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Washington's Foundering Fathers: the Contras and Contragate

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Washington's Foundering Fathers: the Contras and Contragate AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 31 WASHINGTON'S FOUNDERING FATHERS The Contras and Contragate Barry Carr Contragate revealed the depth of Washington's commitment to the Contras. But it hasn't made life any easier for Nicaragua. here is no issue closer to the footsteps of the Founding Fathers of million) to the Contras, Reagan heart of the Reagan administ­ the United States, and has likened commented "I'm sure it put a smile T ration than its crusade against them to Simon Bolivar, the French on the face ofthe Statue ofLiberty".1 the Sandinista government of Resistance and, most recently and Nicaragua. President Reagan is bizarrely, the Abratlam Lincoln Support for the Nicaraguan completely besotted with the Brigade of the Spanish Civil War. counter-revolution is the best Contras. He has described them as When the US Co!!gress finall3 voted, example of the US's grotesque efforts freedom fighters following in the in JuJy 1986, to renew aid ($100 at "symmetry" - i.e. the attempt to AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 33 mtmtc and counter the Soviet Union's alleged instigation of national liberation movements by fomenting anti-communist insurgencies in regions of the world where US hegemony is threatened by nationalist and socialist states. The Contras emerged from the ranks of the hated National Guard who fled to Honduras and Costa Rica following on the fall of the Somoza dynasty in 1979. The bedraggled and demoralised Somocistas in Honduras were reorganised by the CIA during 1981, receiving $19 million in US government funds, and training from Argentine military advisers who had been blooded in the ferocious "dirty war" of 1976-81 in which 25-30,000 Argentine civilians were murdered. Sinte then, US strategy has been aimed at creating a unified military command for the counterrevolution, together with a civilian veneer (UNO) staffed by "respectable" non­ somocista figureheads like Arturo disputes within ARDE over the Atlantic Coast to be allowed to secede from Nicaragua. A number of Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and, to a lesser CIA's insistence that the body merge extent, a former Coca Cola franchise with the Honduras-based FDN led to Indian commanders who ha ve operator, Adolfo Calero. Pastora 's expulsion from the group participated in dialogue with the The FDN (Nicaraguan in 1985. Since then, Pastora has Nicaraguan government have been Democratic Front) is the largest consistently accused US intelligence assassinated by hardliners wit hin the force within the Contras' umbrella of organising the attack. Contra organisation.-' organisation UNO (United A number of anti-Sandinista Over the last two years, the Nicaraguan Opposition). It is also by paramilitary groupings have also Contras have expandcdt hei r far the most reactionary and brutal sprung up among a minority of the numbers through mass inti midation, of the Contra groups. The military small Indian communities on including the kidna pping of entire direction of the FDN is firmly in the Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast now communities, and forced recruitment hands of National Guard officers, the living on the Honduran-Nicaraguan from among Nicaraguan refugees in most senior of whom is Enrique border. Although their relationship Honduras. Despite their access to Bermudez, the FDN's "defence to the Contra general command has lavish US funding (dollars arc always minister" and a former Somo1a always been rather tense, these a powerful attraction), the Cvnrras military attache in Washington. indigenous groups constitute the have been conspicuously unsuccess­ Bermudez' second in command, the only significant social base on which ful in building a real basis of support heads of logistics, intelligence the Contras have been able to draw for their activities in the "'icaraguan operations, and special warfare, and - a reflection of early mistakes made countryside. the bulk of the FDN's field by the Spani!>h-speaking Sandinistas This is hardly surpr i ~ing in vic\\ commanders, are also former Guard who failed to grasp the importance of of the strategies adopted by the officers.l national and ethnic questions in the Nicaraguan counter-revol ution. T he A number of other smaller struggle for reconstruction after Contras have increasingly directed Contra forces arc based in Costa 1979. their energies towards a nti-civil ian Rica, a state whose much-vaunted In 1985 and 1986, some progress terrorism and economic desta bilis­ "neutrality" concea Is a deep was made in discussions between the ation designed to cripple the commitment to the anti-Sandinista Sandinistas and Miskito organisat­ Nicaraguan economy and create un crusade. Until 1985, the most ions like MISURASATA and environment of demoralisation a nd important of the "southern" Contra K I SAN over the question of greater resentment over e conomic groups was ARDE (The Democratic autonomy for the Indian regions on hardships. The principle Yictims of Revolutionary Alliance), whose the Atlantic coast. A final settlement the Contras have become health bestknown military figure was Eden has not been reached. in part because workers , doctors , t each ers. Pastora, a former Sandinista of extreme demands by some Indian agricultural aid workers - in short, commandant. A series of major leaders, including a call for the anyone who is associated with the 34 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW .socio-economic and political The Contras' military record Democratic majority in Congress programs of the Sandinista inside Nicaragua has so far been will make continued funding of the government. extremely poor. They have been Contras more difficult, but the Other targets have been unable to hold territory a sign of cowardice shown by most communications equipment, oil their lack of a genuine social base Democrats on Central American storage facilities, agricultural and the bulk of their forces have been issues over the last year or so doesn't cooperatives, crops (especially coffee pushed back into their Honduran give much cause for optimism. - which is a major earner of foreign bases. However, the Sandinistas' Within Nicaragua, however, exchange) and cattle. Most recently, worst nightmare is of a serious President Daniel Ortega and other the Contras have been planting land border clash between their troops Sandinistras have argued that the mines on roads in northern and and Contra forces supported by units scandal could very well accelerate the western Nicaragua in an attempt to of the regular Honduran army which likelihood of a direct US intervention isolate remote viJJages and cripple could provide a pretext for direct US following the Contra forces' rural trading networks. Civilian and Honduran military intervention. spectacular offensive in early 1987. casualties have been enormous. This might provide sufficient cover intended to establish their credibility for Contra seizures of Nicaraguan as a viable politico-militar) territory either on the Honduran alternative worthy of renewed so far, the debate in border or on the Atlantic coast support by the US Congress. And followed by the declaration of a even if further direct US government Washington has not counter-revolutionary provisional aid is not forthcoming, the last five included any serious government recognised by the US. years have clearly demonstrated that challenge to the Reagan The Contras would then have a the Reagan administration is beachhead through which the US prepared to stop at nothing in its administration's anti­ could massively step up arms struggle to strangle the Nicaraguan Sandinista crusade supplies. revolution. Nicaraguan fears regarding this scenario were strengthened in late NOTES There 1s also considerable November and early December 1986 evidence that the involvement in by a sudden sharp escalation of terrorism by the Contras and their border tension with Honduras in which the Honduran air force (the l. Ellen Ray, Wilham Schappp and l.ou1s backers extends way beyond the Wolf. "The C IA choose~ a new Contra borders of Nicaragua itself. The most powerful in Central America) lc:ader", Covert Action Information Bulletin. FDN's intelligence chief. Ricardo bombed three towns inside "'o. 26 (Summer 1986). Nicaragua killing seven soldiers and Lau, is now believed to have played a 2. 46 of the 48 positions m the FD~ command key role in the assassination of El injuring 14 civilians. At the same structure are held by former guardsmen. Salvador's Archbishop, Oscar time. a meeting of UNO in Costa according to a 1985 report by the US Romero, in March 1980. More Rica announced details of plans for Congressiona l Arms Control and Foreign the establishment of a Contra Policy Caucw.. See Reed Brody. Contra recently, the "Contragate Irangate" Terror in Nicaraf?ua: Repor1 ofa Fact· Find in~ scandal and the revelations of provisional governmnt in Nicaragua, Mission, Sep1emher 1984-Januarr 1985 Eugene Hasenfus, a crew member of while the US announced the (Boston South l·nd Press. 1985). pp. 132143 the Contra supply plane shot down reopening of bases in Panama to J. William Gaspcnni. "Sandinbtas. Misknos on 5 October. 1986 have thrown house members of the infantry edge to\\oard agreement". l.a1inamerica Press more light on links between the brigade which invaded Grenada. O:tober 23. 1986. p. 7. Contras and the activities of 4. For background on Tom Posey and the rightwing terrorist networks nghtw1ng paramilitary groups supportmg the spearheaded by Cuban exiles. Luis Conclusion Conlras m the US. see Ward Churchill Posada Carriles, one of the two "Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown", organisers of Contra s upply At this point it is not clear how Cover/ Action lnforma/ion Bulll'lin, ~o . 22 (Fall, 1984). pp. 22-29. On the "priHiti>alloa operations in San Salvador, had far the Irangate scandal will affect of the Reagan Adminbtratio n\ covert war~. been held in a Venezuelan jail on the viability of the Reagan Doctrine's sec Fred Clarhon. "Pri\atising the W<tr" suspicion of involvement in the strategy of ''rolling back" the Coven Action Information Bulll'lm ~o.
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