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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Between Anarchy and Leviathan: A Return to Voluntarist Political Obligation A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Emily Rachel Hallock 2013 © Copyright by Emily Rachel Hallock 2013 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Between Anarchy and Leviathan: A Return to Voluntarist Political Obligation by Emily Rachel Hallock Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2013 Professor Carole Pateman, Chair No defense of the liberal-democratic state can do without political obligation, yet existing theories cannot provide a successful account of political obligation. Existing accounts of obligation cannot parry critiques from rival theories, nor refute philosophical anarchists’ formidable attack on obligation. To move discussion of obligation forward, this dissertation offers an alternative solution to what George Klosko has called the ‘voluntarist paradox’ of liberal-democratic political obligation. While liberal ideas about the individual require that any obligation to obey be assumed through a voluntary act, individuals do not voluntarily assume obligations frequently enough to support legitimacy claims. In response to this paradox, most scholars deploy non-voluntary justifications for a general obligation to obey, while philosophical anarchists deny that such an obligation exists at all. In contrast, I argue that overcoming the voluntarist paradox requires a radically different view of the aims and scope of political obligation. While most theories of political obligation begin with a general requirement to obey ii and look for its source, my account begins with voluntary action, and asks what requirements it can yield. I show that the conventional goal of political obligation – a general, comprehensive requirement to obey – generates the impasse between obligation’s proponents and philosophical anarchists, inhibits analysis of democratic self-government, and inaccurately depicts obedience and law. Instead, I define political obligation as a voluntarily-assumed ‘binding requirement to take political action,’ a broader category that also includes non-voluntary duties. Voluntarist obligation, I show, is incompatible with a general, comprehensive requirement to obey the law because it is law. Instead, much of the time, non-voluntary duty grounds requirements to obey the law, and voluntarist political obligation concerns the whole variety of political actions one can voluntarily undertake a requirement to perform. Political obligation is a voluntarist practice that expresses one’s freedom to create, shape, and revise the rules of the political game, and of social institutions more generally. A truly voluntarist theory of political obligation lets us understand and critique enduring yet often overlooked features of liberal-democratic politics because it goes beyond state-imposed requirements, and looks to the individual actions that generate those requirements. In liberal democracies, the voluntary acts of state agents develop, interpret, and enforce laws and policy, and individuals affect the state by voluntarily exercising their rights and taking political action. Because my account of political obligation connects voluntarily-assumed requirements to the conditions of political self-determination, it provides a stronger foundation for liberal democracy, and allows more accurate analysis of normative demands on political actors. iii The dissertation of Emily Rachel Hallock is approved. Joshua Dienstag Andrew Sabl Seana Shiffrin Carole Pateman, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2013 iv For Grandpa Bernie and Mom-Mom v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction....................................................................................................................................1 The Historical Roots of Obligation Revisited....................................................................10 Political Obligation Today.................................................................................................16 Political Obligation Beyond Anarchy and Leviathan ........................................................22 Outline of Dissertation.......................................................................................................26 1. Political Obligation and the Law: An Internal Critique of the Obligation to Obey..........31 Obedience to ‘the’ Law in Theories of Political Obligation..............................................32 Differentiating Obedience..................................................................................................40 Disaggregating Justification ..............................................................................................56 Implications for Political Obligation .................................................................................62 Conclusion .........................................................................................................................68 2. Voluntarism, Responsibility, and Freedom...........................................................................70 Voluntarism and Responsibility.........................................................................................72 A Definition of Active Voluntarism ..................................................................................82 The Semi-Voluntary State .................................................................................................86 Obligation Within a Typology of Binding Requirements .................................................90 Figure 1 – Typology of Ought ...............................................................................92 Voluntarist Obligation and Responsibility ........................................................................95 Voluntarism Versus Obedience .......................................................................................102 The Distinguishing Features of Political Obligations .....................................................107 The Scope of Voluntarist Political Obligation.................................................................116 The Advantages of Voluntarist Obligation......................................................................119 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................122 3. Meeting the Challenge of Philosophical Anarchism ..........................................................124 A Brief Overview of Philosophical Anarchism...............................................................127 The Paradox of Voluntarist Obligation Revisited............................................................129 The Case Against Philosophical Anarchism....................................................................136 Politics Beyond Voluntarism...........................................................................................137 Coercion, Voluntary Political Association, and Self-Governance ..................................139 Voluntarism as the Power to Act .....................................................................................148 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................160 4. From Voluntarism to Freedom: Political Obligation as an Evaluative Standard ...........162 The Downside of Political Voluntarism ..........................................................................164 Horizontal Association and State Development ..............................................................171 The State’s Effect on Horizontal Association..................................................................176 Expanding the Self-Governed Sphere: Political Obligation as an Evaluative Standard..179 Political Obligation in Practice: Three Case Studies .......................................................188 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................197 5. Democracy as Action: The Politics of Political Obligation ................................................200 vi Democracy and the True Voluntarist Paradox.................................................................203 The ‘Democratic Gap’ and Other Empirical Challenges.................................................210 Deliberative Democratic Theory: Justification Without Decision-Makers .....................218 A Defense of Participatory Democratic Theory ..............................................................226 Democracy as Action.......................................................................................................234 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................247 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................250 Bibliography...............................................................................................................................258 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 – Typology of Ought………………………………………………………………….92 viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A dissertation is a marathon, not a sprint – and not just for the author. I have been joined in this enterprise by so many generous and insightful mentors, colleagues, friends, and family members. Their feedback,