A Comprehensive Database of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

Home , Foreign Area Officer, Gardez, Ghormach, Mihtarlam, Qarghayi District

Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs The University of Texas at Austin Policy Research Project Report 165 Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Policy Research Project Report PRP Number 165 ISBN Number 978-0-89940-781-4

A Comprehensive Database of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

Project Directed By Kenneth Matwiczak

A Report to the Congressional Research Service by The LBJ School of Public Affairs April 2009

©2009 by The University of Texas at Austin All rights reserved. No part of this publication or any corresponding electronic text and/or images may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Policy Research Project Participants

Students

Erin Boeke Burke, B.A. (International Studies, Political Science), Macalester College

Margaret S. Chamberlin, B.A. (International Affairs, Economics), The George Washington University

Sarah Hutt Chen, B.A. (Political Science, Chinese), Trinity University

Rheagan D. Coffey, B.S. (Civil Engineering), Texas Tech University

Shannon L. Dugan, B.A. (Government), University of Texas at Austin

Kevin E. Gong, B.A. (Political Science, History), University of California at Davis

James A. Hobbs, B.A. (History), University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Rebecca Hopkins, B.A., (International Studies), Emory University

Justin M. Kosoris, B.A. (International Studies), The Johns Hopkins University

Jonathan J. Lee, B.A. (Government), University of Texas at Austin

Marsha L. Lewis, B.A. (International Relations), Bucknell University

Emily P. Linehan, B.A. (Slavic Studies), Brown University

Kyle Denver McGaa, B.A. (International Affairs, Economics), University of Colorado at Boulder

Joanna Schenke, B.A. (International Relations), Pomona College

Nicole E. Trinh, B.S. (Human Development and Family Sciences), University of Texas at Austin

Jung Youn Yang, B.A. (Journalism), Ewha Women’s University

Sahar Zubairy, B.A. (Economics), Texas A&M Unversity

Project Director

Kenneth Matwiczak, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin ii

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms ...... v

Foreword ...... viii

Acknowledgments...... ix

Editors’ Note ...... x

Executive Summary ...... xi

Map of Afghanistan ...... xii

Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 2. Methodology ...... 3

Chapter 3. General Background on PRTs ...... 6

Chapter 4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Overview ...... 8

United States Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...... 9

Provincial Reconstruction Team Asadabad ...... 10

Provincial Reconstruction Team Bagram ...... 12

Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah ...... 14

Provincial Reconstruction Team Gardez ...... 16

Provincial Reconstruction Team Ghazni ...... 18

Provincial Reconstruction Team Jalalabad ...... 20

Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost ...... 22

Provincial Reconstruction Team Mitharlam ...... 24

Provincial Reconstruction Team Nuristan ...... 26

Provincial Reconstruction Team Panjshir ...... 28

Provincial Reconstruction Team Qalat ...... 30

Provincial Reconstruction Team Sharan ...... 32

iii

International Provincial Reconstruction Teams ...... 34

Provincial Reconstruction Team Bamyan ...... 35

Provincial Reconstruction Team Chaghcharan ...... 37

Provincial Reconstruction Team Feyzabad ...... 39

Provincial Reconstruction Team Herat ...... 41

Provincial Reconstruction Team Kandahar ...... 43

Provincial Reconstruction Team Konduz ...... 45

Provincial Reconstruction Team Lashkar Gah ...... 47

Provincial Reconstruction Team Logar ...... 49

Provincial Reconstruction Team Mazar-e-Sharif ...... 51

Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh ...... 53

Provincial Reconstruction Team Pol-e-Khomri ...... 55

Provincial Reconstruction Team Qala-e-Naw ...... 57

Provincial Reconstruction Team Tarin Kowt ...... 59

Provincial Reconstruction Team Wardak ...... 61

Chapter 5. Project Uses and Analysis ...... 63

Bibliography ...... 65

Appendix A. Report Standard and Alternative Spellings ...... A-1

Appendix B. Contact Database ...... B-1

Appendix C. Report of the Survey Team ...... C-1

Appendix D. PRT Data Sheets ...... D-1

Appendix E. Annotated Bibliography...... E-1

List of Acronyms

ACSP – Afghan Country Stability Picture (NATO)

ADT – Agriculture Development Team

AECI – Agency for International Cooperation (Spain)

AIMS – Afghan Information Management Service

ANA – Afghan National Army

ANDS – Afghan National Development Strategy

ANP – Afghan National Police

ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces

CALL – Center for Army Lessons Learned (U.S.)

CERP – Commander’s Emergency Response Fund

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CJTF 101 – Combined Joint Task Force 101 (U.S.)

CMMH – Civil-Military Mission in Helmand

COIN - Counterinsurgency

CRS – Congressional Research Service (U.S.)

CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies

DFID – Department for International Development (U.K.)

ESF – Economic Support Fund (U.S.)

EU – European Union

EUPOL – European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

FOB – Forward Operating Base

GAO – Government Accountability Office (U.S.)

GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

HASC – House Armed Services Committee

HUF – Hungarian Forints

ICG – Integrated Command Group

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

IO – International Organization

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

MOT – Military Observation Team (U.S.)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Nongovernmental Organization

NPS – Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

NZAID – New Zealand Agency for International Development

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom (U.S., Afghanistan)

PAT – Provincial Advisory Team

PO – Provincial Office

PRP – Policy Research Project

PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

RC – Regional Command

SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Turkey)

U.K. – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UN – United Nations

UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP – United Nation Development Programme

UNMACA – United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan

U.S. – United States of America

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USD – United States Dollars

USDA – United States Department of Agriculture

USIP – United States Institute of Peace

vii

Foreword

The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisciplinary research on policy problems as the core of its educational program. A major part of this program is the nine-month policy research project, in the course of which two or more faculty members from different disciplines direct the research of ten to thirty graduate students of diverse backgrounds on a policy issue of concern to a government or nonprofit agency. This “client orientation” brings the students face to face with administrators, legislators, and other officials active in the policy process and demonstrates that research in a policy environment demands special talents. It also illuminates the occasional difficulties of relating research findings to the world of political realities.

The curriculum of the LBJ School is intended not only to develop effective public servants but also to produce research that will enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy process. The project that resulted in this report has helped to accomplish the first task; it is our hope that the report itself will contribute to the second.

Finally, it should be noted that neither the LBJ School nor The University of Texas at Austin necessarily endorses the views or findings of this report.

B.R. Inman Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Interim Dean

viii

Acknowledgments

The Policy Research Project team members would like to recognize the numerous individuals who assisted us throughout our research process. We were able to create a comprehensive database and report on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan thanks to their invaluable contributions.

Among these individuals, we would first like to acknowledge the brave men and women who serve in Afghanistan. As reflected in the database, these military and civilian leaders dedicate themselves to fulfilling the mission of the PRTs. In particular, we would like to recognize Captain Laurence Duaine, Colonel Phillip Bookert, Colonel Patrick Hamilton, and Lt. Colonel Stephen Hickenbottom for sharing their experiences with our team. To this end we would like to extend our greatest thanks and appreciation for their service and the service of all PRT members.

This project also would not be possible without the various experts who aided us in our preliminary phase. We would therefore like to recognize the individuals who participated in our initial field survey. Their insightful responses and commentary regarding PRTs helped build the foundation for the database. Additionally, we would like to acknowledge the countless authors of databases and reports regarding PRTs. Their expertise helped us form the broad knowledge about PRTs that we have today. Specifically, we would like to thank NATO R&D Analyst Luc Vermeulen for supplying ACSP database information.

The Policy Research Team would like to express absolute gratitude to our client representatives from the Congressional Research Service, Rhoda Margesson and Ken Katzman. Their encouraging feedback and project direction enabled us to develop the right strategies and course of action to complete the project.

Our further thanks go out to various faculty and staff members at the LBJ School of Public Affairs. We would like to recognize Dr. Peter Ward and Career Coordinator Lana Morris for providing sessions regarding survey development and interviewing skills, respectively. Additional thanks are extended to Senior Graphics Designer Doug Marshall and Administrative Coordinator Lucy Neighbors. These two individuals ensured that our final product was aesthetically appealing and professional in form.

Lastly, we would like to convey our sincere appreciations to all unnamed contributors and participants of the project. Our utter thanks go out to you for the success of this PRP.

To those who read or use the information in this report, we kindly ask that you respect its contents and protect the contributions provided by cited sources and authors. These contributions are not to be construed in a way that is inconsistent with the project objective. Thank you for your cooperation and sensitivity to the contents of this report.

Editors’ Note

Some Afghan provinces and places have several English names based on imperfect transliteration from Pashto and Dari. The editors have chosen to standardized spellings in this report for consistency. Alternative spellings are listed in Appendix A. These selections do not endorse any particular spelling, and we encourage future users of this database to keep other spelling forms in mind when conducting research.

Executive Summary

This report summarizes a comprehensive data collection and compilation project on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan from their inception in 2003 to the present, focusing specifically on data from 2005 to 2008. A research team of students from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin collected, examined, and compiled PRT-specific data in a verifiable database, which contains wide-ranging information including staffing numbers, funding, and on- the-ground project descriptions. This report is not a definitive analysis of the data; rather it serves to outline the process by which the Policy Research Project team compiled the relevant information to be used in the project, including project methodology, a discussion of the database and database dictionary, as well as an annotated bibliography. The report also contains an overview of the international and U.S. PRT models, as well as a brief on each of the 26 PRTs as they existed in 2008, and concludes with observations on the data collection process, challenges the team encountered in the process of completing the project, and recommendations on how interested parties can best use the database.

Map of Afghanistan

xii

Chapter 1. Introduction

On February 15, 1989, as the Soviet Union completed withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, the country began to fade from the world’s attention. The United States provided $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance to aid Afghans in resisting against Soviet invaders from 1980 to 1989, closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989 and, deeming its role complete, significantly reduced foreign aid to Afghanistan.1 Three years later, the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic movement, came to power, with the help of the same mujahedin (Islamic fighters) that the United States helped to finance during the Soviet occupation.2

The Taliban refused to hand Osama bin Laden over to the United States in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, resulting in a U.S. military-led overthrow of the Taliban. This time, U.S. military action was followed by a systematic effort to build legitimate governing institutions in Afghanistan.3 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) evolved from U.S. military humanitarian assistance teams,4 and were established to help improve stability in Afghanistan by increasing the host nation’s capacity to govern, enhancing provincial development, improving security, and strengthening local governments’ ability to deliver public services such as security and healthcare.5

In 2002, the first PRT was established in Gardez as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).6 As of March 2009, there are 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s International Security Assistance Force’s (NATO-ISAF) command. The United States leads 12 PRTs, while the remaining 14 are led by the following NATO and partner countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.7 Regional Commands coordinate PRTs at the regional level.8

1 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post- Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, February 9, 2009. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf (accessed March 10, 2009). 2 ibid. 3 ibid. 4 Government Accountability Office (GAO). "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq," United States Government Accountability Office. October 1, 2008. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09- 86R (accessed March 10, 2009). 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ," NATO, January 19, 2009. http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html (accessed March 10, 2009). 6 GAO, 2009. 7 NATO. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)," 2009. 8 ibid. 1

From 2002 to 2007, PRTs in Afghanistan have engaged in numerous projects:

• Regional Command Central: 746 CIMIC projects totaling $15.4 million, and 1,565 other major infrastructure projects totaling $1.5 million.9

• Regional Command East: 1,376 PRT projects totaling $504.8 million, and 14,388 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.7 million.10

• Regional Command North: 1,054 PRT projects totaling $31.5 million, and 6842 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.2 million.11

• Regional Command South: 1,362 PRT projects totaling $175.3 million, and 4,150 other major infrastructure projects totaling $1.8 million.12

• Regional Command West: 1,369 PRT projects totaling $160.7 million, and 3,218 other major infrastructure projects totaling $2.7 million.13

Given the important strategic U.S. policy shift that PRTs signify and given the amount of money that the NATO countries have spent on PRTs, this project aims to help guide further policy decisions on PRTs by taking a comprehensive and historical summary of work done by all PRTs in Afghanistan, resulting in useful comparisons between the different PRT models currently used in Afghanistan.

In May 2007, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) contracted the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs (LBJ) to produce a comprehensive database detailing the structure, funding and activities of PRTs in Afghanistan. This project is the product of a Policy Research Project (PRP), a year-long graduate course at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. The PRP lets students to perform research on a real-world policy issue and strengthens research, analytical and presentation skills. The PRP is structured to allow students to serve as a consulting team for a real world client. Clients have come to expect that PRP project will provide professional, much- needed services, ranging from data collection to policy analysis.

The next chapter details project methodology. Chapter 3 gives a brief background on PRTs, while Chapter 4 provides an overview of each PRT operating in Afghanistan. Chapter 5 describes and analyzes the databases, discussing the experience of both creating and populating the database and then gives some research recommendations and possible uses for this data and information.

9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "NATO in Afghanistan." NATO . June 12, 2007. http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/reconst_develop.html (accessed March 10, 2009). 10 NATO. “NATO in Afghanistan,” 2007. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 2

Chapter 2. Methodology

In May of 2007 the Congressional Research Service contracted the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs to produce a comprehensive and verifiable database of factors contributing to the relative successes of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. This contract assigned a Policy Research Project (PRP) team to gather data on PRTs in Afghanistan since their inception in December of 2003 through April of 2008.

The PRP team underwent two distinct phases in order to complete this project. In each phase the project team divided into sub-groups to efficiently complete the necessary tasks. In the first phase the team divided into three groups: database elements, survey and contact database. The database elements produced the framework for the database categories. The survey team designed a survey to send to military and civilian PRT personnel to guide the database and learn a range of perspectives. The contacts database team acquired a list of contacts for future research to be undertaken in the second phase of the project.

In phase two of the project, the team sought to gather as many useful and verifiable database points as possible. To achieve this goal, the team divided into a U.S. group and an international group. The respective groups researched PRTs based on their commanding nation(s). The team appointed members to assess and verify each individual data point before entering the point into the database and cite all information entered into the database.

Phase I—Research and Preparation

Goals: Phase I consisted of three major goals. First, the researchers needed to make initial contacts with both U.S. and international PRT experts and personnel. Second, the researchers sought to develop a framework of what to include in the database. Third, the researchers needed to design a survey to acquire additional information from a select group of contacts to identify keys areas of interest for inclusion in the database. All team members were responsible for conducting preliminary PRT research to familiarize themselves with both the history of PRTs in Afghanistan and with current PRT structure and activities.

Teams: To achieve these goals, the research group split into three teams: the Database Elements Team to develop the framework, the Survey Team to design and conduct the survey, and the Contacts Team to identify key contacts that could help with research during the data collection process.

• Database Elements Team: The Database Elements Team determined which points of data to gather to get an accurate picture of PRT structure and activities. To do so, the team divided up into small groups to research variables on specific sectors, such as “security,” “economic development,” and “local government

interaction.” Primarily using web-based reports and sources. The major challenge for this team was to identify items that could be found across PRTs and that were quantifiable, when possible. The team worked through multiple draft databases with CRS, and defined each variable in a separate database terminology key.

• Contact Database Team: The Contact Database Team compiled a list of people the group could contact for information later in the research process. The contacts were all professionally involved in PRTs in Afghanistan, and included civilian and military personnel, those who had worked in Afghanistan, and specialists in Washington, Brussels, and elsewhere. The team found contacts by looking through reports and websites, as well as by networking through personal contacts. The major challenge for this team was to find non-U.S. contacts, especially foreign military contacts. The team compiled all contact information into a contact database document, which is attached to this report in Appendix B.

• Survey Team: The Survey Team developed and distributed an exploratory questionnaire to individuals with extensive experience with PRTs to identify key areas of future research. The survey team received training on survey techniques and developed open-ended survey questions designed to establish research interest to supplement the database elements team findings. The major challenge for this team was obtaining responses and incorporating a broad range of responses from PRT specialists into useful database elements. This team reported their findings to the class and wrote a report on the process, which is attached to this report in Appendix C.

Deliverables: At the end of Phase I, the PRP delivered a draft database and database terminology key sheet to CRS.

Phase II – Data Collection

Goals: Phase II consisted of two goals: first, the research group aimed to fill in the database developed in Phase I; second, the research group sought to produce an annotated bibliography to record sources and to ensure that the database was verifiable.

Teams: The group divided into two teams, a U.S. team and an international team. Two researchers managed the database and verified all data points as they were entered into the database. The two teams differed somewhat in how they approached their data researching efforts, but the most common strategy was to assign a specific PRT to a specific researcher. To conduct this research, group members used the Internet, contacts from the Phase I contact database, reports and other publications on PRTs in Afghanistan, and embassy staff and military personnel contacts from relevant countries.

Additional Phase II Actions: In addition to researching for database elements, the group also brought in military personnel who worked with PRTs in Afghanistan, Phillip Bookert, COL, (USA, Ret’d), Former Commander, Regional Command-West, Afghanistan and Patrick M. Hamilton, COL, USA, TXANG, Commander, Red Team, CJTF101, Afghanistan. These men helped guide researchers from an on-the-ground

4 viewpoint and briefed the team on the U.S. military’s data collection efforts. Colonel Hamilton informed the PRP that one of the biggest challenges for his team was analysis fatigue due to excessive and repetitive research being conducted on PRTs. As the research progressed, group leaders also revised the database and the dictionary to reflect the data found and to clarify unclear variable definitions. Towards the end of Phase II, the group gained access to a NATO project database, the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture, which contained detailed information on individual projects for each PRT. Information extracted from this NATO database is included in a separate, attached file and reflects projects done as of February 2009.

Deliverables: The Project Directors delivered to CRS a draft database on of the end date agreed upon in the contract, and work continued on the database through Phase III.

Phase III—Report

Goal: Phase III goals consisted of finalizing and presenting the database in an accessible and usable format. This resulted in printable data sheets for each PRT which can be found n Appendix D. The research group also wrote narrative briefs on each individual PRT, focusing on aspects not included in the database.

Deliverables: For this phase, deliverables include this report, electronic copies of the main PRT database as well as the project database. Specifically within this report there is a brief for each PRT (Chapter 4), data sheets for each PRT that were derived from the main PRT database (Appendix D), and an annotated bibliography (Appendix E).

Chapter 3. General Background on PRTs

PRT: Definition and Structure

A PRT is an integrated civil-military organization designated to stabilize and reconstruct an assigned area by supporting and improving the host nation’s governing capacity. The core objective is “to implement projects that will improve stability so that more traditional forms of development assistance can resume.”1 A PRT focuses on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction. First, a PRT aims to increase provincial stability through international military presence and to assist the host nation in ensuring national security. Second, a PRT supports the establishment and improvement of local government. In an area where government lacks legitimacy, a PRT may start stabilization activities without the presence of the host nation government until the legitimacy of the provincial government is enhanced.2 Finally, a PRT facilitates reconstruction in a given area through providing basic services including judicial oversight, health care, and education. A PRT delivers international community assistance efforts on a provincial level and usually covers one province; however, one team may be responsible for multiple provinces (PRTs Konduz and Mazar-e-Sharif) or there may be two PRTs in one province (in Paktika). PRTs operate in semi-permissive environments usually following the abatement of open hostilities.3

In terms of structure, a PRT is composed of military and civilian elements, ranging from 30 to over 400 personnel.4 The size and characteristics of each PRT are determined by those in charge a particular team, whose calculations are based on required tasks and on operational environment factors such as the security situation, development status of the province, and efficiency of local governing institutions. A civilian element provides development planning and implementation and is generally is composed of diplomatic officers, development officers, host government representatives and local support staff. The military element provides security for the PRT as well as logistics support in insecure areas.

U.S. PRTs have an Integrated Command Group (ICG) for unity of effort as well as for efficient management; this structure varies for other PRTs. The ICG consists of a senior member from each participating agency or nation. Usually, the military commander serves as commanding officer of a PRT. The command group has responsibility in making top-level decisions and in determining PRT strategies. The integrated group is necessary because of potential conflict between various participating agencies with different mandates. Beyond interagency integration efforts, the PRT works with

1 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Playbook, No.07-34, September 2007, 58. 2 United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” Pre- doctrinal Research White Paper, No.07-01, 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/provrecon_white paper.pdf (Accessed March 18, 2009). 3 CALL, Playbook, 1. 4 United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 2007. 6

international organizations and non-governmental organizations in the area to share information and to reduce redundancy of work.

According to the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, the end-state of a PRT occurs when sufficient security and public safety can be ensured by the host nation in order to support reconstruction and development.5

PRT: Mission and Goals in Afghanistan

The PRT mission in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan government to increase its governing capacity in the remote provinces of the country. The PRTs follow three elements of stabilization and reconstruction: ensuring security in the province, building local institutions, and facilitating reconstruction. Therefore, the PRTs’ success criteria in Afghanistan are enabling the Afghan government to build itself as a legitimate and credible leadership as well as to accelerate reconstruction efforts.6

PRT activities in Afghanistan focus on for security, stabilization, and reconstruction. Tasks may include patrolling, financing reconstruction and development projects, training Afghan armed forces and police, and setting up networks with the local communities. To ensure a secure environment and to protect individuals, infrastructure, and institutions, the combat force of the PRT may also provide public order and safety. For economic and social stabilization, the civilian component of the PRT often undertakes infrastructure restoration projects, including health, sanitation, transportation, communications, and education.

5 CALL, Playbook, 6. 6 Gauster, Markus. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Occasional Paper Series No. 16." George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. January 2008, 18. 7

Chapter 4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Overview

**The contents of PRT briefs do not represent first-hand knowledge, nor a comprehensive overview of US and International PRTs. PRT briefs showcase available unclassified data available up to Spring 2009.**

Contents of PRT Overview, Structure, and Funding categories match information found in the PRT Database. Full citations are available in the Bibliography of this report.

Contents of PRT Summary category represents a compilation of domestic and international news reports, press releases, U.S. and Allied government agency reports, PRT websites and newsletters, NGO and IGO reports and websites, embassy reports, and academic reports. Full citations are available both in footnotes and the Bibliography of this report.

We encourage those interested in more detailed, specific and complete information on a PRT or a particular Province in which a PRT operates to refer to the Annotated Bibliography of this report.

Canadian soldiers carry the remains of Trooper Brian Good during a ramp ceremony held on the runway of Kandahar Air Field on January 8, 2009. Good was killed by an improvised explosive device during a routine patrol in the Shahwali Kot district north of Kandahar. flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2009

United States Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The mission of the U.S. PRTs is to serve as joint civil-military organizations to promote progress in governance, security, and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The size and composition of U.S. PRTs vary depending on maturity, local circumstances, and the availability of personnel from civilian agencies.1

The 12 U.S.-led Afghanistan PRTs are located in Asadabad, Bagram, Farah, Gardez, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Khost, Mihtarlam, Nuristan, Panjshir, Qalat, and Sharan. The first of these PRTs officially established was Gardez in February 2003, and the most recent PRT was established in Nuristan in November of 2006. Two of the PRTs are located within the same province: Gardez and Sharan are both in Paktika province. The regional command for most U.S. PRTs is in Bagram, but Qalat’s regional command is in Kandahar, and Farah’s is in Herat.

Despite the fact that these PRTs are all under the command of one country, the individual briefs show that the PRTs’ focus and needs vary widely. Consequently, the United States is in a constant struggle to identify common strategies and approaches to fulfilling the PRT mission. Continuity in leadership and reliable funding sources are obstacles that seem to face all U.S. PRTs.

The descriptive data in the upper section of each brief is drawn from our PRT database.

1 U.S. Institute of Peace, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan Lessons Identified. Online. Available: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html. Accessed: April 2009. 9

Provincial Reconstruction Team Asadabad

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Kunar / Asadabad

Date Established: February 2004

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 7

Number of Attacks (to date): 536

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 89 CERP/Year: $21,600 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $53,297,667 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Elections and voter registration • Expansion of governance throughout critical districts • Focused district development • Border management • Natural resource development 2

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Kunar Province is located in a mountainous area in North-Eastern Afghanistan, along the Pakistani border. The Kunar River Valley is primarily irrigated by glaciers, local springs and snow runoff. Most of the mountains in the province are covered by forests.3

2 U. S. Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Online. Available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 3 Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Kunar Province Overview. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Kunar.html. Accessed: March 2009. 10

Demographics

The province is majority Pashtun with a long history of militant militia activity. Several different Pashtun tribes inhabit the area. Literacy is estimated at 31%.4

Security

The security situation in Kunar is better than in some other border provinces. Most incidents occur along the Pakistani border and along the Pech Valley linking two significant coalition bases. 5

LESSONS LEARNED

Various anecdotal reports have mentioned the importance of providing mobility to coalition and Afghan National Security Forces. This enables them to engage in counterinsurgency operations and connects isolated districts to the local and national government. There have been several notable projects to extend road networks and complete fords 6-7 and bridges across the rivers. Guryak Truck Bridge opening ceremony. flickr.com/photos/dvids © 2008 FUTURE OUTLOOK

In the foreseeable future the Kunar PRT will engage in projects to help secure the border. It will do this by working to “facilitate the movement of counterinsurgency operations.” The PRT will also build cooperation with and aid in the training of Afghan security and policing forces at all levels. The PRT will also continue to engage in infrastructure development projects to further encourage economic growth and “responsible natural resource exploitation.” These efforts will serve to provide new opportunities for legitimate work and to provide an attractive economic alternative to the insurgency. 8

4 Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Kunar Province Overview. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Kunar.html. Accessed: March 2009. 5 ibid. 6 Myers, Navy Lt. Neil. CENTCOM, Konar bridge unites divided districts. Online. Available: http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/konar-bridge-unites-divided-districts.html. Accessed: March 2009. 7 Public Affairs Office. ISAF, Matin bridge to connect village to Pech road. Online, Available: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/01-january/pr080117-029.html (accessed March 2009) 8 U. S. Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan . Online. Available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf. Accessed: January 2009. 11

Provincial Reconstruction Team Bagram

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Parwan / Bagram

Date Established: November 2003

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 5

Number of Attacks (to date): 51

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 63 CERP/Year: $158,900 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $11,087,025 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Construction of roads, schools, and medical clinics9 • Humanitarian and reconstruction efforts • Protect and empower women while providing resources for them • Assist Afghan National Police in taking care of villagers in the Province

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The Bagram PRT is located within the Parwan Province in Eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan. The Ghowr Band River and the Panjshir River shape Parwan’s

9 CJTF 101, Bagram Provincial Reconstruction Team Hard at Work Available. Online. Available: http://www.cjtf101.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=255 Accessed March 12, 2009. 12

topography and multiple mountain ranges surround the region. The majority of territory is arable with some areas of intense irrigation.10

Demographics/Conditions

The population of Parwan province is approximately 560,000 and is composed of Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Qizilbash, Kuchi, Hazara, and other minority groups. The primary occupations are agriculture and livestock production. Much of the population is also involved with small enterprises and industries. 11

LESSONS LEARNED

The Bagram PRT has learned that they are most effective when they receive support from the local Afghan people. The reconstruction projects have greater success and are more appreciated when locals are aware of the positive impact that the U.S. presence has on their province.12 Addressing the needs of the Afghan people through their government is the PRT’s main goal, and to that end, they are working with government officials to focus on three major areas for U.S. Army Sgt. Valentin DeLeon, a civil affairs specialist, pumps up a reconstruction: schools, clinics, and soccer ball for a child at the Kapisa Orphanage in Bagram. roads. Roads not only improve flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter © 2008 transportation, but also stimulate economic growth and opportunity. Roads give farmers easier access to important markets and unite villages through commerce.

Members of the PRT have reported the successes of the ‘contractor selection process’ in empowering the local government. By allowing the Afghan people to participate in construction projects, Afghans gain transparency and trust in the U.S war efforts. “It helps place a more vivid face on the Afghanistan nationals and helps become what its people are striving so hard to become—a country undivided.”13

10Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Parwan Province Overview. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Parwan.html. Accessed: March 2009. 11Air Force Link. Bagram PRT rebuilds Afghanistan one school at a time. Online. Available: http://www.af.mil/news/story_media.asp?id=123046392. Accessed March 2009 12 455th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs Office, Bagram Bullet, vol. 2, no. 24, (July 21,2006). Online. Available: http://www.afspa-alamo.org/Bagram%20Bullet-July21-06.pdf. Accessed March 2009. 13 Gabbard, Pvt. Tamara. CJTF 101, New Bidding Process Creating Standards Afghanistan Can Grow With (August 13,2008). Online. Available: http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/New-Bidding- Process-Creating-Standards-Afghanistan-Can-Grow-With.html. Accessed: March 2009. 13

Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Farah, Farah

Date Established: September 2005

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: West

Threat Level: 6

Number of Attacks (to date): 136

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 99 CERP/Year: $5,519,317

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $5,446,417

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

Because Western Afghanistan experiences a lower level of combat, the Farah PRT has been able to focus on stability, reconstruction, and building support for the government of Afghanistan. Building support for the government has been the primary focus, and all other PRT goals have sprung from the partnership between the PRT and the local governor. The ultimate goal is to help the government and its citizens develop the institutions, processes, and practices that will create a stable environment for the long term. The governor’s stated priorities are to positively impact health, education, and the business environment in the region through14: Salh Mohammad of Farah City registers to • Water projects vote for the next Afghan presidential • Roads election in August 2009. • Electricity flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2009

14 Pratt, Lt. Col. Leslie. American Forces Network Afghanistan, Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team Helps Maintain Peace, Stability in Afghanistan. Online. Available: http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=24657. Accessed: March 2009. 14

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Farah province is located in western Afghanistan in a partially mountainous region. The average temperature ranges from 45° F in January to 90° F in July with strong winds throughout the year.

Demographics

Farah Province has a Pashtun majority. There is also a Persian-speaking region around the capital city. Persian-speaking, nomadic Aimaks are predominant in several other areas.

Security

Being situated in western Afghanistan, Farah has experienced relatively low levels of violence in comparison to the rest of the nation; however, mountainous Eastern Farah has seen at least one US offensive against Taliban forces. There has also been a failed assassination attempt on the governor by the Taliban, and in February 2005, the Taliban killed an aid worker in northern Farah. Due to its proximity to the Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, Farah has experienced problems with roaming insurgent gangs moving through and occupying parts of the province for brief periods of time. Incidents of this type have increased as Taliban fighters face heavy pressure from ISAF offensives in the south.15

LESSONS LEARNED

Farah Province roads have improved drastically since May 2005. One major improvement was a large-scale bridge building project over the Farah Rud River. The educational system has also been greatly improved with several new girls’ schools and the Center for Excellence. If the security situation remains secure, the province has a bright future.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The high level of cooperation between the PRT and the government in this province, in addition to the stable security level overall, gives an excellent future outlook for Farah.16

15 “Farah,” Global Security.org. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/farah.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 16 “ISAF's Farah PRT transfers authority during ceremony,” Blackanthem Military News. Online. Available: http://www.blackanthem.com/News/afghanistan/ISAF-s-Farah-PRT-transfers-authority-during- ceremony15344.shtml. Accessed: March 2009. 15

Provincial Reconstruction Team Gardez

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Paktia, Gardez

Date Established: February 2003

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 7

Number of Attacks (to date): 229

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $2,984,499

Civilian: 3 NonCERP/Year: $2,974,049

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

Because of the instability in Paktia province, the primary focus of the PRT has been security. There has also been a significant focus on infrastructure development such as electricity and roads. Road construction projects benefit the region in three major ways: First, they improve infrastructure and provide Afghans with paying jobs as they are being built. Second, completed roads provide more regional mobility, which makes it easier for U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned to a Afghanis to see their government at work and to Civil Military Operations team, the predecessor to PRTs, in Gardez, Afghanistan in August 2002. influence the development of the regional flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2002 government. Third, functional roads make the province easier to police. Another PRT area of focus is education, and the Gardez PRT has built and updated schools, included female students, and integrated male and female students. Maintaining these completed development projects is another important focus.17

17 “Soldiers Inspire Growth in Gardez's Surrounding Communities,” American Forces Press Service. Online. Available: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28471. Accessed: March 2009. 16

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The area is characterized by mountainous and cavernous terrain typical of the Hindu Kush range.

Demographics

The population of Paktia province is approximately 80% Pashtun and 20% Tajik. Because the province is predominantly Pashtun and made up of tribal societies, the border with Pakistan is incredibly fluid.

Security

The province’s demographics and terrain make it difficult to secure. The province remains unstable, despite being the oldest PRT in Afghanistan. Last year, in the hotly contested Zormat district, two PRT members were killed while traveling with the district sub-governor, who was injured, but survived the attack.18 The governor of the region was successfully assassinated by a suicide bomber in 2007.

LESSONS LEARNED

As the first ever PRT, the Gardez PRT has had a steep learning curve and laid the foundation for the 26 separate PRTs in Afghanistan at present. The challenge of achieving a stable security environment while simultaneously attempting to complete development projects has helped to inform the priorities and actions of later PRTs. Despite being the longest operating PRT, the progress to date in the Paktia province is difficult to measure in the same terms as more stable provinces. The gains in development projects have been uneven, with projects being completed in times of lower violence. However, when violence spikes, the PRT must focus on security, putting other projects on hold. Despite the difficult working conditions, significant advances in education and road infrastructure have been made.19

FUTURE OUTLOOK

With continued instability in the province, the future outlook is uncertain. Improvements are slow and hard-won; however, with determination the PRT is making some strides.

18 “Fallen PRT Gardez members honored at memorial service,” Combined Joint Task Force – 101. Online. Available: http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Fallen-PRT-Gardez-members-honored-at- memorial-service.html. Accsesed: March 2009. 19 “Gardez,” Global Security. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/gardez.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 17

Provincial Reconstruction Team Ghazni

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Ghazni, Ghazni

Date Established: March 2004

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 6

Number of Attacks (to date): 398

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $32,394,967

Civilian: 3 NonCERP/Year: $32,306,067

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The main focuses of the Ghazni PRT are: • Infrastructure development • Healthcare

The PRT provides modern medical equipment to the local hospital, is building a new emergency services building, and has improved care for citizens in rural areas by donating 19 ambulances to the province. Today about 90 percent of Ghazni's population has access to basic health services – up from approximately nine percent before the fall of the Taliban. The PRT is also improving roads, which improves access to health care and links population centers to markets and services. It is providing micro-grants to small businesses, enabling them to reopen and create jobs. Finally, the PRT is building the capacity of Ghazni's public administration and supporting the provincial government’s development priorities.20

20 “PRT Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team,” Global Security. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/prt-ghazni.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 18

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The Ghazni province has undergone extreme climatic conditions in recent years. During times of drought, the flood plains were developed and built on. During times of heavy snow and flooding, there has been significant loss of property and life because old dams broke down.

Demographics

The Ghazni province is made up of a mixture of Pashtuns (approximately 55%), Hazaras (approximately 40%), Tajiks (approximately 5%), and a very small Hindu minority.21

Security

In addition to climactic and geographic

challenges, the Ghazni PRT faces security U.S. Army Lt. Col. (Dr.) Thomas Knolmayer helps an challenges common in Eastern Afghanistan. Afghan girl try on donated shoes. flickr.com/photos/dvids © 2008 Though the Taliban claims to control the province, the Afghan government is strengthening its control over its own people.

LESSONS LEARNED

The Ghazni PRT has successfully completed a significant number of diverse projects. There has been a large investment in the health sector and road infrastructure. Other projects include agricultural and cultural improvements. An emergency facility has been added to the local hospital, two roads were completed in Ghazni city, the Returnees and Refugees building and a Mosque in Ghazni city were both refurbished, and seeds and fertilizer have been distributed throughout the province.22

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The outlook for this PRT is fairly positive. Despite being in the insecure eastern region, the PRT has affected positive change through infrastructure projects and will continue to do so if the security situation in the province does not deteriorate.

21 Afghanistan Information Management Services. Online. Available: http://www.aims.org.af/sroot.aspx?seckeyo=52. Accessed: March 2009. 22 “Ghazni,” Global Security. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ghazni.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 19

Provincial Reconstruction Team Jalalabad

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Jalalabad / Nangarhar

Date Established: January 200423

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: RC East

Threat Level: 6

Number of Attacks (to date): 292

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $107,300 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $21,820,334 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS • Elections and Voter Registration • Expansion of governance throughout critical districts • Nangarhar, Inc. (a commerce and industrial focus zone) • Comprehensive Focused District Development (Kus, Konar, Jalalabad, Beshood) • Pakistan Border Management • Sustaining Progress in Counter-Narcotics 24

23 “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings Institute (March 3, 2009), p. 20 23 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), p. 78. 24 Ibid. 20

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Two primary rivers, the Kabul and the Kunar flow through Jalalabad Province. The Spin Ghar and Safed Mountain Ranges lie along the southern border. Forested areas include the mountains and the Dara-I-Nur District in north. The eastern Mahmund Dara District contains the important Kyber Pass, while the center of the province is dominated by range land, bare soil, and rocky outcrop.

Demographics

The estimated population of Jalalabad is 1.3 million, Only169,000 live in urban areas. The province is 90.1% Pashtun, with small groups of Pashai and Arabs.25

LESSONS LEARNED

Nangarhar is extremely important to Afghanistan’s economy because it provides the primary licit trade route with Pakistan at the Torkem border crossing. The province, has one of the most educated populations in the country, and is considered one of the “breadbaskets” of the country due its fertile land. Nangarhar, which produces 15- 20% of the world’s heroin, is also notorious for its history of supporting insurgents.26 The U.S. Government reported that in

2008, 18 provinces earned a U.S. Army Spc. Julie Robinson of the Jalalabad PRT talks to Afghan children total of $28 million through the during a humanitarian aid mission. flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea © 2004 Good Performers Initiative.27

25 “Provincial Overviews: Nangarhar,” Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/LeaderProfiles/Gul%20Agha%20Sherzai%20Profile.pdf. Accessed : March 2009 26 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, CT-290 (Testimony presented before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on September 5, 2007) 27 Catherine, Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2009), p. 51. 21

Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Khost / Khost

Date Established: March 2004

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 8

Number of Attacks (to date): 446

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $41,400 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $18,004,799 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Elections & voter registration • Expansion of governance throughout critical districts (Matun, Mandozai, Gorbuz, Tani, and Terezai) • Khowst-Gardez road • Border management • Natural resource management28

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Khost is located 100 kilometers south of Kabul in Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan on a plateau that extends eastward to the Pakistan border. Since 2001, Khost has been

28 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), p85. 22

home to both US maneuver forces, which wage war against insurgents, and to a US-led PRT which assists with reconstruction efforts. 29

Security

Insurgent threats subsided in 2007, attracting IGOs, NGOs, and international investors. Anticipated increases in insurgent activity through 2008 and into 2009 may compromise progress for economic development for PRT Khost.30

LESSONS LEARNED

PRT Khost is based in Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman near Khost City and tasked with distributing humanitarian aid, mentoring local government officials, planning for construction, and providing security for larger events. The PRT offers services provided by Army National Guard units, yet other service branches participate in reconstruction missions.31

Sustained nonviolence in Khost warranted a visit from US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in late 2007 to recognize reconstruction progress and highlight the accomplishments of PRT Khost; Secretary Gates commented on the “model of concerted counterinsurgency efforts.”32

Progress in Khost frequently serves as an exemplary PRT model due to the Province’s transition from an insurgent-riddled Taliban stronghold in 2001 to a relatively stable US- led reconstruction 2007.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

PRT Khost collaborated with local officials to draft a five year plan for Khost addressing six key areas: education, healthcare, water, energy, reconstruction, and economic development in collaborative efforts with UN, U.S. Army Spc. Mark Suggs gives medical aid to a Asian Development Bank, USAID, and other young child outside Khost. flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea © 2002 IGOs/NGOs.33

29 “Khost,” Global Security. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/khowst_afld.htm. Accessed: January 21, 2009. 30 Ibid. 31 Clare, Pfc. Micah E. “Khowst PRT Winning the Fight in Afghanistan.” Online. Available: http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/05/30/3404-khowst-prt-winning-the-fight-in-afghanistan/. Accessed: January 21, 2009. 32 Miles, Donna. “Gates Lauds Progress in Afghanistan’s Khowst Province.” American Forces Press Service. Online. Available: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48314. Accessed: January 30, 2009. 23

Provincial Reconstruction Team Mitharlam

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Laghman / Mitharlam

Date Established: April 200534

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 6

Number of Attacks (2008): 162

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $32,100 / 2008

Civilian: 3 NonCERP/Year: $72,687,950 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

According to the Department of Defense, “The following areas have been designated by U.S. Government leadership in Afghanistan as priority efforts for Laghman: • Elections and Voter Registration • Expansion of Governance throughout Critical Districts” 35

CLIMATE

Laghman Province is a predominantly mountainous region, with the Kashmund range in the southeast and the Kuhestan range in the north. Major rivers include the Alingar, Alishing, and Kabul Rivers, which allow for intensively cultivated land along river valleys. The mountains are surrounded by forested areas, and there is a lake in the

33 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), p86. 34 Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, p. 20. 35 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181) p. 79 24

Qarghayi district.36

Demographics The population of Laghman Province is 37,810, of which only 4,000 live in urban areas. About half of the population is ethnic Pashtun, with another 21.7% Tajik and 27% Pashai and Kata. Less than a third of the population is literate.37

Security The threat level in Laghman Province is significant due to the activities of Taliban and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), who use the province as a transit into other provinces. Alishing and Dawlat Shah districts are particularly vulnerable to security incidents. A total of 11 security incidents have been reported by BBC Monitoring in 2007; seven of which involved IED attacks. Only one was a suicide attack.38 U.S. Army Spc. Zico Gaynor, with the Mitharlam police mentoring team, help rebuilds a guard tower. LESSONS LEARNED flickr.com/photos/dvids © 2008

U.S. assistance to Laghman has included planting more than 170,000 orchard trees, distributing more than 1,200 metric tons of improved wheat seed, training over 760 women in veterinary practices to improve the health of local livestock, and building and rehabilitating 20 schools and eight health clinics. The U.S. has given approximately $23.6 million USD in assistance to the province since 2002.

36 “Provincial Overviews: Laghman,” Naval Postgraduate School Program (NPS) for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Laghman_Provincial_Overview_CCS. pdf. Accessed March 2009. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid,.p.5 25

Provincial Reconstruction Team Nuristan

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Nuristan / Qala Gush

Date Established: November 2006

Lead Nation: USA

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 7

Number of Attacks (to date): 66

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $5,400 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $24,686,202 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Elections & voter registration • Expansion of governance through critical districts • Pakistan border management • Natural resources39

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Nuristan Province is located in the South Hindu Kush valleys, spanning the basins of the Alingar, Pech, Landai Sam, and Kunar Rivers to the northeast. PRT Nuristan operates from neighboring Kunar Province at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Kala Gush.

Demographics

39 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181) p81. 26

Over 300,000 residents are primarily employed in the traditional Afghan occupations of agriculture, animal husbandry, and day labor. Education on community-based sustainable use of timber and gem resources is available. Radio coverage extends to 75 percent of the population with messages in local languages that educate and connect communities with the national government.

Security ISAF soldiers walking to meet a goat herder in the village of Paruns, Nuristan. Nuristan Province experiences constant flickr.com/photos/dvids © 2008 insurgent activity. Varying levels of insurgent activity since 2005 has prohibited many PRT development and reconstruction efforts. According to a United Nation’s report, Nuristan is one of Afghanistan’s poorest and most remote provinces. Most NGOs do not work in Nuristan due to lack of security and infrastructure. Inhospitable mountainous terrain, widespread poverty, and constant insurgent activity create one of the most challenging environments for US-led PRTs.40

LESSONS LEARNED

Recent PRT Nuristan projects include the construction of a new Nurgram Ministry of Justice building, medical outreach in Dareng Village, and ongoing construction of a school in Kowtalay Village. PRT Nuristan and Dyncorp International provided police force training in 2007. PRT Nuristan still hosts regular shoe drives for local children.41 Road construction encourages small business and independent initiatives, and as a result, Nuristan producer associations are moving goods to regional markets.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

US troops abandoned areas of Nuristan due to increased insurgent activity in mid-2008. 42 ANSF capability has improved since then, with the ANP assuming their roles and responsibilities, and the ANA extending security operations out from major FOBs.43

40 “Afghanistan: Focus on the Province of Nuristan,” Center for International Disaster Information. Online. Available: http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian//hsr/centralasia/ixl100.html. Accessed: February 15 2009. 41 “Nuristan PRT holds shoe-drive for Afghan children.” Task Force Duke Public Affairs Office 3rd Brigade Comabt Team, 1st Infantry Division. Online. Available: http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Nuristan-PRT-holds-shoe-drive-for-Afghan- children.html. Accessed: February 15, 2009. 42 Shah, Amir. “U.S. troops pull out of Afghan base.” The Associated Press. Online. Available: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080716.wusafgh0716/BNStory/Afghanistan/ho me. Accessed: October 28, 2008. 43 Caligiuri, Army Staff Sgt. Giovanni. “Nuristan PRT brings professional training to ANP,” Blackanthem Military News. Online. Available: 27

Provincial Reconstruction Team Panjshir

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Panjshir / Jabal o-Saraj

Date Established: November 2005

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: Not Rated

Number of Attacks (to date): 1

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 55 CERP/Year: $22,200 / 2008

Civilian: 4 NonCERP/Year: $6,851,425 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Civilian-led development model run by the State Department representative • Developing transportation links • Improving healthcare services • Elections and voter registration • Natural resource development 44

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Panjshir Province is centered on the Panjshir Valley and River. The Valley is surrounded by high mountains to the north and south with snow-cap year round.

http://www.blackanthem.com/News/Allies_20/Nuristan_PRT_brings_professional_training_to_ANP5055.s html. Accessed: March 2009. 44 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), pg 80. 28

Demographics

The province is majority Tajik with Hazara, Pashai, Nuristani and Pashtun minorities. Literacy is estimated at 27%.45

Security

Panjshir is known as one of the safest provinces in Afghanistan, with no reported attacks within the last year. Panjshir was a center of resistance against both the Soviets and a base for the Northern Alliance during the Taliban era.46

LESSONS LEARNED

Panjshir PRT’s unique civilian leadership model may be emulated in other low-violence areas.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Panjshir PRT will work to sustain the security environment here by continuing to provide development guidance. The PRT’s near-term goals include completing several major road and communication infrastructure projects, encouraging greater participation in elections and improving the ability of local government to plan and administrate indigenous development projects.47

45 “Panjshir Province Overview.” Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Panjshir%20Summary.pdf. Accessed: March 2009 46 “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings Institute (March 3, 2009). 47 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), pg. 80. 29

Provincial Reconstruction Team Qalat

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Zabul / Qalat

Date Established: April 2004

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: South

Threat Level: 8

Number of Attacks (to date): 251

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 99 CERP/Year: $43,900 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $2,263,000 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Cooperation with Romanian forces • Improving local governance reach and legitimacy 48 • Developing transportation links • Improving water infrastructure for sanitation and agriculture

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Zabul is a southern province adjacent to Kandahar Province and the Pakistani border. The Arghandab and Tarnak Rivers are two major waterways flowing through the province.

48ISAF Public Information Office. CENTCOM. Small Efforts Make Big Difference in Zabul. Online. Available: http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/small-efforts-make-big-difference-in-zabul.html. Accessed: March 2009. 30

The provincial capital of Qalat lies on the major ring road through Afghanistan. Qalat and the road lie in the province’s flatlands; the rest of the province is mountainous.49

Demographics

Zabul is majority Pashtun, with several major tribes playing a role. Literacy is extremely low in the province, estimated at 1%.

Security

Zabul province’s proximity to the Pakistani border and to other less stable provinces has contributed to number of attacks experienced. Most incidents occur in border districts, and along the road. While opium production is not a big problem in Zabul, opium trafficking is.50

LESSONS LEARNED

Zabul PRT has focused on developing Qalat city and the ring road. NATO-ISAF estimates that only 50% of the provincial population lives in these areas. The PRT will need to move out into other districts to engage the rest of the population in civil-military cooperation.51

FUTURE OUTLOOK

According to the Department of Defense’s “Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afganistan” January 2009 report, Qalat PRT will continue to conduct civil-military operations to further build the legitimacy of the Afghan government. The PRT will attempt to meet that goal through, “promoting good governance and justice, supporting and enabling [an] effective Afghanistan security apparatus and facilitating reconstruction, development and economic growth” by funding and Soldiers from the Qalat PRT speak with a village elder. implementing a variety of specific projects flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter © 2008 and activities. 52

49 Provincial Overviews: Zabul,” Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Zabul_Prov_Overview_CCS.pdf. Accessed : March 2009 . 50 ibid. 51 ibid. 52 DOD Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), pg 87 31

Provincial Reconstruction Team Sharan

PRT OVERVIEW

Province/City: Paktika / Sharan

Date Established: October 2004

Lead Nation: United States

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 7

Number of Attacks (to date): 229

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 88 CERP/Year: $10,450 / 2008

Civilian: 2 NonCERP/Year: $2,974,049 / 2008

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Implementing construction and humanitarian assistance projects53 • Extending the reach of the local government • Conducting various projects in the education, healthcare, and agriculture sectors

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Paktika Province is a high desert area. The lack of irrigation makes the land extremely arid. The terrain affects the farming industry and about 95% of the province functions from subsistence farming. Crops grown include wheat, sorghum, nuts, and fruits.

Infrastructure Conditions

53 U.S. Institute of Peace Afghanistan Experience Project. “Interview #42”. Online. Available: http://www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/42.pdf, p.2. Accessed April 3, 2009

Education infrastructure within the province is abysmal. It is reported that there are 352 recognized schools but only 32 school buildings. There is no indication of an electrical grid, and three clinics serve hundreds of thousands of people each. One-third of all children die in the province before age five54.

Security

Paktika Province borders Pakistan and is therefore a target for Taliban activity. The large Taliban presence limits NGO work in the province. Taliban propaganda about their ability to prevent meaningful development has deterred NGOs from coming to the province, and the Taliban have created the impression among locals that working for a PRT is a dangerous and unworthy endeavor. 55

LESSONS LEARNED

According to a political adviser for the provincial Governor, the most prevalent recommendation made regarding PRT Sharan is the “need for a more reliable stream of funding.”56 In order to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the PRT, greater financial commitments must be made. Additionally, there must be greater representation from the Afghan people within the PRT. There is not a strong correlation between PRTs, the Afghan government, and the Afghan civilians. Moreover, a state representative who worked in the PRT stated that one PRT is not enough for the many and varied tasks at hand, and they need help from NGOs. Having a PRT in each district would allow for greater impact.57

FUTURE OUTLOOK

PRT Sharan’s identity is constantly evolving, and though they have made great progress, there is still much work to be done. PRT Sharan will not be successful unless locals have a strong understanding of their own government at the national level. If Americans wish to empower the Afghan government, they must help it become an active force in the lives of villagers. Afghan ministry representatives work at the district level, but are not directly integrated into the PRT structure. They are consulted for relevant PRT projects, but are otherwise not involved. The priority for PRT Sharan is therefore to link the PRT with the national government, which will build trust among rural villagers for their nation’s leadership.58

54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 U.S. Institute of Peace Afghanistan Experience Project. “Interview #38.”Online. Available: http://www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/38.pdf, p.1. Accessed April 3, 2009 p. 1 57 Ibid. p.19-20

International Provincial Reconstruction Teams

While PRTs were initially U.S.-led, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created by a UN mandate, assumed command over all PRTs as of October 5, 2006. Individual NATO member states and other allies lead and structure PRTs, and the non- U.S. PRT leaders include: Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Each nation varies greatly in its strategies toward leading the PRT, establishing benchmarks, and determining year-to-year priorities. All PRTs face different security situations, not to mention constituencies at home who are interested in different levels of results. ISAF PRTs are “under ‘national restraints’, restricting the range of security related measures that can be undertaken” in bolstering the PRT.59 There are a small number of U.S. military and civilian personnel on several of the international PRTs. Most international PRTs are focused on building infrastructure, varying from water, to police, schools, hospitals, and maintaining security situations.

The individual PRT stories will tell of the varying province’s demographics, security demands, and of particular infrastructure weaknesses that each PRT is working to address. International PRTs have been lead by nations for different amounts of time, with different end points in mind, and thus all have very different structures and focuses.

The descriptive data in the upper section of each brief is drawn from our PRT database.

59 USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment. Online. Available: http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnadg252.pdf. Accessed: March 2009.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Bamyan

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Bamyan Province / Bamyan

Date/Country Established: August 2003 / New Zealand

Date/Current Lead Nation: August 2003 / New Zealand

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: 4 (2007)

Number of Attacks: 8 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 129

Civilian: Not Reported NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Representatives: New Zealand Police, NZAID representative, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Agency for International Development

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The focus of the Bamyan PRT as outlined by the New Zealand Defense Forces is to:

• Maintain security in Bamyan Province, • Provide assistance to local and provincial governments, and • Identify, prepare, and provide management for NZAID projects in the region

The PRT works with the Provincial Governors, district sub-governors, and Afghan National Police to deliver services to the province.79

79 New Zealand Defense Force, NZ PRT: New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team Twelve. Online. Available: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 35

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The Bamyan Province is located in the Central Highlands Region. It is very mountainous terrain; Bamyan Village is approximately 2,600 meters above sea level. It is a very dry climate with harsh winters. 80

Demographics

The primary ethnic groups include 67% Hazara, 16% Sadat, and 16% Tajik, and a majority of the population is Shiite Muslim.81

Security

According to a Naval Postgraduate School report, “Bamyan is one of the safest provinces in Afghanistan.”82 There are very few instances of attacks on the PRT. The population of the province has a comparatively high level of education, and women participate in public life. Due to their history of persecution, the Hazara are tolerant of other religions and ethnic groups.83

LESSONS LEARNED

The province is comparatively secure, and PRT is completing projects. The PRT has constructed police stations and police district headquarters, purchased vehicles and radio equipment for Afghan National Police,84 and hosted Provincial Justice Training to maintain this level of security85. Development projects include general bridge repair, village water wells and water reticulation, construction of schools, and a new hospital ward and equipment for Bamyan Hospital.86

80 New Zealand Defense Force, Fact Sheet: Overview of Bamyan Province. Online. Available: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/bamian-overview.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 81 “Provincial Overviews: Bamyan,” Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Bamyan%20 Executive%20Summary.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 New Zealand Defense Force, Projects in Bamyan Province. Online. Available: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/projects.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 85 Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Special Report Bamyan Provincial Justice Training-Gender Justice. Online. Available: http://www.jssp-afghanistan.com/Reports%20and%20Publications/Special_ Report_Bamyan_PJT_NOV_2008.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 86 New Zealand Defense Force, Projects in Bamyan Province. Online. Available: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/projects.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 36

Provincial Reconstruction Team Chaghcharan

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Ghowr / Chaghcharan

Date/Country Established: June 2005 / Lithuania

Date/Current Lead Nation: June 2005 / Lithuania

Regional Command: West

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: 36 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 180 (2008) NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 12 (2008)

Representatives: U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

Lithuania’s PRT policy has focused on reconstruction as well as developing the PRT. This is the first attempt for Lithuania to execute civil- military operation outside of the country.87 The PRT focuses on reconstruction and development efforts and building a close relationship with community members. Chaghcharan PRT is also focusing on interactions with local communities, A local village woman speaks to a Lithuanian soldier including provincial officials and Afghan citizens from the Chaghcharan PRT. through development projects and donations. flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2008

87 Nima Abbaszadeh and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, (Princeton: Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008), 36.

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Ghowr province is located in remote western Afghanistan with approximately 600,000 inhabitants.

Demographics

The population in the province is majority Tajik. Other ethnicities include Hazara, Aimak, Uzbek and Pashtun. Primary agricultural activities include animal husbandry, opium cultivation, wheat, barley, and sesame. The province is one of the poorest provinces in Afghanistan; at least two-thirds of the population depends on outside support for survival.88

Security

A lack of infrastructure hinders the province from becoming an avenue of transport of illegal narcotics.

PRT Structure

Chaghcharan PRT consists of multinational forces, including Ukrainians, Danish, Croatians, Georgians, and U.S. soldiers.89 The PRT is structured in this way to facilitate a future handover to another country.90 The civilian component of the PRT includes doctors, political representatives, development advisors, police officer advisors, and diplomatic representatives.

LESSONS LEARNED

Chaghcharan PRT has built a good relationship with provincial officials as well as Afghan citizens through providing aid and equipment.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Lithuania’s participation in the ISAF mission is expected to last until the current NATO ISAF mandate expires in 2010.91

88 Nima Abbaszadeh and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, 39. 89 Ministry of National Defense Republic of Lithuania, “8th rotation of Lithuanian peacekeepers took over the Afghanistan mission,” News Archives. Online. Available: http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/174041/. Accessed March 2009. 90 Nima Abbaszadeh and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, 37 91 Ibid. 38

Provincial Reconstruction Team Feyzabad

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Badakhshan / Feyzabad

Date/Country Established: September 2004 / Germany

Date/Current Lead Nation: September 2004 / Germany

Regional Command: North

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: Not Reported

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 310 NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 21 (Kunduz PRT)

Representatives: German Foreign Office, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, German Technical Cooperation, German Development Service, German Development Bank, and Europol

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The primary function of the German-led, Feyzabad PRT is to provide a stable and secure environment for reconstruction and development, all other provincial activities take-off from this primary launching point.92 Additionally, the German Bundeswehr (Federal Defense Force) states that the Feyzabad PRT helps to extend the influence of the central government of Afghanistan to the northeastern parts of the country.93 To promote confidence-building and cooperation with the Afghans, the Feyzabad PRT carries out

92 The Bundeswehr, ISAF PRT Feyzabad. Online. Available: http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLN _SJdw2xBMlB2EGu-pFw0aCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUAy6QHdQ!!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdy Evd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82XzFMX0VUQQ!!. Accessed: 11 March 2009. 93 Ibid. 39

“quick-impact” projects to improve the living conditions of Afghans by ensuring security, improving economic development and good governance.94

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The Badakhshan province is located in northeastern Afghanistan and consists of 28 districts. The terrain in Badakhshan is generally mountainous since the province is the cross-section of two mountain ranges, the Pamir and Hindu Kush.95 Overlooking Badakhshan province and the Tajik‐Afghan border. Demographics Jonathan Lee © 2008

Since the province is bordered by Tajikistan (and Pakistan and China), the predominant ethnic group in the province are Tajiks, followed by Uzbeks. There are almost 820,000 people in the province, over 95% of them live in rural districts, while the remaining live in urban areas.96

Security

The security situation in the province is one of the safest regions in the country, with the lowest Taliban presence, however the considerable poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking along the Tajik-Afghan border presents potential security risks.97

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Germans, have learned through their experience managing PRTs like the Feyzabad team, that while much has been achieved through economic reform, building schools, and improving the security situation, more work needs to be done. Regional Command North encompasses massive space, consisting of nine provinces, but only five PRTs. The German government, acting as the regional commander, has realized that the provinces without PRTs are not developing like their neighbors and have launched Provincial Advisory Teams (PAT) to provide aid to the neglected provinces.

94 Bundesregierung, FAQs. Online. Available: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2008/Afghanistan/2007-08-23-faq- afghanistan.html#doc380332bodyText10. Accessed: 11 March 2009. 95 Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Provincial Profile Badakhshan. Online. Available: http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/ProvincialProfiles/Badakhshan.pdf. Accessed: 11 March 2009. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 40

Provincial Reconstruction Team Herat

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Herat / Herat

Date/Country Established: December 2003 / USA

Date/Current Lead Nation: April 2005 / Italy

Regional Command: West

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: 100

STRUCTURE FUNDING

98 99 Military: Approximately 270 NonCERP/Year: €20.3 million / 2006

Civilian: Less than 10 100

Representatives: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and The Italian Development Cooperation

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

According to the Italian Ministry of Defense, the Herat province has significant “geo- strategic importance” as the province essentially stands between Afghanistan and Iran.101 The Italian defense ministry asserts that their “national strategic objective is to support the process of NATO expansion in Afghanistan to the progressive stabilization of the country, confirming the commitment of the international scene and protecting the national interests (economic and foreign policy) in the area.”102

98 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,” The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Online. Available: http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf. Accessed March 2009. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Military Operations, “Mission,” Italian Ministry of Defense, Online. Available: http://www.difesa.it/Operazioni+Militari/operazioni+in+atto/Afghanistan+PRT+-+FSB/Missione.htm. Accessed March 11, 2009. 102 “Provincial Profile Herat,” Afghanistan Investment Support Agency. Online. Available: http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/ProvincialProfiles/Herat.pdf. Accessed March 11, 2009. 41

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Herat provides part of the western Afghanistan border to Iran and Turkmenistan. The terrain features relatively flat land throughout the province except for the western outliers of the Hindu Kush mountain range in the east. The Harirud River is an important geographical feature; Herat city occupies the largest oasis in the province.

Demographics

The most prominent ethnic groups in Herat are the Tajiks and Durrani Pashtuns, but semi-nomadic Dari-speaking people live in the deserts and mountains. The population of the province numbers just over 1.5 million, while Herat city has almost 350,000 inhabitants.103 Because of the province’s proximity to Iran, its culture is dominated by Persian influences.

Security

The security situation in Herat is reasonably well-contained compared to other provinces in the country; the situation can be described as “flourishing and has acceptable conditions of stability and security.” However, Herat also faces significant security threats due to the large-scale drug trafficking of opium and heroin into Iran.104

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Italian Development Cooperation has commissioned and committed to the following projects in the province on Herat: • Rehabilitation of Urban Infrastructure • Urgent Intervention to Assist Vulnerable Displaced Persons • Supporting Vulnerable Populations with Income Generation and Food Self- Sustenance An Italian soldier delivers donated school supplies to students at a • Social Re-Integration of children’s school in Herat. flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2008 Expelled Afghan Refugees from Iran

103 Military Operations, “General,” Italian Ministry of Defense. Online. Available: http://www.difesa.it/Operazioni+Militari/operazioni+in+atto/Afghanistan+PRT+-+FSB/. Accessed 11 March 2009. 104 Ibid. 42

Provincial Reconstruction Team Kandahar

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Kandahar / Kandahar

Date/Country Established: December 2003 / United States

Current Lead Nation: August 2005 / Canada

Regional Command: South

Number of Attacks: Not Reported

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 330 NonCERP: $1.9 billion, as of Nov. 2008105

Civilian: 25

Representatives: 50 Development Specialists

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

• Maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police and supporting efforts in the areas of justice and corrections. • Provide jobs, education, and essential services, like water. • Provide humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees. • Polio eradication106 CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Kandahar is the second largest province in Afghanistan, with close to 1 million people, the majority of whom are Pashtun. Kandahar province is lacking in natural resources, the only resource being Gypsum mines. The Dahla Dam, formerly used as a source of power generation, is now just used for water supply, as there has been a drought. The primary

105 Government of Canada, Canadian Statement on the Situation in Afghanistan. Online. Available: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2008/2008_11_14.aspx. Accessed: March 2009. 106 Ibid. 43

agricultural products in Kandahar are field crops and orchards, all of which have been affected by the drought.

Demographics

323,900 people live in urban areas like Kandahar City, and the total population of the province is 913,900.107

Security

Security in Kandahar has deteriorated, with increasing numbers of Taliban militant attacks in late 2008. Civilian and military casualties were at their highest in late 2008 since 2001.108 Such unstable conditions make it hard to build human capital in the region.

LESSONS LEARNED

Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan have involved supporting training, infrastructure, and mentoring projects to help create self-sustaining government structures. Over time, Canada has added more soldiers and specialists to their efforts, acknowledging the difficulty of creating such structures anew. The PRT has also learned to support local traditions, involving themselves in gift-giving to poorer citizens during Ramadan.109 The Canadian PRT has had success in working with other aid agencies.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Canada is projected to remain in Afghanistan until 2011, guided by the Afghanistan Compact, a “five-year blueprint for coordinating the work of the Afghan government and 60 United Nations and international partners in the areas of development, governance, and security.”110 There are many development opportunities in Kandahar, including improving water efficiency, dairy, fish farming, and poultry development, replanting orchards, and developing business centers.111

107 “Kandahar Province Overview.” Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Kandahar_Provincial_Overview_Jan09. pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 108 “Kandahar security worsened in late 2008: Canada” Reuters. Online. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5236YL20090305?feedType=RSS&feedName=world News. Accessed: March 2009. 109 Government of Canada, Building Relationships at Eid-al-Fitr. Online. Available: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/stories-reportages/kprt-eprk_2008_09.aspx?lang=eng. Accessed: March 2009. 110 Government of Canada, Kandahar Development Results- May 2008. Online. Available: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/projects-projets/key_facts-faits_cles.aspx?lang=eng. Accessed: March 2009. 111 Regional Rural Economic Regeneration Strategies (RRERS) “Provincial Profile: Kandahar.” Online. Available: http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/ProvincialProfiles/Kandahar.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 44

Provincial Reconstruction Team Konduz

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Konduz Province / Konduz

Date/Country Established: January 2004 / United States

Date/Current Lead Nation: January 2004 / Germany

Regional Command: North

Threat Level: 5 (2007)

Number of Attacks: 125 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 400 (330 German, 70 ISAF) NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 24

Representatives: German Foreign Office, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, German Technical Cooperation, German Development Service, German Development Bank, German Police, U.S. Department of State

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The PRT prioritizes diplomatic efforts, Afghan security sector reform, disarmament and demobilization of local militias and warlords, and long-term economic development. It works closely with local Afghan power brokers and international organizations in the province, as well as German NGOs associated with ministries represented on the PRT. 112

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The Konduz PRT operates in two provinces in Northeast Afghanistan: Konduz and Takhar. Both provinces border Tajikistan and rely heavily on agriculture. Kunduz

112 Gauster, Markus. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Occasional Paper Series No. 16." George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. pg 24. January 18 2009. 45

Province covers 78,827 square kilometers of highlands.113 Takhar Province covers 12,376 square kilometers. Over half of the area is mountainous.114

Demographics

Konduz province has a population of 773,000. The largest ethnic groups are Uzbek, Turkmen, Pashtun and Hazara. The city of Konduz is the sixth-largest in Afghanistan with a population of 95,000.115 Takhar’s population is 830,319. The largest ethnic groups are Uzbek and Tajik.

Security

In 2008, the Afghan Ministry of Health named A German soldier overlooks the construction of a bridge. Kunduz and Takhar as two of ten Northern flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2007 provinces where polio had been eradicated – progress that was attributed to the low levels of violence as compared other parts of Afghanistan.116 However, the number of attacks in Konduz increased nearly three-fold in 2008, while it remained essentially unchanged in Takhar.117

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

A study by the Woodrow Wilson Center outlines several criticisms of German PRTs: self-imposed restraints reduce effectiveness; a large bureaucratic structure reacts slowly to changes on the ground; the PRT refuses to intervene to protect civilians; and it is too close to local warlords.118 The Wilson report found that the German government has generally been pleased with the PRT due to improvements on the ground and in interagency cooperation in Berlin. Konduz residents reported improvements in “water, sanitation education, and roads,” and attributed these developments to international assistance efforts, including the PRT.119

113 “Konduz: Provincial Profile.” Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: National Area-Based Development Programme. Online. Available: http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Kunduz%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf. Accesssed: March 2009. 114 “Takhar: Provincial Profile.” Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: National Area-Based Development Programme. Online. Available: http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Takhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf. Accessed : March 2009. 115 GlobalSecurity.org. “Afghanistan - Urban Areas” Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/urban.htm. Accessed: April 2009. 116 IRIN. “ Afghanistan: Polio Virus Eradicated in North, Virulent in South.” Online. Available: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=80555. Accessed: April 2009. 117 Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. p.19. 118 Gauster, 27 and 38. 119 Abbaszadeh, Nima, et al. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Princeton: Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008, 30. 46

Provincial Reconstruction Team Lashkar Gah

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Helmand / Lashkar Gah

Date/Country Established: 2004 / United States

Date/Current Lead Nation: April 2006 / United Kingdom

Regional Command: South

Threat Level: 9

Number of Attacks: 2515

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: Not Reported NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 28

Representatives:

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The Lashkar Gah PRT has accomplished a variety of projects from 2006 to the present, with a focus on governance, education, health, and economic development projects. School construction has enabled more students to enroll than ever before, due in part to Danish financial support of six million British Pounds in 2008. There are district governors in more than half of Helmand’s thirteen districts along with designated offices in five districts to support civil servants and staff.120

The Civil-Military Mission in Helmand (CMMH) is used to refer to the wider body consisting of the PRT and the Task Force Helmand Brigade HQ, which are co-located in Lashkar Gah and work closely together. The PRT has approximately 80 civilian and 40 military staff.121 Smaller stabilization teams works in the outer regions of the province. The PRT is funded by the U.K., Danish, and Estonian governments through their

120 United Kingdom, Foreign and Common Wealth Office. UK in Afghanistan Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Team. Online. Available: http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with- afghanistan/prt-helmand/overview-prt-helmand. Accessed: February 27, 2009. 121 Ibid. 47

associated ministries, such as the U.K.’s Department for International Development. The projects budget for the PRT in 2008 was twenty-nine million pounds.122

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Pakistan lies along Helmand Province’s southern border, and the province stretches to within 100 kilometers of Iran. It is among the largest of Afghanistan’s southwestern provinces.

Demographics

The province of Helmand has a population of approximately 1.4 million.123 The population is a mix of ethnic groups ranging from Pashtun, Hazari, and Tajiks. Most reside in Lashkar Gah.

Security

The security situation in Helmand province and the level of safety for the native people, as well as for foreign workers, remains inconsistent and poor. IED attacks and suicide bombings continue, with the majority of risk occurring along the main roadway linking the PRT of Lashkar Gah to Kandahar. The British government and its military continue to fight a widely publicized mission against opium production, illicit trade, and insurgents. British Royal Marines on patrol in the Nad‐e Ali District of Helmand Province. flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2008 LESSONS LEARNED

Poppy production and general security will continue to influence the future outlook for the PRT in Helmand. The PRT as well as others will continue to provide assistance where they can to mitigate poppy production. In autumn 2008, the PRT distributed wheat to over 30,000 farmers, assisted by the DFID, and USAID.124 Overall, security threats in the region will continue to plague the productivity of the PRT as long as military forces continue to face insurgents and attacks are prevalent.

122 Ibid. 123 United Kingdom, Foreign and Common Wealth Office. U.K. Provincial Reconstruction Team – Lashkar Gah. Online. Available: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/afghanistan- reconstruction/helmand/uk-prt. Accessed: February 27, 2009. 124 Ibid. 48

Provincial Reconstruction Team Logar

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Logar / Shank Base

Date/Country Established: March 2008 / Czech Republic

Date/Current Lead Nation: March 2008 / Czech Republic

Regional Command: East

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: 128 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 275 NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 9

Representatives: Not Reported

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The Logar PRT strives to contribute to the development of Logar Province and implement projects that support Afghan development. Specific priorities include:

• Improving levels of health and education • Development of agriculture • Sustainable use of natural resources • Strengthening and building the capacity of the provincial government • Assist in training the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army125

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

125 Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Logar, Afghanistan. Online. Available: http://www.mzv.cz/prtlogar/cz/kontingent_armady_cr/ukoly_kontingentu_acr/index.html (Translated using Google Translator). Accessed March 2009. 49

Logar province is located in the Logar River Valley. The Spin Mountain range surrounds the province to the East and South. Logar Valley is irrigated for dry-land farming.126

Demographics

The primary ethnic groups include Tajik, Hazara, Pashtun, Kuchi, Wardaki, Khogiani. Sunni Muslims comprise the primary religious group.127

Security

The threat level was considered moderate in 2007, and the security situation has deteriorated considerably in 2008.128 The Logar PRT has been repeatedly attacked by insurgents. On April 30, 2008, four PRT members were injured and one was killed by an IED explosion.129 Seven PRT members were injured in an attack in October 2008. The provincial governor of Logar Province was assassinated by the Taliban on September 13, 2008.130

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Logar PRT has been in operation for one year. In that time, 14 reconstruction projects have been completed. An additional 43 projects are currently in progress including projects to repair provincial buildings, construct schools and hospitals, reconstruct the water system and improve the security of the province by establishing five police checkpoints and

constructing a training center for the Afghan Czech Army Lieutenant Colonel Martin Benda, MD, National Police.131 However, Logar remains a demonstrates how the Mass Casualty Board is used during an incident. dangerous province. One member of the PRT flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2008 was killed by an IED explosion132, and at least 11 PRT members have been injured in the past year.133 The third PRT rotation arrived February 26, 2009, with a contingent of 275 military members and 9 civilian members.134

126 “Province: Logar” Naval Post Graduate School for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Logar.pdf. Accessed March 2009. 127 Ibid. 128 “Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar.” Online. Available: http://old.mzv.cz/wwwo/default.asp?id=56643&ido=21724&idj=1&amb=182&ParentIDO=21724 (Translated using Google Translator). Accessed: March 2009. 129 “Czech Soldier-member of PRT-killed in Afghanistan,” Ministry of Defense. Online. Available: http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=11231. Accessed March 2009. 130 “Province:Logar.” 131 “Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar” 132 “Czech Soldier, killed” 133 “Seven Szech Soldier wounded in Afghanistan,” China View, (October 1, 2008). Online> Available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/02/content_10140260.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 134 “Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar.” 50

Provincial Reconstruction Team Mazar-e-Sharif

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Balkh / Mazar-e-Sharif

Date/Country Established: July 2003 / United Kingdom

Date/Current Lead Nation: March 2006 / Sweden

Regional Command: North

Threat Level: 5 (2007)

Number of Attacks: 41 in Balkh (Jan-Sept 2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 452 (2 Finns, 450 Swedes) NonCERP/Year: $320 million

Civilian: 8

Representatives: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency, Swedish Police Service135

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The PRT has focused on infrastructure, security sector reform, and disarming and demobilizing local militias. 136

• The majority of funds come from the Swedish government. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) directs 15-20% of its development funds to the four Northern provinces through the PRT. The majority of these funds have gone to infrastructure projects. 137

135 CENTCOM, Sweden: Support to the Global War on Terror. Online. Available: http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/sweden. Accessed: April 2, 2009. 136 “Mazar-e-Sharif,” Global Security.org. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/mazar_e_sharif.htm. Accessed: March 2009. 137 Sida, What does Sida do in Afghanistan? Online. Available: http://www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=853&language=en_US. Accessed: March 2009. 51

• In 2003 and 2004, while still run by the United Kingdom, the PRT successfully acted with UNAMA to mediate warring groups and end open battles in the region.

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

The PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif has responsibility for four northern Afghan provinces: Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, and Sar-e-Pul. The four provinces cover almost 22,000 square miles in northern Afghanistan. Balkh Province borders both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while Jowzjan borders Turkmenistan. The other two provinces have no external boundaries.

Because the PRT covers such a large area, members of the PRT are based out of two Provincial Offices (PO) in Sar-e Pol and Shebreghan in addition to the headquarters at Camp Northern Lights. The PRT also has six Military Observation Teams (MOT).

Demographics

Balkh province has a population of over 1 million; the other three provinces combine for a total 1.28 million. The largest ethnic groups in the four provinces are Uzbek, Dari Persian, and Pashto. The city of Mazar-e-Sharif, with a population of 183,000, is the fourth-largest city in Afghanistan and a major trade hub.

Security

As of December 2008, only two Swedish soldiers had died in Afghanistan, a sign of the relative stability of the Northern provinces. From 2007 to 2008, the number of attacks in the first nine months of the year remained steady in the PRT’s area of responsibility; declining in three of the four provinces (the number of attacks in Jowzjian increased from 10 to 21). 138

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

In February 2008, an Afghan television station ran a news report claiming that the PRT was failing to accomplish its reconstruction goals. Sweden has announced that it intends to spend US $18 million on reconstruction and development in the four provinces where the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT operates in 2010. It has also declared its intent to continue leading the PRT and is increasing its troop commitments to ISAF. 139

138 Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings Institute (March 3, 2009), p.16. 139 ISAF Public Affairs Office, Swedish PRT holds press conference. Online. Available: http://www.hq.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/02/pr090210-126.html. Accessed: March 2009. 52

Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Faryab / Meymaneh

Date/Country Established: July 2003 / United Kingdom

Date/Current Lead Nation: March 2005 / Norway

Regional Command: North

Threat Level: 6 (2007)

Number of Attacks: 49 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 200+ (Norwegians and Latvians) NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 12 to 14

Representatives: Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvian Political Representative, Icelandic Political Representative, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police, Latvian Police, 6 to 8 of the total are EUPOL.

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The Norwegian PRT does not carry out development projects independently; rather, it advises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul who then disperse funds to international and nonprofit organizations to implement development projects.140 Projects emphasize supporting regional and local governance, including professional development for local administrators and elected officials. • Training courses for Afghan National Police on crime scene investigation techniques and computer skills, and supplemental funding for two Afghan National Army camps in the province. • Hiring of over 300 local Afghans to build the PRT base.

140 Braekhus, Kyrre Elvenes, interview by Erin Boeke Burke. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway (January 16 and19, 2009).

• Partnering with local governmental officials and NGOs to renovate a hospital and build a crisis center for abused women. PRT soldiers who are doctors or nurses worked with and gave training to Afghan medical staff at a local hospital.141

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Faryab province covers 7,835 square miles in North- Central Afghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan. The region is rich in natural resources, but very isolated. Most of the terrain is rangeland and cropland, with areas of sand dunes.142

Demographics Norwegian soldiers from the Norwegian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team repair a broken well. The province has approximately one million residents. flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2009 Uzbeks and Tajiks are the largest ethnic groups. The region also has significant Pashtun, Turkmen, and Hazara populations. 143

Security

Faryab has been much more stable since the fall of the Taliban than other parts of Afghanistan. The situation deteriorated in 2008 and the PRT requested an additional 120 troops and long-range weapons, but received only 46 troops.144

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Norwegian media declared the base in Meymaneh “the weakest in Afghanistan” in 2008 and other stories decried the PRT’s equipment as out-of-date. As reported, security concerns strained morale on the PRT and the Norwegian military.

At the time of this writing, the Norwegian government was conducting a comprehensive review of PRT operations, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, the Embassy in Kabul, the Ministry of Justice and the Police, as well as the Ministry of Defense. According to a government representative, the review may result in significant changes in PRT operations and structure.145

141 All three cases were described in the ISAF Mirror. 142 Norwegian Embassy to Afghanistan. “Faryab.” Online. Available: http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/about/faryab.htm. Accessed: April 2009. 143 Regional Rural Economic Regeneration Strategies (RRERS) “Provincial Profile: Faryab.” Online. Available: http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/ProvincialProfiles/Faryab.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 144 Catherine Stein. “Norwegian base weakest in Afghanistan .” Aftenposen, (June 5,2008). Online. Available: http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article2466146.ece. Accessed: April 009. 145 Braekhus. 54

Provincial Reconstruction Team Pol-e-Khomri

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Baghlan / Pol-E-Khomri

Date/Country Established: October 2004 / The Netherlands

Date/Current Lead Nation: October 2006 / Hungary

Regional Command: North

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: N/A Not Reported

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 210 Non-CERP: 500 mil HUF ($2.5 mil USD)

Civilian: 1

Representative: U.S. Agency for International Development, Allied Officers from Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The focuses of the Hungarian PRT include: • Job creation • Infrastructure development as part of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) • Enhancing the NATO Alliance's Strategic Airlift Capabilities • Bringing about self-sustaining economy, a constitutional state, educational institutions, and agricultural development • Developing local police infrastructure • Developing a concerted approach by enhancing NATO’s cooperation with other international and local actors based on respective competences and comparative advantages146

146 Molnar, Gyorgy, “Hungary’s Whole of Government Approach to Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Stabilization,” Columbia International Affairs Online. Online. Available: http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:ffO9bjbQdj0J:www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_summer2007/co_summer2 007_c_molnar.pdf+hungarian+prt&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=us. Accessed: March 2009. 55

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Baghlan Province is located 250km north of Kabul, and Pol-e-Khomri is the capital of the province. Baghan Province has both urban and rural portions. Rural Baghlan features large areas of fertile land. The Northern part of the Highlands receives heavy snow during winter months. There is yearly flooding along the river Baghlan river banks.

Demographics

The majority of the population in Baghlan Province is middle-class citizens, and there are many higher educational institutions, including Baghlan University, Faculty of Agriculture, Mazar-e-Sharif University, Private College in Mazar, and others. The ethnic majority is Pashtun, and the region a On the banks of the Baghlan River. former Taliban stronghold. 147 flickr.com/photos/spangledrongo © 2007

Security

Security in Baghlan Province has improved overall, according to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The Afghan National Police have had to deploy many forces into the Anderab District to maintain order. Anderab is one of the districts where poppy growing has yet to be eradicated. The main factors of insecurity identified by UNAMA are illegally armed groups, anti-government elements, criminality and organized crime, and narcotics.148

LESSONS LEARNED / FUTURE OUTLOOK

The Hungarian PRT is still relatively new, but with security improvements, they will be able to focus more on job creation, developing police infrastructure, and other projects. Without a stable security situation, the Hungarian PRT will be unable to create the necessary changes. The Hungarian PRT will continue to work on helping to develop infrastructure and self-sustaining state apparatuses.

147 Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Provincial Profile Baghlan. Online. Available: http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/ProvincialProfiles/Baghlan.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 148 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Profile: Baghlan. Online. Available: http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Baghlan%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf. Accessed: March 2009.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Qala-e-Naw

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Badghis / Qala-e-Naw

Date/Country Established: August 2005 / Spain

Date/Current Lead Nation: August 2005 / Spain

Regional Command: West

Threat Level: Not Reported

Number of Attacks: 121 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian:

Representatives: Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) Representative

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The Qala-e-Naw PRT main focus is on building infrastructure, such as bridges, dams, and roads. The PRT’s policy is to focus on mid- and long-term reconstruction projects. Badghis Province is extremely underdeveloped and lacks essential infrastructure. Most roads outside of the provincial capital are unpaved; however, roadway construction has been delayed due to security reasons.

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Badghis Province is located in Northwestern Afghanistan and shares its boundaries with Heart Province, Ghowr Province, and Turkmenistan.

Demographics

The population is around 500,000 and the majority groups are Tajiks and Pashtuns; Tajiks consist of 62% of the total population while Pashtuns make up 28%.

Security

The security situation has been worse in the northern districts of Ghormach and Murghab since 2006.149 Roadside bombs, ambushes and large scale raids by Taliban fighters have been common in these districts. “The province has become one of the Taliban’s gateways into the north.”150 Most of the inhabitants of these districts are Pashtuns who are sympathetic to the local Taliban.151 Besides these two districts, the security situation in the rest of the province is generally acceptable.

PRT Structure

The civilian component has included personnel from the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) since 2005. There are also a dozen additional workers from the Tragsa Group,152 a Spanish public company that provides technical assistance for forestry and agricultural sectors.

LESSONS LEARNED

Building infrastructure, especially roads has been and should remain the highest priority for the Qala-e-Naw PRT’s development efforts. The Spanish PRT should also focus on raising Afghan awareness of the PRT’s activities for further cooperation.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The PRT will continue to focus on building infrastructure, including water, sewage, and electricity Spanish Defense Minister Carme Chacón (right) and Spanish Foreign networks. The aim is to make Qala-e- Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos (left) arrive in Afghanistan to visit their troops. Naw the first city in Afghanistan flickr.com/photos/23854877@N07 © 2008 equipped with water, sewage, and electricity networks.

149 “Province Overview: Badghis,” Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Badghis/Badghis.html. Accessed: March 2009. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Rafael Roel Fernandez, “The Contribution of the Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Qala e Naw to the Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan (ARI),” Real Instituto Elcano, Online. Available: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcan o_in/Zonas_in/Defense+Security/ARI6-2008. Accessed March 2009. 58

Provincial Reconstruction Team Tarin Kowt

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Uruzgan / Tarin Kowt

Date/Country Established: August 2006 / United States

Date/Current Lead Nation: August 2006 / The Netherlands

Regional Command: South

Threat Level: 8

Number of Attacks: 7

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 1090 NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 4 specialists

Representatives: Netherlands with a large contingent from Australia. The Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Singapore, and Slovakia have either sent a contingent to Uruzgan or will do so in the near future (80 total at PRT).

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

The main areas of focus for the Dutch PRT are education, health, public order, rural development, growing poppy alternatives such as saffron, and improving communication.153 For instance, the Netherlands through UNICEF have funded 154 Dutch PRT soldiers pose for the camera. the building of 15 schools. Many NGOs flickr.com/photos/isafmedia © 2008

153 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reconstruction in Progress. Online. Available: http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/afghanistan/Reconstruction-in-process.html. Accessed: 28 February, 2009. 154 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Preparing for the future, The Netherlands supports primary education in Uruzgan. Online. Available: http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistan- 59

also play an active role in reconstruction projects throughout the area. Uruzgan's poppy production reached record levels in 2006 and 2007, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain Tarin Kowt is the capital of Uruzgan Province located in the south central region of Afghanistan. The PRT is located at Dutch Kamp Holland, and approximately eighty individuals from the Dutch government are assigned to the PRT to coordinate reconstruction projects.

Demographics Uruzgan and Tarin Kowt’s populations are approximately 700,000 and 10,000, respectively.

Security Security and safety in and around Tarin Kowt is unreliable. In mid to late 2007, insurgents captured a number of areas in Uruzgan. Some parts of the Baluchi Valley and the Chora Valley were unsafe until Dutch and Australian troops launched a successful operation to secure the area. The troops constructed permanent forward bases and in June 2008, elections were held in the Chora district for the first time.155 Part of the area directly to the north of Tarin Kowt is considered safe, while land to the east of Tarin Kowt remains unstable.

LESSONS LEARNED

The Dutch government funds the PRT through relevant ministries, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation has earmarked funds for reconstruction in Afghanistan through 2009.156

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Security and safety will continue to influence the PRT’s level of productivity of the PRT in Tarin Kowt. The Dutch government emphasized building infrastructure and projects related to public order in the near future with the understanding that it must be a combined political, military, and economic effort.157

pdf/november08_en_education.pdf. Accessed: March 2009. 155 Radio Netherlands – Military Photos Net. Key military developments in the period 2006-2008. Online. Available: http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=139105. Accessed: 28 February, 2009. 156 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dutch Investments on the Rebuilding of Afghanistan. Online. Available: http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistan-pdf/nlosoverzichtjuli08_internet_310708_ eng.pdf. Accessed: 28 February, 2009. 157 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reconstruction in Progress. Online. Available: http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/afghanistan/Reconstruction-in-process.html. Accessed: 28 February, 2009. 60

Provincial Reconstruction Team Wardak

OVERVIEW

Province/City: Wardak / Maydan Shahr

Date/Country Established:

Date/Current Lead Nation: November 2006

/ Turkey

Regional Command: United States East

Threat Level: 6 (2007)158

Number of Attacks: 241 (2008)

STRUCTURE FUNDING

Military: 64 NonCERP/Year: Not Reported

Civilian: 28

Representatives: Not Reported

PRT SUMMARY

FOCUS

Very little is known about the Turkish PRT. It is the only ISAF civilian-led PRT.159

CLIMATE

Geography/Terrain

Wardak is a very mountainous province: over 80% of the province is mountainous or semi-mountainous. 160 The Kott-I Baba Range is located to the north, and the Paghman

158 Markus Gauster, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper Series no.16 (January 2008): 32-33. 159 Ahto Lobjakas. "Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty." Wardak, Where Nothing Is What It Seems. (January 16, 2009). Online. Available: http://www.rferl.org/Content/Wardak_Where_Nothing_Is_What_It_Seems/1371007.html. Accessed: March 2009. 160 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Development Plan, Wardak Provincial Profile. Online. Available: http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Wardak%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf. Accessed : March 2009. 61

Range in the east. The province is mainly rangeland, with areas of irrigated and dry-land farmland.161

Demographics

The primary ethnic groups are Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara, and the population is mainly Shia and Sunni Islam.162

Security

The threat level in Wardak province is very high. The security situation is considered “Unstable to Volatile”, according to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.163 The United Nations closed down their office in Wardak in September 2008. The PRT “cannot venture more than 3 km from city limits” due to security concerns.164

LESSONS LEARNED

Very little information is available about the operation of the Wardak PRT. In 2008, the PRT built a district police headquarters, and several schools.165 The PRT distributed 33,000 tons of food aid, 1,300 wool blankets, sheets of plastic for shelter, stoves, and clothing to the population of the province.166 The PRT also provided distribution of meat for the Eid sacrifice to 200+ families in the province, and reconstructed a Mosque in Maydan Shahr in 2007.167

161 “Province Overview: Wardak,” Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Wardak.pdf. Accessed March 2009. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Lobjakas. 165 “4 Uplift Projects completed in Maidan Wardak,” Pajhwok News, (October 31, 2008). Online. Available: http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=64546. Accessed: March 2009. 166 “Almost 33,000 tons of food aid delivered to Wardak,” Pajhwok News, (December 10, 2008). Online. Available: http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=66524. Accessed: March 2009. 167 “2000 families helped by Turkish PRT in Wardak,” Pajhwok News, (December 8, 2008). Online. Available: http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=66480. Accessed: March 2009. 62

Chapter 5. Project Uses and Analysis

Project Uses

The data collected throughout the project could potentially be used for a variety of things because of its scope and variety. For example, a glance at the main database can give the user a brief but comprehensive overview of the history and components of all of the PRTs that have operated or are operating in Afghanistan. In addition, the included projects database contains thousands of projects that, when taken as a whole, give a more detailed “history” of each PRT and what its major activities have been. The researchers envision multiple uses for this data, including:

• Breaking down, by PRT and year, of funding totals, funding sources and types of projects funded • Looking at a PRT’s focus on small or large projects and where projects are relative to PRT location • Analyzing which groups (local businesses, local/ International NGOs) work with which PRT

Besides looking at aggregate data, the projects database is easily searchable by keyword; for example, a researcher can easily search for all bridge projects completed by PRTs.

Project Analysis

The team underwent numerous challenges in collecting data. The international group relied on NATO contacts, PRT publications, wire reports and lead nation defense, and foreign affairs websites to gather information. The team faced language barriers, insufficient and irrelevant data sources, a lack of institutional memory, and even complete refusal to share information by some foreign agencies. Furthermore, many of the countries only provided data on national objectives for Afghanistan rather than PRT- specific information. The team also found difficulties in reporting consistent information due to the variable, and sometimes sparse, nature of the data collected. For example, many NATO countries lack a standardized form for particular data variables. This kind of variation made it particular difficult to insert the data points into the database in a uniform way, for example, the group could not find a consistent scale to use for provincial threat levels. Many contacts, embassies, and other offices abroad failed to respond to numerous requests for information, and sometimes sent irrelevant information.

The U.S. group gathered information using Department of Defense reports, think tank publications, USAID reports, military and civilian contacts, and press releases. The team found that most of these reports provided provincial data, rather than PRT specific data. Some data came from other research reports on U.S. PRTs, but the lack of appropriate

63 security clearances and the inability to gain access to unclassified, yet still unreleased, data proved to be challenging. Contacting people directly proved fruitless for many of the team members throughout the research process as compared to secondary source research.

Some of the largest successes came towards the end of the research phase after gaining access to the NATO-ISAF Afghanistan Country Stability Project (ACSP) database. This database contains a nearly complete record of every PRT project documented by NATO’s C3 Agency. COL Hamilton’s Red Team shared a project database sourced from the ACSP and Department of Defense Combined Information Data Network Exchange. These project databases provided useful insight into PRT operations.

Aside from the ACSP database, the research team faced immense challenges gathering data from before 2007. Relevant and useful data are difficult to locate and collect.

The group removed some variables for which no data was found. Although the client requested data on the relationships between PRT and nongovernmental organizations, this was especially difficult to measure since only anecdotal information, rather than solid data points, was available on this subject; this information is presented in the PRT briefs or in the ACSP database as an implementing partner. The reality of the data collection environment forced the group to narrow the scope of data gathered, especially on non- CERP funding, interaction with Afghan agencies, challenges facing PRTs.

Information on PRT background and structure was comparatively easier to obtain. Reports authored by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Marshall Center, the Brookings Institution, the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, and various press services proved to be useful resources for understanding PRTs and the provinces where they operated.

Consistent and accurate information will be difficult to find as long as the political and security environment of Afghanistan remains unstable. This challenge is compounded by the fact that PRTs are evolutionary entities that vary in strategy and goals between countries. Moreover, the numerous attempts to gather information on PRTs by various governmental and nongovernmental research organizations have contributed to analysis fatigue, an unintentional side effect of meaningful research. The policy research project team concluded that an independent research organization, contracted by NATO-ISAF, with unrestricted access to all PRTs would be most well-suited to conduct comprehensive research to consolidate knowledge and produce a comprehensive database on PRTs in Afghanistan.

Bibliography

Abbaszadeh, Nima, et al. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Princeton: Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008.

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals. GAO-05-742, Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005.

"Afghanistan: National Development Strategy (2008-2013)." Afghanistan National Development Strategy. http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/ands_docs/index.asp (accessed November 22, 2008).

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. 2004. http://www.acbar.org/display.php?page_id=8 (accessed January 31, 2009).

Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Report no. 41-409, Washington DC: U.SCongress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2008 .

Algarheim, Camilla. "Appreciation from Afghans." ISAF Mirror, March 2008: 10.

—. "Show of Force Protection." ISAF Mirror, March 2008: 15.

—. "Working with the Afghan National Polic in Baghlan Province." ISAF Mirror, October 2007: 19.

American Forces Press Service. "U.S. Department of Defense." DefenseLink News Article: Turkey to Open 27th Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. November 5, 2006. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2026 (accessed January 15, 2009).

Andriacco, Sgt. Mike. "U.S. Team Opens Shelter for Afghan Women." US Department of Defense . December 18, 2007. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48448 (accessed January 6, 2009).

Arab, Shahpur. "Construction of waterhead gets underway in Logar." Pajhwok Afghan News. January 18, 2009. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=68332 (accessed February 18, 2009).

—. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Provincial council building constructed in Logar. February 3, 2009. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=69163 (accessed February 18, 2009).

—. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Farmers recieve fertilizers, improved seeds. December 26, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=67271 (accessed February 18, 2009).

AREU. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit . http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Item id=53 (accessed November 22, 2008).

Associated Press. "Hungarian soldier killed in Afghanistan while trying to disarm roadside bomb." International Herald Tribune. June 10, 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/06/10/europe/EU-GEN-Hungary- Afghanistan.php (accessed March 21, 2009).

—. "Roadside bomb kills Hungarian soldier in Afghanistan." International Herald Tribune. July 12, 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/12/europe/EU- Hungary-Afghanistan.php (accessed March 21, 2009).

Basharat, Muhammad Hakim. "2000 families helped by Turkish PRT in Wardak." Pajhwok Afghan News. December 8, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=66480 (accessed February 18, 2009). beehive.govt.nz - the official website of the New Zealand government. New Zealand Deployments to Afghanistan - Questions and Answers. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/Afghanistan%20extension%20Q%2 0and%20A.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009).

Braekhus, Kyrre Elvenes, interview by Erin Boeke Burke. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway (January 16, 2009).

—. interview by Erin Boeke Burke. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway (January 19, 2009).

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bundeswehr Operations Abroad. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense Press and Information Office, 2008.

Bundeswehr. Das Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz. July 22, 2008. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPL MnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLN_SJdw0OBMlB2EGu- pFw0aCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUASErP7Q!!/delta/base64xml/ L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82XzFMX0VUOQ!! (accessed January 18, 2009).

—. ISAF PRT Feyzabad. October 11, 2008. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256F1D0022A5C2/vwContentByKey/W26 BUJR5821INFODE (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. ISAF PRT Feyzabad. April 12, 2008. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPL MnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLN_SJdw2xBMlB2EGu- pFw0aCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUAy6QHdQ!!/delta/base64xml/ L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82XzFMX0VUQQ!! (accessed January 18, 2009).

Caligiuri, Army Staff Sgt. Giovanni. "Nuristan PRT brings professional training to ANP." Black Anthem.com Military News . March 15, 2007. http://www.blackanthem.com/News/Allies_20/Nuristan_PRT_brings_professiona l_training_to_ANP5055.shtml (accessed February 5, 2009).

Campbell, Jason H, and Jeremy Shapiro. "Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan." The Brookings Institute. November 18, 2008. http://www.brookings.edu/foreign- policy/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. "Brookings Institution." Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post- 9/11 Afghanistan . January 7, 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/foreign- policy/afghanistan-index.aspx (accessed January 15, 2009).

Canada, Government of. Humanitarian Assistance. October 15, 2008. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/priorities-priorites/aid- assistance.aspx?menu_id=47&menu=L (accessed February 12, 2009).

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Playbook, No.07-34, September 2007.

Chase, Steven. "Globe and Mail: Afghan rebuilding efforts slowed by poor planning." Afghanistan News . January 09, 2009.

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2009/january/jan102009.html#8 (accessed February 18, 2009).

Clare, Pfc. Micah E. "Khowst PRT Winning the Fight in Afghanistan." US Army . May 30, 2007. http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/05/30/3404-khowst-prt-winning-the- fight-in-afghanistan/ (accessed February 10 , 2009).

Coalition for Operation Enduring Freedom. "Coalition Bulletin." Germans "Can-Do" in Konduz. January 2004. http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/09bulletin.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009).

Combined Joint Force Task. Nuristan PRT holds shoe-drive for Afghan children. January 19, 2009. http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Nuristan-PRT-holds- shoe-drive-for-Afghan-children.html (accessed February 6 , 2009).

Cosgrave, John, and Rie Andersen. "Danida Aid Flows to Afghanistan: A Study of Aid Flows from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 inclusive." Channel Research. December 1, 2004. http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B27A79AA-2B28-4414- A533-46D183CB5890/0/AidFlowsAfghanistanFinalReportV16020041201.pdf (accessed December 30, 2008).

DACAAR. DACAAR Annual Report 2005. http://www.dacaar.org/upload/Source/PDf/annual_report_dacaar_2005.pdf (accessed February 9, 2009).

—. DACAAR Annual Report 2006. http://www.dacaar.org/upload/Source/PDf/ar2007.pdf (accessed February 9, 2009).

—. DACAAR Annual Report 2007. http://www.dacaar.org/upload/source/PDF/Annual%20-%202007.pdf (accessed February 9, 2009).

—. Dacaar Factsheet in English. http://www.dacaar.org/dacaar.asp?id=306 (accessed February 1, 2009).

DeGrego, Senior Airman Dilia. "Parwan province breaks ground on road reconstruction projects." COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-. May 19, 2007. http://www.fncm.org/blashfordribboncutting.pdf (accessed January 10 , 2009).

Department of Defense. "Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan ." January 2009 . http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf (accessed February 1, 2009).

Department for International Development. Press Release: Building a new Afghanistan. August 29, 2007. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/afghanistan- 55.asp (accessed February 12, 2009).

Diamond Barikot Construction Company. List of Completed Project by DBCC in year 2006. http://dbccorg.com/Contracts.htm (accessed February 22, 2009).

Diaz, Staff Sgt. Carlos. "Bagram PRT rebuilds Afghanistan one school at a time." Global Security.org . March 27, 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/03/mil-070327- afpn01.htm (accessed January 10 , 2009).

Dietle, Navy Lt. j.g. James. "Guryak truck bridge official opening." Embassy of the U.S Kabul Afghanistan . February 20, 2009. http://kabul.usembassy.gov/prt_200209.html (accessed February 21, 2009).

Dutch Ministry of Development. "Dutch Expenditure on the Rebuilding of Afghanistan." November 2008. http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistan- pdf/nlosoverzichtnovember08_internet_eng.pdf (accessed 7 January, 2009).

Ege, Captain Rune Thomas. "Out of the Elements." ISAF Mirror, March 2008: 27.

Embassy of Afghanistan- Tokyo. Farah PRT Begins $1.7 Million Bridge Construction Over Farah Rud River. November 9, 2007. http://www.afghanembassyjp.com/en/news/?an=546 (accessed February 9, 2009).

European Commission Delegation to Afghanistan. EU and Hungary support the capacity building of the institutions of local governance in Baghlan province. June 25, 2008. http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/press_releases/PR_ Support-Local-Governance-Baghlan-English.pdf (accessed February 8, 2009).

—. EU and Italy Support the Rehabilitation of Provincial and District Offices in Herat Province. November 25, 2008. http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/Nov_2008/Press_R elease/PR_EUItaly251108_English.doc (accessed January 8, 2009).

—. Press Release: Italy and EU support the construction of Female Correctional Centre in Herat. June 04, 2008.

http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/press_releases/PR- EUandItaly-support-the-construction-of-FCC_Eng.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009).

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. UK Provincial Reconstruction Team – Lashkar Gah . 2007. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/afghanistan- reconstruction/helmand/uk-prt (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. 2008 UN opium survey for Afghanistan . November 27, 2008. http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/?view=News&id=9824830 (accessed February 8, 2009).

—. Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT Helmand). http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-afghanistan/prt- helmand/overview-prt-helmand (accessed February 8, 2009).

—. UK PRT Lashkar Gah. February 5, 2008. http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=11653412 15272 (accessed January 6, 2009).

French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. Lithuania’s action in favour of Afghanistan: Cooperation for Security, Reconstruction, and Development. June 12, 2008. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- files_156/afghanistan_498/international-conference-in-support-of-afghanistan- paris-12th-june-2008_6366/colonne-droite_6385/lithuania-action-in-favour-of- afghanistan_11526.html (accessed January 8, 2009).

Garbett, Maj. Kimberly. "New bridge opens in Panjshir Valley." Embassy of the US Kabul Afghanistan . January 31, 2009. http://kabul.usembassy.gov/prt_0102_09.html (accessed February 10 , 2009).

German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). Answers to frequently asked questions about ISAF. January 19, 2009. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPL MnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLN_SJdw2xBMlB2EGu- pFw0aCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUAy6QHdQ!!/delta/base64xml/

L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfMUxfRVQ4?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1D 0022A5C2%2FW269AFA6924INFODE%2 (accessed February 25, 2009).

—. Chronolgy of deployment in Afghanistan (ISAF). January 23, 2009. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPL MnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLN_SJdw0OBMlB2EGu- pFw0aCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUASErP7Q!!/delta/base64xml/ L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82XzFMX0VUNw!! (accessed February 25, 2009).

Gharafi, Hadi. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Seven Pickups donated to Bamyan Police. May 31, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=19035 (accessed February 26, 2009).

Global Security.org . Afghanistan - Urban Areas. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/urban.htm (accessed November 22, 2008 ).

—. Afghanistan Facilities. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. "Afghanistan Militia Facilities." Chagcharan. December 11, 2008. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/chagcharan.htm (accessed January 7, 2009).

—. "Afghanistan Militia Facilities." Kandahar. February 25, 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/kandahar.htm (accessed February 10, 2009).

—. Afghanistan Militia Facilities: Herat. February 25, 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/herat.htm (accessed January 7, 2009).

—. Afghanistan: Pol-e-Khomri. 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/pol_e_khomri.htm (accessed January 6, 2009).

—. Afghanistan: Ghazni. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ghazni.htm (accessed January 6, 2009).

—. Where are the Legions? [SPQR] Global Deployments of US Forces. April 27, 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm (accessed March 25, 2009).

Government Accountability Office (GAO). "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq." United States Government Accountability Office, October 1, 2008. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R (accessed March 10, 2009).

Government of Canada. "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan." Setting a Course to 2011: Report to Parliament. June 2008. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada- afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghrep_en.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009).

—. Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. November 3, 2008. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/kandahar/kprt-eprk.aspx (accessed January 5, 2009).

—. Signature Project: Dahla Dam and Irrigation System. December 04, 2008. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/projects-projets/dam- barrage.aspx (accessed December 30, 2008).

—. Signature Project: Education in Kandahar. October 15, 2008. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/projects- projets/education.aspx (accessed December 2008, 30).

—. Signature Project: Polio Eradication. October 15, 2008. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/projects-projets/polio- poliomyelite.aspx (accessed December 30, 2008).

Grandhagen, Knut H. "Norway Takes the Lead of ISAF." ISAF Mirror, September 2005: 11.

Haberler.com. Turkiye'nin Vardak Yardimlari. April 6, 2007. http://www.haberler.com/turkiye-nin-vardak-yardimlari-haberi/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

Haraszti, Gyula. "istockanalyst.com." Hungarian Troops "Close to Mutiny" Following Fatalities. July 20, 2008. http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/2413927 (accessed February 2009, 8).

Harris, Kent. "Stars and Stripes." Italy to raise its troop level in Afghanistan. April 1, 2005. http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28115 (accessed February 10, 2009).

Hart, U.S. Air Force Capt. Dustin. "School project brings hope, education to Nangarhar." Embassy of the U.S. Kabul Afghanistan . 2009. http://kabul.usembassy.gov/prt_2201_09.html (accessed January 10 , 2009).

Heat, U.S. Army Sgt. Greg. "New School Brings Hope for Afghan Youth." US Department of Defense . http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2003/a090203a.html (accessed February 9, 2009).

Hopkins, Army Staff Sgt. David. "Road opening, combat outpost closure marks progress in Konar." Embassy of the U.S Kabul Afghanistan . February 16, 2009. http://kabul.usembassy.gov/isaf.1802_09.html (accessed February 20, 2009).

House, Billy. "Florida Guard Headed to Afghanistan in 2009." Media General News Service, December 3, 2007. http://www.mgwashington.com/index.php/news/article/florida-guard-headed-to- afghanistan-in-2009/116/.

Ibrahimi, Habib-ur-Rahman. "4 uplift projects completed in Maidan Wardak." Pajhwok Afghan News. October 31, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=64546 (accessed February 18, 2009).

iCasualties.org. Operation Enduring Freedom. 2008. http://icasualties.org/OEF/Afghanistan.aspx (accessed February 25, 2009).

ISAF Public Information Office. "United States Central Command." Spanish PRT opens orphanage in Qala-e-Naw. March 10, 2008. http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/spanish-prt-opens-orphanage-in-qala-e- naw.html (accessed February 26, 2009).

James, Lt. Des. "Government of Canada - Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team Activities." Providing assistance to Kandahar farmers. July 15, 2007. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/stories-reportages/kprt- eprk_2007_07_15.aspx?lang=eng (accessed February 25, 2009).

Joelsdotter-Berg, Eva. "PerCEPtions Newsletter (NATO Civil Emergency Planning)." A View from Sweden: Experiences working as Development Advisor to the Swedish- led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif. June 2008.

http://www.nato.int/issues/cep/cep_newsletter_05e.pdf (accessed February 8, 2009).

Kainulainen, Lt. Thomas. "C.S.I. Maimana: Crime scene investigation training yields good results in Faryab." ISAF Mirror, April 2007: 11.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Post- Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." CRS Report for Congress, February 9, 2009. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf (accessed March 10, 2009).

—. "Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance." CRS Report for Congress. October 18, 2008. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008).

Koehler, Jan, and Christoph Zuercher. "Bundesministerium fuer wirtscahftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung." Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan: Prestudy. August 20, 2007. http://www.frient.de/downloads/AFG_IA_Prestudy.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009).

Krekeler-Jöris, Major Antje. "ISAF gives seven village in Baghlan pure water." ISAF Mirror, November 2007: 21.

Liberty, Radio Free Europe Radio. Newsline. May 6, 2008. http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1144106.html (accessed February 12, 2009).

Lobjakas, Ahto. "Wardak, Where Nothing Is What It Seems." Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. January 16, 2009. http://www.rferl.org/Content/Wardak_Where_Nothing_Is_What_It_Seems/13710 07.html (accessed February 12, 2009).

McCaffrey, General Barry R (USA). "MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Michael Meese." Small Wars Journal. July 30, 2008. http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mccaffreyafghanistanaarjuly2008.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008).

MiPAL: Afghanistan. http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?secID=102&pageID=3&type=section#added (accessed November 22, 2008).

Ministerie van Defensie. PRT opent voetgangersbrug in Khinjan. July 25, 2006. http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2006/07/25/4696167/PRT_opent_voetgang ersbrug_in_Khinjan (accessed January 19, 2009).

Ministerio De Defensa. ASPFOR XXI. 2008. http://www.ejercito.mde.es/ingles/mexterior/afganistan/aspfor_xxi.html (accessed March 29, 2009).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Finland continues to participate in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Press Release 290/2005. September 23, 2005. http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=64932&contentlan=2 (accessed January 19, 2009).

Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. ISAF - Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar. November 25, 2008. http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=6586 (accessed December 17, 2008).

—. ISAF - Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar 1st Contingent of ACR. June 13, 2008. http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=12425 (accessed December 17, 2008).

—. Czech soldier - member of PRT Logar - killed in Afghanistan. May 5, 2008. http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=11231 (accessed February 22, 2009).

Ministry of Defense Hungarian Defense Forces. Flood Control Project in Afghanistan. December 19, 2008. http://www.hm.gov.hu/army/missziok/afganisztan_prt/folyoszabalyozas_arvizved elem (accessed February 8, 2009).

Ministry of Defense Republic of Lithuania. Lithuania help strengthening justice sector in Afghanistan. September 18, 2008. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/169141/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Lithuanian troops donate motorbikes and electricity generators for Ghowr security officers. November 14, 2008. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/173228/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Gift wraps and clothing from Lithuanian Chaplains Association to Chachgharan prison. December 31, 2008. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/178240/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Lithuanian troops support Chaghcharan hospital and police with bandaging material and medicaments. September 1, 2008. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/166999/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. PRT-8 assist institutions of Ghowr to prepare for winter season. December 2, 2008. http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/175593/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Denmark in Helmand 2008." Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan. December 2007. http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/71856C2E-3AE1-4B11-9257- 1E4BC9F56358/0/HELMANDUK.pdf (accessed 5 January, 2009).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary. Hungary's role in Afghanistan (ISAF, PRT). September 1, 2008. http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/security_policy/hungary_in_n ato/hungary_role_in_afghanistan/hungary_role_in_afghanistan.htm (accessed February 1, 2009).

—. The Foreign Ministry welcomes the opening of a new UN office at the headquarters of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. November 8, 2008. http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/spokesman_statements/UNAMA_e ng_081108.htm (accessed 29 January, 2009).

Ministry of Rural Rehabilition and Development. Newsletter. June 2007. http://www.mrrd.gov.af/ENGLISH/Data/English-Newsletter-June.pdf (accessed February 26, 2009).

Mission East. Mission East - Values in Action. http://www.miseast.org/sw1337.asp (accessed February 1, 2009).

Molnar, Gyorgy. "Hungary's Whole-of-Government Approach to Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Stabilization." The Quarterly Journal, Summer 2007: http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:ffO9bjbQdj0J:www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_s ummer2007/co_summer2007_c_molnar.pdf+hungarian+prt&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd =10&gl=us.

Moore, U.S. Navy Lt. Cindy. "Press Conference Opening Statement." Afghanistan News Center. March 27, 2005. http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2005/march/mar272005.html (accessed February 9, 2009).

Nagy, Capt. Andrea. "Drawing competition held for children." ISAF Mirror, March 2007: 10-11.

—. "Passing on Knowledge." ISAF Mirror, March 2007: 14-15.

—. "Provincial Reconstruction Team on new paths: Wreckage in Baghlan." ISAF Mirror, March 2007: 9.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "NATO in Afghanistan." NATO . June 12, 2007. http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/reconst_develop.html (accessed March 10, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." ANP, Nuristan PRT distribute aid to local villagers. February 4, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/02- february/pr080204-052.html (accessed February 6, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force ." ISAF Mirror Archive . October 6, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/index.html (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. "International Security Assistance Force. " Facts and Figures. February 13, 2009. www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (accessed February 16, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force. " Chronology. September 23, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.html (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. "International Security Assistance Force. " ISAF Factsheet. October 7, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/index.html (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." UK Forces Handover Command of Mazar- e-Sharif PRT to Swedish Control. March 16, 2006. http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/pressreleases/2006/Release_16Mar06_016.htm (accessed January 6, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations. December 1, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.pdf (accessed January 6, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." ISAF Regional Command Structure. January 14, 2009. http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html (accessed January 18, 2009).

—. International Security Assistance Force. February 2, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/02-february/pr080202-051.html (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." Swedish PRT hold press conference. February 10, 2009.

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/02/pr090210-126.html (accessed February 25, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." Kandahar PRT on track with Integration Approach. December 5, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/12-december/pr081205- 685.html (accessed February 25, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." PRT eases link from Ab Kamari villages to Qala-e-Now. March 6, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/03- march/pr080306-089.html (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. "International Security Assistance Force." Ceremony opens a new road and a school for 1200 children. February 6, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/02-february/pr080206-054.html (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. International Security Force. December 7, 2008. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/12-december/pr081207- 692.html (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). January 19, 2009. http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/recon_dev/prts.html (accessed March 10, 2009).

—. New medical facility opens in Ghazni Province. November 13, 2007. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/11-november/pr071113- 709.html (accessed February 6, 2009).

—. Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008. Summit Report http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/progress_afghanistan.pdf, Brussels: NATO, 2008.

—. Presentation on Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). February 15, 2007. http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2007/02/070215a.htm (accessed February 25, 2009).

NATO C3Agency. ACSP: Afghanistan Country Stability Project Geo Website. http://gis.nc3a.nato.int/ACSP/.

Nautilus Institute. Australia in Afghanistan. April 24, 2008. http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/afghanistan/coalition-forces- netherlands (accessed February 25, 2009).

Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Bamyan Executive Summary. 78

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Bamyan%20Ex ecutive%20Summary.pdf (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Logar Executive Summary. http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Logar.pdf (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Wardak Executive Summary. http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Executive%20Summaries/Wardak.pdf (accessed February 22, 2009).

—. Afghanistan Provincial Overviews. February 9, 2009. http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ExecSumm.html (accessed March 29, 2009).

—. Website. http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs (accessed February, 2009) .

Network, E-MINE Electronic Mine Information. Danish Demining Group (DDG). http://www.mineaction.org/org.asp?o=72 (accessed February 1, 2009).

New Zealand Defense Force. Afghanistan bound - next defense force contingent departs. April 11, 2006. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20060411-abndfcd.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. Kiwi troops depart for tour in Afghanistan. October 15, 2007. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20071015-ktdftia.htm (accessed February 25, 2009).

—. Kiwi troops prepare for Afghanistan deployment. April 10, 2007. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20070410-ktpfad.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. Kiwi troops prepare for Afghanistan post. October 13, 2006. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20061013-ktpfap.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. New Zealand PRT 11. November 26, 2008. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm (accessed February 2, 2009).

—. New Zealand soldier injured in Afghanistan. April 22, 2006. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20060422-nzsiia.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. NZ PRT: New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team Twelve. November 26, 2008. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm (accessed January 15, 2009).

—. NZ troops off to Afghanistan - FAQ. January 27, 2005. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media- releases/20050127-faq.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. NZAID funding of Bamyan hospital maternity ward. July 1, 2005. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20050701-nzafobhmw.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. Update on injured soldiers. October 30, 2007. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media- releases/20071030-uois.htm (accessed February 25, 2009).

—. Vehicle accident in Afghanistan. August 29, 2006. http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media- releases/20060829-vaia.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

Norway - the official site in Afghanistan. Norwegian led PRT in Faryab. 2007. http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/ (accessed January 25, 2009).

OCHA. "Afghanistan 2007- Table A: List of all Commitments/Contributions and Pledges." United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. November 23, 2008. http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E15243_asof___08112207.pdf (accessed November 23, 2008).

—. "Afghanistan 2008- Table A: List of all Commitments/Contributions and Pledges." United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. November 23, 2008. http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E15441_asof___08111315.pdf (accessed November 2008, 2008).

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. "DoD Identifies Navy Casualty." US Department of Defense. May 23, 2008. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11944 (accessed March 21, 2009)

Pajhwok Afghan News. Almost 33,000 tons of food aid to Wardak. December 10, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=66524 (accessed February 18, 2009).

—. First Afghan wind farm to open next month. October 28, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=64358 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. Governor inaugurates reconstruction of mosque. April 26, 2007. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=35392 (accessed February 18, 2009).

—. Hostel opened at police training center in Bamyan. April 1, 2006. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=15882 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. ISAF donates supplies to orphanage in Herat. June 24, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=57355 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. Italian PRT inaugurates seven uplift schemes in Herat. January 2, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=47949 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. PRT, Afghan doctors treat Herat residents. February 3, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=49501 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. RC West delivers school supplies in Herat. January 30, 2009. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=68975 (accessed February 26, 2009).

Pakistan Times. Italian-led PRT opens bridge in Herat City. June 5, 2008. http://www.pak-times.com/2008/06/05/italian-led-prt-opens-bridge-in-herat-city/ (accessed February 22, 2009).

Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC). Country Profile: Afghanistan. April 25, 2006. http://www.peaceoperations.org/_CMS/Files/2006_11_28_Afghan_Backgrounder.pdf (accessed April 21, 2009)

Perito, Robert M. "United States Insitute of Peace." The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified. October 2005. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html (accessed February 10, 2009).

Powers, Rod. "Joint Chiefs Continue to Examine Deployment Lengths." About.com, April 14, 2007. http://usmilitary.about.com/od/terrorism/a/deploylength.htm.

Pratt, Lt. Col. Leslie. "Farah PRT helps maintain peace, stability in Afghanistan." Combined Joint Task Force . October 17, 2008. http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Farah-PRT-helps-maintain- peace-stability-in-Afghanistan.html (accessed February 9, 2009).

Provincial Reconstruction Team Czech Republic, Logar - Afghanistan. Structure and Management of PRT. March 22, 2008. http://www.mzv.cz/prtlogar/cz/cojeprt/struktura_a_rizeni_prt/index.html (accessed February 22, 2009).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq Letter to Congress. GAO-09- 86R, Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008 .

PRT Nuristan. 2007. http://www.prtnuristan.com/Web%20Site/Pages/index.html (accessed January 10, 2009).

Quraishi, Ahmed, and Sabor Mangal. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Rocket attacks on UNAMA, NATO offices. June 21, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=57194 (accessed February 25, 2009).

Qureshi, Ahmad, and Hamshi Moeed. "Italy donates one million USD for reconstruction in Herat." Afgha.com - News - Afghanistan. September 22, 2007. http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:lWA275lyqkwJ:www.afgha.com/%3Fq%3D node/4371+Ahmad+Qureshi/Moeed+Hashmi&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&cli ent=firefox-a (accessed Feburary 6, 2009).

Qurishi, Ahmad. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Two health centers inaugurated in Herat. January 11, 2009. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=68024 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Italy donates equipment to Herat hospital. June 10, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=56526 (accessed February 26, 2009).

—. "Pajhwok Afghan News." Juvenile center inaugurated in Herat. April 15, 2008. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=53446 (accessed February 26, 2009).

Racius, Egdunas. "The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan." Baltic Security & Defense Review, 2007, Volume 9: 57-78.

RC-N Staff Reports. "ISAF, ANA respond to flooding in North." ISAF Mirror, September 2007: 22.

—. "Maimana." ISAF Mirror, March 2007: 16-17.

—. "New Bridge opens in Tekshan." ISAF Mirror, November 2007: 22.

—. "Political parties meet at PRT Meymaneh." ISAF Mirror, August 2007: 11.

—. "PRT Meymaneh opens female prison facilities." ISAF Mirror, 2007 August: 11.

Regional Command North Public Affairs Office. "Focusing on Afghan Women and Education." ISAF Mirror, May 2008: 20.

Relief Web. Afghanistan : Funding received 2008. 2008. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/doc105?OpenForm&rc=3&cc=afg (accessed November 22, 2008).

—. Bagram PRT delivers cold weather items, food to Mahmood Raqi District humanitarian aid association. January 22, 2007. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-7B4JDZ?OpenDocument (accessed February 10, 2009).

—. Herat PRT supports the education of Afghan youth. November 4, 2008. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7L3EKS?OpenDocument (accessed February 22, 2009).

Rietjens, Sebastiann J.H. "Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan." Armed Forces & Society, 2008: 173-207.

Saddiqi, Abdul Qadir. "Pajhwok Afghan News." 270 tons of wheat distributed among destitute families. February 1, 2009. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=69043 (accessed February 18, 2009).

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-801SP, Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007.

Smith, Herbert. "Afghanistan PRTs U.S. Civilian Staffing Map." USAID, January 22, 2009.

Socor, Vladimir. "Georgia to send, Lithuania to augment toops in Afghanistan." The Jamestown Foundation. February 5, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32457 (accessed Februrary 25, 2009).

Stein, Catherine. "Aftenposten.no." Norwegian Base Weakest in Afghanistan . June 5, 2008. http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article2466146.ece (accessed January 19, 2009).

Swedish Armed Forces. In the World: Afghanistan. October 22, 2007. http://www.mil.se/en/Forces-abroad/Afghanistan/ (accessed January 19, 2009). 83

—. Sweden must be prepared to play a larger role in Afghanistan. December 22, 2008. http://www.mil.se/en/News/Mission-and-defence/Sweden-must-be-prepared-to- play-a-larger-role-in-Afghanistan/?page=10407 (accessed January 25, 2009).

—. International vs. national tasks – reflections after a recent visit to Afghanistan.September 15, 2008. http://www.mil.se/en/News/Newsletter/Newsletter-11-september-2008 (accessed March 5, 2009).

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. SCA Organisation. http://www.swedishcommittee.org/sca/organisation/index.html (accessed January 31, 2009).

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. What does Sida do in Afghanistan? http://www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=853&language=en_US (accessed March 5, 2009).

The Afghanistan Analyst. http://afghanistan-analyst.org/default.aspx (accessed November 22, 2008).

The Asia Foundation . http://www.asiafoundation.org/publications/index.php?q=&searchType=country& country=1 (accessed November 22, 2008).

The Danish Afghanistan Committee. DAC - Den Danske Afghanistan Komite. http://www.afghan.dk/ (accessed February 1, 2009).

The Long War Journal. Afghanistan Attacks Map. 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/afghn-attacks1-v2.php (accessed February 25, 2009).

The Norwegian Delegation to NATO. "Operations: Afghanistan." Norway: The Permanent Delegation to NATO, Brussels. December 13, 2006. http://www.norway-nato.org/operation/afghanistan/ afghanistan.htm (accessed January 6, 2009).

TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency. Projects in Afghanistan. http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=324#wardak (accessed February 12, 2009).

Turkish General Staff. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation. http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm (accessed February 2009, 10).

UNAMA. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. http://www.unama-afg.org/ (accessed November 22, 2008).

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Afghanistan's Provinces. March 19, 2009. http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Provinces.aspx (accessed March 21, 2009).

—. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment. Report no. PN-ADG-252, Washington DC: U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 2006 . http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnadg252.pdf (Accessed 18 April, 2009).

United States Central Command. PRT well project brings water to Afghan villages. December 16, 2008. http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/prt-well-project- brings-water-to-afghan-villages.html (accessed February 6, 2009).

—. Sweden: Support to the Global War on Terror. http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/sweden/ (accessed March 5, 2009).

U.S. Department of Defense. "Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan." Afghanistan Conflict Monitor. January 2009.

—. DefendAmerica News - Afghanistan Update. November 21, 2003. http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/update/nov2003/au112103.html (accessed February 9, 2009).

United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams." Pre-doctrinal Research White Paper No.07-01, 2007. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/provrecon_whitepaper.pdf (accessed March 18, 2009).

Yunlong, Sun. "Xinhua News Agency." Suicide attack wounds 2 in Kabul. July 18, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-07/18/content_6394128.htm (accessed February 26, 2009).

Appendix A. Report Standard and Alternative Spellings

Asadabad / Asad Abad

Bagram / Bergram

Bamyan / Bamian

Chaghcharan / Chackhcharan

Farah

Feyzabad / Fazelabad, Faizabad, Faisabad

Ghazni / Gazne, Ghazna

Gardez

Herat

Jalalabad / Jalal Abad

Kandahar / Qandahar

Khost / Khowst

Konduz / Kondoz, Kundus, Kunduz, Qhunduz, Qonduz

Kunar / Konar

Lashkar Gah

Logar

Mazar-e-Sharif / Mazar-i-Sharif, Mazar-e-Scharif

Meymaneh / Maymana, Maimana

Mitharlam / Metharlam, Metharlem

Nuristan / Nurestan

Panjshir / Panjsher

Pol-e-Khomri / Pul-e-Khomri, Pol-i-Khomri

Qala-e-Naw /Qala-i-Naw

A-1 Qalat / Kalat

Sharan / Sharana

Tarin Kowt / Tarin Khowt

Wardak / Vardak

A-2 Appendix B. Contact Database

This appendix contains a database of persons and agencies contacted through the course of the team’s research. The names and details of several senior officials at NATO Headquarters have been redacted.

B-1 International PRT Research Team Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone 93(0) Wahidullah UN Development Afghanistan's New Public Information 700266970 ext. Amani Amani Programme Beginnings Programme Associate [email protected] 8503 Embassy of the Republic Armalys Egidijus Armalys of Lithuania LTC [email protected] (202)-234-5861 Office of the International Bailey Joanna Bailey Canadian Government Coordination Press Secretary (819) 953-6238

Center for Strategic and Post-Conflict Barton Rick Barton International Studies Reconstruction Project Co-Director [email protected] 202-887-0200

Canadian International Communications Benicy Pascale Benicy Development Agency Branch Information Officer [email protected] 819-997-5006

Brearley Caroline Brearley USAID Afghanistan Desk Head [email protected] (202) 712-0518 Burke Tom Burke [email protected] Jason H. Campbell Campbell Brookings Institute Canada Website [email protected] Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Senior Program Cole Beth Ellen Cole U.S. Institute of Peace Operations Officer [email protected] 202-429-3806

Courtney Morgan Courtney U.S. Peace Corps [email protected] (0093 0)799 715 Royal Netherlands Deputy Head of 500 de Boer Marten de Boer Dutch Government Embassy Development

Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, Matthew P. Department of National Dearing Dearing Naval Postgraduate School Security Affairs Research Associate [email protected] 831-656-3586

Appendix B. Contact Database B-2 Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone United Nations Mine (0093 0)70 276 Action Center for Senior External 029 DeBenedetti Liza Benedetti Afghanistan Relations Officer Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Senior Program Dziedzic Michael Dziedzic U.S. Institute of Peace Operations Officer [email protected] 202-429-3880

House Armed Services Professional Staff Fenner Lorry M. Fenner Committee Member (202) 225-4151 COL Robin Fontes Fontes U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer [email protected] U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations French Dan French Institute [email protected] Humanitarian Policy Gostelow Lola Gostelow Save the Children UK Advisor [email protected]

House Armed Services Professional Staff Hawley Tom Hawley Committee Member (202) 226-6235 Previously worked in Hushek Thomas Hushek U.S. Department of State a PRT [email protected]

UN Development Afghanistan's New Public Information 93(0) 70 072 Ibrahimi Somah Ibrahimi Programme Beginnings Programme Officer [email protected] 577 ext. 8512 Center for Strategic and Irvine Mark Irvine International Studies [email protected]

Jeffrey Jahn Jeffrey U.S. Mission to NATO Political Officer [email protected] (32-2)724-3487 Senior Danish Representative, 93 (0) 797 888 Jensen Lars Jensen Danish Government Helmand [email protected] 116 J.C. Gad Defense Policy and Assistant Defense Jǿrgensen Jǿrgensen Danish Mission to NATO Plans Advisor [email protected] 32-2-707-6130 Embassy of the Republic Jurgaitis Antanas Jurgaitis of Lithuania Col. [email protected] (202)-234-5860

Appendix B. Contact Database B-3 Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone Burson-Marsteller Public Defense and National Keeton Pam Keeton Relations Security Practice Managing Director [email protected] 202-904-7265 Kehoe Melissa Kehoe MAJ Johanna Knoch Knoch [email protected]

House Armed Services Professional Staff Kruse John Kruse Committee Member (202) 226-6712 COL (Ret) Dave Lamm Lamm Naval Defense University [email protected] Linder Rebecca Linder [email protected]

NZAID Humanitarian Loughlin Suzanne Loughlin NZAID Program Manager [email protected] `+64 4 439 8448

McClean Walter Mc Clean U.S. Mission to NATO [email protected] 703-732-1759

House Armed Services Professional Staff McErlean Mike McErlean Committee Member (202) 225-4224

Suzanne House Armed Services McKenna McKenna Committee Counsel (202) 225-5050

Office of the Ministery Meahan Lynn Meahan Canadian Governmnet of Foreign Affairs Press Secretary (613) 995-1851 U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Merrill Susan Merrill Institute [email protected] Mirr Steven Mirr U.S. Department of State [email protected] Royal Netherlands Civil Representative Mollema Peter Mollema Dutch Government Embassy for Uruzgan [email protected] Morgan Amy Morgan USAID [email protected]

Nathan Joanna Nathan International Crisis Group [email protected]

Appendix B. Contact Database B-4 Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Nicols J H (Hank) Nicols Institute Professor [email protected] 717-245-4090 Michael O'Hanlon O'Hanlon Brookings Institute [email protected]

Olson MG Eric T. Olson Center for Strategic and Patel Seema Patel International Studies [email protected] Office of the Minister of Paxton Jay Paxton Canadian Governmnet National Defence Press Secretary (613) 996-3100 Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Senior Program Perito Robert Perito U.S. Institute of Peace Operations Officer [email protected] 202-429-4173 LTC David Pursley Pursley U.S. Department of State [email protected] +93 (0) Qaraeen Arif Qareen DACAAR Kabul Director [email protected] 797011000

House Armed Services Rogers Sasha Rogers Committee Research Assistant [email protected] (202) 226-5048 Herbert (Herbie) USAID/PRT Office Smith Smith USAID Manager [email protected] Mohammad Masoom Jennings Randolf Stanekzai Stanekzai U.S. Institute of Peace Fellowship Program Senior Fellow [email protected]

Stasek Rosemary Stasek A Little Help [email protected] Royal Netherlands Deputy Head of Stasson Yvonne Stasson Dutch Government Embassy Mission [email protected] Czech Republic PRT `+93 796 532 Stepankova Karla Stepankova Logar Media Officer [email protected] 724

Department of Szczepanik Jeff Szczepanik U.S. Mission to NATO Defense [email protected] 322-724-3170

Appendix B. Contact Database B-5 Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone Rule of Law Center of Senior Program Their J Alexander Their U.S. Institute of Peace Innovation Officer [email protected] 202-429-4702 Government of Edu. And Public Theunisson Peter Theunisson Netherlands Netherlands Embassy Information Officer [email protected] 202-274-2635

Center for Strategic and Post-Conflict von Hippel Karin von Hippel International Studies Reconstruction Project Co-Director (202) 775-3116 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability U.S. Department of Special Operations and Operations Ward Celeste Ward Defense Low Intensity Conflict Capabilities [email protected]

House Armed Services Zakheim Roger Zakheim Committee Counsel (202) 226-4444

Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force at the Department of Commerce [email protected] (202) 482-1812

Civil-Military Cooperation 0031-534-80- Centre of Excellence [email protected] 3400

Embassy of Italy in Offices of the Ministry Washington of Defense (202) 612-4500 Embassy of Italy in Washington Press and Public Affairs [email protected] (202) 612-4440 Turkish International Coorperation and Afghanistan Program Development Agency Coordination Office [email protected]; [email protected] UK Embassy in 93 (0) 700 102 Afghanistan 000

Appendix B. Contact Database B-6 U.S. PRT Research Team Last Name Full Name Organization Office w/in Org Position/Title Email Phone

George C. Marshall European Center for Nuristan PRT CDR Brown Todd Brown Security Studies 2006-2007 Burton Greg Burton U.S. PRT Kandahar Donor Faith Chamberlain Chamberlain Georgetown University Researcher

Ferrell Tye Ferrell U.S. PRT Herat USAID Development Advisor Johnson Karen Johnson U.S. Department of State Donor

Kadi Helene Kadi CIDA PRT Kandahar Development Director

Mazaka Dorothy Mazaka U.S. PRT Kandahar Donor Stinson Dana Stinson USAID Donor Trudie E. U.S. Department of Thompson Thompson U.S. PRT Kunduz State Political Officer Acting Assistant Administrator for Asia Ward Mark Ward USAID USAID at USAID AIMS

Appendix B. Contact Database B-7 Appendix C. Report of the Survey Team

November 20, 2008

Team Members: Erin Boeke Burke James Andrew Hobbs Rebecca Hopkins Sarah Hutt Nicole Trinh

Policy Research Project Leaders: Rheagan Coffey Jonathan Lee

Principal Investigator: Kenneth M. Matwiczak, Ph.D.

C-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A student research team at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, led Dr. Kenneth Matwiczak, is conducting a Policy Research Project (PRP) to produce a comprehensive and verifiable database of factors contributing to the relative success of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan for the Congressional Research Service. As part of that project, a group of students known as the Survey Team developed and distributed an exploratory questionnaire to individuals with extensive experience with PRTs to identify key issues and areas of interest. The following report describes the Survey Team’s methodology and process and contains the questionnaire’s findings. Respondents emphasized the importance of leadership, funding, and personnel as critical variables for the successful operation of a PRT. Personal relationships were cited as a valuable success factor, whereas security challenges and unclear mandates were mentioned as frequent challenges to PRT operations.

C-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

101 - Background

101 - Questionnaire Development

101 - Administration, Distribution, and Audience

102 - Analysis of Findings

110 - Recommendations and Conclusion

113- Supplemental Materials:

113 - Timeline

114 - Cover Letter from Dr. Matwiczak

115 - Questionnaire

116 - Full Text of Responses

C-3

BACKGROUND

The PRP as a whole agreed early in the process that a survey could be a useful tool to gain insight and first-hand knowledge of the PRTs and could be utilized to identify important factors not named by other sources. Five students from the PRP formed a Survey Team to develop and conduct a survey.

QUESTIONNARE DEVELOPMENT To gain a more fully developed understanding of the process of conducting a survey, the survey team attended a brief lecture by Dr. Peter Ward of the LBJ School that outlined the basis, formation, content, and expectations for an initial exploratory or “fishing” survey. The Survey Team shared questions that team members developed in advance, yet quickly acknowledged that the questions were too specific for an exploratory survey and should be left for a more detailed future project. Instead, the team agreed to send a brief questionnaire (15-20 minutes to complete) to a small and select group of individuals with extensive first-hand knowledge of PRTs. The exploratory questionnaire contained four open-ended questions, designed to generally establish fields of interest for future investigation.

ADMINISTRATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND AUDIENCE

Survey Administration

After finalizing the questionnaire, the Survey Team deliberated on the best method of administering the survey electronically. The team decided to use the “Survey Monkey” website: an online survey tool that enables people to create their own surveys, distribute them, and obtain feedback.168 Survey Monkey services were most appropriate for the Survey Team’s budget and basic needs for the open-ended question survey. The site allowed the Survey Team to quickly input the questions, format them in a professional manner, and establish a survey link for survey delivery. All Survey Team members could easily access the survey to make modifications or review survey responses at any given time.

Distribution

The Survey Team decided to use e-mail to contact the target audience about the online questionnaire, especially due to the international nature of the target audience and cost- effectiveness. More importantly, electronic communication was easily accessible and allowed respondents to complete the survey at their own convenience.

An electronic cover letter was developed and underwent extensive review by Survey Team members and project advisor. The letter was sent by Dr. Matwiczak; a reminder

168 SurveyMonkey.com, "The Monkeys Behind the Scenes," SurveyMonkey.com, http://www.surveymonkey.com/Home_CompanyInfo.aspx (accessed November 12, 2008).

C-4

letter was sent two weeks later. Recipients were given one to three weeks to respond to the questionnaire.

Audience

The Survey Team worked in association with the PRP Contact Database Team to select and obtain contact information for personnel from a wide variety of fields who had diverse and extensive experience with PRTs. Names and contact information were obtained through personal connections, reading prominent reports on PRTs, and contacts at the U.S. Government, NATO, and foreign embassies. A conscious effort was made to include individuals with diverse backgrounds and varieties of experience with PRTs. They included, among others:

• Former PRT members and commanders

• U.S. Department of State representatives

• U.S. Armed Forces personnel

• NATO employees

• U.S. AID employees

• Foreign policy think tank researchers and managers

• U.S. Institute of Peace employees

• Afghan civilians

The questionnaire was sent in two phases; 21 people received the initial e-mail; one week later nine more people were added to the target audience. Seven e-mails were returned. Sixteen people completed at least part of the questionnaire – over two-thirds of recipients.

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Analytic Methodology

Our survey deliberately sought unfettered opinions of experts through a series of four open-ended questions. Therefore, there was little ordinal or nominal data to sort; only a best-fit write-up synthesizing results would do. Survey Team members worked together to analyze two questions each and produce short summaries of responses, highlighting recurrent key concepts. In some cases, responses varied widely. The following analysis does not include several creative and individual responses; the intent is to address major themes that emerged from the survey responses. Individual responses are located in the raw data section.

C-5

Findings

Question One: Personal Information and PRT Experience

Please briefly describe yourself (age, gender, and nationality), your professional background, and the duration and nature of your experience with PRTs. What did your role entail?

The exploratory questionnaire produced 16 responses from a surprisingly wide range of individuals given the limited number of respondents.

Figure 1A

Age of Survey Respondents

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 No Response 18-25 25-40 40-65 65+ Age

Survey respondents tended toward mid-career, full professional with a substantial portion of respondents choosing not to identify their age bracket. The survey did not target junior professionals, so a lack of responses from the 18-25 age bracket is unsurprising. The respondents’ ages ranged from as young as 28 to as old as 66.

C-6

Figure 1B

Gender of Survey Respondent

Male Female 4 No Response 10

Respondents were overwhelmingly male, with two respondents opting not to identify their gender. Respondents composed a three-to-one male-to-female ratio.

Figure 1C

Professional Background & Affiliation of Survery Respondents

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 l c al ry ic na tary n m nse emi o io ilita o d ssi ss de e Mili l/M fe Rep Aca ro na Aca o Prof ry/ sio N ic/P s ita m il e fe M Pro cad A Professional Background

The categories identified for professional background and affiliation categories include academic, professional, military, and the combinations of the three categories. Nearly all respondents chose to identify their backgrounds to a fairly detailed degree, sometimes including specific assignments, durations, titles, qualifications, and academic coursework. A majority of survey respondents were federal or international professionals with a heavy military component. Respondents have worked or currently work for organizations such as the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Mission to NATO, USAID, and private firms. The exposure that the individuals have or had to PRTs in Afghanistan also covered a broad range from working on senior level policy formation, to visiting PRTs and working on the ground in C-7

Afghanistan for extended periods. With one exception, respondents were U.S. citizens. Few respondents were Afghani or currently living in Afghanistan with direct interaction with a PRT or its members.

Figure 1D

Survey Resondents Affliation with PRTs

1 4 3 Observer of PRT

Support/Administrative Component of PRT

Member of PRT

Support/Administrative Component AND 1 Member of PRT No Response 7

Most survey respondents served as support or administrative components for PRTs, while several identified as PRT members or observers. Several identified themselves as both a PRT member and a PRT support/administrative component. These respondents usually identified themselves as transitioning from military to public sector positions over the course of their careers.

Question Two: PRT Successes

Please describe what you feel are the factors that have the greatest positive influence on PRTs in Afghanistan (such as funding, organization, tasks, leadership, et cetera).

Thirteen respondents answered the second question of the questionnaire. They emphasized four overarching positive influences for PRT success: clear communication; personal relations; good leadership; and plentiful resources. Each category is comprised of several subsidiary categories.

Communication

Several respondents noted the importance of communication in facilitating PRT success in Afghanistan, both in terms of communication with other Americans and the Afghan population. On the U.S. end, many noted that communication between agencies was of paramount importance; others emphasized the necessity of communications between civilian and military counterparts. Regarding communication with Afghanis, some respondents emphasized the necessity of communicating both with the local government and the local civilian population. One respondent noted the importance of staying attuned

C-8

to the interests of the local population and assessing Afghanis’ concerns in both PRT project-planning and implementation.

Personal Relationships

Many respondents also praised personal relationships as an integral element of PRT success. The respondents emphasized the value of strong relationships within governmental agencies, between different agencies, between the U.S. forces and other host nations, and between the different military units. Personal relationships with the local population also play a significant role in PRT success; respondents discussed the necessity of developing relationships with villagers and other local residents, leadership, and contractors for PRT effectiveness. One responded underscored the importance of personal relationships, stating that “[t]he nation responsible for the PRT must be willing to get out and interact with the local populace to make a difference in people’s lives. This must be done no matter what the security situation may be.” According to respondents, reconstruction efforts are some of the most effective tools in establishing firm relations with the local Afghani communities. One explained, “[i]f you don’t have things like community buy-in and cooperation of the local government then you’re wasting money.”

Leadership

Leadership also plays a pivotal role in PRT success. Respondents noted that a leader’s perception of priorities is integral for PRTs. This perception is closely related to clear and constant communication. Additionally, leaders must possess the relevant qualifications and expertise to effectively lead a PRT. Strong leadership is also demonstrated vis-à-vis teambuilding and training exercises. Finally, several respondents noted the importance of the continuity of leadership for PRT success.

Adequate Resources

The provision of and access to adequate resources is the final major factor that plays a positive role in PRT success. Most respondents focused on the importance of flexible funding for ensuring PRT success; many others, however, noted the necessity of having individuals with expertise in their respective areas. Both of these resources, when available, have had a very positive influence on PRTs and are integral for their continued successful functioning.

In addition to the aforementioned overarching categories, participants noted several other positive factors in PRT success. From a personnel perspective, these factors included reasonable tours and turnovers, allowing PRT members vacation time, and PRT composition that includes both military and civilian personnel. Others noted the importance of having manageable projects (which are usually reconstruction efforts with quick impact) for PRT success, as well as leader flexibility and creativity in executing these projects. One respondent shared an example of this creativity.

C-9

In visiting the PRT in Asadabad in March 2008, we learned that the U.S. Navy Commander in command had recently begun the practice of including clauses in contracts for 75% of the labor for a project to be composed of people living within a ten kilometer radius of the project.

Additionally, one respondent noted the important of morale amongst PRT members for success. Another emphasized the importance of having engineers in particular; without engineers, reconstruction efforts are significantly hindered.

Question Three: PRT Hindrances

Please describe what you feel have been the greatest hindrances for PRTs in Afghanistan (such as funding, organization, tasks, leadership, et cetera).

Varied responses from 12 out of 16 survey participants ranged from concrete measures such as funding, accounting practices, and training to abstract concepts such as poor mission definition and complications with humanitarian aid. This summary identifies four major themes of the responses: security challenges; leadership problems; funding difficulties; and a lack of a coherent and appropriate mission and objectives.

Security

A number of respondents emphasized that security conditions were a leading challenge for PRTs. The general sense among these respondents is that there is a direct correlation between the level of security and the ability to carry out meaningful reconstruction projects in a quick and efficient manner. A safe and secure area also plays a role in the lasting influence of a project completed by a PRT, such as the building of schools or bridges. One respondents cited “[i]nability to travel without military support, lack of security meeting the security profile of a given PRT or geographic area, and general lack of security” with regards to security challenges. Some respondents also identified the lack of Afghani awareness of the nuances of PRTs in regards to the large military security component. Respondents reported that Afghanis perceived the PRT military security component as a military presence, not necessarily a peacekeeping or humanitarian initiative.

Leadership

A wide range of respondents emphasized the lack of leadership, including the chain of command, as an overarching factor contributing negatively to PRTs. One respondent pointed to “command management styles and lack of chain of command” while another identified a “lack of civilian development expertise.” Due to the small size and make-up of PRTs, the individual personalities of senior PRT leaders and the relationships between PRT members play a significant role in the efficiency and success of a given PRT. Respondents claimed that personality-driven management styles are magnified under the current PRT structure. Other respondents indicated that differences between military and civilian leadership styles can and do play out negatively in achieving a PRT objective.

C-10

Funding

Respondents also mentioned frequently that insufficient funding and poor prioritization of funds distribution were a hindrance. The U.S. dollar commands the greatest influence for PRTs within Afghanistan. It is the driving force behind much of the motivation for work carried out by Afghanis on PRT projects. Respondents cited “lack of funding, funding allocation, and lack of accounting measures,” as having a negative impact on PRTs. They acknowledged that a large amount of U.S. and foreign aid being sent to and spent in Afghanistan is good for accomplishing PRT objectives. However, a lack of guidelines or vague definitions in that guidance about where and when money is best spent posed significant challenges. Respondents also mentioned there is little accounting within Afghanistan for allocation of funding.

PRT Mission & Objectives

Many respondents emphasized that a general lack of cohesion in mission and goals had had a negative impact on PRTs. They explained that PRTs will take on their own personality and role over time as a result of the unique structure and landscape of Afghanistan. While PRTs must be somewhat unique by nature, the lack of a large-scale operational concept means they do not have guidance when there is disconnect between PRTs and national development goals. Similarly, respondents identified challenges in accountability; specifically, the ability to quantify and track the quality of service as well as the effectiveness of the projects completed by PRTs. PRTs continue to initiate and implement influential changes within Afghanistan that are in direct support of Afghanis. Yet, similarly to accounting practices, respondents repeatedly claimed challenges on how to quantify or track their accomplishments.

Question Four: What Should Decision-Makers Know about PRTs?

If you had the opportunity to individually address your country’s national decision makers, whom would you choose to address and what would you want them to know about PRTs in Afghanistan?

Of the 16 survey participants, 11 responded to the fourth and final question. Three overarching messages emerged from these responses. These messages included: better understanding of PRTs, greater funding for PRTs, and a need for interagency agreements to address communication. Collectively, these messages requested the attention of major national leaders, decision makers, and the American people.

C-11

Specifically, respondents identified:

• American Public

• National Security Council/ Adviser

• Secretary of Defense

• Secretary of State

• U.S. Agency for International Development

• U.S. Congress (Appropriations Committee)

While the responses to this question were the most varied of the questionnaire, there were still recurrent themes, including: greater understanding of PRTs, a need for more resources, and greater communication and collaboration.

Improve Understanding of PRTs

While primarily targeted at the American public, the first widely proscribed recommendation also targeted the international media and the U.S. administration: learn more about conditions in Afghanistan and the mission and nature of PRTs. According to respondents, if the American public understood the many and varied needs of the Afghan people, they would better understand the existence of PRTs. Furthermore, better recognition of PRT work results in fewer negative perceptions among the public and greater support among the administration.

There are many different messages encompassed in this category. Some respondents attempted to drive home that the role of the PRT is to promote “development, diplomacy, and defense” for Afghanistan. Others explained that the success of PRTs is difficult to measure. One respondent emphasized the difficulty of quantifying success in terms of internal capacity and good governance. Decision makers do not always understand the work of PRTs because often times, many of the outcomes of development work are immeasurable.

Finally, respondents urged patience - national leaders must be realistic regarding the time it takes for PRTs to have an impact. They claimed that PRT success was and continues to be dependent upon the amount of time spent in Afghanistan. Longer tours of duty would allow PRTs to have greater impact.

Increase Resources

Several respondents used this section to petition for increased financial support and human resources for PRTs. Quick impact projects are key success factors in PRTs; however, they are not executed well without the proper financial backing. In addition to greater funding, respondents requested more civilian power. Multiple respondents believed that more civilian involvement and civilian leadership is an essential component

C-12 for the success and stability of PRTs. A change in PRT structure allows better distinction and separation between military versus civilian efforts, according to some respondents.

Increase Collaboration

Many respondents encouraged greater interagency agreement and community work on PRTs. Respondents reported that communication was a critical factor for improving PRT operation and effectiveness and many felt that increasing interagency agreements would improve communication. Furthermore, to maximize PRT success, civilian and military elements within a PRT need to work better together. Finally, one respondent reported that interagency agreements “develop efficient and effective coordination/liaison structures between relevant actors involved in PRTs.”

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Many of the recommendations of the survey respondents were outside the scope of the PRP – extending beyond input and output variables and into the realm of malleable relationships and outcome measures. Respondents often focused on the prescriptive, whereas the PRP database will be descriptive.

However, we believe that going through the process of drafting the questionnaire and analyzing the responses of individuals with varied first-hand knowledge of PRTs contributes to the PRP’s knowledge of PRT operations and the challenges they face. It also accelerated the process of building a contact database and revealed the difficulty in identifying and contacting individuals connected to NATO-led PRTs.

The questionnaire responses show that the PRP is on the right track. The database that will be submitted to the CRS will increase knowledge about the operations of PRTs, and may be of use in formulating metrics to measure PRT progress – two respondent recommendations. Many of the issues the respondents identified as critical for PRT success are already incorporated in the database structure, including funding levels and type of appropriations, local threat level, civilian and military staffing levels, and coordination with local government officials.

Based on the questionnaire findings, the Survey Team recommends expanding the number of variables related to the categories most-heavily emphasized by survey respondents: leadership, communication, funding, security, and human resources. We understand that the Policy Research Project may not have the research capacity to gather all of the pertinent data in these recommended areas; in some cases they extend beyond the scope of our specific mission for the CRS. While these recommendations may not all be actionable at this time, we suggest that future research consider the following items:

Leadership

Because many respondents mentioned the importance of leadership for PRT success, we also suggest that the following categories are included as indicators of leadership and preparedness:

C-13

• Number of leadership transitions per year

• Length of leadership transition period

• Number of citations for insubordination

• Number of firings

• Number of unfilled civilian positions

Communication

We also feel it is important to increase the number of indicators of PRT communication. We suggest the following indicators:

• How often are reports submitted to superiors within the PRT and to higher levels of command?

• What types of reporting are used? (formal written report, email, phone)

• To whom were these reports submitted?

Funding

Because most respondents noted the importance of funding, we feel it is necessary to emphasize the importance of having good indicators for these categories. In addition to the variables already entered in the database, we would encourage researchers to explore accounting practices, funding streams within Afghanistan, corruption charges, and the quantity and type of foreign aid present in the region.

Security

At present, the database tracks the Instability level of the region where a PRT operates as documented by the Marshall Report. On account of the survey respondents’ heavy emphasis on security, we recommend adding more variables to track the relationship between the PRT and the local security environment:

• Number of attacks on PRT

• Number of projects attacked

• Number of U.S./ foreign personnel casualties

Human Resources

PRTs depend on strong leadership and the ability to attract top civilian and military employees. Therefore, we recommend tracking the incentives offered to attract and retain good staff and ensure continuity of leadership. We suggest the following categories:

C-14

• Amount of time spent in training before arriving, both with and without former PRT members

• Average number of tours of each PRT member

• Average time off allotted to PRT members

• Average yearly value of benefits (wages plus benefits)

C-15

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:

TIMELINE

All dates are 2008.

8/28 - First Meeting of Policy Research Project

9/11 - Formation of Survey Team

9/18 - Meeting with Congressional Research Service

9/19 - Meeting with Dr. Ward on Survey Methodology

9/25 - Conference Call with Congressional Research Service

10/19 - First Round of Questionnaires Sent

11/2 - Second Round of Questionnaires Sent

11/6 - Questionnaire Deadline

11/20 - Report Issued

C-16

COVER LETTER FROM DR. MATWICZAK

Dear….:

I am supervising a student research team at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. We are working on a project with the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) to develop a database that will provide the relevant information needed to identify factors that affect the success of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. (A brief description of our project is attached.) We hope to complete and submit this database to CRS in May 2009.

While we are familiar with the missions and structures of PRTs, there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge and understanding. Thus, we are asking for your help in determining what elements of information we might use to distinguish “critical success factors” for both US-led and NATO-led PRTs. We have provided a short questionnaire (approximately 5-10 minutes) that aims to identify key issues and areas of interest that we might pursue in gathering information to include in our database. (Any additional insight you provide would also be invaluable.)

This is an initial questionnaire that we will use to determine the overarching topics that should be included in the final database. We may follow up with a second, more detailed survey within the next few months. Because we are in the initial stages of the project, any input that you provide will significantly shape the information that we include in our final product.

You can access this initial questionnaire at the link provided below: (URL)

This questionnaire is completely voluntary and does not ask for any individually identifiable information. Any information that you provide will be treated confidentially. Unfortunately, we cannot release the results of this survey, or our database, until CRS has had an opportunity to review our report, after May 2009, at which time, the decision on who can be included in any distribution list rests with CRS. We would be happy to include you on any potential distribution list we provide to CRS.

We sincerely appreciate your assistance. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions, concerns, or feel you have received this email in error. We ask that you complete this questionnaire by Monday, October 27, 2008, at the latest.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.

Best,

Ken Matwiczak, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer / MPAff Graduate Advisor LBJ School of Public Affairs University of Texas at Austin

C-17

QUESTIONNAIRE

Participants were limited to 1500 characters per response.

Question One: Personal Information

Please briefly describe yourself (age, gender, and nationality), your professional background, and the duration and nature of your experience with PRTs. What did your role entail?

Question Two: PRT Successes

Please describe what you feel are the factors that have the greatest positive influence on PRTs in Afghanistan (such as funding, organization, tasks, leadership, et cetera).

Question Three: PRT Hindrances

Please describe what you feel have been the greatest hindrances for PRTs in Afghanistan (such as funding, organization, tasks, leadership, et cetera).

Question Four: Final Question

If you had the opportunity to individually address your country’s national decision makers, who would you choose to address and what would you want them to know about PRTs in Afghanistan?

C-18

FULL TEXT OF RESPONSES

Question One:

Male, 66, USA: I have written extensively about PRTs and testified about PRTs before Congress.

---

Age: 33 Gender: Female Nationality: US Professional background: MA in Political Science. Four years as the Afghanistan Desk Officer with the US Agency for International Development. Duration and nature of your experience with PRTs: Provided programmatic support to the USAID mission in Kabul, including the office of PRTs. Included several trips to Afghanistan---

United States citizen, female, age 49, retired from US Army as a lieutenant colonel. I served 24 years in the Army, 10 on active duty and 14 in the Army Reserve, including 18 years as a public affairs officer. My last tour of duty was in Afghanistan Aug 2004-Jan 2005 where I served as director of public affairs at Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. My team of public affairs specialists and I reported on the activities of PRTs. I also escorted media to one PRT and a CODEL to another PRT.

---

I am male, a US citizen, 58 years old & have civilian experience in prosecution, governance and elections. I served 4 yrs in Bosnia (BIH) 1996 - 2000, 1yr as a US Army civil affairs (CA) officer seconded to OSCE & 3 yrs more as a US DoS contractor seconded to the OSCE. Recalled to active duty in 2000-2001 at the US Army P’ keeping Inst. working on civil military issues. 2001-2002, assigned to Office of the Sec Def working on the Balkans. Upon retirement worked a personal service contractor with USAID in Afg. & served in the 1st (Gardez) PRT in Afg., 2003-04. The PRT - total assigned - 100 military consisting of 25 civil affairs soldiers and 75 (+/-), military force protection troops & 3 civilians, 1 DoS position, 1 USDA rep & me, USAID rep. Our geo area covered 5 prov., approx. the size of the state of S.C. I served for 12 mo. I was fortunate to understand both the civ & mil parts because each part was ignorant of the others’ ways of doing business. There was a huge culture clash. The troops expected me to arrive with bags of cash. We had very little ready cash during the 1st half of my tour. USAID got ESF funds for projects but USAID saw "quick impact" as months but the

C-19

troops saw it as weeks. The PRT projects were of physical infrastructure type. When DoD CERP arrived money was spent freely without consideration for sustainability. The troops were in a hurry to make an impact before departure & receive a good efficiency report. The mil. metrics were gross numbers, # of projs, # of $ spent, not how many people benefited from our actions

---

Wahidullah Amani: Age: 28, Male, Afghan. My professional is in the field of journalism, I have worked as a journalism trainer for media project which was funded by British PRT in southern Helmand province of Afghanistan for two years. Although the Helmand PRT was doing lots for reconstruction of the province such as building playgrounds for children, green parks, paving roads providing electricity for the city etc. But in my opinion all these projects were limited to the a limited number of people and the rest of the people living in the province thought the PRT is a part of the army they are conducting military operations. When DIFID funded this Media project in which more than 30 local journalists were taught journalism basics after that there were several news about PRT's activities on the local and international media and it gave a very good profile to the PRT in Helmand province.

---

I am a 29 year old American male. I co-author ongoing studies designed to track the progress of reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this capacity I have followed very closely the PRT's in each nation and have a sound understanding of their histories and differences. In addition, I took part in a DoD-sponsored civilian defense experts trip to Afghanistan's RC East in March 2008 and had the opportunity to visit a number of PRT's in this AO firsthand.

---

45 yrs male US citizen government employee 1 year service at a PRT in Afghanistan as civilian advisor

---

I am a male, 58 year old US citizen, retired from the Army in '06 as a major general. Subsequently served as the deputy director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office ('06-07), and then as chief of staff for the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction ('07-'08). From '02 to '05 I was the commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and spent the last year of my command in Afghanistan. During that period the PRT's in Afghanistan were under the operational control of my headquarters. As deputy director of IRMO, I ran all the PRT's in Iraq from 06-07. During my time at SIGIR, we completed several audits and reports on PRT's. Last month at Fort Bragg I served as a senior mentor for PRT's in training to deploy to Afghanistan (a Northrop-Grumman contract).

C-20

---

52 year old U.S. male. 27+ years of military experience; 4+ years of experience (military / civilian) working in NATO. Participated in the formulation of NATO policy regarding the establishment of PRTs in Afghanistan

---

Alison Blosser Age: 30 Female USA Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State Most recent posting: PRT Asadabad, Kunar Province Political Officer/U.S. Department of State Representative Dates: September 2007-September 2008 Current posting: U.S. Mission to NATO Political Officer - Afghanistan Operations Dates: October 2008- October 2011

---

U.S.Army Lieutenant Colonel currently working at US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium. Responsible for providing information on PRT effectiveness to Defense Representatives.

---

42, M, USA, Development Professional with USAID, Aug 07 to Sept 08. Director for USAID PRT Office based in Kabul.

---

42 year old male from the US. USAF pilot with 20 years on active duty. I am assigned at NATO as a Defense Policy Advisor to the US Ambassador to NATO. My area of responsibility is Afghanistan and ISAF issues. I have visited the PRT in Khost, Afghanistan in 2007. I have coordinated on NATO documents regarding PRT policy.

---

Female foreign service officer, senior official with AID, worked on PRT training and management issues for 3 years. Experience in Iraq evaluating PRTs and determining management and resourcing issues with PRTs.

---

47, male, us citizen I am an active guard reserve civil affairs officer I was a PRT commander in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan Sep 04 - June 05

Question Two:

Unity of purpose for the PRT mission good synchronization of activities, engagements amongst all actors within the AOR maximize resources, including host nation engage the locals...build capacity flexible funding mechanisms maximize use of all PRT and

C-21

provincial assets, civilians, maneuver, embedded training teams, police mentoring teams, agribusiness development teams, and IOs and NGOs as available. Key leader engagements are critical...education, religious, business, farmers, etc

---

1) Organization- chain of command and structure; 2) Funding- PRTs need their own source of funding; 3) Authorities- PRT authorities and roles are not clear. See the final report and briefing from the PKSOI, S/CRS Workshop at Gettysburg, PA in March 2008.

---

In my opinion there are 2 key factors in the success of PRTs. 1) Funding. The PRT must be well funded to make any impact in Afghanistan. 2) National will. The nation responsible for the PRT must be willing to get out and interact with the local populace to make a difference in people's lives. This must be done no matter what the security situation may be.

---

The successful PRTs have internalized the training and implemented an Executive Steering Group/Board comprised of the civilian reps of MFA/US Dept of State, USAID (or PRT country development agency), Agriculture Rep, and military Commander. This board makes all strategic decisions for the PRT -- prioritizing, project selection, etc. This group is also responsible for coordinating the PRT's activities with the Afghan government, predominantly at the provincial and district levels, but also pushing to the national level as necessary. -- Close cooperation with maneuver/operational forces in the AO. PRTs in highly volatile provinces need to have an aggressive operational tempo of moving around the province. They need to be able to move into difficult areas to monitor projects and engage with communities, often with Afghan govt counterparts riding along/meeting there/resident at the district level. Coordination with maneuver/operational forces can significantly augment the PRT's ability to move securely. When operational forces are not fighting, they should be supporting the PRT's mission and "extending the bubble" where the PRT can travel. -- Bases are not garrisons. Bases are springboards to be active in the province. When Security Force Protection assets match or exceed the PRT's need to get out, the PRT is highly successful. When SecFor IS the mission, the PRT gets base-bound, which is useless in a counter-insurgency. -- Downtown offices with local staff can be the "front door of the PRT" and the primary interface for Afghan govt AND local populace with the PRT. The PRT is not the center of governance in the province -- the governor's compound is. Meetings should be held downtown in provincial capitals whenever possible to reinforce this message. -- Engineers are critical to the PRT's success and are huge enablers for infrastructure development.

---

Flexible funding to meet changing needs and implementation environment at PRT level, and reflecting different needs and nature of each PRT. Strong strategic linkages between

C-22

PRT level activities and national level development programs (donors and Govt of Afghanistan) in key sectors such as health, education, roads. Effective interagency coordination and cooperation on common objectives of PRT programs. Effective civil- military cooperation and understanding. Leadership at the PRTs -- need to integrate civilian and military players at PRT to get at security, development and governance issues -- they are interrelated. Effective relationships with local leadership. Effective and relevant pre-deployment training for civilian and military PRTers

---

The factors that have the greatest positive influence are the PRTs' ability to facilitate security sector reform, governance and community development. To accomplish this, PRTs must have the resources, both personnel and monetary to support / assist the GIRoA and its institutions in this regard. The tasks undertaken in the areas of security sector reform, governance and community development should be aligned with the Afghan National Development Strategy and in coordinated / synchronized with adjacent PRTs.

---

Interagency composition -- For the most part, good leadership -- Reasonable support from home agencies -- Favorable impression and good support from the leadership in theater (civilian and military) -- Solid relationships with the military units in the same regions -- Flexible organizations, tailored to local needs -- Generally, good credibility and relationships with local leaders (governors, sheikhs, tribal leaders, etc.) -- For most PRT's, enthusiasm of PRT members

---

Quick impact project funds (USAID) and CERF (military) were very important to the success of the PRTs -- especially in the immediate post-conflict transition or in cases of continuing hostility. PRTs where the staff is on the ground for longer periods (including military) were more successful. Some of the NATO-led PRTs have too frequent turnover of military staff. Vacations are necessary but detract from time on the ground. Ability to remain mobile (vehicles, permissive security environment, commo) was critical to outreach.

---

The U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan seem to be doing a better job of integrating local interests and concerns into their project planning and contracting practices, although this seems to be done mostly on an ad hoc basis without formal instruction. For instance, in visiting the PRT in Asadabad in March 2008, we learned that the U.S. Navy Commander in command had recently begun the practice of including clauses in contracts calling for 75% of the labor for a project to be composed of people living within a 10 km radius of the project. This was one of a handful of similar examples of enterprising leaders being

C-23

given the freedom to pursue creative solutions. Nevertheless, it appeared as though many were working on an island as opposed to having good, central direction.

---

In my opinion there are many factors which will have greatest positive influence on PRTs in Afghanistan, if the PRTs directly contact local people through village elders tribal elders, local people's councils and provide them small projects such as solar power, building roads to remote areas, building schools, health clinics, providing water for their lands etc, making employment opportunity to local youth without giving priority to local warlords think this kind of activities will give a good profile to the PRTs and local people will trust their international friends. Beside the reconstructions if the PRTs allocate a small amount of it's budget for funding a small media projects and organize some media tours to the fields it will be very helpful for changing the minds of local people.

---

PRTs represent a stable presence in villages throughout Afghanistan. Because those assigned to PRTs are normally there for 6 months to a year, they are able to develop good relationships with villagers. PRT commanders have relative freedom in how they spend their money in villages, which allows them to address the greatest or most advantageous of needs. PRTs are staffed by a variety of military and civilians with a variety of skills which gives them greater flexibility to meet local needs, keeps the mission and interaction from being strictly military in nature and allows for more and different interpersonal relationships. PRTs also provide security while allowing specialists to interact more freely with villagers.

---

1) Leadership - The leader must understand that members from other agencies are not his subordinates but rather equals with particular expertise. A collegial atmosphere is necessary. 2) Team building - A spirit of cooperation must be engendered and maintained. Each agency must understand the other agencies represented in the PRT. 3) Proactive interest by higher authority - Initiatives should be consistent with a higher plan. Expectations should be realistic there are no overnight miracles. Information & guidance must flow freely from above rather than being pulled in by the PRT personnel. 4) Expertise -Team members should bring the requisite expertise for the job. 5) Metrics - Metrics must measure outcomes, not in-put and out-put.

---

Communication is the #1 factor - for both a positive and negative influence. If there is no (or bad) communication - then the PRTs doesn't operate at its fullest potential. If there are clear and open lines of communication, then the PRT stands to operate much more effectively. Leadership is almost, if not equal, to communication in importance. If the commander is not open to listening to what the civilians have to say then the PRTs effectiveness is greatly diminished. Focusing on the US led PRTs for a minute -- by

C-24

civilians I mean the following: the State Dept rep, the USAID rep, the USDA rep (if present), the DOD civil affairs officer(s), etc. Some commanders do not always accept the advice given by the civilians, esp in the early days. USAID often had trouble being heard at the table because their reps were considered rather junior (they tended to be rather young and often had less than 5-7 years USAID experience). That's not to say they were not great development advisors, but it was hard for them to be taken seriously when they were 20 years younger than everyone else at the table. This, thankfully, has vastly improved over the last 3 years. The leadership issue among the non US led PRTs is slightly different because each of the nations in command of a PRT have a slightly different mandate than the US does. Some consider themselves under a peacekeeping mandate while others see themselves there to do reconstruction while others are there for security reasons. The commander's perception of his/her mandate can and does influence their interaction with the civilians. Funding is another important component. BUT having the bucks doesn't mean you're going to have a positive influence. If you don't have things like community buy in and cooperation of the local government than you're wasting money.

Question Three:

This ties directly back to the previous question. All of the contributing factors that make a successful PRT can also hinder the PRT. However, we are 4 years since the creation of PRTs and instead PRTs being successful because of the personalities present, we should be seeing successful PRTs because best practices have been institutionalized. I'll state the obvious that the security situation can make or break how successful the PRT can be (and by successful, I mean from a reconstruction/development perspective). If only the military can leave the PRT, then the only thing the locals are going to see are the guys with guns and can possibly leave a very negative - and incorrect - perception of "occupation" with the locals. Even if the PRT goes out on patrol lightly armed but has a huge convoy (such as the Germans in Kunduz/Badakshan), it has a negative perception on the PRT. Having the State rep meeting with the local political movers and shakers and the USAID & USDA reps meeting with local government and if permissible, the villagers, to find out what is really needed is key. Not being able to get outside the wire means that the civilians have to rely on contractors to find out what the local needs are and this can sometimes hinder the civilians in making fully informed decisions regarding programming. Also, not having a clear chain of command for resolving issues can hinder things. Organizationally, the civilians do not report to the PRT commander. But realistically, they are dependant on the commander and his/her staff for force protection, housing, etc. Each party needs to know WHEN and HOW to resolve an issue. Its very nuanced and, especially in the beginning of their assignment, its hard for the civilians to know what issues really merit being run up the chain of command. Is it inequitable housing, not enough access to shared computers, or maybe not being allowed entrance in a meeting? Some issues can be resolved internally within the PRT, but others should be run up the chain of command within each respective agency. Of course, each of the examples given above would be treated differently depending on the actual situation at the PRT.

C-25

---

The military commander saw the PRT as "his”. He controlled all force protection assets and was the final authority on operations. His efficiency report was based on his performance of military stability operations and that was his priority. Many PRTs failed to agree to pursue coordinated projects based on a consensus of the various reps. ESF money was seen as the "PRT's money" while military CERP funds were seen as the "military commander's money" to be spent w/o consultation. The PRT leaders were not informed about where their individual PRTs fit into the overall strategy. They were basically told to go "do good". If assessments and surveys were done at all, they were done by unqualified military personnel.

---

It's been difficult to fill some of the civilian positions because of the dangers and hardships.

---

The greatest hindrances for PRTs in Afghanistan is the wide propaganda against foreign troops in Afghanistan to solve this problem the PRTs needs to improve their activities and go directly to the middle of the people again giving job to jobless people in provinces will help lots to return people from joining the insurgents, most of the young people they are joining Taliban lines it is because of unemployment and their are rumors that Taliban are paying them more than the Afghan Government.

---

From the funding standpoint, it was clear from a March 2008 visit that CERP funding accounted for the vast majority of the money spent by PRTs in RC East. The main reason given was that it was the most easily accessible. Many complaints were made about some of the restrictions put on other sources, such as USAID, as well as the vast amounts of paperwork and delays involved with tapping into funds promised by other foreign governments. The problem here is that CERP funds are coming under increasingly strict oversight by the US Congress and it is unlikely that such a blank check will continue into the near future. Aside from this, PRTs in Afghanistan clearly lack in the civilian expertise necessary for optimal development success, particularly when compared to Iraq. Most PRTs have only a handful of such experts who, though they perform very admirably, are clearly overwhelmed. Finally, it is unclear the extent to which US PRTs are performing their primary job: enhancing the reach of the central Afghan government into outlying areas. Though they are working well with local leadership, their good deeds are of limited utility if they do not appear to be a product of an increasingly scrutinized central government.

---

C-26

Lack of tie-in with international and non-governmental organizations also doing reconstruction work in the field. Generally should let these organizations do the job in places where it is possible without military presence. Too many PRTs -- better to focus on developing regional civilian-led platforms (proto-consulates) in parts of the country where security conditions would permit. (Continuing to rely on PRTs or maneuver units for in extremis support.) PRTs shouldn't be seen as permanent fixtures. Nor should the host governments be given the impression that they can provide universal coverage. Not every P will have a PRT. The host governments have started thinking of the PRT merely as a source of project funding. Not enough public diplomacy resources.

---

Instability, lack of security in the operating environment -- Lack of a commonly agreed purpose or understanding of what they should be doing -- Lack of an agreed operational concept-- how should they be doing it? -- No doctrine, no standard operating procedures - - Shortages of key personnel (some agencies are far worse than others) -- Shortages of funding, especially flexible funding that is available to PRT leaders for both PRT operations and investment capital for projects -- Inability to travel without military support -- Insufficient training for the job (especially Iraqi PRT's) -- Turmoil; frequent and unpredictable personnel rotation -- Inability of players in the interagency community in DC to reach agreements results huge disconnects between and inconsistent guidance from parent agencies -- Difficulty coordinating PRT efforts with those of other agencies working in the same region-- US agencies and NGO's/IO's -- Very few native speakers -- Most members coming to Iraq, Afghanistan for the first time

---

One of the greatest issues for PRTs at this time is that they fall under national command and control. As such, the ability to achieve coherence among PRTs is limited and as a result, the overall development efforts, information sharing and harmonization of activities is not optimal. All aspects of PRTs -- funding levels, organization and tasks are directed / dictated by national capitals. Further compounding this problem is the presence of myriad actors involved in reconstruction / development who do not fully coordinate their efforts.

---

Security as it affects ability of PRT to engage with local communities and leaders and carry out development and governance programs. Lack of coordinated civ-mil planning and implementation of development programs at PRTs -- often resulting from differing timelines between military and civilians -- short-term vs. long term objectives. Failure to collect and utilize best practices of last 5 years of PRTs -- how to avoid making the same mistakes with each new rotation. Lack of standard roles and responsibilities for civilians and military at PRTs -- still too personality driven. Differences between NATO led and US led PRTs. Unclear future of PRTs -- what is ultimate aim, how long are they needed, how to measure impact and success of PRTs.

C-27

---

Lack of sufficient Security Force Protection elements that match the security profile in an area. We need to be more creative on provincial capitals - for the ones that are relatively safe, should we really be moving in 4-Humvee convoys with mounted weapons over 2- 5km? Massive muscle movements such as complex convoys could be "saved" for more difficult missions (farther out districts, for example), if we could explore private security options for safer areas. Everyone is supportive of more civilians at PRTs, in theory, but if there is not a concomitant plus-up of ForcePro/SecFor, additional civilians will actually hamper the mission, and will be base-bound (i.e., not worth it).

---

Lack of funds and lack of national will to get out there camp's security environment.

---

Lack of civilian capacity lack of PRT doctrine, structure lack of consistent funding mechanism lack of forces do not allow a more persistent presence we rotate out too frequently.... we need to be there for 18 - 24 months we need to rotate out during off- fighting times we need specific capabilities...city planners, police administrators, government capacity building, power generation etc rather than generalists

Question Four:

PRT's are a tremendous capability we need to have more of them.... including at the local (district level) we have to ensure that we incentivize these positions...make it worth folks while to accept a such a position we need to develop or generate doctrine for these organizations. We need to standardize the structures...core capabilities

---

Secretary of State. There needs to be a gradual hand off of PRTs from the military to civilian leadership. Military should only be present in a PRT for security in this stage of operations in Afghanistan. The Civilian sector needs to step and make a difference.

---

The reporting channels are sufficient, and the Department has been enormously receptive at very high levels to field input. The chain is: PRT office in Kabul up to Afghanistan Desk up to South/Central Asia Bureau

---

Congress -- emphasize the innovative civil-military cooperation taking place at PRTs in Afghanistan. Increase funding levels for USAID, USDA, State and DOD efforts and PRTs --- but based on effective interagency cooperation. US Public -- it’s not just the military out at the PRTs -- hundreds of civilians are working out at the PRTs in the same

C-28

combat environment. Working with their military colleagues. DOD -- there is a whole generation of soldiers who are managing PRTs and working on civil affairs teams who truly understand the linkages between development, diplomacy and defense.

---

I would address the staff of the National Security Council as this for the U.S. is an interagency issue. I would reinforce the need for the United States to do all it could to provide leadership in ensuring that the international community work toward the process of reform and strengthening of civil administration in Afghanistan. In light of the agreement by NATO Heads of State and Government in Bucharest in April 2008, the U.S. should lead the way in strengthening of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and support the strong lead coordinating role of AMB Eide (UN SRSG). We need to lead an effort to develop efficient and effective coordination / liaison structures between relevant actors involved in PRTs. We need to do all we can to support the expansion of UNAMA's presence and engagement across all regions of Afghanistan and in PRTs.

---

Secretary of Defense Secretary of State Director, USAID National Security Advisor Message: If we really believe that "bottom up" solutions will be instrumental to successful security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations, and that these solutions must be interagency in nature, then PRT's should be a major effort. Before they can be successful, an interagency agreement and commitment to the concept must be achieved.

---

Seeing as he has been a vocal supporter of more interagency funding, I would choose to speak with Secretary of Defense Gates. Afghanistan could be a case study of how dire the situation has become. 95% of the personnel at US PRTs in Afghanistan are military. In certain areas of the country there is only 1 USAID rep responsible for an area comprising 6 provinces. No US PRT in Afghanistan has more than 5 civilian experts working at any one time and the average for a PRT is 1 or 2 such expert. Sadly, nothing is being done to fix this. On any given day, one can go onto the usajobs.gov website and find a number of postings seeking civilian expertise to spend a year in Iraq to assist in various sectors such as banking, agriculture, transportation and electricity. Such postings do not currently exist for Afghanistan. Instead, in many cases the military will assign someone within its ranks who just happens to have certain in-demand knowledge to do their best to fill a role. (For instance, a Reservist who is an electrician or farmer back home will be assigned to a PRT and become the de facto expert.) Like in so many other instances, the military is carrying an uneven share of the load. In short, the "economy of force" effort that has accurately explained the military dichotomy between Iraq and Afghanistan for so long is even more apparent when considering the civilian aspect.

---

C-29

I will choose tribal elders and religious scholars especially in south, west, east and central parts of the country. For example if a council of tribal elders in south of Afghanistan make a decision no one can break that decision if they do the tribal elders will heavy fine them, like they may burned their houses and drive them out of the area for ever.

---

Congressional appropriations committees to ask that more money be directed to efforts such as PRTs and less money be spent on big weapons programs like the F22. National Security Council and senior service colleges to urge more support for PRTs as well as to capture and institutionalize the lessons learned and train future generations in DOD, State, Ag and other agencies to use the concepts in other ways and in other countries

---

1) Get a plan 1st. Don't try to build an airplane and fly it at the same time. 2) Consult subject matter experts and then pay heed to their advice rather relying on political spinmiesters. 3) Be realistic about expectations, Afghanistan may get up to par with Bangladesh someday if we are successful. Do not fuel overly optimistic expectations of the Afghan population. 4) Learn what the majority of Afghans want and harmonize our approaches to meet their desires. 5) Undertake sustainable initiatives. 6) Keep in mind that Afghanistan's revenues don't come near supporting all of our expensive initiatives; larger army, more police, etc.

---

I would like to see recognition that PRTs are more than just the military and they are doing great things. What I don't think decision makers always understand is the fundamental difference between the roles of the military and the civilians at the PRTs. The military (esp. US) has a finite mission - clear, hold, and (maybe) build. But the development agencies do more that just build. They do many things that are intangible and I recognize that understanding what the development agencies do is difficult. You can see a courthouse or a school that has been built, but you can't see capacity building. Its important for our decision makers, especially in an election year, understand the true context regarding Afghanistan's lack of internal capacity. Showing the success of governance is difficult and I recognize that it’s hard for lawmakers, since they can't always see the impact, to want to continue to fund things like democracy or governance. But just getting them to realize what we're working with is terribly important. A few examples of what I mean: government officials that are illiterate and corrupt; officials that don't understand the concept why they should hold a decision making meeting or for that matter, how to run one; trying to get people to understand that nepotism isn't always a good thing, etc. You can't always quantify success with a number. If I had the opportunity, time is another thing that I would address to our leaders. Trying to do what we are doing - which some call a cultural shift in thinking - takes time. Development takes a lot of time. Some recognize that we don't have time and in some ways I concur. However, you need more than 5-7 years to turn an economy that was decimated by 30 years of war into a thriving success that is ripe for investment by the private sector.

C-30

Educating Afghans so they can be a productive member of the workforce can't be done overnight. Getting them healthy so they can join the workforce is a long process. And getting jobs created so the newly educated healthy population can get out of the poppy fields and put down the guns TAKES TIME. Unfortunately, this cannot happen in just a few short years, but everyone wants it to happen yesterday.

C-31

Appendix D. PRT Data Sheets

The following is a list of each U.S.-led and ISAF-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. For each PRT listed, there follows individual data sheets, which provide the information contained in the database, including PRT Background Information, PRT Composition, PRT Agency Composition, and PRT Funding and Projects.

U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Asadabad PRT Bagram PRT Farah PRT Gardez PRT Ghazni PRT Jalalabad PRT Khowst PRT Mitharlam PRT Nurestan PRT Panjshir PRT Qalat PRT Sharan PRT

ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Bamyan PRT Chaghcharan PRT Feyzabad PRT Herat PRT Kandahar PRT Konduz PRT Lashkar-Gah PRT Logar PRT Mazar-e-Sharif PRT Meymaneh PRT Pol-e-Khomri PRT Qala-e-Naw PRT Tarin Kowt PRT Wardak PRT

D-1

U.S. PRT Database Definitions Calendar Year of Analysis

PRT Background Information Denotes whether PRT is under Province: Provincial location of the PRT OEF/ISAF Command: the command of OEF or ISAF Number of provinces in PRT Number of provinces in a PRT's Name of organization of the jurisdiction: jurisdiction Commanding Organization: commander Regional Command Leader Country of the regional PRT Lead Nation: Lead nation of a PRT Nation: command lead City in which the PRT base is Regional Command Base City where regional command is Base Location: located within the province Location: located Date the PRT was established in Whether the PRT is co-located Date established: the province Colocated with another force: with another force Initial lead nation of the PRT in Instability Scale for PRTs (as Initial Lead Nation: the province Threat Level: found in Marshall Report)

Comparison of Incidents Carried Out By Taliban/ Anti-Government Number of years a PRT served Number of Attacks/Security Elements January through late Years Served: in the province Incidents: September 2007 and 2008 The country that takes over for a pre-established PRT in a Number of injuries sustained by Take over from Lead Nation: province Number of PRT Injuries: PRT The date of transfer of command from one lead nation to a Date of transfer: different lead nation Number of PRT Deaths: Number of PRT deaths Transfer Nation: Nation taking over PRT

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: The length of a tour of duty of a PRT Total number of military from all branches of the armed forces who work directly in the PRT (not Size of Military component of as the security component Size of PRT Civilian and Support Total number of non-military PRT: attached to it). Staff: personnel who work for the PRT

Total number of people in the Total number of people in the Diplomatic Representatives: PRT from diplomatic agencies Police Training Representatives: PRT who train police Name of agency under which the Name of agency under which the police training representatives Diplomatic Agency: diplomatic representatives work Police Training Agency: work Military Agency: Branches of military represented/military organizations in PRT

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: Total amount of money given to the PRT to operate Non-CERP Funding Total Total amount of Non-CERP funding provided to PRT CERP Funding Total Total amount of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) provided to PRT Name(s) of IO/NGO Name of International/local NGOs and IOs working with the PRT

Appendix D D-2 4/2/2009 Asadabad PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Kunar OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Asadabad Location: Bagram Date established: Feb-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 536 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 89 Staff: 2

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 1 The US Department of Agriculture Agency: Agriculture Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: Department of State Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: U.S. Military

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 53,319,267 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 53,297,667 CERP Funding Total $ 21,600

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-3 4/2/2009 Asadabad PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Kunar OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Asadabad Location: Bagram Date established: Feb-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 7 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 534 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data The US Department of Agriculture Agency: Agriculture Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: Department of State Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 10,559,073 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-4 4/2/2009 Bagram PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Parwan OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Bagram A.B. Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-03 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 51 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 63 Staff: 2

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 1 The US Department of Agriculture Agency: Agriculture Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 0 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: Department of State Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: U.S. Military

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 11,245,925 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 11,087,025 CERP Funding Total $ 158,900

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-5 4/2/2009 Bagram PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Parwan OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Bagram A.B. Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-03 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 5 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 22 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 6,736,139 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-6 4/2/2009 Farah PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Farah OEF/ISAF Command: Italy Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Farah Location: Heart Date established: Sep-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 136 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 99 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 5,519,317 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 5,446,417 CERP Funding Total $ 72,900 UNICEF, UNHCR, UNAMA, UNOPS, UNFAO, UN-Habitat, WHO, IOM, WFP, DACAAR, Name(s) of IO/NGO HELP, OI, ALISIE, WVI, CHA, SWRCA, VARA, HRS, MSDO, SRO ADA.

Appendix D D-7 4/2/2009 Farah PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Farah OEF/ISAF Command: Italy Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Farah Location: Heart Date established: Sep-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 103 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 4,300,168 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-8 4/2/2009 Gardez PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Paktika OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Gardez Location: Bagram Date established: Feb-03 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 229 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 1 Development Representatives: 1 The US Department of Agriculture Agency: Agriculture Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: Department of State Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: U.S. Military

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 2,984,499 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 2,974,049 CERP Funding Total $ 10,450

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-9 4/2/2009 Gardez PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Paktika OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Gardez Location: Bagram Date established: Feb-03 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 7 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 180 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 4,746,008 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-10 4/2/2009 Ghazni PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Ghazni OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Ghazni Location: Bagram Date established: Mar-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 398 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: 1 Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 32,394,967 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 32,306,067 CERP Funding Total $ 88,900 NAC, ICRC, ARCS, MSF, IBN-A-SEENA, WHO, DACAAR, SCA, OI, DCA, DTA, Ibn Sina, Name(s) of IO/NGO UNICEF, COAR, CARE, FAO, WFP, FAO, Shuhada.

Appendix D D-11 4/2/2009 Ghazni PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Ghazni OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Ghazni Location: Bagram Date established: Mar-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 170 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 10,568,059 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-12 4/2/2009 Jalalabad PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Nangarhar OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Jalalabad Location: Bagram Date established: Jan-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 292 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 21,927,634 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 21,820,334 CERP Funding Total $ 107,300 USAID, DAI, PRT, MADERA, AREA, ISRA, FAO, BRAC, FINCA, ICARDA, RI DACAAR, Name(s) of IO/NGO GAA, SC, WB, GTZ

Appendix D D-13 4/2/2009 Jalalabad PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Nangarhar OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Jalalabad Location: Bagram Date established: Jan-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 244 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 12,839,907 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-14 4/2/2009 Khowst PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Khowst OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Khowst Location: Bagram Date established: Mar-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 446 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 18,046,199 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 18,004,799 CERP Funding Total $ 41,400

Name(s) of IO/NGO UNOPS, PRT, UNHCR, CARE, WFP.

Appendix D D-15 4/2/2009 Khowst PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Khowst OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Navy Cmdr. jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: (Commander) Adams Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Khowst Location: Bagram Date established: Mar-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 8 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 321 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 17,968,464 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-16 4/2/2009 Mihtarlam PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Laghman OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Mehtarlam Location: Bagram Date established: Apr-05 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 162 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 3

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 72,720,050 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 72,687,950 CERP Funding Total $ 32,100

Name(s) of IO/NGO DACAAR, SCA, MADERA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO

Appendix D D-17 4/2/2009 Mihtarlam PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Laghman OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Mehtarlam Location: Bagram Date established: Apr-05 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 93 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 3,435,263 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-18 4/2/2009 Nurestan PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Nurestan OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Qala Gush Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-06 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 66 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 24,691,602 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 24,686,202 CERP Funding Total $ 5,400

Name(s) of IO/NGO Afghanaid, UNHCR, IFRC, PMS, MADERA, WFP, WHO

Appendix D D-19 4/2/2009 Nurestan PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Nurestan OEF/ISAF Command: United States

Number of provinces in PRT March 2007 - March 2008 jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Navy Cmdr. Paparo Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Qala Gush Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-06 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 7 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 93 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 20,546,046 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-20 4/2/2009 Panjshir PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Panjshir OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: U.S. Foreign Service Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Jabal o-Saraj Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-05 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 1 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 55 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 6,873,625 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 6,851,425 CERP Funding Total $ 22,200 Emergency, IMC, RAA, HT, MDC, CARE, ACTED, ICRC, MSF, ACF, AMI, WFP, WSD, Name(s) of IO/NGO SCA, UNICEF, AVACINA.

Appendix D D-21 4/2/2009 Panjshir PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Panjshir OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: U.S. Foreign Service Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Jabal o-Saraj Location: Bagram Date established: Nov-05 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 0 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 5,450,159 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-22 4/2/2009 Qalat PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Zabul OEF/ISAF Command: Canada Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: Canada Regional Command Base Base Location: Qalat Location: Kandahar Date established: Apr-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 251 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 99 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 2,306,900 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 2,263,000 CERP Funding Total $ 43,900

Name(s) of IO/NGO Ibn Sina, Vara, ADA, Red Cresent, CADG

Appendix D D-23 4/2/2009 Qalat PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Zabul OEF/ISAF Command: Canada Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: Canada Regional Command Base Base Location: Qalat Location: Kandahar Date established: Apr-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 8 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 209 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 927,174 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-24 4/2/2009 Sharan PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Paktika OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Sharana Location: Bagram Date established: Oct-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 229 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: 1 Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 88 Staff: 2

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ 2,984,499 Non-CERP Funding Total $ 2,974,049 CERP Funding Total $ 10,450

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-25 4/2/2009 Sharan PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Paktika OEF/ISAF Command: United States Number of provinces in PRT Combined Joint Task jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: Force 82 Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: United States Regional Command Base Base Location: Sharana Location: Bagram Date established: Oct-04 Colocated with another force: No Initial Lead Nation: United States Threat Level: 7 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: No Data Incidents: 180 Take over from Lead Nation: No Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: No Data Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: No Data

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: Military: 12-15 months, State Department: 1 year Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects PRT Funding Total: $ - Non-CERP Funding Total No Data CERP Funding Total $ 23,816,477 Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data

Appendix D D-26 4/2/2009 International PRT Database Definitions Calendar Year of Analysis

PRT Composition The length of a tour of duty of a Total number of personnel Length of tour of duty: PRT Size of PRT: working for the PRT Total number of military from all branches of the armed forces who work directly in the PRT (not Size of Military component of as the security component Size of PRT Civilian and Support Total number of non-military PRT: attached to it). Staff: personnel who work for the PRT

PRT Agency Composition Total number of people in the Total number of people in the PRT who work on development Agriculture Representatives: PRT from Agriculture agencies Development Representatives: projects Name of agency under which the Name of agency under which the development representatives Agriculture Agency: agriculture representatives work Development Agency: work Total number of people in the Total number of people in the Diplomatic Representatives: PRT from diplomatic agencies Police Training Representatives: PRT who train police Name of agency under which the Name of agency under which the police training representatives Diplomatic Agency: diplomatic representatives work Police Training Agency: work Miltary Agency: Branches of military represented/military organizations in PRT

PRT Funding and Projects Total number of NGOs/IOs that Total amount of money given to Number of IO/NGOs working with work closely with the PRT per PRT Funding Total: the PRT to operate PRT year Number of joint projects Lead Nation Funding Amount given to the PRT by the Number of joint projects between conducted through the PRT and Contribution: Lead Nation PRT and IO/NGO NGO/IOs Total amount of funding that the Other Nation Funding Amount given to the PRT by the PRT provides for NGO/IOs per Contribution: non-Lead Nations IO/NGO Funding: year Total non-CERP/ESF expenditures by civilian Civilian Expenditures: organizations for the PRT Name(s) of IO/NGO Name of International/local NGOs and IOs working with the PRT Miscellaneous Data Other pertinent data found relating to the PRT

Appendix D D-27 4/2/2009 Bamyan PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: Aug-03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5.4 Incidents: 8 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: Sep-03 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months for soldiers Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 136 (4/2008-10/2008), Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 129 (10/2008-present) Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition 1 USAID, 12 Singapore Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: Military NZAID, USAID, Agriculture Agency: USDA Development Agency: Singapore Military Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: US State Dept. Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). 10 Singaporean engineers

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Solidarities, MSF, IMC, Shuhada, Lepco, DHSA, FOCUS, ICRC, CCA, CCF, AWCP, Save Name(s) of IO/NGO the Children, Oxfam, Zulfruk, IBN, NCA, CAWC. Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-28 4/2/2009 Bamyan PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: Aug-03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 4 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.4 Incidents: 3 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: Sep-03 Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 122 (4/07-10/07), 77 Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: (10/2007-4/2008) Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: No Data Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-29 4/2/2009 Bamyan PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: Aug-03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.4 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: 3 Date of transfer: Sep-03 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 123 (4/06-10/06) , 108 Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: (10/06-4/07) Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-30 4/2/2009 Bamyan PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: Aug-03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.4 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: Sep-03 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition 10 months for police Length of tour of duty: officers Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 136 (2/05-11/05), 94 Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: (11/05-4/06) Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: 2 Diplomatic Agency: No Data Police Training Agency: NZ Police Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-31 4/2/2009 Chaghcharan PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Ghowr OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Lithuanian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Lithuania Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 6/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: Lithuania Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.5 Incidents: 36 Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: NA Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: NA

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: 193 Size of Military component of 180 (130 Lithuanian army, 20 DynCorps police trainers, 28 Croatian army, 1-2 Ukrainian PRT: military doctors, 1 Georgian military medic) Size of PRT Civilian and Support Staff: 12

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 2 1 USAID, 1 Icelandic Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: development advisor Diplomatic Representatives: 3 Police Training Representatives: 2

2 Lithuanian diplomats, 1 2 Lithuanian police officer Diplomatic Agency: U.S. Department of State Police Training Agency: advisors Miltary Agency: Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: $3.2 million PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data UNAMA, WV, Afghan Aid, CHA, MADERA, Global Partners, DACAAR, Shura-a-Ulaema, WFP, UNCHR, RAMP, NPS, Christian Aid, ARCS, ICRC, MDM, OMAR, IAM, Lipco, Name(s) of IO/NGO Shohada Miscellaneous Data 1 joint security project for upcoming presidential elections

Appendix D D-32 4/2/2009 Chaghcharan PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Ghowr OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Lithuanian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Lithuania Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 6/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: Lithuania Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.5 Incidents: 22 Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: NA Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: NA

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: 130-140 Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 120-130 Staff: 7 to 15

PRT Agency Composition 7 Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: (1 Ukrainian and 5 Lithuanians, medical Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: team), 1 USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 3 Police Training Representatives: 0 2 Lithuanian diplomats, 1 U.S. Department of State, plus Lithuanian military Diplomatic Agency: advisors Police Training Agency: n/a Miltary Agency: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: $1.6 million PRT 10 Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: $2,500,000 PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Afghan Aid, International Assistance Mission, Catholic Relief Services, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, World Vision International, Global Partners, UNAMA, UNOPS, Name(s) of IO/NGO Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Sadaee Development Foundation, DACAAR Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-33 4/2/2009 Chaghcharan PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Ghowr OEF/ISAF Command: NATO/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Lithuanian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Lithuania Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 6/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: Lithuania Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 0.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: NA Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: NA

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 160 (70 Lithuanian Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: soldiers) Staff: 54

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: 6 (1 Ukrainian and 5 Lithuanians, medical Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: team) Diplomatic Representatives: 4 Police Training Representatives: No Data Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania Civilian Special Diplomatic Agency: Mission Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: $0 PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: USAID IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Name(s) of IO/NGO UNAMA, DACAAR Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-34 4/2/2009 Chaghcharan PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Ghowr OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Lithuanian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Lithuania Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 6/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: Lithuania Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: NA Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: NA

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition 6 Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: 1 Ukrainian and 5 Lithuanians, medical Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: team) Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: No Data Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: $462,000 PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: USAID IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Name(s) of IO/NGO UNAMA, DACAAR Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-35 4/2/2009 Feyzabad PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Badakhshan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Feyzabad Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.25 Incidents: 50 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

PRT Composition commanders: 5-7, soldiers: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: civilians: minimum 1 yr Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 300 Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: 1 Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: No Data Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-36 4/2/2009 Feyzabad PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Badakhshan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Feyzabad Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 5 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.25 Incidents: 30 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

Appendix D D-37 4/2/2009 Feyzabad PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Badakhshan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Feyzabad Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.25 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

PRT Composition commanders: 5-7, soldiers: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: civilians: minimum 1 yr Size of PRT: 350 20 (10 diplomats plus Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support police trainers and PRT: 330 Staff: development experts)

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: 10 Police Training Representatives: No Data 10 German diplomats - Diplomatic Agency: AA Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-38 4/2/2009 Feyzabad PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Badakhshan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Feyzabad Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.25 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

Appendix D D-39 4/2/2009 Herat PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Herat OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Italian Army Colonel (Development Cooperation Department and Ministry of Foreign Number of provinces in PRT Affairs report separately jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: to Rome) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Italy Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Vianini Location: Herat Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5.1 Incidents: 100 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Italy

PRT Composition Commander: up to 1 year, Army: 6 months, Length of tour of duty: Civilians: 3-4 months Size of PRT: 280 Size of Military component of 270 (Italian Army and Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: NATO CIMIC) Staff: less than 10

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 1+ 1 USAID, Italian Army/ Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: CIMIC specialists Diplomatic Representatives: 3 Police Training Representatives: 0 2 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 US Diplomatic Agency: Department of State Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: Italy

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: 100000 PRT and IO/NGO provincial govt. Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: 400000 Civilian Expenditures: No Data IOM/Voice of Women, CARITAS, UNICEF, World Vision, IOM, Action Contre la Faim, Name(s) of IO/NGO WFP, WHO, MSF, MDM, Order of Malta, CHA, IbniSina. Miscellaneous Data 100000 euro of NGO Funding

Appendix D D-40 4/2/2009 Herat PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Herat OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Italian Army Colonel (Development Cooperation Department and Ministry of Foreign Number of provinces in PRT Affairs report separately jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: to Rome) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Italy Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Vianini Location: Herat Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 5 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.1 Incidents: 83 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Italy

PRT Composition Commander: up to 1 year, Army: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: Civilians: 3-4 months Size of PRT: 280 Size of Military component of 270 (Italian Army and Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: NATO CIMIC) Staff: less than 10

Appendix D D-41 4/2/2009 Herat PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Herat OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Italian Army Colonel (Development Cooperation Department and Ministry of Foreign Number of provinces in PRT Affairs report separately jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: to Rome) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Italy Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Vianini Location: Herat Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.1 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: 1 Transfer Nation: Italy

PRT Composition Commander: up to 1 year, Army: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: Civilians: 3-4 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: 20.3 million Euro PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: 20.3 million Euro PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data

Civilian Expenditures: 15.3 million Euro (CIMIC) Name(s) of IO/NGO DACAAR Miscellaneous Data Military Expenditures = 5.3 million Euro (CIMIC)

Appendix D D-42 4/2/2009 Herat PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Herat OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Italian Army Colonel (Development Cooperation Department and Ministry of Foreign Number of provinces in PRT Affairs report separately jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: to Rome) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Italy Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Vianini Location: Herat Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.1 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Italy

Appendix D D-43 4/2/2009 Kandahar PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Kandahar OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Canadian Forces officer Regional Command Leader South: Canada (Rotates PRT Lead Nation: Canada Nation: GBR, NLD) Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Nathan Smith Location: Kandahar Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5.1 Incidents: 820 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: 90 Transfer Nation: Canada

PRT Composition civ & mil commanders: 12 months, mil forces: 6 Length of tour of duty: months Size of PRT: 330 Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support 25 + 50 development PRT: 355 Staff: specialists

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 1 Development Representatives: 9 6 Canada International Development Agency, 3 Agriculture Agency: USDA Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 6 Police Training Representatives: 12

5 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and 2 Correctional Services International Trade, 1 Canada, 10 Royal Diplomatic Agency: U.S. Department of State Police Training Agency: Canadian Mounted Police Miltary Agency: Canada

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Various UN Organizations, Islamic Relief Organization, International Organization for Name(s) of IO/NGO Migration, Senlis Council, CARE, Medecins Sans Frontieres. Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-44 4/2/2009 Kandahar PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Kandahar OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Canadian Forces officer Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: Canada Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Nathan Smith Location: Kandahar Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 9 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.1 Incidents: 534 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Canada

PRT Composition civ & mil commanders: 12 months, mil forces: 6 Length of tour of duty: months Size of PRT: 380 Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 355 Staff: 25

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 7 6 Canada International Development Agency, 1 Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 6 Police Training Representatives: 12

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data 14mil Euros on development b/w Lead Nation Funding Summer 2006 & Summer Number of joint projects between Contribution: 2007 PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-45 4/2/2009 Kandahar PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Kandahar OEF/ISAF Command: NATO/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Canadian Forces officer Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: Canada Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Nathan Smith Location: Kandahar Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.1 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Canada

PRT Composition civ & mil commanders: 12 months, mil forces: 6 Length of tour of duty: months Size of PRT: 120+ Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-46 4/2/2009 Kandahar PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Kandahar OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/NATO Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United Staets/ Canada Nation: NA Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Nathan Smith Location: NA Date established: 12/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.1 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Canada

PRT Composition civ & mil commanders: 12 months, mil forces: 6 Length of tour of duty: months Size of PRT: 250 Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-47 4/2/2009 Konduz PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Konduz OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 2 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Konduz Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 1/6/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5 Incidents: 125 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 1/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: Germany

PRT Composition commanders: 5-7, soldiers: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: civilians: minimum 1 yr Size of PRT: 432 Size of Military component of 400 (330 German military, Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 70 other ISAF) Staff: 22

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 17 1 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany), 8 German Technical Cooperation, 6 German Development Service, 2 KfW (German Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: Development Bank) Diplomatic Representatives: 5 Police Training Representatives: 2 4 German Foreign Office, 2 German police officers, Diplomatic Agency: 1 US State Dept Police Training Agency: EUPOL Miltary Agency: Germany

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-48 4/2/2009 Konduz PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Konduz OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 2 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Konduz Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 1/6/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 5 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4 Incidents: 32 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 1/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 17 1 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany), 8 German Technical Cooperation, 6 German Development Service, 2 KfW (German Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: Development Bank) Diplomatic Representatives: 4 Police Training Representatives: 2 Diplomatic Agency: 4 German Foreign Office Police Training Agency: 2 German police officers Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-49 4/2/2009 Konduz PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Konduz OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 2 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Konduz Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 1/6/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 1/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

Appendix D D-50 4/2/2009 Konduz PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Konduz OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 2 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Konduz Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 1/6/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 1/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: Germany

Appendix D D-51 4/2/2009 Konduz PRT 2004

PRT Background Information Province: Konduz OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Civilian: Foreign Ministry, Number of provinces in PRT Military: Federal Defence jurisdiction: 2 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: US/ Germany Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Konduz Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 1/6/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 1/1/04 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Germany

PRT Composition commanders: 5-7, soldiers: 4 months, Length of tour of duty: civilians: minimum 1 yr Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 200+ German, 2 Swiss Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: officers Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Agriculture Agency: Ministry of the Interior Development Agency: Ministry for Development Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: German Foreign Office Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-52 4/2/2009 Lashkar-Gah PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Helmand OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader South: Canada (Rotates PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom Nation: GBR, NLD) Regional Command Base Base Location: Lashkar-Gah Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.3 Incidents: 490 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/20/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: UK

PRT Composition 6 months (civilians and civilian contractors often Length of tour of duty: stay longer) Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support 80, 1 estonian health PRT: 40 Staff: adviser

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: 1 Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: US State Dept Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: Britain. with Denmark and Estonia

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Danish Demining Group, Danish Refugee Council, Mission East, DACAAR, Danish Name(s) of IO/NGO Afghan Committee Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-53 4/2/2009 Lashkar-Gah PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Helmand OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Lashkar-Gah Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 9 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.3 Incidents: 170 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/20/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: UK

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 8 1 British Department for International Development, 6 Post- Conflict Reconstruction Unit (joint MOD, FCO, Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: DFID), 1 UNAMA Diplomatic Representatives: 7 Police Training Representatives: 10 7 British Foreign and Number of police mentors Diplomatic Agency: Commonwealth Office Police Training Agency: hired by FCO Miltary Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-54 4/2/2009 Lashkar-Gah PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Helmand OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data United States/ United Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: Kingdom Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Lashkar-Gah Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.3 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/20/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: UK

Appendix D D-55 4/2/2009 Lashkar-Gah PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Helmand OEF/ISAF Command: OEF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom Nation: NA Regional Command Base Base Location: Lashkar-Gah Location: NA Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.3 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 4/20/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: UK

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-56 4/2/2009 Logar PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Logar OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT Civilian and Military (only jurisdiction: No Data Commanding Organization: if safety is comprimised) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Czech Republic Nation: East: USA Regional Command Base Base Location: Shank Location: Bagram Date established: 3/16/08 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: No Data Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 0.75 Incidents: 170 Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: 14 Date of transfer: 3/16 or 8/18/2008 Number of PRT Deaths: 1 Transfer Nation: Czech Rep

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 198 Staff: 8

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data UNHCR, HAND, AMDA, WROR, ISRA, DACAR, NCA, SCA, UNICEF, NPO, CARE, Name(s) of IO/NGO MEDAir, INTERSOS, UNOPS, IRC, Barak. Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-57 4/2/2009 Mazar-e-Sharif PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Balkh OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT 4 (Balkh, Samangan, jurisdiction: Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul) Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Sweden Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Northern Lights Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5.5 Incidents: 41 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 3/15/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Sweden

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 2 Finns, 450 Swedes Staff: 8

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: 1 Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: USAID Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: US State Dept Police Training Agency: No Data Miltary Agency: Sweden

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: $320 million PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data

Name(s) of IO/NGO No Data Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-58 4/2/2009 Mazar-e-Sharif PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Balkh OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT 4 (Balkh, Samangan, jurisdiction: Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul) Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Sweden Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Northern Lights Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: 5 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.5 Incidents: 44 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 3/15/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Sweden

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-59 4/2/2009 Mazar-e-Sharif PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Balkh OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT 4 (Balkh, Samangan, jurisdiction: Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul) Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom/ Sweden Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Northern Lights Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 3/15/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Sweden

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-60 4/2/2009 Mazar-e-Sharif PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Balkh OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT 4 (Balkh, Samangan, jurisdiction: Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul) Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 3/15/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Sweden

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-61 4/2/2009 Meymaneh PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Faryab OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Norwegian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Norway Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Meymaneh Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 5.5 Incidents: 49 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Norway

PRT Composition 6 months (2005-08), 2 Length of tour of duty: years from 2009 onwards Size of PRT: No Data 154 (60 with helicopter Size of Military component of ambulance team) & "a Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: few" Latvian soldiers Staff: 12 to 14

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: 0 Development Representatives: 1 Agriculture Agency: n/a Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: 3 (would this be 4) Police Training Representatives: 8 to 10 4-6 Norwegian prison Norway Ministry of officers, police, or from Foreign Affairs (2), 1 Ministry of Justice, 2 from Latvia, 1 from Latvian police, 6-8 of the Diplomatic Agency: Iceland Police Training Agency: total are EUPOL Military Agency: Norway. with Sweden.

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT 7+ Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data minimal: any $ are from Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and Norwegian Civilian Expenditures: Ministry in Kabul World Bank, United Nations, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 2006-08, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) 2006-07, Dacaar 2006-07, IOM (2006), World Food Programme (2006), Name(s) of IO/NGO UN Food and Agriculture Association (2006-07), UNDP (2006-08) PRT receives minimal NGO funding. It is not channeled through PRTs, rather through Miscellaneous Data embassy and MFA.

Appendix D D-62 4/2/2009 Meymaneh PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Faryab OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Norwegian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Norway Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Meymaneh Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.5 Incidents: 37 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Norway

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-63 4/2/2009 Meymaneh PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Faryab OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Norwegian Army Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Norway Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Meymaneh Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Norway

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-64 4/2/2009 Meymaneh PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Faryab OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United Kingdom/ Norway Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Meymaneh Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 7/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: UK Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.5 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Norway

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 126, including 28 Finns Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Finland was present until Diplomatic Agency: 2005 Police Training Agency: No Data Military Agency: No Data

Appendix D D-65 4/2/2009 Pol-e-Khomri PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Baghlan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Hungary Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Pol-e-Khomri Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 10/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: The Netherlands Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.25 Incidents: 80 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: 2 Date of transfer: 9/30/06 Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: Hungary

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 210 Hungarian Military Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: No Data Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture Agency: Agriculture Development Agency: No Data Diplomatic Representatives: No Data Police Training Representatives: No Data Hungarian Ministry of Diplomatic Agency: No Data Police Training Agency: Justice Military Agency: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects 500 million forints (2.1million Euro) from Ministry of Defense + 2.5million USD annually for developmental projects from Hungarian govt. + Greece: 500,000 Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: Euro PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding 500 million forints Number of joint projects between Contribution: (2.1million Euro) PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: Greece: 500,000 Euro IO/NGO Funding: No Data 500 million forints Civilian Expenditures: (2.1million Euro)

Name(s) of IO/NGO Hungarian Inter-church Aid, Hungarian Baptist Aid Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-66 4/2/2009 Pol-e-Khomri PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Baghlan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Hungary Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Pol-e-Khomri Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 10/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: The Netherlands Threat Level: 4 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.25 Incidents: 55 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: 0 Date of transfer: 9/30/06 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Hungary

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data 9 non-Hungarian officers Size of Military component of from Central Eastern Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: Europe Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects 500 million forints (2.1million Euro) from Ministry of Defense + 2.5million USD annually for developmental projects from Hungarian govt. + Greece: 500,000 Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: Euro PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding 500 million forints Number of joint projects between Contribution: (2.1million Euro) PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding $0 from EU Development Contribution: Greece: 500,000 Euro IO/NGO Funding: Fund Civilian Expenditures: No Data Name(s) of IO/NGO Hungarian Inter-church Aid, Hungarian Baptist Aid Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-67 4/2/2009 Pol-e-Khomri PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Baghlan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: The Netherlands Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Pol-e-Khomri Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 10/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: The Netherlands Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.25 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/30/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Hungary

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 130 Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects

4.5 million Euro from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 500,000 Euro from Dutch Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: Interdepartmental CIMIC PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), UNAMA, Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau (ANCB), Child Fund Afganistan (CFA), NGO Halo Trust, Aga Khan Name(s) of IO/NGO Foundation (AKF), UNICEF, UNHCR, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-68 4/2/2009 Pol-e-Khomri PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Baghlan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data The Netherlands/ Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Hungary Nation: North: Germany Regional Command Base Base Location: Pol-e-Khomri Location: Mazar-e-Sharif Date established: 10/1/04 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: The Netherlands Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.25 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: 0 Date of transfer: 9/30/06 Number of PRT Deaths: 0 Transfer Nation: Hungary

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: 6 months Size of PRT: 150-170 Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 130 Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects

4.5 million Euro from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 500,000 Euro from Dutch Interdepartmental CIMIC, 500 million forints Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: (2.1million Euro) PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding 500 million forints Number of joint projects between Contribution: (2.1million Euro) PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding $0 from EU Development Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: Fund Civilian Expenditures: AgencyNo Data Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), UNAMA, Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau (ANCB), Child Fund Afganistan (CFA), NGO Halo Trust, Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), UNICEF, UNHCR, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), Name(s) of IO/NGO DACAAR Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-69 4/2/2009 Qala-e-Naw PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Badghis OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Spain Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 8/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: No Data Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.4 Incidents: 121 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 5/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Spain

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: military: 4 months Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: No Data Development Representatives: >1 1 USAID, Spanish Agency for International Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: Cooperation Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data Diplomatic Agency: US State Dept. Police Training Agency: No Data Military Agency: Spain

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data UNICEF, UNHCR, UNAMA, UNOPS, UNFAO, UN-Habitat, WHO, ALISEI, OI, NPO, IMC, Name(s) of IO/NGO WV, Norway WV, RRAA, IOM, Maltesser, German Argo Action, MSF. Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-70 4/2/2009 Qala-e-Naw PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Badghis OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Spain Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 8/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: No Data Threat Level: 6 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.4 Incidents: 46 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 5/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Spain

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-71 4/2/2009 Qala-e-Naw PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Badghis OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Spain Nation: West: Italy Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: Herat Date established: 8/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: No Data Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.4 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 5/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Spain

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-72 4/2/2009 Qala-e-Naw PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Badghis OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: United States/ Spain Nation: NA Regional Command Base Base Location: No Data Location: NA Date established: 8/1/05 Colocated with another force: No Data Initial Lead Nation: No Data Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 0.4 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 5/1/05 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: Spain

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-73 4/2/2009 Tarin Kowt PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Uruzgan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Dutch Army Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: The Netherlands Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Tarin Kowt Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.3 Incidents: 130 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: The Netherlands

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data 9 NL, 1090 Australia Size of Military component of (NATO map), 1200 troops Size of PRT Civilian and Support 4 specialists: diplomatic, PRT: (NL in AF) Staff: development, legal, tribal

PRT Agency Composition Agriculture Representatives: none Development Representatives: 1 Agriculture Agency: No Data Development Agency: USAID, DEVAD Diplomatic Representatives: 1 Police Training Representatives: No Data US State Dept., POLAD: Ambassador from Hungarian Ministry of Diplomatic Agency: Foreign Affairs Police Training Agency: No Data Military Agency:Netherlands. With Australia and 40 Singaporean military medics and others

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data 14mil Euro spent on Lead Nation Funding development b/w Sep Number of joint projects between Contribution: 2004-Summer2007 PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data Name(s) of IO/NGO ADA, PEP, CADG, AHDS Miscellaneous Data No Data

Appendix D D-74 4/2/2009 Tarin Kowt PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Uruzgan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Dutch Army Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: The Netherlands Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Camp Holland Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 8 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.3 Incidents: 49 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: The Netherlands

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-75 4/2/2009 Tarin Kowt PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Uruzgan OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data United States/ The Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: Netherlands Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Tarin Kowt Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.3 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: The Netherlands

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-76 4/2/2009 Tarin Kowt PRT 2005

PRT Background Information Province: Uruzgan OEF/ISAF Command: OEF Number of provinces in PRT jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: No Data Regional Command Leader South: Rotates CAN, PRT Lead Nation: United States Nation: GBR, NLD Regional Command Base Base Location: Tarin Kowt Location: Kandahar Date established: 9/1/04 Colocated with another force: yes Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 1.3 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 8/1/06 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: The Netherlands

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: No Data Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-77 4/2/2009 Wardak PRT 2008

PRT Background Information Province: Wardak OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT civilian-led (only one in jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: ISAF) Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: Turkey Nation: East: USA Regional Command Base Base Location: Maydan Shehr Location: Bagram Date established: 11/1/06 Colocated with another force: No Data

very unsafe, PRT "cannot venture more than three kilometers from city limits". UN closed down their office in Wardak in Initial Lead Nation: Turkey Threat Level: September 2008. Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 2.2 Incidents: 241 Take over from Lead Nation: no Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: NA Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: NA

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: 0 Staff: No Data

PRT Funding and Projects Number of IO/NGOs working with PRT Funding Total: No Data PRT No Data Lead Nation Funding Number of joint projects between Contribution: No Data PRT and IO/NGO No Data Other Nation Funding Contribution: No Data IO/NGO Funding: No Data Civilian Expenditures: No Data TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, DACAAR, MADERA, Name(s) of IO/NGO SCA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO Miscellaneous Data Approximately 12 Afghan Govt Reps from Wardak Provincial Council work with PRT.

Appendix D D-78 4/2/2009 Wardak PRT 2007

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: 8/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: 4 Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 4.4 Incidents: 3 Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: No Data Date of transfer: 9/24/03 Number of PRT Deaths: 2 Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 122 (4/07-10/07), 77 Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: (10/2007-4/2008) Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-79 4/2/2009 Wardak PRT 2006

PRT Background Information Province: Bamyan OEF/ISAF Command: OEF/ISAF Number of provinces in PRT New Zealand Defense jurisdiction: 1 Commanding Organization: Force Regional Command Leader PRT Lead Nation: New Zealand Nation: East: USA Bamian Village ("Kiwi Regional Command Base Base Location: Base") Location: Bagram Date established: 8/1/03 Colocated with another force: no Initial Lead Nation: US Threat Level: No Data Number of Attacks/Security Years Served: 3.4 Incidents: No Data Take over from Lead Nation: yes Number of PRT Injuries: 3 Date of transfer: 9/24/03 Number of PRT Deaths: No Data Transfer Nation: New Zealand

PRT Composition Length of tour of duty: No Data Size of PRT: No Data Size of Military component of 123 (4/06-10/06) , 108 Size of PRT Civilian and Support PRT: (10/06-4/07) Staff: No Data

Appendix D D-80 4/2/2009 Appendix E. Annotated Bibliography

US Citations

Caligiuri, Army Staff Sgt. Giovanni. "Nuristan PRT brings professional training to ANP." Black Anthem.com Military News. March 15, 2007. http://www.blackanthem.com/News/Allies_20/Nuristan_PRT_brings_professional_traini ng_to_ANP5055.shtml (accessed February 5, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Campbell, Jason, H., and Jeremy Shapiro. Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan- index.aspx, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009. • Source Type: Brookings Institution report that is updated on a monthly basis • Information Cited: Province of PRT, date the PRT was established, number of attacks on the PRT, initial lead nation, number of PRT members from the military, number of civilian PRT members, number of agriculture representatives in the PRT and their agency, number of development representatives in the PRT and their agency, number of diplomatic representatives in the PRT and their agency.

Clare, Pfc. Micah E. "Khowst PRT Winning the Fight in Afghanistan." US Army . May 30, 2007. http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/05/30/3404-khowst-prt-winning-the-fight-in- afghanistan/ (accessed February 10 , 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Combined Joint Force Task. Nuristan PRT holds shoe-drive for Afghan children. January 19, 2009. http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Nuristan-PRT-holds-shoe- drive-for-Afghan-children.html (accessed February 6 , 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

E-1

Embassy of Afghanistan - Tokyo. Farah PRT Begins $1.7 Million Bridge Construction Over Farah Rud River. November 9, 2007. http://www.afghanembassyjp.com/en/news/?an=546 (accessed February 9, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Embassy of the U.S. Kabul Afghanistan . 2009. 2009. Online. Available: http://kabul.usembassy.gov/prt_2201_09.html (accessed January 10 , 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Project Information

Garbett, Maj. Kimberly. "New bridge opens in Panjshir Valley." Embassy of the US Kabul Afghanistan . January 31, 2009. http://kabul.usembassy.gov/prt_0102_09.html (accessed February 10 , 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Gauster, Markus. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Occasional Paper Series No. 16." George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. January 2008. http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index- 1/static/xdocs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009). • Source Type: Occasional paper published in January 2008 by the George C. Marshall Center • Information Cited: Threat level

Global Security.org . 2009. Online. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ghazni.htm (accessed January 6, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Project Information, Date Established, Initial lead nation, Transfer date, Transfer lead nation, Duty Length for PRT members

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Post- Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." CRS Report for Congress, February 9, 2009. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf (accessed March 10, 2009). • Source Type: CRS Report for Congress • Information Cited: Base city, Military Agency

E-2

NATO . "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures." February 13, 2009. www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (accessed February 16, 2009). • Source Type: Maps and table or “placemat” • Information Cited: Regional Command base location

Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ (accessed February, 2009).

• Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Organizations, NGO name

• Source Type: Report • Information Cited: Duty Length, date established

Pratt, Lt. Col. Leslie. "Farah PRT helps maintain peace, stability in Afghanistan." Combined Joint Task Force. October 17, 2008. http://www.cjtf101.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Farah-PRT-helps-maintain-peace- stability-in-Afghanistan.html (accessed February 9 , 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

PRT Nuristan. 2007. Online. Available: http://www.prtnuristan.com/Web%20Site/Pages/index.html (accessed January 10, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Relief Web. Online. Available: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ- 7B4JDZ?OpenDocument (accessed February 10, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Project Information

E-3

U. S. Central Command . PRT well project brings water to Afghan villages. December 16, 2008. http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/prt-well-project-brings-water-to- afghan-villages.html (accessed February 6, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

U. S. Department of Defense. "Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan ." January 2009 . http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf (accessed February 1, 2009). • Source Type: Department of Defense Report to Congress • Information Cited: Total PRT funding, total CERP funding, total non CERP funding

U.S. Department of Defense. Online. Available: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48448 (accessed January 6, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Project Information

International Citations

Abbaszadeh, Nima, et al. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Princeton: Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008. • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Commanding organization, years PRT has served, initial lead nation, date of PRT transfer, duty length for PRT members, number of military and size of civilian members within the PRT, size of PRT, agricultural representative, agriculture agency, diplomatic representative, diplomacy agency, development representative, development agency, police training representative, police training agency, lead nation funding contributions, other nation’s funding contributions, total funding available to PRT, base city, number of death, number of attacks, total funding available to PRT, civilian and military expenditure, date established

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. 2004. http://www.acbar.org/display.php?page_id=8 (accessed January 31, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited:

E-4

Auswärtiges Amt. Germany's leading role in rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan. March, 2005. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01- Laender/Afghanistan.html (accessed March 5, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Police training representative, police training agency, lead nation

Bais, Karolien. "The Netherlands in Afghanistan." Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. December 2006. http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistan-pdf/the-netherlands- in-afghanistan_en_low.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: beehive.govt.nz - the official website of the New Zealand government. New Zealand Deployments to Afghanistan - Questions and Answers. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/Afghanistan%20extension%20Q%20and% 20A.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Website Article • Information Cited: Number of police officer representatives in PRT, representative agency, and duty length,

Braekhus, Kyrre Elvenes, interview by Erin Boeke Burke. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway (January 16 and19, 2009). • Organization/Affiliation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway • Information Cited: number of civilian PRT members, number of agriculture representatives in the PRT, number of development agency representatives and agency, number of diplomatic agency representatives and agency, number of police agency representatives and agency, amount of civilian expenditures on PRT.

E-5

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bundeswehr Operations Abroad. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense Press and Information Office, 2008. • Source Type: Website Article • Information Cited:

Bundeswehr. 2008. Online. Available: http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw (accessed January 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Information about German-led PRTs, including date of PRT transfer, date PRT was established, duty length for PRT members, and number of deaths in PRT, command organization of PRT, number of years served.

Campbell, Jason, H., and Jeremy Shapiro. Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan- index.aspx, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009. • Source Type: Brookings Intitution report that is updated on a monthly basis • Information Cited: Province of PRT, date the PRT was established, number of attacks on the PRT, initial lead nation, number of PRT members from the military, number of civilian PRT members, number of agriculture representatives in the PRT and their agency, number of development representatives in the PRT and their agency, number of diplomatic representatives in the PRT and their agency.

Chase, Steven. "Globe and Mail: Afghan rebuilding efforts slowed by poor planning." Afghanistan News . January 09, 2009. http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2009/january/jan102009.html#8 (accessed February 18, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited:

Coalition for Operation Enduring Freedom. "Coalition Bulletin." Germans "Can-Do" in Konduz. January 2004. http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/09bulletin.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Number of military PRT members, diplomatic agency represented, development agency represented, agriculture agency represented

E-6

Cosgrave, John, and Rie Andersen. "Danida Aid Flows to Afghanistan: A Study of Aid Flows from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 inclusive." Channel Research. December 1, 2004. http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B27A79AA-2B28-4414-A533- 46D183CB5890/0/AidFlowsAfghanistanFinalReportV16020041201.pdf (accessed December 30, 2008). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited:

DACAAR. 2009. Online. Available: http://www.dacarr.org / (accessed February 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Information from annual reports, including name of NGO working with PRTs

Department for International Development. Press Release: Building a new Afghanistan. August 29, 2007. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/afghanistan-55.asp (accessed February 12, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Information about PRT projects including project description, countries or PRTs involved, approximate cost and project duration.

Diamond Barikot Construction Company. List of Completed Project by DBCC in year 2006. http://dbccorg.com/Contracts.htm (accessed February 22, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Information about PRT project including project description, PRT involved, approximate cost and partnership organization.

Dutch Ministry of Defense. "Defense News." Adressing women's rights in Afghanistan. January 28, 2009. http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/Addressi ngWomensRightsInAfghanistan.htm (accessed February 8, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Names of nongovernmental organizations working with the PRT.

E-7

European Commission Delegation to Afghanistan. 2009. Online. Available: http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/ (Accessed February 2009.) • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Amount of lead nation funding and international organization funding.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. 2009. Online. Available http://ukinafghanistan.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/?view=News&id=9824830 (accessed February 8, 2009) • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Number of military and civilian PRT members.

French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. Lithuania’s action in favour of Afghanistan: Cooperation for Security, Reconstruction, and Development. June 12, 2008. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/afghanistan_498/international- conference-in-support-of-afghanistan-paris-12th-june-2008_6366/colonne- droite_6385/lithuania-action-in-favour-of-afghanistan_11526.html (accessed January 8, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Lead nation funding.

Gauster, Markus. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Occasional Paper Series No. 16." George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. January 2008. http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index- 1/static/xdocs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Date PRT was established, and initial lead nation, size of military and civilian component of PRT, size of PRT, diplomatic agency, diplomatic representative, threat level

GlobalSecurity.org. 2009. Online Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/ (accessed Government of Canada. 2009. Online. Available:. http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada- afghanistan/ (accessed January 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Size of PRT, project information including project description and funding amount.

Haberler.com. Turkiye'nin Vardak Yardimlari. April 6, 2007. http://www.haberler.com/turkiye-nin-vardak-yardimlari-haberi/ (accessed February 22, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Number of military and civilian members of PRT

E-8

Harris, Kent. "Stars and Stripes." Italy to raise its troop level in Afghanistan. April 1, 2005. http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28115 (accessed February 10, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Duty length, Police Agency represented, Afghan Government Agency

House of Commons International Development Committee. Reconstructing Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2007-2008. April 24, 2008. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/IDC-report-afghan-08.pdf (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Number of civilian PRT members. iCasualties.org. Operation Enduring Freedom. 2008. http://icasualties.org/OEF/Afghanistan.aspx (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Number of PRT deaths.

ISAF Mirror, 2008. (DO WE NEED TO CITE EDITIONS? – THERE ARE MULTIPLE) • Source Type: Articles from monthly NATO public information publication • Information Cited: Storytelling Information

ISAF Public Information Office. "United States Central Command." Spanish PRT opens orphanage in Qala-e-Naw. March 10, 2008. http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/spanish- prt-opens-orphanage-in-qala-e-naw.html (accessed February 26, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited:.

Joelsdotter-Berg, Eva. "PerCEPtions Newsletter (NATO Civil Emergency Planning)." A View from Sweden: Experiences working as Development Advisor to the Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif. June 2008. http://www.nato.int/issues/cep/cep_newsletter_05e.pdf (accessed February 8, 2009). • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Number of civilian and military PRT members.

E-9

Liberty, Radio Free Europe Radio. Newsline. Online. Available: http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1144106.html (accessed February 12, 2009)

• Source Type: Website Article • Information Cited: Threat level of PRT, number of Afghan government representatives and agency, development agency working with PRT.

Lobjakas, Ahto. "Wardak, Where Nothing Is What It Seems." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. January 16, 2009. http://www.rferl.org/Content/Wardak_Where_Nothing_Is_What_It_Seems/1371007.html (accessed March 10, 2009).

• Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Base, Commanding organization

Marton, Peter, and Peter Wagner. The Netherlands and Hungary's Contribution to Operations in Afghanistan. http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/keklevel/MKI_hirlevel_2008- 01.pdf, Budapest: Hungarian Institute for International Affairs, 2008. • Source Type: Article • Information Cited: Size of PRT, number of PRT members from the military, number of civilian PRT members, number of agriculture representatives in the PRT and their agency, development agency represented, diplomatic agency represented, police agency represented, number of PRT injuries and deaths, duty length for PRT members, funding amounts from lead nation, other nations, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations.

Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 2008. Online. Available: http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=6586 (accessed December 17, 2008). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Base location, commanding organization, date established, number of injuries and deaths at the PRT, duty lengthy, size of the civilian and military components

E-10

Ministerio De Defensa. ASPFOR XXI. 2008. http://www.ejercito.mde.es/ingles/mexterior/afganistan/aspfor_xxi.html (accessed March 29, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Duty length

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary. 2008. Online. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/security_policy/hungary_in_nato/hun gary_role_in_afghanistan/hungary_role_in_afghanistan.htm (accessed February 1, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Total funding for the PRT, lead nation funding, Civilian expenditures, project information

E-11

Ministry of National Defense Republic of Lithuania. 2008. Online. Available: http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/178240/ (accessed February 22, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Number of development representatives, NGO work, NGO name, number of PRT government projects, project information

Ministry of Rural Rehabilition and Development. Newsletter. June 2007. http://www.mrrd.gov.af/ENGLISH/Data/English-Newsletter-June.pdf (accessed February 26, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Mission East. Mission East - Values in Action. http://www.miseast.org/sw1337.asp (accessed February 1, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Project Information

Molnar, Gyorgy. "Hungary's Whole-of-Government Approach to Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Stabilization." The Quarterly Journal, Summer 2007: http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:ffO9bjbQdj0J:www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_summer 2007/co_summer2007_c_molnar.pdf+hungarian+prt&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=us. • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

NATO. Online. Available: http://www.nato.int/ (accessed January, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Base location, commanding organization, if the PRT is collocated, initial lead nation, date of transfer, transfer nation, project information

Nautilus Institute. Australia in Afghanistan. April 24, 2008. http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/afghanistan/coalition-forces-netherlands (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Report • Information Cited: Base

E-12

Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture & Conflict Studies. Online. Available: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ (accessed February, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Threat level, number of attacks on the PRT, NGO name

Network, E-MINE Electronic Mine Information. Danish Demining Group (DDG). http://www.mineaction.org/org.asp?o=72 (accessed February 1, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: NGO name, project information

New Zealand Defense Force. Online. Available: http://nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/ (accessed February, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Base location, commanding organization, PRT Deaths, Duty Length, military component size, number of agricultural, diplomatic, development and political representatives, agriculture agency, diplomatic agency, development agency, political agency

Norway - the official site in Afghanistan. Norwegian led PRT in Faryab. 2007. http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/ (accessed January 25, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Initial lead nation, transfer nation, NGO name, project information

Pajhwok Afghan News. 2009. Online. Available: http://pajhwok.com/ (accessed February 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Information about multiple PRT projects including project description, countries or PRTs involved, approximate cost and project duration.

Pakistan Times. Italian-led PRT opens bridge in Herat City. June 5, 2008. http://www.pak-times.com/2008/06/05/italian-led-prt-opens-bridge-in-herat-city/ (accessed February 22, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

E-13

Qureshi, Ahmad, and Hamshi Moeed. "Italy donates one million USD for reconstruction in Herat." Afgha.com - News - Afghanistan. September 22, 2007. http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:lWA275lyqkwJ:www.afgha.com/%3Fq%3Dnode/4 371+Ahmad+Qureshi/Moeed+Hashmi&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&client=firefox-a (accessed Feburary 6, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Racius, Egdunas. "The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan." Baltic Security & Defense Review, 2007, Volume 9: 57-78. • Source Type: Report • Information Cited: Military and civilian component sizes, number of support staff, number of diplomatic and development representatives, diplomatic agency, development agency, IO work

Relief Web. Herat PRT supports the education of Afghan youth. November 4, 2008. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7L3EKS?OpenDocument (accessed February 22, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Project Information

Rietjens, Sebastiann J.H. "Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan." Armed Forces & Society, 2008: 173-207. • Source Type: Report • Information Cited: NGO name

Smith, Herbert. "Afghanistan PRTs U.S. Civilian Staffing Map." USAID, January 22, 2009. • Organization/Affiliation: USAID • Information Cited: Number of USAID, US Department of State, and USDA representatives to each province where a PRT is stationed.

E-14

Socor, Vladimir. "The Jamestown Foundation." Georgia to send, Lithuania to augment toops in Afghanistan. February 5, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32457 (accessed Februrary 25, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Commanding organization, PRT total size, size of the military and civilian components

Stein, Catherine. "Aftenposten.no." Norwegian Base Weakest in Afghanistan . June 5, 2008. http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article2466146.ece (accessed January 19, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Size of the military component

Swedish Armed Forces. Online. Available: http://www.mil.se/en/Forces- abroad/Afghanistan/ (accessed January, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Number of provinces covered by the PRT

—. International vs. national tasks – reflections after a recent visit to Afghanistan. September 15, 2008. http://www.mil.se/en/News/Newsletter/Newsletter-11-september- 2008 (accessed March 5, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Size of military component

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. SCA Organisation. http://www.swedishcommittee.org/sca/organisation/index.html (accessed January 31, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: PRT total funding Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. What does Sida do in Afghanistan? http://www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=853&language=en_US (accessed March 5, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Lead nation funding contributions

The Long War Journal. Afghanistan Attacks Map. 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/afghn-attacks1-v2.php (accessed February 25, 2009). • Source Type: Map • Information Cited: Number of attacks on the PRT

E-15

The Norwegian Delegation to NATO. "Operations: Afghanistan." Norway: The Permanent Delegation to NATO, Brussels. December 13, 2006. http://www.norway- nato.org/operation/afghanistan/afghanistan.htm (accessed January 6, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Initial lead nation, transfer nation

TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency. Projects in Afghanistan. http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=324#wardak (accessed February 12, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: NGO Name, NGO joint projects, project information

Turkish General Staff. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation. http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm (accessed February 2009, 10). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Initial lead nation

United States Central Command. Sweden: Support to the Global War on Terror. http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/sweden/ (accessed March 5, 2009). • Source Type: Website • Information Cited: Size of civilian component, police training representative, police training agency, diplomatic representative, diplomatic agency, development representative, development agency

U.S. Department of Defense. DefendAmerica News - Afghanistan Update. November 21, 2003. http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/update/nov2003/au112103.html (accessed February 9, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: Date transferred

Yunlong, Sun. "Xinhua News Agency." Suicide attack wounds 2 in Kabul. July 18, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-07/18/content_6394128.htm (accessed February 26, 2009). • Source Type: Press Release • Information Cited: PRT Injury

E-16