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“One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

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“One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs October 10, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30341 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Summary Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the “one China” policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan’s status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” President Reagan also offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei in 1982, partly to continue arms sales. Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy have been challenged by the PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion, moves perceived by Beijing for Taiwan’s de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s) president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to investing in self-defense. After the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing reduced tension and resumed talks—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a rhetorical convergence emerged about “peaceful development” of cross-strait ties. However, disagreements remain about the PRC’s goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan’s status, Taiwan’s self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan. On September 23, 2014, 29 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for a new Taiwan Policy Review (after 20 years) to examine expanded engagement with Taiwan. Congressional Research Service China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Contents Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China” ................................................................................................. 1 Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 1 Congressional Concerns ............................................................................................................ 2 Key Statements and Ambiguity ................................................................................................. 6 Has U.S. Policy Changed? ......................................................................................................... 9 Overview of Issues .................................................................................................................. 32 Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei ................................... 33 Statements During the Nixon Administration.......................................................................... 34 Statements During the Ford Administration ............................................................................ 37 Statements During the Carter Administration .......................................................................... 37 Statements During the Reagan Administration ........................................................................ 42 Statements During the George H. W. Bush Administration .................................................... 49 Statements During the Clinton Administration ........................................................................ 51 Statements During the George W. Bush Administration ......................................................... 71 Statements During the Obama Administration ........................................................................ 84 Tables Table 1. Cabinet-Rank Visits to Taiwan After 1979......................................................................... 5 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 87 Congressional Research Service China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China” Historical Background Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up in 1912 after the revolution that started on October 10, 1911, in China to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. The ROC uses October 10 to commemorate the national day, celebrated as “Double Ten.” The ROC does not recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) founded in Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC ceased to exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of “one China.” (The Qing Empire had incorporated Taiwan as a full province in 1885-1895, when more settlers moved from China to the island.) The PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two Chinas. The ROC refers to the other side of the strait as the “mainland.” The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of Taiwan with the mainland as a part of “one China,” without renouncing the use of force. In any case, since 1949, the ROC has governed only on Taiwan, and the PRC has ruled mainland China. Previously called Formosa, Taiwan never has been ruled by the CPC or as a part of the PRC, and until 1945, had never been ruled by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or “Retrocession Day,” marked the ROC’s claim of “recovering” Formosa from Japan. However, upon Japan’s surrender, that was the first time that the ROC’s military forces had occupied the island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in existence. Moreover, the colony’s people did not have a say in self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August 1945, with no country challenging the island’s status. The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taipei in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over mainland China. Taiwan’s people have faced social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issues of whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local “Taiwanese” and “Mainlanders” (people who retreated to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their descendants). One of the first major powers to support reforms and the new republic of progressive leaders in early 20th century China, the United States recognized the ROC from 1913 until the end of 1978.1 The United States then shifted to recognize the PRC, with its capital in Beijing, under the U.S. “one China” policy. By the early 1970s, the United States had looked to switch the diplomatic recognition to the PRC, while figuring out a framework to sustain engagement with Taiwan. Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed policy
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