The Clinton Administration and the Taliban: When Geopolitical and Economic Interests Clash with Reality
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Corso di Laurea magistrale in: Relazioni Internazionali Comparate – International Relations Tesi di Laurea in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali The Clinton Administration and the Taliban: when geopolitical and economic interests clash with reality Relatore: Prof. Duccio Basosi Correlatore: Prof. Matteo Legrenzi Laureando: Francesco Sergi Cucinelli Matricola: 835582 Anno Accademico 2011 / 2012 Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 1: Pre-Invasion Afghanistan………………………………………6 1.1 Afghanistan: Culture and Society…………………………………………6 1.2 Before the Invasion………………………………………………………10 Chapter 2: 1979-1989: The Afghan Quagmire…………………………….20 2.1 Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan………………………………………..20 2.2 Alliances and Rivalries…………………………………………………...28 2.3 The Afghan War: 1979-1985……………………………………………..33 2.3.1 Operation Cyclone…………………………………………………..33 2.3.2 The Actual War……………………………………………………...40 2.4 The Afghan War: 1985-1989……………………………………………..47 2.5 War Outcomes…………………………………………………………....56 Chapter 3: From the Civil War to the Rise of the Taliban………………..60 3.1 The Najibullah Regime: 1989-1992………………………………………61 3.2 Infighting and Chaos: 1992-1994…………………………………………66 3.3 The Taliban………………………………………………………………..69 Chapter 4: The Taliban’s Afghanistan……………………………………..75 4.1 The Taliban and the Changing Regional Scenario………………………..75 4.2 The Taliban’s Ideology…………………………………………………...77 4.3 The Changing Regional Scenario…………………………………………88 4.4 The Taliban’s Military Campaign in Afghanistan………………………..94 4.5 The Taliban as a Governing Body………………………………………108 4.6 The Taliban, Drugs and Terrorism………………………………………116 Chapter 5: Clinton and the Taliban………………………………………127 5.1 Clinton’s World…………………………………………………………127 5.2 The New Great Game and the U.S.-Taliban Relations………………….139 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..162 Acknowledgements………………………………………………………....165 Abstract……………………………………………………………………..166 Bibliography………………………………………………………………...168 Introduction The aim of this dissertation is outlining the relations between the United States and Afghanistan during the years of the presidency of William J. Clinton (1993-2001). In particular, the main focus is placed on the relations between the U.S. establishment and the Taliban movement, which took power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The terrorist attacks which targeted the United States at the turn of the twentieth century cast an ominous light on the events which took place in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979. A vast array of specialised literature focuses on the reconstruction of the events which eventually led to the rise of the Taliban and their takeover of Afghanistan. It is indeed fundamental to retrace the events and the consequences of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as they set a subtle mechanism in motion. The geopolitical and geostrategic considerations typical of the Cold War mind-set drove the U.S. administrations during the 1980s to foster and to generously finance fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Basically, the theoretical framework constituted by the balance of power overshadowed any other type of reflection. Therefore, as soon as the Soviet army withdrew from the Afghan quagmire, the United States had no more interests at stake in the region, and thus essentially forgot Afghanistan. Still, in a dramatic turn of events, the mechanisms set in motion by Washington in the Central Asian region, would eventually come back to haunt the American mastermind and its allies. During the Afghan jihad, the CIA played a pivotal role in channelling huge sums of money, weapons, and traineeships to the Afghan mujahedeen, whom President Reagan will addressed as ‘freedom fighters’. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency would even turn a blind eye on drugs trafficking and the development of an important network of Islamic fundamentalism. Since bleeding the Soviet superpower was the paramount objective, drugs, terrorism, - 1 - religious fundamentalism, and human rights respect represented minor and expendable concerns. The dissertation is organised in order to provide the basic concepts necessary to understand and evaluate the factors and characteristics which rendered the rise of the Taliban possible, as well as the ground on which the relations with the United States took place. The first chapter deals with the fundamental cultural and social Afghan background, which results instrumental in the understanding of core aspects of the Taliban ideology. The second chapter concerns the Soviet decision to intervene military in Afghanistan. The invasion of the country, in late 1979, marked a watershed for the destiny of both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The subsequent decade of conflict was characterised by the involvement of a number of different countries, each with different and sometimes contrasting interests and needs. The governments of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, India, and even Israel had a role in fomenting the Afghan jihadists against the infidel invaders. Eventually, the decision to military invade played a pivotal role in bringing about the end of the Cold War as well as the demise of the same Soviet Union. Moreover, the war itself and its long-lasting consequences unleashed a power, the Islamic extremism, which was never fully understood or correctly taken into account by the establishments in Washington. The third chapter outlines the events that occurred in that period of time, between the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Taliban in 1994, characterised by brutal infighting and internecine chaos. The political vacuum left after the fall of the communist Najibullah was never really filled in until the late 1990s. As a result, Afghanistan was a failed state, where anarchy and warlordism loomed large. The end of the Cold War brought about another fundamental consequence in the Central Asian stage: geopolitical and geostrategic considerations dwindled in importance, replaced by geo-economic factors. - 2 - The forth chapter tries to analyse the impact the Taliban had on Afghanistan. The Taliban presented themselves as bringing about the resurgence of the Islamic tradition in order to gain the legitimacy they needed to take over the country. Still, their ideology was the result of an odd mixture between fundamentalist Deobandism and the traditional Pashtun code of behaviour, as such resulting alien to mush of the Afghan population. The Taliban takeover of the country, and the consequent imposition of strict Islamic law, was rendered possible mainly due to the interference of outside actors, principally Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. These countries had particular interests in Afghanistan and in the final victory of the Taliban. Yet, the religious student’s policies on issues such as drugs, terrorism, and human rights respect proved to represent a stumbling block for their official international recognition. The fifth chapter, finally, attempts to describe the world in which the Clinton administration acted, and its relations with the Taliban. A significant change in the attitude of the Clinton administration towards the situation in Afghanistan should be noticed between its first and second term in office. This change was essentially due to a transformation in the domestic political scenario rather than a conscious and thorough re-evaluation of the US foreign policy and its role in the Middle East and on the world stage. Generally speaking, the Clinton administration demonstrated the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy framework, considering instead every single issue case by case. This kind of vision in international affairs was a direct consequence of Clinton’s predilection of domestic over foreign policy. As far as the U.S.-Taliban relations are concerned, in the 1990s Afghanistan found itself at the crossroads of trade in Central Asia. Therefore, new geo- economic interests were at stake in Afghanistan. It should indeed be taken into account what the journalist and expert Ahmed Rashid called ‘the New Great Game’, namely the challenge between oil companies to exploit the huge sources of gas and oil in Central Asia. The oil companies strategies, in fact, worked as a spearhead also for governments which, after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were willing to find new outlets in a part of the world so particularly rich in mineral resources. - 3 - Since Washington did not officially recognised the Taliban government in Afghanistan, official relations did not really exist. Yet, two major events must be taken into consideration. In late 1997, a Taliban delegation visited the United States and had important talks with U.S. officers. Most importantly, U.S. official documents show that in the aftermath of Clinton’s decision to strike bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, Mullah Omar called Washington. It was the first and only time Omar had direct contacts with the Americans, as he predicted the growing of anti-American feelings in the Muslim world. This telephonic conversation between Omar and a U.S. officer is usually overlooked or ignored, as it did not really bring about significant changes in the Taliban’s attitude nor in the relations with Washington. Still, it has to be emphasised in the context of the scarcity of official contacts between the Taliban and the United States. In order to outline the relations between the Taliban and the Clinton administration, it has been made use of a significant literature on the topic complemented