DOCSLIB.ORG

THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 62 16-30 November 2010 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-7 While overall incident vol- organisers was to stage tion as, until recently, it had 8-13 Northern Region umes have continued to de- these protests on main remained relatively unaf- Western Region 14-16 cline as the year matures (see thoroughfares, resulting in fected by the conflict graph p.2), NGO incidents numerous road blockages which has embroiled the Eastern Region 16-21 have continued apace (see and hampering freedom of rest of the region. Direct Southern Region 22-26 graph p.8). A total of 9 movement. While it is attacks against the PRT NGO direct incidents from 8 likely that the volume of and a PDO compound, 27 ANSO Info Page separate provinces were re- such activities have peaked, along with separate IED corded this period, covering it is also probable that they strikes and ambushes 4 of the 5 regions (South will continue into the short against IMF elements, YOU NEED TO KNOW being the exception). This term as some of the ag- point to a concentrated data is a testament to the grieved have vowed to con- effort to intensify AOG • Destabilization of Jalalabad impact pervasive insecurity tinue their efforts until sat- actions and bring the con- City can have on the NGO com- isfaction is achieved. flict to the regional centres • Consistent NGO incident munity. These incidents doorstep. In response to volumes Suicide attack trends for were instituted by a variety of 2010 have remained consis- this, there has also been • Elections related civil unrest actors, including armed op- tent, averaging 11 incidents push back on the part of position, criminals, and in per month (see graph p.22). security forces, including • Inter-AOG conflicts one case, the beneficiaries Of note, this attack vector focused IMF operations themselves. Incident compo- along with a planned en- • Suicide attacks appears to be divorced sition was also diverse and from the typical ratio based hancement in the national included abductions, armed relationships noted between security force presence attacks, intimidation efforts within the city. individual tactics and over- and theft. all incident volumes. This The inclusion of an AOG, ANSO is supported by The Parliamentary electoral period recorded BBIED composed of 73 members, process has been an element related incidents in the in the reconciliation effort shaping the countrywide con- East, South and West. The reported from Baghlan text during the past few stand out incidents amongst signifies one of the largest months. The recent an- these included the double such event recorded. Typi- nouncement of disqualified BBIED attack against the cally, reconciled groups candidates has resulted in a ANP HQ in the provincial have consisted of small continuation of this dynamic, capital of Paktika and the scale units, with the major- particularly the latter half of detonation of a planned ity of these occurring in the the period. Demonstrations attacker during an arrest Western and Northern Re- on behalf of these disquali- attempt in Ghor. It would gions. In the West, these fied candidates occurred appear that the introduction reconciliation efforts have countrywide, in many cases of this tactic into Ghor is actually become a source of resulting in multi-day, pri- part of deliberate effort to insecurity, as disparate ele- marily small scale (with the raise the armed oppositions ments engage in politically exception of Samangan), and profile in this province. or philosophically moti- peaceful gatherings. A delib- The events in Jalalabad City vated armed clashes. erate tactic on the part of the this period warrant atten- THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 8 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Police forces in pursuit of AOG 40 and ACG networks (in particular Surobi, and another IED explo- 30 abduction gangs) maintained a sion on the link road between 20 Karte Naw/PD 8 and Bagrami). sustained tempo of operations 10 both in the capital and rural dis- In Karte Naw, two suspected 0 tricts, representing 60% of the AOG members were interrupted combined 31 incidents recorded while emplacing an IED under a during this cycle (as of 28th of No- stationary ANA truck. Quick to vember). The risks peculiar to jump on their motorcycle and KABUL AOG KABUL Crime drive away, the two individuals NGO safety in the Kabul envi- vated. ronment are currently assessed as became involved in a vehicular low to moderate. Surobi remains accident which triggered the ex- Several sources have also identified the recent the primary area of concern to plosion of the device. As of the appointment of a new AOG Shadow Gover- NGOs, due to overt AOG activity time of reporting, reports were nor for Kabul Province. If proved true, such a and its impact on overland access also received about three separate situation would most likely increase the men- towards Jalalabad. The announce- instances of SAF targeting PSCs tioned AOGs’ leadership motivation to stage a ment of the final election results and IMFs convoys along the Jala- spectacular attack in Kabul in order to mark (except for Ghazni) was followed labad Road, and a local dispute the appointment. However, more likely than by a series of peaceful demonstra- between two villages in Surobi close range and complex attacks, which require tions in Kabul, called, as in the whose residents are involved in reconnaissance & planning, logistical prepara- previous cycle, by the Union of the Surobi Dam construction tions and clearly allocated resources, an IDF the Wolesi Jirga Candidates. works, interpreted by other attack against a high-profile venue would be a sources as AOG’s abduction of 18 more feasible option, though this would put Despite the usual high volumes of workers. The circumstances of the the residents of the neighbourhoods adjacent threat reporting, Kabul City and latter incidents are yet to be con- to such location at the mercy of AOG IDF the rural districts remained calm, firmed. Lastly, on 26 November, a operators. The overwhelming majority of this with AOG actions having materi- newly appointed NDS liaison offi- year’s IDF attacks in Kabul employed weapons alized in 3 confirmed direct inci- cer to the PD 15 ANP HQ was such as 107 mm rockets, which rendered the dents (2 close range attacks in stabbed to death by unknown attacks inherently imprecise. Prominent loca- attackers. However, a clear link to tions included KAIA, Kabul Polytechnic Insti- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG motivation behind the at- tute, and IMF facilities in various locations in Civil unrest tack has not been established and PD 9 and 10 as well as in Darulaman. Criminality the suspicion remains that the Spectacular attacks murder was not politically moti- Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2010 (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks) 1800 1600 1541 1400 1319 1326 1366 1200 1181 1096 1000 972 800 853 600 613 658 523 400 200 0 2 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 Following a lull in armed escala- 40 tions in the first half of Novem- swathes of the said districts, and 30 ber, when the preparations for occasional strikes by the French 20 Special Forces. In such circum- Eid apparently outweighed the 10 war game, Kapisa returned to the stances, conflict spill-over into the 0 low-intensity warfare typical of western parts of Kapisa remains a the previous periods. Out of 5 possibility, reminiscent of the re- reported incidents, all but one cent AOG influx into Kohi Safid occurred in the eastern districts, (Parwan) from Tagab. In counter- KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime including all three AOG-initiated point to this, however, the first 11 months of 2010 saw a combined last year. Overall, Kapisa witnessed a 10% in- attacks (one kidnapping in Nijrab, crease in AOG-initiated attacks in comparison two close range ambushes of 12 AOG-initiated incidents in the western districts as opposed to 20 to the same period last year, and a 17% in- IMF/ANSF patrols in Tagab and crease when compared to 2008. an additional roadside IED dis- incidents for the same period in covery in the same district). Con- 2009. Henceforth, while the risks Population-centric efforts continued by pro- struction projects along strategic of NGOs exposure to hostile ac- GOA forces, in an attempt to wrestle Tagab routes in Nijrab, Tagab and Ala- tion in the eastern districts are district out of AOG control. Besides the train- say represent the main conflict currently assessed as substantial, ing of regular police forces, IMF mentoring hotspots. Nevertheless, AOG the western districts represent a units have been engaged in recruitment and have demonstrated their capacity favourable environment for NGO training of local militias, hired to assist ANP as to challenge the pro-GOA struc- operations. However, the Shukhi an auxiliary force in policing the roads in the tures right in the DACs. The vast Area of Mahmudi Raqi remains of district. The deployment of such militias has majority of AOG attacks remain concern for its explosive mixture been envisaged mainly in the areas where IMF- close-range assaults (64%) and of andiwal networks, conservative led infrastructure rehabilitation is underway. stand-off IED or IDF (35%) at- clerics and income-oriented crimi- Allocated to particular checkpoints, the ser- tacks against security installations nal elements active locally, each of vicemen undergo a six-day training course and patrols in the aforementioned the structures occasionally hosting ranging from weapons’ maintenance to small- districts.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar
    Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar M AY 2014 Above: Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar Province (Photo by TLO) A TLO M A P P I N G R EPORT Justice and Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar May 2014 In Cooperation with: © 2014, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] ii Acknowledgements This report was commissioned from The Liaison Office (TLO) by Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit. Research was conducted via cooperation between the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC) and TLO, under the supervision and lead of the latter. Cordaid was involved in the development of the research tools and also conducted capacity building by providing trainings to the researchers on the research methodology. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. TLO and AWRC are solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cordaid. The Liaison Office (TL0) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization established in 2003 seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Draft FSAC Meeting Minutes 8 Jan 2013.Pdf
    TYPE OF MEETING: Food Security & Agriculture Cluster meeting DATE & LOCATION Tuesday 8th January, 2013 at WFP Mazar Area Office CHAIR PERSON: WFP NOTE TAKER: Mohammad Masoud Saqib WFP Programme Officer [email protected] WFP, FAO, UNOCHA, WHO, UNICEF, IOM, Islamic Relief, ICRC, ATTENDEES: JOHANNITER, PIN, NRC, SC, ACTED, DACAAR, Aschiana, SHA, ADEO, MAAO, SORA, ASAARO MEETING AGENDA Organization Agenda item presenting 1. Introduction and adoption of previous FSAC meeting WFP 2. FAO Vegetable seeds and hand tools distribution FAO 3. Emergency response capacity (Timeframe) 3 months (Jan – Mar) Projection WFP 4. Inter-agency Winter contingency Plan, WG on People with Special Winter Assistance Need and CERF update UNOCHA 5. Seasonal Livelihood Programming SLP workshop WFP rd rd 6. FSAC Kabul update (3P P IPC Analysis workshop update, 3Ws 3P P Quarter WFP 7. AOB (Input for FSAC newsletter and Partners attendance on FSAC monthly WFP ti MEETING Action points RESPONSIBL MIN ACTION ITEM TIMELINE E PARTY WFP to calculate the questioner format to the partners and 1 partners to response with their food stock availability in the WFP Jan region. FAO to liaise with their country office to see their position in 2 FAO Jan CERF funding application. WFP to send the draft SLP report with the calendar to the FSAC 3 WFP Jan partners for their input 4 5 6 NEXT MEETING DATE LOCATION Monday, 4th February 2013 Islamic Relief Office, Mazar-I-Sharif Afghanistan MEETING MINUTES MINUTE NO: AGENDA: FACILITATOR: 1 Introduction and adoption of previous FSAC WFP Mazar meeting DISCUSSION The meeting was chaired by WFP Mazar Area Office.
    [Show full text]
  • Briefing Notes 17 July 2017
    Group 22 - Information Centre Asylum and Migration Briefing Notes 17 July 2017 Afghanistan Armed confrontations The fighting, purges, and raids by the security forces continue as well as the ambushes and attacks of the insurgents and sometimes also civilians are killed or injured. According to media reports the following provinces were affected in the last two weeks: Lagham, Kunar, Nangarhar (east), Kunduz, Baghlan (northeast), Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan (south), Ghazni (southeast), Faryab (north), and Parwan (centre). The renewed outbreak of fighting in Kunduz (northeast) drove more than 350 families from their homes. Reportedly Afghan government forces reconquered Nawa district in Helmand (south). Already on 04 July 2017 the leader of the Afghan branch of IS, Abu Sayed, is said to have died in an air strike on the regional IS headquarters in Kunar (east). Assaults and attacks On 11 July 2017 a high ranking criminal police officer was assassinated by the Taliban in Logar (centre). In Kandahar (south) two children died in the explosion of a roadside bomb. On 12 July 2017 the Taliban stopped a bus in Farah province (west) and shot at least seven of the 16 passengers. On 13 July 2017 tribal elders from Faryab province (north) complained that members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) had shot eleven civilians and burnt down their houses in Dawlatabad district. On 14 July 2017 seven civilians, including women and children, were injured in an attack in Jalalabad (Nangarhar province, east). Furthermore two civilians were shot, one of them was a reputed poet. It is reported that several children died in an air strike on their school in Kunduz (northeast) on 15 July 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • 26 August 2010
    SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Security Situation Report, Week 34, 20 – 26 August 2010 JOINT WEEKLY SECURITY ANALYSIS Countrywide security incidents continued to increase compared to the previous week with the NER, NR, SR and SER, recording higher levels of security incidents. In the ER a minor downward trend continues to be observed over the last three weeks, in the WR and CR records dropped. The dynamics along the south and south-eastern belt of the country vary again with the SR reasserting as the most volatile area. Security incidents were more widespread countrywide with the following provinces being the focus of the week: Kunduz, Baghlan in the NER; Faryab in the NR, Hirat in the WR, Kandahar and Helmand in the SR; Ghazni and Paktika in the SER and Kunar in the ER. Overall the majority of the incidents are initiated by insurgents and those related to armed conflict – armed clashes, IED attacks and stand off attacks - continue to account for the bulk of incidents. Reports of insurgents’ infiltration, re-supply and propaganda are recorded in the NR, SR, SER, ER and CR. These reports might corroborate assumptions that insurgents would profit from the Ramadan time to build up for an escalation into the election and pre-election days. The end of the week was dominated by the reporting of the violent demonstration against the IM base in Qala-i-Naw city following a shoot out at the entrance of the base. Potential for manipulation by the local Taliban and the vicinity of the UN compound to the affected area raised concerns on the security of the UN staff and resulted in the evacuation of the UN building.
    [Show full text]
  • Health and Integrated Protection Needs in Kunduz Province
    [Compa ny name] Assessment Report- Health and Integrated Protection Needs in Kunduz Province Dr. Noor Ahmad “Ahmad” Dr. Mirza Jan Hafiz Akbar Ahmadi Vijay Raghavan Final Report Acknowledgements The study team thank representatives of the following institutions who have met us in both Kabul and Kunduz during the assessment. WHO – Kabul and Kunduz; UNOCHA – Kunduz; MSF (Kunduz); UNHCR- Kunduz; Handicap International Kunduz; Provincial Health Directorate, Kunduz; Regional Hospital, Kunduz; Afghanistan Red Crescent Society (ARCS), Kunduz; DoRR, Kunduz; Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Kunduz; JACK BPHS team in Kunduz Thanks of INSO for conducting the assessment of the field locations and also for field movements Special thanks to the communities and their representatives – Thanks to CHNE and CME staff and students District Hospital staff of Imam Sahib Our sincere thanks to the District wise focal points, health facility staff and all support staff of JACK, Kunduz who tirelessly supported in the field assessment and arrangement of necessary logistics for the assessment team. Thanks to Health and Protection Clusters for their constant inputs and support. Thanks to OCHA-HFU team for their feedback on our previous programme and that helped in refining our assessment focus and added the components of additional issues like operations, logistics and quality of supplies which were discussed elaborately with the field team of JACK. Thanks to Access and Security team in OCHA for their feedback on access and security sections. Page 2 of 102 Final
    [Show full text]
  • Briefing Notes KW24 2021
    Briefing Notes Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration 14 June 2021 Afghanistan Taliban cooperate with al-Qaeda / ISKP still active in the country As reported by LongWarJournal on 07.06.21, the UN Sanctions Monitoring Team published a new report on insurgents/Islamists in Afghanistan on 01.06.21. According to the report, the Taliban still maintain good connections to al-Qaeda in the country, especially through the Haqqani network, whose members have married into al-Qaeda families, amongst other things. In addition, Sirajuddin Haqqani is a leading figure within al-Qaeda, but not of the al Qaeda core leadership (the Hattin Shura), the report says. Al-Qaeda is active in 15 Afghan provinces, despite the Taliban's claims to the contrary, and is led by its Jahbat al-Nasr wing, the report continues. Both the al- Qaeda leadership and that of al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS), including the leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, are based in the border region with Pakistan. Besides, the Taliban are in control of 280 mining locations across 26 provinces (government control: 281 locations across 16 provinces; warlord control: 148 location across 12 provinces) and had gained about $450 million profit from them last year, the report continues. Despite its defeats in Kunar and Nangarhar, the ISKP also remains a threat, being still active in small cells (about 1,500-2,200 fighters) in the two provinces; other fighters (Tajiks, Uzbeks) are also active in Badakhshan, Kunduz, Balkh and Sar-e Pul, the report says. Taliban: more districts captured Reports of 09.06.21 say that the Afghan parliament has confirmed the capture of several districts by the Taliban in the last two months: Jond district in Badghis, Barka in Baghlan, Nerkh and Jalrez in Maidan Wardak, Dawlat Shah in Laghman, Qaisar in Faryab, Gizab in Uruzgan, and Sharak in Ghor.
    [Show full text]
  • The ANSO Report (16-30 September 2010)
    The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 58 16-30 September 2010 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-7 The impact of the elections and Zabul while Ghazni of civilian casualties are 7-9 Western Region upon CENTRAL was lim- and Kandahar remained counter-productive to Northern Region 10-15 ited. Security forces claim extremely volatile. With AOG aims. Rather it is a that this calm was the result major operations now un- testament to AOG opera- Southern Region 16-20 of effective preventative derway in various parts of tional capacity which al- Eastern Region 20-23 measures, though this is Kandahar, movements of lowed them to achieve a unlikely the full cause. An IDPs are now taking place, maximum of effect 24 ANSO Info Page AOG attributed NGO ‘catch originating from the dis- (particularly on perceptions and release’ abduction in Ka- tricts of Zhari and Ar- of insecurity) for a mini- bul resulted from a case of ghandab into Kandahar mum of risk. YOU NEED TO KNOW mistaken identity. City. The operations are In the WEST, Badghis was The pace of NGO incidents unlikely to translate into the most affected by the • NGO abductions country- lasting security as AOG wide in the NORTH continues onset of the elections cycle, with abductions reported seem to have already recording a three fold in- • Ongoing destabilization of from Faryab and Baghlan.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Compilation of Country of Origin Information (COI)
    Afghanistan: Compilation of Country of Origin Information (COI) Relevant for Assessing the Availability of an Internal Flight, Relocation or Protection Alternative (IFA/IRA/IPA) to Kabul December 2019 This document provides decision-makers with relevant country of origin information (COI) for assessing the availability of an internal flight, relocation or protection alternative (IFA/IRA/IPA) in Kabul for Afghans who originate from elsewhere in Afghanistan and who have been found to have a well-founded fear of persecution in relation to their home area, or who would face a real risk of serious harm in their home area. UNHCR recalls its position that given the current security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Kabul, an IFA/IRA is generally not available in the city. See: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, 30 August 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8900109.html, p. 114. Table of Contents 1. The relevance of Kabul as an IFA/IRA: the security situation for civilians in Kabul ............. 2 1.1 Security Trends and Impact on Civilian Population in 2019 ................................................. 2 1.2 Presence and Activity of the Taliban in Kabul....................................................................... 6 1.3 Presence and Activity of ISIL in Kabul .................................................................................. 6 1.4 Other Security Threats in Kabul ...........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’S Faryab Province Geert Gompelman ©2010 Feinstein International Center
    JANUARY 2011 Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province Geert Gompelman ©2010 Feinstein International Center. All Rights Reserved. Fair use of this copyrighted material includes its use for non-commercial educational purposes, such as teaching, scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news reporting. Unless otherwise noted, those who wish to reproduce text and image files from this publication for such uses may do so without the Feinstein International Center’s express permission. However, all commercial use of this material and/or reproduction that alters its meaning or intent, without the express permission of the Feinstein International Center, is prohibited. Feinstein International Center Tufts University 200 Boston Ave., Suite 4800 Medford, MA 02155 USA tel: +1 617.627.3423 fax: +1 617.627.3428 fic.tufts.edu Author Geert Gompelman (MSc.) is a graduate in Development Studies from the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN) at Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands). He has worked as a development practitioner and research consultant in Afghanistan since 2007. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank his research colleagues Ahmad Hakeem (“Shajay”) and Kanishka Haya for their assistance and insights as well as companionship in the field. Gratitude is also due to Antonio Giustozzi, Arne Strand, Petter Bauck, and Hans Dieset for their substantive comments and suggestions on a draft version. The author is indebted to Mervyn Patterson for his significant contribution to the historical and background sections. Thanks go to Joyce Maxwell for her editorial guidance and for helping to clarify unclear passages and to Bridget Snow for her efficient and patient work on the production of the final document.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 USIP –ADST Afghan Experience Project Interviwe #1 Executive
    USIP –ADST Afghan Experience Project Interviwe #1 Executive Summary The interviewee is a Farsi speaker and retired FSO who has had prior Afghan experience, including working with refugees during the period the Taliban was fighting to take over the country in 1995. He returned to Kabul in 2002 as chief of the political section, although retired, for seven months. He returned in 2003 and worked at the U.S. civil affairs mission in Herat for 6 months. He came back later in 2003 to Afghanistan working for the Asia Foundation. He worked on a PRT for approximately three months in late 2004 in Herat. The American presence was minimal when he got there. Security was excellent and the local warlord, Ismael Khan, was using revenues he siphoned from customs houses into development projects. Shortly after subject arrived in Herat, Khan was ousted in a brief battle by forces loyal to Kabul and with the threat of unrest U.S. forces were increased in the area. Our subject suggested to Khan that he make peace with the Kabul government, and he did, perhaps in part on the advice of subject. The Herat PRT had about one hundred American uniformed troops with three civilians, State, AID, Agriculture. Subject was the political advisor to the civil affairs staff, a reserve unit from Minnesota. But much of their work was soon taken over or undercut by the U.S. military task force commander brought in in response to the ouster of Khan. According to subject, the task force commander in the region saw himself as the political expert.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluation of “Sustainable Livelihood Programme Through Community Mobilization and Establishing Knowledge Resource Centre in Mazar-E-Sharif” Final Report
    2013:39 Sida Decentralised Evaluation Sarah Gray Elisabeth Montgomery Evaluation of “Sustainable Livelihood Programme through Community Mobilization and Establishing Knowledge Resource Centre in Mazar-e-Sharif” Final Report Evaluation of “Sustainable Livelihood Programme through Community Mobilization and Establishing Knowledge Resource Centre in Mazar-e-Sharif ” Final Report December 2013 Sarah Gray Elisabeth Montgomery Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2013:39 Sida Authors: Sarah Gray and Elisabeth Montgomery The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2013:39 Commissioned by Sida - Afghanistan Unit Copyright: Sida and the authors Date of final report: December 2013 Published by Citat 2013 Art. no. Sida61667en urn:nbn:se:sida-61667en This publication can be downloaded from: http://www.sida.se/publications SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY Address: S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Valhallavägen 199, Stockholm Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64 E-mail: [email protected]. Homepage: http://www.sida.se SIPU International –Final Evaluation Report Acronyms, Abbreviations and Local Terms AMA Association of Microfinance Agencies AREDP Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme CDC Community Development Council CIA Conflict Impact Assessment EIF Enterprise Incubation Fund DDH District Development Hub FGD Focus Group Discussion GDP Gross Domestic
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN – North-Eastern Region Baghlan Humanitarian Team Meeting 16 May 2012 at UNAMA Puli Khumri Office
    AFGHANISTAN – North-Eastern Region Baghlan Humanitarian Team Meeting 16 May 2012 at UNAMA Puli Khumri office Draft Minutes Participants: ACTED, AKF-A, FOCUS, Global Partners, Hungarian Embassy, IOM, NRC, OCHA (Chair), UNAMA, USAID, WFP, apologies: IOM (assessment) Agenda: Welcome and introduction Flood emergencies: assessments, response coordination, concerns, gaps Conflict displacement Cluster coordination and resource mobilization Way forward 1. Welcome and introduction OCHA welcomed participants. Participants introduced themselves and informed about type of work they are doing in the province. Global Partners: community development, WASH (septic systems), retaining walls, education, implementing partner of WFP for cash and voucher in Samangan province. ACTED: works in Burka district. AKF-A: works in several districts. Focus: works in Dushi and other districts 2. Flood emergencies On 10 May 2012, a new flood has affected 9 areas of Baghlan province. A Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) was held in Puli Khumri on 11 May. It has assigned assessment teams. As of early 16 May, assessment results are available for two districts: Burka district (232 affected families) and Dahana-i-Ghuri (68 affected families). Assessment and distribution procedures: ANDMA, the Afghan National Disaster Management Committee, is the designated body within the Government to address natural disasters. In this capacity, ANDMA Baghlan provides secretarial support to the Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC). The PDMC assigns joint assessment teams and approves assessment reports. Based on it ANDMA prepares an official government relief request which is then forwarded to UN agencies and NGOs for assistance. The relief request should include beneficiary lists. Normally, beneficiary lists are drawn up during assessments.
    [Show full text]