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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 72 16-30 April 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The IEA announced the ini- salary lines, banks, demon- A second, equally lethal 5 Northern Region tiation of their ‘Spring Offen- stration, arbakai shura and effective trend that has Western Region 10 sive’ on April 29th, an event meetings and shops but we developed in line with the that occurs an a yearly basis will need to monitor the previous, is the surgical Eastern Region 14 and is generally intended as a target pattern closely to targeting of key leadership Southern Region 20 strategic statement regarding fully understand this scope (military, political, and ci- their goals, methodology, as of this term. When taken in vilian) with suicide attacks. 27 ANSO Info Page well as guidance to their lead- conjunction with the in- Of note, this trend, when ership though is also an ele- struction to deliver coupled with the above, ment of their wider infor- “meticulous military plans” proves to be particular dif- YOU NEED TO KNOW mation operations plan. The however we would stop ficult to mitigate for the operation, known as ‘Badar’, short of seeing it as carte target groups, as seen in • IEA announces spring offen- while short on tactical details, blanche to attack any place the penetration of the sive, Operation Badar contains a few comments of that targets recreate or gath- MoD this period in Kabul. • ‘Sleeper’ agents within the contemporary interest includ- er. (the full English text of The Eastern Region con- ANSF ing: the statement is provided tinues to provide a high 1. An explicit statement re- on p. 25 & 26 of this re- volume of NGO incidents, • Increasingly sophisticated port) targeting of key Afghan civ- garding the targeting of for- with 3 recorded this period mil leadership eign and local supporters of AOG use of ‘sleeper’ agents (1 Nangarhar, 2 Kunar), the IMF occupation, most embedded within the ANSF though Ghor also reported • IEA ‘protection’ of NGO clinic likely directed at local logis- is a tactic quickly becoming 3 incidents with a final one tics facilitators as well as for- a definitive trend as seen from the North. Of par- eign Private Development during the end of 2010 and ticular interest in an inci- Companies (PDC) throughout 2011. While dent reported from Kunar ANSO is supported by 2. A direct mention of the this tactic has proven to be in which the IEA broke off High Peace Council as legiti- particularly lethal, typically an engagement with securi- mate targets. involving a single operative ty forces due to the poten- armed with a suicide device, tial of damage it would 3. An explicit instruction re- it also serves a greater stra- have caused an NGO clinic garding the avoidance of ci- tegic goal. (which was occupied by vilian casualties and a warn- security forces as a result of ing to civilians to avoid target It may prove to be a fault line for the impending tran- the attack). This is signifi- sites. Of particular concern cant as it marks one of the to is the rather vague descrip- sition plans, sowing the seeds of distrust between first confirmed reports of tions of “gatherings” which such an action taken on the could be read to include any the two key agents of this plan, the IMF and the part of an AOG, further place where targets congre- evidence that groups within gate either professionally or ANSF, as the on-going de- velopment of the ANSF the East are taking steps to personally. Recent attacks minimise the conflicts im- that may fall within this defi- remains a critical factor in the implementation of this pact on the NGO in this nition may have included dog region. -fights, buzkashi matches, plan. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 The were a total of 35 incidents 40 reported this period, with only 3 generally involving ‘sleeper’ agents 30 AOG initiated, 5 IMF operations, within the security forces who use 20 their access to maximise casual- 21 ANSF actions, and 6 criminal 10 ties, generally through suicide at- events. While most of the inci- 0 dents fall within the standard cate- tacks. gories of incidents reported in this The second incident, which on its province, there were a few excep- surface would appear similar to KABUL AOG KABUL Crime tions. the first, also involved an ANSF The first incident, a brazen pene- member, this time Air Force, who AOG efforts, which could have significant tration of the MoD by an AOG ultimately killed 9 US mentors (8 implications for the transition process, a key bearing the full rank and insignia IMF, 1 contractor) and wounded element of the broader IMF exit strategy. of an ANA Colonel (who was one national. While the IEA claimed responsibility for this at- Criminality, an issue that in many cases takes a apparently an actual service mem- back seat in light of the wider conflict, resulted ber, though of lower rank) result- tack, this appears unlikely, and the details of this event and his moti- in at least 4 deaths and 1 injury this period. All ed in the deaths of 1 and the of these were caused by small arms fire result- wounding of 4 others by SAF, vations remain more murky. Some reports suggest this was the ing from inter-personal disputes. Lastly, there with the apparent target of this was one abduction of a business man from attack being a high ranking official result of private difficulties which, when coupled with an inter- District 8 in Kabul City, a persistent issue from within the MoD. While the at- within the capital, a crime that falls under the tacker was armed with a suicide personal dispute, triggered the individual to attack. purview of various abduction syndicates oper- device, he failed to detonate ating kidnap for ransom rings. Of note, this (reasons unknown) and was in- These two events speak to a high- latest incident was perpetrated by a group stead ultimately killed by weapons er level issue regarding the deteri- wearing ANSF uniforms, an unfortunately fire. This incident marks the lat- oration of trust between the common enough element in such incidents. est in a string of such occurrences, ANSF and IMF, the goal of such NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Incident volumes were low in Ka- pisa this period, with only Tagab, the continuation of the AOG 30 Alasay and Nijrab represented. campaign in that district thought 20 The focus was Tagab, with 3 di- to have been announced with the 10 SVBIED attack in late March. rect attacks on ANSF in the mid- 0 dle of the period, one of which ANP did, however, manage to led to the death of an AOG fight- defuse a single IED in the Gurra er in the exchange of fire. Also in area of the district. KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime Tagab, a large IED struck an IMF In Alasay, two incidents on con- secutive days in the Ashpi valley vehicle, killing one soldier and copter assault killed 7 AOG fighters and in- both shone insights onto the on- injuring 9 more. As such, although jured 4 others. Finally, in Nijrab, ANP discov- going operations there. First on last period was quiet in the dis- ered a large cache of mortar shells in Shada trict, partly because of on-going the 23rd, an IMF helicopter Gul village. ANA clearing operations, this crashed while on operations there, period has seen what may well be and on the following day, a heli- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 A total of 15 security incidents 40 this report are unknown. It is were recorded in Logar this re- 30 porting period, displaying a drop worth noting that reported abduc- 20 when compared to the 19 report- tion cases have been rare in Baraki ed in early April. Nonetheless, Barak and this abduction marks 10 AOG activity in the province re- the first incident to occur this year 0 mained relatively constant with 8 and only the fourth ANSO rec- AOG initiated incidents. The geo- orded abduction since 2009. graphical distribution of security In the past two weeks Logar host- LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime events followed familiar patterns ed three IED incidents, respec- checkpoint in the Aynak Copper Mine area of with Baraki Barak, Charkh and tively in Puli Alam, Baraki Barak Muhammad Agha District. Puli Alam districts recording the and Khushi, of which one device bulk of incidents. In Baraki Barak, detonated. In Puli Alam, Padkhab ANSF/IMF activities were focused on Baraki apart from an AOG attack on an area, an IED struck an ANA vehi- Barak and Charkh districts. Although several ANP checkpoint in Shah Moham- cle travelling on the main district arrests have been reported in Baraki Barak dur- mad Village, which resulted in one road but did not cause casualties. ing the current military operations, anecdotal ANP wounded, another notewor- In addition, AOG launched two reporting suggests the vast majority of fighters thy incident took place in Pulijugi IDF attacks in Charkh and Mu- had already left the area and moved to the Area. On 24th April, an AOG hammad Agha districts.
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