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Afghanistan: Community Engagement on Civilian Protection Recognize

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Afghanistan: Community Engagement on Civilian Protection Recognize AFGHANISTAN: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND. PROTECT. PREVENT. RECOGNIZE. MAY 2019 COVER T +1 202 558 6958 Community Civilian Protection Council (CCPC) group E [email protected] work session, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. civiliansinconfict.org CIVIC Photo ii Center for Civilians in Confict (CIVIC) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the protection of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC’s mission is to work with armed actors and civilians in conflict to develop and implement solutions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Our vision is a world where parties to armed conflict recognize the dignity and rights of civilians, prevent civilian harm, protect civilians caught in conflict, and amend harm. CIVIC was established in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a young American activist and humanitarian who advocated on behalf of civilian war victims and their families in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on her extraordinary legacy, CIVIC now operates in conflict zones throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and South Asia to advance a higher standard of protection for civilians. At CIVIC, we believe that parties to armed conflict have a responsibility to prevent and address civilian harm. To accomplish this, we assess the causes of civilian harm in particular conflicts, craft practical solutions to address that harm, and advocate the adoption of new policies and practices that lead to the improved wellbeing of civilians caught in conflict. Recognizing the power of collaboration, we engage with civilians, governments, militaries, and international and regional institutions to identify and institutionalize strengthened protections for civilians in conflict. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This briefing paper was written by Mohammad Emal Aslami, Program Manager, Afghanistan and edited by Sahr Muhammedally, Director, MENA & South Asia. Jordan Lesser-Roy, Program Ofcer, MENA & South Asia provided copy editing support. This report was designed by Kate Raley. iii Herat Community Civilian Protection Council (CCPC) and Civilian Protection Working Group (CPWG) directory Members with AIHRC’S Chair Person-Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Herat Ofce, Herat Province, Afghanistan. CIVIC Photo TABLE OF CONTENTS Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 2 Executive Summary 3 Recommendations 4 CPWG and CCPC Structure and Trainings 4 Efficacy of Commununity-Based Protection Approach 5 Engagement with Community 5 Engagement with Armed Opposition Groups 5 Engagement with Governemnt Authorities and Other Organizations 6 Engagement with Government Forces 9 Challenges and the Future of CCPC 10 Conclusion 11 1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS AAF: Afghan Air Force AIHRC: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ALP: Afghan Local Police ANA: Afghan National Army ANA-TF : Afghan National Army Territorial Force ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police ANDSF: Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANP: Afghan National Police AOGs: Armed Opposition Groups CCPCs: Community Civilian Protection Councils CHM: Civilian Harm Mitigation CIVIC: Center for Civilians in Conflict COMAC: Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians CPWGs: Civilian Protection Working Groups ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross IEDs: Improvised Explosive Devices IHL: International Humanitarian Law IMF: International Military Forces ISAF: International Security Assistance Force, NATO security forces in Afghanistan IS-K: Islamic State of Khorasan NDS: National Directorate of Security NGO: Non-Governmental Organization POC: Protection of Civilians TOR: Terms of Reference UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY on their protection concerns to convince them to change their behavior and reduce violence with mixed results.4 To strengthen these eforts, in 2017 CIVIC Decades of protracted armed conflict in Afghanistan facilitated the creation of gender-inclusive Community have caused thousands of civilian deaths, injuries, Civilian Protection Councils (CCPC/shuras) in Baghlan property damage, and displacement, creating the and Kandahar, led by respected community leaders need for myriad protection tactics to reduce the toll on to better identify the most urgent protection needs of civilians. One emerging approach is local communities civilians in areas experiencing armed conflict and to engaging with armed actors to influence them to build their advocacy capacity using IHL and Islamic change their fighting tactics to reduce civilian harm. law to engage on protection with both pro- and Local populations impacted by violence are not just anti-government forces. In 2018 and 2019, the CCPC passive actors but, as we see in Afghanistan, trying to model was expanded to Herat, Nangarhar, and Balkh influence the behavior of armed actors. This briefing provinces respectively. paper examines how communities engage with parties to the conflict on protection of civilians (POC). To complement community-based protection activities in rural areas, CIVIC also worked with Afghan non- In 2018, the United Nations Assistance Mission in governmental organizations (NGOs) in urban centers Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded over 10,000 deaths and facilitated the formation of Civilian Protection and injuries and attributed 63 percent of casualties Working Groups (CPWGs) in Kandahar, Baghlan, Herat, to Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs),1 14 percent Nangarhar, and Balkh provinces and began to build to Afghan National Defense and Security Forces their capacity to advocate on POC. CCPC members (ANDSF),2 six percent to international military forces engage with the Taliban, government forces, and (IMF), and two percent to other pro-government armed ofcials, whereas CPWGs engage at the provincial groups.3 capital level with government and ANDSF.5 Parties to the conflict, including the ANDSF, As discussed in this briefing paper, the CCPCs have international forces, and AOGs are obligated under had positive results through engagement on their International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to not engage in protection concerns, albeit at the local level. For indiscriminate attacks and minimize incidental harm example, the Kandahar CPPC convinced the Taliban to to civilians and civilian objects. In 2017, President remove Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Maroof Ashraf Ghani signed the “Policy on Prevention and district in Kandahar. In Herat, the CCPC requested Mitigation of Civilian Casualties and Damages,” improved security and deployment of the ANDSF on which demonstrates the commitment of the Afghan the Herat highway to deter attacks on civilians using government and its forces to mitigate and prevent the highway, which was acted on by the ANDSF with civilian casualties and property damage. The efective increased presence. CCPCs and CPWGs are also enforcement of the policy however, requires more helping families impacted by conflict to link up with eforts. At the same time, community-based approaches government post-harm assistance program such as to reducing violence at the local level are beginning to Code 91 and Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians show promise in improving civilian protection. (COMAC), which provide some monetary and non- monetary assistance. In 2016, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) undertook research in Baghlan, Kandahar, Herat, Protection of civilians necessitates creative approaches and Kunduz to understand how communities protect to reduce violence. Community-based protection themselves in conflict-afected areas. We found some and empowering communities to be advocates for communities engage with the Taliban or Afghan forces their safety is one such important tactic. The CCPCs 1 AOGs includes the Taliban, Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), and other armed groups. 2 Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) also Known as Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) operate under Afghan government legal structures, and consist of Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA-TF), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Force (ABF) and National Directorate of Security (NDS). Conversely, pro-government armed groups and militias do not operate under formal government structures. 3 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, February 2019, (hereinafter “2018 Annual POC Report”). UNAMA attributed 42 percent of casualties from the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in suicide and non-suicide attacks by AOG, 31 percent during ground engagements between pro-government forces and AOGs, nine per cent due to aerial attacks, and eight percent due to targeted killings by AOGs. 4 CIVIC, Saving Ourselves: Security Transition and Impact on Civilian Protection in Afghanistan, (2016) 5 To date CIVIC staf has not had any direct engagement with the Taliban or any other AOGs. 3 and CPWGs are showing the potential to be efective • Engage in dialogue with communities to address protection advocates at the grassroots level to reduce their protection concerns without civilians fearing violence and yield better protection outcomes. The reprisals. success of these groups, however, will be impacted by the cohesiveness of the CCPC irrespective of tribal CPWG AND CCPC STRUCTURE AND and ethnic diferences, the mentorship and trainings TRAININGS the groups receive to be efective advocates, how seriously their protection concerns are considered and CIVIC has been
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