"A New Stage of the Afghan Crisis and Tajikistan's Security"

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VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT

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A NEW STAGE OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND TAJIKISTAN’S SECURITY

Akbarsho Iskandarov, Kosimsho Iskandarov, Ivan Safranchuk

MOSCOW, AUGUST 2016 Authors

Akbarsho Iskandarov Doctor of Political Science, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Acting President of the Republic of Tajikistan (1990–1992); Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Tajikistan; Chief Research Fellow of A. Bahovaddinov Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Law of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Tajikistan Kosimsho Iskandarov Doctor of Historical Science; Head of the Department of Iran and Afghanistan of the Rudaki Institute of Language, Literature, Oriental and Written Heritage of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Tajikistan Ivan Safranchuk PhD in Political Science; associate professor of the Department of Global Political Processes of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

The views and opinions expressed in this Report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Contents

The growth of instability in northern Afghanistan and its causes ...... 3

Anti-government elements (AGE) in Afghan provinces bordering on Tajikistan ...... 5

Threats to Central Asian countries ...... 7

Tajikistan’s approaches to defending itself from threats in the Afghan sector ...... 10 A NEW STAGE OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND TAJIKISTAN’S SECURITY

The general situation in Afghanistan after two weeks of fierce fighting and not has been deteriorating during the last few before AGE carried out an orderly retreat. years. The year 2015 saw several record low In 2015, AGE seized another 23 administrative points at once. Anti-government elements centers in different districts (as compared (AGE) gained control over a larger stretch with only four in 2014).2 In 2015, the greatest of Afghan territory than at any time since number of civilian losses was registered for 2001.1 It was the first time that they captured the entire statistical period (nearly 90 percent Kunduz, the administrative center of Kunduz of casualties were inflicted by AGE and Province. The Afghan Security Forces (ASF) the ASF): 11,002 people, with 3,545 dead and were able to regain control over the city only 7,457 wounded.3

The Growth of Instability in Northern Afghanistan and Its Causes

Afghanistan’s southern, southeastern and The surge in civilian losses as a result eastern provinces (adjacent to Pakistan) remain of the ASF-AGE conﬂ ict in the northeastern, some of the most dangerous and unstable northern and western provinces reflects an areas in absolute terms. Dynamically, however, intensification of armed clashes between the situation appears different. the governmental and pro-government armed In provinces adjacent to Pakistan, groups, on the one hand, and the armed the number of civilian losses in the ASF-AGE opposition, on the other. The question is, where conflicts has increased by 35 % since 2009, has the armed opposition in these provinces and by 530 % in provinces adjacent to Central obtained the resources for stepping up combat Asian countries (northeastern, northern and operations? There can be just one answer: western Afghanistan). In 2009, losses in regions the number of militants is on the rise because contiguous with Central Asia were 80 % these provinces, primarily Badakhshan, Takhar lower than in regions bordering on Pakistan; and Kunduz, have been infiltrated by armed in 2015, the ﬁ gure dropped to just 23.1 %.??? groups from Pakistan and eastern provinces The dynamics are clear. of Afghanistan. In recent years, the situation has been The official explanation for this stable, and has even slightly improved in regions migration is that in recent years (particularly contiguous with Pakistan. In areas adjacent after the December 2014 terrorist attack to Central Asia, the situation has been steadily deteriorating since 2009, and particularly rapidly 2 As of late 2015, the ASF had regained control over 20 administrative centers. Afghanistan. Annual Report. Protection of Civilians in in the last year or two. Armed Conflict. Kabul, Feb. 2016. P. 7. 3 Afghanistan. Annual Report. Protection of Civilians in Armed Con- 1 SIGAR’s Quarterly Report to the US Congress. Jan. 30, 2016. P. iii. flict. Kabul, Feb. 2016. P. 1.

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in Peshawar), Pakistan has been more actively Pashtun-populated central Afghanistan. But why conducting military operations against are they making for the northeastern, northern entrenched extremist groups in Waziristan. and western provinces with predominant Tajik Fleeing from the advancing Pakistani and, in some provinces, Uzbek populations? military, squads of militants have crossed Even in the case of Kunduz, where Pashtuns to mountainous regions of Afghanistan, fanning predominate, why would the armed Pashtun out to eastern provinces and Badakhshan, groups move so far from Pakistan, whose army where it is easy to hide. From Badakhshan they they have long and successfully confronted, and later headed for Takhar and the comfortably so far from Kabul, the headquarters of the regime Pashtun-populated Kunduz Province. with which they are at war? The militants were actually pushed out The militants are being squeezed of Pakistan. For obvious reasons, the Pakistani out of Pakistan. This should have led army did not pursue them in Afghanistan, to a sharp exacerbation of security problems whereas the ASF failed to intercept the armed in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces and later fugitives in the mountains. Eventually they in other Pashtun-populated areas. But what gained a foothold in Afghanistan and joined is not quite clear from the ofﬁ cial version is why various AGE. this “squeeze” has brought about a radical This explanation is based on a number deterioration in the northeastern and – of verifiable facts. The Pakistani army had to a slightly lesser extent – northern provinces. indeed stepped up its military operations Eventually the Afghan press and in Waziristan and has scored successes. Quite political circles offered another explanation, logically, the armed groups in the mountains according to which the militants’ migration and began a retreat to eastern Afghanistan. Pashtun reinforcement of AGE is an organized rather tribes have always migrated across the border, than spontaneous process. You can often hear which they don’t recognize as such. But this or read in Afghanistan that in the spring or version fails to answer several questions. summer of 2014, the Pakistani intelligence, For example, why, as the militants migrate the ISI, and the CIA, and later the ISI and from western Pakistan to the eastern Afghan the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban movements, provinces, are there no signs of intensified signed a secret agreement on the redeployment local warfare between the ASF and AGE? of militants. Allegedly, the agreement provides (On the contrary, fighting seems even to be for a corridor to Afghanistan to be left open subsiding.) Why don’t the Pashtun armed groups to the armed groups being “pushed out” that cross from Pakistan to Afghanistan linger of Pakistan. These groups are even encouraged in eastern provinces, or seek to return to western to cross to the northeastern, eastern and western Pakistan? Why don’t they stay in their native provinces of Afghanistan. Certain variants Pashtunistan on both sides of the Afghan- of this version claim that Pakistan is not only Pakistani border? It’s understandable why “squeezing out” armed groups from Waziristan, the Pashtun armed groups head for the heavily but that it has also organized conveyance

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to Afghanistan of Central Asian militants, who As usual, the situation in Afghanistan in recent years used to head to Syria and Iraq is highly intricate; there are controversial via Turkey to join the ﬁ ght and who now cannot events and numerous interpretations of them. return home by the same route. But a clear dynamic pattern is discernible over This “organized migration” version has a period of several years. Near its borders with many inconsistencies as well. For example, how Central Asian countries, the situation has been can we explain the December 2014 terrorist deteriorating steadily since 2009, particularly attack in Peshawar, if secret agreements were in the last few years. In the northeastern areas in place earlier in the summer? Could it be contiguous with Tajikistan, this deterioration that some Taliban chief simply “slammed has been particularly pronounced over the door?” In any case, the above version (and the last two years. In the meantime, the situation its variations) is widespread in Afghanistan, in areas adjacent to the Pakistani border remains Pakistan and the neighboring Central Asian complicated but stable, without a clear change countries. It is largely through its prism that for the worse, although it is to there that people look at and explain current events. the militants were “pushed out” from Pakistan.

AGE in Afghan Provinces Bordering on Tajikistan

Four Afghan provinces have a common of sorts for AGE forces operating in other border with Tajikistan, and the situation has northeastern and northern provinces. By all deteriorated in each of them over the last two years. appearances, Badakhshan serves as a north- Two districts in Badakhshan – Warduj bound transit route for armed groups from and Yumgan – are almost entirely under Pakistan and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. AGE control. In other districts, AGE control Badakhshan sends militants and weapons large territories. During 2015, AGE seized to AGE in other northeastern and northern administrative centers in four districts. provinces. In addition, Badakhshan has The strongest organizations in Badakhshan emerged as an important “financial center” are the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin catering to AGE. Raghistan District is a scene Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party. But the leading of continuous inﬁ ghting for gold-panning sites role is played by the Taliban Movement (TM). and emerald deposits. (Last year, AGE established The local Taliban-appointed governor, Qari control over the district’s administrative center.) Fasehuddin, coordinates most AGE operations The province hosts drug laboratories that are in the province. AGE forces in Badakhshan practically inaccessible to the ASF, and their are well-armed and have heavy weapons and proceeds are used to support AGE. Drugs are military equipment. The remote, predominantly smuggled via Tajikistan, which leads to frequent mountainous Badakhshan has become a base clashes on the Tajik-Afghan border.

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In Takhar, AGE are entrenched population. The local Taliban-appointed in Ishkamish, Yangi Kala, Darqad and Khwajah governor, Mullah Abdul Salam, was in command Ghar. Last year, they established control over of the seizure of Kunduz in September–October the administrative centers of the latter two 2015. This was for the ﬁ rst time since 2001 that districts. The local Taliban-appointed governor, the Taliban succeeded in capturing a provincial Qari Aminullah Tayyiba, has his headquarters administrative center. Nothing of the kind had in Ishkamish District. Last year’s fighting been done in any province before. The Taliban in Takhar Province took place in three border held Kunduz from September 28 to October districts – Yangi Kala, Khwajah Ghar and 13, 2015, when they retreated in a fairly Darqad – in close proximity to the Tajik border. organized manner under ASF pressure. In this Residents of two border districts of Tajikistan’s case, the government forces were provided Khatlon Region – Panj District and Farkhor combat support by foreign units remaining District – repeatedly told the media in 2015 that in Afghanistan. This was a clear show of force their houses had been shaken by shell bursts by AGE. In Kunduz, AGE units captured a lot on the Afghan side. There were cases in which of weapons, including heavy weapons. AGE ASF shells landed on the Tajik side of the border maintain strong positions in three districts (the authorities in Kabul promptly apologized). of Kunduz bordering on Tajikistan’s Khatlon The Panj River contracts abruptly in a locality, Region (and they seized their administrative where Afghanistan’s Yangi Kala and Khwajah centers in 2015). Ghar districts are contiguous with the Panj and Balkh Province (bordering on Tajikistan, Farkhor districts of Tajikistan. but mostly on Uzbekistan, and on a small Last fall, when engagements near section of border with Turkmenistan) remains the Tajik-Afghan border became particularly relatively safe. Governor Atta Muhammad fierce, Tajik border guards were seriously Nur, one of the most powerful Tajik field concerned, lest this stretch of the Afghan border commanders, is keeping the situation under be taken under AGE control. control for the time being. Balkh is one of two Most of Kunduz Province is controlled Afghan provinces bordering on Central Asian by the Taliban and other antigovernment countries, where AGE failed to seize a single armed groups. In 2015, AGE established administrative center in 2015 (the other control over the administrative centers of ﬁ ve province is Herat). However AGE units have out of seven districts, including the provincial managed to set up camp in southwestern capital. In 2016, AGE are in full control highlands. The local Taliban-appointed only of the center of the city of Kunduz. governor, Mavladi Yunus, is a prominent The situation in Kunduz is extremely fragile. TM figure and a Quetta Shura member. This province is a rather comfortable haven for The Chimtal, Sholgara, Dawlatabad and AGE, since certain districts are predominantly Charbolak districts are where AGE units are Pashtun-populated, with the Taliban enjoying concentrated; their total strength is estimated support or at least neutrality from the local in the hundreds. Attempts by AGE to mass

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their forces and organize a full-scale fortified and two in Helmand) in restless southern area from which to threaten the provincial Afghanistan. Another two were occupied administrative center, Mazar-i-Sharif, were in Farah Province, bordering on Iran in western thwarted. Governor Nur was personally Afghanistan. Only one administrative center in charge of an operation against the militants was seized in unstable eastern Afghanistan in March 2016 that culminated in their (Nuristan Province), and not a single one dispersal. But they were not finished off and in the destabilized central provinces. will most likely continue to consolidate their The situation appears as follows. As they hold on southwestern Balkh Province. fight their way through eastern and central What is interesting is not only the fact that provinces, AGE are mostly focusing on securing AGE have become active all over Afghanistan and their freedom of movement. In northeastern particularly in provinces bordering on Central (and partially in western and southern) Asian countries, but also certain particularities provinces, however, they are establishing of this activity. As mentioned, AGE captured permanent bases and seek to take power by a total of 24 administrative centers in different occupying administrative centers. The Taliban districts in 2015, of which 15 were in provinces feel safe in AGE-controlled districts and bordering on Central Asian countries and are perceived as the “authorities” by local 11 in provinces bordering on Tajikistan. Out populations. Taliban-appointed governors of 11 districts, where administrative centers supervise both military and social efforts. were seized in Afghan provinces contiguous Local populations are being actively lured with Tajikistan, six are districts that border away to the side of AGE. Particular attention on Tajikistan. At the same time, AGE captured is being placed on working with young people, just four administrative centers (two in Kandahar including schoolchildren.

Threats to Central Asian Countries

The countries of Central Asia will not face importantly, prepare to capture provincial a direct military threat from the main AGE forces administrative centers. Currently the main if hostilities between the ASF and AGE continue AGE forces do not intend to head north or west or escalate. beyond Afghanistan’s borders or attack Central It can be said with sufficient certainty Asian states. For this reason, a head-on attack that for now, the main task of AGE in western, by AGE on the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan northern and northeastern Afghanistan and Turkmenistan can be practically ruled out is to expand territories under their control, until AGE establish full control over the Afghan take power, impose their rules and, most provinces contiguous with the Central Asian

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POTENTIAL OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, 1994-2015

Thousand tons 8

1 3.42 2.34 2.25 2.80 2.69 4.59 3.28 0.19 3.40 3.60 4.20 4.10 5.30 7.40 5.90 4.00 3.60 5.80 3.70 5.50 6.40 3.30 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

The high-low lines represent the upper and lower 3URGXFWLRQˉJXUHVIRUWRKDYHEHHQUHYLVHG ERXQGVRIWKHFRQˉGHQFHLQWHUYDORIWKHHVWLPDWHV VHH0&1812'&$IJKDQLVWDQRSLXPVXUYH\ Figures refer to oven-dry opium

CIVILIAN DEATHS AND INJURIES BY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

62% Anti-Government Elements

17% Pro-Government Forces

8QDWWULEXWHGˉJKWLQJ 17% between AGE and PGF

4% 2WKHU

Sources: UNODC and MCN/UNODC opium surveys

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countries. At the same time, we cannot exclude draw for as long as possible on current, the possibility of limited attacks by the main including shadow, sources of income. AGE forces, which might signal displeasure The second threat is gradual infiltration with the neighboring states’ policies and/or be of small groups of militants from AGE forces, ordered by sponsors. including natives of post-Soviet countries. A continued ASF-AGE war presents two The main peril in this case is posed by young clear threats. people who left Central Asian countries The first is drug trafficking across for the wars in Syria and Iraq over the last the Tajik and Turkmen borders (this cannot five years. At present, they can hardly use be done on the Uzbek border) with support the official return routes. Some will settle from armed fighting groups. This is what Tajik in Turkey or other Muslim countries. But and Turkmen border guards face regularly. a number of militants in this category have In the future, pressure by militants covering been reported to have surfaced in Afghanistan. drug trafficking operations can only grow. As They will be inclined to return home by they expand their zone of control, AGE will crossing the Afghan-Tajik or Afghan-Turkmen increasingly be involved in the drug business, border. If successful, they will fan across taking it from the old drug mafia, and they the region to organize underground resistance will fight to lay drug routes to Tajikistan and receive new militants from Afghanistan. and Turkmenistan. As the ASF grow weaker Another likelihood is for militants hailing and regional field commanders come to play from the post-Soviet space to launch direct a more important role in the war against AGE, attacks, including with support from other AGE the latter may also be increasingly involved forces, to probe the border, project power or in drug trafficking and smuggling to finance enable breakthroughs with groups consisting their forces. This will become a particularly of dozens of militants, who may try to set up grave problem as international aid to Kabul a base in certain areas (more likely, located subsides. Cut off from this source of funding, far from the capital cities) in Tajikistan and field commanders will fall back on smuggling, Turkmenistan. the only available opportunity to make a quick If AGE establish stable control over several buck, or they will ask outside partners for Afghan provinces contiguous with Central financial aid. The last fifteen years of foreign Asian countries, the above threats will continue financial injections into Afghanistan have to exist and may even become aggravated. But left major politicians and field commanders some new ones will be added to them as well. with considerable personal fortunes estimated First, a refugee influx powered by tens in the hundreds of millions or even billions of thousands of ethnic Turkmens, Uzbeks of dollars. In principle, upper-bracket field and Tajiks may occur. In this connection, commanders can go on fighting as long as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and particularly they have resources. But they are more likely Tajikistan (where the inflow of ethnic Tajiks to want to preserve their own fortunes and is likely to be particularly strong by virtue

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of their large numbers) may be inclined Third, after consolidating their hold to receive at least some part of the refugees, on Afghan provinces, the main AGE forces thus generating not only a social, but also, will consider the possibility of helping potentially, a grave political problem. A their ideological brethren and recent fellow security problem is also possible, because combatants, who have left to organize an a vast refugee flow may be accompanied by underground resistance in Central Asia. massive hostile infiltration. Communications will be maintained between Second, if AGE are successful, defeated the main AGE forces, their sponsors and field commanders may request permission the underground resistance ﬁ ghters in Central to redeploy at least part of their rear services Asia. If the underground organizations are or even to withdraw some of their forces strong enough to stage attacks, particularly to neighboring Central Asian countries, such in relative proximity to the Afghan border (in as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. eastern Turkmenistan, southern Uzbekistan, This decision will be difficult for certain Tajikistan or southern Kyrgyzstan), the main of these governments. If, for political AGE forces are likely to render them support. reasons, some of them agree, this would mean If so, this will amount to a major attack by a new level of involvement of their country AGE forces on Tajikistan (or via its territory in the Afghan conflict. on Kyrgyzstan), Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan.

Tajikistan’s Approaches to Defending Itself from Threats in the Afghan Sector

Tajikistan has traditionally focused for the Tajik government. Russia closely on protecting its border with Afghanistan, cooperated with Tajikistan in this regard, with viewing instability beyond the border as its border guards directly involved in border dangerous for itself. After 1993, when units protection efforts. of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) left After the Taliban was toppled for Afghanistan, border protection has in the fall of 2001, moods began to shift. Leaders been important for the safety of the official of Tajikistan believed that peace and order authorities. Following the seizure of power by could be established in Afghanistan. As before, the Taliban in Kabul in 1996 and the signing Dushanbe was focused on border protection, of peace agreements with the UTO in 1997, but it reduced its cooperation with Russia by Tajikistan, in cooperation with Russia, Iran and having Russian border guards withdrawn from India, played an important role in supporting the Tajik-Afghan border in 2005. Simultaneously, the Northern Alliance in northern Afghanistan. Tajikistan was being carried away by the idea Even then, border protection was a priority of “a pivot to the south.”

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Transport links between Kazakhstan more stringent, which caused complications and Russia via Uzbekistan have always been and displeasure on the part of Afghan business complicated on account of the difficult people. However, in strengthening the Afghan relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. border, Tajikistan refused to bring back Russian Roads passing through Kyrgyzstan that border guards, which was discussed in 2010– circumvent Uzbekistan are in the mountains, 2011. Experts believe that Tajikistan did so and even their most intense exploitation in deference to the US stance.5 cannot replace a railway. It was believed that Dushanbe felt the sting of security a way out of the predicament, which was threats in the fall of 2015, when AGE units not even described as a “transport blockade,” only became entrenched in the Badakhshan, could be found in routes leading to Pakistan Tahar and Kunduz provinces bordering and India via Afghanistan. In line with these on Tajikistan, but also took under their moods, Tajikistan joined bridge and road control some areas located in direct proximity construction projects that would ensure it to the border. On October 6, 2015 (with AGE closer ties with Afghanistan. The cultural in control of the city of Kunduz for a week and and linguistic affinity between Tajiks and consolidating their positions in six border Afghans (particularly Afghan Tajiks) was only districts in the Kunduz and Tahar provinces), contributing to the growth of these moods. President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan Tajikistan and Afghanistan established broad met with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. unofficial human contacts. According to some He told his Russian counterpart: “Today statistics, Tajik consulates in Afghanistan have I would like to talk about security issues issued between 20 and 30 thousand visas per in the CSTO’s area of responsibility, because year during the last decade. the Tajik-Afghan border is part of this area. At the same time, Tajik border guards The situation in Afghanistan grows worse with sought to keep the border protection regime each passing day. In fact, there are hostilities at an appropriate level. Moreover, Tajikistan along more than 60 percent of the border again began expanding cooperation with Russia opposite Tajikistan and the neighboring and the CSTO after 2010. It is fair to say that countries. We are highly concerned, and Tajikistan emphasized national border protection therefore, during our meeting today, I would efforts, albeit in close cooperation with like to discuss precisely the security issues the regional security organization, the CSTO. in the region.”6 In cases where promoting economic ties with However, while cooperating with Afghanistan clashes with security interests, the CSTO on security issues, Tajikistan Dushanbe opts for security.4 In recent years,

border-crossing regulations have been made 5 George Gavrilis. Afghan Narcotrafficking. The State of Afghanistan’s Borders. East-West Institute. April 2015. P. 22-23. 6 Transcript (excerpt): Meeting with President Emomali Rahmon of 4 Сафранчук И. А. Таджикистан и Туркменистан: разные подходы Tajikistan. The President of Russia’s Official Web Resource. Octo- к защите границы с ИРА // Большая Игра: политика, бизнес, ber 6, 2015, 19.45. Sochi. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/ безопасность в Центральной Азии. 2015. № 6(45). P. 39. news/50453 (last access May 3, 2016).

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continues to pin great hopes on Kabul In the last decade, Tajikistan preserving a viable government that would be has sought to strike a balance between able to maintain order in the country. Spring reliable border protection and promotion 2016 provided Tajikistan some hope in this of economic/humanitarian ties with regard. In the course of several operations, Afghanistan. In different periods, Tajikistan the ASF managed to expand governmental has shifted this balance, but it has once again control in the Kunduz, Tahar and Badakhshan prioritized security in the last few years. provinces. In so doing, Tajikistan provides border security It is of particular importance for in cooperation with the CSTO. Dushanbe that in the spring of 2016, AGE At the same time, Dushanbe, for all its were dislodged from areas in direct proximity border protection efforts, doesn’t seem to be of the Tajik border. Active combat operations willing to build an impenetrable wall between are no longer conducted, with AGE units itself and Afghanistan. To some extent, it will shifting their camps to the south. However, be inclined to become involved in Afghan affairs it is too optimistic of the official Afghan and “play” on the Afghan territory to minimize authorities to claim that they have completely risks for its borders. cleared of AGE the districts in Tahar and For the time being, Tajikistan prioritizes Kunduz that border on Tajikistan. As is evident cooperation with the official authorities from the experience of the last two years, in Kabul. But if the central authorities are the ASF can scatter AGE units and frustrate ultimately paralyzed by a political crisis, their plans, but they are unable to cripple Tajikistan is likely to vacillate between coming them or undermine their positions. Though to terms with certain representatives of AGE retreating under government pressure, AGE and supporting friendly field commanders retain their combat capability. fighting AGE. The latter policy could both As mentioned, it is doubtful that be pursued on a limited scale and escalate AGE would at this stage storm the borders into a program to organize a full-blown of the Central Asian countries. They are focusing “buffer zone” in northeastern and northern on establishing governments in the border Afghanistan that would contain AGE on distant provinces and therefore tend to take control over approaches to the border. The “buffer zone” administrative centers. So far, they need access can be handled with both hard and soft power to the border for general political (to show off methods, the latter including aid programs for their power) and economic (to derive additional local populations to maintain their practical beneﬁ ts from legal trade and smuggling) reasons. interest in and moral resolve for resisting AGE. Therefore, dislodging AGE from the border Thus, Tajikistan can consider several is good news. But they are still ﬁ rmly entrenched options with regard to Afghanistan, but will in Kunduz, Tahar and Badakhshan, this despite eventually end up with whatever can be carried the successful ASF operations in the spring out if partners prepared for an active regional of this year. policy are found.

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