Bases ...... 17

C) Reasons for Egypt’s Military Investments and Egypt’s Perceived Threat ...... 22

D) The Concept of Military Power and the Practical Equivalent of Egypt’s Military Investments ...... 24

Conclusion ...... 29

References ...... 32

Endnotes...... 35

Map and Table

Table : Arms Procurements During Al-Sisi Period in Egypt ...... 12

Map: Some of the Bases Built / Developed and Used for Military Purposes During the Al-Sisi Period...... 17

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INTRODUCTION However, the debate continues about whether all these investments have a holistic effect on According to the classification made by increasing the capacity of the Egyptian army the “Global Fire Power” in 2020, the Egyptian and how much it deserves its place in the Army ranks as the 9th most powerful army in ranking mentioned, or whether the ranking the world, going up three levels compared to reflects the real situation. the previous year.1 Considering the main reasons for this rising, it can be seen that there 1. EGYPT’S ARMS are multidimensional moves made to improve PROCUREMENTS, SUPPLIER the conventional capacity of the army and the DIVERSIFICATION POLICY AND arms procurements made under the admin- INFRASTRUCTURE istration of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who took the INVESTMENTS DURING THE presidency in 2014, especially after Mohamed AL-SISI PERIOD Morsi was overthrown by the military coup. Efforts to Reduce Military Dependence on the USA In this period, when arms (Diversification) in the Al-Sisi Period procurement is used as an and Its Reasons important tool for political In Egypt, the state and economy came purposes, Egypt tries to utilize under military tutelage beginning with the alternative sources such as Russia Free Officers Movement in 1952. After the and China and the EU countries suspension of King Farouk and the British particularly France, Germany, Italy, from the administration, while Gamal Abdel as well as the USA, which is Nasser became the first president of Egypt, a traditionally its most important Pan-Arabist-Socialist regime was established supplier. in the country where soldiers began to be as- signed to the most critical positions in the public sector. In this context, considering the In addition to arms procurements, Egypt’s experience of the United Arab Republic, it can policy to reduce its dependence on the United be said that there is an Egyptian nationalist States of America (USA), which has become approach rather than Pan-Arabism. In the the most important arms supplier with the context of socialism, it can be said that the change of axis after the Camp David Accords developments especially before and during Agreement with Israel, and to diversify its the Suez Crisis led to a breaking point. Anwar military supplier countries including Russia, Sadat, the successor of Nasser, tried to reduce European countries and China, stands out as the volume of soldiers in the state, but the an important strategy that has the potential opposite position was adopted during the reign to affect regional balances. Another important of Hosni Mubarak. Accordingly, the soldiers’ move that should be underlined on behalf of dominance in the country’s economy increased Egypt, is the steps that have been taken to by allowing them to establish economic en- improve its military infrastructure and bases. terprises. Nonetheless, the military influence

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on the state has been greatly increased by that this strategy has risks in itself, but is not building a tutelary regime with the appointment the result of a haphazard policy. of the soldiers to high levels of authority in To interpret the reasons that pushed Egypt the state administration.2 In 2008, the Egyptian to change its foreign policy and to instrumen- Army was described as a “semi-commercial talize its arms procurement strategy in this institution” in a comment attributed to the US direction, it is necessary to evaluate the Embassy in Cairo, which is an actual summary process that started with the military coup of the military situation in the country. The against the Morsi government, as well as the Egyptian Army holds special permits such as protests leading to the resignation of Mubarak. fuel incentives, control over profitable real estate, priority in government tenders, and It will be useful to comprehend the effects control over many sectors, from petrochemi- of the indecisive steps taken by the USA, in cals to tourism, exceeding legal limits.3 During this period, in the face of the dilemma arising the reign of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who came to from her relations with Al-Sisi and the concerns power with the military coup against Mohamed regarding her image within the context of Morsi, it was observed that the role of the democratic values. military in the state increased significantly. In the current situation, it can be said that the The Obama administration’s statements regime in Egypt has evolved into a structure against then-President Hosni Mubarak during where the influence and presence of the mil- the 2011 protests and his recognition of the itary over the state is much stronger compared legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood gov- to 1952 in terms of its characteristics. This ernment by congratulating Morsi for the pres- influence has increased not only in the public idency after winning the elections was the beginning of this breaking point. The steps but also in terms of opportunities to influence taken by the USA during the overthrow of public opinion through wide-ranging economic Morsi with the military coup in July 2013 con- activities and media dominance. The military stituted another important reason for the has played a role in almost all of the critical policy of the Sisi regime towards multilater- decisions in recent years.4 alism. After the military coup, opposition and It can be stated that Egypt, which re-es- protests were violently suppressed, the use tablished its traditional foreign policy during of arms against protestors in the Rabia al- the Al-Sisi era, had an undeniable role in Adawiyya and El-Nahda Squares caused many arms procurement. In this period, when arms casualties and, subsequently, the Muslim procurement is used as an important tool for Brotherhood was declared illegal. On the political purposes, Egypt tries to utilize alter- other hand, according to US law, if a demo- native sources such as Russia and China and cratically elected government is overthrown the EU countries particularly France, Germany, by a military coup, it is obligatory to stop the Italy, as well as the USA, which is traditionally aid to the relevant country.5 In this respect, its most important supplier. Considering the Obama’s condemnation of the military inter- post-Arab Spring period and the delicate vention, calling for the re-establishment of process in which the Al-Sisi regime seized the democratic order, and ordering the revision power with the military coup, it can be stated of the aid to Egypt were the developments

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that deepened the crisis of trust between the of Egypt-USA relations and the restrictions parties. on American aid, was perceived by the military leadership in Egypt as a betrayal against “an This escalating tension in relations with ally that has served the regional interests of Egypt has created risks that US interests in the USA sincerely.” The traces of this per- the region will be negatively affected, and the ception were also found in the negative state- gap will be filled by Russia and China.6 At this ments used against the United States in the point, the United States took care not to define official discourse of Egypt at the time.11 It is the things that happened in the country as a possible to express the nature of Egypt’s military coup in order not to cut the annual foreign policy as an extension of its domestic 1.3 billion dollar aid to Egypt by prioritizing policy, especially in terms of managing internal its interests in the aforementioned dilemma. security dynamics. In this context, it is essential Despite the rising criticism, the Obama ad- to avoid sensational moves and resist threats ministration decided to work with the new by relying on the regional status quo. The regime. However, restrictions were imposed post-coup events and the al-Sisi regime’s on the arms procurement to Egypt with a step perception of the balance of regional threats that can be seen as a midway point, which have also influenced the dynamics that de- was stated before. Within the scope of these termine Egypt’s foreign policy. In a speech he restrictions, the planned delivery of main made in 2018, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh weapons systems such as F-16’s, AH-64 Shoukry stated that this country is “primarily Apache Helicopters, M1A1 Abrams tank kits7, focused on the preservation of its own interests and Harpoon missiles8, as well as $ 260 million and national security.”12 In foreign policy, it is in aid to the military were stopped and the important to understand how Egyptian foreign Operation Bright Star held every 2 years be- policy is shaped from a perspective and the tween Egypt and the USA was canceled. On steps taken since the beginning of the Sisi the other hand, it was underlined that the era. In this context, the discourse on the point measures in question were not long term and that Egypt, which began to adopt a multilateral could continue only when a democratically foreign policy from its point of view, adopted elected civilian government came to power in foreign policy principles that prioritize its na- the country again.9 Following these steps, as tional security and interests rather than the al-Sisi’s consolidation of his power and radical regional interests of the United States, unlike elements in the Sinai Peninsula threatening the Mubarak era, drew attention. Inspired by Israel’s security as of 2015, the sale of the Trump’s “America First” themed foreign policy main weapon systems to Egypt was gradually approach, which is also referred to as the allowed and the funds were released again. “Egyptian Doctrine First” or the “Sisi Doctrine,” In particular, Israel, afraid of the possibility it is aimed at regaining Egypt’s weakened re- of not being able to prevent the strengthening gional position with a discourse reminiscent of these groups, also wanted the United States of the Nasser era. Therefore, an approach to continue its assistance and the delivery of that is dominated by a new nationalist discourse Apache attack helicopters to Egypt.10 and a new strategy based on establishing Dating from the Tahrir Square protests, “balanced” relations with the great powers the process, which continues with the state has been adopted.13

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As a result, the democracy-emphasizing Germany and Italy, and China, and this calls made by the Obama administration during strengthens the country’s position, both in the resignation of Mubarak and the military these countries and facing the United States coup process, caused the USA to give up the and Russia. It can be said that the aim is to restrictions. Despite the USA’s policy of con- balance off the United States and establish tinuing its support to Egypt, it has led to the comprehensive diplomatic relations with these inability to prevent changes in the US-oriented countries, to give legitimacy to the regime policy of this country, which has been going that came to power in the coup, and to ensure on for nearly forty years. Although the al-Sisi that human rights violations in the country administration does not position itself as an are ignored. If US-Egyptian relations are neg- alternative to the USA, it has been able to find atively affected by this strategy, this should suppliers that can ignore human rights viola- not be seen as unexpected for Egypt. On the tions and can obtain high-tech weapons from other hand, France and Germany, which have Western countries, especially Russia. It was made high-value arms deal with Egypt, have noteworthy that the decision of the USA to accepted the provisions stipulated under the continue the aid was realized recently, with “EU Common Position” 2008/944/Common the high-value deals between France and the Foreign and Security Policy “(CFSP) which aforementioned alternative suppliers and was accepted by all EU countries.15 Article 4 Egypt. Therefore, the changing attitude of the of this document, in which the common rules USA can be interpreted as being effective in on the control of the export of military tech- Egypt’s changing policy, with certain limita- nology and equipment are determined, foresees tions. the determination of member states to prevent the export of “military technology and equipment to countries where there is concern of its use with human rights violations such as It can be said that the aim is to domestic oppression or international aggres- balance off the United States and sion” and for purposes of destabilizing inter- establish comprehensive diplomatic national stability.16 The United Nations (UN) relations with these countries, to “Arms Trade Treaty” (2013), which mentioned give legitimacy to the regime that the countries that are a party in it, emphasizes came to power in the coup, and to ensure that human rights violations the human rights issue while manifesting the in the country are ignored. regulations regarding conventional arms trade.17 While France expresses that it is a party and respectful to both agreements,18 it continues to sell arms despite the deaths and In line with its new strategy, Egypt aims to injuries of a thousand people during the Rabia get both more help and more weapons by al-Adawiyya and El-Nahda protests caused building bridges with Russia.14 It can be stated by the al-Sisi regime in Egypt, the violations that, with this diversification in arms pro- of human rights committed by the regime in curement, Egypt has advanced alternatives the following period, as included in the reports in terms of military technology, This can be of Amnesty International,19 and the claims seen with European countries such as France, about the role of equipment bought from

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France in these violations. Between 2012 and proving relations with the USA. It can be said 2015, the military equipment procured by the that this strategy bears the stamps of the Egyptian Security Forces from France con- policy that developed with the arms agreement tinued to be sold to this country despite the signed between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in EU sanctions imposed on the Egyptian gov- 1955, followed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and ernment on the grounds that it was used to which led to good relations with the Soviet violently suppress demonstrations.20 It is strik- Union until the mid-1970s. Nasser considered ing that Germany also displays a contradictory Israel as a threat to Egypt, which declared its attitude towards the sale of arms to countries independence after the 1948 War, and found with a troubling human rights record. Germany, it necessary to strengthen the Egyptian Army which stopped its arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its economy to ensure the security of the for reasons such as the air bombardments in country and to pursue independent policies. Yemen and the murder of Cemal Kaşıkçı in Therefore, he tried to get the support of the USA by approaching the Soviet Union, but the Consulate General of Istanbul, does not after this country remained unresponsive and hesitate to sell the arms produced for Saudi then rejected the request, he signed an arms Arabia, to Egypt, which intervened in Libyan deal with Czechoslovakia. The relations that and Yemen civil wars with the Gulf countries progressed over time were not limited to and committed the aforementioned acts related arms procurement, but also brought along to human rights.21 As a result, while it is clear cooperation within the nuclear and economic that the al-Sisi regime has managed to gain fields, and with the Soviet support in the re- international recognition and legitimacy by covery of the Egyptian Army after the 1967 establishing relations with the relevant coun- War and the escalation of tension after 1969, tries through loaded arms contracts, it is seen these relations peaked during the War of At- that the obligations arising from international trition between Egypt and Israel.22 agreements are not complied with, especially by France, in the area of human rights. Despite the many agreements signed between Egypt and Russia regarding arms sales Arms Procurement as a Tool of and civil nuclear facilities since 2014, it can Multilateral Foreign Policy be said that al-Sisi has no intention of leaving the USA completely or gradually reducing the Al-Sisi did not waste time before starting support that comes from this country.23 to act upon his foreign policy that has evolved into multilateralism and paid a visit to Russia Egypt has main goals, one being to get rid in February 2014, while the restrictions of the of the over-dependence on US aid and diplo- USA’s arms procurement continued. With this matic support. Another goal of Egypt is to be step, Russia became the first non-Arab country selective in arms procurement to this country, that al-Sisi visited, and his meeting with Putin which, for many years, it has come by always gave the first signs of a new era in the relations considering its interests in its regional policies. between the two countries. At this point, the Egypt also has a goal to balance off this steps taken by Sisi can be considered as a country, even partially, against developments planned message to Washington and delicate such as the fact that it can be restricted cycli- moves taken to strengthen the benefits from cally and not be sold some key weapon sys- this country while maintaining and even im- tems.

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In this way, the aim is to ensure the national has been dependent on for many years. Nev- interests of Egypt, which is believed to be ertheless, there is strong support in Cairo to limited by these reasons, through diplomatic diversify the country’s arms procurement. Al- relations are to be established with Russia, Sisi’s main purpose is to do this without China, and other European actors.24 putting the US out of the action.30 It can be stated that this policy is more rational. Another assessment of the reasons for Egypt’s efforts to diversify its resources can be made as the interests of this country con- verge with Russia when it conflicts with the The US sanctions warnings did not United States on issues such as relations es- cause a deterrent effect on Egypt tablished with the regime in Syria, as well as which also signed a draft active support given to Khalifa Haftar in Libya.25 agreement allowing the use of At this point, it can be considered that the airspace mutually with Russia in Gulf country’s support, which played a key November 2017, and threats were role, facilitates the implementation of Egypt’s answered with the statement, regional policies. However, Egypt’s trend to "Egypt is an independent country alternative countries to balance off US support, that does not take orders from any which it is overly dependent on, has become country on domestic and foreign even more obvious with the inclusion of Gulf policy issues." countries in the equation. During the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, disturbed by the US ‘anti-Mubarak attitude, took the There are other driving factors leading initiative by taking advantage of the afore- Egypt to turn to alternative arms supliers mentioned separation.26 Thus, King Abdullah such as the fact that Egypt was refused pro- declared that every support that has been curement of strategic platforms and ammu- withdrawn by the USA will be covered by nition (such as F-15’s, AIM-120’s AMRAAM 27 them. As a result, Egypt has found the op- air-to-air missiles and the AGM-84H SLAM- portunity to maintain its tense relations with ER) by the USA and her steps to take part in the USA on a more solid basis against the the F-35 program remain inconclusive, due sanctions thanks to the support provided by to the commitment of the USA to maintain Is- Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. rael’s qualitative military edge.31 This situation, As stated before, with the gradual rap- parallel to the process that has been going prochement that took place after the Free on since 2014, led to Egypt’s agreement with Officers Movement, Egypt used Soviet weapon Russia in 2018 to purchase Russian Sukhoi- systems against Israel from 195528 until the 35 warplanes32 along with many other weapon end of the 1970s29 in the Cold War. During the systems and the first deliveries of the Su-35s Mubarak era, the army relied mainly on ad- took place in 2020.33 The US sanctions warnings vanced US weapons. However, it is unlikely did not cause a deterrent effect on Egypt that either the Russian systems or the military which also signed a draft agreement34 allowing technological infrastructure of the mentioned the use of airspace mutually with Russia in countries will replace the USA, which Egypt November 2017, and threats were answered

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with the statement, “Egypt is an independent fact that this policy brings along economic country that does not take orders from any dependence. In other words, even if Egypt’s country on domestic and foreign policy is- dependence on a single supplier reduces pro- sues.”35 Despite the initiation of the Su-35s curements that do not match its economic delivery and the deterioration of relations and possibilities, it will cause new dependencies the threats of sanctions within the framework as a result of expenditures that will have to of the “Countering America’s Adversaries be made for requirements such as mainte- Through Sanctions Act” (CAATSA), the USA’s nance and repair of these weapons and keeping approval of the “ Maritime Domain Awareness them ready for war. In this sense, new finance System” sale to Egypt in October 2020, worth will be needed to keep the arms available $ 417 million, draws attention as a contradictory bought through external financing, especially attitude. In fact, despite the approval of the from the Gulf countries, and as a result, sale of these systems, Egypt did not hesitate various political concessions will be required. to participate in the “Friendship Bridge”36 naval exercise with Russia, which will start in 2. ARMS PROCUREMENT AND November and last until the end of 2020. INFRASTRUCTURE While the tension between NATO and Russia INVESTMENTS in the Black Sea is escalating and mutual exercises are being carried out, those steps A) Arms Procurement taken can be seen as another sign that Egypt’s Since al-Sisi came to power in 2014, Egypt area of action against the USA is expanding. has spent at a record level to increase its As a result, it’s possible that Egypt will military capacity. In this period, it was observed 38 use arms procurement from Russia and other that Egypt’s arms imports increased 215%, alternative countries and, thus, subsequently while it continued in the following years. Be- improving relations with these countries as a tween 2014 and 2018, Egypt became the third leverage in her relations with the USA. Hence, largest arms importer in the world after Saudi it can be expected that Egypt will continue to Arabia and India,39 and the second-largest buy strategic weapons such as the Su-35, as arms importer in the Middle East.40 On the well as other high-tech equipment needed by other hand, while it is possible to be informed the navy and land forces, rather than lagging about the quantity and amount of them even behind in terms of military technology at the from open-source intelligence and statements regional scale by facing manageable crises of the countries with which arms deals were with the USA.37 Strategically, instead of being made, it can be said that Egypt did not fully dependent on a single supplier, Egypt’s pro- report and refrained from explaining the real curement from different suppliers who are situation to its people and the international willing to sell arms to it on their own terms community. As per Article 203 of its Constitu- and will contribute to strengthening its political tion, Egypt’s military expenditure and full se- position. While diversification of suppliers will crecy over the budget allocated to the army eliminate the dependence of Egypt on a single cause difficulties in understanding the real supplier, it will allow pursuing more inde- situation.41 Therefore, it can be said that Egypt pendent policies. On the other hand, it is a has different resources in addition to the

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items specified in the budget. For example, clearly with the escalating tension in the while Egypt expanded the Mohamed Naguib context of the limitation of maritime jurisdiction Military Base near Alexandria, it carried out areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and the many large-scale infrastructure projects si- interests of this country in Libya. While Egypt multaneously. The economic size of these has been one of the key partners in the US projects is an enormous burden on the budget, moves to fill the void in the Middle East and in which leads to the conclusion that either the the aggressive, interventionist policies45 adopt- announced budget is not correct or the foreign ed by France under President Emmanuel 42 aid is not included in the budget. On the Macron, which claims political leadership other hand, while the Stockholm International within the EU, Anti-Turkism has developed Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data showed as one of the most important focuses of this a decrease in expenditure -in general- for partnership. the 2011-2020 period, the mentioned organization also puts an annotation regarding the It can be said that Russia has also risen to clarity of Egypt’s data shows that the actual the second rank among these suppliers, and situation is not reliable.43 Germany has taken an important position in arms procurement to Egypt, especially sub- The increase in Egypt’s arms procurement marine sales.46 By 2020, Italy has become one has progressed parallel to the increase in the of the most important suppliers of this country aforementioned suppliers. As a result of the with the agreement made with Egypt. Despite relations that developed after the Camp David Accords Agreement and the aid, it was seen the criticism, the Italian Government reached that the USA, which has been in the first place an agreement on the sale of strategic air and among Egypt’s arms suppliers for decades, naval platforms, especially Eurofighter fighter gave its leadership to France in this period, planes and FREMM class frigates, to Egypt. while Egypt has become the biggest market In this way, Egypt signed high-value deals of this country.44 France was among the arms with the three countries with the largest eco- suppliers of Egypt in the past and the improving nomic power within the EU and it also aimed relations with France took such a place in the to establish long-term relations with these al-Sisi period, that they have become reflected countries with undisputed weight in the Union.

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While the modernization of air and naval of 24 Sukhoi-35 fighter jets in March 2019, factors became a current issue in Egypt be- which is an important move in terms of its re- tween 2014 and 2018, 8 billion dollars from lations with the USA, despite the exclusion of the military budget was allocated for French the F-35 program as previously mentioned. and Russian weapon systems. In 2014, after Despite the USA’s reaction, the delivery of al-Sisi visited Russia, a $3.5 billion defense these aircraft started in 2020. deal was signed between the two countries, In 2016, the 550-ton P-32 missile corvette covering the sale of many systems such as carrying supersonic Moskit anti-ship missiles 9M82M, 9M83M missiles for the S-300 VM bought from Russia is another platform added (Antey-2500) air defense missile system (ADS)47 to the inventory.51 During this period, Egypt to Egypt. In 2015, agreements were made for became the second-biggest customer of Ger- main weapons systems such as 46 Russian man arms. Al-Sisi’s visit to Germany in 2015 MiG-29Ms Fighter Jets, 1 Recce Satellite, and was a milestone in terms of gaining the inter- 46 Ka-52K combat helicopters - originally national legitimacy of the putschist general.52 produced for Russia but designed to be used In addition to this, a contract has been signed in the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship for the procurement of 2 submarines of the sold to Egypt due to the occupation and an- same type as the 2 Type 209/1400 submarines nexation of Crimea - and 9A1472 Vikhr for ordered in 2011 from German Thyssen Krupp these helipads, and 9M120 Ataka anti-tank Marine Systems (TKMS). China also stands guided missiles to be delivered by 2020. Egypt out among Egypt’s suppliers, especially with also bought US-made Avenger anti-aircraft the UAV and armed UAV system sales. Wing launchers from Russia, as well as the BUK- Loongs, which are used extensively to support M2E and TOR-1/TOR-2 air defense missile Haftar’s forces in Libya53 and the Sinai Penin- systems.48 Especially, these purchases from sula against ISIS, were purchased from this Russia were one of the most concrete reflec- country, while there is no exact information tions of the breaking point in Egypt’s policy at about their number.54 that time.

Since 2008, the number of F-16 warplanes in Egypt’s inventory has increased from 151, Iran-oriented threats can be 113 of which are modern C and D Blocks, and considered to be important in the from 208 to 220, 177 of which are new models. Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and In addition to these, Egypt reached an agree- adjacent regions by means of the ment with Russia to buy 46 Russian MiG- Gulf country’s support for Egypt. 29Ms Fighter Jets,49 one of the advanced M2 Additionally, the benefit of models, spending $ 2 billion. In 2015, Egypt balancing off Turkey can be signed a �5.2 billion contract including 24 considered as another important Rafale fighter aircrafts which is another im- factor in the context of the Eastern portant procurement, and received the first Mediterranean and Libya, where batch in the same year.50 Another important tension is increasing nowadays. threshold was overcome when Egypt signed an agreement with Russia for the procurement

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The resource provided by the Gulf countries days. Half of the amount spent on French in the financing of Egypt’s aggressive armament warplanes was funded by the Gulf countries, policy is an important factor. After the Arab while the other half was covered by commercial Spring, the people of the Middle East perceived loans and guarantees received from France. the demand for change as threats to their regimes. Therefore, the US approach to the There were huge developments in the navy Arab Spring and the Egyptian military coup, when al-Sisi came to power. In 2014, a pro- as well as the importance attributed to the curement agreement was made with France al-Sisi regime being against the Muslim Broth- for 4 Gowind-2500 Corvettes. The most sig- erhood, which is suspended, and the anti- nificant procurement was a Mistral-class am- Iran agenda of the Gulf countries are the rea- phibious assault ship, each of these is capable sons.55 What was tried was that the military of carrying 6 helicopters, as well as an armored power of Egypt under Sisi’s rule was to be in- battalion and an infantry battalion. This pro- strumentalized within the framework of the curement cost Egypt about 1 billion euros. It regional policies and competitions of the Gulf has been noted that Egypt has not previously countries. Iran-oriented threats can be con- indicated a need for ships that are the largest sidered to be important in the Red Sea, the compared to their counterparts in the Middle Persian Gulf, and adjacent regions by means East. It has been stated that the financing of of the Gulf country’s support for Egypt. Addi- these landing ships, which allow accelerating tionally, the benefit of balancing off Turkey the transfer to the Gulf region,56is funded by can be considered as another important factor the Gulf countries.57 As a result, Egypt became in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean the country with the largest navy in the region and Libya, where tension is increasing nowa- after Turkey.58

Arms Procurements During Al-Sisi Period in Egypt:

Country / Year Piece Received Equipment Description Deal Cost Germany 2019-* 4 MEKO-A200-class frigates 2011-(2016-2017) 2 Type-209/1400 Submarines 2014-2019 2 Type-209/1400 Submarines

2015-2015 4 MTU-4000 Diesel Engines To be used in FREMM Class Frigates

2016-(2015-2019) 125 SUT AS/ASW Surface and Underwater Target Torpedos 2018-2019 330 AIM-9L/I Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missiles 2019-* 7 IRIS-T SL Surface-to-Air Missiles

2010-2015 4 MTU-595 Diesel Engines To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2012-(2016-2017) 2 Type-209/1400 Submarines To be used in Type-209 Submarines, which 2015-(2016-2019) 125 Torpedos have been transferred as Torpedo, while the Type is unknown 2017-(2018-2019) 330 AIM-9L/I Sidewinder Missiles Possibly version of AIM-9L / I-1 2019-* IRIS-T SLM Surface-to-Air Missile 2020 9 Patrol Boats Possibly TNC-35 and / or FIB-25 130 Million Euros 2020 1 Coastal Defense Ship Possibly FPB-38

Report No: 23 13 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

Bulgaria 2014-2014 2 MT-LB Armored Personnel Carriers Possibly Second-hand

Canada 2012-2013 6 PW100 Turboprop/Turboshaft Engines To be used in C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2013-(2013-2014) 12 PW100 Turboprop/Turboshaft Engines To be used in C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2014-(2015-2016) 16 PW100 Turboprop/Turboshaft Engines To be used in C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2015-2016 8 PW100 Turboprop/Turboshaft Engines To be used in C-295 Cargo Aircraft

China 2012-2014 18 ASN-209 UAV systems

2016-(2017-18) 300 Blue Arrow-7 Anti-Tank Missiles To be used in Wing Loong UAVs

2016-(2017-18) 10 Wing Loong-1 UAV systems

2018-* 32 Wing Loong-2 armed UAV systems

Finland

To be used in Mistral-class amphibious assault 2015-2016 6 W-16 Diesel Engines ships bought from France

To be used in Mistral-class amphibious assault 2015-2016 2 W-18 Diesel Engines ships bought from France

France 2014-2017 4 Gowind-2500-Class Corvettes 1 billion Euros

2006-(2013-2015) 3 MRR-3D Radar Systems To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2010-2015 1 MRR-3D Radar System

2012-(2013-2014) 173 Sherpa 4x4 Tactical and Light Armored Vehicles

2014-2017 50 MM-40-3 Exocet Anti-Ship Missiles To be used in Gowind-Class Corvette

2015-(2016-18) 500 AASMs To be used in Rafale ﬁghter aircrafts

2015-2015 25 ASTER-15 SAAM Surface-to-Air Missiles To be used in FREMM-Class Frigate

2015-2016 2 EDAR Landing Ships To be used in Mistral AALS

2015-2015 1 FREMM- Class Frigate

2015-2017 100 MICA Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles To be used in Gowind-Class Corvettes

2015-(2015-18) 150 MICA Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles To be used in Rafale ﬁghter aircraft

The ships built for Russia were sold to Egypt 2015-2016 2 Mistral-class amphibious assault ships due to the sanctions imposed on this country 1 billion Euro in 2015.

2015-2015 15 MM-40-3 Exocet Anti-Ship Missile To be used in FREMM-Class Frigate

8 units of Rafale-EM and 16 units of Rafale- 2015-2019 24 Rafale Fighter Aircraft DM versions with an agreement of 5.2-6 billion Euros.

Storm Shadow/SCALP ASM General-Purpose Long-Range 2015-* 50 To be used in Rafale ﬁghter aircrafts Cruise Missiles 2015-(2016-2018) 12 TALIOS Aircraft Electro-Optical Systems To be used in Rafale ﬁghter aircrafts

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Italy

2006-(2013-2015) 3 Super Rapid 76mm Naval Guns To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2011-2015 1 Super Rapid 76mm Naval Gun To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2014-2017 4 Super Rapid 76mm Naval Guns To be used in Gowind-Class Corvettes

2015-2015 1 Super Rapid 76mm Naval Gun To be used in FREMM-Class Frigates

2019-* 24 AW-149 Medium-Lift Helicopters 871 million Euros

2019-* 8 AW-149 Medium-Lift Helicopters

2020 24 Euroﬁghter Typhoon Aircraft 10 billion Euros 2020 24 M-346 Advanced Trainer Jets

2020 2 FREMM Bergamini-class Frigates

2020 20 Falaj II Patrol Boats

2020 1 Military Satellite

2020 20 Missile Launchers

Jordan

2018-2019 2 Il-76MF Cargo Aircraft Second-hand

The Netherlands

2006-(2013-2015) 3 Scout Radar Localization Systems To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2006-(2013-2015) 3 STING Fire-Control-Radar Systems To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2010-2015 1 Scout Radar Localization System To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2010-2015 1 STING Fire-Control-Radar System To be used in Ambassador-4 Corvettes

2014-2017 4 SMARTs To be used in Gowind-Class Corvette

2014-2017 4 STING Fire-Control-Radar Systems To be used in Gowind-Class Corvette

2017-2018 1 SMART Perry-class Frigate

Russia

2009-2014 1 Recce Satellite/Egypt Sat-2

To be used in S-300 VM (Antey-2500) Air Defense 2014-2017 40 9M82M Surface-to-Air Missiles Missile System

To be used in Mistral-class amphibious assault 2015-(2017-19) 46 Ka-52K Attack Helicopters ships

2015-(2017-19) 1000 9A1472 Vikhr Anti-Tank Missiles To be used in Ka-52K Attack Helicopter

2015-2019 1 Recce Satellite /Egypt Sat-2

2015-(2017-19) 50 Mig-29M Jet Fighter Aircraft

To be used in Tarantul Class-Project 1241 2015-(2015-2016) 10 Moskit Anti-ship Cruise Missiles Corvettes

2015-2016 1 Protivnik-GE Radar System

Report No: 23 15 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

2015-(2017-19) 300 R-73/AA-11 Air-to-Air Missiles RVV-AE / AA-12 Adder Medium-Range Air-to-Air To be used in Mig-29M Jet Fighter 2015-(2017-19) 300 Missiles Aircraft 500 million-1 billion 2015-2017 3 S-300VM Air Defense Systems dollars 2016 1 Tarantul Class-Project 1241 Corvette

2019-2020 24 Su-35 Aircraft 2 billion dollars

2014-2017 150 9M83M Surface-to-Air Missiles To be used in S-300VM

2015-(2017-19) 1000 9M120 Ataka Anti-Tank Guided Missiles To be used in Ka-52K Attack Helicopter

South Africa

2012-2014 14 Mamba Armored Personnel Carrier

South Korea

2016-2017 1 Po Hang-Class Corvette Second-Hand

Spain

2012-2013 3 C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2013-2014 6 C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2014-2016 8 C-295 Cargo Aircraft

2015-2016 4 C-295 Cargo Aircraft

The United Arab Emirates

2013-(2014-2019) 2500 Panthera T6 Light Armored Personnel Carriers

Second-hand, to be used against riots in 2014-(2015-2016) 12 AT-802U Remote Supplier Aircraft The Sinai Peninsula

USA

2008-(2009-2013) 125 M-1A1 Abrams Tanks

2011-(2015-2018) 125 M-1A1 Abrams Tanks

2014-(2016-2017) 6 Swiftship-93 Patrol Boats

2016-(2017-2018) 4 Swiftship-93 Patrol Boats

2003-(2013-2015) 25 RGM-84L Harpoon-2 Anti-Ship Missiles

2005-(2013-2015) 139 RIM-116A RAM Surface-to-Air Missiles 25 million dollars

2006-(2013-2015) 3 Ambassador-4 Corvettes 1 billion dollars

2010-2014 10 AH-64D Apache Attack Helicopters

2010-2015 1 Ambassador-4 Corvette 165 million dollars

2010-2013 1 DB-110 Aircraft Reconnaissance/ Recce System 11 million dollars

2010-(2013-2015) 20 F-16C Block 50-52 Fighter Aircraft 3,2 billion dollars

2010-2013 2 LFATS Submarine Defense Warfare Sonar Systems 25 million dollars

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2011-(2013-2015) 12 AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Electro-Optical Aircraft Systems 2011-2014 4 Swiftship-93 Patrol Boats 20 million dollars 2013-2015 13 M-88-Armed Recovery Vehicles Second-hand 2014-2014 200 MIM 72 Chaparral Self-Propelled Air Defense Systems Second-hand 2015-(2016-2017) 356 AGM-114 Hellfire Anti-Tank Missiles 2015-(2016-2019) 400 Caiman Armored Personnel Carriers Second-hand 2015-2015 1 LM-2500 Marine Gas Turbine 2015-2016 12 MaxxPro Armored Personnel Carriers Second-hand 2015-2016 350 RG-33 Armored Personnel Carriers Second-hand 2016-(2018-2019) 65 AN/AAQ-14 LANTIRN Electro-Optical Aircraft Systems Second-hand 2016-2017 20 RGM-84L Harpoon-2 Anti-Ship Missiles 2016-2019 7 Swiftship-93 Patrol Boats 2017-2018 68 Caiman Armored Personnel Carriers Second-hand 2017-2019 8 AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel Radar Units 2019-* 4 LM-2500 Gas Turbines *-2018 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters 1 billion dollars 2020-* * Electro-Optical / Infrared Sensors (fixed, mobile, airborne) 2020-* * Wireless Communication Suites 2020-* * Hybrid Power Generator Systems 2020-* * Closed Circuit Television 2020-* * Power and Data Distribution Units 2020-* * Automatic Identification System 2020-* 34 Integrated Fixed Towers 2020-* 28 Communication Towers 2020-* 12 Rocket Towers Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) System 417 million dollars 2020-* 6 Naval Base Operations Rooms 2020-* 2 Regional Operations Centers 2020-* 1 Strategic Operations Center 2020-* 6 Port Protection Systems 2020-* 6 Ground Stations 2020-* 12 Vertical Take-Off UAV Systems 2020-* 14 Mobile Marine Observation Vehicle Systems 2020-* 3 Aerostat ISR Platforms Unknown Supplier(s) 2016-(2017-2018) 13 Mi-24V and Mi-35 Type Attack Helicopters Second-hand, Supplier is probably Russia

- Strategic weapons, which were bought with an agreement before 2013 and were delivered after the military coup, were also included in the list. - The dates represent the order or delivery dates; both are included if the information is available. Deliveries made on different dates are indicated in parentheses. References: - SIPRI “Trade Register” Database 2013-2019 data, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php. - Alexandra Kuimova, “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure”, SIPRI Background Paper, SIPRI, October 2020. - Egypt-Maritime Domain Awareness System, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 1 October 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/egypt-maritime- domain-awareness-system. - “The military’s deal of the century: A $10bn arms sale from Italy”, Egypt Watch, https://egyptwatch.net/2020/06/02/the-militarys-deal-of-the-century-a-10bn- arms-sale-from-italy/. “Roundup: Deutsche Patrouillenboote für Ägypten statt Saudi-Arabien”, Boerse, 2 November 2020, https://www.boerse.de/nachrichten/ROUNDUP-Deutsche-Patrouillenboote- fuer-Aegypten-statt-Saudi-Arabien/31133080.

Report No: 23 17 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

SOME OF THE BASES BUILT / DEVELOPED AND USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES DURING THE AL-SISI PERIOD:

Jerjoub Naval Base East Port Said Alexandria Naval Base Naval Base

Sidi Barrani Military Base Bir Gifgafa Airfield Habata Military Airport Mohamed Naguib Military Base

Uthman Air Base

Safaga Naval Base

Ras Banas Naval base Berenice Military Base

B) Developments in Infrastructure includes highways, factories, and the reset- and Bases: tlement of millions of people in the region, which took shape during Morsi’s rule.59 The Focusing only on Egypt’s arms procure- decision has been made to build 7 tunnels for ments will not be sufficient to understand the vehicles and trains underneath the Suez Canal military structure of this country. Military to be completed by 2020 which will cost 4 forces don’t just move from one place to an- billion dollars. It is a fact that these plans will other. Many infrastructure factors are needed be beneficial for the development of the country such as military bases, training facilities, in case of population increase and settlement roads, etc. In recent years, Egypt has also in the Sinai Peninsula. On the other hand, it made significant investments in these areas. can be said that the plan will provide Egypt One of them is the Sinai Development Plan, with opportunities beyond civilian purposes which aims to further integrate Egypt and as it makes it easier to reach every part of the the Sinai Peninsula, most of which has been Sinai Peninsula through highways, economic an unmanned region for many years, and it development, and factories. Therefore, this

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project is important in terms of enabling the • Egypt’s biggest land force is located here.67 rapid transfer of large-scale military factors • This base is used as the headquarters for to Sinai.60 Within the scope of the project some forces of the Northern Military Re- started in 2016, the construction of 5 tunnels gion. has been completed as of 2020.61 More than $ 1 billion has been allocated for the plan, • This base was established on an area of whose responsibility was given to the mili- 75.6 square kilometers. tary.62 • The base, which has a capacity of 20 thou- On the other hand, especially in the satellite sand soldiers, has 1,155 facilities such as images after 2014, it can be seen that many hospitals, housing, social areas, and green- arsenals were built on the Cairo-Suez line house areas, as well as wide exercise and the mobility in the region is generally areas. comprised of military activities. It has been observed that many new military camps with • Joint military exercises are held here with a capacity of more than one battalion were other countries. positioned in the region.63 • The nuclear power stations planned to be The Egyptian Army has developed and set built in El Dabaa, secures the oil fields in up many military bases in recent years. The the region and the western borders of the Mohamed Naguib Military Base, known as the state.68 largest military base in the Middle East with • The base includes fighter airplanes, attack an area of 75.6 square kilometers, located in and transport helicopters, armored vehicles, Hammam of Marsa Matruh on the Libyan bor- tanks, and heavy artillery units.69 der, and the expanded Sidi Barani and Berenice Military Naval Base, which is the largest base b) Berenice Military Base on the Red Sea, are the foremost examples.64 What can be observed is that the deficiencies • This base was officially opened on January 70 in the infrastructure and training facilities of 15, 2020. the army are being resolved quickly by allo- • This base is located in the southeast of cating large amounts of resources. Considering Aswan, near the southern border of Egypt, the doubling the capacity of the Suez Canal on the Red Sea coast. within a year and expanding the Mohamed Naguib Military Base near Alexandria, it can • It has been stated that the base was built be stated that Egypt’s engineering capacity to protect and secure the Egyptian southern should not be underestimated.65 coasts, economic investments, and natural resources, and global navigation traffic a) Mohamed Naguib Military Base from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and 71 • The Mohamed Naguib Military Base, which associated economic areas. replaces the “military city” built in 1993 in • This base was established on an area of the Matrouh Governorate; “El-Hamam” 630 square kilometers.72 city, west of Alexandria, was opened after the renovation was completed on 22 July • This base includes Air, Land, and Naval 2017.66 bases, training areas, and social facilities.

Report No: 23 19 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

• Berenice is considered to be the largest economic area in western Egypt, including military base in the Red Sea, the largest a commercial port, industrial and logistics naval base in the Middle East and North center, economic and tourist center.76 Africa, and the second of its kind in Egypt. • This base is expected to be opened soon. Berenice Air Section d) East Port Said Naval Base • The base includes runways each 3000 meters long and with widths ranging from 30 • This base base was built at the northern meters to 45 meters with two runways, a entrance of the Suez Canal. general hangar for aircraft maintenance • The base provides the security of the in- and repair, technical and administrative dustrial zone and Port Said harbor, the areas, fortified aircraft bunkers, mechanical city, and the Gas Fields in the Eastern and armored units, signal units, electronic Mediterranean, with Port Said Base. warfare units, eyesight observation units, and logistics units. • The base, which controls the northern entrance of the Suez Canal, is also important • The base has an Air Defense System as in terms of navigation safety in the northern well. part of the Canal.77 Naval Section • It was built to provide the security of the • This naval station includes a military pier region from the northern shores of the 1000 meters long and 14 meters deep, Sinai Peninsula to the port of al-Arish. Mistral-class helicopter ships, submarines, e) Ras Banas Naval Base and frigates. • It has been stated that the Ras Banas • There are training areas, logistics, and Base, which will be built in the east of housing facility, a 50-bed military hospital Berenice Military Base in the Red Sea, will with the latest medical means.73 74 be the focal point of the Egyptian forces in c). Jerjoub Naval Base the Red Sea from the beginning of the Suez Canal to the Bab-el Mandab Strait.78 • Jerjoub Naval Base, located on the west of Mersa Matruh, was built to protect the f) Sidi Barrani Military Base northwest of Egypt, Alamein city, and secure - This base was opened on July 22, 2017, the al-Dabaa Nuclear Power Station in the after renovation and expansion.79 Mediterranean.75 - This base, located in the northwest of • It includes fighter aircraft, battleships, and Egypt, on the Mediterranean coast 100 km armored land vehicles. from the Libyan border, has been restored • It has been stated that the civil war and in- and expanded.80 stability in Libya are the reasons to build • New ports, airports, runways, and various the base. facilities were built and basic infrastructure • Jerjoub enhances the security of the planned works were carried out.

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• It has been stated that it has been expanded civilian settlement around the region to for purposes such as securing the borders, use the facilities also strengthens the pos- protecting the resources discovered in the sibility that the studies are for military Mediterranean, ensuring internal security, purposes.83 and preventing illegal immigration.81 • The runways in the area were made func- • Joint military exercises are held here with tional again and the infrastructure of the various countries. terminal building was improved, and it was g) Habata Military Airport observed that 8 protected aircraft shelters and airport aprons which are certain to be • This base is used by the Egyptian Air Force used for military purposes, and embank- (EAF) and is located in the northwest of ments were built to protect them.84 the country, 50 km from the Libyan border. • It has been stated that Egypt has used this base in counter-terrorism operations.85 • Extensions have been made in the north and south directions, which have been ren- • It has been reported that Chinese made ovated since 2019. Wing Loong UAVs were deployed on this base by Egypt.86 • An increase in the number of military aircraft shelters has been observed.82 i) Uthman Air Base

• The activities of military and private aircraft • This base is located 69 km east of the between Cairo Airport and Habata Military Libyan border. Airport on the border of Egypt and Libya stand out. • As of 2016, infrastructure works have been carried out and improvements have been • The base is considered to have the potential made in hangars, runways, and other in- to be used for intelligence purposes. frastructure components within this frame- • This is one of the bases used by the UAE to work. support Khalifa Haftar in Libya. • It has been stated that this is another base h) Bir Gifgafa Airfield where Chinese made Wing Loongs are deployed.87 • This base is located 90 km east of the Suez Canal. j) Ras El Teen Naval Port

• This base had a strategic role in the wars • A new 1500-meter-long port is being built with Israel. in the region. • After the peace treaty was signed with k) Safaga Naval Base Israel, large-scale military studies were carried out on the base, which displayed • This base is the 2nd headquarters of the an abandoned image, according to 2015- Naval Forces and the main headquarters 2017 satellite images. The absence of any of the Southern Fleet Command.88

Report No: 23 21 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

• On January 4, 2017, Egyptian President • Docks were built for Gowind class frigates. Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi inaugurated the new • In total, 13 new piers and groynes were headquarters of Egypt’s southern naval 92 fleet command in Safaga, located on the built at the base. country’s Red Sea coast, while reviewing • It is the headquarters of the Naval Forces.93 the Safaga Port Improvement Project, which cost about $ 28 million. • During the Sisi period, infrastructure improvements began at bases such as this • This is the 2nd Headquarters of the Naval and Safaga Naval Base, including a large Forces and the main headquarters of the 94 Southern Fleet Command. number of naval ships and military units.

• On January 4, 2017, Egyptian President • Four heliports have been built. Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi inaugurated the new In addition to these bases, it can be seen headquarters of Egypt’s southern naval that another focal point of improvements and fleet command in Safaga, on the country’s Red Sea coast, while reviewing the Safaga developments for Egypt’s military infrastruc- Port Development Project, which cost about tures is with the bases and airports on the $ 28 million. line between Cairo and Sinai and up to the east of Sinai.95 In addition to Bir Gifgafa, six • The Southern Fleet Command was estab- protective aircraft shelters were built in and lished to ensure full control of sea activity around the airport in El Arish, and it was de- in the Red Sea region.89 termined that two battalion-sized military 90 l) Alexandria Naval Base campsites were set up. Lt. Col. Eli Dekel, who • As of October 2017, many facilities have works for the Israeli Military Intelligence Serv- been built. ice AMAN, stated that Egypt built 88 protective aircraft shelters and 6 runways on the Cairo- • Four new submarine units were established, Sinai line - including Cairo West Airport - in and hangars were built for Type-209/1400 the last 10 years until 2017. While there is no submarines purchased from Germany. civilian activity at the West Cairo and Katameya • One of the only seven simulation units in International Airports, it has been questioned the world was built here. why there is an improvement.96 It can be said • New piers have been built for Mistral-class that the said platforms have started to be amphibious assault ships purchased from built in military bases such as Uthman, while France to be landed and the water with- UAV and armed UAV systems are observed in drawal distance of existing piers has been bases close to the Libyan border. As a result, 91 increased from 10 to 12 meters. it can be observed that comprehensive activities • A Pohang-Class Corvette named “Egypt have been undertaken in Egypt regarding mil- Youth” from South Korea is anchored on itary infrastructure and bases, which are an this base. important parameter of military power.

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C) Reasons for Egypt’s Military unlike Mubarak and Sadat. Therefore, it can Investments and Egypt’s Perceived be said that al-Sisi, who came to power with a Threat military coup, had more self-confidence than his predecessors in eliminating a coup. The Hosni Mubarak remains distant to the experiences he gained during his tenure as concern that the army would become profes- the director of military intelligence and the sional and autonomous during his time, and extensive relations he established with other that this situation might lead to some political senior staff in this period, played a major role ambitions among the soldiers. He led the in the appointment of Sisi as the defense min- army to economic activities instead of in- ister in 2012. This condition has allowed him creasing its capacity because the peace with to place staff at the highest level in the army Israel was continuing and there was no need and intelligence apparatus. As a result, Sisi for a power projection in the region at that gains the strength to take risks not only polit- time. In this process, Mubarak tried to appease ically and economically, but also in terms of the military officers by purchasing advanced US weapons.97 On the other hand, it can be strengthening vital security functions. Al- 98 stated that despite the provision of high-tech Sisi , who has gained a wider area of action weapons, to be used effectively, there are in the name of long-term revision of Egypt’s problems in terms of the army’s ability to military doctrine, such as the design, supply counter domestic and regional threats, as of weapons, and the ability to work together well as improving qualifications with training with allied forces, had the opportunity to in- and organization. crease his popularity in the armed forces through arms procurements and to provide On the other hand, Sisi had the opportunity support for the discomfort in his policies.99 to closely monitor and follow the military officers -especially thanks to his institutional Egypt has traditionally become one of the background and connections within the army- most important countries in the Middle East.

Report No: 23 23 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

Egypt, which played for the leadership of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, Egypt’s efforts Arab world after the 1952 “Free Officers Move- to maintain its strategic superiority also play ment,” debated with Iraq and Saudi Arabia a role in its armament. Issues such as con- for this cause from time to time. It can be trolling the traffic in the Suez Canal and nav- said that, after the peace treaty with Israel, igational security in Egypt, and the protection the country gradually entered the US line in of hydrocarbon discoveries in its exclusive terms of foreign policy and the economic economic zones (EEZ) such as the Zohr Field, problems experienced in the last twenty years which has the richest reserves in the region, were effective in this situation.100 After the can be interpreted as justification for military Arab Spring, actors in the Gulf, which strive investments in the navy. In the South, an im- to play a more determining role in the course portant dynamic of the power projection re- of the region and which Egypt has relied on vealed by Egypt is the set of disputes with economically, have taken on the leadership. Ethiopia over the construction of Renaissance These countries try to have a successful role Dam and sharing of the Nile River water. in regional improvements by using their eco- While Egypt meets most of its drinking water nomic power. On the other hand, dependence and irrigation needs from the Nile, the tension on Saudi Arabia and the UAE limits its mobility between the two countries has increased since and poses a serious problem for Egypt, which Ethiopia began to accumulate water in the wants to take its place among the leading dam. The tensions between Sudan and the countries in the Middle East again as a regional Hala’ib Triangle and the radical groups in power.101 Therefore, it can be said that the in- Sinai are seen as the other important factors creasing dependence on the Gulf countries expressed by Egypt as shaping the perception and related discomfort is another motivation of a regional threat. It can be seen that the for the armament of Egypt. It is considered weapons included in the inventory reveal a that Egypt is trying to increase its influence in military infrastructure beyond the mentioned 104 the region by trying to balance its economic purposes in terms of quality and quantity. weaknesses by improving its military capacity. For example, while it is stated by military Indeed, al-Sisi expressed his dissatisfaction sources that the Mistral-class amphibious with the dependence on Saudi Arabia, despite assault ship will be used for the protection of the $ 30 billion support he received since his the gas fields of Egypt in the Mediterranean and to combat terrorism, it is a more reason- coming to power after the military coup.102 able option to carry out such missions by It cannot be said that Egypt makes efforts speedboats and air defense systems, not by to increase its military capacity with diversified the attack and reconnaissance helicopters purchases, only to counter the Gulf hegemony launched from armored vehicles and helicopter in the region and to establish relations with carriers capable of transporting hundreds of actors such as France, Germany, and Italy so soldiers and landing them on an enemy shore, that Egypt can gain its strategic independence. to protect the gas fields, as in the concept One of the main goals here, of course, is to implemented by Israel.105 Likewise, Israel’s increase Egypt’s military capacity internally consideration of the many conventional and and externally.103 On the other hand, despite asymmetrical threats as well as the goal of the increasing struggle and tension in the protecting gas fields in the region, including

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the threats originating from Hezbollah, rep- but rather political and geopolitical require- resents a more ideal vision at this point, while ments. For example, while the Egyptian Army revealing the qualities that Israel sought in faces off against the armed groups in Sinai the Sa’ar 6 Corvette, the first one it received from time to time, it can be seen that many of in December 2020. The Sa’ar 6 has been pro- the arms procurements are more suitable to duced so that it is suitable for some missiles be used in a conventional war, not in operations and sensors such as the Israeli-made Iron against these unconventional factors in Sinai. Dome and electronic warfare systems produced However, “Maritime awareness systems” ap- by the Israeli company Elbit Systems.106 proved for sale from the USA in October 2020, Wing Loong-1 and Wing Loong-2 purchased Al-Sisi, who declared Sirte and Jufra to be from China, AT-802U close air support aircraft a red line and warned of military intervention supplied from the UAE and the limited number in the name of ensuring his country’s security of platforms and equipment are exceptional. against “radical elements,” as a result of the The deployment of Wing Loongs to both Uthman Government of National Consensus (GNC) in and Habata air bases near the Libyan border Libya breaking the siege in Tripoli and taking and Bir Gifgafa Airfield in Sinai does not reflect the Al-Watiya base in the south and moving in the aforementioned needs. Therefore, these the East, did not consider such to be a red developments justify the views regarding the line after ISIS conquered Sirte and controlled realization of the geopolitical goals of the al- 107 the line up to Jufra in 2015 and 2016. It ternative functions of these purchases and makes the Egyptian Government’s sincerity the re-establishment of the regional influence in its current discourse on threat perceptions weakened by Egypt’s economic difficulties.109 questionable. The military capacity of any of the aforementioned countries with which Egypt D) The Concept of Military Power and has problems, does not pose a threat to Egypt the Practical Equivalent of Egypt’s which makes the objectivity of arguments of- Military Investments fered by Cairo as justification for armament questionable. While it is stated that such re- The classification of armies takes place gional problems indicate threat perception at within the framework of many different criteria. various levels by the Egyptian security bu- At this point, examining the sources is a reaucracy, al-Sisi himself stated that Egypt is priority for any discussion of a country’s 110 not afraid of any invasion and that no regular military capacity. Manpower, air, land, and army in the region poses a threat to Egypt. naval forces’ capacity, natural resources, lo- However, Egypt needs a large army due to gistical support, economic power, geographic the instability and governance gap in the location, combat readiness, domestic and foreign military bases, and defense facilities and Middle East. Moreover, Sisi stated that the fortifications stand out as the most important Egyptian Army is designed to quickly move to criteria. These are a function of the assets various regions in the Middle East.108 that a country has on a national scale. While As a result, the point to which Egypt’s mil- evaluating national capacity in terms of military itary power has reached leads to evaluations issues such as the defense budget, manpower, that the mentioned huge arms expenditures and military infrastructure especially need to are not made for purchases that Egypt needs, be analyzed.111

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It is important to consider what resources in which many political and geopolitical factors an army uses and to what extent, as well as get involved. Therefore, it is clear that the whether they can be effectively transformed import of weapon systems should be extremely into military power. It can be said that the careful, and purchases should be carried out concept of military efficiency refers to the re- in line with objective needs, with a forward- sources provided to an army and the ability to looking and broad vision. However, countries transform them into effective combat capa- that have difficulty in catching up with the bilities. Partial improvements only cause a transformation in the security dynamic continue mess and cause difficulties in military support to design their security infrastructures and programs, however generously done.112 In the armies with a conventional approach. However, case of misidentification of a country’s military as a result of the hybridization of the dynamic doctrine, despite providing its army with high threat world, it is important to make the deci- budget and manpower, inadequate training, sions meticulously and with good planning in organization, or inadequate leadership military terms of the efficient use of resources and a capacity will be adversely affected.113 sustainable fight against threats. In this respect, the main weapons systems that are not pro- In the Middle East, where the security dy- duced in a short time such as aircraft, tanks, namics are changing suddenly and sharply, helicopters, or ships, which are preferred to the countries in the region may have difficulties ensure national security, come to the fore as in keeping up with the developments. Countries important factors that should be taken into have to closely follow these changing processes account when planning for defense.114 to adapt to the radical changes in the battlefield to ensure their national security. At this point, Since the Egypt-Israel peace, the Egyptian the strengthening of non-state armed actors Army has been purchasing large-scale, high- in the region following the weakening of state tech weapons from the USA with the aid it re- structures after the Arab Spring and the emer- ceives through115 the “Foreign Military Financ- gence and spread of radical organizations ing Account”. 116 117 Egypt maintained a stubborn such as ISIS are good examples. The fight attitude towards purchasing popular weapons against these organizations requires the exe- with high prices although it is not the best cution of operations with elements such as option for itself in line with the threat perception UAV and armed UAV systems, which constitute and scope. Moreover, after the Camp David a tactical and operational power factor for Accords Agreement, the national resources the armies, as well as electronic, signal, and were used to increase conventional capacity, satellite intelligence, which requires high rather than lighter, more flexible and mobile technological infrastructure rather than heavy elements that are more suitable for use in mechanized weapons designed for conventional counter-terrorism operations, and the radical warfare. This means that countries that do groups in Sinai while the possibility of a conflict not have domestic abilities to produce the with Israel, which Egypt had fought four times, weapons in question, fill this deficiency through has gradually decreased. This shows that the import. As a result, this process led to both purchases serve purposes other than national flow of national opportunities abroad and security needs and/or decisions were not complex and laborious procurement processes made by the Egyptian administration itself

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but were shaped significantly by external lead- new procurements are likely to cause problems ing and imposition. although the Egyptian Army has carried out this diversification with the simultaneous use Looking at Egypt’s purchases between of various types of aircraft in the air force.120 2013-2020, it can be said that the stubborn These procurements, which include different attitude of the supply of advanced weapons platforms and ammunition from many coun- has not completely over. Egyptian authorities tries, have significant effects on the organi- insisting that they must “protect the Egyptian zation of the Egyptian Army in terms of logistics borders” while ignoring the threat of terrorism and doctrine. and revolt, opposed requests to reduce conventional military capacity and invest more in F-16 Falcons from different blocks formed special forces, air force, reconnaissance-ob- the backbone of the EAF in the 2000s. In addi- servation platforms, and command and control, tion to that, the EAF was operating over 400 118 made by the US authorities. It was also fighter jets before 2012 as well as Mikoyan found in Wikileaks documents that the US MiG–21, Chengdu F–7, McDonell Douglas F–4 authorities pressured Egypt to take into account Phantom II, Dassault Mirage V, and Dassault the 21st-century realities of transnational Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Within the framework threats such as Iranian-backed groups using of its existing agreements, Egypt will purchase asymmetric methods, hijacking, and illegal 7 different combat aircraft from 5 different immigration, and to construct its military suppliers, including light attack aircraft and structure accordingly.119 advanced trainer aircraft, platforms such as the French Rafale, the Russian Mig-29, Su- 35, and finally the agreed Eurofighter Ty- phoon.121 These aircraft have different systems These aircraft have different that are not interchangeable, and it is not systems that are not possible to replace even the smallest compo- interchangeable, and it is not nents among them. Moreover, such an air possible to replace even the force inventory would require backing, including smallest components among them. the development of different combat doctrines Moreover, such an air force and different maintenance doctrines over inventory would require backing, many years.122 In this case, serious problems including the development of will be encountered in the training of pilots, different combat doctrines and technicians, and all “aircraft contact” per- different maintenance doctrines sonnel, and these many platforms in the air over many years. force inventory, each of which has a distinctive standard and requires different procedures and techniques, will need to be supported si- Although the diversification of weapon re- multaneously. Moreover, in switching from sources and reducing dependence on a single one model to another, personnel will need to supplier may seem like an advantage, it also be re-trained, which makes it possible to en- has disadvantages and complicates the situ- counter related weaknesses. On the other ation in terms of military organization. The hand, in terms of career goals, it may cause

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personnel to specialize in a limited number important features that makes the F-35 such of models, and the air force itself will have a sought-after aircraft for countries is that it difficulty in incentives for retraining.123 Apart is the best aircraft ever produced for net- from the economic burdens that will arise, work-based warfare.125 there is a potential risk in terms of the con- Due to the wasteful attitude towards buying tinued support of the importer countries in the high-tech weapons, the lack of resources keeping the aircraft ready for war, in case of to keep the weapons in the inventory ready an intense polarization that may occur in the for war and to modernize them has remained international conjuncture. a chronic problem in Egypt for many years. It While the doctrine and organization should has been stated that only 30 percent of the determine which equipment will be supplied, resources that Egypt receives from the USA it can be understood that the equipment pur- are used for maintenance costs, while this chased in the Egyptian example determines figure is below the 50 percent rate recom- the doctrine and organization. The relatively mended by US experts.126 Moreover, it is doubt- poor performance of the EAF is not only the ful whether this amount is also used effectively. difficulty in using the aforementioned different In addition to other factors, the low amount of platforms together but also the failure to es- money spent on maintenance and repairs tablish a network that will enable them to act shows why Egypt can benefit far less from in harmony as elements of an air force between these platforms compared to the USA. Looking these platforms. Network-centric warfare has at the time taken for warehouse maintenance, become a necessity rather than a choice for it can be seen that Egyptian F-16s have fewer armies in recent years.124 One of the most sorties than half of the US F-16s each year.

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This can be seen on the land and maritime that, since the Yom Kippur War, it had not platforms. For example, M1A1 Abrams tanks, changed despite the relatively effective oper- which were produced jointly with the USA and ational plans that allowed the Egyptian Army near Cairo, were routinely kept in the factory to cross the Canal with a surprise attack. In yard for months before being delivered to op- the 1990s, the statement of an American erational units, and Knox and Perry-class official gives clues about the general condition frigates stayed in the Alexandria Port, which of the Egyptian Army. Accordingly, lack of ini- 127 is a typical period for Egypt. tiative and motivation, strictly centralized com- Whether weapons systems and infrastruc- mand structure, poor training, and various ture investments will bring training, mainte- problems are the main problems of the army. nance and general war preparation is the im- While some of these problems were still on- portant point here. It is a fact that an army going, it has been reported that there is cor- with advanced weapons but limited capabilities ruption in some positions in the army, as in 131 cannot be as effective as a more capable the past. In recent years, efforts have been army with the same opportunities.128 Regard- made in Egypt to increase awareness about less of weapons, equipment, and other op- these issues and to eliminate them. Consid- portunities, no army can succeed without reg- ering the developments in the military struc- ular, realistic, constant, and repetitive training ture, infrastructure, and training facilities as activities. The fact that Egypt has benefited of the Sisi period, it can be seen that the less from its weapons in its inventory for Egyptian Army has undertaken significant re- many years led to the insufficiency of its forms and has been increasing its capacity training activities. This problem is exacerbated for a while.132 Egypt performs more regional in Egypt by the fact that exercises and training and comprehensive exercises. It can be said are mostly carried out without the execution that it will take time to change the on-going of free war games by adhering to a pre- habits and to realize comprehensive reforms. planned scenario with clear results and no For example, while the financial resources room for surprises. It has been stated that, acquired by the army increase and military the reports regarding these are fictionalized expenditures increase parallel to these re- by avoiding mentioning the mistakes and sources, it can be expected that there will be 129 taking lessons from them. Realistic, joint difficulties in obtaining sufficient resources exercises and activities aimed at providing for activities such as maintenance, repair, flexibility and strength to leaders and deci- and keeping ready for war, a good part of sion-makers, which are extremely critical for which will require external financing when success in a clash environment, are lack- the purchasing policy is examined in general. ing.130 As a result of these procurements, in the The training exercizes of the soldiers was future, a considerable amount of defense also at a low level since Egypt could not budget will be spent on expenses such as allocate sufficient resources for the mainte- maintenance, development, spare parts, and nance and repair of its weapons. Therefore, it increasing their operational service life, and can be stated that the training of the Egyptian these expenses can reach up to six times the Army is traditionally mediocre. It can be said orginal purchase cost.133

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CONCLUSION developed with the Egyptian administration and the contracts signed. It is also possible to The Al-Sisi regime, which came to power question the sincerity of the aforementioned in 2014 after the military coup, signed high- positions and commitments of these actors. cost arms procurement contracts that were Secondly, the Obama administration’s policies inconsistent with the realities of the Egyptian against Egypt, which formed the backbone of economy and initiated many civil and military the army inventory after 1979 with the aid re- infrastructure projects. When we look at the ceived from the United States, and the weapon conventional and unconventional threat per- systems provided from this country, during ceptions expressed in Libya, the Eastern the overthrow of Mubarak, the coming to Mediterranean and the region, where arms power of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al- procurements and infrastructure projects are Sisi seized power with a military coup, were justified and their sources and the quantity, perceived as “betrayal” by the military ad- quality, and type of the weapons on which an ministration. The Al-Sisi regime aimed to agreement is reached, the asymmetry between achieve the balance of interests in its relations them stands out directly. The study presents with the United States by diversifying its arms a comprehensive and preliminary analysis of suppliers and reducing its dependence on the historical background and diplomatic and this country. political possible causes of these arms procurements, inventory information on arms Thirdly, Sisi, who has a military intelligence procurements, and what this picture means background, has gained self-confidence against in the context of Egyptian foreign policy and a possible coup since his staffing over the defense industry. years, his past positions, and his relative dominance over the army compared to his mili- It can be said that arms procurements tary-origin predecessors Mubarak and Anwar served three important purposes for the al- Sadat. This has enabled him to take more ini- Sisi administration’s order after the military tiative in military investments. Therefore, Al- coup. The first of these, as expected, was to legitimize the putschist and authoritarian do- Sisi increases his popularity among the military mestic political design and existence in the through massive arms procurements and in- presence of international actors and to gain frastructure investments. In this way, he both both recognition and international support. strengthens the main center of power and Therefore, one of the important reasons for tries to eliminate any risk from the army. the trend towards countries other than the On the other hand, it can be said that USA in arms procurements made after 2014 Egypt’s armament has increased relatively, is the aim of widening the spectrum of recog- considering that arms procurement is an im- nition. Russia and China, Germany, France, portant factor that increases the possibilities and Italy, which are parties to the agreements and capabilities of the army. However, it cannot that emphasize universal values such as be said that only arms procurements will in- democracy and human rights and prioritize crease armament linearly. these concepts in arms sales, have received what the Al-Sisi administration wants in terms The armament of a country will be negatively of legitimacy, based on the relations they have affected by issues such as the lack of effective

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organization and training, lack of determination weapons ready for war. These weapons require of doctrine and not keeping the weapons ready more costs than procurement over the years. for war, as well as lack of good and long- It can be stated that its dependence on the term threat assessment and inappropriate Gulf countries and European countries such procurement policy. At this point, it can be as France receiving financial support for arms observed that investing more in conventional procurements, will increase while reducing weapons creates a weakness while Egypt its dependency on the USA in terms of supply. needs more planning and procurement for This is likely to cause Egypt to become more asymmetric threats rather than conventional engaged in these countries in the context of threats in the region. The problems experi- its regional policies. enced in fighting the armed groups in Sinai also point to this. For example, for Egypt, In recent years, it has been observed that which supports the putschist Haftar in Libya, awareness in terms of education and doctrine to make a move on the red lines specified for has increased in Egypt and more efforts have Sirte and Jufra, will require great logistical been made for the effective use of weapons. preparations and the deployment of mecha- The Egyptian Army participated more in in- nized troops to the region, which means a lot ternational exercises and focused on infra- of time and cost. Turkey demonstrated a ca- structure. However, the aforementioned chron- pacity to change the course of the Libyan civil ic problems are still ongoing. As a result, it war through UAV and armed UAV systems can be considered that a comprehensive in- with a lower cost from 1,500 km away. This is crease in the capacity of the Egyptian Army an example of how important planning is to will take years but, with such a diversified determine national goals and needs. supply of defense industries, this process should be accompanied by an effort to har- Another disadvantage of the diversification monize it in a way that does not seem techni- of the supply in the defense industry pro- cally possible. Otherwise, the current situation curements of Egypt is that the EAF’s inventory will remain as a means of diversifying the de- consists of aircraft supplied from different fense industry in foreign policy, finding support, countries, each of which requires distinctive and gaining legitimacy rather than improving maintenance and training doctrines. This case the Egyptian Armed Forces. Such diversification will cause problems both in the training of may occasionally trigger distrust in bilateral the staff and the execution of the activities in relations among actors. This situation can be coordination between the aircraft. It should triggered by new polarizations that may develop be underlined that the coordination between depending on the global and regional con- the forces on the battlefield is much more juncture. In such a situation where Egypt may important than in the past. Moreover, Egypt’s be forced to take a position by its existing deficiency in this regard should be highlighted, partners and other actors whose relations it based on the development of weapon systems has developed through arms procurements, accordingly. making a decision between its traditional part- It can be said that Egypt, which has been ner, the USA, upon whose dependency for experiencing economic problems for many arms procurement is reduced and the alliance years, will have difficulties in keeping its relations are maintained, and the other parties

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with possible polarization, poses a great risk. be reevaluated in terms of the coalition against Egypt, where it is much more difficult to Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean issue allocate the budget to maintain such a multi- as it was seen in Libya. The fact that the lateral approach in terms of economy, com- support of the Gulf countries becomes vital pared to the Gulf countries, may not only ex- for maintaining these moves, pressure made perience economic difficulties but also it will on the Egyptian economy and its foreign policy, be obliged to take a side in tensions between poses a significant threat to the national in- its suppliers in times of regional crises and terests and the foreign policy profile of Egypt, breaking points. Thus relations with some which is one of the most important actors in suppliers may be tensed up despite purchases. the region. In a period when Egypt tries to Economic limitations and the breaking points overcome dependency by diversification, the in bilateral relations that will be brought along country only and partially changes the direction with these limitations, cannot make it possible of dependency and restricts its maneuverability to sustain the current policy in the medium in foreign policy. Finally, while it is possible term. For example, in the simplest form, even to interpret the line, diversification efforts, the separation of France, the United States, and the profile of purchases in the defense and Russia only in the eastern Mediterranean industry in terms of internal and external dy- equation leaves no choice but to hope that namics and especially considering the way the moment of breaking and forced elections the Sisi regime took power, it is impossible to will not come for a country that follows such continue without a deepening dependency. a line, and thus the funds that it channels for This deepening dependency is a bilateral the support of these actors, despite all the process that is not only in the hands of Egypt economic difficulties, will not be “wasted.” but also linked to the future elections of the Due to these limitations, to maintain Egypt’s actor/s who are on the opposite side of the aforementioned line, the Gulf countries’ support said dependency. This situation does not should be given all at once to the country in strengthen Egypt’s regional and global profile, the defense industry purchases. The pressure on the contrary, it has become increasingly to put certain matters into practice needs to risky.

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Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt Website, “Berenice Military Base”, . اﳌﺸﺎرﻊ-اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔ/ﻗﺎﻋﺪة-ﺑﺮﻧﻴﺲ-اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﺔ/https://www.presidency.eg ﻓﻴﻠﻢ ﻋﻦ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻧﺠﻴﺐ Egyptian Ministry of Defense Official YouTube Account, “ ”, July 2020. Shapir Y. and Parpiani K., “Egypt Rearms”, INSS, Strategic Assessment, Volume 19, Issue 3, October 2016. Sharp J., “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congress Research Service Reports, 27 May 2020. Springborg R. and Williams P., “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes”, Carnegie Middle East Center, January 2019. Tessler M., “A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 2009. Topol S., “WikiLeaks Reveals U.S. Efforts to Change Egypt’s Military Strategy”, Newsweek, 21 December 2010. Torry H. ve El-Ghobashy T., The Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2015, Wezeman P., Fleurant A., Kuimova A., Tian N., Wezeman.S., “Trends In Internatıonal Arms Transfers, 2018”, Mart 2019. ,April 2020 ,ﻃﺎﺋﺮات ﻣﻦ دﻣﺸﻖ واﻟﻘﺎﻫﺮة واﻹﻣﺎرات ﻟﺪﻋﻢ ﺣﻔE D ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ .20- ﺎ ﻴ ﺒ ﻴ ﻟ/https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2020/7/4

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ENDNOTES 1 “2020 Military Strength Ranking”, Global Fire Power, 2020, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 2 Zeinab Abul-Magd, “The Egyptian military in politics and the economy: Recent history and current transition status”, CMI Insight, 2013, s.1. 3 Yagil Henkin, “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma”, The Jerusalem Institutefor Strategy and Security, 7 January 2018, https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-egyptian-military-buildup-enigma/. 4 Nathan Brown, “The Role of Egypt’s Armed Forces: A Military Empire”, ISPI, 24 September 2020. 5 “Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations”, Congress Research Service Reports, 20 August 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11267.pdf. 6 Lazar Berman ve Moshe Albo, “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia”, The Jerusalem Institutefor Strategy and Security, 5 April 2020, https://jiss.org.il/en/berman-albo-egypts- strategic-balancing-act-between-the-us-and-russia/. 7 Robert Springborg and F. C. “Pink” Williams, “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes”, Carnegie Middle East Center, January 2019, s.5. 8 Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, “Egypt’s Military Relations in the post-Mubarak Period”, ORSAM Opinion, 14 June 2016.https://orsam.org.tr/tr/mubarek-sonrasi-donemde-misir-in-askeri-iliskileri/. 9 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 10 Yiftah S. Shapir ve Kashish Parpiani, “Egypt Rearms”, INSS, Strategic Assessment, Volume 19, Issue 3, October 2016. 11 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 12 Giuseppe Dentice, “Shifting Priorities: The Evolution of Egypt’s Foreign Policy”, ISPI, 24 September 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/shifting-priorities-evolution-egypts-foreign-policy- 27409. 13 Ibid. 14 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 15 “2016 France and the Control of the Arms Trade”, Minister of the Armed Forces (France), 2016, p.6. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/france_report_2014_eng.pdf. 16 “Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”, Official Journal of the European Union, Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty, 8 December 2008, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 17 “Arms Trade Treaty”, BM, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012- 01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf. 18 Minister of the Armed Forces (France), 2016, p.6 19 “Egypt: How French Arms were Used to Crush Dissent”, Amnesty International, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2190382018ENGLISH.PDF. 20 “Egypt: France flouts international law by continuing to export arms used in deadly crackdowns”, Amnesty International, 16 October 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/10/egypt- france-flouts-international-law-by-continuing-to-export-arms-used-in-deadly-crackdowns/. 21 “Roundup: Deutsche Patrouillenboote für Ägypten statt Saudi-Arabien”, Boerse, 2 November 2020, https://www.boerse.de/nachrichten/ROUNDUP-Deutsche-Patrouillenboote-fuer-Aegypten-statt- Saudi-Arabien/31133080.

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22 John W. Copp, “Egypt and the Soviet Union, 1953-1970”, (Master’s Thesis, Portland State University, 1986), p. 59, 77, 78, 118. 23 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 24 “Shifting Priorities: The Evolution of Egypt’s Foreign Policy” 25 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 26 Shapir, p. 63. 27 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 28 Marc Tessler, “A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 2009, p.348. 29 “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 11 October 2017, p.10. 30 Ibid. 31 “F-16 Without AMRAAM: Egyptian Air Force Operates 220 F-16 Fighter Jets Without BVR Missiles”, Fighter Jets World, 22 July 2020, https://fighterjetsworld.com/weekly-article/f-16-without-amraam- egyptian-air-force-operates-220-f-16-fighter-jets-without-bvr-missiles/22333/. 32 “Su-35 Jet Purchase: Egypt Seeks Equipment Equal to Israel’s”, The Defense World, 5 August 2020, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/27592/Su_35_Jet_Purchase__Egypt_Seeks_Equipment_Equal_t o_Israel_s#.X3yS_Wj7TIU 33 Jamie Hunter, “Here Are The First Photos Of Egypt’s New Su-35 “Super Flankers”, The Drive, 23 July 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35055/here-are-the-first-photos-of-egypts-new-su- 35-super-flankers . 34 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congress Research Service Reports, 27 May 2020, p.19. 35 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 36 “3 Egyptian warships cross Turkey’s Bosphorus to take part in drills with Russia in Black Sea”, Egypt Today, 15 November 2020, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/94250/3-Egyptian-warships-cross- Turkey-s-Bosphorus-to-take-part. 37 Ibid. 38 Mohamad Al-Kinani, “Why Egypt is spending Money on Buying Arms?”, SDArabia, 21 November 2019, https://english.sdarabia.com/why-egypt-is-spending-money-on-buying-arms/. 39 Pieter d. Wezeman vd., “Trends In Internatıonal Arms Transfers, 2018”, March 2019, p.6. 40 Sharp, p.14. 41 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy”, The Egypt Watch, 18 February 2020, https://egyptwatch.net/2020/02/18/egypt-army-ranks-9th-in-the-world-despite-weak-economy/ 42 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 43 “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2018) US$ m., 1988-2019”, SIPRI, 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80% 932019%20in%20constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf . 44 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” 45 Kemal İnat, “Fransa’nın Doğu Akdeniz politikasını anlamak”, 17 August 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/fransa-nin-dogu-akdeniz-politikasini-anlamak/1944261.

Report No: 24 37 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

46 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” 47 According to Russian sources, the scope of the deal is $ 1 billion, and Egypt has requested 3 batteries from them. The first batteries delivered to Egypt in mid-2017. 48 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 49 This figure is specified as 50 in the SIPRI database. “Egypt to Buy 46 Russian MiG-29 Fighter Jets For $2 Billion”, Defense World, 26 Mayıs 2015, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/13027/Egypt_To_Buy_46_Russian_MiG_29_Fighter_Jets_For_ _2_Billion. 50 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 51 Ibid. 52 Harriet Torry ve Tamer El-Ghobashy, The Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sisis-german-visit-highlights-his-growing-international-legitimacy- 1433343553. 53 Many sources state that Wing Loong UAVs are deployed in bases on the Libyan border. 54 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 55 Sayigh, p.65. 56 Ibid. 57 Sayigh, p.303 58 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 59 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 60 Ibid. 61 “Bright future awaits Sinai, Suez Canal Economic Zone after connected to mainland with huge tunnels, bridges”, 25 April 2020, Egypt Today, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/85088/Bright- future-awaits-Sinai-Suez-Canal-Economic-Zone-after-connected 62 “Sisi unveils LE10bn development plan for Sinai”, Al-Masry Al-Youm (English), 8 March 2016, http://www.egyptindependent.com/sisi-unveils-le10bn-development-plan-sinai/. 63 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 64 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” ,”ןוכיתה חרזמב רתויב לודגה יאבצה סיסבה והז :םירצמ אבצ“ 65 Globes, 28 July 2017, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001199046. 66 “Egypt’s Sisi inaugurates Mohamed Naguib military base west of Alexandria”, Ahram Online, 22 Temmuz 2017, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/274035/Egypt/0/Egypt’s-Sisi- inaugurates-Mohamed-Naguib-military-b.aspx 67 Giuseppe Dentice, “Matrouh: Egypt’s Linchpin in North Africa and the Mediterranean”, ISPI, 1 December 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/matrouh-egypts-linchpin-north- africa-and-mediterranean-28506. 68 “All you need to know about ‘Mohamed Naguib’ military base”, Egypt Today Staff, 22 July 2020, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/13105/All-you-need-to-know-about-Mohamed-Naguib- military-base

orsam.org.tr 38 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

69 Ibid. 70 “Egypt’s Sisi inaugurates Mohamed Naguib military base west of Alexandria” 71 Ibid. 72 Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt Website, “Berenice Military Base”, اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻊ-اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔ/ﻗﺎﻋﺪة-ﺑﺮﻧﻴﺲ-اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﺔ https://www.presidency.eg/en/ / July ,” ﻓﻴﻠﻢ ﻋﻦ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻧﺠﻴﺐ“ ,Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt Website, YouTube Account 73 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gzEn93rfRqc&t=150s 74 “Egypt’s biggest military base on the Red Sea in details”, Egypt Independent, 15 January 2020, https://egyptindependent.com/egypts-biggest-military-base-on-the-red-sea-in-details/ 75 Mahmoud Gamal, “Egypt 2017: Developments in the Military Scene”, 5 January 2018, https://en.eipss-eg.org/egypt-2017-developments-in-the-military-scene/ ,June 2020 ,” ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﺣﻮل ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﺔ ﻣﺼﺮﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪود ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ“ 76 / ﻣﺼﺮ-ﺗﺴﺘﻌﺪ-ﻹﻃﻼق-ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ-ﻋﺴﻜﺮﺔ-ﺟﺪﻳﺪة-ﻗﺮب-ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ-ﺻﻮرhttps://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1123453- 77 Ibid. 78 “To thwart terrorist attacks from Libya, Egypt is building a new military base”, 12 June 2020, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/06/12/to-thwart-terrorist-attacks-from-libya-egypt-is- building-a-new-military-base/ 79 Ahmed Eleiba, “Egyptian military acquisitions 2017: A timeline”, Ahram Online, 1 January 2018, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/43/1178/286397/Year-End-Issue/Egypt/Egyptian- military-acquisitions—A-timeline.aspx 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. ,April 2020 ,ﻃﺎﺋﺮات ﻣﻦ دﻣﺸﻖ واﻟﻘﺎﻫﺮة واﻹﻣﺎرات ﻟﺪﻋﻢ ﺣﻔﺘﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ 82 20- ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ/https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2020/7/4 83 “Egypt’s Strategic Balancing Act between the US and Russia” 84 Ibid. 85 “Drone Bases Updates”, Drone Center, 1 October 2018, https://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone- bases-updates/. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 “Egypt’s navy modernization, The growth of new power in the Middle east” 89 Shaul Shay, “The Egyptian navy in the Red Sea”, IDC Herzliya, January 2017, 90 “Alexandria Naval Base Development”, Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt Website, October . اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻊ-اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔ/ﺗﻄﻮﺮ-ﻗﺎﻋﺪة-اﻹﺳﻜﻨﺪرﺔ-اﻟﺒﺤﺮﺔ /https://www.presidency.eg/en ,2017 91 “Berths Draft Increase in Alexandria Naval Base”, Mısır Cumhurbaşkanlığı Resmi İnternet Sitesi, . اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻊ-اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔ/زﺎدة-اﻟﻐﺎﻃﺲ-ﻟﻸرﺻﻔﺔ-اﻟﺒﺤﺮﺔ /October 2017, https://www.presidency.eg/en 92 “Establishment of Some Berths, Alexandria Naval Base”, Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt Website, October 2017, . اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻊ-اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﺔ/إﻧﺸﺎء-ﻋﺪد-ﻣﻦ-اﻷرﺻﻔﺔ-اﻟﺒﺤﺮﺔ-اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة/https://www.presidency.eg/en

Report No: 24 39 Investments in Armaments and Military Infrastructure of Egypt in the Al-Sisi Period

93 Mahmoud Gamal, “Egypt’s navy modernization, The growth of new power in the Middle east”, 1 February 2019, https://navalnews.net/egypts-navy-modernization-the-growth-of-new-power-in- the-middle-east/ 94 Ibid. 95 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma 96 Ibid. 97 Springborg ve Williams, p.1. 98 Ibid. 99 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” 100 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 101 Shapir ve Kashish,p.65 102 “The Rationale For Egypt’s Military Spending Spree” 103 Ibid. 104 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 105 Ibid. 106 Tamar Beeri, “Israel’s Navy to receive first German-made Sa’ar 6 ship”, Jerusalem Post, 5 November 2020, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/idfs-navy-receives-new-german-saar-6- ship-648135. 107 “Sisi did not consider Sirte a red line when ISIS occupied it’, ex-US envoy says”, Middle East Monitor, 30 July 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200630-sisi-did-not-consider-sirte- a-red-line-when-isis-occupied-it-ex-us-envoy-says/. 108 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 109 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” 110 “Measuring Military Capability”, RAND, p.136. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110/MR1110.ch7.pdf 111 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110/MR1110.ch7.pdf. 112 Springborg ve Williams, p.1. 113 “Measuring Military Capability” 114 “Egypt’s Military Relations in the post-Mubarak Period”, 115 Through this account, the president is authorized to provide direct grants or loans to foreign countries for the provision of services such as defense equipment and training of the USA. Which countries will receive this support and the management of the program are at the discretion of the foreign minister. 116 “Foreign Military Financing”, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, https://www.dsca.mil/foreign- military-financing-fmf 117 Sharp, p.25 118 Springborg ve Williams, p.2. 119 Sarah A. Topol, “WikiLeaks Reveals U.S. Efforts to Change Egypt’s Military Strategy”, Newsweek,

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21 December 2010, https://www.newsweek.com/wikileaks-reveals-us-efforts-change-egypts- military-strategy-68921. 120 Shapir ve Kashish, p. 63. 121 “Egyptian Air Force: Repeating Past Mistakes”, Egypt Defence Review, 2 July 2017, https://egyptdefreview.wordpress.com/2017/07/02/egyptian-air-force-repeating-past-mistakes/. 122 Shapir ve Kashish, p. 63-64. 123 “Egyptian Air Force: Repeating Past Mistakes” 124 Ibid. 125 Hakan KILIÇ, Tolgaozbek, “Türkiye Neden F-35 Lightning-II Almak İstiyor/İstiyordu?”, 7 June 2020, https://tolgaozbek.com/yazarlar/turkiye-neden-f-35-lightning-ii-almak-istiyor-istiyordu/. 126 Springborg ve Williams, p.2. 127 Ibid., p.2-3 128 “Egypt army ranks 9th in the world despite weak economy” 129 Springborg ve Williams, p.3. 130 Ibid. 131 “The Egyptian Military Buildup: An Enigma” 132 Ibid. 133 Sayigh, p.303

Report No: 24

ORSAM Publishes Middle East Analysis and Middle Eastern Studies as periodical journals. Middle East Analysis, which is published bimonthly in Turkish, covers the expert opinions on contemporary developments in the Middle East. Middle Eastern Studies is a semi-annual journal on international relations. As a scholarly and refereed journal, published in both Turkish and English, Middle Eastern Studies is composed of the contributions of academics who are experts in their field. Middle Eastern Studies, where respectable, national and international level academics publishes their papers, is indexed by Applied Social Sciences and Abstracts (ASSIA), EBSCO Host, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBBS), Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (WPSA).