THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 62 16-30 November 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-7 While overall incident vol- organisers was to stage tion as, until recently, it had 8-13 Northern Region umes have continued to de- these protests on main remained relatively unaf- Western Region 14-16 cline as the year matures (see thoroughfares, resulting in fected by the conflict graph p.2), NGO incidents numerous road blockages which has embroiled the Eastern Region 16-21 have continued apace (see and hampering freedom of rest of the region. Direct Southern Region 22-26 graph p.8). A total of 9 movement. While it is attacks against the PRT NGO direct incidents from 8 likely that the volume of and a PDO compound, 27 ANSO Info Page separate provinces were re- such activities have peaked, along with separate IED corded this period, covering it is also probable that they strikes and ambushes 4 of the 5 regions (South will continue into the short against IMF elements, YOU NEED TO KNOW being the exception). This term as some of the ag- point to a concentrated data is a testament to the grieved have vowed to con- effort to intensify AOG • Destabilization of Jalalabad impact pervasive insecurity tinue their efforts until sat- actions and bring the con- City can have on the NGO com- isfaction is achieved. flict to the regional centres • Consistent NGO incident munity. These incidents doorstep. In response to volumes Suicide attack trends for were instituted by a variety of 2010 have remained consis- this, there has also been • Elections related civil unrest actors, including armed op- tent, averaging 11 incidents push back on the part of position, criminals, and in per month (see graph p.22). security forces, including • Inter-AOG conflicts one case, the beneficiaries Of note, this attack vector focused IMF operations themselves. Incident compo- along with a planned en- • Suicide attacks appears to be divorced sition was also diverse and from the typical ratio based hancement in the national

included abductions, armed relationships noted between security force presence attacks, intimidation efforts within the city. individual tactics and over- and theft. all incident volumes. This The inclusion of an AOG, ANSO is supported by The Parliamentary electoral period recorded BBIED composed of 73 members, process has been an element related incidents in the in the reconciliation effort shaping the countrywide con- East, South and West. The reported from Baghlan text during the past few stand out incidents amongst signifies one of the largest months. The recent an- these included the double such event recorded. Typi- nouncement of disqualified BBIED attack against the cally, reconciled groups candidates has resulted in a ANP HQ in the provincial have consisted of small continuation of this dynamic, capital of Paktika and the scale units, with the major- particularly the latter half of detonation of a planned ity of these occurring in the the period. Demonstrations attacker during an arrest Western and Northern Re- on behalf of these disquali- attempt in Ghor. It would gions. In the West, these fied candidates occurred appear that the introduction reconciliation efforts have countrywide, in many cases of this tactic into Ghor is actually become a source of resulting in multi-day, pri- part of deliberate effort to insecurity, as disparate ele- marily small scale (with the raise the armed oppositions ments engage in politically exception of Samangan), and profile in this province. or philosophically moti- peaceful gatherings. A delib- The events in Jalalabad City vated armed clashes. erate tactic on the part of the this period warrant atten- THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 8 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Police forces in pursuit of AOG 40 and ACG networks (in particular Surobi, and another IED explo- 30 abduction gangs) maintained a sion on the link road between 20 Karte Naw/PD 8 and Bagrami). sustained tempo of operations 10 both in the capital and rural dis- In Karte Naw, two suspected 0 tricts, representing 60% of the AOG members were interrupted combined 31 incidents recorded while emplacing an IED under a during this cycle (as of 28th of No- stationary ANA truck. Quick to vember). The risks peculiar to jump on their motorcycle and KABUL AOG KABUL Crime drive away, the two individuals NGO safety in the Kabul envi- vated. ronment are currently assessed as became involved in a vehicular low to moderate. Surobi remains accident which triggered the ex- Several sources have also identified the recent the primary area of concern to plosion of the device. As of the appointment of a new AOG Shadow Gover- NGOs, due to overt AOG activity time of reporting, reports were nor for Kabul Province. If proved true, such a and its impact on overland access also received about three separate situation would most likely increase the men- towards Jalalabad. The announce- instances of SAF targeting PSCs tioned AOGs’ leadership motivation to stage a ment of the final election results and IMFs convoys along the Jala- spectacular attack in Kabul in order to mark (except for Ghazni) was followed labad Road, and a local dispute the appointment. However, more likely than by a series of peaceful demonstra- between two villages in Surobi close range and complex attacks, which require tions in Kabul, called, as in the whose residents are involved in reconnaissance & planning, logistical prepara- previous cycle, by the Union of the Surobi Dam construction tions and clearly allocated resources, an IDF the Wolesi Jirga Candidates. works, interpreted by other attack against a high-profile venue would be a sources as AOG’s abduction of 18 more feasible option, though this would put Despite the usual high volumes of workers. The circumstances of the the residents of the neighbourhoods adjacent threat reporting, Kabul City and latter incidents are yet to be con- to such location at the mercy of AOG IDF the rural districts remained calm, firmed. Lastly, on 26 November, a operators. The overwhelming majority of this with AOG actions having materi- newly appointed NDS liaison offi- year’s IDF attacks in Kabul employed weapons alized in 3 confirmed direct inci- cer to the PD 15 ANP HQ was such as 107 mm rockets, which rendered the dents (2 close range attacks in stabbed to death by unknown attacks inherently imprecise. Prominent loca- attackers. However, a clear link to tions included KAIA, Kabul Polytechnic Insti- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG motivation behind the at- tute, and IMF facilities in various locations in Civil unrest tack has not been established and PD 9 and 10 as well as in Darulaman. Criminality the suspicion remains that the Spectacular attacks murder was not politically moti-

Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2010 (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks)

1800 1600 1541 1400 1319 1326 1366 1200 1181 1096 1000 972 800 853 600 613 658 523 400 200 0 2 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 Following a lull in armed escala- 40 tions in the first half of Novem- swathes of the said districts, and 30 ber, when the preparations for occasional strikes by the French 20 Special Forces. In such circum- Eid apparently outweighed the 10 war game, Kapisa returned to the stances, conflict spill-over into the 0 low-intensity warfare typical of western parts of Kapisa remains a the previous periods. Out of 5 possibility, reminiscent of the re- reported incidents, all but one cent AOG influx into Kohi Safid occurred in the eastern districts, (Parwan) from Tagab. In counter- KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime including all three AOG-initiated point to this, however, the first 11 months of 2010 saw a combined last year. Overall, Kapisa witnessed a 10% in- attacks (one kidnapping in Nijrab, crease in AOG-initiated attacks in comparison two close range ambushes of 12 AOG-initiated incidents in the western districts as opposed to 20 to the same period last year, and a 17% in- IMF/ANSF patrols in Tagab and crease when compared to 2008. an additional roadside IED dis- incidents for the same period in covery in the same district). Con- 2009. Henceforth, while the risks Population-centric efforts continued by pro- struction projects along strategic of NGOs exposure to hostile ac- GOA forces, in an attempt to wrestle Tagab routes in Nijrab, Tagab and Ala- tion in the eastern districts are district out of AOG control. Besides the train- say represent the main conflict currently assessed as substantial, ing of regular police forces, IMF mentoring hotspots. Nevertheless, AOG the western districts represent a units have been engaged in recruitment and have demonstrated their capacity favourable environment for NGO training of local militias, hired to assist ANP as to challenge the pro-GOA struc- operations. However, the Shukhi an auxiliary force in policing the roads in the tures right in the DACs. The vast Area of Mahmudi Raqi remains of district. The deployment of such militias has majority of AOG attacks remain concern for its explosive mixture been envisaged mainly in the areas where IMF- close-range assaults (64%) and of andiwal networks, conservative led infrastructure rehabilitation is underway. stand-off IED or IDF (35%) at- clerics and income-oriented crimi- Allocated to particular checkpoints, the ser- tacks against security installations nal elements active locally, each of vicemen undergo a six-day training course and patrols in the aforementioned the structures occasionally hosting ranging from weapons’ maintenance to small- districts. Due to low NGO pene- AOG members from the East. unit infantry tactics and first aid. As an IMF tration and weak presence of During this cycle, ANP reported officer quoted in a recent press-release, “(...) for GOA, reporting from the eastern discovery of a quantity of military some residents [these units] are the only security forces parts remains scarce with the materiel from weapons caches in or other government forces they see regularly and it’s mapping of security incidents the area, while other sources important they earn their neighbor’s trust.” In a pub- coming hand-in-hand with as- claimed an influx of AOG fight- lic appeal in the Tagab bazaar earlier during sumptions about AOG’s complete ers, supposedly intending to ramp this cycle, ANP and IMF unveiled the roll-out freedom of movement in large up IED activity in the surround- of ‘the Guardians of Peace Program’, a scheme ing areas. So far this year, 2 armed of financial incentives for the community clashes and an IED discovery members in Tagab to inform the ANSF/IMF KEY THREATS & CONCERNS were reported from Shukhi. Of on AOG plans and movements in the prov- Factional disputes in west note, Shukhi has a legacy of more ince. Irregular security units intensive fighting resulting in sev- AOG presence in east eral documented IMF casualties THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 2 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 A slight decrease in security inci- 40 dents has been recorded in Logar contention with the GOA au- 30 during this cycle. Out of the 23 thorities), civilian casualties, com- incidents, ANSF and IMF docu- bined with accounts of IMF’s 20 mented actions (60%) outweighed night raids and house searches, 10 AOG activity, with at least 4 high- severely undermine the communi- 0 ranking AOG members’ arrests, 4 ties’ support for the pro-GOA IED discoveries (all of them in cause. Baraki Barak, including 2 ‘daisy Logar also witnessed a targeted LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime chains’ formed of respectively killing of a high-rank member of in Logar this year. AOG activity concentrated four and three devices planted in the Provincial Council and a on stand-off attacks (2 IED blasts and 1 IDF two locations), and at least 2 sub- prominent tribal leader. The dep- attack against an ANP checkpoint) and close- stantial weapons cache discoveries uty Head of the Provincial Coun- range ambushes along the main supply roads with most of the action concen- cil was gunned down alongside his (4 close-range ambushes, and another case of a trated on the major population brother in Qalai Sari Sang, near targeted killing of a local resident, most proba- centers (Baraki Barak, followed by Puli Alam DAC, on the morning bly due to his known cooperation with the th Puli Alam and Muhammad Agha). of 28 of November. His two GOA security forces). However, an IMF air strike con- bodyguards received injuries but ducted during Eid festivities on survived the attack. While the NGOs with operations and movements in the 18th of November in Shah murder would fit into the AOG’s Logar should assume a continued elevated Mazar of Baraki Barak ended up agenda of targeting prominent threat of their staff members’ apprehension at in the tragic killing of at least 1 GOA figures, several indications illegal checkpoints, boldly operated by AOG in civilian and the critical injuries of support the claims, also endorsed ever closer distance to the ANSF bases along 4 other (2 of whom reportedly by several sources inside ANSF, the Kabul – Gardez Highway. Prior to over- succumbed to their injuries). The that the individual was killed as a land travel, NGOs are encouraged to contact strike sparked a public outcry and result of personal disputes. Fur- ANSO for updates regarding the road condi- instigated a delegation of elders to thering this assessment, no AOG tions. In general, movement between Chahar visit the deputy governor in the has claimed responsibility for the Asyab and Puli Alam should be effectuated provincial capital. Although the attack and given the tribal identity between 0900 hrs and 1500 hrs; while the road IMF have been effective in reduc- and profile of the individual, such from Puli Alam towards Gardez hosts regular ing collateral casualties as one of a killing, if publically claimed by illegal checkpoints shortly after 1400 hrs. the major standpoints of the AOG, could also considerably COIN strategy (and a point of reduce AOG supporters’ base among the members of this im- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS portant tribe. Disregarding the Abduction in transit motives and authors of the attack, Targeted killings the killing represents the highest Roadside IED level civilian GOA official killing THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 5 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 1 The abduction business came to 80 met. Ultimately, the staff member the fore of security developments 60 in Wardak, with an NGO abduc- was released unharmed two days 40 tion reported from Saydabad on later. The incident marked the 4th 18th of November of an off-duty NGO staff abduction within War- 20 INGO staff member, returned to dak for 2010, 2 of which occurred 0 the province to celebrate Eid, in within Saydabad. The scope of his home village. The preliminary this recent abduction is similar to WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime information indicates that the the previous cases, including the staff member had been warned length of captivity, questions asked, as well as the safe release of that included 21 AOG attacks displaying the about the possibility of being a typical tactical methods (ambushes, IED, ab- candidate for abduction (probably staff involved. As in numerous other NGO abduction incidents ductions) and territorial distribution (main due to his profile and known em- roads and DACs). 70% of all incidents oc- ployment with the NGO), and countrywide this year, the group responsible took steps to confirm curred in Nirkh and Saydabad combined (for spent the first two days of his stay the most part close range attacks or IEDs) and inside the family compound. the veracity of the staff member’s information with outside agen- confirmed all parties’ converging interests in However, the third day he left his the control of the Highway 1. One of the IED home for an outdoor venue, cies. While the staff member’s employment and local identity incidents in Saydabad detonated against an where he was effectively kid- IMF patrol, killing one and injuring another napped by a group headed by a played a role in this incident, it also speaks to the saturation of serviceman. AOG concentration along the prominent AOG mullah. Upon Highway such as in Deh Hayat, Haftasayab, being relocated, negotiations for the AOG presence and their situ- ational awareness and information Salar, Sayadabad DAC, and Tangi, as well as his release ensued. While in cap- further reports of seasonal influx of fighters tivity, the individual was ques- gathering abilities within Sayda- bad. Specific to the latest case, into the southern districts from Ghazni, pro- tioned in regards to his status vide realistic ground to assume that AOG ac- within the NGO, information that however, was the pressure exerted on the individual by the kidnap- tivism along the Highway will continue during the AOG confirmed with other the winter months. sources including a direct phone pers. Reportedly, the victim was call to a GOA office. While the made witness to the beheadings of AOG expansion in the northern districts has full details regarding his release another two abductees, identified recently been voiced as a major concern by the remain unclear at this time, family as local employees of a private head of the Afghan Public Protection Force members and local leadership security company. (APPF) in Maidan Shahr. Accordingly, AOGs were the primary interlocutors, On a more positive note, the have started focusing on night letter campaigns and while financial demands were group of four, including a former and other forms of intimidation against the made during the negotiations, it member of Meshrano Jirga and families of APPF personnel in the district. If appears these demands were not her female friend, kidnapped in confirmed, such a shift may indicate the next Saydabad two weeks earlier, was stage of AOG expansion in the province. released following a rescue opera- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion by ANSF in the Tangi Area Attacks along main road of Saydabad. For the rest, the AOG expansion province recorded the usual inci- Abductions dent volumes featuring 29 entries THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 NGO perceptions of instability, 40 largely nurtured by accounts of drive away from the scene of at- 30 roadside criminality, weak govern- tack. 20 ance and prevalence of local feu- Local sources from Khadir con- dal lords in most areas of the firmed that the local elder ab- 10 th province, found an echo in an- ducted by AOG on 13 of No- 0 other road robbery reported dur- vember was released two weeks ing this cycle. On 13th of Novem- later following the negotiations ber at around 1700 hrs, an armed brokered by leaders from the DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime group robbed the passengers of at Poshtroq Village. ANSO enquiries least three flying coaches transit- revealed that the case was a part Reporting from the southern districts high- ing thru the Sangara Kish Pass in of a more comprehensive stand- lighted the continued influx of AOG fighters Shahristan on the main road to off between a local dominant into Gizab and Kajran. Yet, AOG presence Nili. Similar robberies were lately commander and the district wu- has not materialized into tangible security inci- reported from Khadir, Miramor, luswal, himself a prominent jihadi dents, and at this stage, it rather appears part Sangi Takht and Shahristan dis- figure. Local sources reiterated of a seasonal migration outside of the promi- tricts, including the killing of one that the clash had flared into a nent fighting areas in Helmand and Uruzgan. truck driver who attempted to series of abductions instigated by Migrating AOG fighters have so far consti- both parties, with at least two ab- tuted a less destabilizing element than, for in- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ductees on each side, all of them stance, the well-entrenched presence of do- Migration of AOG into south released unharmed once the nego- mestic criminal networks eager to answer the Spoilers to peace tiations were brokered by the calls from local patrons. Banditry community leaders.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN This Report Period 0 50 In a single incident reported from 40 Bamyan during this cycle, ANP levels strike a flagrant lull as com- 30 pared to the 20 incidents recorded arrested a group of four on the 20 for the same period in 2009, and main bazaar in Saighan, with the 10 suspects reportedly engaged in the 15 in 2008. Similarly, documented 0 ‘searching for ancient items’. criminal attacks for the same pe- While security incidents remain riod fell from 32 incidents in 2008 to 17 in 2009 and further down- rare in the province, NGOs con- BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime tinue to monitor the situation in wards to the current 12 in 2010; however, the hard data are in con- the Shikary and the Ghandak Val- cash and valuables. Indeed, overland access to leys in the North-East for their tradiction with general NGO per- ceptions of increased criminality Bamyan rose to prominence as the most sig- mixture of politically and crimi- nificant security issue for NGOs in the prov- nally oriented armed groups, as levels, namely along the strategic passes on the access roads be- ince, with the Ghorband, Jalrez and Tala wa well as the access routes to Barfak roads falling prey to deliberate attacks Daykundi and Ghor for a contin- tween Bamyan and Daykundi. Since early 2008, 6 NGO com- against pro-GOA forces and infrastructure ued presence of local armed gangs rehabilitation projects, local factional disputes engaged in roadside robberies. bined incidents (both direct and collateral) were recorded by and criminality. Whereas the alternative access, With only 4 AOG initiated inci- ANSO. The last case, reported on such as the strenuous drive from the Marghzar dents recorded this year (all of the 1st of July 2010 from the Cluster in Zare (southern Balkh) via Balkhab them in Kahmard), AOG incident Khargul Pass in Waras, was a col- (Samangan) to Yakowlang, presents the full lateral incident involving a group array of vehicular access challengers encom- passing road accessibility, climatic conditions KEY THREATS & CONCERNS of robbers disguised in ANP uni- and the remoteness of the areas. NGOs are Instability in Kahmard & Shibar forms who apprehended, at gun- point, a flying coach in transit and encouraged to contact ANSO prior to under- Climactic conditions taking overland road missions into the prov- Access restrictions robbed (among other passengers) an NGO national staff member of ince. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents Rukha District. Ten days later, an IED deto- PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 nated inside the Girls’ School in Malpesa Vil- This Report Period 0 Two rather brazen incidents were lage of Bazarak in the late evening hours, caus- reported from the Valley during cacies of internal Panjshiri dis- ing light structural damage to the building. this cycle. Typically for the prov- putes. The only certainty comes This year, Panjshir has witnessed seven escala- ince, none of them has been as- with the fact that the attacks were tions so far. When investigated, all of the inci- cribed to particular authors or not initiated by AOG and that dents were largely interpreted as originating motives, condemning outsiders to neither meant to cause human from local rivalries. NGOs should carefully mere speculations about the intri- casualties. On first instance, on monitor their environment to avoid being ma- 16th of November, ANP recov- noeuvred into similar local disputes. ered a makeshift explosive device KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Factional disputes from the road in Darkhel Area of

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 2 PARWAN This Report Period 1 50 The last day of November saw an 40 NGO-related intimidation occur subsequent release of NGO staff, 30 in the Monara Area of Jabalussa- suspected surveillance of NGO raj. During the night, an unknown movements and facilities. The 20 attacker hauled a hand grenade only direct NGO incident result- 10 inside the compound of an NGO ing in casualties (1 NGO staff 0 training center, causing minor killed and 5 injured) occurred in damage to the facility, and the Jar Zaro Area of Ghorband th prompting the NGO to request on 20 of August 2008, when a PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime assistance from the local shura in national NGO road mission hit a clarifying the incident and ensur- roadside IED. 0800 hrs. The explosion killed one and injured ing security guarantees for its staff AOG strikes were once again dis- an additional two servicemen, bringing to and operations. Additional cir- tributed between the areas adja- seven the cases of effective IED strikes re- cumstances and motives behind cent to the Bagram Airfield Base ported from the Ghorband Valey this year (the the attack are yet to be estab- (Bagram and Kohi Safid) and the first such incident was recorded in June 2010). lished. Out of the combined 16 Ghorband Valley. Whereas the Another RCIED struck a private vehicle in NGO-related incidents (both di- security environment in the for- Qalandar Khel, on the Bagram-Deh Sabz- Ka- rect and indirect) reported from mer is dominated by AOG’s at- bul Road, confirming the trend of increased Parwan since 2006, 38% were tempts to disturb access and daily IED activity alongside the access routes to the cases of intimidation, varying business at the base, vectors of Bagram Airfield Base. In spite of the measures from general night letters warning insecurity in the latter include reportedly adopted by the ANP in Bagram in against ‘cooperation with NGOs mainly the road construction pro- relation to the sustained IED activity, such as and GOA’ to particular threats ject and AOG expansion. Expo- regular morning patrols along the main arteries against NGOs including direct sure to strategic targets in the vi- in the district, effective IED strikes have be- hostilities such as arson attacks cinity of the base, and movement come a regular occurrence in the area. against assets and equipment, along the main road in the Following the patterns of the previous periods, IED explosions, handgrenade Ghorband Valley, represent two both Kohi Safid and Bagram witnessed two explosion and kidnapping; 30% distinctive risk factors increasing instances each of effective IDF strikes respec- represented forced intrusions into NGO vulnerability in the other- tively against the Bagram Airfield Base, and the NGO premises and robberies; wise calm province. ANP HQ in Kohi Safi (the latter at one in- and the remaining incidents split Indeed, IED activity continued on stance coincidence with Parwan ANP Chief of into collateral involvement in the Kabul – Bamyan Road in Police visit to the facility). Reporting from armed attack, abduction and a Ghorband, with an instance of an Kapisa featured an additional influx of fighters RCIED exploding against a two- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS from Tagab, ready to ramp up operations in vehicle convoy (white, marked Kohi Safi. In light of this, further escalations in AOG/ACG in Ghorband pick-up trucks) of an ANP unit the district are to be expected in the short  IED & IDF in Bagram on their way from Kabul to Kah- term. AOG in Kohi Safi mard on 22nd of November at THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 11 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 After a short period of relative 40 were wounded. In addition, on calm, AOG activity has resumed 30 the 30th two incidents occurred along the Mazar-Shibirghan Road, 20 with four incidents of note occur- almost simultaneously. Around 10 ring during the present period in 0745 hrs, in Mirgan Tepa area an Chahar Bolak and Balkh districts. armed group stopped three vehi- 0 On 25th November around 0815 cles travelling on the main road hrs, an IO convoy escorted by an and abducted the passengers BALKH AOG BALKH Crime ANP vehicle came under an AOG along with their vehicles. At the attack (SAF and RPG) along this time of writing this report the cording to the individual NGO’s risk thresh- road in Timurak area. The RPG exact whereabouts of the abduc- old. As usual, NGO national staff should keep round missed the target and the tees and their identity remains distance from any potential targets along this convoy managed to escape from unclear. It seems that while the road and maintain an extremely low-profile the area unharmed. Of note, this first group conducted the abduc- posture. marks the first reported incident tion, a second follow-up group set Besides Chahar Bolak, AOG activity mani- in the Timurak area since 28th Oc- up an ambush in Chahar Bolak fested itself in Chimtal District with three at- tober, when an armed clash oc- District, on the main road, in the tacks against ANSF/IMF static positions. For curred between ANP and AOG, area of the Khanabad Intersec- instance, on 20th November, in Gas Pipeline also during day-light hours, fol- tion. An ANP vehicle deployed, area, an ANP CP came under SAF and mortar lowing an AOG illegal check probably in response to the pres- attack which apparently ended without casual- point. Despite the fact ANP ence of armed men, drove into ties. The following day, an AOG attacked (also checkpoints already exist along the ambush. A brief fire fight with mortars) an IMF FOB located in the area this road at kilometre intervals, ensued and the armed men finally of Nawshahir Alizaz village, wounding three another direct attack occurred on withdrew from the area. The co- IMF soldiers. The incident marked the first use 19th November in Gortepa area, ordination of the attack indicates of mortars in the province indicating a diversi- targeting this time an IMF con- that the assault was well planned fication of AOGs’ tactic in Balkh. Of note voy. As a result, two IMF soldiers and executed. Due to the recent also, an increase in AOG activity has been re- increase in incident levels along ported in Kaldar District with a direct attack this road, travel after 1500 hours against an ANP convoy in Tazariq area and an KEY THREATS & CONCERNS through the district, as well as IED discovery on the main road to Qara Jar AOG checkpoints expatriates’ travel, is highly dis- village. AOG expansion couraged. Travel during the day- NGO abduction light hours should be taken ac-

Monthly NGO Incidents (Combined AOG/ACG)

20

18 18

16 16 16

14 14 14 14 12

10 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 2

0 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 1 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 In Sar-e Pul, the activity recorded 40 time hours. In addition, on 21st during the present period concen- 30 November, AOG set up another trated almost exclusively on Sar-e 20 check point along the Sar-e Pul- Pul and Sayyad districts. Contin- 10 Jawzjan road in Adbakshshi area ued risks of abduction along the 0 main roads across the province and attempted to stop a private vehicle. It seems that the driver were once again highlighted by SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime the presence of AOG check refused to stop at the checkpoint points. During the present cycle, and AOGs opened fire towards als surrounded the residence of a school prin- three check points have been re- the vehicle, wounding two occu- cipal with the intention to abduct him. This ported on the Sar-e Pul- pants. It should be underlined kidnapping was marred by an ANP deploy- Shibirghan Main Road in Sa that, although for the time being, ment which forced the AOG to withdraw. Shanba, Imam Jaffar and Adbakh- there is no indication that the Another large AOG entered the Charbagh shi villages of Sar-e Pul district, AOGs were looking for NGO village to collect taxes from the locals, an ef- with AOG searching for ANSF members, the potential risk of fort that was also foiled when again ANSF and GOA employees. Of note, abduction while confronted with deployed to the area and the AOG retreated two of them occurred during day- such check points should not be before their arrival. Finally, in Sayyad, Khowaja ruled out. Also in Sar-e Pul Dis- Yagana Village, an interpersonal conflict be- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS trict,in Sang Tuda village (between tween two local commanders degenerated into Abduction along Sar-E Pul - Sar-e Pul and Sozma Qala dis- fire fight that resulted in one person killed and Shibirgan road tricts) a group of armed individu- one abducted.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 3 KUNDUZ 100 This Report Period 0 The bulk of AOG activity in Kun- 80 duz was concentrated in the tradi- 19th November in Kunduz Dis- 60 tional hotspots of Imam Sahib, trict, an IED exploded against an 40 Qalay-e Zal, Chahar Dara and IMF foot patrol, reportedly injur- 20 ing four IMF soldiers. Three days Kunduz districts. More than 60% 0 of all recorded incidents were re- later, in Chahar Dara, on the Kun- lated to IED deployment. How- duz-Chahar Dara Main Road, an ever, this period also experienced IED struck an IMF vehicle, injur- KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime ing another two IMF soldiers. two AOG direct attacks targeting government militia commanders, on 16th No- Another area of IED concentra- ANSF and pro-government militia vember, in Khanabad District, an IED deto- tion was the village of Zarkhadir personnel and facilities. Of note, a nated targeting the Kunduz City Director of in Kunduz District, where at least significant AOG attack occurred Municipality. The Municipality Director was two RCIEDs detonated against in Qalay-e Zal District, where af- injured, along with his two bodyguards, while ANSF, and another two were dis- ter a fire fight that lasted several his brother and one other person was killed as covered and defused. hours AOG overran an ANP a result of the blast. It is worth noting that in checkpoint. One ANP, nine pro- It is interesting to note that most Kunduz Province, GOA officials have become government militia members, and likely as the result of a joint the subject of regular AOG attacks. Most re- six AOGs were killed. The AOGs ANSF/IMF operation, Aliabad cently, on 1st November, an IED detonated in also looted the checkpoint, seizing and Chahar Dara districts have the southern part of Kunduz City, targeting a number of weapons and ammu- witnessed a decrease in number of the vehicle of the Aliabad District Governor. nition. incidents in the past two weeks, The District Governor’s two bodyguards were Also during the present cycle, with only one incident, an IED injured in the attack. While GOA officials may IED deployment primarily tar- discovery, reported in the latter be targeted by AOGs for their effective role or geted the IMF. For instance, on district on the Chahar Dara- symbolic value as government appointees, the Kunduz. fact that high profile individuals may also be KEY THREATS & CONCERNS After two RCIED attacks re- targeted due to interpersonal or political rival- AOG offensive ported in the PRP targeting the ries should not be excluded as well. IMF operations Aliabad District CoP and pro- THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 6 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 Baghlan Province saw 73 AOG 40 an ANP check post located in members surrender to the GOA 30 forces in Baghlani Jadid District. Larkhabi area, along the Pul-e Khumri-Dushi Road. Another 20 Nonetheless, AOG activity con- 10 tinued in the past two weeks, par- incident of note occurred on the 0 ticularly in Burka, Dushi and Pul-e 24th November in Pul-e Khumri Khumri districts, with direct at- District, when AOG attacked with tacks as the tactic of choice. For RPGs and SAF an IMF convoy BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime instance, on 21st and 22nd Novem- which was travelling on the Pul-e should be aware of the continuing threat of ber, heavy fighting was reported Khumri - Mazar-e Sharif Main direct attacks and potential for abductions in in the Burka District Centre in Road which resulted in the these areas, and plan road travel accordingly. which an AOG attacked the DAC wounding of two IMF soldiers. ANSO has encouraged NGOs to restrict road with heavy weapons and SAF. The incident marks the first travel through Pul-e Khumri District with a ANSO-recorded day-time attack As mentioned in previous ANSO particular stress put on the Pul-e Khumri- on this road since mid October, reports, the road security across Kunduz road. Also in Baghlan, the second when on 13 October, a fuel tanker the province remains a distinctive half of this reporting period experienced dem- was hijacked from the main road concern. This was underlined on onstrations related to the elimination of local in Cheshmashir area. Although, the 21st, with an AOG attack on candidates from the parliamentary elections. over the past few weeks the num- On the 22nd and 23rd supporters of two local ber of direct attacks has decreased candidates interrupted road traffic along the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS on the road, this incident demon- Pul-e Khumri-Kabul Main Road. Finally, after IMF operations strates once again the AOG capa- the discussion with the local authorities the Tensions in Baghlan-e Jaded bility to access the main road dur- said protest ended peacefully. Attacks on Baghlan-Kunduz road ing the day. Therefore, NGOs

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 4 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 0 50 As seen in several other northern 40 provinces, events in Badakhshan in Fayzabad City and further dem- 30 Province during the present re- onstrations occurred in Yaftali 20 porting period were shaped by Sufla District. This being the 10 stronghold of the said candidate, political tensions ensuing from the 0 ECC announcement of the list of his supporters blocked the Fayza- candidates disqualified from the bad-Yaftal Payan (Sufla) Main BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime parliamentary elections. A total of Road over the course of three days. Although, the said demon- five demonstrations in reaction to viduals fired two RPG rounds towards the strations ended without reported the ECC resolution took place in PRT. The projectiles missed the intended tar- violence, local reporting indicates the province, all within the second get and impacted in an open area. According that the possibility of further pro- week of the present cycle. Several to ANSO data, this incident marks only the tests exists. hundred supporters of a parlia- second attack against the PRT in 2010. The mentary candidate staged demon- In Fayzabad City, in the vicinity of first took place on 10 September, when three strations for two consecutive days the Layab check point, ANP shot RPGs were fired toward the PRT. In both and injured a suspected AOG cases, no casualties were reported. Despite the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS member who was carrying an AK low level of reported incidents, AOG activity IDF attacks in Fayzabad 47 and a RPG launcher. Another continued unabated, particularly in Kishim and Instability in Kishim and Darayem incident of note occurred on 15 Darayem districts. November, when unknown indi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 1 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 1 An NGO direct incident was re- 40 ported during the present period was in the first vehicle pretended 30 in Shibirghan District, Sae Shanbi to be stuck in the mud and the 20 two armed men exited the vehi- Afghani Village, which is located 10 cles, probably to assess the situa- around 20 km south-west of 0 Shibirghan City. On 21 Novem- tion. This allowed the drivers to accelerate and escape. The gun- ber, three INGO national staff JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime arrived to their project sites in the men shot at the INGO vehicle, said area. Ministry for Rural Reha- breaking two of its windows but This period also recorded a rather unusual inci- bilitation (MRRD) personnel were both drivers escaped unharmed. dent. On 23rd, in the Darzab DAC area, an also visiting the INGO’s project According to ANSO data, this is unprovoked AOG fired RPGs at local civil- sites along with another car be- the first attempted NGO abduc- ians. Pro-government militia members re- longing to a consulting firm. After tion reported in Jawzjan Prov- sponded to the attack and as a result, a child dropping off their staff, the two ince. Regarding the province as a and two other local civilians were injured in drivers were waiting in the area, whole, the majority of reported the cross-fire. Reportedly, the local civilians when around 1030 hrs, two armed abductions have, so far, been con- were watching Buzkhashi game that had previ- men riding on motorcycles ap- centrated in Darzab and Qush ously been prohibited by AOGs as they already peared. They verbally and physi- Tepa districts- well known AOG’s warned the population not to attend. Another cally assaulted the INGO drivers, strongholds. This incident may case of intimidation was reported from the then got into the cars and forced have been a sign that AOGs are Darzab DAC area, as AOG threatened the the drivers to proceed. Of note, intent on expanding their influ- locals not to send their daughters over 13 year during the incident further armed ence into this area however, it is old to school, otherwise they will be responsi- men had been seen in the sur- also possible that this attempted ble for the consequences. Still in the same dis- rounding hills. While the exact abduction was criminally moti- trict, two IMF helicopters came under attack circumstances regarding the con- vated (rather than politically) as by RPG and heavy machineguns fire. The heli- clusion of the event remains un- this area is not known to host copters made an emergency landing in Shibir- clear, anecdotal reports indicate AOG activity. In addition, given ghan airfield after one of them was hit in the that while attempting to cross a the presence of the GoA employ- tail. Finally, in Fayzabad District, in Shah Jaan small river, the INGO driver who ees at the time of the incident, the Qala Village, AOG attacked an ANP check fact that NGO staff may have point with SAF and RPGs. The ANP re- been mistaken for government sponded to the attack and AOG retreated after KEY THREATS & CONCERNS employees or seen as being associ- a two hour-long fire fight. AOG/ACG activity ated with the GOA should not be Abduction ruled out as well.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 1st of December 2010. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 17 FARYAB This Report Period 1 50 th On 25 November in Kohistan 40 rather the result of local factions District, a grenade was thrown 30 competing for perceived patron- into an INGO compound located 20 age in the form of jobs for the in Lawlash Bazaar area. The gre- 10 affected organization. nade attack was followed by small 0 arms fire from surrounding hills. During the present reporting pe- The incident caused no casualties, riod AOG activity continued, in FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime but minor damage was reported Qaysar and Almat, and also in to the compound. Although, pre- Bilchiragh and Dawlatabad dis- incident resulted in two children being liminary information suggests tricts. In line with previously ob- wounded. criminal, rather than a political served trends, the main tactic em- In Bilchiragh District, AOG activity mani- motivation for the attack, the area ployed by AOGs across the prov- fested itself in Archatu Village, with a direct hosts an intermittent presence of ince remained direct attacks on attack on an ANP check post. Furthermore, a exogenous AOGs. It is worth ANSF/IMF and pro-government targeted-style killing occurred on the 24th when noting that Kohistan District has militias. Significant activity was an AOG opened fire on a private vehicle on already experienced two similar reported in Almat District, around the road between Kawleyan and Qaralek Vil- incidents, though not recently. On Ghalbala Village, where within lages. Two ANP members and five district th 20 April 2009, in Bandar area, two consecutive days, AOGs elders were killed and four other local civilians unknown individuals threw a gre- launched three direct attacks tar- were injured in the incident nade into an INGO compound, geting IMF patrols. Whereas these st damaging one vehicle and causing attacks were mostly ‘hit and run’ A rather unusual incident took place on 21 in no casualties. The same INGO’s assaults and ended after a short Dawlatabad District, Jungle area, when AOG compound was the target of an- fire fight, in the neighbouring dis- fired an RPG round towards an electricity other hand grenade attack on 3rd trict of Qaysar, in the area of power pylon, damaging the tower. Addition- May 2009. The result of the in- Shakh Village, AOG attacked an ally, in Pashtun Kot, a long term interpersonal vestigation of at least one of the ANP check point for two hours. dispute between two local commanders erupted into a fire fight. The clash lasted for aforementioned incidents indi- IED deployment remains a con- cated that the impetus for the at- about nine hours, killing two brothers of one cern as well in the area, with four of the commanders. tack was not AOG-related but incidents reported during this pe- riod. For instance, in Qaysar Dis- Finally, in Faryab Province tensions surround- trict, on 15th November, in Doabe ing parliamentary elections affected Shirin Ta- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Village, an IED detonated target- gab District. The removal of a local prominent Sustained attacks in Qaysar ing a construction company’s ve- candidate from the list of successful candidates Suicide attacks hicle. In the same village, this time resulted in four days of protests with his sup- Demonstrations on the 25th, another IED-related porters blocking the Shirin Tagab-Dawlatabad Road.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 4 SAMANGAN This Report Period 1 50 This period Samangan witnessed 40 direct incidents reported in one NGO related incident. On 30 th Samangan for 2010 but this marks 28 November, in Dara-e-Sufi 20 the first of its kind. Another inci- Bala District, 3 NGO national 10 dent of note occurred on 29th, in staff members were transporting 0 construction materials to one of Dara-e Suf Payan District, Dara-e Khushk Area. A purported AOG their projects in the DAC area. SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime Before arrival to the village a dis- abducted three national staff cussion started between the said working for a private road con- Aybak City on 23rd November. Although the staff and local community over struction company along with scenario of the protests was similar with other the transportation of these materi- their car. The incident marks the provinces—with candidate’s supporters block- als to their destination. A verbal first abduction in the said district ing the main road—the demonstrations were argument degenerated into vio- since 22nd July 2010, when four significant in their scale and organisation. Ac- lence, and the three NGO staff staff members of an international cording to reports around 3000 people partici- members were physically assaulted road construction company were pated in the protests, with a large group of by the members of the local com- abducted from Kotal area. demonstrators staying overnight to block the munity, strangely, the same group During the present cycle, perhaps road (as seen in Faryab as well). Finally, on the who were the NGO beneficiar- even more than in other northern 26th, the road was been reopened as a result of ies. ANP officials arrived at the provinces, the security situation in the ongoing discussion between the candidate scene and rescued the assaulted Samangan was shaped by tensions and the authorities. As the security situation in NGO staff. According to ANSO surrounding the parliamentary the province has proven in the past to be par- data, there have been three NGO elections. The ECC announce- ticularly vulnerable to political tensions and ment of the disqualification of a rivalries, NGOs should closely monitor the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS prominent local candidate from result of these discussions and associated local AOG/ACG checkpoints the list of successful candidates developments in the short term. Political tensions was at the origin of three days of demonstrations, which started in

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 5 TAKHAR This Report Period 0 50 In the past two weeks incident 40 levels in Takhar remained consis- nation of the Governor of Kun- 30 tent with the previous period, in- duz Province - who was killed 20 dicating a slight increase in the inside Shirkat Mosque, along with 10 number of AOG-initiated inci- 15 other civilians. Although the 0 dents. In the past two weeks, majority of significant incidents in seven incidents were recorded of the province were related to IED which three were AOG-initiated. deployment, an AOG direct at- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime rd On 28th in Taloqan City, an tack occurred on the 23 , in dition, another explosive device, this time an RCIED attached to a bicycle Khwaja Ghar, Chaghati Village, RCIED placed under a bridge, was located detonated in Sar-e Chawk area, where AOG attacked a pro- then defused in the Puli Haji Shamsuddin area killing two civilian and wounding government militia’s checkpoint of Yangi Qala District. Finally, as in other another two. The incident marks with SAF and RPGs. A pro- provinces, political tensions surrounding the the first IED detonation in the longed fire fight ensued, resulting elections resulted in two demonstrations re- city since 8 October - the assassi- in the injuring of two AOGs and ported. The first protest occurred on the 25th, a militia member. The following with supporters of several unsuccessful candi- day in Khwaja Bahawuddin Dis- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS dates gathering in the Sar-e Chawk area in Ta- trict Centre, a suspected AOG loqan City. Four days later, apparently as a re- Tensions in northern Takhar was killed, and a civilian injured, sult of the authorities’ failure to address the Banditry along Takhar-Kunduz in a premature explosion of an road protestors’ demands, another peaceful demon- IED that he was carrying. In ad- stration took place in the City. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 17 HERAT 80 This Report Period 2 70 As in previous months, AOG 60 presence and activity in the north abovementioned area as AOG 50 and north-eastern districts of activity has so far been concen- 40 Herat was visible. One of the two 30 trated in the north-eastern part of 20 NGO related incidents during this Karukh District. Local authorities, 10 reporting period is a symptom of however, are rather reluctant to 0 this, even though it occurred in an believe that these threats could area that is not usually affected by result in action (though this may HERAT AOG HERAT Crime AOG activity. On 21 November be just wishful thinking) despite have not faced similar problems and the bene- in Karukh District an AOG locals concern about the security ficiaries remained intent on continuing with (reportedly based in Kushki Ku- situation in the area. While these the training. The rumours appear to be related hna) via a local spokesman, in- incidents indicate an apparent to tensions emanating from a small community formed an INGO of the require- desire of AOGs from Kushki Ku- in a neighbouring village that have had objec- ment to submit regular payments hna to expand their activities fur- tions, mainly because the training involves men in order to continue its work in ther south, it is too early to tell if and women alike. Local elders are currently Palezkar Village, an area north of AOGs have the capacity to do so involved in resolving the situation. Of note, the district centre. Two days later, or if their efforts will remain lim- this incident highlights the ability of local inter- the spokesman then informed ited to rhetoric-based intimida- est groups to capitalise on the prevailing con- village elders that no NGO in tion. flict in order to further their own agendas. general is welcome to work in the The second NGO related inci- Though there were no incidents recorded in area, and those that do can expect dent, recorded in Azimabad Vil- Chishti Sharif during this reporting period, to come under attack. The threat lage of Injil, is unrelated to AOG local power struggles and the related tensions is further supported by rumours activity (since AOG influence in are ongoing, with this destabilising influence indicating that local groups are the area is low). Rumours about a likely to continue until a new power balance is emerging, with apparent links to possible AOG attack on an achieved. Pashtun Zarghun, the site of an in- AOG efforts in Kushki Kuhna. INGO training centre spread on tensive ANSF operation on the 17th, is likely to The incidents are unusual for the 21 November 2010 but after con- enjoy a temporary period of increased stability, sultation with local elders, it ap- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS however the long term effects remain to be pears that the source of the ru-  seen as AOG efforts to regroup and reengage Local power struggles mours is not necessarily credible. is likely. AOG in Karukh It is worth noting that other IEDs NGO training centres in the area

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 The increased level of ANSF/ 40 IMF operations in Farah Province on the 27th November. Bakwa and 30 continued, particularly noted in Pur Chaman districts are typical 20 the first part of the reporting pe- strongholds of AOG influence 10

riod. These operations focused on and the removal of these two 0 Bakwa between the 20th and 22nd DSG may have a follow on affect of November, reportedly killing on AOG structures in other dis- four AOG members, including tricts. FARAH AOG FARAH Crime Bakwa’s District Shadow Gover- The lull in IEDs noted in the last resulted in an increase in security measures, a nor, and leading to the arrest of a reporting period has continued. It possible contributing factor on AOG ability to further 10. In addition, the DSG appears that AOG tactics have deploy IEDs. An incident of exception to cur- of Pur Chaman was arrested dur- shifted to direct attacks against rent trends was the SAF attack against two ing an operation in Khaki Safed ANSF and IMF, concentrated in local transport buses in the Ab Khorma Area Bala Buluk, Bakwa, Gulistan and of Bala Buluk (along the Herat-Kandahar road) KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Pusht Rod. The recent BBIED which resulted in the wounding of four civil- Security force-AOG clashes activity (attack against the NDS ians and abduction of a further eight. AOG direct attacks and an arrest of another) has also THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 10 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 AOG activity targeting IMF is 40 steadily increasing and in general RPGs towards the PRT, without 30 the security situation is deteriorat- causing any casualty or damage. 20 ing. While the motivations behind While RPG attacks in Chaghcha- 10 this dynamic remains unclear, cur- ran have occurred previously they 0 rent operations north of Ghor are typically rare, occurring once (Faryab and Badghis) as well as yearly against security targets. operations to the south (Helmand However, when taken into con- GHOR AOG GHOR Crime and Kandahar), and the possible text it serves as another piece of AOG to attract significant media attention, forced relocation of fighters, may the recent trend. Of greater sig- since the internet statement on Ghor men- serve as an impetus to amplify this nificance was the BBIED related tioned above refers to the lack of media atten- process. As well, there are indica- incident on the 28th of November. dance on their activities in the province. For tors of an increased AOG focus ANP attempted to arrest a suicide NGOs the main risk is being collaterally in- on the province, as noted in AOG attacker in a private residence volved, which increases with the proximity and statements and propaganda sites. close to the PRT, which resulted the exposure to potential targets. It should be noted, however, that in the panicked attacker detonat- Dawlat Yar, an area typically known for the the trend of slow deterioration ing when the police surrounded dynamics of tribal tensions saw an SAF against had been established previously the house. There were no casual- a vehicle on 27 November. An unknown and can be seen as part of the ties beyond the suicide attacker. number of armed men attempted to stop the steady, continued expansion of Prior to October 2010, there had vehicle of GoA officials (MRRD) and opened AOG influence and operational been no suicide attacks recorded fire when the vehicle failed to stop, killing one areas countrywide as the conflict for Ghor Province. This recent person and wounding four. While the exact has progressed. In reaction, the event, along with the BBIED at- nature of the group responsible and the moti- GoA has begun the deployment tack against the PRT (in October), vation behind the attack remains unclear, local of ANA soldiers to Ghor, to be confirms a new and different level dynamics suggest that an ACG is the most based in Chaghcharan City, with of AOG involvement in Ghor. likely answer. In 2010 there have been similar 100 of the planned 400 soldiers Rumours of further BBIEDs al- incidents, as in April (also in Gandab Area) already in place. ready present in Ghor persist; when a locally known ACG first robbed sev- however, opinions are divided During this reporting period, eral travellers and then opened fire on them regarding potential targets. Pre- there were two further incidents for unknown reasons. All attacks, including the sent trends indicate that continued that fit this pattern of AOG ac- recent one, occurred during the day with the targeting of IMF, as well as GoA tivities targeting IMF in Ghor. On groups demonstrating a significant propensity related targets, is the most likely 21 November, AOG fired two to violence. However, it is worth noting that course of action. This assessment ACG activities remain infrequent, with only is furthered by AOG statements KEY THREATS & CONCERNS three recorded cases during 2010 so far. regarding the lack of media atten- AOG activity against IMF tion on the province, with high BBIED/IEDs profile attacks in the interest of THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 70 The previous period saw inter- 60 AOG clashes in Muqur and Qadis clear at this time if the reconcilia- 50 tion ‘successes’ are a result of the 40 and these clashes, between the 30 ‘reconciled’ and the irreconcilable, concentrated security force opera- 20 tions in the area. As well, all these 10 continued into the present period. 0 As seen on the 21st, an AOG at- factors may constitute a power tacked the residence of a former struggle in advance of the ex- AOG commander who had re- pected handover to ANSF begin- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime ning in 2011. cently joined the GoA. This is hana Area on 27 November. indicative of the tensions that ex- Also during this reporting cycle, ist between the two groups in the ANSF/IMF operations targeting As anticipated in October, IED activity in- area, and that the process of rec- the command structure of the creased. The ratio between direct attacks and onciliation may actually serve as a AOGs continued, particularly in IEDs are more or less even; however, direct destabilising influence. It is un- Qadis district. On 22 November, attacks were concentrated on Ghormach and an AOG commander was killed IEDs focused in Murghab, the more estab- lished AOG operational area of the two. Qadis KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and an AOG member wounded in an IMF/ANSF operation in Da- is also slated to become another hotspot in Security force-AOG clashes rae Boom Area. In addition, an air Badghis province as indicated during the par- Inter-AOG clashes operation killed two AOG mem- liamentary elections in September. IEDs bers and wounded three in Khirk-

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN This Report Period 0 50 In Nuristan Province, there was 40 only one recorded incident during against ground operations by the 30

the reporting period: an airstrike Nurgram-based IM forces. 20 Reports from the province sug- in Waygal district, with no casual- 10 ties reported. Waygal is known to gest an increasingly fragmented be the core location for AOG GOA presence, and an inability 0 fighters and commanders in the even for many Afghans without province’s central and western strong family or friendship links districts, and as such is an under- to travel to the eastern districts, NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime standable target for IMF air which are home to a significant As such, we are likely to see a significant strikes – with the province’s for- number of Pakistani and Middle dearth of security incidents – or at least their bidding geography militating Eastern AOG fighters, particularly reporting – from Nuristan for the coming during the cold winter months weeks, as the heavy winter weather shuts down KEY THREATS & CONCERNS when they seek refuge in isolated most movements. Moreover, the weather itself Weather driven inaccessibility valleys blocked by snowfall from may present a significant impediment to NGO Changing AOG perceptions of outside access. access in the next months, certainly away from humanitarian actors the primary arteries into the province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 3 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 Trends in Nangarhar Province 80 were worrying during this period, credible rumours of SVBIEDs in in a number of important dimen- Jalalabad City were enough to put 60 sions. First, there was a continua- the IMF, GOA and ANSF on 40 tion of the clear escalation of the heightened alert for the evening. 20 pattern of AOG attacks on the In all, therefore, there was a much 0 central IMF facilities in the prov- heavier sense of threat across the ince, which is all the more con- province and in Jalalabad City in spicuous for going against ex- particular. This may be why it has NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime pected seasonal conflict trends. been confirmed that Jalalabad will opt for this method has increased. Two other On the night of the 25th, AOG soon have its own ‘ring of steel’ raids took place in Khogyani, the first on the fighters staged the second hit and security belt constructed and 19th seeing the detention of an IED run RPG/SAF attack on the Nan- maintained by ANSF; more details ‘facilitator’, the second on the 20th, which led garhar PRT this year, destroying a will be provided as they are col- to the capture and detention of a mid-level radio tower, and landing several lated. jihadi commander and the confiscation of grenades inside the compound. Second and similarly from the three automatic weapons found in his house. This incident stood out among IMF side there was a clear escala- Indeed, this raid led to a demonstration out- the other attacks on IMF across tion of significant capture/kill side the Nangarhar Provincial Council offices the province, as did an IED operations against AOG of im- in Jalalabad the next morning, on the 21st, with against an IMF vehicle in portance across the province dur- locals from the commander’s relatives and po- Chaparhar on the 14th, which ing this last fortnight. The most litical constituency travelling en masse in 30-40 caused extensive vehicular damage remarkable was a major operation vehicles seeking his release from IMF deten- but no casualties. Of note, this in Marki Khel, Sherzad district, at tion, to no avail. th incident occurred in the Sra Kala 0200 hrs on Nov. 27 led to the Furthermore, there was a raid on a house in Area, on the main district road killing of 23 AOG fighters, in- the Muqam Khan area of Bihsud District on just after the two tributary roads cluding one mid-level commander the 21st, in follow up to the ineffective attack converge, very near to the site of who was emerging as a key link in on JAF on the 13th; in the operation, 11 AOG the accidental killing of an NGO the inter-provincial and cross- fighters/supporters were rounded up and de- worker by an IED on November border chain of preparing and tained. The following day – the 22nd – as with 10th. It was followed on the 21st activating suicide bombers for the Khogyani incident a follow-up demonstra- by an AOG ambush on an IMF/ attacks against high profile targets tion took place in the area of the Farm-e Adda ANSF convoy moving through across the province, as well as bridge, blocking the main road in the area, with the same area. As such, it should offering active armed opposition the protestors asserting that the detained indi- be noted that the Sra Kala area to IMF operations in Sherzad and viduals were innocent. Given that it is known represents the key point of insecu- Khogyani. The attack marked the some of the individuals were self-confessedly rity in the district. largest death toll of an IMF opera- involved, this is perhaps why the protest, while Moreover, this period also wit- tion in the history of the conflict rowdy to start with, fizzled out relatively nessed two failed suicide bomb- in Nangarhar, and is a sign of the quickly. ings, one in Shinwar near to the increased importance being placed The last point of note in the AOG-IMF con- Marko Bazaar on Nov. 22nd, and on lethal operations by the IMF at flict dynamic was the ‘rogue’ killing of 6 IMF one on the Jalalabad Ringroad on the current juncture of the ongo- trainer soldiers by an ABP policeman thought the 23rd. It is likely that each was ing counterinsurgency campaign. to be from Khogyani, at Nangarhar’s primary on the way to attack a notable More broadly, there have been a ANSF training facility in Pachir wa Agam, IMF/GOA target in the area, and number of similarly casualty-heavy which occurred late in the reporting period (on as such can be seen as part of this attacks in these southern districts the 29th). This rogue killing, the worst in the escalation, in spite of their acci- in recent months, particularly dur- intervention’s history, which also led to the dental failure. Also, on the 28th ing September, which each led to shooting dead of the policeman responsible, is 3-5 AOG fighters being killed. likely to further escalate the IMF’s proactive KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Yet it would not be accurate to and aggressive targeting of AOG fighters in Escalation of the conflict describe the IMF as solely inter- the south-west of the province. IEDs in Jalalabad City ested in such lethal raids – even if Demonstrations it seems that their propensity to THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 9 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 One of the two NGO incidents in 150 the eastern region during the re- is ongoing, but the fact that this porting period occurred in Kunar threat emerged as a real one has 100 on the 16th. In this case, in Narang knock-on consequences for the 50 threat environment faced by District, late in the evening a 0 group of armed men came to the NGOs operating in/travelling clinic, tied up the guards, and through the district. sought to make off with solar Apart from these two important panels affixed to the roof – as incidents, the military conflict KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime they had done successfully twice dominated the security landscape districts has not heavily affected the nearby previously. This time, the security of the province. In Wata Pur, fur- provincial capital, Asadabad, which saw only measures taken by the clinic pre- ther tallies have been received on two IDF incidents against the IMF base in the vented their forceful detachment, the scale of the IMF operations Yar Gul area, marking a period of unexpected and they were therefore smashed that took place there during the th th calm in the city. in anger. The two guards and a period of the 12 -16 . In the Ka- In Dangam, while there were just three AOG- nurse were then temporary de- mano area of the district, 30 AOG initiated incidents (lower than in other dis- tained and brought to another fighters were reported killed, with tricts) those incidents that did occur were of location, before being warned large quantities of small arms and noteworthy significance. First, on the 15th in about reporting the incident. A heavy weapons seized, while in the Dew Band area, AOG fighters ambushed small generator was also stolen by the Kuro, Maidan, Sangar and an IMF patrol, which led to the killing of a the assailants. Qatar Qala areas, a total of 13 local AOG commander. Second, on the 21st An ongoing threat in Khas Kunar fighters were reported killed, and there was an AOG attack on the private resi- District has been an opposition/ further weapons seized. The IMF dence of the District Governor of neighbour- criminal group based in Pakistan’s have deemed the operations as ing Marawara with heavy weapons and small Mohmand Agency but operating successes, and in so far as the arms, killing one person on the residence and across the border. In August ‘clearing’ phase is concerned, that injuring seven others. Subsequently, ANP ar- ANSO reported on information may be partially true at present; rested two AOG fighters suspected of involve- that the group had decided to tar- however, just days after these op- ment. It is a noteworthy incident because the get employees of humanitarian erations ceased, AOG fired heavy overwhelmingly military nature of the conflict and private construction organisa- weapons at a local house in the in Kunar has typically squeezed out much of tions for abduction, in order to area, killing two civilians, suggest- the targeting of GOA officials and facilities, extract ransom payments. During ing that even such lethal opera- making up only about 10% of all AOG attacks this reporting period, the first tions have not fully eliminated the in 2010; in other provinces in the east, such as confirmed reports of abductions presence of the armed opposition Khost and Paktya, this percentage is closer to by this group were received; at in the district, and clearly there are 40%. 1500 hrs on Nov. 27th, on the questions about the sustainability Just to the north of Dangam, in Nari district, main district road in the Ahangaro of such operations. there was an attack on a road construction Kala area, 3 local engineers from a Narang, Sirkanay and Manogai company, while other attacks on IMF patrols private road construction com- continue to form a central belt of and ANP CPs were also recorded. Finally, in pany – working on a PRT-driven insecurity in the province, with 7, Khas Kunar, apart from the abduction men- road construction programme – 11 and 6 AOG-initiated attacks on tioned above, an IED hit an IMF vehicle in the were kidnapped by the group, and GOA, IMF and ANSF in the re- Mangwal village area on the 18th, injuring 3 taken across the border. The case spective districts – and each dis- trict not seeing a single IMF- or IMF soldiers and damaging the vehicle. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF-initiated operation, indica- Military operations tive of the side with whom the Abduction in border districts momentum of the conflict lays. However, the conflict in these THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 1 KHOST This Report Period 1 120 Khost recorded the other NGO 100 incident in the region during this and is in one sense unsurprising, 80 reporting period, when an NGO given that the district has wit- 60 clinic was semi-destroyed and its nessed a fourfold increase in secu- 40 guards tied up by a group of un- rity incidents on 2009. 20 known armed men in Qalander This compares with slightly more 0 District, at 2200 hrs on Novem- than a doubling of security inci- th ber 26 . Qalander, a mountain- dents across the province in 2010 KHOST AOG KHOST Crime ous, isolated district with poor more generally, as compared with infrastructure and with a known 2009 levels, and while the absolute fied as mid-level commanders belonging to the foreign AOG presence, is remark- number of incidents dropped dur- primary cross-border AO Group in the region, able among Khost’s districts for ing this reporting period when the regional networks of which IMF are cur- being a comparative safe haven compared with the last period – rently focusing on disrupting in Khost and from the conflict which is affect- from 113 to 96 – this is only neighbouring provinces. From the AOG side, ing the rest of the province, at slightly outside of the statistical their IDF and IED attacks, again focused on least in terms of the number of margin of error. As such, the the area around the DAC, summed to 19, or security incidents that are regis- colder weather that hits this more than one a day, showing that they are tered there. Until this attack on mountainous border province at willing and able to execute a similar jump in the clinic, the district had re- this time has not dampened its operational intensity as displayed by the IMF. corded just two security incidents pervasive insecurity, and incident The pattern is broadly identical in nearby Bak in 2010, with a May killing of an volumes have remained relatively and Tere Zayi Districts, which can be grouped abducted ANP policeman, and a consistent with those reported together with Sabari as forming one unified September attack on a road con- this period in 2009. battlespace, although the absolute intensity of struction company working in the However, the locus of security the conflict there is somewhat lower than in district, which killed one em- incidents has changed when com- Sabari. Across the two districts, 16 AOG at- ployee. In 2009, only 4 incidents pared to the same period in 2009, tacks on their DACs and ANSF and IMF were recorded: 2 of which directly when insecurity in the province bases were registered, although it is worth affected an NGO working in the was focused around Khost City. mentioning that five of the incidents in Tere district, 1 of which struck a road Now, while Khost remains the Zayi were against ANBP facilities – bases and th construction company, and the 4 site of approximately a quarter of outposts – along the border with North Wa- of which was an IMF/ANP op- all incidents, insecurity is dispro- ziristan. From the IMF side, an operation eration that killed 30 AOG fight- portionally focused upon Sabari against a senior AOG figure in Tere Zayi cap- ers. As such, the picture is one of District, which along with Bak tured another mid-level AOG figure on the an isolated district used as a safe and Tere Zayi forms the territory 29th, in the Kuza Kala area near the DAC. haven by foreign AOG fighters most hostile to IMF and GOA Moving back to Khost City, the pattern of at- much less sympathetic to the local actors. While no continuation of tack has remained stable on previous periods, community and keen to maintain the SVBIED campaign was seen with the majority of attacks (15 in total) either the district’s isolation. during this period in Sabari or IDF attacks from outside the city, at night, In neighbouring Musa Khel, elsewhere in the province, 36 towards GOA and IMF installations, or IEDs meanwhile, the sole incident regis- other serious security incidents covertly emplaced to strike IMF vehicles or tered was an ambush which killed were recorded there, the majority cause more generalised insecurity. It should be the District Chief of Police as he comprising what has emerged as a noted however, that most of the IDF attacks travelled home from the DAC on competition between IMF opera- are inaccurate and ineffective, while a consider- st the 21 . It is the first killing of a tions on the one hand, and AOG able number of the IEDs emplaced by AOG significant GOA official in the IDF and IED attacks on the DAC fighters are discovered and safely defused. For history of the district, the quietest and nearby IMF base on the example, during this period, 5 of the 9 IEDs in the province after Qalander and other. There were 14 separate were safely defused, with 3 of the 4 that deto- the ethnically homogenous and IMF operations – or nearly one a nated causing minor injuries, and only one semi-autonomous Jaji Maydan, day – mostly by special forces, striking an ANSF vehicle. From their side, the focused on the immediate vicinity IMF conducted one operation in the city envi- of the DAC, with 1 AOG fighter rons, with a Nov. 21st raid in Bak village lead- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS killed and 29 more captured AOG primacy in isolated districts ing to the arrest of 14 AOG fighters. across all the operations. Of note, Intensified conflict in north/east of those 29 fighters, 5 were identi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Laghman registered an uncharac- 40 incidents per month, concentrat- teristically high number of signifi- 30 cant security incidents during the ing on ANP vehicle patrols and 20 reporting period, suggesting a the DAC, while in 2010 we saw a continuation of the concerted slightly higher level of ambushes 10 campaign by new provincial com- on ANSF and IDF attacks against 0 manders against the IMF and the DAC beginning to become GOA started in the last 6 weeks, particularly noticeable from Au- which has also stood out against gust. For the last 3 months, the LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime expected seasonal trends. confidence and rigor of the came up after an IMF operation in Alishing First, in the provincial capital, AOGs operating in the district that led to civilian casualties, about which the Mehtarlam, a twin IED attack has significantly strengthened, local community was angry, and for which the occurred in the vicinity of the with illegal CPs being set up to GOA set up a committee to investigate, but Laghman PRT on the morning of search for GOA and IMF em- which was felt by the community to be an in- November 20th. The first took the ployees, the first stand-off attacks sufficient and ineffective response. form of a BBIED who blew him- against IMF convoys being regis- Part of why the IMF may not have quite suffi- self up at an ANP CP in the vicin- tered, and a much more concerted ciently focused upon Dawlat Shah lies in their ity of the Mehtarlam Public effort to target ANSF. During this traditional focus on Alishing and Alingar, Health Hospital, killing himself latest reporting period, we have which remained unstable during this reporting and five children passing by. He seen 3 such significant events in period, particularly the latter district. In Alish- also injured nearly 20 civilians, just a fortnight, with two attacks th ing on Nov. 15th, an IMF convoy came under and two of the ANP policemen in the Zarkamar area on the 15 th attack with SAF and heavy weapons, while in standing at the CP. Thirty minutes and 16 , targeting an ANP CP Alingar four IED incidents were recorded on later, on the same road leading to and an IMF convoy respectively, the main road to the Alingar DAC: two IEDs the PRT but near to Intezar and then an IDF attack on the st struck IMF convoys on the 22nd and 23rd, the Chawk in the vicinity of the Lagh- DAC on the 21 . Furthermore, second one injuring four IMF soldiers and one man Battlestation, an IED deto- AOG fighters also kidnapped a AOG, while on the 16th the ANP found two nated, injuring 8 civilians and local man in the Kundi Por Ziarat rd separate IEDs and had them safely defused by causing no fatalities. Such attacks area on the 23 , with his where- an IMF EOD team. are broadly unheard of within the abouts still unknown. Finally, in Qarghayi district, the main Kabul- city. In 2010, the first IED to be The IMF have perhaps not caught Jalalabad Highway, usually a site for AOG at- emplaced in the city was discov- up operationally to the changing tacks and IEDs against ANSF, IMF and fuel/ ered and defused on October 28th, security picture in the district, as supply convoys, has been unusually quiet. This while the detonation of the sui- there have yet to have been any is similar to the trend on the Jalalabad- cide bomber was the first such IMF or joint operations in the Torkham Road in Nangarhar. In Qarghayi, it is suicide attack Mehtarlam has ever district. Furthermore, information likely that attacks have dropped because of witnessed. As with Nangarhar, suggests they are in danger of los- IMF operations to disrupt AOG networks in then, during this period we can ing the district for good; reports Nangarhar’s southwestern districts of Khogy- detect the expansion of AOG have come in that a memorandum ani and Sherzad, which have traditionally tactics traditionally used in the of understanding has been agreed served as the origin of the networks that are south and southeast into the east- between the AOGs in Dawlat based south of the Highway which conduct ern region. Shah and Alishing districts and attacks on it. Furthermore, for those AOGs Similarly, Dawlat Shah has also their respective local communities that operate from the north of the highway, seen unprecedented high number that if these communities with- from the Bad Pakh safe haven, it is thought of attacks by AOG fighters. hold their cooperation from the that they are also involved in AOG activity in Through 2009, the district regis- IMF, the AOGs will refrain from Alishing and Dawlat Shah; as such, the high tered on average just 1.5 security targeting development projects and cell phone towers, and will activity in these districts has a direct impact on scale down their nighttime patrols. the number of attacks those groups stage on KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the Highway. IEDs This, however, has clear positive benefits for NGOs working in Suicide Attacks these districts. The memorandum THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 0 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 Paktya recorded no NGO inci- 80 dents during the reporting period, experiencing; what IEDs have 60

but interesting trends in the wider been emplaced have not been ef- 40 conflict were visible. Zurmat, the fective, with two discovered and 20 district through which the main defused, and only one striking a Gardez-Ghazni and Gardez- target, in the DAC area on the 0 Sharan roads run, was the focus 15th, which caused minimal dam- age to an IMF vehicle. Unfortu- for IMF operations against AOG PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime facilities outside of Gardez, with nately, this preference also led to four IMF raids on compounds in the accidental killing of eight civil- Shah Karez village, and in Degan ians, including two children, in of Jaji and Chamkanay, which form the north- Qala and Sahak areas, on the 21st, two separate IED detonations eastern section of the province and contains its 22nd and 23rd. In all, 4 AOG fight- during this last fortnight. How- main border crossing to Pakistan’s Kurram ers were killed, including an IED ever, AOGs also staged two short Agency, the pattern of the conflict in these ‘facilitator’, approximately 21 were hit and run stand-off attacks on provinces during the current reporting period arrested, and a number of weap- ANP CPs in the area, and three (as in previous periods) is one of a mature and ons seized. Moreover, an IMF/ IDF attacks with mortars/rockets confident set of AOGs – much closer in form ANSF operation in the Zurmat against IMF and GOA targets – to that which exists in Khost and Kunar. This DAC area on the 15th led to a fur- two of which misfired and caused is largely due to geography, as these districts ther nine AOG fighters being ar- AOG deaths and/or injuries. are on the other side of the mountains from rested, while the ANA conducted Moving north to Gardez City, a the main body of the province, and thus closer an autonomous search operation lower proportion of attacks were to Kurram than Gardez in commerce, family in the DAC area on the 19th, witnessed in the city than normal, ties and political influence. As such, in these which saw 2 further AOG being similar to the quiet picture in districts the GOA and IMF is faced with detained. Finally, on the 28th an Kunar’s Asadabad provincial capi- AOGs that have the momentum with them, IED cell leader was killed in an tal. The capital district was the and who therefore primarily focus on attacking IMF operation in the Janek Khel second focus for IMF and ANSF IMF bases and convoys, DACs and key ANP area, alongside an unconfirmed operations during this fortnight, facilities. number of fighters. Zurmat has with an IMF operation in Rabat Moving back to the south of the province, in typically been one of the least sta- Shahr village on the 24th, which Wuza Zadran district a demonstration in sup- ble districts in the province, in led to the arrest of 5 suspected port of a failed parliamentary candidate and spite of its flat central topography AOG, a joint operation in local tribal strongman took place on the main and well developed road infra- Shakarkhel on the 23rd that ar- Khost-Gardez Road on the 17th, blocking it for structure, and it is clear from this rested one suspect, a ‘facilitator’ three hours in the Laka Tiga area. This is the heightened number of proactive of assassinations against GOA second demonstration to take place over the military operations that the IMF targets, and a solo ANP operation parliamentary elections issue in a month along and ANSF are currently placing that discovered and confiscated a this main road, the other being one in significant emphasis on taking weapons cache in the Qala Abdul- neighbouring Shwak district on October 23rd, back the momentum in the dis- lah area on the 24th. The majority which took place in support of the same candi- trict from the AOGs present. of the other incidents were not of date – whose tribal-political constituency Consistent with this picture, from major significance, including 3 stretches across both districts. This protest the AOG side we have seen a defused IEDs, one that detonated made a change from the usual pattern of inci- preference for IED emplacement in an open area away from civil- dents in Wuza Zadran, where it is much more in the district, as a means to work ians, and an ineffective opportun- normal to see IDF attacks on the IMF base in around the IMF/ANSF pressure istic SAF attack on an IMF heli- the area. True to form, 3 of the 4 other inci- the AOG fighters are currently copter on the 19th. The one IED dents were such IDF attacks, while the fourth that did strike a target was an anti- was an IMF operation that led to the arrest of 4 AOG, including a mid-level commander, in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS personnel mine that struck and the Sarawti area on the 25th. IEDs in Zurmat & Gardez injured two ANA soldiers in nd Military operations in northeast Shebet Kelay village on the 22 . Continuing north to the districts THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 8 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar Province witnessed a 150 incidents (detonations and discov- decrease in activity compared to 100 the previous reporting period. eries) of which 17 occurred in This period AOGs were active in Kandahar City. Although, the vast 50 Maywand, Zhari, Argistan and majority of IEDs were discovered 0 Kandahar City. The trend of and subsequently safely defused, AOG avoidance of direct con- AOG continued to targeted secu- frontations with security forces rity forces in Spin Boldak, May- KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime has continued through to the cur- wand and Kandahar City. Of rent period, with only three such note, two IED strikes were re- wan Village, another three civilians were killed incidents reported. In addition, a ported in Kandahar City in Dis- in a similar incident. hand grenade attack was reported trict 6, Sarpoza Prison area. On on 15th November in Kandahar 17th November in the said area, AOG campaign of targeted killings of ANP City District 8 against an ANP one IMF soldier was wounded as officials have continued as well during the pre- check post. Also, an armed clash a result of an IED strike. Later, sent cycle. In Kandahar City, two off-duties occurred between AOG and on 29th, another IED detonated ANP were killed in District 1 and 7. Addition- IMF/ANP during an operation in wounding three ANP officials. As ally two officials were killed by AOG in Maruf Zhari District, Sanzari Village. seen in the previous reports, IED and Maywadan districts. In the past two weeks Whereas the province experienced deployment frequently affects the ANSF/IMF operations were concentrated in a low level of direct attacks, IEDs security of the local population. Zhari, Daman, Dand, Kandahar City and May- have continued to represent the This period, on 21st in Shah Wali wand districts. In the latter district, 25 AOG main threat in the area. There Kot District on the Kandahar- members were reported to have been arrested. have been at least 28 IED related Uruzgan Main Road, a roadside IED struck a civilian Toyota Sara- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cha vehicle en route to Uruzgan Province, killing four occupants, Direct attacks against ANP including two women and one AOG assassinations child and wounding three others. IMF operations As well, on the 26th in Zhari, Mak-

SUICIDE ATTACKS - 2010 (Combined VB/BBIED) 14 13 12 12 12 12 12 11 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 6 4 2 0 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 During the present cycle the level of security incidents in Helmand IED related incidents have de- 150 creased as well compared to the has decreased compared to the 100 PRP. The probable reasons be- previous period with eight re- hind this decrease are the com- ported events. In one notable 50 bined factors of the Eid-e-Qurban IED strike in Nahri Sarraj Dis- 0 celebrations and the continuing trict, on 17th November, an IED hit an ANA patrol wounding two high level of IMF/ANSF activity HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime across the province. Of the secu- ANA soldiers. The use of IEDs rity incidents recorded, AOG di- throughout the province contin- As mentioned previously, ANSF/IMF contin- rect and indirect attacks ac- ued to represent a significant ued to lead numerous operations, killing and counted for the majority and con- threat for the local population. arresting large number of AOG members. In nd centrated during this period in For instance, on 22 in Naw Zad, parallel with AOG activity, ANSF/IMF ef- Nad Ali, Sangin, Nahri Sarraj and an IED detonated where several forts, during this period, were focused on Nad Garmser districts. The favoured children were playing, killing two Ali, Sangin and Kajaki districts, particularly target of these attacks remained of them. In another incident, on targeting AOG commanders. On 18th in Nad th ANSF/IMF patrols. This period 19 in Lashkar Gah District, ex- Ali District, Spin Jumat area, IMF conducted Nad Ali District was particularly plosives placed in a ditch deto- an airstrike, killing a reported 18 AOG mem- active with three reported AOG nated near a large group of people bers. Three days later, as a result of a joint attacks on ANSF/IMF patrols, who had come to the area for a ANSF/IMF operation, another 20 AOG were followed by two such attacks in picnic, fortunately causing no reported to have been killed in Sangin District. Sangin. casualties. Several days later, again The same day, but in Kajaki District, an IMF in Lashkar Gah City, an RCIED airstrike accounted for 22 AOG deaths, includ- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS placed in a rickshaw detonated as ing those of five commanders, among them IMF operations an ANBP vehicle was passing by. the Sangin District Shadow Governor. As a result of the detonation five AOG attacks civilians were wounded, including IED strikes three children.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL This Report Period 0 100 The incident level in Zabul Prov- 80 occupants. In line with the previ- ince was consistent with the previ- 60 ous period. The province contin- ous period, ANSF/IMF activity 40 ued to experience very low AOG accounted for the majority of re- activity, which in the past two ported incidents. IMF operations 20 weeks was concentrated in Day- affected Shahjoy and Shamuzayi 0 chopan, Shamulzayi and Qalat districts, and resulted in the re- districts. In the latter district, a ported death of three AOG mem- ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime targeted killing was reported on bers and the detention of another 21st November in Basaka area, as five. tinue the protest on 25th November but the an AOG shot and killed an ANP. Two election related demonstra- small scale gathering was dissipated rapidly In Daychopan, Chinarto area, a tions occurred in Zabul during the following talks with local authorities. Finally, roadside IED detonated against a present cycle. On 22nd November the protest continued on 30th with around 200 civilian vehicle, wounding four in Qalat City, around 100 people demonstrators who temporarily blocked the staged a demonstration voicing Kabul-Kandahar Main Road. It should be KEY THREATS & CONCERNS their discontent concerning the noted that the demonstrators vowed their de- elimination of 3 local candidates Political tensions termination to continue the protest until their stemming from the parliamentary IMF operations candidates have been reinstated. elections. The supporters of the IED strikes said candidates attempted to con-

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 1 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 Unlike others provinces in the 80 southern region, the level of secu- Kot (Bazaar area), when a suicide rity incidents recorded in Uruzgan attacker detonated his device 60 sharply increased compared to the against the Provincial Governor's 40 previous report. One of the most convoy while it was passing in the 20 notable incidents occurred on 16th area. This incident caused numer- 0 November in Chora District, Dar- ous casualties beside the attacker, weshan area, where a suicide at- with three children killed and four URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime tacker detonated his device in the other civilians and one ANP house of a prominent local, killing wounded. two occupants and wounding five others. The following day in Chora, Jangal area, another the elder and wounding another During the present cycle the six civilians. It should be noted roadside IED detonated wounding three road AOG’s tactic of choice remained construction company workers. that although rarer lately, suicide IED, with 34 IED related inci- attacks are not unheard of in dents reported mainly in Tirin There were also eight AOG direct attacks in Uruzgan and, according to ANSO Kot, Dihrawud and Chora dis- the province. In the most notable incident that data, there have been three similar tricts. The large majority of IED occurred in Tirin Kot, Khanaqa area, AOG incidents across the province in were discovered but, in two sepa- attacked the associates (body guards) of the 2010. The most recent incident rate incidents in Dihrawud, a total former provincial Governor while they were was reported on 26th June in Tirin of three ANA soldiers were killed praying in a mosque. As a result of the fire and another one was wounded. In fight, two of the former Governor's associates KEY THREATS & CONCERNS addition, on 22nd in Tirin Kot, and one AOG member were killed, and an- IED strikes Mirabad area, an IED detonated other associate was wounded. targeting a civilian vehicle, killing THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 In Ghazni this report period, the 200 most important dynamic has been intensity in the province as across political. The province remains the country, killed the Taliban 150 the only in the country to still Shadow Governor for Khogyani 100 th await the final results of the parlia- on the 24 in nearby Waghaz Dis- 50 mentary elections, scheduled for trict, detained two other AOG the 1st of December and therefore members, and recovered a cache 0 as yet unknown at the time of of ANP-issue weapons thought to writing. However, from the pre- have been stolen in the high pro- GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime liminary results known so far, all file assault on Khogayani DAC ments initiated by AOG fighters were three 11 seats in the majority Pashtun during the previous reporting pe- attacks in the Khak-e Ghariban area to the province swung to candidates be- riod. west of the city, two stand-off attacks on IMF longing to the Hazara minority, Andar District, a strategically vital patrols, wounding 4 soldiers, and one mortar- who previously held just 5, and district through which the main ing of an ANP CP, wounding 4 police. the concerns surrounding this Kabul-Kandahar and Sharan- Zana Khan and Dih Yak, northeastern highly significant political shift in Ghazni Roads both run, remained neighbours of both Andar and Ghazni City, the province is likely to be the above and beyond the least secure are also worth mentioning for the registered primary reason for the delay of district in Ghazni, with 23 AOG- insecurity in this period. First, when compared announcement by the IEC, which, initiated incidents, more than 75% with 2009, when Dih Yak recorded 23 inci- however, cited ‘technical reasons’ of them in the area around the dents and Zana Khan 26, this year’s tallies so as the cause. DAC, Miri. All but two were at- far are approximately 120 and 39, respectively. This result profile is likely to re- tacks on the district’s IMF base, During the current reporting period, Dih Yak, main in effect however, and while newly built at Sini, and on IMF which has suffered a substantial deterioration compensatory measures are likely patrols and convoys in the vicin- so far this year, saw 8 AOG attacks, targeting to be taken by the central govern- ity, showing a strong momentum IMF patrols and the district IMF base, ANP ment – perhaps in proposing that in the district on the side of the vehicles, and a PSC vehicle, killing a PSC a number of Pashtuns from the AOG, while the other two were guard. Meanwhile, Zana Khan, up to now not province are fast-tracked to posi- attacks on the DAC. The remain- rapidly deteriorating, registered 5 separate tions in the upper house of the ing incidents were entirely IMF stand-off attacks by AOG fighters on the parliament – the impact of the discovery and disposal of IEDs. DAC, an attack on an ANP CP, and an IED results is likely to be highly nega- Andar has been this unsafe for against a PSC vehicle; put another way, in one tively felt amongst the Pashtuns, much of 2010, and when com- fortnight a fifth of the annual sum of attacks and to have an important impact pared with 2009 levels, it can be was recorded. upon their view of the central seen that the absolute number of In each of Giro, Qarabagh, Muqur and Gelan government and therefore their security incidents has more than (along the highway) there were approximately propensity to side with armed quadrupled, even with a further 5 AOG attacks focusing on DACs and ANSF/ opposition. The next reporting month to go in the year. IMF targets, and a number of IED disposals period will include a fuller analysis Ghazni City has similarly substan- along the route. Again in each of these dis- of this political picture. tially deteriorated in 2010 on 2009 tricts, the absolute number of security inci- In terms of the security environ- levels, yet this period saw it record dents in 2010 is two to three times higher than ment, the province remains vola- a number of security incidents last year. tile, with a high number of AOG below average, with 6 IEDs dis- As such, with a number of districts in the IDF and stand-off attacks occur- covered and defused, and just 1 province having substantially deteriorated ring in Andar above all other dis- detonating against an ANBP vehi- through this year so far, it is with a sense of th tricts, but also Zana Khan and cle on the 26 , wounding 5 ABP deep foreboding that the parliamentary conse- Dih Yak. Also, it was announced policemen. Of note, IMF air as- quences of highly organised and effective that IMF, which are conducting sets targeted and killed 3 AOG Hazara voting tactics will sink in during the th capture/kill operations at greater members on the 25 as they were next month and into 2011. And more immedi- planting IEDs in the Qala-ye Qazi ately, we may well see demonstrations in area, and arrested 8 others during Ghazni City and/or the eastern Pashtun- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS an operation in the Mullah Noh Elections related unrest majority districts in the coming period as the Baba area on the following day. results are released. Clashes in eastern districts The only direct kinetic engage- THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA This Report Period 0 150 The stand out security event in Paktika during the reporting pe- curity incidents in the capital dis- 100 trict bear this out. One of the two riod was the double suicide attack 50 that took place against the prov- took the form of a joint ANP/ ince’s ANP HQ and central train- NDS operation on the 22nd, 0 ing facility, located in the provin- which led to the detention of one cial capital, Sharan. The two at- suspected AOG member and the tackers were strapped with suicide seizure of an automatic weapon. PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime vests underneath ANP uniforms, The other was an IMF operation th and managed to negotiate their on the 27 , which detained a mid- found near their Margha base. Indeed, the way inside the installation during level AOG commander and one nearly total focus on the IMF base and the the daytime, before detonating of his cell members. In this re- DAC was abnormal, as we have normally seen, their vests. In total, they killed 13 spect, Sharan stands in stark con- during 2010, approximately 75% of incidents policemen, wounding 16 more, trast to Khost and Gardez cities, directed at these two sites. Of note, 2010 has including the District Chief of the other Loya Paktya provincial seen a fourfold increase in incidents in the dis- Police. Suicide attacks have not capitals, within which a very high trict. been as common in Paktika as in proportion of AOG-initiated se- In Jani Khel and Sar Hawza – the next most neighbouring Khost or to the curity incidents are concentrated. insecure district during the reporting period, south in the greater Kandahar Kinetic engagements remained and more insecure than normal – the pattern area, with this only the 3rd in the focused on the province’s most was slightly different, with a greater emphasis province in 2010, and the 9th in insecure districts; Barmal particu- by AOG fighters on attacks against mobile the past two years. However, this larly, but also Sar Hawza, Dila, IMF and ANP patrols and convoys. In Sar was very much the most signifi- and Jani Khel. Barmal, the most Hawza, there were two attacks on ANP patrols cant suicide attack seen in the populous of the border districts, on the 22nd, each wounding one policeman, province’s history, and as such continued to see the greatest pro- while there were two other attacks – one stand may be part of the same pattern vincial insecurity, as it has during -off and one IED – against IMF convoys on of a more concerted and larger 2010 more generally, as part of the 16th and 19th respectively, all of which fo- scale campaign by the primary AO the AOGs’ ‘pen and press’ strat- cused around the district centre. In Jani Khel, Group based across the border in egy; that is, penning GOA and there were also two attacks on IMF convoys, Waziristan which is being seen in IMF to urban centres and central one stand-off and one IDF, while there was a Khost and Nangarhar. We can installations once they have given further attack on an ANP CP with SAF and reasonably expect that more such up trying to actively hold rural heavy weapons. From the ANSF side, Jani attacks, while not necessarily on ground, and then routinely press- Khel also saw operations by the ANSF, which the same scale, will occur in the ing them with frequent IDF and led to two arrests and one AOG injury, while medium term, if indeed it was part occasional stand-off attacks to in Saw Hawza, ANP located and defused two of this wider campaign seen in the ensure awareness of their pres- separate IEDs. As such, in these districts we eastern and southeastern region. ence and a consistent heightened can see that the AOG are still at the stage of Up to now in 2010, Sharan has state of alert. This same strategy pushing the ANSF and IMF back to the dis- been one of the more relatively can be seen in neighbouring trict centre, and can therefore continue to ex- secure districts in the province, Khost particularly, but also any- pect kinetic engagements in the future until with a registered drop in the num- where where AOGs have a strong this task is completed. ber of AOG-initiated attacks on infrastructure of safe havens, In Yahya Khel, interestingly, generally the sec- 2009 levels, partly the conse- good access to weaponry, and ond most insecure area in the province, there quence of a higher number of broad control/influence over ar- was a notable quiet, with just two incidents, proactive IMF and ANSF opera- eas of the countryside. During the neither of which were AOG-initiated. On the tions in and around the city, with reporting period, there were eight 22nd, the ANP discovered and defused two the NDS taking a particularly visi- such IDF attacks on the DAC and IEDs emplaced in the same area, and as such ble role in disrupting AOG cells the IMF base in nearby Margha, is likely to have disrupted an attack that had and networks. The only other se- as well as one stand-off attack on been planned with a little more effort than on that base. Furthermore, there average, while on the 25th IMF arrested a local were 3 IED detonations in the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG commander in a raid who is believed to DAC area, one striking an IMF be an important actor in planning and execut- IDF/IED in urban centres vehicle and one killing a civilian; Collateral damage from attacks ing IED attacks in the district. IMF safely defused one other THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

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