The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans
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THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE 1 BY THE SAME AUTHOR RACIAL PROBLEMS IN HUNGARY. By Scotus Viator. 1908. CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN HUN- GARY: A Study of Electoral Practice. 141 (Enlarged German edition, 1912, Leipzig.) THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION AND [*HE HABSBURG MONARCHY. 19". (Greatly enlarged German edition, 191?,, Berlin.) ABSOLUTISM IN CROATIA. 1912. THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY. Jointly with A. E. Zimmern, J. Dover Wilson, and A. Greenwood. 1914. (Swedish edition, 1915) ROUMANIA AND THE GREAT WAR. [915. THE BALKANS, ITALY AND THE ADRIATIC. 2nd Edition, 1916. GERMAN, SLAV AND MAGYAR. A Study in the Origins of the Great War. 1916. (French edition in the Press.) THE RISE OF NATIONALITY IN THE BALKANS )tr by R. W. SETON-WATSON D.Litt. LECTURER IN EAST EUROPEAN HISTORY, KINGS COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. WITH FOUR MAPS. NEW YORK E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 1 918 DRSLa TO MY WIFE 25 March, 1917. NOTE Owing to his departure from London on military service the author has not been able to finish this book : it is, therefore, not the true fulfilment of his intention. But, as the substance of it is in its final form and nothing is wanting except a preface and the statement of general conclusions, his publishers believe that the value of the book as a guide to critical affairs in the Balkans is in no way impaired. They therefore present it to the British reading public with full confidence that, alike in its intrinsic worth and by the acknowledged authority of its author, it will help to serve the great purposes of the War. 25 March, 1917. CONTENTS PACK CHAPTER BYZANTIUM AND STAMBUL I CHAPTER II TURKEY IN DECLINE II CHAPTER III THE BALKAN CHRISTIANS AND THE RISE OF NATIONALITY . 21 CHAPTER IV THE SERBS AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE . 2$ CHAPTER V THE GREEK REVOLUTION 44 CHAPTER VI MODERN ROUMANIA .... 56 CHAPTER VII BULGARIA UNDER THE TURKISH YOKE 69 CHAPTER VIII AUSTRO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN THE BALKANS ... "85 viii CONTENTS PAGH CHAPTER IX THE CONCERT OF EUROPE VND THE NEAR EAST ... 94 CHAPTER X THE BERLIN SETTLEMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ( 1 878- 1908) 113 CHAPTER XI THE YOUNC TURKISH REVOLUTION 1 34 PART II CHAPTER XII THE BALKAN LEAGUE 143 CHAPTER XIII THE TURCO-BAI.KAN WAR 166 CHAPTER XIV THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WAR 204 CHAPTER XV THE DISPUTE AMONG THE ALLIES 230 CHAPTER XVI THE BREAK-UP OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE . 240 CHAPTER XVII THE SECOND BALKAN WAR 257 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 285 INDEX 299 THE RISE OF NATIONALITY IN THE BALKANS CHAPTER I BYZANTIUM AND STAMBUL The master of Constantinople, said Napoleon, will rule the world, and his reputation for political prophecy has given an unnatural lease of life to what is merely a dangerous half-truth. In a conjunction of circum- stances such as ten centuries may not bring, and under the guidance of some universal genius of peace and war, Byzantium may resume that supremacy which it enjoyed under its Imperial founder and to a lesser degree under the great Justinian. But even then it will be for the future historian to consider whether other causes, such as undermined the fighting powers of Rome and diverted the trade routes of the Middle Ages, were not the main factors in the revival with which he will be concerned, and whether Constantine would have been any the less supreme had he refrained from found- ing a New Rome upon the shores of the Bosphorus. That it may in the future dominate the European situa- tion none would be rash enough to deny ; to assert that it must of necessity do so would be little short of an open defiance of the past. For history shows us that, B 2 THE RISE OF NATIONALITY IN THE BALKANS despite its commercial importance and its ancient tradi- tions of culture, Constantinople has for many centuries played a purely negative part in the politics of Europe, and that even under such great and war-like sovereigns as Basil II., Mohammed II., and Suleiman the Mag- nificent, Europe, though it rang with their victories, was never the tool of their policy. To-day, more than ever, the straits between Europe and Asia possess a potential rather than an actual importance, which is intimately connected with the fate of the territory separating them from the Balkans and the Taurus. On the other hand, for purposes of defence, communica- tion, and administration, its strategic position is un- rivalled and bears witness to the genius of its founder. Geography, indeed, goes far to explain alike the stubborn survival of the Eastern Empire as a trunk- less head and the frequent recoveries of the Sick Man from a seemingly hopeless illness. In a word, Con- stantinople is a key which, in the right hands, may work wonders, but which only acquires full value when key and lock are in the same possession. For the past two years history has been writing the proof of this asser- tion in letters of fire across Europe, and the fate of Constantinople is one of the most decisive issues of the Great War. The definite establishment of German control would at once convert the dream of "Berlin to Bagdad" into the most practical of realities, while its acquisition by Russia would change the whole centre of gravity in Eastern Europe by assuring to the greatest of Slavonic Powers its access to the sea and removing the chief incentive to political activity in Persia or the Middle East. The victories of Belisarius and Narses in Italy and Africa (533-554) were the last serious acts of aggression in the West committed by the so-called "Byzantine" Empire. Henceforward its military resources were BYZANTIUM AND STAMBUL 3 devoted on the one hand to retaining or reasserting its hold upon the Balkan Peninsula, and on the other to holding back the advancing tide of Islam from its Asiatic provinces. For ten centuries after the fall of the West before the repeated onslaughts of the bar- barians (476), the East held Asia at bay. While the rest of Europe was sunk in the depths of barbarism and anarchy, Constantinople preserved, with much that was corrupt and decadent, many of the great traditions of the ancient world. Recent research and a wider con- ception of history have restored it to its place as the true centre of culture during the Dark Ages. Indeed, for a long time the Moorish Court of Cordova was its only serious rival as a repository of learning and science ; it was only later that the great scholastic centres of Bologna and Paris, of Oxford and Prague, began to assume a real importance in the history of thought and civilisation. It is true that in the sultry atmosphere of Byzantine ceremonial all initiative had long been stifled ; but the West was now ready to receive the treasures so long hoarded on the Bosphorus, and it is hard to exaggerate the impetus which their dispersal after the Turkish conquest gave to the Italian renaissance, and the con- sequent revival of art and learning throughout Europe. Internal decay and stagnation had rendered the fall of the Byzantine State inevitable, nor need its dissolu- tion have been a cause for regret, had its conquerors possessed either the inclination or the capacity to accept its great traditions and transfuse them with their own fierce virility. Unhappily, the very opposite occurred. Religious fanaticism and military prowess combined to inspire the Turk with contempt for the conquered Greeks. By a glorious death the last Constantine vindicated his own honour, but could not conceal the craven spirit of his subjects, while the corruption of b 2 I THE RISE OF NATIONALITY IN THE BALKANS the Eastern Church served to render the art and culture which centred round it peculiarly abhorrent to a race which followed the purer tenets of Mohammed. By the middle of the fourteenth century the collapse of the Empire had become a mere question of time, and in the year 1355 we find a Venetian diplomat treating 1 it as the certain prey of the Turks. Yet the great strength of its strategic position enabled the imperial city to postpone its downfall for a whole century after the Turks had gained their first foothold in Europe. The additional respite afforded by the onslaught of the Mongols on the Turkish rear came too late to save either the Empire itself or the loosely-knit Slavonic states of the peninsula, to whom the triumph of the Crescent meant national ruin. In the ninth and tenth centuries (807-1018) the Bulgars, under the leadership of the savage Krum and his great successors, Boris and Simeon, had seemed more than once on the point of sweeping all before them, but the ferocious energy and military prowess of Basil II. reduced them to complete subjection for 170 years. The second, or Roumano- Bulgar, Empire of the Asenid dynasty,2 and the still more formidable Serb Empire of Stephen Dushan, both proved unequal to the task of uniting the peninsula against the infidel. The fatal battle of Kosovo (1389) —the Flodden of the Southern Slavs—which has been immortalised by a wonderful cycle of popular ballads, assured to the Turks a dominant position in the Balkans. It was followed in a few years by the subjection of Bulgaria (1393), while Serbia and Bosnia were reduced to the defensive, and were only permitted to survive in uncertain vassalage, until .the Sultan, after planting the Crescent upon the Golden Horn, was ready for an advance into the heart of Europe.