Israel Vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Thrust of Force Roni Bart

Israel vs. the Palestinians: Limitations of Dialogue and the Thrust of Force Roni Bart

The Limitations of Force Hizbollah’s harassment. Similarly, it is fair to ”There is no military solution” is an oft- state that Israel succeeded in implementing spouted mantra, albeit somewhat non-spe- a military solution to the problem of Pales- cific. Exactly which problem has no military tinian terrorism in the Gaza Strip in 1969-70, solution? There is no military solution to the as well as in Judea and Samaria since 2003, Israeli-Arab dispute; neither is there one to meaning that “there is a military solution” the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. There is also to the immediate military problem, but not no military solution to terrorism, if what is to the basic diplomatic problem. If so, the meant is a classic decisive military victory: role of Israel’s military force is to serve as an the eradication of ideology or the uprooting “iron wall” that proves to the Arabs the price of basic terrorist motives; or the capture or of their diplomatic intransigence and in turn death of all the terrorists; or the total preven- provides Israel the impetus and wherewithal tion of terrorist attacks. But there is a military to resolve the diplomatic problem. In other solution to terrorism, if the term “decisive words, at work here is an iron wall with op- victory” is adjusted to refer to a new type of portunities for dialogue. low intensity war: a reduction of terrorism to a level that does not impede the daily rou- The Limitations of Dialogue tine of the targeted country, and that there- In contrast to its frequent recourse to the mil- fore does not figure as a political constraint itary version of the phrase, Israel is not wont in government calculations. to say “there is no diplomatic solution.” The The limitations of Israel’s power were nearest slogan is “there is no partner,” a re- prominently revealed in the two wars in Leb- frain that has drawn increasing disparaging anon. In the first, the use of power in imposing criticism. According to the Western view, to a new pro-Israel order failed; in the second, it which perhaps most Israelis and certainly failed in releasing the captives, in implement- most of the Israeli elite subscribe, the sanc- ing Security Council resolution 1559, and in tity of life is an overriding value, and there- removing the rocket threat from the north of fore dialogue is always preferable to force as the country. At the same time, in the first war, a tool for resolving disagreements and con- Israeli power succeeded in expelling the PLO frontations. Consequently, Israel, the more from Lebanon; and in the second, it succeed- moderate, democratic, and “Western” side, Roni Bart, research ed (perhaps) in placing certain limitations on has the responsibility to initiate and conduct associate at INSS

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 45 Dialogue ongoing dialogue, even at the cost of repeat- act of dialogue strengthens Syria’s ability to is certainly ed rebuffs and excessive concessions. This is undermine the government in Beirut. how the West behaved in the past vis-à-vis Third, dialogue rewards criminality. Dip- preferable Hitler and Milosevic, this is how the world lomatic dialogue driven by the problematic to the use of today deals with Iran and Sudan, and this conduct of an international actor almost in- force, but even is how Israel has acted vis-à-vis the Pales- evitably rewards it, since as per conventional dialogue has tinians, at least since 1993. Again and again, Western dialogue, the carrot is more domi- limitations, the ineffectiveness of this approach has been nant than the stick. Every conciliatory mea- proven, not to mention its immorality (from sure justifiably convinced Hitler that aggres- disadvantages, this standpoint it can be said that the means sion was worthwhile, and the nuclear prolif- and a price. destroy the ends since the obsession with erator who is bought off with carrots proves dialogue has always claimed many casual- to others that nuclearization pays. The mes- ties). The frequent use of the term “limita- sage of “good things happen to bad people” tions of force” overshadows the notion of is a destructive message in the international “limitations of dialogue.” Dialogue is cer- sphere. tainly preferable to the use of force, but even Fourth, dialogue takes time, and time dialogue has limitations, disadvantages, and claims lives (Bosnia, Sudan), or scores fail- a price. ures (North Korea, Iran?), or causes weak- First is the limited ability to influence. ness (southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip). Dialogue can change the external interna- This difficulty can presumably be overcome tional behavior of those engaged in it; this by setting deadlines for the diplomatic ef- is its intention. Sometimes it is also able to forts, but in practice this happens very infre- influence intra-state conduct. For the most quently or very late, both due to the Western part, however, dialogue, is not able to change anti-force philosophy and because intelligent essence or character. The more dictatorial a adversaries propose a small concession at the regime or the more ideological an organiza- last minute, which enables (if not requires) a tion, the more difficult it is to effect a shift continuation of negotiations. in its behavior. In extreme cases, the absence Given the price of dialogue, it is worth- of a fundamental change also means the lack while to remember what should be self-un- of change in behavior or a temporary, tacti- derstood. The statement that “it is better cal, or superficial change alone. This is tanta- to talk than to fight” is usually, but not al- mount to fraud on the part of the particular ways, valid. Against certain adversaries, if dialogue partner. we choose dialogue, in the final analysis, we Second, dialogue provides legitimacy for get war under worse circumstances. Experts actors whose starting positions are not ac- and diplomats have the responsibility to de- ceptable to the international community. For cide when to stand up to such adversaries. example, as long as Syria does not recognize In practice, this happens very infrequently the independence and sovereignty of Leba- because choosing the military option repudi- non, the refusal of the United States to en- ates the accepted ethos. Intelligence experts, gage with it in dialogue on this issue is justi- researchers, and diplomats are expected to fied. American and Syrian goals for Lebanon analyze critically the smallest details in any are completely contradictory, and the very problem and thereafter propose well-con-

46 sidered alternatives. Concluding that there Israel is the strong side in the confronta- is no path other than the use of force is con- tion, and it therefore must take the first steps sidered simpleminded to the point of being in the attempt to reinvigorate the dialogue. primitive, but at least sometimes we must act Israel must meet Abu Mazen at least halfway according to “Occam’s razor,” that all things in almost anything he wants, i.e.: release all being equal, the simplest explanation tends Palestinian Authority funds that were fro- to be the best one. zen; release as many eligible prisoners as Israel’s almost instinctive reaction to the possible; “whitewash” some of the wanted results of the civil war in Gaza was a call to operatives; significantly reduce the number separate between Fatahland in the West Bank of roadblocks; implement maximum civil- and Hamastan in the Gaza Strip, and there- ian-economic-humanitarian relief; remove il- upon embrace the former while boycotting legal outposts; enable total freedom of move- the latter. The right immediately opposed the ment for Palestinian security forces; approve first clause and the left rejected the second, the transfer of weapons and ammunition to basically with the common claim against the these forces and allow the entry of the Badr over-simplicity of the proposed policy, which brigade from Jordan; and immediately begin is expected to fail. This is precisely the time diplomatic negotiations on a permanent so- to remember the basic logic of Friar William lution. The manner of implementing this pol- of Ockham. icy is no less important: preconditions must be avoided; Abu Mazen must not be pushed A Carrot for Fatahland to do what he does not want; and he must Even before the Hamas victory in the elec- not be embraced with a bear hug. The im- tions and the establishment of the unity pression that Abu Mazen is Israel’s yes-man government, Israel justifiably did not agree cannot be created or substantiated. These to advance the diplomatic process with Abu steps should not be implemented bit by bit as Mazen due to his unwillingness or inability isolated measures of good will. Rather, this is to implement the security measures he was the time for a dramatic event, such as a meet- committed to in accordance with Phase I of ing at Abu Mazen’s office in Ramallah or a the roadmap, chief among them dismantling direct appeal to the Palestinians in Arabic (in the terrorist organizations. His main consid- a dubbed speech or a translated article). Is- eration was apparently preventing a fitna – a rael must demonstrate actual progress to the civil war. Today the fitna is a fact, and it is Palestinians, both in improving the fabric of Taking risks is blatantly clear to Fatah members how justi- their lives and advancing toward diplomatic justified due to fied the warnings were that a strengthened independence. Hamas is a threat not only to Israel but first Such dialogue neither redeems the dis- the possibility of all to them. There is reason to assume that graced nor rewards criminality. There is no that Hamas Abu Mazen will be prepared to implement diplomatic risk in adopting this line. If, after aggression belatedly the obligatory security measures; some months, it becomes clear that Abu Ma- has actually and indeed, hundreds of Hamas members zen is not “delivering the goods,” there will changed Abu have been arrested in the West Bank and a be no lack of pretexts or reasons to change prohibition has been issued, mainly directed direction. The security risks entailed by this Mazen's basic at Hamas, against carrying illegal weapons. policy can be managed. Even if the day comes approach.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 47 when Palestinian weapons and ammunition Why should the world be reminded of are turned against the IDF, strengthening the what it already knows? Because of the voices Palestinian security forces now will not sig- that for some time have been calling for dia- nificantly alter the power balance between logue with Hamas (as if it was interested in the sides (as long as Israel continues its con- dialogue with Israel), and that are now op- trol to prevent the possibility of high trajec- posed to a boycott of Hamastan. According tory fire from Judea and Samaria). What is to this line of thinking the hudna that began much more serious is the risk of renewed in 2004 proves that an understanding can be terrorist attacks in Israel, due both to the re- reached with Hamas on creating a situation moval of roadblocks and to the motivation of of calm; the movement is not monolithic, Hamas to disrupt the situation. The solution and since its victory in the 2006 elections, a here is the rapid completion of a hermeti- moderate stream has developed within it; cally sealed barrier, including via temporary Israel must take risks in order to encourage manpower. In any case, taking these risks is this pragmatization; and in any case “there is justified due to the possibility that Hamas no military solution.” Therefore, Israel must aggression has actually changed Abu Ma- talk with the movement, and perhaps even zen’s basic approach. There is obviously no be happy that there is now “an address” in guarantee that such a policy will succeed; as Gaza. This approach ignores the limitations per the limitations of dialogue, Israel’s abil- of dialogue. ity to strengthen Abu Mazen and Fatah in the First, even though Iraq has been burn- intra-Palestinian sphere is limited. However, ing for the past four years, with the flames it is incumbent on Israel to do all it can in perhaps raging more now than before, the order to promote a diplomatic solution with Israeli-Palestinian dispute is the most acute the Palestinians, even if the efforts’ final re- problem in the Middle East and in the con- sult yields little more than proof to those at frontation between radical Islam and the home and abroad of a serious pursuit of di- West. As if this were not sufficient, Hamas plomacy. Such a policy of carrots will also as- stridently emphasizes the religious element sist in legitimizing the policy of sticks to be in the dispute, and the creation of Hamastan implemented in Gaza. strengthens the importance of the regional context. What exactly is at issue? Both region A Stick in Hamastan and religion are going through a trend of First: basic facts. The interim goal of Hamas radicalization. It is difficult to expect that at is the destruction of the State of Israel (as a this volatile nexus Israel of all parties would step toward the establishment of a state that succeed in encouraging pragmatization. will be part of the Islamic caliphate), and its Second, any dialogue – including indi- preferred strategy is the murder of civilians. rect – with Hamas grants legitimacy to the Its use of force as a tool for solving disputes, movement, whose very essence contravenes even in relation to its fellow Palestinians, is even the lowest common denominator of the the current norm in Gaza. Moreover, the cre- international community. For over a genera- ation of Hamastan enhances the radical Iran- tion Israel has proclaimed the perils of terror- led Islamic axis, an anti-Israel/West alliance ism, and for the past six years, Israel has also that is steadily gaining strength.1 been warning against the threat of radical Is-

48 lam. Hamas is correctly considered the local the Palestinians that choosing and support- Dialogue incarnation of these two threats. Today, even ing Hamas means total isolation and living with Hamas the relatively moderate Palestinian stream is on no more than basic subsistence levels would show not prepared to engage it in talks, at least not n Ending the process of Hamas’s mili- publicly or officially. Israel’s readiness for di- tary buildup, and even weakening it in order the movement alogue would show the movement that Qas- to prevent a future threat along the lines of that Qassam sam barrages and military conquest warrant Hizbollah barrages n reward, and would demonstrate to its allies Defeating Qassam terrorism, i.e., a re- and military on the radical axis that adversaries bow to duction of the problem to a “tolerable” level conquest aggression. (as per the definition of “decisive victory”) Third, any agreement arrived at, either n Drawing a red line vis-à-vis the enemy warrant reward, tacitly or through dialogue, and certainly a and unacceptable positions, reinforcing Is- and would hudna would enable Hamas to become stron- rael’s deterrent capability, and defeating the demonstrate to ger politically and financially, and above all radical axis. its allies on the militarily, just as the hudna of 2004 did. Israel In order to achieve these goals, Israel suffered the results of a similar process last must take the following actions: radical axis that year on the northern border. Its adversaries n Avoid all direct or indirect contact with adversaries bow are working to duplicate their success in the Hamas figures. Israel must not speak with to aggression. Gaza Strip, particularly since Israel gave up those who seek Israel’s soul, and it must not control first of what lies under the Philadel- reward the radical axis. phi route and afterwards of the route itself. It n Cease all traffic and passage from Is- is unreasonable to take this high risk in the rael to the Gaza Strip other than food, water, hope that the slim chance of pragmatization and medical relief. Use can be made of inter- will be realized. rupting electricity and fuel for the purposes Israel must wage an uncompromising of pressure, bargaining, and image. war against Hamas in order to prove to the n Paralyze the internal telephone infra- Palestinians and to the world at large that structure in the Gaza Strip in order to inter- Hamas advances “won’t wash.” As opposed rupt government functions, and block inter- to previous short term efforts, this time the national telephone connections in order to effort must be sustained until the movement cut Hamas off from its external supporters. loses its ability to attack, or until its changes n End visitation for Hamas prisoners and its spots, or until the Palestinian Authority cut off their contact with the outside world, succeeds in preventing the export of terror even if there is need for legislation of a basic to Israel. In any case, at issue here is a sub- law for this purpose. stantial period of time. Hamas’s takeover of n Sever the banks in the Gaza Strip from Gaza is an opportunity, since it undermines the international banking system in order to the reservations of both Abu Mazen and make financing difficult. the international community toward such a n Appeal to international actors (Egypt, process. Such a campaign has a number of the Arab League, the Union of Muslim Coun- goals: tries, the European Union, NATO, the United n The neutralization of the governing Nations) to assume security responsibility of ability of Hamas in Gaza in order to clarify to the Gaza Strip, or at the very least over its

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 49 Determined border with Egypt. There is no chance that 1First, Israel must fully exploit the unique military force such appeals will be accepted, and their pur- advantage it has in dealing with Gazan ter- pose is to preempt objections. After a month, ror. It appears that there is no parallel in the that does Israel will announce that in the absence of in- world where the struggle against terrorism not falter in ternational resolve, it is free to guarantee its is geographically limited to such a small and the face of security on its own. containable territory. On the one hand, this Palestinian n Take control of the Philadelphi area, situation enables Israel to implement fully the steadfastness clearing a corridor that is at least a kilometer principle of concentrated effort. For example, wide for the length of the border (even at the Israel would not find it difficult to maintain must be used. price of tens of thousands of refugees) and full intelligence capability over the theater of digging a canal against the tunnels. This pro- action. On the other hand, the terrorists are cess will at once stop the smuggling of arms, certainly able to integrate into the civilian ammunition, money, other tools, terrorists, population, yet they cannot escape and also and training personnel from Hizbollah, Iran, cannot receive reinforcements (at least not af- and al-Qaeda. ter the takeover of the Philadelphi area). n Stop all commercial traffic even via the Egyptian border. Israel will declare that 2A second, unique advantage that Israel en- it does not intend to convert the Strip into a joys is in public diplomacy: Gaza is the only giant prison, and that the Gazans are free to case where the government is part of the ter- enter Israel and leave it as they wish subject rorist organization that is under attack.2 The to Israeli security inspections. Israel will also government, which is responsible for its citi- declare that it is not interested in maintain- zens, will be blamed by at least some of the ing control over the border area, and that population for the deterioration, particularly it would be happy to transfer it to an inter- due to Hamas’s military takeover of the Strip, national party that would establish security and popular support of Hamas will therefore control as required. be limited. Israel needs to encourage such a If Hamas doesn’t react, Israel could be trend by maximum humanitarian consider- satisfied with these steps and wait out this ations and by instituting positive measures situation for a long time. But this will likely (such as in the field of health or education) not happen. At a certain stage, if not before via the Palestinian Authority. the takeover of the Philadelphi area then certainly afterward, the massive Qassam fire Third, even ideological terrorist organi- will be renewed (as part of the diplomatic- 3 zations have what to lose, and they can be publicity campaign, it is highly desirable that deterred. Instead of merely chasing terrorists Israel not intensify military activities before and thwarting actions, the opponents of ter- Hamas initiates this reaction). Israel must rorism must estimate the price that the orga- open a military campaign in order to reach nizations are not willing to pay, and make decisive victory, specifically, a campaign and this the point of victory. In the case of Hamas, decisive victory that are appropriate for a this is apparently its social-ideological stand- low intensity conflict. This campaign must ing among the population via its civilian arm be based on a number of principles. and the survival of its senior leaders. If so, these need to be the focus of IDF actions.

50 4Fourth, guerrilla and terrorist organiza- stage, there will be a need to deal with Beit tions use the civilian population as camou- Hanoun or Beit Lahiya in a similar manner, flage for their operations, as refuge after the including the expulsion of residents, prefer- operations, and as a publicity tool if the pop- ably without destroying their homes. This ulation is harmed by the enemy. Two ways is a problematic step from both ethical and of dealing with this are to encourage oppo- public-image standpoints, but it is preferable sition among the civilians to terrorist activi- to its two alternatives: the continued firing ties by immediately and directly connecting of Qassams or return fire that will harm ci- them to the price their support exacts from vilians. Expulsion is a reversible step; killing them, and to remove the population from the is not. It is possible that there will be a need combat arena as much as possible. in the third stage to take a similar step regarding the northern neighborhood of Gaza 5Fifth, a standing army is generally at a City. If this too does not bring about a cessa- disadvantage in relation to a terrorist or guer- tion of the firing, this policy will be stopped, rilla organization since its size and weight do but even in this situation, there will be two not enable a decisive victory against a flexible achievements: the launch areas will be dis- and fleeting opponent that excels at blood- tanced from the border, thus shortening the shed and attrition. However, when such an target range, and the public’s pressure on opponent is embodied in a public and there- Hamas will increase. fore vulnerable government, its modus ope- n Applying pressure via the fuel and randi can and must be copied. Instead of re- electricity supplies sorting to large and ordered military forces, n Defining all Hamas fighters and their commando forces should be used. political leaders as legitimate assassination On the basis of these principles, upon targets, as in the (all too brief) move adopted renewal of massive Qassam fire, the Israeli in the period of Sheikh Yassin’s assassina- military campaign must include the follow- tion ing steps: n Arresting thousands of activists from n As an immediate and direct measure Hamas’s civilian arm and those who are to stop the firing: the “expropriation” or neu- identified with it: imams, union heads, social tralization of the launching areas. The inten- and educational workers, public servants, tion is not permanent conquest and certainly and so on not resumption of long term control over the n Destroying all Hamas installations, Palestinian population. In the first stage, Isra- from training camps to weapons factories el must take over the unpopulated northern and welfare offices area, expose it completely, mine its southern- n Destroying all government installa- most border with the rest of the Gaza Strip, tions withdraw IDF forces to positions where they n Confiscating all money, in homes, of- can control the area by fire, declare it a killing fices, and banks, belonging to any person zone and prohibit entry, and warn that this or organization suspected of support for will also be done to other launch areas if the Hamas rocket fire continues. Presumably this pack- n Broad use of surprise, fraud, deceit, age of steps this will not suffice. In the second and psychological warfare

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 51 The time n Using large and vulnerable units and that Abu Mazen may actually want and may has come to attacks on a limited basis only, depending on gradually even need to progress with Israel along a diplomatic course while taking secu- reduce the the task at hand. Most of the operations will be carried out by combat helicopters, recon- rity steps that were until now prevented by compromises to naissance teams, sniper cells, ambush teams, fear of Hamas and a fitna. To this end, Israel a minimum. and undercover squads. Any masked person, must take risks and act with the utmost dip- any procession or gathering, and any figure lomatic generosity. On the other hand, Israel who is identified in any way with Hamas today, free of some of the significant limita- will be targeted. In essence, the roles must be tions levied on it previously, has the ability to reversed: Hamas will be the stationary and act against Hamas. To this end, determined exposed target, and the IDF will function as military force must be used that does not fal- an exhausting sting, surprise, and guerrilla ter in face of Palestinian steadfastness. In the force. current circumstances of a Palestinian split Described here is the military solu- – and not as in the past – the use of force will tion, not to the dispute but to terrorism, to contribute to the advancement of the diplo- Hamas, and to the extension of the radical matic process instead of its regression. Pre- axis. Even though there is obviously no cer- cisely those who desire peace must support tainty regarding the outcome, the attempt the use of targeted force over time against is worthwhile. Slogans that senior military the Hamas and Qassam threats. Without a and diplomatic echelons have been spout- show of ability on the part of Israel to stop ing for years regarding “an uncompromising these threats, the Israeli public will not sup- struggle against terrorism” have proven to port diplomatic steps toward a resolution to be baseless words. There have always been the conflict. compromises, some justified and others not. The time has come to reduce the compro- Notes mises to a minimum. For instance, due to the 1 Implied here is not a monolithic axis. There is sensitivity in the north, Israel could compro- no absolute convergence of interests between mise and not attack Hamas in Syria. all the actors in the radical Islamic camp, which is divided both religiously and nation- Conclusion ally. However, all these actors share the desire to weaken Israel, the United States, and the The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip pro- pro-Western Arab governments. vides Israel with not one but two opportu- 2 The Taliban in Afghanistan was a similar nities. On the one hand, there is a chance case.