Dec 2012

OE Threat Assessment: Egypt

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

[Type the author name] United States Army 6/1/2012 OE Threat Assessment: Egypt

Introduction Egypt is located at an important crossroad, both geographically and politically. Physically, the country possesses the land on both sides of the Suez Canal, thus controlling a vital chokepoint for global maritime commerce. Politically, it is still attempting to develop a new constitution and a functioning government since the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011. While the country faces many challenges including natural disasters, unemployment, terrorist activity, and drug trafficking, the absence of a stable government that is legitimate in the eyes of its own people overrides all other concerns. Political Egypt’s current political system is in a state of transition that began on 25 January 2011. At that time, the “Arab Spring” manifested in the country in the form of large protests and demonstrations against the government that only grew in size and intensity with each passing day. Long-time President and U.S. ally Hosni Mubarak resigned under pressure on 11 February 2011 and handed power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which immediately dissolved the Egyptian parliament and suspended the constitution.

The SCAF put forth an interim constitution, approved by voters and put into force in March 2011, that outlined steps to achieving a new, permanent constitution. The document called for the creation of a constituent assembly to draft the new constitution, and also included reforms such as presidential term limits and an independent judiciary. Elections for a new Parliament were held November 2011-January 2012, and both houses convened shortly thereafter. The presidential election of May-June 2012 resulted in Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, winning the poll and taking office on 30 June 2012.

The current Egyptian political system consists of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The executive is headed by the president, who appoints the prime minister, at least one vice president, and the cabinet. The legislature consists of the 508-seat Majlis al-Sha’b (People’s Assembly) and the 270-seat Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council). 498 members of the former and 180 of the latter are elected; the remainder are appointed by the president. The judiciary includes general courts, special courts such as military courts, and the Supreme Constitutional Court. Four political alliances – each consisting of 3-7 political parties – and seven additional parties currently exist in Egypt.

The most pressing issue in the country is political instability. The president and the judiciary are at loggerheads, as are the Islamist parties against the moderate and liberal parties. Examples of these conflicts include the following events:

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• The Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved the People’s Assembly on 14 June 2012, which President Morsi subsequently attempted to reinstate – unsuccessfully – by presidential decree.

• The first constituent assembly was also dissolved by the Court, which deemed it to be "unrepresentative.” A second assembly was then appointed, but was later boycotted by moderate and liberal political parties, who viewed it as being dominated by Islamists.

• President Morsi issued a decree on 22 November 2012 granting himself new powers and removing the Supreme Constitutional Court’s right to overturn any of his decisions. Popular demonstrations immediately broke out, at one point forcing Morsi to flee the presidential palace. Morsi subsequently annulled the decree on 9 December after continuous protests, some of which turned violent.

• The remaining members of the second constituent assembly rushed the completion of a proposed constitution, which is scheduled for a vote on 15 December 2012. Despite repeated requests by opposition members, Morsi has refused to delay the referendum. Moderate and liberal parties are protesting the vote, stating that the proposed constitution is unrepresentative and will impede on the rights of women and minorities.

• Thousands of judges went on strike after Morsi’s 22 November decree. As it is judges who oversee popular elections in Egypt, it is possible that the referendum either will not be able to occur due to the refusal of the judiciary to oversee it, or that it will occur despite lack of judicial oversight and then be declared null and void by the courts.

As these incidents show, Egypt remains politically unstable nearly two years after the resignation of Mubarak. Depending on the events surrounding the constitutional referendum – still slated for 15 December 2012 as of this writing – there is the real possibility that the country will fall back into fighting and undergo yet another revolution.

Military

Non-State Paramilitary Forces

Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam The Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam – not to be confused with the Abdullah Azzam Brigades – is a militant Egyptian Islamist group associated with al Qaeda to the extent that two

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of its aliases are “al Qaeda in the Levant and Egypt” and “al Qaeda in Syria and Egypt.” The group’s goal is to remove non-Muslims and their influence from Middle Eastern Muslim countries. It is best known for sophisticated bomb attacks against popular tourist sites in Egypt, including the simultaneous vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) bombings of multiple Sinai resorts in 2004. Though the group is not known to have committed any attacks after 2005, it was assessed to still be active as recently as 2008.

Gama’a al-Islamiya (IG) Also known as Islamic Group or Egyptian Islamic Group, IG was formed in Egypt during the 1970s. Prominent former members include Omar abd ar-Rahman, aka the “Blind Sheikh”, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al Qaeda (AQ). IG’s primary goal is to establish an Islamic state in Egypt. Activities in the 1980s and 1990s included the assassination of then- President Anwar Sadat; the attempted assassination of then-President Hosni Mubarak; town uprisings; attacks on Christians, security forces, government officials, and tourists; and bank/train robberies. In 1997, the group formally announced its affiliation with AQ. An Egyptian crackdown on IG led to a ceasefire in March 1999, which was widely maintained until 2006.

The group split in 2006, when Abu Jihad al Masri announced its merger with al Qaeda (AQ). Those primarily outside Egypt stayed with the Abu Jihad faction and AQ, while the majority of members inside Egypt went with Sayyid Imam al Sharif, aka Dr. Fadl, who rejected AQ tactics. The Fadl faction has continued to maintain the ceasefire, and now operates as the Building and Development Party – a legal Egyptian political party. The Abu Jihad faction operates primarily in Egypt, and common TTP include vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) – including suicide VBIEDs (SVBIEDs) – and small arms attacks against tourist locations such as hotels.

Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (“Excommunication and exodus”) is a group of nebulous origin and identity. Some analysts believe it to be a Sunni Islamist religious group whose members include Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Others think it is a derogatory name used by Egyptian and other nation’s officials for any militant Islamist group they cannot immediately identify. The group has been linked to or credited with attacks as diverse as the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1981, the attempted assassination of Osama bin Laden in Sudan in 1995, the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the killing of Iraqi Army recruits in Iraq in 2005, and the rocket-propelled grenade attack on a police building in Egypt in 2011.

Additional Groups Groups that have previously been active in Egypt include the Abu Nidal Organization, the Islamic Liberation Organization, and the International Justice Group. While these groups have not been known to have committed any attacks in the past several years, there is insufficient 4 UNCLASSIFIED

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information to determine whether or not they are, in fact, still active. Another group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad – aka al-Jihad – merged with al Qaeda in 2001; it has not committed an attack in Egypt since 1995 and it is unknown if the group retains independent attack capability. Any one of these groups has the potential, given the right impetus, to regroup and recommence attacks in the country. Another group, the Muslim Brotherhood, denounced violence in the early 1980s and has since focused on instituting an Islamic government in Egypt via political means. President Morsi and the majority of Egyptian Parliament members belong to this group.

Threat Actors Military Functions

Mission Command Threat actors may conduct centralized planning, but will conduct decentralized operations. Threat actors will refrain from the use of electronic mediums for most important communication and instead rely upon couriers. While slower, the messenger system prevents the detection of the communication from sophisticated systems.

Maneuver Most threat actors will operate on foot or in civilian vehicles to conduct their terrorist missions.

INFOWAR All threat groups will attempt to shape the message that the open media gives the people, both internally and externally to the country.

RISTA Most threat actors will use human intelligence (HUMINT) as their primary means to gain information. With their supporters scattered throughout the population, the information will eventually get to the threat actors. In planning any type of operation, the threat actors will most likely conduct personal reconnaissance of the target.

Fire Support Threat actors in Egypt will have limited means of fire support. If a threat actor has indirect fire support, it will likely come from one or two mortars at most.

Protection Threat actors have limited protection since they will travel on foot or in civilian vehicles. On foot, the threat actors must blend in with the people so they will just wear normal clothing with 5 UNCLASSIFIED

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possibly equipment hidden underneath it. Civilian vehicles are no match for military vehicles during a confrontation.

Logistics Threat actors have limited logistics requirements. During the planning phase, the threat actor will gather the materials needed from a variety of sources and then conduct the attack when they possess the necessary equipment. Supporters will provide food and shelter to those threat actors when it is needed and the civilians can do so safely.

Nonmilitary Armed Combatants Many civilians in Egypt may possess a legal or illegal firearm, but it is near impossible to determine how the person will feel about the U.S. The nonmilitary armed combatants could range from friendly to hostile dependent upon the individual’s disposition, their connections, and political persuasion. There are approximately 1.9 million guns owned by civilians in Egypt or about 3.5 firearms per 100 people. According to Egyptian law, civilians cannot own any long guns, but the cost of an AK-47 is approximately $300. Citizens with a license may own a pistol or revolver. To own a handgun, a civilian must be 21 years of age, prove a genuine reason to possess the firearm, and pass a background check. Gun owners must re-apply and re-qualify for their gun license every three years. Both open carry and concealed carry is legal in Egypt as long as the gun owner possesses the proper license.

State Security Forces Based on 2012 estimates, the Egyptian Government commands a total of about 947,500 troops, when counting both active duty soldiers and active national guardsmen. The major military branches include the Egyptian Army (340,000 active, 375,000 reserve); Egyptian Navy (16,500 active, 14,000 reserve, 2,000 Coast Guard); Egyptian Air Force (30,000 active, 20,000 reserve); and Egyptian Air Defense Command (80,000 active, 70,000 reserve).

ARMY Armored Equipment in Service M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank 1,005 M60A1 Main Battle Tank 300 M60A3 Main Battle Tank 850 T-62 Main Battle Tank (stored) 500 T-54/T-55 Main Battle Tank 840 Ramses II Main Battle Tank 260 (stored) (modified T-54/T-55; stored) YPR 765 Infantry Fighting Vehicle 390 BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicle 300 BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle 220 w/25mm cannon (stored) BMP-600P Infantry Fighting 250 Commando Scout Reconnaissance 112 BTR-60 Armored Personnel Carrier 250 Vehicle Vehicle (stored) BTR-50PK Armored Personnel 500 OT-62 Armored Personnel Carrier unk Walid Mk 1/2 Armored Personnel 650 Carrier (stored) (most stored) Carrier 6 UNCLASSIFIED

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Fahd Armored Personnel Carrier, 410 Fahd 30 Armored Personnel unk M113A1/2 Armored Personnel 2,600 4x4 Carrier, 4x4 Carrier Artillery Systems in Service 130mm M-46 Field Gun 420 122mm M1931/37 (A-19) Gun, 36 155mm E52 Howitzer, towed 16 towed 155mm M109A2 Howitzer, self- 164 155mm M109A3 Howitzer, self- 201 122mm SP122 (M109) Howitzer, 124 propelled propelled self-propelled 122mm M1938 (M-30) Howitzer, 300 122mm D-30M Howitzer, towed 190+ 160mm M160 Mortar 30 towed 120mm M106A2 Mortar, self- 48 120mm M1943 Mortar, towed 1,800 82mm M125A2 Howitzer 500 propelled 81mm M125A2 50 240mm BM-24 Multiple Rocket 48 227mm Multiple Rocket Launch 26 Launcher (stored) System 140mm BM-14-16 Multiple 32 130mm Kooryong Multiple Rocket 36 122mm BM-21 Grad Multiple 60 Rocket Launcher Launcher Rocket Launcher 122mm BM-11 Multiple Rocket 96 122mm Sakr 36 Multiple Rocket 100 122mm Sakr 18 Multiple Rocket 50 Launcher Launcher Launcher 122mm Sakr 10 Multiple Rocket 50 Launcher AT/SAM Weapons in Service AT-3 ‘Sagger’Anti-Tank Missile 1,200 Milan Anti-Tank Missile Launcher 200 BGM-71 TOW-2A Anti-Tank 700 Missile 107mm B-11 Recoilless Anti-Tank 520 M-901 Anti-Tank Missile 52 FROG-7 Surface-to-Surface Missile 9 Gun SS-1C Scud B TEL Surface-to- 9 Sakr-80 Surface-to-Surface Missile 24 Sakr-Eye (modified SA-7/(K32 2,000 Surface Missile (in trials) Strela-2) Surface-to-Air Missile SA-9 ‘Gaskin’ Surface-to-Air 20 M54 ‘Chaparral’ Surface-to-Air 26 Avenger Air Defense System 50 Missile Missile, self-propelled FIM-92 ‘Stinger’ MANPADS unk

AIR FORCE Fixed Wing Aircraft in Service F-16A-15 ‘Fighting Falcon’ 26 F-16C ‘Fighting Falcon’ 113 F-4E ‘Phantom II’ Fighter/Ground 29 Fighter/Ground Attack Fighter/Ground Attack Attack Mirage 5E2 Fighter/Ground 16 Mirage 5SDE (Mirage III) 53 Mirage 2000 Fighter/Ground 18 Attack Righter/Ground Attack Attack Alpha Jet MS-2 Fighter/Ground 12 J-7 / MiG-21 ‘Fishbed’ PF/PFM/MF 74 F-6 Fighter/Ground Attack 44 Attack Fighter/Ground Attack Mirage 5SDR (Mirage III) 6 MiG-21R ‘Fishbed’ 14 C-12J ELINT 1 Reconnaissance/Observation Reconnaissance/Observation Reconnaissance/Observation EC-130H ‘Hercules’ ELINT 2 E-2C ‘Hawkeye’ AEW 6 Hawkeye 2000 unk Reconnaissance/Observation Reconnaissance/Observation Reconnaissance/Observation An-74 ‘Coaler’ Transport 3 C-130H ‘Hercules’ Transport 22 Boeing 707-366C VIP Transport 3 Boeing 737-100 VIP Transport 1 DHC-5D ‘Buffalo’ Transport 4 Gulfstream III Transport 3 Gulfstream IV Transport 3 Gulfstream G-45P Transport 4 C-12J Transport 4 Beech Super King Air 200 1 Falcon 20 Transport 3 F-16B-15 ‘Fighting Falcon’ Trainer 12 transport

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F-16D-32 ‘Fighting Falcon’ Trainer 6 Gomhoureya 6/8R Trainer 36 FT-6 ‘Farmer’ Trainer Unk MiG 21US ‘Mongol B’ Trainer 14 Alpha Jet MS-1 Trainer 24 Mirage 2000 BM Trainer Unk L39 ZO ‘Albatros’ Trainer 10 L59E ‘Albatros’ Trainer 35 EMB312 ‘Tucano’ Trainer 34 DHC-5D ‘Buffalo’ Trainer 5 K-8 Karakorum Trainer 80 Grob 115 E Trainer 74 L-29 Delfin Trainer 26 Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service AH-64A “Apache’ Attack 35 AS-61 VIP Transport Unk CH-47C ‘Chinook’ Transport 3 CH-47D ‘Chinook’ Transport 16 Commando 2 Transport 25 Commando 2E EW 4 S-70A-21 “Black Hawk’ VIP 4 UH-12E Transport 17 SA342L ‘Gazelle’ ASW 5 Transport SA342K ‘Gazelle’ Attack 65 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Transport 40 Mi-6 ‘Hook’ Transport 12 SH-2G ‘Super Seasprite’ 10 Sea King Mk 47 5 UH-60A ‘Black Hawk’ 2 UH 60L ‘Black Hawk’ 5 Air Defense Weapons in Service AA-2 ‘Atoll’ Air-to-Air Missile Unk R530 Air-to-Air Missile Unk Super 530D Air-to-Air Missile Unk R550 ‘Magic’ Air-to-Air Missile Unk AIM-7E/F/M ‘Sparrow’ Air-to-Air Unk AIM-9F/L/P ‘Sidewinder’ Air-to-Air Unk Missile Missile ARMAT Anti-Radiation Missile Unk AGM-114A ‘Hellfire’ Anti-Tank Unk AGM-114 ‘Hellfire II’ Anti-Tank Unk Missile Missile AGM-119 ‘Penguin’ Air-to-Surface Unk AGM-84 ‘Harpoon’ Anti-Ship Unk AGM-65A ‘Maverick’ Air-to- 80 Missile Attack Missile Surface Missile AGM-65G ‘Maverick’ Air-to- 30 AGM-65D ‘Maverick’ Air-to- 123 AGM-65F ‘Maverick’ Air-to- 12 Surface Missile Surface Missile Surface Missile AS-30L laser-guided Air-to- Unk HOT Anti-Tank Missile Unk AM 39 ‘Exocet’ Anti-Ship Attack Unk Surface Missile Missile AS-12 ‘Kegler’ Air-to-Surface Unk Missile

NAVY Vessels in Service Romeo Class Submarine 4 Sharm el Sheikh Frigate 4 Abuqir Class Frigate 2 Najim al Zafir Class Frigate 2 Damiyat Class Frigate 2 Ramadan Class Guided Missile 6 Patrol Boat (2 in reserve) OSA I Class Patrol Boat (2 in 12 October Class Patrol Boat (2 in 4 Hegu Class Patrol Boat 4 reserve) reserve) 23 July Class patrol Boat 5 NISR Class Patrol Boat Unk Shershen Class Fast Attack 5 Torpedo Boat Shanghai II Class Fast Attack Craft 4 Al Nour Class Fast Attack Craft (4 8 Houku Class Fast Attack Craft (2 in Unk in reserve) reserve) 200-ft Fast Attack Missile Craft Unk Polnocny A Class Landing Ship 3 Vydra Classl Utility Landing Craft 9 Seafoz Class Swimmer Delivery 5 Swiftships Type Coastal 3 Safaga Class Route Survey 2 Craft Minesweeper Giza Class Minesweeper Unk Osprey Class Minehunter 2 T-43 Class Mine Warfare 3 Tuima Class Fast Minelayer Unk Yurka Class Ocean Minesweeper 4 Ayeda Class Tanker 7 Nyryat 1 Class Tender 2 Poluchat I Class Torpedo Retriever 2 El Kousser Training Unk 8 UNCLASSIFIED

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Sekstan Class Training Unk Type 620 Ammunition Ship Unk Type 701E Replenishment Ship Unk El Hurreya Class Troop Transport 2 Swiftships Design Coastal Patrol 11 Timsah Class Coastal Patrol Boat 5 Boat Timsah II Class Coastal Patrol Boat 16 MV70 Class Coastal Patrol Boat 6 DC-35 Class Coastal Patrol Boat 29 Type 83 26-m Coastal Patrol Boat 3 47-foot Motor Life Boat 3 48-foot Coastal Patrol Craft 3 45-foot Coastal Patrol Craft 9 P-6 Class Coastal Patrol Boat 5 Swiftships Protector-Design Small 6 Coastal Patrol Craft

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND Amoun Vehicle with RIM-7F 72+ 23mm Sinai 23 Twin, Mounted 36+ 100mm KS-19, Towed 300 ‘Sparrow’ 85mm KS-12 with Fire Can Radar, 400 57mm S-60, Towed 600 23mm ZSU-23-2(4) Twin, Self- 230 Towed Propelled 23mm Sinai-23, Towed 23 M48 ‘Chaparral’ Missile 50+ Amoun (Batteries) Missile with 72+ Skyguard Radar SA-2 ‘Guideline’ Missile Launcher 282+ SA-3 ‘Goa’ Missile Launcher 212+ SA-6 ‘Gainful’ Missile, incl Self- 56+ Propelled Crotale Missile Launcher 24+ I-Hawk MIM-23B Missile 78+ Pechora-2M Missile Unk TPS-59 Radar Unk TPS-63 Radar Unk JY-9A Radar Unk B-18 Radar Unk B-14 Radar Unk

Government Paramilitary Forces Egypt’s Central Security Force contains around 325,000 personnel and is responsible for building and infrastructure security; it is also used to quell protests and strikes in the country. The National Guard numbers 60,000 and is usually deployed along the border with Libya. At 12,000, the Border Guard is tasked with manning frontier border checkpoints. Both the National Guard and the Border Guard may act as reserve forces in times of war. Egyptian Forces Military Functions

Mission Command The Egyptian military operates through a central command chain that originates from the president who is also the Commander-In-Chief through the Minister of Defense (MOD) to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff to the commanders of the four services: army, air force, navy, and air defense. The glitch in the system is that three different branches bear some responsibility for protection of Egypt’s air space. While the Air Defense Command provides the bulk of the responsibility, the army fields some air defense equipment including some units for coastal defense. In addition, the navy also mans several batteries for protection of the shoreline.

With both the conversion of equipment and doctrine from the Soviet Union to Western thought and the recent political upheaval at the top of the command structure, command and control in

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the Egyptian military could be in a state of flux. Most of the oldest Egyptian generals probably grew up under Soviet doctrine while the Western countries have most influenced the younger officers. This conversion of old Soviet directed missions versus Western initiative may cause a generational clash in the Egyptian officer corps.

Maneuver The Egyptian army is almost completely an armored and mechanized infantry force capable of maneuvering in the open space of the country’s desert terrain. In urban operations, however, the lack of large numbers of light infantry might hamper the army’s effectiveness. The Egyptian military does possess several specialized units that can operate in mountain or desert terrain and can conduct amphibious operations.

INFOWAR With its own two national and six regional television networks, the Egyptian government can help shape its message to its people. With over 20 private television stations, however, the Egyptians have many other ways to access the news. For the most part, it appears that the forces that took over the Egyptian government after the 2011 ouster of President Mubarak understand the nature of modern media and attempt to use it to their advantage. The Egyptian air force fields one Electronic Warfare/Electronic Intelligence (EW/ELINT) squadron that could be used in an INFOWAR role.

RISTA Compared to most of their neighboring countries, the Egyptian military possesses a wide range of RISTA assets. The army fields a large number of reconnaissance vehicles and would most likely use them to locate their enemy on the battlefield. The Egyptian air force also fields a wide array of RISTA assets including reconnaissance squadrons, the EW/ELINT squadron, an airborne early warning squadron, and several Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadrons.

Fire Support The Egyptian army still cannot get away from the old Soviet style doctrine when it comes to artillery. The army fields almost 500 guns, over 1,000 howitzers, and over 2,400 mortar tubes for indirect fire. This is in addition to the fire support provided by the air force’s fighter/ground attack squadrons and naval gunfire.

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Protection As most of the Egyptian army is armor or mechanized infantry, the military carries a basic level of protection. During desert maneuvers, the vast terrain provides the means to distribute the force to avoid a build-up that would make it an inviting target.

Logistics The composition of the Egyptian military’s equipment could possibly create major logistical issues. The army fields at least six different main battle tanks (MBT) from three countries, twelve different armored fighting vehicles from five countries, and other major military equipment from still other countries. The equipment ranges from the most modern available to technology several decades old with many of the oldest vehicles in storage. The maintenance of such a wide variety of equipment, much with advanced age, would make it difficult to maintain and require more downtime in each successive year.

The air force does field several transportation units including a fixed wing transportation regiment, several tactical fixed wing airlift squadrons, and a helicopter transportation regiment. The cost of air transportation for logistical operations is quite high over other cheaper methods.

Force Protection Issues Americans in Egypt—civilians, government officials, or military—could find themselves in difficult situations due to the chaotic nature of the political situation. With regularly occurring mass protests in Cairo, no one is safe from the mob’s actions. In February 2011, the crowd at a protest sexually assaulted an American female reporter. In October 2012, members of another Cairo protest attacked a French female television reporter.

At about the same time as the Benghazi attack on U.S. Consulate personnel in September 2012 in Libya, Egyptian protestors also climbed the U.S. Embassy fence in Cairo. Both attacks demonstrate that anti-American demonstrators or terrorists in Muslim countries will not always obey the generally accepted rules of law when it comes to diplomats. All U.S. governmental officials need to stay alert and practice personal protection procedures to ensure their own safety. Economic Egypt’s economy is service-based, accounting for 48% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 45% of employment in 2011 and 2008, respectively. Industry made up 38% of the country’s GDP and provided employment for 23% of the labor force, while agriculture accounted for the remaining 15% and 32%, respectively. The country possesses both oil and natural gas reserves, but not to

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the level of its Middle East neighbors; refined petroleum products must actually be imported to meet national demand. Unemployment was around 12% in 2011, and inflation measured approximately 10%. The country is reliant upon food imports despite the fertility of the Nile Delta region, as agriculture is primarily focused upon commercial crops such as cotton.

Political and economic instability contributes to a number of illegal economic activities. Terrorism activities, the recent revolution, and continued political instability in Egypt provide an ideal environment for black market activity. Criminal activities taking place in the country include money laundering, drug trafficking, and trafficking in persons. Terrorist and insurgent groups engage in smuggling of goods and weapons from Egypt to the Gaza Strip, and have recently taken to bombing oil pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula. Social Egypt’s 84 million residents are young and ethnically Egyptian. The population is predominantly literate: 80% of men and 64% of women can read. Arabic is the official language, though members of the middle and upper classes usually understand English and French as well. The official religion is Islam, and most of the populace subscribes to the Sunni variant of that faith. Women are commonly discriminated against, though not as badly as in some countries such as Saudi Arabia. The country currently hosts 87,200 refugees, 80% of whom are from the Palestinian Territories. Human rights violations that were present under Mubarak included suppression of freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press. Security forces committed arbitrary arrests, torture, and unlawful killings. While many of Egypt’s revolutionaries desire to increase adherence to basic human rights in the country, others desire to further restrict them through the institution of Sharia (Islamic) law. Information Common communication methods include newspapers, television, radio, and word of mouth via post, landline and cell phones, and face-to-face meetings. There are almost as many cell phones as people in the country and around one-quarter of residents have access to the Internet. Private newspapers and broadcasting is legal, but subject to government censorship – as is the Internet. The government has been known to confiscate newspapers that printed objectionable articles, and has raided an Al Jazeera affilitate’s offices more than once.

Egyptian intelligence organizations include Egyptian Military Intelligence (DMI), the State Security Investigative Service (SSIS), and the General Intelligence Service (GIS). DMI falls under the Ministry of Defense and focuses on counter-terrorism. SSIS – formerly known as the General Directorate for State Security Investigations-GDSSI – is under the Ministry of the Interior. It contains two branches – the Egyptian Intelligence Service and the State Security

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Service – and focuses on domestic security and counter-terrorism. The GIS falls under the presidency and deals with both domestic and foreign national security.

Infrastructure Nearly half of Egypt’s residents live in urban areas, which are usually of dense random construction with narrow streets. Houses typically have an enclosed courtyard and a flat roof, which may be used for both storage and – on particularly warm nights – sleeping. The vast majority of residents live along the Nile River Valley or in the Nile Delta, while much of the remainder lives along the Mediterranean, Gulf of Suez, and Red Sea coasts. The vast majority of residents have access to improved drinking water, sanitation, and electricity.

The Nile River plays an important part in Egypt’s infrastructure. It provides a vital transportation link for the country, and is its only year-round source of fresh water. The Aswan Dam, in the south of the country on Lake Nasser, fills the dual purpose of power production and water regulation on the Nile River. Extensive irrigation channels in the Nile Delta allow for year-round agriculture.

Roads are one of the primary transportation methods, along with rail and waterways. Approximately three-quarters of the roads are paved, and the major roads are usually in good condition. The country has a considerable rail network and multiple airports with both paved and unpaved runways. International trade usually occurs via ports on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and considerable travel occurs on the Nile River. Unsurprisingly, the country has considerable hydrocarbon-related infrastructure, including nine oil refineries and nearly 8,200 miles of pipelines. Oil and natural gas pipelines run across the northern and eastern part of the country, including an oil pipeline that goes through the Sinai Peninsula and under the Gulf of Aqaba to Jordan. Physical Environment Egypt occupies the far northeast corner of the African continent and the Sinai Peninsula. The country shares borders with Sudan, Libya, Israel, and the Gaza Strip. It also has coastal borders on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Gulf of Aqaba. Major bodies of water include the Nile River, Lake Nasser, and the Suez Canal, which the country controls. Egypt’s terrain consists primarily of desert, though the Nile Delta region is renowned for its fertility. The Red Sea coastline, the far southwest, and the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula are mountainous. The climate is predominantly arid (desert), though the Mediterranean coastline enjoying cooler temperatures and high humidity. Natural resources include oil and natural gas, iron ore, manganese, and phosphates. Natural hazards are primarily dust and sand storms, droughts,

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floods, earthquakes, and landslides. Desertification and lack of fresh water are major environmental concerns in the country, as is pollution from oil spills, pesticides, raw sewage, and industrial run-off. Time The Egyptian culture is unconcerned with adherence to strict time schedules, though people in the urban areas are more likely to understand the Western emphasis on time. The work day varies by profession, with the standard work week being eight hours per day from Sunday through Thursday. Six full days is the maximum work week allowed by law.

References “90 Killed, Wounded in Suicide Attack on Faryab Mosque.” TOLO News. 26 October 2012. Abdurrahman, Sarah. “Continuing the legacy of censorship in Egypt”. On the Media. 29 September 2011. “Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra.” Jane’s World of Insurgency and Terrorism. 16 November 2012. Al-Youm, Al-Masry. “Intelligence warns of attacks against US and Israeli embassies.” Egypt Independent. 11 September 2012. “Another female reporter assault in Egypt’s Tahrir Square.” Mail & Guardian. 20 October 2012. Arab Media Outlook 2011-2015. Dubai Press Club. 2012. pp 145-147. “Background Notes: Egypt.” USDoS. 19 March 2012. Bureau of Consular Affairs. “Egypt: Country Specific Information.” USDoS. 2012. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “2009 Human Rights Report: Egypt.” USDoS. 11 March 2010. “Coastal Defense Forces.” Jane’s. 9 December 2011. Cordesman, Anthony H. US State Department and Counter-Terrorism Center Reporting Terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia, August 2010. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 29 June 2011. pp 47-48. “Court verdict will dissolve People’s Assembly, says elections official.” Egypt Independent. 14 June 2012. “Ease of Doing Business in Egypt, Arab Rep.” Doing Business. 2012. “Egypt.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2012. “Egypt: Air Defense Forces.” Military Periscope. October 2011. “Egypt - Air Force.” Jane’s. 29 November 2012. “Egypt: Air Force.” Military Periscope. October 2011. “Egypt: Army.” Military Periscope. October 2011. “Egypt court rejects reinstatement of dissolved lower house of parliament.” Ahram Online. 22 September 2012. “Egypt crisis: Morsi gives army arrest powers before vote.” BBC. 10 December 2012 “Egypt crisis: Morsi offers concession in decree annulment.” BBC. 9 December 2012. “Egypt: Getting Around.” Lonely Planet. 2012. “Egypt – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law.” Gun Policy. 26 May 2012. “Egypt: Human Rights Reform an Urgent Priority.” Human Rights Watch. 7 June 2011. “Egypt: Navy.” Military Periscope. October 2011. “Egypt: Overview.” Military Periscope. October 2011. 14 UNCLASSIFIED

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“Energy Overview of Egypt.” Global Energy Observatory. December 2012. “General Intelligence Service.” Global Security. 2012. “Geography of Egypt.” Maps of World. 2012. Global report on trafficking in persons: Country profiles – Africa and the Middle East. UNODC. 2012. “Lara Logan Suffered ‘Brutal” Sexual Assault in Egypt.” Huffington Post. 15 February 2011. “Mukhabarat el-Khabeya.” Global Security. 2012. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Global Terrorism Database.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2011. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Terrorist Organization Profiles.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2008. “North Africa Pipelines map.” Countries of the World. May 2008. “Press crackdown: Egypt’s Morsi slammed for censorship.” RT. 18 August 2012. “Protesters attack U.S. diplomatic compounds in Egypt, Libya.” CNN. 12 September 2012. “Q & A: Egypt’s constitutional referendum.” Al Jazeera. 10 December 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Senior al Qaeda leader thought killed in North Waziristan strike.” Long War Journal. 1 November 2008. Schanzer, Jonathan. “Egyptian Islamic Group plans to sue Interior Ministry over torture.” Long War Journal. 25 February 2012. “Sinai Peninsula.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2012. “Special Forces (Air).” Jane’s. 9 December 2011. “Special Forces (Government).” Jane’s. 9 December 2011. “Special Forces (Land).” Jane’s. 7 December 2012. “State Security Investigative Service.” Global Security. 2012. “Voting abroad starts in Egypt constitutional referendum.” Reuters. 12 December 2012. “Working conditions in Egypt: Work hours and vacation.” Just Landed. 2012. “World Armies: Egypt.” Jane’s. 29 November 2012. World Databank. “World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance Database.” World Bank. 2012. “World Factbook: Egypt.” CIA. 14 November 2012. “World Navies: Egypt.” Jane’s. 29 November 2012.

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