The ANSO Report (16-30 September 2010)
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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 58 16-30 September 2010 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-7 The impact of the elections and Zabul while Ghazni of civilian casualties are 7-9 Western Region upon CENTRAL was lim- and Kandahar remained counter-productive to Northern Region 10-15 ited. Security forces claim extremely volatile. With AOG aims. Rather it is a that this calm was the result major operations now un- testament to AOG opera- Southern Region 16-20 of effective preventative derway in various parts of tional capacity which al- Eastern Region 20-23 measures, though this is Kandahar, movements of lowed them to achieve a unlikely the full cause. An IDPs are now taking place, maximum of effect 24 ANSO Info Page AOG attributed NGO ‘catch originating from the dis- (particularly on perceptions and release’ abduction in Ka- tricts of Zhari and Ar- of insecurity) for a mini- bul resulted from a case of ghandab into Kandahar mum of risk. YOU NEED TO KNOW mistaken identity. City. The operations are In the WEST, Badghis was The pace of NGO incidents unlikely to translate into the most affected by the • NGO abductions country- lasting security as AOG wide in the NORTH continues onset of the elections cycle, with abductions reported seem to have already recording a three fold in- • Ongoing destabilization of from Faryab and Baghlan. moved out of the areas un- crease in incidents. In- the North The difference in motivations der attack. In addition, it is cluded in this were various for these abductions serves expected that IMF claims of abductions of IEC staff , a • Pervasive AOG presence in success from these opera- the East to highlight the complex and total of 10 staff members diverse nature of the region, tions over the next months in 3 separate instances. • Elections related incident and the actors operating will surface as overall secu- Herat also recorded it’s spike countrywide within. The substantial num- rity incidents naturally de- highest incident volume crease as a result of the on- • ber of incidents recorded thus far for 2010, though Temporary lull in Kabul set of the harsh Afghan incident levels throughout the North during the majority of these oc- the elections cycle also serves winter and the normal end curred a day prior to the ANSO is supported by as a further indicator of the to the fighting season. actual election, a situation continuing deterioration of Proving that quantity has a that was out of the norm the security context, with 7 quality of its own, the for the countrywide con- of the 9 provinces recording EAST accounted for over text. While commonly their highest incident vol- 35% of all incidents re- overshadowed by the per- umes thus far. This deterio- corded countrywide on the vasiveness of the conflict, ration has also begun to af- 18 September election day, the threat of criminal activ- fect previously benign prov- marked with extensive use ity to NGO remains, as inces, as seen in the suicide of indirect fire, IED, and attested by the in-transit attack in Balkh which re- small unit engagements. theft of NGO property in sulted in a substantial num- The low lethality of these Ghor. ber of civilian casualties. attacks have been attributed Election day in SOUTH by some as an indicator of clearly resulted in an increase the efficacy of security in security incidents. Excep- forces, though this is not tions to this were Helmand likely the case as high levels THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 1 On 20 September, Kabul Prov- 40 ince witnessed a rare case of an AOG’s respect for the status of 30 AOG-staged abduction targeting NGO workers as well as an effec- 20 seven employees of an Afghan tive line of command at place en- 10 NGO involved in demining activi- suring timely implementation of 0 ties in Dashti Saqawa, Chahar the decision. Asyab District. All of the abduc- AOG initiated attacks represented tees were released 24 hours later 13 out of the total 32 reported KABUL AOG KABUL ACG with their abductors explaining incidents. Albeit most of the that they had been mistakenly threat reporting focused on secu- the low level of AOG activity on the polling taken for GOA employees, most rity inside Kabul City during elec- day to effective police efforts prior and during likely in an attempt to organize a tion day. The centre of gravity for the elections, it may also be argued that the prisoner exchange. Although the AOG kinetic activity proved to be core of AOG resources was simply directed to identity of the attackers hasn’t found in the southern rural dis- other theatres of operations. Nonetheless, the been plausibly established, local tricts in the aftermath of the elec- fact remains that no spectacular or complex testimonies suggest a possible link tion. Increased levels of AOG- attack took place in Kabul City while the level to the Taliban mobile units oper- IMF/ANSF escalations were re- of AOG activity in other districts of the prov- ating on the Kabul – Logar High- ported from Surobi (6), Khaki ince remained low in nature and lacked lethal- way. Elevated risks of similar Jabar (3), Musayi and Chahar ity. NGO (mis)targeting in the future, Asayb (2 each); with election day As of 28 September, the ECC processed a re- in conjunction with increased lev- recording only 5 directly related cord number of 468 complaints, out of which els of AOG activity, should be incidents, namely 2 road-side IED more than 50% have been classified as A- assumed for the southern districts. strikes, 2 rocket detonations and a category cases, that is, having a potential to On a more positive note, the hand-grenade. The sixth violent impact on the final outcome of the elections. prompt release of the abductees incident recorded on 18 Septem- The impacts of eventual ballot recounts and by the kidnappers emphasized the ber was related to an IMF engage- disqualification of fraudulent and illegal votes ment of AOG in the Uzbin Valley are yet to be seen; however, so far the elections of Surobi. In comparison, the last do not seem to have particularly shaken Kabul KEY THREATS & CONCERNS year’s presidential and provincial political environment in a way that would indi- Spectacular attacks elections saw 11 attacks on elec- cate higher risks of larger public protests in the Criminality tion day in Kabul Province. Al- short term. Demonstrations though IMF and ANSF attribute NGO Incidents fostered during the years of privileged access PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 of Panjshiri leaders to the key positions in the This Report Period 0 Government. A revived competition over the Panjshir enjoyed another period representation of factional interests at the pro- devoid of security incidents, September, the ECC registered 12 vincial headquarters and in Kabul, mirroring a dominated instead by the com- duly submitted complaints with 10 growing alienation between Marshal Fahim’s memoration of Ahmad Shah of them related to polling irregu- clique and the President, seems to have gained Masoud’s assassination and the larities. 3 cases have so far been momentum recently. NGOs should watch Wolesi Jirga elections. The elec- qualified as A-complaint category. closely the future developments in the distri- tions were held without major Nevertheless, beyond the unifying bution of power between Panjshiri factions, hindrances reported. As of 28 element of loyalty to Masoud’s including their respective representation in the legacy, a closer look inside the central Government, as any eventual changes Valley reveals a delicate balance of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS in the current set-up may destabilize the secu- power among various factions Potential of political instability rity environment in the province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Overshadowing the local peren- 30 nial political rivalries that were (Ghorband and Shinwari Dis- 20 strongly echoed in the election tricts), and an opportunistic killing period, a spike in AOG activity in of an off-duty ANP officer in his 10 the Ghorband Valley and an in- home village in Shinwari. Of par- 0 flux of AOG fighters into the ticular note to NGOs is the case Kohi Safi district dominated the of an RCIED strike targeting a PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG security environment in Parwan. private construction company While the previous cycle had seen vehicle (white pick-up) in transit strike hit and killed a group of six AOG fight- only 2 security incidents, 14 cases on the main Kabul – Bamyan ers in Mandiqol Area. On 28 September, a were reported in the last two road in Shinwari, which resulted roadside IED struck an ANP vehicle on a dis- weeks. With the exception of a in 9 casualties (incl. 5 fatalities). trict road in Kotal Piran, while the next day the shoot-out between ANP and un- The spike in AOG activity in convoy of the Kohi Safi Chief of Police hit known attackers in Jabalusseraj Kohi Safi gave credibility to re- another IED placed in a culvert in Milan Area, (most probably reflecting an esca- ports indicating a concerted ap- located between Kohi Safi DAC and Qalai lation between local political net- pearance of two separate AOGs, Zhale. NGOs should expect an escalation of works) the rest of the incidents each composed of approx.