The ANSO Report (16-30 September 2010)

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 58 16-30 September 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-7 The impact of the elections and Zabul while Ghazni of civilian casualties are 7-9 Western Region upon CENTRAL was lim- and Kandahar remained counter-productive to Northern Region 10-15 ited. Security forces claim extremely volatile. With AOG aims. Rather it is a that this calm was the result major operations now un- testament to AOG opera- Southern Region 16-20 of effective preventative derway in various parts of tional capacity which al- Eastern Region 20-23 measures, though this is Kandahar, movements of lowed them to achieve a unlikely the full cause. An IDPs are now taking place, maximum of effect 24 ANSO Info Page AOG attributed NGO ‘catch originating from the dis- (particularly on perceptions and release’ abduction in Ka- tricts of Zhari and Ar- of insecurity) for a mini- bul resulted from a case of ghandab into Kandahar mum of risk. YOU NEED TO KNOW mistaken identity. City. The operations are In the WEST, Badghis was The pace of NGO incidents unlikely to translate into the most affected by the • NGO abductions country- lasting security as AOG wide in the NORTH continues onset of the elections cycle, with abductions reported seem to have already recording a three fold in- • Ongoing destabilization of from Faryab and Baghlan. moved out of the areas un- crease in incidents. In- the North The difference in motivations der attack. In addition, it is cluded in this were various for these abductions serves expected that IMF claims of abductions of IEC staff , a • Pervasive AOG presence in success from these opera- the East to highlight the complex and total of 10 staff members diverse nature of the region, tions over the next months in 3 separate instances. • Elections related incident and the actors operating will surface as overall secu- Herat also recorded it’s spike countrywide within. The substantial num- rity incidents naturally de- highest incident volume crease as a result of the on- • ber of incidents recorded thus far for 2010, though Temporary lull in Kabul set of the harsh Afghan incident levels throughout the North during the majority of these oc- the elections cycle also serves winter and the normal end curred a day prior to the ANSO is supported by as a further indicator of the to the fighting season. actual election, a situation continuing deterioration of Proving that quantity has a that was out of the norm the security context, with 7 quality of its own, the for the countrywide con- of the 9 provinces recording EAST accounted for over text. While commonly their highest incident vol- 35% of all incidents re- overshadowed by the per- umes thus far. This deterio- corded countrywide on the vasiveness of the conflict, ration has also begun to af- 18 September election day, the threat of criminal activ- fect previously benign prov- marked with extensive use ity to NGO remains, as inces, as seen in the suicide of indirect fire, IED, and attested by the in-transit attack in Balkh which re- small unit engagements. theft of NGO property in sulted in a substantial num- The low lethality of these Ghor. ber of civilian casualties. attacks have been attributed Election day in SOUTH by some as an indicator of clearly resulted in an increase the efficacy of security in security incidents. Excep- forces, though this is not tions to this were Helmand likely the case as high levels THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 1 On 20 September, Kabul Prov- 40 ince witnessed a rare case of an AOG’s respect for the status of 30 AOG-staged abduction targeting NGO workers as well as an effec- 20 seven employees of an Afghan tive line of command at place en- 10 NGO involved in demining activi- suring timely implementation of 0 ties in Dashti Saqawa, Chahar the decision. Asyab District. All of the abduc- AOG initiated attacks represented tees were released 24 hours later 13 out of the total 32 reported KABUL AOG KABUL ACG with their abductors explaining incidents. Albeit most of the that they had been mistakenly threat reporting focused on secu- the low level of AOG activity on the polling taken for GOA employees, most rity inside Kabul City during elec- day to effective police efforts prior and during likely in an attempt to organize a tion day. The centre of gravity for the elections, it may also be argued that the prisoner exchange. Although the AOG kinetic activity proved to be core of AOG resources was simply directed to identity of the attackers hasn’t found in the southern rural dis- other theatres of operations. Nonetheless, the been plausibly established, local tricts in the aftermath of the elec- fact remains that no spectacular or complex testimonies suggest a possible link tion. Increased levels of AOG- attack took place in Kabul City while the level to the Taliban mobile units oper- IMF/ANSF escalations were re- of AOG activity in other districts of the prov- ating on the Kabul – Logar High- ported from Surobi (6), Khaki ince remained low in nature and lacked lethal- way. Elevated risks of similar Jabar (3), Musayi and Chahar ity. NGO (mis)targeting in the future, Asayb (2 each); with election day As of 28 September, the ECC processed a re- in conjunction with increased lev- recording only 5 directly related cord number of 468 complaints, out of which els of AOG activity, should be incidents, namely 2 road-side IED more than 50% have been classified as A- assumed for the southern districts. strikes, 2 rocket detonations and a category cases, that is, having a potential to On a more positive note, the hand-grenade. The sixth violent impact on the final outcome of the elections. prompt release of the abductees incident recorded on 18 Septem- The impacts of eventual ballot recounts and by the kidnappers emphasized the ber was related to an IMF engage- disqualification of fraudulent and illegal votes ment of AOG in the Uzbin Valley are yet to be seen; however, so far the elections of Surobi. In comparison, the last do not seem to have particularly shaken Kabul KEY THREATS & CONCERNS year’s presidential and provincial political environment in a way that would indi- Spectacular attacks elections saw 11 attacks on elec- cate higher risks of larger public protests in the Criminality tion day in Kabul Province. Al- short term. Demonstrations though IMF and ANSF attribute

NGO Incidents fostered during the years of privileged access PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 of Panjshiri leaders to the key positions in the This Report Period 0 Government. A revived competition over the Panjshir enjoyed another period representation of factional interests at the pro- devoid of security incidents, September, the ECC registered 12 vincial headquarters and in Kabul, mirroring a dominated instead by the com- duly submitted complaints with 10 growing alienation between Marshal Fahim’s memoration of Ahmad Shah of them related to polling irregu- clique and the President, seems to have gained Masoud’s assassination and the larities. 3 cases have so far been momentum recently. NGOs should watch Wolesi Jirga elections. The elec- qualified as A-complaint category. closely the future developments in the distri- tions were held without major Nevertheless, beyond the unifying bution of power between Panjshiri factions, hindrances reported. As of 28 element of loyalty to Masoud’s including their respective representation in the legacy, a closer look inside the central Government, as any eventual changes Valley reveals a delicate balance of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS in the current set-up may destabilize the secu- power among various factions Potential of political instability rity environment in the province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Overshadowing the local peren- 30 nial political rivalries that were (Ghorband and Shinwari Dis- 20 strongly echoed in the election tricts), and an opportunistic killing period, a spike in AOG activity in of an off-duty ANP officer in his 10 the Ghorband Valley and an in- home village in Shinwari. Of par- 0 flux of AOG fighters into the ticular note to NGOs is the case Kohi Safi district dominated the of an RCIED strike targeting a PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG security environment in Parwan. private construction company While the previous cycle had seen vehicle (white pick-up) in transit strike hit and killed a group of six AOG fight- only 2 security incidents, 14 cases on the main Kabul – Bamyan ers in Mandiqol Area. On 28 September, a were reported in the last two road in Shinwari, which resulted roadside IED struck an ANP vehicle on a dis- weeks. With the exception of a in 9 casualties (incl. 5 fatalities). trict road in Kotal Piran, while the next day the shoot-out between ANP and un- The spike in AOG activity in convoy of the Kohi Safi Chief of Police hit known attackers in Jabalusseraj Kohi Safi gave credibility to re- another IED placed in a culvert in Milan Area, (most probably reflecting an esca- ports indicating a concerted ap- located between Kohi Safi DAC and Qalai lation between local political net- pearance of two separate AOGs, Zhale. NGOs should expect an escalation of works) the rest of the incidents each composed of approx. 20 full- violence in Kohi Safi in the coming weeks, pertained to AOG activity. time local fighters, affiliated to a namely in light of expected IMF strikes and Inclusive of the polling day, 7 local IEA commander (former search operations, which may also flare up AOG attacks were launched Taliban administrator of the dis- strong local resentment. against targets in the Ghorband trict) who is overseeing the opera- Political clashes between several local candi- Valley, completing the incident tions from Pakistan. Several dates in Chaharikar didn’t translate into secu- map with 2 IED strikes sources indicate that the two rity incidents though as of 28 September, the AOG would be primarily tasked ECC processed 29 formal complaints. NGO with launching IDF attacks from KEY THREATS & CONCERNS should be attentive to the animated political Deh Sabz and Puli Charkhi loca- environment in Chaharikar, particularly around AOG in Ghorband tions towards targets inside Kabul the announcement dates of the preliminary/ Clashes in Kohi Safi City. On 24 September, an IMF final results by IEC.

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 More reminiscent of AOG opera- 30 2009 presidential and provincial tions in Wardak, Daykundi wit- 20 nessed a six indirect fire attacks elections and that of 2010. 10 oriented against the Kajran DAC A peaceful march in the Nili DAC on election day. More effective as on the 20th concluded the series of 0 a demonstration of force rather demonstrations sparked in pro- than a testimony of AOG marks- tests against the announcement of DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI ACG manship, all six projectiles and the by-then abandoned “Quran- mortars impacted well beyond the burning Day” in Florida, ulti- firmed reports indicate that negotiations have DAC. This attack marks the only mately emphasizing the extent to been opened with a pro-GOA Pashtun com- direct attempt by AOG at disrupt- which the province lives discon- mander in Ghazni province to “oversee” secu- ing the polling activity in the nected from real time events in rity developments in Ghizab District. The province, inclusive of both the the rest of the region. implications of such development are yet to be Pertaining to the Kabul admini- seen as further details haven’t been disclosed at KEY THREATS & CONCERNS strations’ efforts to tame the un- this stage. Spoilers to peace in Gizab ruly southern districts, uncon- THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40 Contrary to the steady downwards IMF brigades reportedly sched- 30 trend in incident volumes during 20 uled for November 2010 will the past few months, the last two 10 most likely prompt further in- weeks have seen a spike in vio- 0 lence with the incident levels crease in violent incidents. marking up a two-fold increase in 3 ANSF/IMF search operations comparison to the previous report and 16 of 26 AOG attacks took LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG cycle. Out of 42 combined inci- place between 16 and 20 Septem- A-category with most of files classified as dents, 60% were initiated by ber. Similar to the presidential and “polling irregularities” and “undue influence”. AOG. Besides 7 search operations provincial elections in 2009, elec- The ANP COP confirmed that 17 IEC work- conducted by IMF/ANSF, ANP tion day saw 8 direct AOG at- ers and 28 voters were arrested for election reported 5 IED discoveries while tacks, out of which 5 occurred in rigging in Muhammad Agha, Puli Alam, Baraki an equal number of road-side Puli Alam. 4 IDF attacks, 3 SAF Barak and Charkh, while the arrests of two IEDs struck 4 intended targets attacks and 1 IED targeted the senior IEC officers were reported from Khar- and 1 accidentally activated by a polling centers and an ANSF se- war District two days after the election. civilian motorcycle. Most of the curity detail dispatched to protect Logar came to the fore of international atten- violent escalations took place in the DACs and access roads. Be- tion on 22 September, when GOA signed a proximity of the main population sides the AOG attacks, election multi-billion investment deal with China Met- centers, of Puli Alam (18), Baraki day was characterized by numer- allurgical Corporation Group for construction Barak (10) and Muhammad Agha ous accounts of wide-spread elec- of a railway corridor from Aynak Copper Mine (5). The arrival of three additional toral rigging and repeated gaps in towards Torkham and Hairatan. The first mobile network coverage, namely phase of the investment consists of a feasibility between Puli Alam and Baraki study which is supposed to take 2 years prior KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Barak. IED to any commencement of construction works. Out of 139 electoral complaints Abductions while in transit processed by the ECC as of 28 September, 54 cases fell into the

Central Region AOG Incidents‐Election Comparison

Wardak

Bamyan

Panjshir

Parwan 2009 Election Day

Logar 2010 Election Day

Kapisa

Kabul

Daykundi

0 5 10 15 20 THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40

Six incidents reported from 30 Kapisa during this cycle evoke IDF attack was launched against unchanged patterns in the inci- the Tagab DAC resulting in the 20 dent levels, tactics and territorial injuries of three local residents. 10 distribution of AOG activity and A particularly noteworthy inci- 0 ensuing ANSF/IMF operations. dent from Nijrab involved the Nevertheless, NGOs should keep only suicide attack (albeit at- an eye on the developments in tempted) recorded on election day KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG Mahmudi Raqi, where an eventual countrywide. A BBIED was spot- spill-over of AOG activity from ted and shot by the ANP protec- which have witnessed occasional infiltrations Nijrab and Tagab remains a possi- tion unit at the entrance of a poll- by AOG in an attempt to intimidate the local bility. ing center in the Chawkan Area of communities against cooperation with GOA authorities and IMF. Anecdotal evidence During this cycle, three of the five Nijrab District. While the attacker points out a variety of tactics displayed by AOG attacks concentrated on managed to detonate his charge, AOG, ranging from speeches in the mosques disrupting the polling activity on no other casualties resulted from to more hostile actions such as direct intimida- the election day in the eastern the explosion. tions and perusals of passengers on the roads districts, while the only security Reverting to the patterns of the after dark. Sustained AOG mobilization in incident in the West saw a joint warfare waged in the 1980s, AOG Shukhi eventually sparked the abovementioned IMF-ANP search operation result kinetic activity concentrates on joint police action conducted by IMF and in the killing of 2 AOG members asymmetric attacks against the ANP on 22 September. Unrelated to the AOG in Shukhi, Mahmudi Raqi on 22 DACs, bases of pro-GOA secu- threat, Mahmudi Raqi DAC and the September. Two of the AOG at- rity forces, and strategic supply neighbouring Jamal Agha cluster in Kohistan 2 tacks on the Election Day tar- routes while the mountainous had also seen several cases of previously unre- geted Nijrab and Tagab DACs: in parts of the districts provide a safe ported intimidations against a particular Nijrab, a road-side IED struck a environment for AOG retreat and INGO, preceding the spontaneous demonstra- vehicle of an election candidate supply. An eventual expansion of tion on 9 September which culminated in the on his way from the DAC to a AOG networks towards Mahmudi looting of the INGO office in the Bazar Area polling center (resulting in 3 cas); Raqi, capitalizing on the old muja- of Mahmudi Raqi DAC. while a three-fold and inaccurate hideen networks, in particular for- mer HIG fighters, is a concern Otherwise, the election period and the polling voiced out by the local NGO itself merely reflected local political divisions KEY THREATS & CONCERNS community. In relation to the risk and factional disputes, featuring mainly HIG AOG expansion of conflict spill over, NGO and Jamiat factions in the eastern parts of the Factional disputes in west should monitor the developments province. AOG presence in Nijrab &Tagab in Shukhi and Nawabad Areas, THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 4 100 This Report Period 1 80 Wardak Province recorded the 60 highest concentration of AOG blast caused minor structural dam- 40 operations in the Central Region age. Ironically, the clinic person- 20

explicitly aimed at disrupting poll- nel successfully resisted an earlier 0 ing activity on 18 September. Be- attempt by local IEC representa- sides the closures of numerous tives to improvise a polling station WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG polling centers (namely in Day inside the facility. Mirdad and Jaghatu) the attacks Overall, most of the AOG activity ported from Day Mirdad related to road-side resulted in 7 ANSF and 6 civilian on 18 September concentrated on IED placements, while other IED placements casualties, and an infrastructural multiple IDF attacks against the and detonations accounted for 2 out of 5 inci- collateral damage sustained by an DACs with 8 cumulated cases dents occurring in Nirkh. INGO. reported from Chaki Wardak, Day Besides the traditional SAF attacks, IED em- Out of 38 recorded incidents dur- Mirdad, Jaghatu, Maydan Shahr, placement has been quite popular with AOG ing the present cycle, 30 were ini- Nirkh, and Saydabad. 2 prolonged planners, as illustrated in 5 IED strikes and 4 tiated by AOG with 16 attacks SAF attacks against election instal- emplaced IED discoveries, distributed between having been conducted on the lations were recorded while a Saydabad (3), Day Mirdad (3), Nirkh (2) and election day alone. In comparison complex attack combining RPG Jaghatu (1). Two incidents demonstrated the with the 2009 elections, only 11 and SAF was staged in the Salar lethality of IED attacks. On 21 September, 3 AOG attacks were staged on the Area of Saydabad. In addition, 2 civilians were killed and 2 injured when their polling day. Saydabad DAC wit- IED explosions targeted IMF, tractor struck a roadside IED in Dashti Qutb; nessed a climax of AOG indirect resp. ANA convoys, 2 SAF as- while 6 ANP sustained injuries in another IED fire attacks with 7 projectiles saults were launched against IMF/ explosion in Haftasyab, Saydabad on the Elec- (RPG 7 and mortars) consecu- ANSF static targets and an armed tion Day. tively launched in 4 intervals. One clashed erupted between rival Widespread allegations of electoral fraud, of the projectiles detonated inside AOG factions in Nirkh District. the compound of an INGO-run namely restriction of access to the polling sta- The following days saw an addi- tions and consequent stuffing of ballot boxes, hospital in the Sheez Area while tional 26 violent escalations in the the personnel were just attending but also the intimidation of IEC workers and follow up of AOG attacks and their involvement in the rigging of the election a civilian victim of another SAF numerous IMF/ANSF search attack perpetrated on Highway 1. results, were reported from the province. operations in the major popula- However, hard evidence submitted so far to Although no casualties resulted tion centers and hotspots of AOG from this collateral incident, the ECC lags behind the rumoured accounts. 42 activity. 9 AOG attacks alone electoral complaints have so far been proc- were carried out in the typical hot- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS essed by ECC, with 33 cases falling into A- spots of Saydabad, mainly against AOG attacks along Hwy 1 category. The implications of the complex ANSF/IMF static targets and Abductions electoral game, as much as renewed inter- convoys on the Kabul – Ghazni AOG clashes in Nirkh, are yet to be seen. IEDs Highway. 4 of 5 incidents re-

NOTE: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 29th of September 2010 THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

BAMYAN NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 With the exception of the over- 30 land access routes to the province reported from the southern parts 20 and the districts of Kahmard and of Panjab District during the pre- 10 Shibar, Bamyan represents one of vious cycle have not resurfaced 0 the most stable security environ- thus far. Saighan District came to the fore on 21 September follow- ments for NGO operations in the BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN ACG Central Region. The last AOG ing an arrest of a local prominent Jamiati commander by NDS. initiated attack dates back to the national pattern of allegations indicating ambush of an IMF convoy in the This arrest reportedly results from a two-fold criminal charge involv- fraudulent behavior during and in the after- Eshpushta Area of Kahmard on 3 math of the election day. Out of 38 registered August and the armed robberies ing the planning of a kidnapping and ordering a targeted killing. and triaged complaints so far, the ECC has KEY THREATS & CONCERNS qualified 26 files as first priority cases that may The election was not marked by affect the final outcome. Instability in Khamard & Shibar any significant hampering, albeit Bamyan isn’t an exception to the

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 5 GHOR 50 This Report Period 1 An armed robbery on the 30th of 40 September in Taywara District opportunistic personal gain rather 30 than a more nefarious targeting of directly affected an INGO. Un- 20 the INGO. known armed men stopped a local 10 transport vehicle and demanded Ghor Province saw an increase of 0 the unaccompanied bags belong- incidents during this reporting ing to the INGO be handed over. period as a direct result of the Once accomplished, the driver parliamentary elections. Nearly GHOR AOG GHOR ACG was allowed to continue on un- 60% of all incidents during this molested. These bags, which con- cycle were recorded between the opened fire on an IMF mobile patrol team. tained high value items like com- 17th and 18th of September. Daw- This is only the second such attack against in- puter and communications equip- lat Yar experienced the most seri- ternational forces recorded in Chaghcharan ment, were en route to Pasaband ous incidents, including an armed City during the last four years. In 2008, un- at the time of incident. At this clash from tribal tensions. While known armed men opened fire at a vehicle of time, it is believed that someone tribal issues in this area are not international police advisors in Chaghcharan saw INGO staff bring these items unusual, current tensions seem to City without causing any casualties. At present, to the local transport and subse- be linked to election related is- it is too early to tell if it was an isolated case or quently informed the perpetrators. sues. As are result of these current if the incident marks a change in the security This is supported by the facts that issues, GoA offices and schools situation. However, Chaghcharan District has not only were these were the only were closed. While the situation at seen seven IED discoveries and one detona- bags taken, they were also specifi- present is stable, further increases tion in 2010 so far, of which four were discov- cally demanded. The motive for in tensions and armed clashes are ered since the end of August and two during the armed robbery seems to be likely, particularly when the elec- this reporting period. Altogether, these latest tion results are announced. incidents suggest that AOG are becoming KEY THREATS & CONCERNS more active, especially in the Murghab Area of Furthermore, on 23 September AOG in Murghab Chaghcharan District. two IMF soldiers and one civilian Tribal tensions were shot and wounded when an IED unknown man on a motorbike THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 60 Incidents in Badghis Province 50 nearly tripled during this reporting Badghis Province, especially on 40 period, with 30% of the incidents the election day were over 50% of 30 20 recorded on the election day. IEC the periods total were recorded, most of them against polling cen- 10 staff were particularly hard hit, 0 with 8 staff (along with 10 local tres in Qadis District. Qadis, elders) being abducted on 16 Sep- which saw already more AOG tember. As well, IEC were also activity than usual during the last BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS ACG abducted in two separate incidents reporting period, became a focal from the Bobakha Area of Ab area around the election day. Of note, 60% of all IED detonations affected Kamari District and in Eshaq Zai However, activity in the district civilians, particularly in Muqur and Ghormach. Village of Murghab District. decreased drastically after the 20 This further highlights the increased risk of September with the shifting to collateral involvement for civilians. While it Direct attacks by AOGs were Ghormach and Murghab districts remains to be seen if IEDs will replace the again the prevailing issue in during the second half of the pe- preferred tactic of direct attacks in the long- riod. In addition, a trend noted term, they do present less risk for AOGs than KEY THREATS & CONCERNS already at the beginning of Sep- direct attacks and ultimately achieve the same IED tember continued after the elec- goals. Armed clashes tion week: IED detonations were AOG presence in Qadis increasing visibly in the province.

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 Farah Province recorded one indi- 40 rect NGO incident. AOG fired attacks bear the risk for NGOs of 30 being collaterally involved when one rocket towards the DAC, 20 which impacted in vicinity of an in proximity to such frequent tar- 10 NGO clinic; however, the clinic gets. was not affected by the impact. Incidents in Farah Province in- 0 This was the fifth IDF attack creased around 50% compared to against the DAC in Pusht Rod the precious reporting period, FARAH AOG FARAH ACG District in 2010. AOG attacked primarily due to the elections. the DAC before on 29 May, 4 and Election related incidents included and final election results in October. 14 June with rockets and on the direct and indirect attacks against Altogether, IED related incidents remained the 7th of August with three mortars. polling centers, as recorded in majority with Farah City once more seeing Of note, there are no indications Pusht Rod, Bala Buluk, Gulistan most (45%) of these incidents. District 4 fig- that the NGO clinic was targeted and Khaki Safed. In Farah City, a ured prominently in this reporting, with two in any way in the recent case as group of armed men forcefully IED detonations and one discovery. A fourth the attack fits into the usual pat- entered a polling centre and IED was discovered in Baghe Naw Area of tern of AOG attacks against stuffed several boxes with ballots Farah City. Of note, civilians were again af- DACs in general. However, such in the afternoon of Election Day. fected in Pusht Rod and Dilaram In addition, Such incidents indicate that fur- in Dokin Village of Pusht Rod three IEDs KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ther tensions in regard to fraud detonated inside a school without causing Electoral fraud allegations allegations are not unlikely in casualties on 29 September. IEDs Farah Province around the an- nouncements of the preliminary THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 11 80 This Report Period 0 70 The province saw more than 60 twice the number of incidents in nine of them being IED detona- 50 comparison with the PRP, 30% of tions. The IEDs were mainly tar- 40 geting ANSF and IMF, though in 30 which were recorded on 17 Sep- 20 tember with a further 20% were one case a civilian was killed. The 10 noted from the 18th. Herat was vast majority of IEDs were con- 0 the only Province in the Western centrated in the usual areas such Region which recorded more inci- as Darzak, Chel Dokhtar, Ganj HERAT AOG HERAT ACG dents on the 17 than on the Elec- and Yaka Toots. An exception tion Day itself with AOG being was the last IED detonation on 29 corded incidents and presented the main secu- particularly active in the north- September in Rabat Sangi, the rity concern for Herat Province. eastern and southern districts. district centre, on the main road In Herat City, the ‘rocket rickshaw’ tactic ap- Altogether there were no high to Turghundi, marking the first peared again after being utilized in the last re- profile attacks but rather an inten- IED strike in the District Centre porting period and July. In the recent case one sification of the usual incident in the last years. In Obe two IEDs of the rockets struck a civilian residence with- picture. detonated reportedly without out causing casualties. Since it is the third inci- causing casualties in the district Kushk and Obe districts were dent of this kind in three months, it is likely centre area and Sar-e-Pol village. particular hotspots during this that the rickshaws are used intentionally as a A further IED was discovered reporting period, with Kushk re- launch platform rather that just a method of Kashmiran Village. In addition, cording twelve incidents alone; transport. The probably unintended impact of Obe recorded two abductions, one rocket in a private residence demonstrates one of a local truck driver and one the risk for collaterally damage from such at- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS involving the district administra- tacks. Indirect fire attacks tor of Taywara district of Ghor Intimidation Province. Altogether, IED deto- IEDs nations made up 37% of all re-

Western Region AOG Incidents‐Election Comparison

Badghis

Ghor 2009 Election Day 2010 Election Day Farah

Herat

0 5 10 15 20 THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 9 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 Balkh Province experienced the 40 most violent two week period The proliferation of IED inci- 30 dents in Balkh Province was per- since ANSO began collecting data 20 in 2006. The province saw a total haps the single most unanticipated 10 of 25 AOG-initiated incidents, trend during this election period. more than doubling the average Balkh recorded the highest num- 0 rate of 10 per two-week period ber of IED-related incidents in noted since the beginning of 2010. the northern region for this two BALKH AOG BALKH ACG The disparity between last year’s week period, with seven detona- incident rate during the presiden- tions and three discoveries. Two cle to detonate instead against a civilian bus. tial election, and this year’s rate separate IED detonations against The SVBIED caused a total of 28 civilian inju- on 18 September, underlines a civilian vehicles in Balkh District ries and the death of one child, bringing the process of deterioration which has accounted for 11 out of the 14 civilian casualty rate to its highest level re- progressed over the course of the civilian deaths recorded in the corded in Balkh Province, according to ANSO past year. While only one AOG- northern region during the two- data. Only two SVBIEDs have been reported initiated incident was reported on day election period of 17 and 18 over the past four years in the province – one 20 August 2009 in Balkh Prov- September, while the remaining on 17 April 2009 in Ewad Village of Balkh ince, ten such incidents were re- casualties were due to indirect fire District on the Mazar-Balkh Road, which killed ported on 18 September 2010, attacks in the northeastern prov- an IMF soldier and injured two others, and including IEDs and direct-fire inces. On 16 September in Chim- one on 3 July 2009 which detonated at Haira- attacks on polling centres. The tal District Centre, AOGs distrib- ton Junction in Nahri Shahi District, killing location of these incidents – Cha- uted night letters warning civilians only the bomber. The incident has placed se- har Bolak, Chimtal, Nahri Shahi, not to leave their homes due to curity forces on high alert, perhaps prompting Kaldar, Sholgara and Balkh – be- the presence of IEDs and the like- the first escalation-of-force shooting reported lies a growth in AOG presence lihood of attacks against polling on the Mazar-Shibirgan Road the day after the and capabilities beyond the tradi- centres. While security forces have event. ANA opened fire on a civilian bus in tional hot spots in the west of been slow to identify and disclose Aqcha District on the main road, when the bus Mazar-e Sharif City. Most re- the types of IEDs which deto- came too close to its convoy. cently the spread of influence has nated against two civilian vehicles In other notable events, reports of pro- been witnessed in Alburz Subdis- on two separate occasions in government militias continue to surface in trict of Chimtal District, south of Balkh District, resulting in five Chimtal, particularly in the Alburz Subdistrict, the Alburz Mountains. As was injuries and eleven deaths, it has where an increase AOG presence has been noted in Baghlan Province, AOGs been suggested that the IEDs in- reported in the past four months. These mili- in Balkh Province are not cur- tentionally targeted civilians in tias were formed in August with the support of rently able to sustain the rate of order to deter them from partici- the provincial government, and backed by for- incidents seen during this election pating in the elections. Reports of mer Jihadi alliances, independent of the recent period; however, this period dis- UXO remaining from the election central government’s Local Police Initiative. played the current peak capacity period have been received from Though these individuals lack uniforms and of AOG capabilities and reach in various villages in Chahar Bolak official authorities, they apparently maintain the province, belying what could and Chimtal districts. the ability to request IMF air support, as seen become the potential norm of In a more publicized incident, an on 19 September in Qabchaq Area of Alburz activity to be seen in the coming SVBIED detonated on the Mazar- Subdistrict of Chimtal District. Since their level six months. Shibirgan Road this period, ten of security of community support is still un- kilometres west of Mazar-e Sharif known, it cannot be determined at this time City, in Dehdadi District, border- whether they will be an effective deterrent KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ing Balkh District. The bomber against the spread AOG influence, or a poten- IED attempted to target an IMF con- tial catalyst for increased violence. Pro-government militias voy, which managed to veer away from the device, causing the vehi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 5 BAGHLAN This Report Period 1 50 On 27 September AOGs am- 40 by the AOG. bushed an INGO convoy as they 30

were heading from Kunduz to Pul Four NGO abductions have oc- 20

-e Khumri on the main highway. curred in Baghlani Jadid District 10 One vehicle, an unmarked col- on the main road in the past year, 0 oured Surf, was hijacked along two of which occurred when staff with three INGO staff. The rest members were stopped at AOG of the convoy, which consisted of checkpoints, and two of which BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG marked white high-profile vehi- were the result of targeted am- tween the militias and ANSF, the former of cles, managed to escape un- bushes. Out of the four incidents whom feel neglected by their official counter- harmed. All three abducted occu- which have occurred, abductors parts, and the latter of whom mistrust their pants were released three days received ransom for the release of former enemies. later with the help of the interven- NGO staff on at least one con- Election-day violence in Baghlan saw a seven- tion of locals, while the vehicle is firmed occasion, while on at least fold increase in incidents compared to last still in AOG custody. This inci- two other occasions, release was year’s presidential election. The proliferation of dent marked the second ambush negotiated through local contacts. incidents in areas beyond Baghlan-e Jadid Dis- of an NGO convoy with the in- AOGs may be motivated to ab- trict underscores the severe deterioration in tent to abduct NGO staff mem- duct NGO staff in exchange for security that Baghlan has seen over the past bers along the Pul-e Khumri- ransom or in order to facilitate a year. Prolonged clashes were reported near Kunduz Main Road. The first oc- prisoner exchange. Baghlan Old City, Baghlani Jadid District, curred on 4 July 2010, when 5-6 Despite numerous military opera- Bagh-e Shamal Area on the Baghlan-Mazar unseen gunmen ambushed an un- tions in Baghlani Jadid District, Main Road in Pul-e Khumri District, and Da- marked INGO vehicle carrying security forces have not been able han-e Ghori District Centre. Isolated attacks two staff members. The pur- to secure the area north of Bagh- on polling centres also occurred in Burka, Tala ported AOG released the staff lan Old City, where all of these Wa Barfak and Dushi districts, with at least members on 14 July after the in- incidents have occurred. Confi- one incident resulting in the closure of the tervention of elders and the vic- dence in the most recent attempt polling centre. An estimated 13 BM-1 rockets tims’ families furnished a substan- to create security via the forma- were fired on villages in Baghlani Jadid, Dushi, tial ransom. A close run-in was tion of pro-government militias Burka and Pul-e Khumri districts, resulting in also reported on 15 November was challenged this period prior to an at least three civilian deaths and two civilian 2009 in the same area, when an the elections, when a single attack injuries. Three civilians were also injured when INGO travelling northward on on a polling centre resulted in the their vehicle was attacked on the Pul-e Khumri the Pul-e Khumri - Kunduz Road deaths of six pro-government mi- -Doshi Road, south of Pul-e Khumri City. in a marked white Land Rover litia members and the injury of six Clashes near the main roads temporarily closed came across a suspected AOG others. The militias have been the Baghlan-Mazar, Baghlan-Kunduz and checkpoint at Jar-e Khushk Area. formed from former Hezb-e Baghlan-Kabul highways for intermittent peri- The vehicle stopped about 300 Islami Gulbuddin fighters who ods during the day. Though Baghlani AOGs metres short of the checkpoint had surrendered to the govern- lack the capacity to sustain the kinds of simul- and, while attempting to turn ment following a defeat by the taneous attacks such as those seen on election around, was fired at several times Taliban in early March 2010. Elec- day, the expansion of their presence and capa- tion-day attacks overwhelmed bilities were made known this period, giving a KEY THREATS & CONCERNS militias and security forces in glimpse ahead into what may shortly become Illegal checkpoints Dand-e Shahabuddin (Pul-e Baghlan’s regular state of affairs. Attacks along main routes Khumri) and Baghlani Jadid dis- tricts, exacerbating tensions be- THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 4 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 While AOG control in northern 40 Takhar predictably disrupted elec- voting, and also fired on the dis- 30 trict centre and surrounding areas, tion proceedings this period, a 20 resulting in the closure of several military operation in the south of 10 the province also highlighted the polling centres. One civilian was 0 instability of the border area be- killed and two others were injured tween Ishkamish District (Takhar) as a result of ANSF mortar fire in and Burka District (Baghlan). response to the IDF attacks. After TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG the elections, AOGs retaliated AOGs in Darqad District against a pro-government militia militia positions, as well as the third IED- launched IDF and direct-fire at- commander by setting his house incident reported in the district, in which an tacks on the district centre on fire, and resumed illegal check- IED detonated against a militia’s convoy, caus- throughout the election day, re- points in search of GOA employ- ing no casualties. IDF and direct-fire attacks sulting in the confirmed closure of ees along the Khwaja Bahawuddin remain the preferred tactics among AOGs in all but one polling centre. In -Yangi Qala main road. the neighboring districts, where only two IED Khwaja Bahawuddin District, ci- incidents have been reported in Khwaja Ba- vilians were threatened against Beyond incidents of intimidation, hawuddin (May and June), as well as one participating in the elections, and direct-fire and IDF attacks re- botched IED attempt in Darqad (May). election-day brought two IDF ported during the election period attacks on the district centre, as in Darqad, Yangi Qala, Khwaja In southern Takhar, Ishkamish District, IMF well as a direct-fire attack on a Bahawuddin, a sustained rate of launched a night raid targeting the AOG which polling centre during the ballot AOG attacks on ANSF and pro- has recently emerged along the Baghlan- count. In Yangi Qala District, government militias has marked a Takhar border. The raid resulted in four AOG AOGs warned citizens against new AOG offensive in Khwaja and two civilian deaths, reportedly children. Ghar District, particularly in Zard The incident underscores the significance of Kamar Area, where a group of AOG expansion in this area, where AOGs also KEY THREATS & CONCERNS pro-government militia members attacked an ANP checkpoint on election day – AOG offensive in Khwaja Ghar joined AOGs this period. Khwaja the single AOG-initiated incident to occur be- Intimidation in northern Takhar Ghar witnessed three days of sus- yond the northern districts. Destabilization in Ishkamish tained attacks on pro-government

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 1 SAMANGAN This Report Period 1 50 On 15 September AOGs attacked 40 the district centre for several village of the district, the IEC was 30 hours into the night, causing dam- prevented by local villagers from age to a government building as unloading election material, as 20 well as an NGO-built school. This AOGs had apparently threatened 10 marked the first coordinated at- them against participating in the 0 tack on a district centre in the elections. Despite these incidents preceding the election, only one province. Two IEDs also deto- SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN ACG nated against an ANP convoy in incident was reported on election Dara-e Suf Payan District this day in Samangan Province. A poll- to be present in the area, specifically in Baya- period, causing some damage, and ing centre in Hazarat-e Sultan nan Village and Kandi Moshak Villages. This marking the first successful IED District came under a brief SAF group is suspected to be made up of local detonation in the district. In one attack by two armed men on a criminal elements who have been mobilized by motorcycle, the motive of which a small external AOG contingent, possibly KEY THREATS & CONCERNS could not be confidently deter- from Baghlan Province. Beyond Dara-e Suf mined to be AOG-initiated. Payan District, the security situation in Saman- IED Though no incidents were re- gan Province has remained stable. Intimidation ported on election day in Dara-e Attacks against DAC Suf Payan, AOGs are still assessed THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzan Province saw a decline in 40 reported incidents during this prolonged IDF and direct-fire 30 year’s election period, as com- attacks on the day of the elections. 20 pared to last. This decline may While AOGs launched attacks on district centres elsewhere in the 10 only signify a consolidation of 0 insecurity in the two districts region in order to prevent partici- pation in the elections, AOG con- where violence was reported on JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN ACG election day, in which the severity trol in these two districts had al- of attacks were well-beyond that ready precluded polling centres a push for control of the route which connects of last year’s. Darzab and Qush from opening, so that these at- Darzab to neighboring Faryab Province. As Tepa district centres came under tacks may have been launched reported in the Balkh Province report, ANA simply as a reminder of AOG fired on a civilian bus in Aqcha District, be- control. Beyond election-related cause it was driving to close to its convoy. The KEY THREATS & CONCERNS incidents, AOGs continued at- shooting happened one day after an SVBIED AOG control of Darzab & Qush tacks on ANSF/IMF targets in detonated on the same road, which likely Tepa the Dasht-e Laylee Area, as men- prompted the ANA to react in this way to this AOG attacks in Dasht-e-Laylee tioned in the last ANSO report, in particular incident.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 3 KUNDUZ 100 This Report Period 0 On 17 and 18 September 2010, 80 the northern region reported a reached a point of saturation in 60 137% increase in the number of several areas of the province, 40 whereas in other provinces in the security incidents, as compared to 20 north, AOGs are just now begin- the same period during last year’s 0 elections (19-20 August 2009). All ning to expand their influence. but two provinces experienced an Indirect-fire (IDF) attacks ac- over 100% increase in incident counted for 26% of the overall KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG number of security incidents in rates, while Kunduz saw a 43% were killed by an unexploded mortar round on the region reported on 17 and 18 increase and Jawzjan’s rate fell 19 September, which had been leftover from September, the majority of which from five incidents in 2009 to the previous day’s fighting. AOGs bore the were reported in Kunduz (15) and only two in 2010. Faryab and brunt of casualties in Kunduz Province, where Baghlan (9), with four incidents Baghlan provinces accounted for 18 were wounded and 20 killed on election day also reported in northern Takhar. 38% of the overall number of alone. The majority of these casualties were The IDF rate in Kunduz doubled incidents in the region, reporting inflicted during ANSF/IMF operations con- this year, with 15 IDF-related inci- 23 incidents each (identical to the ducted in northwestern Kunduz and Imam dents reported during the election Kunduz incident rate in 2009). Sahib districts. Joint military operations have period in 2010, versus 8 such inci- The reduced rate increase in Kun- effectively thinned out local AOG leadership dents during 2009’s elections. The duz can be attributed to the fact in the province, highlighted by the fact that the majority of these attacks consisted that AOG control has nearly post-election period saw only three AOG- of mortar and rocket fire on Kun- initiated incidents. The successful targeting of duz City itself, as well as two pro- Kunduz AOG leadership may lead to an in- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tracted attacks on Archi and Alia- crease in AOG dependence on high-impact Indirect fire bad district centres. Seven civil- tactics which require little manpower, mainly Degradation of AOG command ians were wounded by IDF on IEDs, IDF and suicide attacks. structure election day, while six children THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

BADAKHSHAN NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 40 The dual nature of Badakhshan’s 30 security situation was character- centre is rarely seen in Badakh- shan, like everywhere else on elec- 20 ized by two major events on elec- 10 tion day – an extended attack on tion day, AOGs took advantage 0 the district centre in Tagab, and a of the “prime time” to show their large demonstration in a sub- presence. Despite this show of district of Darwaz-e Bala. The force, polling centres in the dis- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG attack on the Tagab District Cen- trict centre reopened by noon. While AOGs are in fact increasing Subdistrict of Darwaz-e Bala District, where an tre, which lasted approximately estimated 4,000 people gathered in dissent, and seven hours and resulted in the their presence in western Badakh- shan, other areas remained calm in Jurm District, where voters burnt empty death of one AOG and the injury ballot boxes in front of the ANP headquarters of two ANP, was indicative of the on election day, including those areas in the southeast which have to demonstrate their disappointment. In AOG presence which continues Yawan District, as well, two polling centres to increase in Kishim and its sur- recently shown the potential for AOG infiltration. While Afghans were closed due to insufficient ballots. It can- rounding districts. While a pro- not be discounted that the political maneuver- tracted onslaught on a district in most areas of the country were too afraid or uninterested to vote, ing of certain candidates may have instigated voters in at least three districts in these situations; however, the will to vote in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Badakhshan outnumbered the much of Badakhshan certainly highlights the Attack on Tagab DAC district’s available ballots. This led relative level of security that the province still Elections related demonstrations to demonstrations in Mah-e May enjoys.

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 0 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Much like the rest of the region, 40 from the district due to a sudden Sar-e Pul Province reported its 30 deterioration in security. Outside highest incident rate this period, 20 including six AOG-initiated inci- of the district centre, a single poll- ing centre came under attack in 10 dents which occurred on 18 Sep- 0 tember, compared to last year’s Tar Bolak Village on election day, single incident reported on elec- forcing the IEC staff to flee and SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL ACG tion day in 2009. Continued at- allowing the attackers to confis- tacks on ANP checkpoints in the cate the election material. and killed the leader of the local shura, and in vicinity of the Sayyad District Beyond Sayyad District, the inci- Majar Village, AOGs abducted a village elder Centre occurred this period, as dent rate in Sar-e Pul District has who was accused of supporting the election AOGs are resuming an offensive been steadily increasing since Au- process. Boghawi Village was also the site of position in the district. The situa- gust. Two out of the three direct- the alleged poison attack on a girl’s school in tion may be more dire than re- fire attacks on polling centres dur- June. In the same area southeast of Sar-e Pul ported, underscored by uncon- ing the election were reported in City, on the Sar-e Pul-Sangcharak Road, an firmed reports of IDPs escaping Sar-e Pul District. In addition to IED was discovered and removed in Bazar night letters in some villages prior Bashi Village. This is the first IED-related inci- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS to the elections, village elders dent reported in the district since an individual AOG offensive in Sayyad were targeted after the elections in was arrested while planting an IED in Febru- Intimidation in Sar-e Pul District two separate villages – in Boghawi ary 2009. Village, unknown armed men shot THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 14 50 This Report Period 1 A group of INGO national staff 40 who had been abducted on 29 INGO stop sending female staff 30 August in Kohistan District were to the district. The AOG in ques- 20 finally released this period on 18 tion does not have an official po- 10 September. This is the fifth NGO sition within the AOG shadow 0 abduction reported in Faryab government in Faryab, and may have used the abduction in order Province in the past two months. FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG While the current trend in NGO to raise his own status among the abductions in Faryab appears to AOG leadership. gan are the only two provinces in the region in be centrally directed by AOG The number of AOG-initiated which election-day casualties were limited to leadership, it should be noted that incidents executed in Faryab combatants, with two ANSF and four AOG local AOGs may also carry out Province on election day marked a deaths reported. This was perhaps owing to abductions for personal gain, be- five-fold increase compared to the the relative lack of IED and indirect-fire at- yond their stated political or ideo- presidential election in 2009. The tacks in the province, although some were re- logical objectives. This abduction majority of incidents were direct- ported. appears to have specifically tar- fire attacks on polling centres and Following the elections, two abductions were geted the INGO in question, as it ANP checkpoints (these targets reported in Dawlatabad District this period – was carried out by a local AOG were often difficult to distinguish one former ANP and one village elder. The who had previously attempted to from one another because often threat of abduction remains high in the prov- pressure the INGO into provid- the checkpoints were guarding the ince, particularly in Dawlatabad District. In ing him with direct support. The polling centres). Direct-fire at- Bilchiragh District, AOGs continue to fight INGO abstained, in an effort to tacks on polling centres happened for control of Qorchi Village which has been preserve their neutrality, and the in Qaysar, Almar, Pashtun Kot, under de facto siege since the end of March AOG likely directed the abduc- Dawlatabad, Shirin Tagab and 2010, as it is the remaining GOA-controlled tion in retaliation. Among various Bilchiragh districts. As in the rest village to the east of the district centre. GOA demands made by the AOG in of the region (with the exception maintain control of the village in order to pre- question, the AOG demanded the of Jawzjan), the increased rate of vent AOG access to Sar-e Pul and Jawzjan election-day incidents highlighted Provinces; however, this control has also es- the spread of AOG activity which KEY THREATS & CONCERNS sentially denied the freedom of movement for has taken place over the past year NGO abduction threat civilians, as commercial traffic is denied from in the entire region. According to the neighboring villages under AOG control. Elections related violence ANSO data, Faryab and Saman-

Northern Region AOG Incidents‐Election Comparison

Kunduz Takhar Sar‐e Pul Samangan 2009 Election Day Jawzjan 2010 Election Day Faryab Balkh Baghlan Badakhshan

0 102030 THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 Helmand Province has experi- enced a substantial decrease in Sangin, but neither incidents re- 150 security incidents over the past sulted in any significant damage. 100 two weeks, which is notable in of Targeted killings were down as 50 itself, but rather remarkable con- well, with only two such incidents sidering that this report period reported during the past two 0 contained the elections, which weeks, both occurring in Nad Ali caused security incidents to spike District as a male civilian was shot HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG in most other provinces in the and killed for ‘collaboration with south. IMF’ and a GOA employee with Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, Nahri Sarraj and Lashkar Gah. Of note is an incident in Lashkar Gah Direct AOG attacks amounted to the agriculture department was City, wherein ANP arrested an AOG wearing a a mere handful, restricted to SAF shot in Charsada village a few suicide vest underneath a burqa. The actual attacks on ANP posts in Nahri days later. target of the potential suicide attack had, at the Sarraj, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah IMF/ANSF were relatively active time of writing, not been determined. Districts. IMF convoys were at- during the report period, conduct- tacked in Nad Ali on two occa- ing a number of successful search It is important not to read too much into the sions and once in Nawa-i-Barak and seizure operations which net- drop in incidents in Helmand Province this Zayi District. In addition, vehi- ted a sizeable quantity of drugs, as report period, as it represents a very small dip cles transporting IEC personnel well weapons, ammunition and within a much larger trend of ever-increasing and materials were attacked on IED-making materials. insecurity. Indeed it would be surprising if AOG were able to maintain the torrid pace of two occasions in Marja and Musa In Marja, IMF engaged and killed the last six months, especially after initiating Qala Districts. On election day four AOG as they were planting record levels of attacks during the month of itself rockets were fired at the an IED while in Nad Ali an air- August. With large operations occurring in DACs of Lashkar Gah and strike killed three AOG including neighbouring Kandahar Province it is expected an individual described as a mid- that temporary shortages of arms and muni- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS level commander. In other opera- tions will occur as supply lines from Pakistan IED tions, a total of 12 other AOG are disrupted. AOG attacks were arrested in the districts of

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Nimroz Province experienced a 80 spike in security incidents during ANP posts near the villages of the report period, primarily due to Razai, Dilaram, and Ghorghori 60 the appearance of rockets in the however there were no reports of 40 serious casualties associated with province, a weapon system not 20 usually used by local AOG. any of these incidents. 0 Rockets were fired in Zaranj and Illegal checkpoints, a staple of Khash Rod Districts on seven Nimroz AOG activity, occurred NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ ACG separate occasions, with five of in the Post-e-Hassan area and the those attacks occurring on elec- near the village of Minar in Khash killed. tion day and two on the day after. Rod District, however no GOA Lastly, ANP search operations netted a total of employees were seized or any oth- Direct AOG attacks occurred in 20 kg of heroin in the Dilaram area of Khash ers detained. After another such the district of Khash Rod, on Rod, further evidence of the growing process- checkpoint was erected in the ing capability of drug operations in Afghani- Haily area of Chakhansur District, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS stan, as opposed to the traditional approach of ANP units responded and en- AOG checkpoints transporting unprocessed opium into gaged the AOG for approximately Attacks against ANP neighboring Iran for further processing and 30 minutes, resulting in two AOG distribution as heroin. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 8 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar Province is currently 150 host to several areas of intense estimated 950 families (6500 – 100 7500 people) leaving the most clashes between AOG and IMF/ 50 ANSF units, all parts of the much active combat areas. These fig- -discussed Operation Hamkari. ures have not yet been confirmed 0 In the south-western and western by UNHCR or UNOCHA, but rather are cited by provincial gov- edges of Kandahar City, repeated KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG clashes have taken place as the ernment sources, whose method- security perimeter is constructed ology for estimating such move- by IMF/ANSF forces, and chal- ments has been called into ques- ANP vehicle sustaining only minor damage. lenged by AOG units. In Ar- tion in the past. Targeted killings continued in the city, al- ghandab District checkposts and In addition to this, IEDs continue though at a decreased rate, with only seven forward operating bases are being to plague Kandahar City and the reported during the report period, primarily attacked by AOG on a regular approaches from the east, al- ANP, although one tribal elder from Spin basis. Lastly, in the last few days though IED strikes were markedly Boldak and one NDS official were also of the report period, significant lower than in the last report pe- amongst the victims. numbers of IMF/ANSF troops riod. It is certainly premature to IMF vehicle traffic was noticeably increased, have been pushed into Zhari Dis- discern any trend from this, as it is not only to support the operations mentioned trict, to begin the process of dis- most likely due to the expenditure above, but also to support a series of house lodging AOG units which have of a significant number of IEDs and neighborhood searches conducted in Dis- heretofore enjoyed dominance in and rockets during the day of the tricts 7 and 9 of Kandahar City. There were the immediate area. elections, when a large number of no reports of the success of these searches The heavy clashes have resulted in polling stations were attacked by however they are set to expand and are certain a reported movement of families indirect fire. In addition, there to create some discontent amongst the civilian from Zhari and Arghandab Dis- were an increased number of population in the coming weeks. IMF also tricts into Kandahar City, with an ANP EOD units deployed in the arrested a reporter working for Al Jazeera, in days leading to the elections, re- an operation similar to one which occurred in sulting in an increased number of Ghazni Province in which the reporter was KEY THREATS & CONCERNS discoveries. In a notable IED Attacks against ANP accused of having close ties with AOG. As incident, an RCIED detonated as with the Ghazni-based reporter, the reporter, AOG assassinations the convoy of the Governor of from District 5 in Kandahar City, was released IMF operations within Kandahar Kandahar Province passed by in after a few days detention. City District 2 of the city, with one

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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 0 100 This Report Period 0 Security incidents were down dur- 80 ing the report period, and AOG attacks. AOG launched very few 60 activity was markedly lower than direct attacks, with only tow re- 40 corded during this report period, in past weeks. IMF/ANSF activ- 20 both against PSC personnel ity increased, with a significant 0 number of operations resulting in guarding construction sites in Mi- AOG deaths and detentions. zan District. There were two inci- dents of targeted killing, both oc- In a trend which was noted in the ZABUL AOG ZABUL ACG curring on the same day in Lalai previous report, rockets and mor- Village of Shahjoy District, as these operations air assets were used, with one tars appear to be flowing into the AOG shot and killed an NDS airstrike claiming the lives of eight AOG, near province at an increased rate, and official and in a separate incident the village of Shahr-e-Safa in Tarnak wa Jaldak rocket attacks accounted for the shot a civilian accused of ‘spying’ District. majority of AOG activity. These for IMF. occurred in the DACs of Ar- Lastly, in an incident which pushed the total of ghandab, Shahjoy, and Naw Ba- There were a significant number IMF losses over that of last year, an IMF heli- har, without any significant dam- of IMF/ANSF operations (13), copter crashed in Daychopan District, killing age being incurred in any of the primarily in the districts of Shah- nine IMF, and seriously wounding three other joy, Shinkay, Qalat, and Tarnak passengers. Reports indicate that technical KEY THREATS & CONCERNS wa Jaldak over the report period. problems were to blame, however as usual AOG attacks In total, over 23 AOG were killed AOG claimed, on their various websites, to and another 44 detained. It have downed the aircraft with RPG fire. IMF operations should be noted that in five of

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA This Report Period 0 140 120 AOG maintained their previous 100 levels of heightened activity, in the the border areas. In this report 80 period Paktika witnessed a total of 60 form of direct attacks, indirect 40 attacks and IED strikes. IMF/ 22 indirect fire attacks, mostly 20 ANSF units responded with a during the election day and target- 0 number of operations, however ing DACs throughout the prov- the use of airstrikes appeared to ince. PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG decrease slightly over previous IMF bases were attacked by rock- periods. ets and/or mortars in the districts cles on the receiving end of 19 of those at- As outlined in previous reports, of Gayan, Yahya Khel, Barmal, tacks. AOG in Paktika clearly have ac- and Urgun. IMF convoys were cess to rockets, mortars and other also the target of more conven- IMF/ANSF units were fairly active during the heavy weapons unavailable to tional ambushes, and AOG initi- report period, initiating at least 11 attacks those AOG operating away from ated operations against convoys against AOG, using air strikes in four of those on seven occasions, primarily in operations. In total an estimated 22 AOG the districts of Yahya Khel, Gayan were killed and a further 29 were arrested in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and Khushamand. operations in Sharan, Barmal, Yahya Khel and AOG attacks against DAC IEDs remained a major problem Yosuf Khel Districts. Airstrikes as well, as IED strikes occurring a  IED total of 26 times, with IMF vehi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents GHAZNI GHAZNI Year to Date 1 250 This Report Period 0 During the reporting period 200 the province does not share a bor- Ghazni Province hosted an enor- 150 mous number of security inci- der with Pakistan, which in theory 100 dents – over 110 – in which all would enable AOG to periodically but a handful were AOG-initiated rest their fighters and replenish 50 attacks. Certainly security inci- supplies quickly. In this light, it is 0 dents spiked throughout the apparent that they enjoy a high country as a result of the 18 Sep- level of local support within the GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG tember elections, however, this province. level of activity is remarkable for It would be rather tedious to list, an SVBIED detonated against his vehicle on several reasons. First, AOG at- as has been attempted in the past, the outskirts of Ghazni City. tacks in Ghazni are simply not the various incidents during the In another major coup for Ghazni AOG, in restricted to one type, such as report period, categorizing them Muqur District, four ANP officers abandoned IEDs, or SAF attacks. Rather, by either intended target or their posts and joined the local AOG unit, tak- AOG have consistently shown the method of attack. In summary, ing with them two vehicles, four HF and VHF ability to attack a wide variety of every single DAC within the prov- radio sets, and a variety of light and medium targets using both direct and indi- ince was attacked multiple times, weapons. rect methods. Second, AOG have with some DACs – such as Ajris- IMF operations were limited as all units were demonstrated the ability to main- tan – being attacked 13 separate diverted to provide election security and sup- tain heightened levels of activity times. Virtually every IMF facility port the movement of elections personnel and over the entire ‘fighting season’, in the province was attacked with materials in the days leading up to and follow- apparently possessing an unlim- IDF – with either rockets or mor- ing the election day. In an operation in the ited number of recruits, weapons tars – and a total of 53 attacks Chola area of Muqur District IMF killed four and materials, and experienced were launched against ANP posts AOG, and in the village of Laram two more leaders. This is all the more re- using rockets, mortars, SAF and AOG were detained by a joint IMF/ANSF markable when one realizes that or RPGs. force. Lastly, IMF conducted a raid on the In one of the most high-profile residence of a local reporter for Al Jazeera TV, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS assassinations this year, the Dep- claiming that the reporter had close links with uty Governor of Ghazni Province AOG. The reporter was released several days AOG attacks on convoys was killed, along with his son, his later, after a wide variety of national and inter- IDF attacks against DAC nephew and his bodyguard, when national organizations protested the detention.

Southern Region AOG Incidents‐Election Comparison

Uruzgan

Paktika

Ghazni 2009 Election Day Zabul 2010 Election Day Kandahar

Helmand

Nimroz

0 1020304050 THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 1 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 Uruzgan Province witnessed a 80 very large number of security inci- ons systems will mean little if the dents over the report period. requisite expertise is not devel- 60 While many of the incidents were oped at the same time, and it is 40 obvious that local AOG are not associated with the elections, a 20 yet adequately trained in their ef- great number of AOG attacks 0 were also aimed at a variety of fective usage. other targets. The use of IEDs Direct attacks by AOG were also increased dramatically over the common in Tirin Kot and Khas URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG past report periods, while the Uruzgan Districts, with a total of greater number of search teams deployed in number of direct and indirect at- 18 separate incidents taking place, the days prior to the election. tacks also remained high. In primarily involving SAF attacks Lastly, a significant demonstration, consisting short, it was a violent fortnight for on ANP posts. On three of these of about 3,500 civilians, took place in Tirin Uruzgan Province. occasions however IMF patrols in Kot City, essentially an escalation of a protest Tirin Kot were ambushed, in the The increased use of rockets, a which occurred the previous day in Chora Dis- Mir Abad and Moosa Zayi areas relatively new trend, continued trict, in which four protesters were shot and of the district. and expanded over the report pe- killed and four other protesters and four ANP riod, with DACs and Bazaar areas IED strikes accounted for a fur- were wounded by IMF. The original protest in Khas Uruzgan and Char Chino ther 11 incidents in the province, was organized in response to an IMF raid in receiving several barrages each, to and in these ANP and ANA vehi- the area during the night of 15 September in little effect. Polling stations in cles were the most common tar- which four local houses were searched. Local Tirin Kot also were targeted with get. What is notable, however, is residents claimed that a copy of the Holy indirect fire but, as has been men- the enormous number of IEDs Quran was desecrated during the raid, and tioned in previous reports, the discovered and disposed of by marched on an IMF base in Chora District, possession and use of such weap- ANP units – during the report where the shootings took place. Protests and period over 18 such devices were demonstrations have been slowly increasing found. This is a result both of the throughout the country, and both IMF and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS greater supply of IEDs apparently IED strikes ANSF units need to be better prepared to en- moving into the area and also the sure that they do not spiral out of control as AOG attacks against security forces was the case in this series of incidents.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 0 100 This Report Period 0 80 AOG actions on election day fol- lowed the shape and scope as The AOG complex attack on the 60 elsewhere in the region though a 24th in Gardez City marked the 40 heavier dependence on indirect latest such effort within the East. 20 fire was noted, accounting for a Involving a group of 5 BBIED 0 full 62% of all actions taken. along with supporting forces, an While these occurred throughout IMF/ANSF base was attacked, PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG the province, they almost exclu- resulting in 7 casualties (6 sively directed at DAC likely due wounded, 1 killed). The attack was to their use as polling centers. initiated by a BBIED (the only cessful as it negated any follow on AOG ac- successful one) at an entry gate to tions and wrested the initiative away from the PRT followed by SAF and them. RPG fire. The follow on IMF/ KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANA operation (including heli- Complex attacks copter support) ensured that that IMF operations attack was not particularly suc- THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Laghman is the latest battleground in the information war being The issue of civilian casualties 30 waged between the parties of the resulting in public unrest is a regu- 20 conflict, efforts of which are lar enough feature throughout the 10 aimed at swaying public support Eastern Region. Due to the rela- 0 in their favour. As a result of an tive isolation of the many rural ISAF/ANSF operation in Mithar- areas (where operations com- LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG lam on the 24th of September, monly occur), previous occur- rences of actual civilian casualties, conflicting casualty reports re- ment in Laghman for this reporting period, it and lack of transparent reporting, sulted in demonstrations within wasn’t as dramatic as in other provinces. The the truth remains elusive. The Mitharlam City. On one side, comparative volumes between the 09 and 10 impact on the NGO community claims that the 30+ casualties elections were also almost on par, with a 1 in- is clear, however, as the resultant were AOG combatants conflict cident difference in AOG actions recorded. A demonstrations affect freedom of with IEA counter-claims that the fact that is also out of the norm for the region. movement and cause temporary casualties were entirely civilian. The scope of type of AOG activity was similar destabilisation of district and pro- however, with direct and indirect fire attacks KEY THREATS & CONCERNS vincial centres. and, to a lesser extent, IEDs against security Demonstrations While the elections played a role forces and polling sites making up the majority Instability in Alishing & Alingar in shaping the security environ- of efforts.

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 2 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 The inclusion of the elections into 80 against polling stations. This was this reporting period pushed inci- 60 followed by IED deployment, dent volumes to their highest lev- 40 els recorded for 2010. Nangarhar accounting for a further 30% of AOG actions taken. 20 accounted for the 3rd highest inci- 0 dent volume for the 18th country- While some of this volume can be wide, behind Kunar and Ghazni, attributed to inter-factional ac- rather surprisingly as this province tions, it nonetheless illuminates NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG typically does not trend this high. the growing penetration and reach The 18th accounted for a full 60% of AOG elements within Nan- ceived weakening of local governance have all of all incidents recorded for the garhar. As well, the extensive use attributed to this operational growth. As seen period, of note, 97% of these oc- of direct attacks also speaks to the in other regions, without a considerable and curring during the morning hours. force levels they are able to gener- focused effort to counter this, a continuing Indirect fire attacks featured less ate and deploy. degradation of the security context is to be expected. prominently as 60% of the inci- Efforts to stem this tide have dents involving direct attacks been ongoing, as seen in ISAF (SAF, RPG), almost exclusively and ANSF operations within Khogyani, Sherzad, and Jalalabad KEY THREATS & CONCERNS City. However, the considerable AOG presence in south of prov- freedom of movement AOG ex- ince ercise, proximity to cross-border IDF in Jalalabad City safe havens, the previous reduc- IED tions of IMF forces, and the per- THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan has consistently reported 40 the lowest incident volumes from of opposition groups maintain 30 within the otherwise volatile East- dominance throughout the re- 20 ern Region. This is consistent mainder. While there have been 10 with provincial trends reported instances of direct challenges to 0 for 2009, though inconsistent with this relative stability (as seen in the general growth witnessed Bargi Matal), the continued main- throughout the region in 2010. tenance of this equilibrium indi- NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN ACG cates that a continuing low level These low volumes can be attrib- of incidents will be the norm. particularly for NGO who enjoy high levels of uted to the fact that this province local support. is largely uncontested. An equilib- In some ways, this predictability rium has been established where has led to it’s own form of stabil- The low incident rate surrounding the recent GOA and security forces remain ity, a reality played out by the total elections can be partially attributed to the lim- restricted to within district and lack of any NGO incidents re- ited number of polling stations opened within provincial centres while a variety ported this year. Other actors, 4 out of the 7 districts. The 3 incidents re- such as PDOs, have had incidents corded on the 18th included a short detention KEY THREATS & CONCERNS (including abductions and IED of IEC staff, an IDF attack against a polling AOG dominance of rural areas attacks) further supporting recent station, and an ambush of a polling materials Limited GOA presence/control trends involving armed opposition convoy. acceptance of NGO activities,

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 6 200 This Report Period 0 Countrywide, Kunar represented 150 the province most affected by the Recorded late in the period, an 100 elections period. This was not abduction along the Asadabad- 50 unexpected as it regularly records Jalalabad Road marked a deviation one of the highest fortnightly inci- from standard incident reporting 0 dent volumes for 2010, 2nd only due to the inclusion of an interna- to Ghazni. The AOG incident tional employee. 4 PDO employ- composition surrounding the elec- ees (1 international, 3 nationals) KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG tions cycle was dominated by di- were taken in what appears to be a rect fire (62%) and indirect fire well planned and executed abduc- It is worth noting that the present incident (38%)against polling stations and tion during the daylight hours of does not necessarily translate into an alteration DAC. Despite this muscular ef- the 26th of September. At pre- in the threats faced by NGO. There have been fort, there were surprisingly few sent it is unclear who is responsi- 3 NGO staff abductions previously this year, 2 casualties. 11 in total were re- ble, as various groups have denied were of the ‘catch and release’ variety with the corded, this figure including 6 or claimed responsibility, though third concluding after a week long detention. civilian and 5 ANP. While 2 secu- indications suggest that this was a Local acceptance levels, coupled with AOG rity force operations were financially motivated incident. operational approaches to NGO suggest that, launched on the 18th (both in- This area within Kunar has a well for NGO abductions at least, they are likely to volving airstrikes), this had little established history of instability, conclude with a positive resolution. impact on overall AOG opera- particularly in the vicinity of the tional capacity and efforts. road, with a variety of groups known to be operating in its envi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS rons. In response to this incident, Prevailing instability security forces have also launched Abductions operations into the area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 0 100 This Report Period 0 The high level of incidents re- 80 corded on election day has re- (50%) the majority and followed 60 sulted in this period marked the by direct fire attacks ( 30%) and 40 greatest volume in incidents re- IED (20%). Of note, over 80% 20 of all incidents recorded that day corded for Khost in 2010. The 0 18th accounts for 37% of the occurred in the morning hours, months total alone. As with other though this is not surprising as provinces, despite the high vol- AOG elements likely moved into KHOST AOG KHOST ACG umes of incidents, the overall strike positions under the cover of casualty rate was low, with only 4 darkness the night before. The umes. Though steady decline as the winter being recorded. These were all roads and approaches to polling approaches is expected, this drop will not be as suffered by security forces, 3 of stations had also been seeded with significant as previous years. The graph pro- which were in a single IED inci- IED the evening prior, and on vided, along with a review of overall conflict dent. election day most IED incidents growth patterns, indicate a higher, and more also occurred during the morning consistent, month to month incident volume The composition of incidents on hours, a fairly typical reality when which experience, higher peaks and lower val- election day followed the estab- assessing IED threats. leys as the conflict has matured. lished patterns seen elsewhere in the region, with indirect fire While this period marked a dra- matic increase in AOG activity, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS without a specific operational goal IEDs to focus and expend efforts upon, Indirect fire attacks the upcoming weeks will mark a Attacks against security forces return to standard incident vol-

Eastern Region AOG Incidents‐Election Comparison

Paktya

Nuristan

Nangarhar 2009 Election Day 2010 Election Day Laghman

Khost

Kunar

0204060 THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 This is because we do not know enough NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) about the area to Elizabeth Detwiler - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 comment on the sig- Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 nificance of the inci- To Register with ANSO dents occurring contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) there. [email protected] Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 N/A

ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) If you can help us Board. If you have any Peter Dimitroff - [email protected] 0796 688 416 understand the prov- feedback, good or bad, let Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 ince better, please them know on: contact us. [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

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ACG-Armed Criminal Group / COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Police / ANP-Afghan National Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu- tised militias) / DAC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised ANSO VACANCY Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. This month, ANSO is recruit- Security (Intelligence) / PRP- ing for a Regional Safety Advisor (Mazar-e-Sharif) Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, cover letter, VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- and two substantive English writing samples to [email protected]. vised Explosive Device / PDO- Private Development Organisa- tion / LDI-Local Defense Initia- FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES tive (pro-GoA militias)

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