Achieving Peace and Security in Korea and North East Asia a New US Diplomatic Strategy Toward North Korea

Asia Program I s s u e Br i e f

t h e At l a n t i c Co u n c i l o f t h e Un i t e d St a t e s

Achieving Peace and Security in Korea and North East Asia A New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea

Unless President Obama adopts a new strategy of seeking a comprehensive settlement in Korea, the U.S. is unlikely to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program. Adopting a new diplomatic strategy to end the nuclear threat from North Korea is the core proposal of the Atlantic Council Final Report released today, with detailed recommendations for the Obama administration on policy toward the reclusive communist state. Seeking a comprehensive settlement in Korea – including a peace agreement that replaces the 1953 Armistice – will facilitate the success of the Six Party Talks and resolve other critical security, political and economic issues on the peninsula that underlie the nuclear issue and fuel tensions in Northeast Asia.

Strategic Recommendations in Summary

- Seek a Comprehensive Settlement: Express a firm U.S. commitment to achieve a comprehensive settlement in Korea both to facilitate the success of the Six-Party Talks on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program and to resolve other critical security, political and economic issues on the peninsula that underlie the nuclear issue and fuel tensions in Northeast Asia.

- Appoint a Special Envoy: Name a Special Envoy with presidential authority to address outstanding security, political and economic issues with North Korea at the highest level, where decisions are made.

- Conclude a Denuclearization Agreement and other Accords: In parallel with a denuclearization agreement, a comprehensive settlement would take the form of a series of accords, including a peace agreement that replaces the 1953 Armistice, a U.S.-North Korea agreement for normalizing relations, a trilateral U.S.-South Korea- North Korea agreement on military measures, and a North-South accord based on the 1991 Basic Agreement.

- Offer Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea: Express a willingness to announce near-term U.S. diplomatic recognition of North Korea as soon as North Korea meets a number of stringent conditions. February 2009 February Information on Atlantic Council programs and publications is available on t h e At l a n t i c Co u n c i l the world wide web at: o f t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s http://www.acus.org 1101 15th Street, NW - 11th Floor Requests or comments may be sent to Washington, DC 20005 the Atlantic Council via email at: Tel. (202) 778.4968; Fax: (202) 463-7241 [email protected]

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VICE CHAIRS The Council embodies a nonpartisan network of leaders who Carol C. Adelman Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by: Roger Kirk Geraldine S. Kunstadter Richard L. Lawson – stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical interna- John D. Macomber Virginia A. Mulberger tional issues with a view to enriching public debate and pro- W. DeVier Pierson Paula Stern moting consensus on appropriate responses in the adminis- Ronald P. Verdicchio tration, the Congress, the corporate and nonprofit sectors and David L. Aaron Arnold Kanter the media in the United States and among leaders in Europe, Robert J. Abernethy Kathryn Dickey Karol Michael A. Almond Francis J. Kelly Asia and the Americas; G. Allen Andreas James V. Kimsey David D. Aufhauser Henry A. Kissinger Nancy Kassebaum Baker Franklin D. Kramer – conducting educational and exchange programs for succes- Donald K. Bandler Charles R. Larson Lucy Wilson Benson Roderick K. von Lipsey sor generations of U.S. leaders so that they will come to value Julia Chang Bloch John R. Lyman Avis T. Bohlen Barry R. McCaffrey U.S. international engagement and have the knowledge and Beth A. Brooke James P. McCarthy Harold Brown Jack N. Merritt understanding necessary to develop effective policies. Dan W. Burns Judith A. Miller Richard R. Burt George E. Moose Kathryn Bushkin Steven Muller As i a Pr o g r ams Daniel J. Callahan, III William A. Nitze Sarah C. Carey Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Michael P.C. Carns Philip A. Odeen The Atlantic Council’s Program on Asia seeks to encourage U.S. Daniel W. Christman Hilliard W. Paige Wesley K. Clark William J. Perry leadership and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region to: pro- Curtis M. Coward Thomas R. Pickering Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Joseph W. Prueher mote prosperity, security and stability, enhance U.S. coopera- W. Bowman Cutter Norman W. Ray Brian D. Dailey Stanley R. Resor tion with Asian states on regional issues and global challenges Kenneth W. Dam Susan E. Rice and encourage European-American cooperation on Asian is- Jaime Daremblum Robert W. RisCassi Edwin Dorn Joseph E. Robert, Jr. sues. Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Jeffrey A. Rosen William H. Draper, III Charles O. Rossotti Stanley Ebner Marjorie M. Scardino Patrick deGategno ([email protected]) Richard Edelman James Schlesinger Stuart E. Eizenstat William O. Schmieder Associate Director, Asia Programs Robert F. Ellsworth John P. Schmitz Barbara H. Franklin Jill A. Schuker Ronald M. Freeman Brent Scowcroft John L. Fugh Patricia Sherman Carlton W. Fulford Eric K. Shinseki Jacques S. Gansler Matthew R. Simmons Sherri W. Goodman Kiron K. Skinner John A. Gordon Anne-Marie Slaughter Janet Mullins Grissom William Y. Smith Marc Grossman Helmut Sonnenfeldt Kenneth H. Hannan, Jr. Delbert L. Spurlock, Jr. Harry Harding George J. Stathakis Rita E. Hauser John Studzinski Marten H.A. van Heuven William H. Taft, IV James Hogg Peter J. Tanous Benjamin Huberman Carl E. Vuono Robert E. Hunter Charles F. Wald Robert L. Hutchings Roger W. Wallace Mansoor Ijaz J. Robinson West Mercy Jimenez Togo D. West, Jr. A. Elizabeth Jones R. James Woolsey Paul G. Kaminski Dov S. Zakheim Information on Atlantic Council programs and publications is available on A New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 3 the world wide web at: http://www.acus.org Requests or comments may be sent to Foundation, experts from the United States, the Atlantic Council via email at: The release of these policy recommendations comes at a time when North Korea’s leadership South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia discussed [email protected] appears bent on forcing the “nuclear issue” to how adopting the new diplomatic strategy of the top of the Obama administration’s interna- seeking a comprehensive settlement in Korea, tional agenda, despite U.S. preoccupation with recommended by the April 2007 Atlantic Coun- the domestic economic crisis, an orderly with- cil report, would facilitate the success of the drawal from Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and Six-Party Talks on eliminating North Korea’s the conflict in the Middle East. nuclear program. They reviewed, in detail, recent developments in these nuclear negotiations dur- Tensions are once again rising dangerously on ing 2008. the Korean peninsula. Last Friday, January 30, South Korea heightened its military readiness, They affirmed that parallel negotiations to one day after North Korea canceled longstand- achieve a series of agreements on political, ing agreements on security cooperation between security and economic issues related to the the two countries. nuclear deal will provide the U.S. with significantly greater diplomatic leverage for achieving The Atlantic Council Final Report culminates its strategic policy goals of denuclearizing North a nearly three-year study and fully reflects the Korea and establishing long-term peace and conclusions of a high-level, nonpartisan working stability in Northeast Asia. Realizing a compre- group on North Korea which released its report hensive settlement would also demonstrate the entitled A Framework for Peace and Security in strategic value of making diplomatic common Korea and Northeast Asia in April 2007. cause with an emerging China. (The members of the Atlantic Council working group are listed in Appendix I). Background Enlarging the diplomatic agenda through paral- The United States has few more important poli- lel negotiations, alongside the nuclear talks, will cy goals than eliminating North Korea’s nuclear strengthen the U.S. hand by enabling diplomats weapons program. The risk that Pyongyang to assert additional pressures on North Korea could transfer nuclear weapons and materials to as well as provide Pyongyang, and other nego- rogue states or terrorist groups weighs particu- tiating partners, new incentives. By offering larly heavy on the minds of U.S. policymakers. the prospect of a fundamental settlement of all In April 2007, after more than nine months of outstanding disputes with North Korea (and by deliberations, a high-level, nonpartisan working expressing a willingness to negotiate other mili- group, organized by the Atlantic Council, con- tary, political and economic issues together with cluded that the United States should now seek a the nuclear issue), the U.S. would significantly comprehensive settlement in Korea. Members improve the political conditions for the negotia- of the working group included distinguished tions. The history of negotiating with North American scholars, former government of- Korea demonstrates that improvements in politi- ficials, and practitioners with a wide range of cal conditions almost always precede and foster experience on Korea and Northeast Asia. It agreements on security-related issues. was chaired by Ambassador James Goodby and Clearly, North Korea will be required to make General Jack Merritt. major concessions in the course of negotiations At a December 18-19, 2008 conference in Seoul, on a comprehensive settlement. Pyongyang hosted by the Atlantic Council and the East Asia will be more likely to do so if it perceives that 4 The Atlantic Council of the United States

U.S. Strategic Goals

Pursuing the elements of a comprehensive settlement in Korea will significantly help the U.S. achieve the following strategic policy goals:

- Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and curtailing the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation Consistent with U.S. policy going back to the early 1990s, it is critical to manage, contain, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear threat from North Korea.

- Establishing regional peace and stability while avoiding a war on the Korean Peninsula This broader U.S. strategic goal would be facilitated by normalizing relationships among the nations concerned, negotiating significant redeployments and reductions of conventional forces on the Korean peninsula to establish stable military postures on both sides of the DMZ, and replacing the 1953 Armistice with a comprehensive settlement that engenders both North-South and multilateral cooperation on security, economic and humanitarian issues. Significant progress in resolving North Korea-related issues would strengthen the U.S. relationship with China and by so doing, help to stabilize Northeast Asia.

- Transforming the behavior of the North Korean regime The United States has a strong interest in transforming the behavior of the government of North Korea, both by encouraging it to proceed with economic reform and by loosening con- trols over its people. Economic reform in North Korea will open its society to international norms of conduct and beneficial outside influences.

- Enhancing Japanese security Japan is more at risk from a North Korean nuclear attack than the United States because Pyong- yang potentially possesses the means for delivering a weapon at a short to medium range, while it still lacks long-range missile delivery systems. A settlement with North Korea which furthers peace and stability in Korea would strongly advance Japan’s national interests.

- Strengthening the U.S.-Korea alliance South Korea plays a critical role in the U.S. strategic alliance structure in the Asia Pacific. The non-military component of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been expanding as well, based on common political values and the mutual desire to strengthen economic ties through a free trade agreement. A major policy goal of the U.S. should be consciously to promote measures that harmonize U.S. and South Korean policies and, in so doing, strengthen the alliance.

February 2009 New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 5 its concessions will help bring about a resolu- At the end of the December 2008 conference, tion of all major security issues, while furthering participants formulated the following recom- economic development and normalizing political mendations for the Obama administration to relations with the United States. assist it in dealing with the problems of peace Participants at the conference also met with and security in Korea and Northeast Asia, fully senior Republic of Korea officials, including taking into account the work of the high-level, South Korean chief negotiator at the Six-Party nonpartisan Atlantic Council working group. Talks, Kim Sook, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee (The working group’s April 2007 report, A Yong-joon, and Senior Secretary to the President Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and for Foreign Affairs and National Security Kim Northeast Asia, as well as a companion volume, Sung-hwan. U.S.-North Korea Relations: An Analytic Com- pendium of U.S. Policies, Laws & Regulations, is available at the Atlantic Council website, www. acus.org). Recommendations to the Obama Administration

• Express a firm U.S. commitment to achieve a comprehensive settlement in Korea both to facilitate the success of the Six-Party Talks and to resolve other critical security, political and economic issues on the peninsula that underlie the nuclear issue and fuel tensions in Northeast Asia. • Appoint a Special Envoy with presidential authority to address outstanding security, political and economic issues with North Korea at the highest level. • Undertake broad consultations with the countries involved about beginning negotiations on peace arrangements for the Korean Peninsula to implement the September 2005 Six-Party Joint State- ment that “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” In parallel with a denuclearization agreement, peace arrangements would take the form of a series of accords, including a peace agreement that replaces the 1953 Armistice, a U.S.-North Korea agreement for normalizing relations, a trilateral U.S.-South Korea-North Korea agree ment on military measures, and a North-South accord based on the 1992 Basic Agreement. Military matters within the purview of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, including U.S. conventional force levels in South Korea, would not be subject to direct negotiation in the peace agreement without the explicit approval of South Korea and the United States. Concluding an agreement on a regional organization for security and cooperation in North east Asia, as envisaged in the September 2005 Agreed Statement of Principles at the Six-Party talks, would make an important contribution to peace arrangements. • Reaffirm the October 2000 “Joint Communiqué” in which the United States and North Korea agreed to build a new relationship free from past enmity without “hostile intent.” • Express a willingness to announce near-term U.S. diplomatic recognition of North Korea as soon as North Korea: 6 The Atlantic Council of the United States

Reaffirms its September 2005 commitment to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and, at an early date, agrees to return to the Nuclear Nonprolifera tion Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state and to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards. Commences negotiations on peace arrangements for the Korean peninsula, consistent with the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement. Resumes bilateral talks with Japan on the issue of Japanese citizens abducted during the Cold War in order to fully implement the 2002 “Pyongyang Declaration” normalizing Japan-North Korea relations. Agrees in writing to a robust verification protocol that allows IAEA inspectors to remove material samples for scientific analysis as well as visit undeclared, suspected nuclear-related sites. Promptly gives up all the spent nuclear fuel removed during the process of disabling its nuclear facilities. Makes significant progress toward fully dismantling its nuclear facilities and giving up all its nuclear material. Fully engages with South Korea on implementing the 1991 Basic Agreement and other exist ing bilateral agreements including the June 15, 2000 and October 4, 2007 Joint Declarations. • Affirm the U.S. administration’s willingness to consider a fully-prepared high-level meeting – including a possible presidential summit – of all the participants in the Six-Party Talks, including North Korea, for the purpose of concluding a detailed agreement on recipro cal steps leading to full denuclearization and political normalization with North Korea. • Acknowledge China’s critical role in chairing the Six-Party Talks. • Convene an ongoing series of meetings of foreign ministers of the countries involved in negotiating a comprehensive settlement – South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States – for the purpose of overseeing these negotiations and forming the nucleus of a new multilateral organization for regional security and cooperation. An initial meeting of foreign ministers, agreed to in the Six-Party Joint Agreement of February 13, 2007, should take up these issues. • Endorse the creation of new issue-specific working groups, reporting to the foreign ministers, as a means of enhancing regional security dialogue and building momentum toward a new multilateral organization for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. These working groups could focus on increasing cooperation among the parties on energy security, agriculture, development financ- ing, and transportation, among other issues. Any countries with an interest in a specific issue could join each working group. No country would have a “veto” over the creation of a work- group that other countries would like to establish. Encourage the formation of a new administrative mechanism within the Six-Party Talks to strengthen coordination and communication on regional issues, facilitating the work of the foreign ministers and working groups.

February 2009 New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 7

Developments in 2008 and Early 2009 a six-month delay, and it blew up the cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear plant as a dem- During 2008, the Six-Party Talks proceeded in onstration of good will. the usual fashion, making some progress, then halting for long periods as either North Korea or The Bush administration responded to Pyong- other parties claimed foot-dragging on the part yang's gestures by removing North Korea from of others in meeting agreed commitments. The the Trading with the Enemy Act and notify- year began with a failure to meet the 2007 year- ing Congress of its intention to remove North end deadline to complete the second phase of Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list negotiations that was agreed on in the Six Party in the next 45 days. When Washington failed to Joint Second Phase Actions Agreement issued take Pyongyang off the terrorism list after the on October 3, 2007. North Korea had begun, lapse of the period, saying that North Korea had but not completed, the disablement of nuclear not provided a suitable written agreement on facilities, and it had not provided a complete and the terms of verification, Pyongyang barred all correct declaration of all its nuclear materials, international inspectors from its Yongbyon site facilities and programs. and threatened to restart the reactor. Pyongyang did not agree that the U.S. had ful- In October 2008, U.S. negotiator Christopher filled its commitments to begin the process of Hill traveled to Pyongyang, and North Korea removing the designation of North Korea as a then orally agreed to some verification measures. state sponsor of terrorism and advance the pro- The Bush administration proceeded to take it cess of terminating the application to the North off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. (This of the Trading with the Enemy Act – TWEA. caused some tension between the U.S. and Japan A portion, but not all, of the equivalent of one because of the lack of progress between Japan million tons of heavy fuel oil had been provided and North Korea on the issue of abductions to North Korea. of Japanese citizens by the North.) The lat- est session of the Six-Party Talks in December Following the inauguration of South Korean adjourned when the North would not agree to a President Myung-bak Lee, in February 2008, re- written verification protocol based on the Octo- lations between North and South Korea deterio- ber oral understandings between North Korea rated as the new South Korean government took and the United States. a tougher stance on North-South relations than the prior government of President Moo-hyun One of the topics of discussion in December Roh. Pyongyang immediately announced it was was the delivery of the final 450,000 tons of cutting off some cooperative programs as well heavy fuel oil or equivalent aid to North Ko- as some communication links with the South. rea in exchange for disabling its nuclear facili- On July 11, a North Korean soldier fatally shot ties. When the talks ended without agreement a South Korean tourist at the Mount Kumgang on a verification protocol, the U.S. announced resort in the North, further straining relations. that delivery of this aid had been suspended (although this was disputed by the Chinese and In the nuclear negotiations at the Six-Party Talks, Russians), and Pyongyang in turn threatened to North Korea delivered approximately 18,000 slow disablement of its nuclear program. The pages of documents to the United States in May year thus ended with the Six-Party process on 2008, detailing production records of its nuclear hold, waiting for the Obama administration to programs. In June, Pyongyang finally handed take office in Washington. over a declaration of its nuclear programs, after 8 The Atlantic Council of the United States

In mid-January 2009, North Korea toughened its Conclusion position in the nuclear talks by making several harsh public declarations, seemingly to focus the To achieve its strategic goals in Korea and Obama administration’s attention on the nuclear Northeast Asia, the U.S. should seek a compre- negotiations. Pyongyang announced that it hensive and durable settlement on the Korean would: i) maintain “its status as a nuclear weap- peninsula. Pursuing a set of parallel negotiations ons state” as long as the nuclear threat to it from on political, economic and security issues, along- the U.S. continued; ii) not “dismantle” its nuclear side the denuclearization talks, will specifically program until the U.S. changed its “hostile at- facilitate reaching a nuclear agreement as well as titude”; and iii) adopt an “all-out confrontational other strategic U.S. policy goals. posture” with the new government of South An enlarged negotiating agenda that addresses Korea led by President MB Lee. Moreover, all underlying security concerns will provide the American scholar Sig Harrison reported in mid- United States with significantly greater diplomat- January he was told by North Korean officials ic leverage. By enabling the U.S. to assert a vari- that Pyongyang has “weaponized” enough pluto- ety of additional pressures on North Korea as nium for four to six nuclear bombs. well as provide new incentives, it would strength- On Friday, January 30, North Korea unilaterally en the U.S. hand in achieving a denuclearization declared its intention to cancel its 1991 agree- accord. The aim of this broader negotiation ment with South Korea on reconciliation and would be not just a nuclear-free North Korea, non-aggression, which laid out specific measures but also long-term peace and stability on the for easing tensions on the peninsula. Pyongyang Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole, also said it would not abide by a border agree- strongly furthering U.S. interests. ment between the two countries in the western With so many other pressing issues currently on sea, where naval clashes occurred in 1999 and the Obama administration’s agenda – including 2002. South Korea responded by bolstering its a domestic economic crisis, orderly withdrawal military readiness. from Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the Middle East conflict – the U.S. administration understandably might prefer not to focus major attention on North Korea. Recent developments, however, make it all too clear that North Korea intends to force the “nuclear issue” to the top of the administration’s agenda by dangerously heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula. At this critical time, adopting the new diplomatic strategy of seeking a comprehensive settlement in Korea is very much in the best interests of the United States.

February 2009 New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 9

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful for the financial support provided by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Korea Foundation that made this project possible. Foundation funding was essential for the work of the original Atlantic Council working group, the meeting in Seoul in December 2008, and the writing and publication of the reports in this project, including this Final Report. We are particularly appreciative of the work of all those who have participated in this project since its inception in 2006, including the members of the Council’s original American working group, our partners at the East Asia Foundation; the Institute for Korean Unification Studies at Yonsei University; the Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library; and the experts from the United States, South Korea, Russia, China and Japan who took part in our Seoul conference.

The contributors to this Final Report are: James Goodby, Stanford University Donald Gross, Atlantic Council of the United States John Park, U.S. Institute of Peace Alan Romberg, Stimson Center Leon V. Sigal, Social Science Research Council Joseph Snyder, Atlantic Council of the United States

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude for the leadership of Atlantic Council senior fellow Donald Gross, who has directed this project from the beginning, and of Professor Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University, whose skill and dedication was instrumental in arranging the two Seoul confer- ences. Patrick deGategno, associate director for Asia Programs at the Atlantic Council, played a critical role in supporting the December 2008 conference and preparing this Final Report for publication. Joseph Snyder Director, Asia Programs Atlantic Council of the United States

10 The Atlantic Council of the United States

Appendix I

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA

Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on North Korea

April 2007

Members of the Working Group The members of the working group believe that the recommendations stated in this report promote overall U.S. interests. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in full agreement, each participant believes that the report, as a whole, provides a sound basis for future actions by the government of the United States. The views of the working group members do not represent the official position of any institution.

Co-Chairs Ambassador James Goodby, The Brookings Institution, former U.S. Ambassador for Nuclear Security & Dismantlement and U.S. Ambassador to Finland General Jack N. Merritt, U.S. Army (Ret.), Atlantic Council of the United States, former Director of the Joint Staff and Commandant of the U.S. Army War College

Project Director Donald Gross, Atlantic Council of the United States

Senior Project Consultants Banning Garrett, Institute for Sino-American International Dialogue, University of Denver C. Richard Nelson, Atlantic Council of the United States

Assistant Project Director Patrick deGategno, Atlantic Coucncil of the United States

February 2009 New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 11

Members Jonathan Adams, Institute for Sino-American International Dialogue, University of Denver Daniel Bob, Canonbury Group Richard Bush, The Brookings Institution Paul F. Chamberlin, Center for Strategic and International Studies Jay G. Cohen, Duane Morris LLP Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies Steve Costello, ProGlobal Consulting William Drennan, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) Gordon Flake, The Mansfield Foundation Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies Michael Green, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University Elisa D. Harris, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland Selig Harrison, Center for International Policy Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, Kissinger McLarty Associates, former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Frank Jannuzi, Council on Foreign Relations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee David C. Kang, Dartmouth College Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council of the United States Franklin Kramer, Atlantic Council of the United States Kenneth Lieberthal, Univesity of Michigan – Ann Arbor Jan Lodal, Atlantic Council of the United States Admiral Eric McVadon, (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Yale University Donald Oberdorfer, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University Katy Oh, Institute for Defense Analyses Aloysius O’Neill, Former foreign service officer W. DeVier Pierson, Hunton & Williams Daniel Poneman, The Scowcroft Group 12 The Atlantic Council of the United States

Scott Rembrandt, Korea Economic Institute Alan Romberg, The Henry L. Stimson Center Michael Schiffer, The Stanley Foundation General Robert W. Sennewald, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea Leon Sigal, The Social Science Research Center Anne-Marie Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton Univer- sity Helmut Sonnenfeldt, The Brookings Institution Paul Stares, U.S. Institute of Peace David I. Steinberg, Georgetown University James Steinberg, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin David Straub, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University Robert Sutter, Georgetown University

February 2009 New US Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea 13

Appendix II KOREA CONFERENCE “Developing a Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia”

December 18 - 19, 2008 The Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea CO-HOSTS: The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Institute for Korean Unification Studies at Yonsei University, The East Asia Foundation

CO-SPONSORS: The Korea Foundation, The Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library, Yonsei University

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS South Korea

Cha Du-Hyeogn (Professor, KIDA) Choi Jong Kun (Professor, University of North Korean Studies) Choi Kang (Professor, IFANS) Chang Kay Soon (Professor, IKUS, Yonsei University) Kim Soung Chul (Senior Fellow, Sejong Institute) Lee Geun (Professor, Seoul National University) Lim Jae-Cheon (Professor, IKUS, Yonsei University) Moon Chung-in (Professor, Yonsei University) Nam Chang-hee (Professor, Inha University) 14 The Atlantic Council of the United States

Paik Hak-soon (Professor, Sejong Institute) Park Jong Chul (Professor, KINU)

United States

Donald Gross (Project Director, the Atlantic Council) Joseph C. Snyder (Director of Asia Programs, the Atlantic Council) John S. Park (Senior Research Associate, the U.S. Institute of Peace) Leon V. Sigal (Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, SSRC) Peter M. Beck (Professor at American University in Washington, D.C.) Note: Ambassador James Goodby and Alan Romberg were not able to attend the conference but participated actively in drafting the final report.

Japan

Okonogi Masao (Professor, Keio University) Tanaka Hitoshi (Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange)

China

Jin Canrong (Professor, Renmin University) Yang Bojiang (Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, CICIR)

Russia

Georgy Toloraya (Professor, IMEMO)

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