CSCAP

REGIONAL SECURITY

OUTLOOK 2016 COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION EDITOR

IN THE ASIA PACIFIC Ron Huisken Established in 1993, the Council for Security Adjunct Associate Professor, Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Strategic and Defence Studies Track Two organization in the Asia Pacific region and Centre, Australian National counterpart to the Track One processes dealing with University security issues, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Defence Ministers Plus Forum. Olivia Cable It provides an informal mechanism for scholars, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific officials and others in their private capacities to discuss Affairs political and security issues and challenges facing the The Australian National region. It provides policy recommendations to various University intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with EDITORIAL PANEL institutions and organisations in other parts of the Desmond Ball world to exchange information, insights and experiences CSCAP Australia in the area of regional political-security cooperation. Anthony Milner CSCAP Australia Rizal Sukma CSCAP Indonesia Jusuf Wanandi CSCAP Indoensia Front cover image Satellite image of Fiery Cross Reef under construction, LETTER FROM THE CO-EDITORS 11 April, 2015. Source: Centre for Security and International Studies On behalf of CSCAP, we are Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative pleased to present the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) 2016. Inaugurated in Back cover image 2007, this is the ninth annual Monks in Angkor Wat, Siem Reap, Cambodia. CRSO volume. Source: Jan Huisken The CRSO brings expert analysis to bear on critical security issues facing the region and points to policy-relevant alternatives for Track One (official) and Track Two (non-official) to advance CSCAP thanks the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific multilateral regional security Affairs, The Australian National University, for their cooperation. support with this publication. The views in the CRSO 2016 Designed and printed by Paragon Printers Australasia, do not represent those of Canberra, Australia. any Member committee or other institution and are the responsibility of the individual authors and the Editor. Charts ISBN: 978-0-9942248-3-5 and images in the CRSO 2016 do not necessarily reflect the views of Copyright © 2016 by CSCAP the chapter authors. www.cscap.org Ron Huisken and Olivia Cable CONTENTS

3 The Outlook for Security in the Asia Pacific: Uncertain Ron Huisken

7 The Pivot: A Sound Policy in Need of Serious Repair Michael J. Green

10 The Security Landscape in East Asia: A Justifiable Anxiety? Zha Daojiong

13 In Search of a Seamless Security Posture: US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and National Security Legislation Ken Jimbo

17 The Asia–Pacific Paradox: Rising Wealth, Rising Tension Brahma Chellaney

21 Russia in the Indo-Pacific: A New Awakening? Alexey D Muraviev

25 A New Model of Major Country Relations: Avoiding the Inevitable Fan Jishe

28 The Ascent and Demise of “New Type of Great Power Relations” Between the US and China Bonnie Glaser and Jake Douglas

31 China’s Concept for a New Type of Great Power Relations: An Indian Perspective Neelam D. Sabharwal and Hemant K. Singh

34 The China-US Interaction Over the “New Type of Major Country Relationship” Seiichiro Takagi

37 Security Outlook 2016: A South Korean Perspective Chung-in Moon

41 The Regional Security Outlook for 2016: A View From Thailand Kavi Chongkittavorn

44 Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Options for Peaceful Settlement Arif Havas Oegroseno

47 The ‘Boat People’ Crisis: Promoting Regulation and Mitigation Thitinan Pongsudhirak

50 CSCAP: Keeping it Alert, Agile and Relevant Ralph Cossa and Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa

1

The Outlook for Security in the Asia Pacific: Uncertain

Ron Huisken

The assessments assembled in authority of regional multilateral The spreading concern about the this volume broadly confirm the processes have failed to prevent the security environment in the region judgement that the Asia Pacific further erosion of the security order means that it is incumbent on continued over the past year to and a matching intensification of analysts to avoid simply joining in deplete its most precious asset: military posturing, partnering for and strengthening a bandwagon the confident expectation that security purposes and the like. that in itself could make troubling the region could preserve order The states of the region are still outcomes more likely. The sobering and stability while managing spending a lot of time in dialogue but aspect of recent trends is that it is a strategic transformation of along critical channels the degree of certainly not confined to the media historic proportions. The resolve engagement, communication and but extends to political circles in of governments, the influence of understanding appears to have most states of the region (including robust bilateral political, economic encountered sharply diminishing President Obama, quoted in the and security relationships and the returns. CSCAP Regional Security Outlook

Military expenditure trends 1990–2012 700

650 USA

600

550

500

450

400

350

140 CHINA US$billion

120

100

80

60 JAPAN INDIA 40 ASEAN ROK 20

0 2011 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 Year

Source: Adapted from SIPRI yearbooks; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers; IISS Military Balance.

3 2015). For the first time in 10 years, change, reached an important was assigning major prominence to the 2015 risk assessment prepared agreement on managing air-to-air an amalgamation of these proposals for the World Economic Forum encounters and strengthened their in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept. listed ‘interstate war’ as the most commitment on state-sponsored Beijing also quietly launched a likely of the risks that could have economic cybertheft. Xi and Obama carefully pre-planned program to a significant negative impact on the tried to tackle the latter issue in develop seven submerged features global economic outlook.1 Further, Sunnydale, California in 2013 in the Sprately Group in the South some of the world’s most respected and agreed to set up a bilateral China Sea into artificial islands, academics are expressing concern, working group within the annual some large enough to dock ships or most recently Graham Allison, high-level Strategic and Economic operate medium-sized fixed wing Director of the Belfer Center for Dialogue. From the American aircraft. This program surged Science and International Affairs perspective, however, the problem rapidly into a frantic, large-scale at Harvard and, in the past, the did not diminish. President Obama operation that, in the age of satellite author of a seminal work on the resorted to simple and public photography, gradually pushed 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Allison exhortations to alert Beijing to the the rest of Beijing’s foreign and has written that war between the disproportionate damage the cyber security policy agenda off centre US and China is “more likely than activities attributed to China were stage and into the shadows. By the is recognized at the moment.”2The doing to official and public attitudes time China declared in June 2015 sense one has is not of imminent toward China and the mounting that the program was approaching war but of a wearing down of the pressure he faced to take counter- completion the political climate margin of safety, the room for error vailing steps. American officials also in the Asia Pacific had become and the capacity to absorb shocks insisted that advances in tracing noticeably colder and more that we could regret in the future. hackers had long since striped cyber complicated. theft of political anonymity and, The United States and China are for all practical purposes, of legal The majority of ASEAN states, at the core of this adverse trend. anonymity as well, that is, that the together with the US and Japan, China, it would appear, remains US had very precise information on appeared to signal new resolve to of the view that the established where and who. deny Beijing any significant and powers continue to resist and enduring strategic gains from this frustrate China’s achievement of In Washington, the two leaders pre-emptive move. The US pointedly policy objectives that are legitimate agreed that neither side would flew maritime surveillance aircraft and reasonable given its growing ‘conduct or condone’ such activities, close to the new islands and several strategic weight and influence with Obama adding that the naval exercises were conducted in in regional and global affairs. US would be very serious about the area (Japan–Philippines; US– The US, for its part, is no longer verifying compliance. On the other Philippines; and China). ASEAN reticent about acknowledging hand, Xi’s proposal to work toward leaders and Foreign Ministers either China’s substantive capacity a new model of major country issued statements that described to challenge America’s role and relations remained at the level of this lightning transformation of the status in the Indo Asia Pacific or abstract, motherhood assertions Sprately Island group as having “… its determination to do so. The well removed from the attitudes eroded trust and confidence and US appears to have become more and perceptions driving the actual may undermine peace, security resigned to the likelihood that conduct of the two parties. As the and stability in the South China achieving a stable co-existence four essays on this theme make Sea”.3 Beijing’s public diplomacy with a powerful China will involve clear, in the absence of a deeper on the episode was something of a a prolonged period of geo-political understanding on strategic intent tangle, ranging from pugnacious contestation. The events of the past and clearer thinking on how statements that it could do whatever year have confirmed this underlying changed behavior would play out in it wanted with its possessions in the trend rather emphatically. the real world, this initiative may South China Sea, through claiming have already run its course. that it was doing no more than other Fortunately, President Xi’s first claimants had already done, to state visit to the US in September Beijing was managing the launch the assertion that the new islands 2015 went reasonably well. The two of its popular Asian Infrastructure would enable China to be a better leaders were serious and cordial, Investment Bank, had proposals neighbor in the area. The crisis while giving little outward sign of in play for enhanced land and was eventually eased through the genuine rapport. They sustained maritime trade routes that it by-now familiar diplomatic device their strong posture on climate wanted to call new ‘Silk Roads’ and of China and ASEAN agreeing to

4 comply with the non-binding 2002 Japan itself was not under direct expected future stresses has been the Declaration on a Code of Conduct in attack, provided further signals continued attractiveness of hedging the South China Sea and promising that the region would continue to against the current order being to accelerate their interminable look back rather than start to build up to the task. A political appetite negotiations on a binding set of a reliably different future. Despite for new or the further qualitative rules for this arena. these ongoing stresses, there enhancement of recently established were indications that a trilateral security ties remained evident Beijing has carefully and discreetly summit (China, Japan and South across the region. Beyond the formal protected the option of using the Korea) might still be agreed for late US alliance (with Japan, Republic new islands to introduce new October or November 2015. Of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, military capabilities to the South the Philippines and Thailand), the China Sea. This will further The reconstruction of the China- countries that added in some way ensure that this issue will become Japan relationship is a critical to the thicket of security linkages imbedded as a source of controversy piece of business that remains on in the region included India and the and instability. the regional agenda. These two US; India and Japan; Japan and the countries, in particular, need to Philippines; Japan and Vietnam; In 2014, one of the more prominent think carefully not only about Japan and Australia; Australia and concerns fueling pessimism about whether Japan’s actions can South Korea; and Vietnam and the the regional security outlook was credibly be seen as a revival of US. China has a single formal ally, the enduring rift between China and militarism, but also about why the Democratic People’s Republic Japan, especially the fact that years the Abe government has been of Korea, but has active security were slipping by without a face-to prepared to incur severe, possibly relationships with Pakistan, face leaders meeting. That stand-off even fatal, political injury to secure Russia, Vietnam, Myanmar, seemed to end at the Asia-Pacific these qualified amendments to the Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka Economic Cooperation (APEC) role of the JSDF. Opinions vary and its four central Asian partners summit in Beijing in November rather widely on where the balance in the Shanghai Cooperation 2014, although both President Xi of responsibility for the current Organization. Russia, too, is seeking and Prime Minister Abe made it impasse should be located but there to remind everyone that it is an Asia abundantly clear that they were not can be no doubt that both sides have Pacific power, despite its prevailing overjoyed. Early in the new year, work to do to jettison the baggage of economic difficulties and a current the foreign ministers of China, the past and define the options for politico-strategic agenda focused Japan and South Korea conducted the future. heavily to the west of the Urals. a positive meeting that seemed to promise further engagement at the Further evidence of a perceived If it is accepted that a special leaders level. These hopes faded deficit in the region’s capacity to effort should be made to arrest the and, by mid-2015, it was also clear cope peacefully with current and on-going erosion of the security that the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender would not constitute a circuit breaker. Expectations for Abe’s much anticipated speech on the anniversary shrank to hopes that he would not step back from earlier expressions of remorse and responsibility. China, for its part, elected to go ahead with the traditional—but rather lavishly spectacular—military parade, rather than a more subdued commemoration of this milestone. Shortly thereafter, Japan’s enactment—in the face of strong public and political opposition—of legislation to allow a constrained right to collective defence and to Chinese President Xi Jinping during a Military Parade at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, allow the Japan Self-Defense Force September 3 2015, to Mark the 70th Anniversary of Victory over Japan and the End of World (JSDF) to assist an ally even when War II. Source: Xijingpingoffice Instagram.

5 order in the Asia Pacific and shift The country or countries involved the trend of events onto a more will have to find the right political positive trajectory, who might take and bureaucratic personnel, give the lead and what could they seek them sufficient time to gauge to accomplish? It cannot be said and evaluate regional attitudes, that the region lacks opportunities devise a plausible fresh approach for leaders and the key figures for and consider the most effective foreign affairs, trade, and defence means of giving the new approach to address concerns and intentions, traction. The scope to appear as identify common interests, resolve some combination of biased, naive, or reconcile differences and so unimaginative and incompetent is on. It is true that, at the level of considerable. But it may be prudent leaders, the APEC summit is not for states like South Korea and optimized to address the security Australia to discreetly engage in agenda while the East Asia preparatory discussions on such an Summit is still growing into an initiative. institution capable carrying this formidable responsibility let alone Ron Huisken being accepted by key leaders as Adjunct Associate Professor, the forum in which they must and/ Strategic & Defence Studies Centre or want to address the region’s The Australian National University. primary security issues. On the 1 “Global Risks 2015”, 10th Edition, World whole, however, it is hard to argue Economic Forum, 2015. that a basic deficiency is a lack 2 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: of opportunities for key decision Are the US and China Headed for War?”, makers to meet and address the big The Atlantic, 24 September 2015. issues confronting the region. In 3 These words appear in the ASEAN addition, China and the US, have Summit Chairman’s Statement, 27 April a sufficiency of regular bilateral 2015 and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meetings—from formal and Joint Communique, 4 August 2015. informal summits, through their annual cabinet-level Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to meetings— on-demand between key principals.

This also means, of course, that these two countries are not likely to be the source of a drive toward a new security narrative for the region. If circumstances are considered to be sufficiently worrying or are deemed to have the potential to reach such depths, interrupting an adverse trajectory and inviting consideration of more positive alternatives is a challenge that may fall to the region’s so- called ‘middle powers’. This is not a challenge to be lightly proposed or accepted. Canvassing regional concerns and remedies, and reflecting them with integrity as the inspiration behind a novel approach or process that would attract the earnest engagement of the US and China is no trivial undertaking.

6 The Pivot: A Sound Policy in Need of Serious Repair

Michael J. Green

President Barack Obama’s pivot/ rebalance to Asia is neither as transformational as the administration claims, nor as short-lived as allies in the region fear. In July 2015 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published the results of a survey of regional strategic elites in which an average of 79 percent of respondents across Asia welcomed the goal of the pivot/rebalance, 51 percent thought it was poorly resourced and implemented, but 57 percent nevertheless thought that the United States would continue to lead the definition of order and power in Asia over the coming decades.1 That sounds about right. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh hold a news conference in Hanoi, 1 Vietnam, 2015. Source: US Department of President Obama came to office Defense. with unique experiences in Asia and the Pacific, but generally region, including participation in President will have to add clarity built on policies established by the East Asia Summit and a more and purpose in five areas. his predecessor, including the active diplomacy in Southeast Asia. trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Moreover, since 2011 polls have Strategic conceptualization realignment of US forces in the demonstrated that the American region, the pursuit of stable public now for the first time identifies Pivoting to Asia is not really relations with China, and the Asia as the most important region a strategy. Strategy requires continued strengthening of alliance in the world to US interest, while identification of ends, ways relations. The initial spin of his the 2014 CSIS survey found that 96 and means—something the White House political advisors percent of American foreign policy administration has failed to do in notwithstanding, the United States experts surveyed supported the any consistent or coherent way had never left Asia during the Bush pivot/rebalance –regardless of their for years now. The term “pivot” administration. In fact, the Chicago party affiliation. In other words, the was introduced in Secretary of Council on Global Affairs found increased American focus on Asia State Hillary Clinton’s November in its 2008 survey of soft power and the Pacific is likely to continue 2011 Foreign Policy Magazine in Asia that publics in the region beyond the Obama administration. article and was then elaborated thought the United States had on in President Obama’s speech That said, American policy in increased its soft power influence before the Australian Parliament Asia will continue to require over the previous decade more than in Canberra on November 17. By serious attention under the any other power, including China.2 2012, it was relabeled as America’s next administration. It would Yet Obama also added new pillars “rebalance” to Asia in the 2012 be a mistake to either praise or to American engagement in the Defense Strategic Guidance. Prior bury the pivot. Instead the next

7 to those brief declarations that president is not willing to contest to the gray zone coercion short of the United States intended to challenges to the prevailing order. war, or in terms of the forces the pay more attention to the region, It is important that the US Navy United States would have to devote there was no hint of the strategy. has pledged to go from deploying to the problem in an already complex The Administration’s May 2010 50 percent of its fleet in the Pacific operational environment inside the National Security Strategy made no to 60 percent. The Chief of Naval First Island Chain. The challenge reference to a refocus on Asia and Operations also deserves credit for the next President will be how articulated no objectives for the for already reaching roughly the to restore confidence in American region as a whole, lumping China 58 percent mark. However, the willpower without exacerbating into a section on engaging “Other Administration’s unwillingness to security tensions in the region. 21st Century Centers of Influence” fight for the Secretary of Defense’s and Asian allies after North Atlantic budget proposals and the passive Future engagement of ASEAN Treaty Organization in a section reaction to sequestration and the emphasizing the need to “Ensure budget impasse with Congress have The administration deserves Strong Alliances”. A survey of seriously damaged the credibility credit for stepping up its game speeches on the rebalance to Asia and operational sustainability of the in Southeast Asia. There was by principals in the administration rebalance. The White House was considerable debate in the White demonstrates constantly shifting obviously unhappy when Assistant House about whether joining the and often contradictory priorities.3 Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, East Asia Summit might undermine The administration’s vision of Katrina McFarland, told the press Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation order in Asia has shifted from in April 2014 that because of budget (APEC), but Indonesia helped vowing to respect “core interests” pressures, “the pivot is being looked to solve the problem by aligning with China in the November at again, because candidly, it can’t the Bali summit with APEC on 2009 Obama summit with Hu happen”.4 She revealed the serious the calendar in 2011. Secretary Jintao; to listing China as a threat nature of the challenges. The Clinton also compensated for the alongside Iran in the January 2012 current defense budget trajectories inconsistent attendance of the Strategic Guidance; to welcoming will make it extremely difficult Clinton and Bush administrations Xi Jinping’s proposal for a “New to invest in forward presence in the ASEAN Regional Forum Model of Great Power Relations” and the so-called “Third Offset” (ARF) and removed an irritant in 2013, before walking away from needed to develop technologies in US relations with ASEAN that formulation because allies that counter ballistic missile and by engaging Myanmar just as were concerned at the emergence other asymmetrical threats to US President U Thein Sein was ready of a bipolar condominium forming forces and American allies. With to undertake reforms on his own. with Beijing at their expense. leadership, the next President can The demand signals from Southeast eliminate the sequestration threat Asia for more US engagement in The next administration should not in Congress and set the budget on the wake of Chinese assertiveness reject the rebalance, but rather, a more predictable and effective were important, but it was also the articulate clearly and consistently trajectory. case that the Administration saw the order the United States seeks to the strategic opportunity and took shape in Asia. The most successful Willpower also matters. When it. and sustainable concept will be one President Obama suddenly centered unequivocally on allies reversed his pledge to use force The problem is that all the easy with a priority on securing a rules- against Syria for chemical weapons work is now over. Growing based order where smaller states use in September 2013, there were political crises in Thailand and are not coerced and cooperation shudders among national security Malaysia and the reversal of with China is a means to that end officials in Tokyo and Seoul. The opening and reconciliation in rather than an end in itself. Administration’s obvious hesitation Burma/Myanmar leave the next US to order Freedom of Navigation administration with hard choices. Willpower and defense operations or other measures in the The Administration also appears face of China’s rapid construction less energetically engaged as new resources of four 3000 meter military-spec more Euro-centric leadership has airfields on features in the South Rebalancing to Asia will not be taken over at the State Department. China Sea has also raised concerns. credible if the larger relative share Perhaps most troubling, the effort While it is true that these military of defense resources is coming to support multilateral diplomatic facilities would be easy targets in a out of a shrinking pie and the engagement in EAS and ARF conflict, that is not true with respect

8 on the territorial issues in the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Pacific, including an American South China Sea is becoming and the Trans-Pacific Partnership public more focused on the region increasingly irrelevant as Beijing (TPP) with the Congress and the and a region now more focused on takes unilateral steps to solidify American people after being elected. the United States. its control over the so-called Nine With the Republican victory in Dash Line. Congressional elections in 2014, Michael J. Green the administration began doing Senior Vice President for Asia and The ticking North Korean the hard domestic political work of Japan Chair, Center for Strategic rallying support for the agreements and International Studies; problem (which require Republican votes) Associate Professor, Georgetown and passed the TPA in 2015. University. The Administration has declared Whether there is enough time left a policy of “strategic patience” on the American political calendar 1 Michael J. Green, Nicholas Szechenyi, et. on North Korea—neither (not to mention all the other al., Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of investing credibility in high level Regional Expectations (Center for Strate- partners’ political calendars) for negotiations like the Agreed gic and International Studies, Washing- the TPP remains to be seen, but Framework and Six Party Talks, ton, DC, July) 2014. an agreement and even ratification nor significantly increasing 2 Christopher B. Whitney et. al., Soft in the US Congress still seem pressure on Pyongyang. The lack Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multina- possible by the end of the Obama tional Survey of Public Opinion, (The of engagement is entirely justified administration. The credibility Chicago Council on Global Affairs, News by Pyongyang’s provocations and of the pivot will rise or fall on this Results and Analysis, 2009), pp. 7-11. declaration of nuclear weapons outcome. Now that the TPP has come 3 For a comparison of administration status in 2012. Meanwhile, the speeches on Asia, see, Michael J. Green into force in October 2015, the next Obama Administration has done a and Zack Cooper, “Revitalizing the administration will need to pick up creditable job aligning diplomatic Rebalance: How to Keep the US Focus on work on the complementary parts Asia,” The Washington Quarterly, 37:3 policies and counter-provocation of trans-Pacific economic strategy, 2014, pp. 28-31. plans with Seoul. including the largely moribund 4 David E. Sanger and Mark Landler, “Obama’s Strategic Shift to Asia Is Hob- However, Pyongyang has also Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations with Beijing and an bled By Pressure at Home and Crises used this period to continue Abroad,” The New York Times, 21 April, work on uranium and plutonium economic cooperation formula for 2014. based weapons and long-range the ASEAN states not in TPP. If 5 Michael J. Green, Nicholas Szechenyi, et. delivery systems. Many experts TPP fails, the next administration al., Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of expect a major missile test on will have a very large hole to dig out Regional Expectations (Center for Strate- of before it can restore confidence in gic and International Studies, Washing- the anniversary of the Korean ton, DC, July) 2014. Workers Party with a nuclear test the American commitment to free to follow on October 10. Strategic trade and economic engagement in patience will not be a sustainable Asia. framework for much longer. The United States should have shifted More work to be done, but to more proactive interdiction and much to work with sanctions policies some time ago, and will likely have to do so in the The 2014 CSIS survey of regional coming years. How this will be strategic elites found that a combined with diplomacy depends plurality of respondents across on a number of variables, including the region viewed continuous US North Korea’s stance, but America leadership as preferable to the will have a stronger grasp of the alternatives (Sino-centrism, a US- issues if progress can be made on China condominium, a multipolar the fractured Japan-Korea ties. balance of power, or multilateral institutionalism).5 Despite the Trans-Pacific Partnership conceptual, resource and diplomatic flaws in the pivot, the next Obama campaigned against trade administration will likely have agreements and was then very strong foundations for expanded slow to make the public case for engagement with Asia and the

9 The Security Landscape in East Asia: A Justifiable Anxiety?

Zha Daojiong

While alarm and pessimism intensifies, assessments of the East Asian regional security landscape are a matter of perspective. The year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the Second World War, as well as the establishment of the United Nations. Major power relations, many would argue, are still in disarray. The foreign policy establishments in Beijing and Washington struggle to produce credible reassurance from presidential summits, with the first state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the United States in September. Both Beijing and Tokyo, again, failed to commemorate the end of the end of the Second World War. On a daily basis, media headlines US Secretary of State John Kerry with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Washington, 24 June 2015. Source: US Department of announce rising tensions—coupled State, flickr. with television images of warships benchmark East Asia against, it out to be an excuse for refusing to and planes of China, Japan, and the is noteworthy that for a region as explore alternative. Worse still, United States “showing the flag”— historically complex and politically highlighting the lack of trust can in the East and South China seas. dynamic as East Asia, no-war is a serve to endorse putting the blame In addition, North Korea tests the significant accomplishment. This on others for the ongoing state of patience of virtually every nation suggests that East Asian resilience affairs. In short, it may be wiser for concerned about its displays of is not just a phenomenon to be self- commentators to acknowledge that rage. The general message is clear: congratulatory about, but should in trust and cooperation is in reality East Asia is fast becoming a more fact be fostered through pursuing another chicken versus egg puzzle. unpredictable and dangerous region. cooperation. Viewed objectively, East Asia seems A less alarmist picture can also ‘Trust’ is a frequent buzzword to be a bastion of stability. Why be drawn: peace is prevailing in discussions about managing then all the anxiety? One powerful throughout the East Asian region. security dynamics across East mindset, and perhaps the main This is possible when we define peace Asia. But trust is hard to define culprit, is a simplistic vision of the as the absence of active warfare; or characterize. An emphasis on US in decline and China on the either between two countries trust can quickly lead to difficulties rise, and its corollary: the time for or involving a larger number of in identifying steps to follow. On countries to choose between them states or their proxies. Realities the one hand, trust can motivate as the ultimate security guarantor on the ground are such that East thinking toward sensitivity is drawing near. This image feeds Asia has fared far better than the in relation to other countries. the fear that the postwar Pax Middle East or Eastern Europe, Hopefully, such sensitivity can Americana in Asia is crumbling, and especially in the past decade. While help encourage symmetry in acts will inevitably be replaced by a fierce the state of affairs in the Middle of diplomacy. One the other hand, Darwinian power struggle between East and Ukraine is a low bar to reference to trust could well turn the United States and China. Over-

10 confident Chinese commentators World Bank. On the other hand, the East and South China Seas in fall into jingoism. American the crash of China’s stock markets recent years, after being dormant observers leap to the conclusion in the summer of 2015 made it clear for many decades. The US and that China is maneuvering to upset that the Chinese economy is not its allies claim to see a China the US-led hub-and-spoke regional as stable as its nascent high-speed determined to seek revenge for the security arrangements and, by train system. past and domination in the future. extension, the global order. Such It is a matter of regret, and concern a simplification is so powerful In the future, China’s vision of that voices of calm in the US simply that even establishment of the seeing revitalization of economic fall on deaf ears.1 The result of these multilateral Asian Infrastructure growth in countries along the perceptions is a self-perpetuating Investment Bank is depicted as an ancient Silk Road and in maritime belief in inescapable enmity. unmistakable indication of a zero- trade routes from Southeast Asia to sum competition, notwithstanding the Persian Gulf notwithstanding, Security anxieties in the Asia widespread support for additional its economic performance will Pacific do have legitimate causes sources of investment, which is just have to continue to reply on but further heightening is not in turn conducive to generating unfettered access to the financial immutable. For China, there needs growth in demand in the region’s systems and consumer markets of to be more appreciation of the economies. the United States and its security positive role the US has played in allies. More fundamentally, the enabling its prosperity. China’s This vision deserves to be production chain weaving together forty years of sustained economic debunked. Talk of US decline is a the economies of China, Japan, the growth coincides with the history long-standing American neurosis. US and other Asia-Pacific countries of a workable relationship with the Similar sentiments of weakness is very strong and no economy can United States. China’s confidence emerged in the early 1970s, after expect to flourish by diminishing its in its governing system is justifiable, the Arab oil embargo, and again in participation in it. but wholesale rejection of foreign the 1980s after Japan’s phenomenal (including American) lessons and rise prompted fears of US economic To many of the region’s geostrategic ideas for economic and political eclipse. In both periods, there was thinkers schooled through the governance can only be a net loss no shortage of foreign jingoism, American intellectual tradition of for China. Furthermore, a United in support of the argument that International Politics theory, the States that continues to be strong America’s global position had crux of the issue is that China, is in China’s economic self-interest. peaked. In both cases the US proved unlike Japan in the 1980s, has failed far stronger than its internal or to meet America’s expectations of For its part, the US must face the external critics imagined. The re- evolving into a like-minded country. unpleasant truth that its capacity emergence of US-decline rhetoric China’s record in poverty reduction, to re-shape another country’s today is in fact a sign of American both at home and abroad through system of governance is limited— strength, which starts with brutal aid and investment, means little especially in regard to a large self-reflection. to those who see Western-style and complex society like China political democracy as an absolute with deep-rooted and generally Arguably, America’s relative value. This judgment validates the successful governance traditions. position is stronger now than in fears of Chinese thinkers who see And American geostrategic thinkers the 1970s or 1980s. China has not the US as fundamentally committed should consider the positive value caused the United States economic to the overthrow of China’s political of political stability in China. harm as the Organization of the order in order to remake its system Stability does not simply mean the Petroleum Exporting Countries in the American image. unwelcome persistence of a regime (OPEC) states did in the 1970s. they dislike: a stable and secure Quite the reverse. China has Many Chinese observers are puzzled China is one that, in the long run, is proved a hugely beneficial economic by America’s characterization of more likely to accept the possibility partner for the US. Nor has China as a military threat; by any of learning from the US. Chinese competition had anywhere objective measure, China is decades near the impact that Japan’s did away from military parity with the Between China and Japan, the in the 1980s. True, China seems US, and indeed may never attain it. history issue is often said, including destined soon to end America’s Chinese analysts also see American by those in both countries tasked 140-year run as the world’s biggest rhetoric and action as a strong to find ways out of the continuing economy if one believes the latest factor behind the heightening of impasse, to be the key roadblock to purchasing-power estimates of the maritime sovereignty differences in getting back to a normal routine of

11 high level interactions. Over time, domestic conversations about the If so, what risks can be accepted as hope for government-sponsored joint past and their present-day relevance sensible when continuing to push versions of the history of World War for the nation as a whole. the boundaries of nerve testing? If II has faded. What can be done next? not, what can be done to persuade For other countries in East Asia, space our domestic and international China should come up with the must be made for a distinct narrative audiences to support efforts toward intellectual fortitude to highlight about their positions in the evolution positive symmetry in handling the domestically Japan’s post-war of the region’s security dynamic: region’s security challenges, hard contributions towards China’s pursuit the supposed choice between China and soft? Luckily, unlike the Middle of modernization. In the 1950s, and the US as the ultimate security East or Eastern Europe, East Asia while locked in Cold War hostility guarantor is a false one. The past few enjoys a rather solid societal basis towards the Chinese government, years have witnessed Washington, for dispute resolution. This is largely the Japanese government allowed Beijing, Tokyo testing their separate as result to the regions high level of limited trade activities to proceed capacities in building up respective economic integration, and effective when the former was under broad coalitions of the willing in the East multilateral channels such as the Western isolation in the wake of the Asian region and even beyond, over Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Korean War. Official development issues ranging from investment to and informal security dialogue assistance from Japan played a maritime order. Factors feeding into proposed by ASEAN. By putting the powerfully supportive role in China’s this rivalry include changes in United principle of inclusivity into practice re-linking with the rest of the world States policy as well as campaigns by wherever manageable, parties stand economy, and not only in a material some Southeast Asian governments, a better chance of extending the sense. Particularly in the 1970s and those of the Philippines and Vietnam aggregate stability of the region and 1980s, the fact that China and Japan in particular. For China, the United locating each spur of anxiety in its were able to sustain cooperative States and Japan, it is becoming proper, relative place. trade and investment relations was more obvious that no party can seen as a vote of confidence in China prevail in attempting to re-engineer by other industrialized nations. the regional security and economic Zha Daojiong order as textbook geostrategic and Professor of International Political China could not have succeeded geoeconomic mapping would suggest. Economy, Peking University. in improving its relative economic position, were it not for the foundation The time has come for security 1 Chas Freeman, Jr. Diplomacy on the laid in these early years. China analysts to look back at advocacy Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the has, of course, repaid its Yen loans, and actions taken in the past five South China Sea, at http://chasfreeman. but this history of economic aid still years—over maritime issues in net/diplomacy-on-the-rocks-china-and- other-claimants-in-the-south-china-sea/. merits recognition. East Asia, for example—and ask: is the region better off than before? Likewise, Japan needs to demonstrate political courage and argue that the time has come for its government to finally stay clear of efforts to whitewash what the country did in China and the Korean peninsula during the war. Yes, the Japanese political system is far more pluralistic; Japanese political parties and individual politicians are elected to speak on behalf of their constituencies. But how the Japanese polity projects the country’s past to its own citizenry has been, is and will be taken into account by other countries, especially those that once suffered. Japan should beware of the future costs that the ongoing diplomatic tensions carry. A truly The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan (CVN 76) off the island of Iwo To, wise approach would be to re-orient Japan, 29 September 2015. Source: US Navy.

12 In Search of a Seamless Security Posture: US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and National Security Legislation

Ken Jimbo Abe’s Evolutionary Security Policy Reform

Highly controversial National Security Legislation was finally passed in the upper house of Japanese Diet on19 September 2015. The prolonged demonstrations and rallies near the Diet reflected the deep divisions within the Japanese public on how to reconcile a desirable security role with its pacifist Constitution.

Although Abe’s security policy reform has been characterized as a watershed pushing the country towards a more aggressive military Carter and Kishida: US Defense Secretary Ash Carter shakes hands with Japanese Foreign posture, this development in Minister Fumio Kishida after signing an agreement during a ceremony at the Pentagon, reality is ‘evolutionary’ rather than Sept. 28, 2015. Source: US Department of Defense. revolutionary.1 Japan’s priority still resides in the defence of its w National Security Strategy and institutional reform, arms own territory and ensuring the US (December 2013); export policy, territorial defense, forward presence through US-Japan alliance management and Japan’s security alliance. Although the w The Three Principles on Transfer global engagement. Indeed, the security legislation allows Japan to of Defense Equipment and new security legislation consists exercise the long-banned right of Technology (April 2014); of eleven different legal cases collective self-defense, its operational packaged together in an attempt to scope is strictly confined to the case w Cabinet Decision on Development modify and streamline the patch- when Japanese national security is of Seamless Security Legislation work of legal arguments supporting vitally challenged. to Ensure Japan’s Survival and security policy amendments that Protect its People (July 2014); had accumulated since the end of That said, the series of security reforms the Cold War. under the Abe administrations w The Guidelines for Japan-US constitute a significant and dynamic Defense Cooperation (April 2015); package. The major policy advances Four dimension of ‘Seamless in the security field over the three w Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security Posture’ for Japan years of the Abe Administration Security (September 2015). include the following: The key concept informing Japan’s This package of reforms addresses a current security policy reform w Establishment of the National number of layers and dimensions of has been the “seamless security Security Council and National the national security arena, ranging posture”.2 The concept initially Security Bureau (December 2013); from decision making processes

13 emerged in the National Defense amount to a full-scale armed attack. rear-area support in the Situation Program Guideline (NDPG) in 2004. As China has stepped up its assertive Surrounding Japan (mainly focusing That document underscored the behavior in the East and South China on contingencies on the Korean importance of ensuring an effective Seas, it has become increasingly Peninsula). The Joint Statement of response towards “new security apparent that the territorial status the US-Japan Security Consultative threats and various situations” quo can be challenged without Committee in February 2005 (obviously encompassing the rise crossing the military threshold. endorsed “Global common strategic of terrorism and asymmetrical The Gray-Zone domain obviously objectives” as a commitment threats), and urged a seamless, requires the primary role to be to promote peace, stability and whole of government approach. played by law-enforcement agencies prosperity around the world. Developments in defense doctrine such as Coast Guards and what from 2010 elaborated on the concept is required is deeper cooperation The legal foundations for engaging of seamlessness. For example, the between the Coast Guards and different geographical layers— adoption of the “Dynamic Defense” Self-Defense Force, particularly territorial defense, regional, and concept in the NDPG 2010 aimed for escalation management. From global security—were individually at enhancing the mobility and the alliance perspective, enhancing established, however, and had little operational tempo of Japan’s US-Japan peace-time security connectivity among them. For Intelligence, Surveillance and cooperation including intelligence example, when Japan dispatched Reconnaissance (ISR) activities sharing through alliance its Self-Defense Force for the in the Southeastern Island Chain coordination mechanisms and joint refueling mission in Indian Ocean in order to deal with potential ISR operations will also contribute in support of Operation Enduring challenges seamlessly. The concept significantly towards managing Freedom from 2001 to 2007, also permeates a number of major Gray-Zone challenges. and for the humanitarian and documents, including the NDPG reconstruction mission in Iraq from 2013, the US-Japan Defense Another domain is the heightening 2003 to 2009, these SDF operations Cooperation Guidelines and and expanding of Anti-Access and were based on the Special Measures National Security Legislation. Area-Denial (A2/AD) challenges. Bill with sunset clauses. A The modernization of China’s political awareness developed that In order to decipher the concept, it conventional military capabilities is without seamless geographical is helpful to examine it from four increasingly placing the US forward coverage ensured by a permanent distinct vantage points. presence and its operations at law, Japan’s regional and global risk. As outlined in the Guidelines, engagement would be jeopardized. a) Phases of Conflict protecting military facilities, air The US-Japan Defense Cooperation and missile defenses, as well as Under the two laws related to Guidelines (2015) underscored resiliency, hardening and damage support activities by the SDF that “the two governments will repair capabilities are key to (namely, the Law to Ensure take measures to ensure Japan’s countering the A2/AD environment. Security for Situations that will peace and security in all phases, The new Guidelines also suggested have an Important Influence on seamlessly, from peacetime to wider dispersal options in both Japan’s Peace and Security; and contingencies, including situations commercial and non-commercial the International Peace Support when an armed attack against Japanese airports and ports to Law), the SDF will be able to Japan is not involved”. The new ensure flexible operations for US provide necessary logistics support Guideline encompasses the all- forces stationed in Japan. and search and rescue assistance phase/full-spectrum approaches to to armed forces of foreign conflict escalation management, b) Geography countries collectively addressing departing from the sharper divisions The geographical scope of Japan’s the situations outlined in these between peacetime, emergency and security policy has expanded laws. Under the new legislation, situation surrounding Japan in the steadily over past decades. geographical constraints on previous Guideline in 1997. Since the establishment of the engaging in alliance support and International Peace Cooperation support for coalition missions will What should be underscored is the Law enacted in 1992, Japan has be significantly waived. emergence of two new domains in dispatched personnel to 13 United Japan’s security threat perception. Nations Peace Keeping Operations c) Cooperation with Others One is the so-called Gray-Zone (PKO) worldwide. The US-Japan Japan’s traditional security partner challenges: infringements of Defense Cooperation Guidelines in is the United States, its only treaty Japanese territory that do not 1997 highlighted Japan’s expanded ally for more than six decades.

14 In the past, the laws explicitly can now function as a key logistics laid the legal foundation for the affirmed SDF’s logistic support to hub during such a crisis, offering SDF to play a more active role in US forces in accordance with the support to the forces of all the multiple domains. The key concept US-Japan Security Treaty. For nations engaged in the operation. of these series of reforms has been example, the Act Concerning the to develop a “seamless” security Measures for Peace and Safety d) Cross-Domain Response posture that streamlines operations of Japan in Situations in Areas The new security reforms in Japan in four major domains: 1) all- Surrounding Japan enacted in 1999 would also support high-end phases of conflict, 2) geographically provided the SDF legal backing scenarios to support Pentagon’s cross-boundary, 3) multinational to implement the 1997 US-Japan Joint Operation Access Concept cooperation, 4) cross-domain Defense Cooperation Guideline to (JOAC). This concept, announced synergy. These developments provide rear-area support only to in January 2012, seeks to ensure constitute a significant departure the United States. that US joint forces would achieve from the legal restrictions of the operational access - the ability past in the defense and security The 2015 US-Japan Defense to project military force into an field. Significantly, however, Cooperation Guidelines and the operational area—in an A2/AD these reforms have been put in National Security Legislation both environment. Its central theme, place without altering the major enable the provision of necessary rather highly conceptual, is constraints enshrined in the support activities to the US and other attaining Cross-Domain Synergy, Japanese Constitution. countries’ armed forces in situations described as “the complementary that will have an important influence vice merely additive employment Despite these significant on Japan’s peace and security. of capabilities in different domains accomplishments on the political The amended Self-Defense Force such that each enhances the and legal fronts, a seamless law also enables the protection of effectiveness and compensates for security posture is still a long way weapons/other equipment of the US the vulnerabilities of the others off. First, Japan needs to develop and other countries’ armed forces. to establish superiority in some more sophisticated scenarios and Additionally, the International Peace combination of domains that will concepts for managing Gray-Zone Support Law enables the provision provide the freedom of action challenges. As mentioned earlier, of necessary support activities to required by the mission”. the primary agency to deal with the armed forces of foreign countries non-military challenges at sea collectively addressing the situation, Under the new Guidelines and will be the Japanese Coast Guard. which threatens the international National Security Legislation, Japan has already indicated that it peace and security. the US and Japan will work to will fund the faster development of ensure the resiliency of relevant Coast Guard capabilities in coming With a scope of operations that now space assets and their networks fiscal years. However, the Japanese covers cooperation with countries and systems. Japan has tasked Coast Guard Law has not been other than the United States, the Japan Aerospace Exploration changed under the new security Japan’s security engagement in Agency (JAXA) to provide space legislation. Their criteria for the peacetime and during any crisis situation awareness information to use of weapons are strictly limited will be further enhanced. The the United States, demonstrating and on a par with guidelines for new legal arrangement will enable a commitment to deeper inter- the Police, namely, confined to self- the SDF to conduct more robust agency collaboration to support defense and emergency evacuation. joint training and exercises with the national security agenda. What the new SDF law does allow regional partners such as Australia, Cooperation in cyberspace includes is for the maritime SDF to step into India and ASEAN. There will improvement of individual cyber the policing function swiftly if the be fewer legal qualms over joint capabilities and interoperability government determines that this is operations for common purposes between the Self-Defense Forces necessary to deal with a Gray-Zone such as humanitarian support and US Forces. Cooperation will challenge. The early involvement and maritime patrol. During any encompass sharing information in of the MSDF could put the prudent crisis, the new legislation also peacetime to contingencies in which management of escalation at risk. allows the provision of support to cyber threats challenge the mission other regional partners engaged assurance of both forces. Second, the scope for exercising in the contingency. For example, collective-self defense seems to a crisis on the Korean peninsula The Abe administration has be too narrow as a result of also could see the deployment of US- achieved a historic reform of adopting the Three New Conditions led multinational force. Japan Japan’s security policy that has for Use of Force. In the New

15 Security Legislation, collective- self defense will be exercised only when the armed attack by a foreign country “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”. Although a historic step forward for Japan, it still sharply limits the exercise of collective-self defense, essentially to crises in the areas immediately surrounding Japan. Any wider scope of operations, such as the defence of the US homeland or Pacific islands by Japan’s missile defenses would still not be ensured under the new legislation.

Abe’s evolutionary security reform has certainly provided a solid legal foundation for Japan’s proactive security policy in territorial defense, robust alliance management, and global engagement. However, Japan must also be prepared to constantly update its security posture and legal framework in order to respond to the dynamics of the security environment in Asia.

Ken Jimbo Associate Professor, Keio University

1 William Choong, “Abe’s security bills represent evolution not revolution”, IISS Voices (October 1, 2015); and Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary”, Washington Quarterly (Summer 2015). 2 Ken Jimbo, “In Search for Seamless Security Posture under the Abe Ad- ministration: National Defense Pro- gram Guideline, US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline, and Secu- rity Legislation” Issue and Studies, vol.44, no.2, (June 2015).

16 The Asia–Pacific Paradox: Rising Wealth, Rising Tension

Brahma Chellaney

The Asia-Pacific region is likely to remain for the foreseeable future the world’s economic-growth and maritime centre. Yet the challenges in this region have been fundamentally changed by new geopolitical realities and the rise of unconventional threats. It is important to view these challenges in the broader context of global power dynamics, including the ongoing power shifts. Given the tectonic power shifts that are underway, the international order is clearly in transition.

We live in a rapidly changing world. The pace of technological change has been revolutionary since the 1980s, facilitating the ascent of US President Obama with India’s Prime Minister Modi, January 2015. Source: The White Asian economies in particular. The House. growing tide of new innovations has also contributed to the accelerated weaponization of science, even as shifts in relative economic weight will be unlikely to enjoy a stable the pace of innovation has shrunk already experienced will be further power equilibrium. the shelf-life of most technologies. accentuated in the period ahead. More broadly, the Asia-Pacific Today, technological forces are The pace of geopolitical change exemplifies that the world is playing a greater role in shaping has been no less extraordinary. becoming more interdependent— geopolitics than at any other time The geopolitical landscape in the and not just in trade and capital in history. Asia-Pacific has been significantly flows—rather the interdependencies Economically, the fast pace of change transformed since 1990. The extend to the technological, in technology, transportation costs region is characterized by the public-health, environmental and and the regulatory environment accumulation of greater relative climate spheres. For example, has acted as a spur to the dramatic power but also by new uncertainties. environmental degradation on the rise of Asia. The share of world But as history testifies, major Tibetan Plateau, because of its trade of the advanced economies in power shifts are rarely quiet. Such towering height, is likely to affect the past quarter-century has sunk shifts usually create volatility and general atmospheric circulation from 75 percent to just below 50 uncertainty. In fact, given the even in Europe and North America. percent. Developing economies are fast pace of political, economic and China’s role as the largest also attracting increasing amounts technological transformation that greenhouse-gas emitter carries of foreign direct investments, with has been witnessed, one can assume global implications. The mobility such inflows jumping from 20 percent that the next 25 years will bring of technical expertise in the Asia- to 50 percent of global totals just about equally dramatic geopolitical Pacific, as in Europe, is another between 2002 and 2012. The global change in the region. This means example. Global pandemics serve that the region, in the coming years, as yet another example.

17 The Asia-Pacific also illustrates their political relations, fast- subsidies. As though to stir its that the interdependencies are not rising bilateral trade will not be people into a frenzy of patriotism, bringing the world closer together. sufficient by itself to stabilize China has also declared two Rather they have intensified their relationship. Not only does new national days to remember competition between important the region’s political integration Japanese aggression. powers for relative advantage. lag badly behind its economic In this context, the struggle for integration, it has no security But what if the victims of China’s natural resources has set off framework of any kind, with even aggression followed its example and sharpening geopolitical rivalries in regional consultation mechanisms commemorated Chinese attacks the Asia-Pacific. The resurgence of remaining weak. on them? China, while seeking to territorial and maritime disputes in obscure its own aggressions and the South and East China Seas, for One concern about the regional occupations since the communist example, is linked to the resource situation arises from the legacy ‘revolution’—including the 1951 competition, given the significant of wars. Unlike Europe’s bloody annexation of the sprawling possibility that the seas that wars of the first half of the Tibetan plateau and invasions surround the disputed islands hold twentieth century, which provoked of India and Vietnam in 1962 rich hydrocarbon reserves beneath changes that have made war there and 1979, respectively—has long the seabed. unthinkable today, the wars in Asia called on Japan to take history as in the second half of the twentieth a mirror and demonstrate greater That economics cannot be century only accentuated bitter remorse for its past aggressions. separated from politics is apparent rivalries. Several inter-country from the fact that booming trade wars have been fought in Asia More ominously, history continues between important countries has since 1950, when both the Korean to shape national narratives and only accelerated their political War and the annexation of Tibet fuel competing nationalisms in rivalries. In Asia, the danger of started, without resolving the the Asia-Pacific. Squabbles over military conflict is most apparent underlying disputes. history and remembrance remain between countries that boast the principal obstacle to political booming bilateral trade. Indeed, as In fact, history continues to hold reconciliation, reinforcing negative underscored by the grating hydro- the region hostage. As the recent stereotypes of rival nations and politics in some river basins and 70th anniversary of the end of helping to rationalize claims to the recrudescence of Cold War-era World War II underscored, some territories long held by other territorial disputes in Asia, trade nations in the region are still nations. In this economically and economic interdependence resurrecting the ghosts of history. integrating but politically are no guarantee of moderation or How diplomatic relationships are divided region, relations between restraint between states. held hostage to history is best nations remain trapped in a exemplified by the strained ties mutually reinforcing loop: poor Economic interdependence helps between America’s closest allies political relations help magnify to raise the costs of political in East Asia—South Korea and and accentuate the history miscalculation, yet economics Japan. These two countries face a problem, thus chaining interstate alone cannot solve politics or stark choice: find ways to stem the relationships to history. avert conflict. Economic forces, recrudescence of bitter disputes for example, have failed to rein over history or stay frozen in a Breaking out of such a vicious cycle in geopolitical competition over political relationship that plays demands forward-looking leadership natural resources or to open into China’s hands. and a will to political reconciliation. up autocratic political systems At present, though, the trend is in thriving on market capitalism. Playing the history card, China the opposite direction. For example, Despite a greater role for economic has made ultra-nationalism the attempts in East Asia to rewrite power in international relations, legitimating credo of Communist or sugarcoat history, including politics continues to drive rule. In recent years, China by revising textbooks or erecting economics, with political risk has sought to draw attention to memorials for newfound heroes, dominating the financial markets the atrocities committed by the are inciting greater intra-regional and sanctions remaining as a Japanese during World War II by rancor and recrimination. A potent viable policy tool. expanding and renovating war mix of domestic politics, increasing museums memorializing the 1931- geopolitical competition, and military The Asia-Pacific shows that if 1945 invasion, as well as through tensions has turned history into a estranged neighbors do not fix other government projects and driver of corrosive nationalism.

18 Disputes between South Korea the Chinese President Xi Jinping more cooperative future. If South and Japan, and China and Japan in the summer of 2014. Korea and Japan, for example, over territories, war memorials, take the lead to put their past textbooks and natural resources South Korea, a hyper-nationalistic behind them, they could set an are the result of an entangled state like China, has sought to example for other interstate history. The Sino-Indian eliminate all signs of Japanese relationships in Asia that are relationship is also a prisoner of colonial rule. But not all Asian burdened by historical differences the past, especially seen in the states seek to obliterate their and distortions. context of China’s elimination of colonial past. India continues the historical buffer— Tibet—and to transact much of its key More fundamentally, the Asia- its subsequent war with India. government business from British- Pacific today is at a defining Even the Chinese-South Korean era edifices, and some of its major moment in its history. The relationship carries the baggage criminal and civil laws date from international spotlight on its rapid of history, burdened most recently the colonial period. Taiwan—a economic ascent has obscured the by China’s revisionist claim to the former Japanese colony—also has serious challenges it confronts. The kingdom of Koguryo, one of three a tolerant view of its imperial resurgent territorial, maritime, kingdoms in ancient Korea. subjugation. and history disputes highlight that securing regional peace and The commitment of US President Some regional states, however, stability hinges fundamentally on Barack Obama and Indian Prime blend historical fact with myth. respect for existing borders. The Minister Narendra Modi to For example, China, as the fairy- single biggest source of regional work with likeminded states to tale Middle Kingdom, claims to instability today is a refusal to establish power equilibrium and be the mother of all civilizations, accept the existing territorial and a rules-based order in the Asia- weaving legend with history to maritime status quo. This has Pacific can make little headway foster a chauvinistic Han culture prompted efforts to change the if history remains a barrier to centered on regaining lost glory. territorial and maritime borders improved relations even between The Communist Party projects through stealthy land grabs or democracies. Take Japan and great-power status as China’s land reclamation, especially in the South Korea: as export-oriented historical entitlement. Indeed, South and East China Seas and powerhouses with traditionally by embellishing China’s past, it the Himalayas. close cultural ties, the two share wants to make real the legend many values. But resurgent that drives Chinese revisionist Regional states need to start history issues between them have history—China’s centrality in the discussing the security challenges put paid to hopes for a concert of world. This is reflected in Xi’s goal in the Asia-Pacific. Focused democracies to rein in China’s to build what he calls the “Chinese discussions are necessary to growing assertiveness. dream.” create institutions and rules-based cooperation and competition. The century-old case of the Korean Harmful historical legacies create There is no alternative to activist Ahn Jung-geun serves serious impediments to rational institutionalized cooperation. as a good example of history’s policy choices. President Park, for divisive hold. Considered a example, has sought closer ties with The region’s resource-related terrorist in Japan where he China when South Korea’s natural competition can be prevented from was hanged but a hero in South regional partner is Japan. Asia’s injecting greater instability and Korea, Ahn assassinated four- oldest liberal democracy, Japan insecurity only by establishing time Japanese prime minister has not fired a single shot against rules-based cooperation and and the first Resident-General of an outside party since World War competition. Unfortunately, Korea, Hirobumi Ito, in 1909 at II. President Park—the daughter there has been little headway in the Harbin city railway station in of the military general who served this direction thus far. Regional China. The case has resurfaced as South Korea’s dictator for 18 economies need an integrated, after China opened a memorial hall years until 1979—has yet to hold holistic approach to resource- in Harbin recently commemorating a single one-on-one meeting with security issues. Environmental Ahn, prompting Japan to denounce Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo degradation in the region can China for glorifying a terrorist. Abe. potentially affect climatic, weather, The shrine was built at the request and rainfall patterns in other parts of South Korean President Park Asian states cannot change their of the world. The Tibetan Plateau Geun-hye during a meeting with past but they can strive to shape a is warming at a rate almost twice

19 as fast as the rest of the world, according to several scientific studies. The Asia-Pacific must find ways to build a more sustainable and peaceful future for itself.

Brahma Chellaney Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.

India’s Prime Minister Modi arrives at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, 23 September, 2015. Source: http://pmindia.gov.in/en/image-gallery/.

20 Russia in the Indo-Pacific: A New Awakening?

Alexey D Muraviev

Caption: A Russian Tu-95 Bear 'H'. Source: Wikipedia.

September 2015 may be ground force elements and a naval nations. Some nations felt more remembered as a strategic turning task force not only placed Russia at vulnerable, and others began to point in Russia’s global fortunes. the centre of the controversy over reconsider Russia as a reliable After more than a year of harsh Syria and the fight against ISIL/ISIS and predictable strategic partner. criticism, targeted economic but symbolized Moscow’s growing These developments effectively sanctions, and attempts to isolate global ambitions in the contest for reanimated the confrontational Russia, the Kremlin is on the a role in global leadership, as well tendencies that clouded the winning tide. Russia’s President as the effective failure of the West European and Transatlantic Vladimir Putin commanded the to contain and drain Russia for its geopolitical space during the Cold floor in New York when he took actions in Ukraine. War era. part in the Jubilee Assembly of the United Nations. He succeeded in The confrontation over Syria and In Asia and the Pacific, the reaction maneuvering Moscow’s strategy in the regime of Bashar al Assad, to Russia’s rapid assertiveness Syria through intense discussions together with the crisis over within former Soviet Eurasia and in New York, whereupon Russia Ukraine triggered by the ousting of in Europe was mixed. Whilst was able to demonstrate to the west then President Viktor Yanukovich Australia and Japan supported and the rest of the world its restored and Russia’s takeover of Crimea targeted economic and political ability to undertake swift actions have strained Moscow’s ties with sanctions, other regional powers in support of its national strategic many Western nations. Russia’s either exercised a degree of agenda. The rapid massing of actions in Ukraine in 2014 and restraint in condemning the Putin offensive air power reinforced by 2015 alarmed many European government, or displayed respect

21 and recognition for Russia as a tensions with the US and some of of-area activity: long-range aircraft global player and a rediscovered its Asia-Pacific allies, including have resumed bomber patrols in regional partner. Australia; territorial disputes with key theatres of operations—the the US and Japan; confrontation Atlantic, the Black Sea and the Since Putin assumed the Russian on the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific. In the Pacific, Russia’s presidency in 2000, the eastern risk of conflict escalation; ongoing air force now operates bimonthly vector of Russia’s strategic agenda capability upgrades for the Japan or monthly patrols, normally has become more prominent.1 From Self-Defense Forces and China’s involving Tu-95MS bombers from 2009, Moscow has accelerated its People’s Liberation Army and Navy. the Ukraink air base. Patrol areas push for active reengagement with include the Aleutian Islands, the the region. In 2010, Russia joined As a result, Russian military Alaskan coastline and the vicinity the East Asia Summit (EAS) at the activities in the area have of Japan. Russian strategic aircraft same time as the United States. In intensified considerably. The extent have also made prolonged patrols September 2012, it chaired the 24th of the Pacific Fleet’s operational near Taiwan and over Southeast Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation naval activity in 2014 and 2015 Asia, and far out over the Pacific to (APEC) Summit in Vladivostok. was impressive. Russian warships the US island of Guam and the US Since Russia holds a perceived need operated throughout Southeast West Coast. to diversify its geo-economic agenda Asia, near the Western Pacific’s and the escalation of tensions with Horn of Africa. In late 2013, a task Despite the increased operational the West over Ukraine, Moscow has group from the Fleet was deployed tempo of the Russian Navy and further deepened its long-standing to the Mediterranean to form the Air Force, the current posture of impulse to re-engage with Asia and backbone of a reconstituted Russian the Russian armed forces east of the Pacific, driven by economic, Navy Mediterranean Squadron. the Urals is defensive in nature political and military–strategic Warships from the Baltic and Black and lacks any substantial offensive considerations. Sea Fleets operating in the area capabilities. The heightening of called in on ports in Indonesia, military-political tensions with The military–strategic driver is a Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka. NATO over Ukraine, as well as the heightened threat perception on the In 2015, the Russian Navy staged continuing need to address security eastern strategic flank compared joint Indra-2015 and SAREX-2015 concerns in the Transcaucasia area to other geopolitical areas of exercises with India and Japan and Central Asia has forced Moscow significance for Russia. However, the respectively. These were followed to allocate a major portion of its vast Asia–Pacific theatre provides by two large-scale maritime advanced military equipment and to Russia with both opportunities and interoperability exercises with the concentrate the bulk of its offensive challenges. Moscow has leveraged Chinese Navy in May and August capabilities west of the Urals. In itself by displaying its restored 2015. the near-term, Russia’s defence military power with potential allies efforts in Siberia and the Far East and friends, including through As part of its regional sub- will be concentrated on upgrading military exercises and out-of-area strategy aimed at improving the its regional defensive posture, with deployments. Exercising overt operational flexibility of its forces an emphasis on key tactical and deterrence in times of heightened in forward areas, Russia’s Ministry strategic deterrent capabilities. geo-political tensions, such as those of Defence has pursued targeted The Russian armed forces’ power created by the crisis over Ukraine, arrangements with several regional projection capability in the Far have contributed to these threat states (Seychelles, Singapore and East will be limited to the strategic perceptions. Vietnam) to permit regular port bomber force, airborne troops and calls by Russian warships. Russia special operations elements, and When it comes to strategic and is not, at least for the time being, the Navy. Fortunately, the absence defence planning in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a new network of overseas of the fear factor in the perceptions planners in Moscow consider a support bases but, rather, legal of the regional powers towards number of ongoing and newly arisen agreements which would allow the Russia gives Moscow a chance to factors that affect the geo-strategic Russian Navy to rely on a number further its economic and political landscape as they see it. These of foreign ports and bases for interests across Asia and the Indo- include a growing re-appreciation replenishment. Pacific. of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical system; Russia’s strategic interests Since August 2007, the Russian That said, however, Russian in polar geopolitics—the Artic and armed forces have steadily Minister of Defence General the Antarctic vectors; heightened increased another element of out- Sergei Shoigu said in June 2014,

22 that the conventional capabilities accelerating its efforts to develop of Russia’s views and approaches of both the Pacific Fleet and the regional political and security towards regional engagement.2 ground and air forces in the Eastern frameworks that will suit its long- Russia’s foreign and strategic military district will be extensively term strategic agenda. Its approach policy makers clearly place the modernized over the next five years. is based on developing bilateral People’s Republic of China at the Similarly, on 30 September 2015, strategic partnerships, notably with forefront of Russia’s policies in the new-generation Borey-class China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, greater Asia, and continue to aspire SSBN Aleksandr Nevskiy arrived at Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and to former foreign minister Evgeniy Rybachiy, marking the beginning of Vietnam. Primakov’s design for a ‘Grand the organic replacement of the ageing Triangular’ framework, involving Delta-class with next-generation Since 2009, Russia has again an entente between Russia, China sea-based strategic platforms. clearly recognized that Hanoi will and India.3 be its key partner in Southeast The economic driver of Russia’s Asia. Russian energy companies Larger political dividends, such regional re-engagement is the are actively engaged with their as an enhanced geopolitical realization that the centre of Vietnamese counterparts on joint standing, might also accrue from global business activity is shifting projects inland and in coastal areas. the security framework emerging towards the Asia-Pacific, and that Russia has resumed the supply under the auspices of the Shanghai its own economy, including the of advanced military hardware Cooperation Organization (SCO).4 crucial energy and defence sectors, to the Hanoi, with an emphasis The SCO has increased its global require market diversification and of upgrading Vietnam’s air and geopolitical weight and extended expansion. A recent example of the naval capabilities, predominantly its Indo-Pacific footprint with the implementation of such strategy for interdiction and area denial inclusion of India and Pakistan as was the signing in May 2014 of operations. Russian defence full members of the organization at the 30-year mega contract on the contractors have been involved in its summit meeting in Ufa in July annual supply of 38 billion cubic building the submarine training 2015. The ongoing tussle between metres of gas from Eastern Siberia centre for Vietnam’s Navy at Cam Russia and China for control of that to China. Ranh Bay. The Russian armed body complicates any assessment forces have resumed regular port of potential net strategic dividends The political driver is the desire to calls to Cam Ranh Bay for refueling for Moscow. It is therefore not enhance Russia’s regional influence operations. surprising that Russia also feels by reanimating old Soviet ties and the need to expand its engagement by establishing close links with Russia also considers good relations in international security dialogues, former political rivals, notably with both Koreas and Japan, and broadening its security agenda China. Relations with Europe, and critical to its regional engagement. beyond key partners, such as the the Commonwealth of Independent The geographical proximity of SCO, to include groupings like States remain the prime strategic North Korea to Russia borders and the BRICS—Brazil, India, China focus, but the eastern vector of the potential fragility of the ruling and South Africa. In fact, the Russian foreign policy is gaining regime combined with concerns new Russian Defence Doctrine importance. regarding North Kearea’s weapons 2014 suggests that consultations of mass destruction programs with BRICS members are gaining Despite the rhetoric from Moscow, drives Moscow’s close engagement importance in Russia’s global shared by some western analysts, with Pyongyang. Collaboration risk assessments and policy that Russia’s attention is switching in the high technological sphere, formulation.5 away from Europe towards Asia the need for strategic investments and the Pacific, Russia has not in the Russian economy and the In the context of the geopolitics of articulated a clear regional strategy. ongoing interest in maintaining Asia and the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s Unlike the Soviet period, Russia’s political and security dialogue return as a Pacific player is unlikely engagement in the Asia-Pacific is attracts Russia to South Korea and to destabilize the regional balance. driven neither by an overarching Japan. Russia remains an important national agenda nor by political- contributor to the global war on military challenges that require an Similarly, the development of terror and is becoming increasingly immediate strategic response. An friendly relations with China and prominent as a provider of energy assessment of Russia’s diplomatic India is an important purpose resources. Its influence in a number and other activity in the region of Russia’s foreign and strategic of regional forums is likely to remain supports the view that Moscow is policy in Asia. Beijing is at the core high. In the long run, Russia

23 may become a key player in the region’s efforts to restore stability in Korea and—notwithstanding its currently intensifying security relationship with Beijing—possibly to contain China, which many in Russia consider as a future security challenge.

Alexey D Muraviev Head, Department of Social Sciences and International Studies, Curtin University.

1 Roy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin: Chetyre Goda v Kremle (Vladimir Putin: Four Years in the Kremlin), Moskva: Vremya, 2005 p. 215. 2 ‘Kontseptsiya Vneshnei Politiki Rossi- iskoi Federatsii’ (The foreign concept of the Russian Federation), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12 July 2008, http://www.rg. ru/2008/05/26/koncepciya-dok [accessed 29 April 2011]. 3 Primakov proposed his strategic vision during his prime ministerial visit to India in December 1998. Dmitriy Gornostayev and Sergey Sokut, ‘Karatel’naya Aktsiya protiv Iraka Zavershilas’ Krizisom Mezh- dunarodnykh Otnosheniy’ (Punitive ac- tion against Iraq led to the international relations crisis), Nezavisimya Gazeta, 22 December 1998, p. 1. 4 As of early 2015, the Shanghai Coopera- tion Organization comprised six member states—China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; five observer states—Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan; and three dialogue partners—Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka. 5 ‘Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federat- sii’ (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 Janu- ary 2015, p. 2.

24 A New Model of Major Country Relations: Avoiding the Inevitable

Fan Jishe

A New Model of Major Country China has tried hard to dispel the Bush era, the new shorthand Relationship has been the major such concerns and misperceptions for the Sino-US relationship catchphrase in China’s foreign and provide reassurance that became candid, constructive, and policy, especially in its relationship China will not take that path. The cooperative. with the US. The concept itself ‘reassurance message’ China wants is not very new in China’s foreign to convey is directed both at the In 2011, China began to talk policy, but it has been advanced world in general, and toward the about a New Model of Major in a visible way ever since the United States in particular. Country Relationship, and has Sunnylands Summit in June since attached much importance 2013. What has motivated China In the first decade of 2000s, the new to this concept. The context of this to advance this idea? How is the concept of China’s peaceful rise was proposal is particularly important. concept defined? Is this proposal first articulated in 2003 at Boao In 2010, China surpassed Japan in helpful in handling China’s disputes Forum by Mr. Zheng Bijian, then GDP, terms and became the Asia’s with other countries? vice president of the CPC Party second largest economy. Core School. It was also later used by Interests became a controversial An effort to promote President Hu Jintao and Premier topic in the Sino-US relationship, Wen Jiabao. Two years later, in and the United States announced transparency with strategic December 2005, the State Council its high profile Pivot to Asia policy. intention Information Office published a This only added to the tension and white paper entitled ‘China’s the disputes between China and its China’s economic development Peaceful Development Road’. In this neighboring countries over historical in past three decades has been White Paper, China argued that its issues and territory claims, which accompanied by concerns about the national conditions, historical and became more troublesome than ‘China threat’. In late 1990s, China cultural traditions and the present in the past. Thus, scholars and started to increase its investment world development trends made officials from both China and the in military modernization, the last the road of peaceful development USwere very much concerned about of the four modernization objectives an inevitable choice. The White the implications of China’s rise for set in the 1980s under Deng Paper was meant to reassure other its relationship with the US. Xiaoping. Double digit increases countries that China was taking a in the military budget and the new road of peaceful development and Starting from then Vice President capabilities showcased in military would continue to do so as it became Xi Jinping’s visit to the United parades were widely cited to justify stronger in the future. States in February 2012, the theme this perception of “China threat”. of building a New Model of Major The underlying logic goes like this: China’s relations with the United Country Relationship has been first, history teaches that the rising States have been its top priority for highlighted consistently. In a power will challenge the status many years. China has managed to speech delivered at a luncheon co- quo power—as happened before find the appropriate framework for hosted by the National Committee WWI and WWII in the so-called this bilateral relationship. In late and the US-China Business Council, Thucydides’s Trap; second, China 1990s, after China and the United Xi laid out the key components will transform its economic power States exchanged state visits, both for New Model of Major Country into military might; and third, countries agreed to work toward Relationship: increasing mutual China is not a democratic country, developing a constructive strategic understanding and strategic trust, which the so-called Democratic partnership which was later recast respect core interests and major Peace Theory suggests will make as seeking to build a constructive concerns; deepening mutually war more likely. and cooperative relationship. In beneficial cooperation; enhancing

25 cooperation; and coordination promoting practical cooperation; An assessment of progress in international affairs and on enhance people to people and global issues. Immediately after cultural exchange; strengthening The proposal of New Model of Major the Sunnylands Summit, the cooperation on international Country Relationship has been essential features of New Model of and regional hotspots and global helpful in dislodging some barriers Major Country Relationship were issues; and prioritizing cooperation which prevent bilateral cooperation further distilled as: no conflict or on Asia-Pacific affairs and opening up some new vantage confrontation; mutual respect; and points for official dialogue. win-win cooperation. This was Clearly, the proposal of New Model China’s latest attempt to build a of Major Country Relationship is a Both countries have shown their stable and constructive relationship message of strategic reassurance. joint leadership on global issues, between China and the US, which Foreign Minister Wang Yi clearly especially climate change. In would be resilient enough to stated that China respects the November 2014 ASEAN withstand possible challenges in the traditional influence and Summit, both Presidents made the future. immediate interests of the United historic commitments to curb their States in the Asia-Pacific, and greenhouse emissions over the next A defensive proposal China has never thought about two decades. The United States pushing the US out of the region. would cut its 2005 level of carbon President Xi defined the key Nor has China ever had the emissions by 26 to 28 percent features of New Model of Major strategic intention to challenge or before 2025, and China would Country Relationship himself, and even replace the United States for peak its carbon emissions by 2030 Foreign Minister Wang Yi further its position in the world. and will also aim to get 20 percent elaborated this concept in his of its energy from zero-carbon speech delivered at the Brookings This proposal has also been reduced emission sources by the same Institution on 20 September, 2013. to specifics. Foreign Minister year. During President Xi’s state Wang Yi listed the areas of possible visit to Washington in September Key points in this narrative further pragmatic cooperation, 2015, the two Presidents reaffirmed include: for both China and the US including cyber security; climate their determination to move the international environment has change; the Syria issue; the ahead decisively to implement been fundamentally transformed Palestine and Israel peace process, domestic climate policies; to over recent decades—the two the North Korea nuclear issue, and strengthen bilateral coordination countries share many interests and the Afghanistan issue. China is and cooperation; and to promote are increasingly interconnected. ready to work together with the sustainable development; and Neither China nor the US will United States to address these support a transition to green, benefit from confrontation, and war regional and global challenges. low-carbon and climate-resilient will get them nowhere. Avoiding economies. conflict or confrontation is not a In essence, the proposal is defensive. choice but a necessity. Mutual China respects American interests Both sides have tried to narrow respect means that each country and concerns across the world in their differences and boost respects each other’s system, core general, and in the Asia-Pacific cooperation on regional security interests and concerns, and the region in particular. Meanwhile, challenges, such as the nuclear path chosen by their people. This China hopes the United States will crises in Iran and North Korea. As enables both countries to live also respect China’s interests and stated by President Obama in a together in harmony. Win-win concerns. In his speech, Foreign press conference on 25 September, cooperation is to work together and Minister Wang Yi noted that the 2015, China was critical to both contribute on issues ranging from Taiwan issue and the “system and the sanctions regime that brought counterterrorism, nonproliferation, path chosen by their people” as two Iran to the negotiating table and climate change to peace in of China’s major concerns, among to the talks that produced the the Middle East and economic others. comprehensive deal to prevent Iran development in Africa. from obtaining a nuclear weapons. Overall, the proposal advocates China broadened its cooperation avoiding the bad, promoting the As to how to build the New Model with the United States in addressing good and accommodating each of Major Country Relationship, the proliferation challenge from other. It is the broad and principled Foreign Minister Wang Yi has North Korea. As well, both sides framework for Sino-US relations advanced a number of ideas: decided to maintain communication that China has pursed for so long. enhancing strategic trust, and cooperation with one another

26 on the Afghanistan issue, to Country Relationship between increased and increasing economic, support peaceful reconstruction and China and the US, the US has political and military capabilities economic development, support the been very hesitant or at least viewed? Are these capabilities seen reconciliation process and promote less enthusiastic in responding to as enabling China to take more trilateral dialogue between China, China’s request for mutual respect. international responsibilities, to the United States and Afghanistan. American reluctance is partially contribute more to the international because the United States is not public good, or viewed as preparing Bilaterally, military-to-military ready yet to accept China as an for the 'inevitable' conflict? relations between China and the equal great power, and partially United States have progressed because the United States is significantly in the past three concerned that China remains quite Fan Jishe years. These advances include: vague on its core interests. Senior Fellow and Director for exchange visits of high ranking Strategic Studies, Institute of military officials has increased Working on a strategically American Studies at Chinese dramatically; joint military Academy of Social Sciences. exercises—such as the joint counter stable relationship piracy naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden and the joint search and There can be no doubt that the rise rescue exercise in Hawaii. Further, of China will see China and the US China was invited to participate develop a competitive relationship the Rim of the Pacific Exercise; in the Asia-Pacific. This will two Memoranda of Understanding see competition in the political, on Confidence Building Measures economic and even military arenas. were signed by the US and China A competitive relationship is in November 2014. Overall, the not necessarily negative. What military relationship has been is important is preventing a substantially delinked from the competitive relationship from political relationship, making it developing into a confrontational less vulnerable to other bilateral one. disputes. A New Model of Major Country There have also been other efforts Relationship between China and to manage bilateral differences. the United States is a solution Cyber security issues have been a proposed by China. Over the past major source of friction in bilateral several decades, China and the relations in recent times. China and US have developed four pillars the US set up the China-US Cyber supporting a strategically stable Working Group in 2013 to address relationship between two countries: the thorny topic. Though China mutual vulnerability to a nuclear suspended this Working Group strike; shared interests and common when the US indicted five Chinese challenges; economic and political military officers were involved in an interdependence; and mutual alleged cyber theft case. Both sides reliance on a prosperous and stable managed to address the case in the international environment. recent summit. The two leaders How can these four pillars agreed that neither government be consolidated to make the would conduct or condone economic strategically stable relationship espionage in cyberspace. They also reliably durable? Now it is the agreed on a high-level joint dialogue America’s turn to provide its mechanism on fighting cybercrime solution. The US needs to answer and related issues, together with the following questions: How China a senior experts group for further is defined in American foreign, discussion of cyber security. military, and security strategies? Though advances have been made Is China entitled to protect its in forging a New Model of Major core interests? How are China’s

27 The Ascent and Demise of “New Type of Great Power Relations” Between the US and China

Bonnie Glaser and Jake Douglas

In 2015, relations between the concessions that advance Chinese such effort: a transformative shift in United States and the People’s interests at America’s expense. As power between the world’s “largest Republic of China continued the President Barack Obama prepares developing country” and “largest steady decay seen in recent years. to enter his last year in office, the developed country”, between Their visions for the future order in Administration appears all but whom there are few cultural or Asia, and to some extent globally, ready to shed the phrase and much ideological similarities. To navigate now diverge sharply over issues of the optimism that inspired it. The it peacefully would be a unique of profound disagreement like implications reach far beyond words. diplomatic achievement, for which maritime disputes, regional security “there is no precedent for us to follow architecture, cyber security, and The idea for using a NTGPR and no ready experience for us to international financial institutions. framework to re-conceptualize refer”. While Washington and Beijing Sino-American ties seems to have did sign a significant military-to- originated with former Chinese Independently, a parallel idea arose military agreement and agree to state councilor Dai Bingguo, who at the same time in the American establish a new high-level dialogue first used it in remarks at the second halls of power. Then-Secretary mechanism on cybercrime during round of the US-China Strategic of State Hillary Clinton gave an Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) important speech in March outlining visit this September, there are few in 2010. Xi Jinping was then vice how the US hoped to manage China’s other tangible signs of progress president, and Presidents Obama rise. This task was herculean, in the security domain. Many and Hu Jintao had only just agreed because Washington sought “to observers believe a rubicon has in 2009 on a new joint objective of work with a rising power to foster been reached, if not yet crossed, and “build[ing] a positive, cooperative, its rise… while also sustaining and that the two countries are in acute and comprehensive US-China securing American leadership”. danger of slipping into outright relationship for the 21st century”. As Clinton’s framing was actually more strategic rivalry. the first years of his administration complex than the “Thucydides Trap” have shown, however, Xi like with which it is often conflated. It is therefore especially timely to Deng Xiaoping before him is a “big Not only does the US wish to avert reflect on the idea that was supposed ideas guy” determined to imprint a repeat of the tragedy of ancient to prevent this. Xi’s signature foreign his personal stamp upon Chinese Athens and Sparta during their policy concept, the “New Type of politics. Xi took Dai’s idea and ran hegemonic war, but it also seeks Great Power Relations” (NTGPR, with it. enhanced cooperation on a host of or xinxing daguo guanxi), for a time pressing regional and global issues embodied the joint aspiration of Xi gave his first and fullest that cannot be solved without these nations to avoid the historical elaboration of the concept during a China’s support. trap of established and rising powers visit to the United States in February inevitably coming into conflict.1 Yet 2012. Shrewdly building it out of Beijing was probably the first to the mutual desire for peace quickly President Hu’s existing intellectual realize the basic compatibility ran aground on the practical question structure, in an address to 600 top between these two concepts. By of implementation: peace on whose US corporate and political leaders, May of that year, China was gearing terms? Policy disagreements have Xi called for the two nations to begin up for a once-in-a-decade leadership eroded trust between the two capitals working towards a “new type of transition, and Xi’s strength was and frustration within Washington relationship between major countries already great enough to influence has grown at the perception that in the 21st century”. In another the agenda of the 4th S&ED. Beijing has sought to use the NTGPR speech at the State Department, Xi President Hu appears to have been to obtain and legitimize unilateral hinted at the challenge prompting persuaded to present Xi’s new

28 idea. The opening session was even using the ‘great power/major deference and that it is past time to named after the NTGPR concept. country’ modifier. Beijing designed balance the scales. The Chinese had evidently listened the NTGPR with only Washington closely to Secretary Clinton’s speech in mind, so it is extremely rare With its longstanding human rights in March 2012, and parroted almost for Chinese officials, scholars and concerns and defense commitments her exact language about “writ[ing] media to include any other country under the Taiwan Relations Act, a new answer” to “age-old” problem under its umbrella. This exclusivity Washington probably would never of power transitions. It proved an intensified fears of abandonment have swallowed true accommodation effective buy-in tactic—Clinton said or a Sino-American “G2” power- on even this limited range of issues. she was honored so many Chinese sharing arrangement among US China’s evolving definition of its core officials had referenced “her” idea. allies and partners. Tokyo privately interests and the NTGPR framework American officials probably also pressed hard for Washington to in general has only exacerbated this appreciated that as a new leader, ditch the proposal, so much so that problem. In addition to the restive Xi wanted to break with former then-National Security Council Xinjiang province, some Chinese president Hu and pioneer his own senior director for Asian affairs officials controversially applied the concept for this critical bilateral Evan Medeiros sought to mollify core interest label to the South China relationship. In theory, making Tokyo’s concerns in an interview Sea in 2010 and to the Senkaku/ such a grand rhetorical gesture with a Japanese newspaper. Diaoyu islands in 2013. The 2011 could have gone a long way towards White Paper on China’s Peaceful securing his goodwill. Although every S&ED Strategic Development and the new national Outcomes factsheet since 2013 security law in 2015 also identified The NTGPR received its most has reaffirmed the accord reached “sovereignty and territorial authoritative acclaim by the two at Sunnylands to work towards integrity” as core interests. As for heads of state in June 2013 at the “a new model of relations”, this the new model, at the sixth S&ED Sunnylands Summit. President watered-down phrasing reflects the in July 2014 President Xi explicitly Obama spoke of the need to “forge Administration’s refusal to bend to connected it with this much broader a new model of cooperation between Beijing’s loaded language. reading of Chinese core interests. countries based on mutual interest When a Chinese fighter jet engaged and mutual respect”. In his own Perhaps most importantly, the an American patrol aircraft in a dicey remarks, President Xi offered United States and China have “Top Gun” encounter the following what became the most common very different definitions of month, the Chinese foreign ministry Chinese definition of the concept: mutual respect. In his readout of spokeswoman linked the idea that no confrontation or conflict, mutual the Sunnylands Summit, State realizing NTGPR must begin in respect and win-win cooperation. Councilor Yang Jiechi asserted Asia and lead to the reduction Xi also articulated a second, sub- that the two countries had agreed and eventual termination of US concept—“the new type of military- to acknowledge “each other’s core close-in surveillance along China’s to-military relations”—that was interests and major concerns”. The periphery. welcomed by then-Secretary of issue is that Beijing really means Defense Chuck Hagel and featured US one-sided accommodation of The biggest question is what China prominently in the Defense what China believes to be its core thinks the concept means at the Department’s 2014 China Power interests—the set of policy areas on level of grand strategy. Beijing has Report, as well as in many of the which it brooks no compromise and been inconsistent about whether secretary’s public addresses.2 sees US intervention as illegitimate. it welcomes a role for the United Through the medium of National Xi did not dive into the details States in the Asia-Pacific. Even Security Advisor Tom Donilon, the publicly at Sunnylands, but he had as China assures the US that the US broadcast that it had reached already expounded upon this aspect Pacific Ocean is big enough for both a “consensus” with China to work at great length in his 2012 speech as powers, in May 2014 Xi Jinping towards this new model. vice president. Then, Xi had named outlined a new “Asia for Asians” three core interests: Taiwan, Tibet, security concept at the Chinese- Yet from the very beginning, and China’s unique “development hosted meeting of the Conference on irreconcilable differences in path” (code for the legitimacy of the Interaction and Confidence Building interpretation signaled the practical Chinese Communist Party and its in Asia. This stokes fears that China limits of the NTGPR framework. For authoritarian model of governance). is trying to supplant the United instance, Obama Administration Neglecting to mention any US core States as Asia’s leading power and is officials (except for the State interests, Xi obviously felt Beijing using the NTGPR to seek its ejection Department) have carefully avoided had shown Washington excessive from the region. Indeed, in May 2015

29 Chinese Ambassador to the United Ultimately, the NTGPR has fallen Of course, we do not know what States Cui Tiankai implied that to as quickly as it rose to prominence. Obama has said in private, and overcome its “Cold War mentality” The Obama Administration is weary the White House is not openly and build the new model, the United of playing the slogan game, and its rejecting the concept either. Yet as States would have to abandon its willingness to engage President Xi the United States’ competition with military alliances in Asia. on the language of the new model China for security and influence has worn thin. Beyond the well- continues to deepen, Washington Accepting Beijing’s maximalist known policy disagreements, US will probably stop talking about definition of the NTGPR patience has been stretched to the the new model of relations that was would conflict with many of breaking point by Chinese state supposed to prevent it. Although US Washington’s most vital security media repeatedly spinning America’s officials will continue highlighting interests in the Asia-Pacific. In acceptance of the framework in ways the need for increasing cooperation, particular, defaulting on its treaty it does not support. Frustration managing differences and even commitments would jeopardize builds every time Beijing says avoiding rivalry, they will do so in the bilateral access and basing Washington has already agreed to a significantly more pessimistic agreements that allow the US to what the United States sees as an context. surmount the “tyranny of distance” aspiration that requires hard work involved in projecting power on both sides to achieve. The impact Both countries may have halfway around the globe. Over of lobbying by US allies and partners overreached in seeking to turn a time, frustration in Washington should also not be underestimated. mutual desire to avoid conflict into has mounted with Chinese constant US officials privately complain wide-ranging concessions by the efforts to persuade the US to publicly about the Chinese misrepresenting other side. It is still conceivable reaffirm support for the NTGPR Washington’s position to ASEAN that Beijing will decide to accept the label. Following the Sunnylands countries, suggesting the United legitimacy of a strong US presence Summit, US officials immediately States is privileging Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacific, and Washington began competing with China to at their expense. may ultimately accommodate a role define the framework on their own for China commensurate with its terms. In March 2014, Medeiros Since September 2014, there has power. argued that Washington and Beijing been significant rollback in US official “need to focus less on core interests discourse. Rice conspicuously avoided But achieving a modus vivendi will and… more on common interests”. mentioning the NTGPR during talks require tough negotiations and At the 6th S&ED Secretary Kerry in Beijing that fall. Even more genuine mutual respect. Mouthing said that the NTGPR was “not pointedly, following the November the words of the “new type of great going to be defined by us carving APEC summit Obama outlined power relations” will not be a up areas and suggesting there are his own vision for the relationship panacea for all of the ills in China’s spheres of influence… [but] by as expanding cooperation and relationship with the United States. our mutual embrace of standards narrowing differences where possible. of global behavior”. National The Pentagon under Secretary Bonnie S. Glaser Security Advisor Susan Rice Ashton Carter has also scrubbed any Senior adviser for Asia and stressed in a speech that the US allusion to a new military-to-military Director of the China Power Project and China should “operationalize” model. Despite repeated use by at the Center for Strategic and the framework—and not just senior Chinese officials in speeches International Studies. agree on a slogan—by specifying and op-eds published in American concrete avenues for increased newspapers, the NTGPR was all but Jake A. Douglas cooperation. At the fifth S&ED, dropped from the June 2015 S&ED, Research assistant with the Japan Deputy Secretary of State William and US officials did not make so Chair at Centre for Strategic and Burns linked Chinese fidelity to the much as one public reference to the International Studies. spirit of the new model to Chinese new model during Xi’s official state progress in areas as diverse as the visit in September 2015. 1 China’s preferred English-language trans- lation is “new model of major country exercise of restraint; rules-based relationship”.” regional architecture; human The United States has evidently concluded that the costs of repeating 2 On the rise and fall of the “new type of rights; intellectual property theft; military-to-military relations” concept, freedom of navigation; unimpeded the term outweigh the benefits. To see Bonnie Glaser and Jake Douglas, “An- commerce; the UN Law of the Sea; Beijing’s chagrin, the administration other Sign that US-China Relations Are and even its handling of the Edward appears to have concluded that the Souring,” National Interest, July 7, 2015. Snowden case. NTGPR is an unnecessary liability.

30 China’s Concept for a New Type of Great Power Relations: An Indian Perspective

Neelam D. Sabharwal and Hemant K. Singh

On the agenda for the Xi-Obama China worries about major challenges ASEAN states have welcomed the US summit during Chinese President Xi’s from the established great power, role at the East Asia Summit (EAS), first state visit to the US from 23-28 as evidenced by its concerns about the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus September 2015, Beijing’s insistence America’s “Rebalance” towards process and the expanded ASEAN on engaging the US on a new type Asia. These concerns extend to the Maritime Forum. of major-power relations over the emergence of other rising powers, next decade featured prominently. new strategic alignments and the Thus, managing great power relations Having emerged as an economic consolidation of existing alliances in its has assumed an added urgency for powerhouse following decades of neighborhood. China has thus placed China and has become the fulcrum spectacular and sustained growth, itself in opposition to the “Rebalance”, of its diplomacy with the US since its China now rivals the US as a major seeing it as a cover for countries led new leadership took office in 2012. economic power. Furthermore, as a by the US ganging up on China to The orchestrated build-up of Xi in development paradigm, the so-called prevent its peaceful development. the run up to the leadership change, “Beijing consensus” is superior to the These factors, combined with as a more self-confident and powerful “Washington consensus”, has gained China’s presumptive claim to major leader capable of making big strategic traction in global discourse. Backed power status with its accompanying moves, prepared the ground for by its rapidly modernizing military regional initiatives such as the Asian launching China’s new orientation. and growing political influence in Infrastructure Investment Bank and China lost no time at the beginning regional and global institutions, an new China-led security constructs for of President Xi’s term to reset the ascendant China sees itself as the Asia, have in turn directly challenged fundamental direction of its relations rising power in a region where the the US role in East Asia’s security with the US by announcing its foreign long dominant power, the United order. policy concept of a “New Type of Great States, is declining. Clearly, China Power Relations”. The new concept, sees this as an opportune moment Given China’s unilateral assertiveness, buttressed by China’s foreign policy to reposition itself in relation to the most regional countries want the US under Xi Jinping, has effectively been world’s sole existing great power and define its position on China with clarity. a script characterizing China’s new claim its rightful place at the global This also goes for China’s projection status as the leading power in Asia, high table. of its territorial and maritime claims, poised to be one of the two leading and other destabilizing actions from major powers globally, that China has At the same time, China recognizes Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. The endeavored to act out. that even as its power gap with the US response of regional states to these shrinks, in GDP terms its economy is actions will also determine acceptance The addition of a “new model of still little more than half that of the of China’s claim to regional supremacy major country relations” as a guiding US. China also lags way behind in and positioning as a global power. principle of foreign policy has sent soft power appeal. Though the largest There is also regional support for the Chinese media, party and state fast-growing economy in the world, America’s constructive engagement in entities, strategic community and China is still by its own admission Asia for continued stability. The last indeed the entire foreign policy an emerging economy aspiring to five years have seen the deepening establishment into overdrive to moderate prosperity. In other words, of Trilateral strategic cooperation explain and annotate the concept. China is the first developing country between Australia, Japan and the Reminiscent of the campaigns to have achieved major power status. US, advances in the India-Japan- launched by the theoretical and US Trilateral and an increase in propaganda wings of the Chinese Due to the asymmetry of resources bilateral strategic partnerships such Communist Party in its heyday, this vis-à-vis the US and questions about as the ones developed between India was projected as a novel concept its own future economic growth, and Japan and India and Vietnam. developed by China to manage

31 major power relations appropriate Significantly, the only jointly the US by State Councillor and to the 21st century. The main formulated set of guiding principles former Head of the International characteristics have been described announced by China were the Five Liaison Department of the CCP, Dai as the simultaneous presence of Principles, or Pancasila, coauthored Bingguo, who had also been principal challenges and interests; coexistence with India in 1954. These principles interlocutor with the US and Russia of competition and cooperation; represented the most basic elements and with India on the boundary mutual respect and a win-win of international law, the essential question. In 2010, he tested the idea framework of relations. Within China characteristics of a new type of at the second Sino-US strategic and it was widely applauded as creative interstate relations, and were hailed economic dialogue, when he proposed thinking to defy traditional theories on for their universal validity in a “China and the US should initiate, the inevitability of conflict associated resurgent developing world. But less in an era of globalization, a new type with h the rise of a new power. than a decade after their enunciation, of great power relations of mutual China jettisoned these principles in its respect, harmonious coexistence, China’s influential ally’s have relations with India in 1962. Today, win-win relations between states also endorsed the concept as in a vastly transformed world, China with different social systems, cultural innovative thinking to avoid the has reinvented them to carve its way traditions and levels of development”. so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’, that to regional and global leadership. most dangerous period in relations Indeed, the “new type of great power Ahead of Xi’s visit in 2012, a between states when a rising power relations” in essence bears close compelling case was presented by Cui challenges established pre-eminent similarity to the Five Principles of Tiankai, then Vice Foreign Minister powers. For instance, Kevin Rudd, Peaceful Coexistence. It keeps open and at present China’s Ambassador to Australia’s Prime Minister from 2007- the discourse of equality and sovereign the US. He went so far as to say that 10, and again in 2013, has supported rights to project itself as a responsible for China to follow unswervingly its the concept as a means to avoid the rising power. What has changed strategic choice of taking the peaceful mistakes of the early 20th century. today is that instead of ideological road to development, a major pre- grandstanding, China now focusses on requisite was for China and the US The idea of evaluating the the process of major power dialogue, to develop a new model of bilateral international situation and developing engagement and partnership. relationship. Based on a “win-win its foreign policy and national approach”, the two countries should security goals is consistent with In conformity with this historical cooperate in international affairs, Chinese practice since the founding lineage, an optimistic President Xi maintain channels of dialogue and of the PRC in 1949. Its critique of the raised this concept in the informal communication (including military- existing world order is centered on setting of the Sunnylands Summit to-military links), strengthen the objective of breaking up the global with President Obama in June 2013. business ties, intensify people to concentration of power, while China The core elements were stressed as people exchanges and uphold a views its own accumulation of power no conflict, no confrontation, mutual strategic consensus that neither side as just, democratic and ethical. Thus, respect, and win-win cooperation. Xi has any territorial claims on the in its own transition from a position of had also put forward this idea earlier other. He also listed the five thorny isolation and relative weakness in the when he visited the US in February problems in China-US relations: twentieth century to its emergence as a 2012 as the Chinese Vice President. lack of mutual trust, bottleneck of preeminent power, China has created During that visit, he had called upon “core interests”, Taiwan issue, the a narrative of theoretical constructs: the two countries to work together imperative of treating each other as from Mao’s “strident three worlds” to build a new type of relationship equals, restructuring the trade mix, to Deng’s “setting aside disputes and between major countries in the and ensuring healthy interaction in keeping sovereignty”, “good neighbor 21st century, to set an example of Asia. China, he concluded, respected policy”, “multi-polarity” and “peaceful constructive and cooperative state US legitimate interests and expected rise”. Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world’’ to state relations between countries the US to likewise respect China’s and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” and with different political systems, interests and concerns. “New Type of Great Power Relations” historical and cultural backgrounds add to the narrative. A thread and economic development goals, an Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s address running through these concepts example without precedent and one at the Brookings Institution in propounded unilaterally in different that would inspire future generations. September 2013 explicitly singled out eras has been China’s aim to advance the Asia-Pacific as an experimental its core interests and to achieve a The groundwork for this enunciation area, where the two sides could transformation of existing power was laid during several preceding work together to develop such a hierarchies. rounds of strategic dialogue with relationship. China, he said, had no

32 interest to drive the US away, while US Administration on its own turf. in China’s favor. Its controlled equivalent US respect for China’s But the Xi-Obama summit has not escalation, creeping expansionism interests would ensure the avoidance brought the “new type of major power and growing capacity for military of confrontation. relations” any closer, despite tentative coercion are giving rise to new commitments on cyberattacks. Xi security alignments and strategies Xi’s ambition to engage the US has reiterated China’s claim of for diplomatic, political and military Administration to develop a “New sovereignty over the South China balancing. China’s attempts (with Type of Major Power Relations” Sea “since ancient times”, denied that Russian support) to impose a regional reflects the desire to manage the construction activities target or impact security architecture that pushes relationship to better accommodate any country, and made an ambiguous the US alliance based system and China’s rise and pre-empt threats to commitment that China does not strategic partnerships among like- its ability to advance its expanding “intend” to pursue “militarization”. minded democracies to the periphery economic and strategic interests. are being resisted. Although skeptical, the US side For Asia’s emerging powers, the was initially receptive, as indicated security challenges posed by China India has revived its historical in early statements by President will thus remain paramount. The maritime interests across the Indo Barack Obama and other senior absence of a balanced, region-wide Pacific and joined the US, Japan administration officials. security architecture to mediate power and ASEAN in raising concerns shifts and uphold a rules-based order about maritime freedoms in the Obama and his team may have is acute, rendered infeasible by a lack South China Sea. Japan has adopted assumed that China could be of congruence in national systems and new security laws which will add persuaded to step back from security perspectives. The revival of substance to its aspiration to make challenging the “rebalance” to Asia, Asian power in the 21st century is proactive contributions to peace, the cornerstone of US policy in the creating “Asian anxiety” instead of which has been broadly welcomed in region. However, there is now a “Asian solidarity”. It is increasingly the region. Trilateral constructs are growing perception that the Chinese clear that having long benefitted being elevated and deepened. And position demands disproportionate from the US-led international order, there is still hope that ASEAN may compromises and a pre-emptive China has enjoyed a free ride to major retain enough cohesion to strengthen withdrawal by the US to accommodate power status and secured far greater the EAS as the principal leaders’ Chinese ambitions. China for its salience for itself at the expense of an led forum for strategic dialogue, part has escalated confrontation Asia where everyone rises. security cooperation and upholding a in East Asia and the South China normative regional order. Sea, launched initiatives like Asia This conjuncture must now be Infrastructure Investment Bank scrutinized more critically, and China would do well to understand and presented major new challenges for good reason. In its external that the principal constraint to its on issues like cyber security. These manifestation, Xi’s Chinese dream inexorable rise is its own aggressive, moves signal China’s determination is not a benign construct. It seeks nationalist posture. Alongside its to change the regional order in Asia, to impose a hierarchical regional push for a “new type of major power as much as the US “Rebalance” seeks order which respects Chinese relations”, it should seriously consider to preserve it. So far, China has not hegemony. Countries like Japan and putting forward constructive ideas been able to significantly advance its India must reconcile to this reality for a “new type of emerging power “new type of major power relations” as Russia appear to have; the US relations” that uphold a more multi with the Obama Administration, nor must accommodate; and none can polar balance in Asia to secure peace, has the US been able to persuade question China’s core interests which stability and long term prosperity. China to step back from challenging are non-negotiable. Nowhere is the the cornerstone of its policy in the challenge to regional security more Ambassador Neelam D. Sabharwal Asia-Pacific. evident than in the maritime domain. Associate Professor, University of China’s artificial islands in the South Maastricht. Against this background, Xi’s state China Sea are changing facts on the visit to the US was watched with great ground and will potentially alter the Ambassador Hemant K. Singh interest in world capitals, especially in naval balance of power by excising Professor for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific region. Xi’s proactive the maritime heart out of South East Indian Council for Research on engagement with the US business Asia. International Economic Relations, community and technology leaders to New Delhi. project the lure of the Chinese market Fortunately, the regional power appeared designed to trump the equation has not yet swung irrevocably

33 What’s in a Name?: The China-US Interaction Over the “New Type of Major Country Relationship”

Seiichiro Takagi

When Xi Jinping’s visited the activities, and of Vietnamese and of the US Navy in the Pacific. United States as Vice-Chairman Philippine fishing activities in the Politically, it took the ASEAN of the State in February 2012 and disputed areas continued into 2010. Regional Forum more seriously proposed to establish the Xinxing A Chinese fishing boat rammed than its predecessor and decided Daguo Guanxi, or New Type of into two Japanese coast guard to participate in the East Asian Major Country Relationship1 ships near the Senkakus and the Summit. Economically, it proposed (NTMCR), with the United States, captain was arrested in September to join the ambitious Trans-Pacific it was not so apparent that he 2010. The shift to assertiveness, Partnership (TPP) trade agreement meant far more than simply an which represents a clear departure as the next objective for selected aspiration for positive relations. It from the low profile approach, was partners in the region. China sensed became increasingly clear, however, motivated by several factors. The the budding of a US containment that this new manifestation of most significant is the heightened strategy in these developments. the Chinese penchant for concept- self confidence caused by China’s driven management of important rapid rise in global economic Xi Jinping’s address in Washington international relationships, and status, including a swift recovery in February 2012 was delivered the interaction between the United from the global financial crisis and in this context. Xi called for the States and China over the use surpassing Japan as the world’s establishment of the NTMCR and for of the concept, constituted an largest economy after the US. The a common effort on four particular important aspect of the search for fact that the 2008 global financial issues: mutual understanding and a new bilateral equilibrium with crisis—originated in the US— strategic trust; respect for each serious regional implication. Xi’s fuelled Chinese perceptions that other’s core interests and significant Washington speech was delivered power balance between them and concerns; structure of cooperation, against the backdrop of two the US was shifting in their favor. for mutual benefit and win-win; important changes in the bilateral The Obama Administration’s initial and coordination and cooperation relationship, which had found a accommodative approach to China on international and global issues. post-cold war equilibrium in the in 2009, manifest in its decision Although he did not make clear US engagement approach based to postpone Taiwan arms sale what constituted the NTMCR, it was on its supremacy and China’s low and President’s meeting with Dali clear that the speech called on the profile foreign policy, known as Lama, reinforced these perceptions. U.S. to search for a new equilibrium the Taoguang Yanghui, or hide in the bilateral relationship. capability and bide one’s time. The pronounced shift in China’s One change was China’s shift to external posture, and the concerns The US took the speech seriously. assertive pursuit of what they call expressed by its allies and friends, Xi was, after all, China’s next State “core (national) interests” and the encouraged th United States move Chairman. State Secretary Hilary other was the US rebalance to Asia- its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. Clinton responded to it, in a speech Pacific. The shift, first called a “pivot” and in March 2012, by raising “the then a “rebalance” to Asia, further ancient question of what happens China’s assertiveness was most highlighted the drawdown in when an established power and a clearly visible in the East Asian Iraq and Afghanistan. Compared rising power meet ”. The question maritime theater, with the with the past administrations’ was preceded by the assertion that harassment of the US navy’s emphasis on Asia, the Obama the US is attempting to “work with surveillance activity in the South Administration’s approach a rising power to foster its rise as an China Sea in March 2009 as the was more comprehensive and active contributor to global security, harbinger. Chinese harassment ambitious. Militarily, it centered on stability and prosperity while also of other US naval surveillance a commitment to deploy 60 percent sustaining and securing American

34 leadership”. Former US Secretary confrontation; mutual respect for her intention could have been of State Hilary Clinton appeared social system, developmental road, to define the concept in terms of to be asking how the Chinese felt and win-win cooperation. The gist observable behavior or phenomena, about the strong propensity for a of the formula appeared to be to as in the case of behavioral science, rising power to risk war through convince the US that China would which is closer to the US penchant challenging the established power, avoid confrontation and to make the for focusing on concrete actions. the so-called Thucydides trap. US respect China’s “core interests”, which had been officially defined In any case, Rice’s November China’s response to this question in 2011 as national sovereignty, statement was shortly followed by came in a speech in May by Hu national security, territorial China’s unilateral announcement Jintao. Hu mentioned, as the first integrity, national unity, stability of of the Air Defense Identification of four requirements of the NTMCR, its political system and sustainable Zone (ADIZ) in East China Sea the need of innovative thinking to development. including the airspace above the break down the traditional logic Senkakus. The US government of major power confrontation and Meanwhile, the United States quickly announced disapproval and conflict in the history. This point echoed China’s intention to avoid dispatched military aircraft to the was elaborated on in an article the Thucydides’ trap but was area without prior notification. The written by Cui Tiankai, Vice Foreign unenthusiastic about the use of the exchanges over the ADIZ led to re- Minister, with a junior colleague and term NTMCR. In a speech delivered examination of the US approach published in June. It characterizes in March 2013, National Security to the NTMCR concept. In early the NTMCR as a relationship of Advisor Donilon challenged the December Susan Rice delivered “cooperation not confrontation, win- proposition that an established a speech at a human rights win results not zero-sum game, and power and a rising power are organization, clearly suggesting healthy competition not malicious bound to fight a war, but never that human rights and democracy rivalry”, and argued extensively for referred to the NTMCR President belongs to the US definition of “core its realism and practicality. Obama himself avoided the usage interests”. Even more explicitly, of the Chinese expression and the Quadrennial Defense Review of The article also examined used such phrases as “new model 2014 issued in February included difficulties to be overcome such as of cooperation between countries” the security of allies and partners, the lack of mutual strategic trust, or “new model of the US-China “respect for universal values at mutual respect for core interests, relations” to express basically the home and around the world,” and and interactions in the Asia-Pacific same thought. It seems that what “an international order advanced by (for which the US had to take the U.S. was interested in was the US leadership” in the definition responsibility). Interestingly, the concrete action not words. of the US “core national interest”. article stressed that China had The report also made clear that the no intention to confront the US, However, the US official treatment U.S. was not convinced that China and insisted that the relationship of the concept in the latter half intended to avoid confrontation by with the US takes “a special and of 2013 caused some confusion. noting that “China will continue important position in China’s President Obama’s statement in seeking to counter US strength” overall diplomacy”.It also re- September that he and Xi agreed with its anti-access and area-denial emphasized the low profile (TGYH) to build “a new model of great (A2/AD) approach and its cyber and approach toward the US adopted power relations based on practical space control technologies. These by China’s leaders in the past and cooperation and constructively actions by the US signaled its own suggested that this approach was managing our differences” was demanding expectations of the still being practiced. perceived as acceptance of the concept of “mutual respect for core concept in spite of modifying interest”. From then on to the informal Xi- the phrase. When National Obama summit in California in June Security Advisor Susan Rice said Since 2014, the US has stopped 2013, China took every opportunity in November that “we seek to making explicit reference to the to press for the establishment of operationalize a new model of major NTMCR and started to explicitly the NTMCR. At the press briefing power relations” it was perceived refute what the US considered to be following the two-day informal as another sign of acceptance of implied in the Chinese definition of meeting State Councilor Yang Jiechi the NTMCR concept. The term the term. China, however preferred presented the official formulation “operationalize” was understood to to report that official exchanges of the NTMCR as consisting of mean making the concept work as with the US continued to reaffirm three pillars: no conflict and no the Chinese defined it, even though a consensus on the NTMCR. These

35 distinct attitudes to the NTMCR point proposal for NTMCR at the were starkly apparent at the summit, but also suggested that the Beijing summit in November 2014, Chinese demand for the “mutual with Chinese media reporting respect” had been reformulated. that Obama had agreed to jointly As the objects of “mutual respect”, establish such a relationship while the Xinhua report now only the White House could show that mentions “differences in historical Obama had never mentioned the and cultural tradition, social term. At the joint press conference institutions, road of development in Beijing, Xi publicly stated that and developmental stage”. The list “the Pacific Ocean is broad enough no longer included sovereignty and to accommodate the development of territorial integrity, not to mention both China and the United States”, the reference to “core interest,” which he had reportedly stated at which seems to reflect lowered the informal summit in California expectations on the Chinese side. in 2013 and was interpreted as a proposal to divide up the Pacific The evolution of the US response Ocean into spheres of respective to the Chinese advocacy of influence. Whether or not Xi the NTMCR resembles a piece actually intended it, the notion of wisdom from Confucius, the of spheres of influence was flatly ancient Chinese sage. In the denied by Obama in his speech in chapter 5 of the Analects, he said, Australia which he visited after “At first, my way with men was to Beijing. hear their words and give them credit for their conduct. Now my A similar pattern was evident during way is to hear their words, and look Xi state visit to the US in September at their conduct.”2 The US has yet 2015. Xi mentioned the NTMCR to find effective counter-measures twice at the joint press conference to change China’s disappointing but Obama never mentioned it. conduct. China, on the other The press conference also suggested hand, appears to coming slowly to that the summit meeting had the realization that the NTMCR involved almost confrontational with the US as they defined it in exchanges. Concerning the cyber 2013 is an unattainable goal. And security issue, Obama hailed as they have yet to come up with the common understanding that a new formula, the new strategic neither government would “conduct equilibrium is still in the process of or knowingly support cyber-enabled evolution. theft of intellectual property” but also said that the words need to be followed by action and suggested Seiichiro Takagi the possibility of sanctions Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan against China to protect American Institute of International Affairs companies, citizens and interests. He also expressed “significant 1 The English translation of the term by concerns over land reclamation, both sides varied at first but it gradually settled on this on the Chinese side. The construction and the militarization concept is referred to as the NTMCR, of disputed areas” in the South except in the case of direct quote. China Sea. 2 The translation is by James Legge, and taken from the USC US-China Institute Xi, on the other hand, insisted that website. the “islands in the South China Sea since ancient times are Chinese territory” and defended the land reclamation. A Xinhua report again inferred that Xi had pressed his six-

36 Security Outlook 2016: A South Korean Perspective

Chung-in Moon

Since its inauguration in 2013, the government of President Park Geun-hye has initiated the Kore- an Peninsula Trust Process, which seeks to improve inter-Korean rela- tions and facilitate peaceful reunifi- cation through the promotion of ex- change and cooperation as well as confidence-building. But in practice, the process has been rather dismal. As South Korea and the US con- ducted their annual joint military exercise Key Resolve and military training Foul Eagle from January to April 2015, North Korea responded by conducting massive military ma- neuvers and test-firing seven -sur face-to-air missiles into the sea on 13 March 2015. This was the first time North Korea tested the SA- South Korean President Park Guen-hye with Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Beijing, 2015. 5—a medium-to-high-altitude sur- Source: Korea.net. face-to-air missile—which was de- veloped by the Soviet Union in the erings were proposed. But Pyong- provocation and violating the 1953 1960s. On 11 May this year, North yang turned them down flatly, and Armistice Agreement. Korea claimed to have successfully inter-Korean relations hit rock-bot- launched a ballistic missile from a tom. Seoul’s response was firm. In submarine, which its state media addition to its usual rhetoric of hailed as a “world-level strategic On 4 August, two South Korean retaliatory punishment, Defense weapon” with an “eye-opening suc- soldiers were critically wounded in Minister Han Min-koo increased cess”. Likewise, military tension a mine blast while patrolling the psychological warfare against North was heightened over the Korean southern part of the heavily fortified Korea by resuming loudspeaker Peninsula in the first half of 2015. demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Paju, broadcasts in the DMZ, which Gyeonggi Province. Although no were suspended in 2004 through With such tension notwithstand- fatalities occurred, the incident mutual consensus at a North-South ing, marking the 70th anniversary shook South Korea. After a two-day general-level talk. The propaganda of Korea’s liberation and nation- joint probe with the United Nations program, known as “Voice of al division on 15 August 2015, the Command, the ROK Joint Chief of Freedom”, broadcast such news Park Government planned an array Staff concluded that steel springs, as the execution of elite military of joint events with North Korea firing pins and other debris from officials and other power struggles as a means for a possible break- the detonated devices collected within the top echelons in the North, through in the stalled inter-Kore- from the scene were consistent the defection of senior North Korean an relations. Soccer and Korean with the wooden-box mines used military officials, information about wrestling matches, joint cultural by the North Korean military. freedom and democracy, and other and performing arts festival events, North Korea was condemned for regional and global issues. Such and religious and academic gath- committing a nasty and intentional broadcasts are known to have been

37 effective in reaching as far as ten and tension reduction, but Korean scheduled and promoting civilian kilometers into the North. Ten days security still remains quite exchanges and cooperation. The after the incident, North Korea’s precarious and uncertain. South can reciprocate by lifting the National Defense Commission ban on the Mt. Geumgang tourist officially denied its involvement in Three scenarios: Escalation, project, as well as relaxing the 24 the landmine explosion, demanding May measures. President Park, Seoul provide solid proof. The de-escalation, status quo who planned to visit the US on North Korean statement said: “If 16 October, could easily persuade A further round of crisis escalation our army really needs to achieve a President Barack Obama to is a disturbing prospect. Pyongyang military purpose, we would have resume a dialogue with Pyongyang, has recently announced that it will used strong firearms, and not three fostering a virtuous cycle of launch a rocket for the peaceful units of mines.” The commission constructive interactions among use of Space around 10 October further warned that the North South Korea, North Korea and the 2015, the 70th anniversary of the Korean military will stage precision US. But the plausibility of this founding of the Korea Workers’ attacks on those speakers. scenario seems rather dim. Party (KWP). Contrary to North The confrontation resembled a Korea’s claim that the rocket is to Finally, an in-between scenario game of chicken awaiting a fatal launch satellites and that it has has some credibility. Despite crash, which could quickly escalate an inherent right to launch it, the Pyongyang’s rocket launch, Seoul into something very serious. This international community regards abides by the 25 August agreement, is more so because Seoul and it as a violation of UN Security and carries out the reunion of Washington started an annual Council resolutions that ban any separated families and retains joint military exercise named the application of ballistic missile- official channels of communication Eulji Freedom Guidance (UFG) related technology. If the North with the North. In a similar on 17 August 2015. Although goes ahead with the launch, it is vein, the Park government could the exercise was by and large likely to face tougher sanctions, become more prudent in imposing a computer simulation, 30,000 and the US would even consider sanctions against the North. Such American soldiers and 50,000 initiating a “secondary boycott” a flexible stance by Seoul could South Korean forces participated, that could severely damage North prevent Pyongyang’s additional along with small numbers of troops Korea’s economy by placing its brinkmanship diplomacy and from Australia, Canada, the United routine trade under sanction. mitigate a hardline military posture. Kingdom, France and New Zealand. Judged on its past practices, North Domestic and international political Korea may well reciprocate by pressures may well prevent the After marathon crisis talks, North undertaking a fourth underground Park government from taking such and South Korea averted the nuclear test. Such developments a reconciliatory stance. Thus, if brink of military confrontation would invalidate the 25 August North Korea launches the rocket, on 25 August 2015. North Korea agreement, and heighten military the status quo scenario might be expressed regret for the landmine tension due to the threatening less likely, in which case the overall blasts that maimed two South peace and stability on the Korean security situation would become Korean soldiers and agreed to Peninsula. worse and more complicated. withdraw forces from the frontline. Although some analysts predict a On the other hand, there is a chance In response, South Korea also potential security crisis, followed for the de-escalation of tension vowed to stop broadcasting anti- by the collapse of the North Korean through mutual concession and Pyongyang propaganda across the regime, it seems highly unlikely in the creation of a virtuous cycle of border. In addition, the negotiations the short run. resulted in an agreement to resume confidence-building and improved bilateral relations between Seoul a reunion for separated families as Stalled Six Party Talks well as expand civilian exchanges and Pyongyang, and Washington and cooperation. More important and Pyongyang. This scenario and North Korea’s nuclear was the reactivation of high-level could become plausible when and ambitions official talks between Pyongyang if the North takes a more prudent and cooperative attitude by not and Seoul that were severed in Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions will only aborting its launch plan, but October 2014. Defusing a sharp continue to pose a major threat to also implementing the 25 August crisis had abruptly resulted in South Korea’s security throughout 2015 agreement by holding the greatly enhanced expectations for 2016. While the Six Party Talks reunion of separated families as improved inter-Korean relations have been stalled since 2009, North

38 Korea has been strengthening its US, but has so far failed. If North in Washington and Tokyo nuclear weapons capability by Korea refrains from any further that Seoul is tilting toward— increasing its stock of plutonium provocation such as a fourth nucle- if not bandwagoning—with and diversifying into uranium ar test, China has insisted that the China. American opposition enrichment. If left unchecked, concerned parties should resume notwithstanding, South Korea North Korea is expected to acquire the Six Party Talks, while urging joined the Asia Infrastructure more than 100 nuclear warheads the US and South Korea to low- Investment Bank (AIIB). The in the coming decade. It has also er the bar for North Korea to join Park government has also shown a undertaken three underground diplomatic talks by avoiding unnec- rather hesitant attitude regarding nuclear tests, and has significantly essary provocations such as joint an American plan to deploy the enhanced its delivery capabilities. South Korea-US military drills and Terminal High-Altitude Area Worse, North Korean leader Kim by reopening the Six Party platform Defense (THAAD) system in South Jong Un pledged to push for the immediately without any conditions Korea, which is designed to shoot “Byongjin Line” —a policy that aims attached. But Seoul and Washing- down incoming short, medium, and to pursue economic development and ton have not taken Beijing’s offer intermediate ballistic missiles from nuclear weapons simultaneously. seriously, and Pyongyang has also the North, partly due to China’s Pyongyang has declared itself as been distancing itself from Beijing. sensitive reaction. Most recently, the ninth nuclear weapons state in As China’s influence is limited, on 3 September, President Park the world, which would jeopardize prospects for the Six Party Talks attended a ceremony in Beijing security on the Korean Peninsula, become even more dim. Failure to celebrating the 70th anniversary trigger a nuclear domino effect in resolve the North Korean nuclear of China’s victory against Japan the region and threaten the global problem through dialogue and ne- and the international war against nuclear non-proliferation regime. gotiations will hinder the process of fascism. She was the only leader inter-Korean confidence-building, among American allies and friends Major stakeholders have remained and eventually precipitate a cat- who attended the Victory Day inactive and even helpless in the astrophic security outcome on the ceremony and parade. face of North Korea’s intensifying Korean Peninsula. nuclear threat. After the third nu- Pundits in Tokyo and Washington clear test in February 2013, Pyong- Walking a tightrope? have accused President Park of yang called for the immediate re- taking an opportunistic attitude sumption of the Six Party Talks Another security concern could toward China, compromising without any preconditions, which arise from China’s strategic the alliance with the US. Such was partly orchestrated by the Chi- rivalry with the US. Since 2010, accusations seem unfair and overly nese government. On January 9, the Obama Administration has simplified. As to the AIIB, other 2015, the North made another pro- been pursuing a “Pivot” to Asia American allies such as Australia posal to suspend its missile launch- strategy, as a means of balancing joined, and Seoul is known to ing and nuclear testing and to make the rise of China. As a staunch have had a full discussion with additional concessions if the US and ally, South Korea is expected to Washington before it made the South Korea halted joint military join the American balancing efforts decision. And the American exercises and training. But Wash- along with Japan and other allies government has not yet officially ington rejected the offer instantly. in the region. But Seoul has been proposed the deployment of Under its “strategic patience” poli- somewhat ambiguous in its strategic THADD. President Park had cy, the Obama administration has positioning. Growing economic a close consultation with the maintained that it won’t talk with dependence on China as well as Obama administration before her Pyongyang unless it comes with a Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang visit to Beijing in September. In sincere attitude and commitment have made the Park government Beijing, she secured an impressive to nuclear disarmament. The US take a more prudent and balanced array of achievements that are also insists that the North must foreign policy between the two beneficial for both South Korea abandon its Byongjin policy. South giants, seeking to harmonize a and the US, which included closer Korea and Japan have taken sides dependable ROK-US alliance and policy consultation between Seoul with the US. developing a strategic cooperative and Beijing; a commitment by partnership with China. the leadership of both countries As host of the Six Party Talks, Chi- to the denuclearization of North na has been trying to narrow the But recent moves by President Korea; reducing the risks of acute gap between North Korea and the Park have generated concerns tensions on the Korean peninsula; candid discussion over the Korean

39 unification; and an agreement on the resumption of a trilateral summit among the ROK, China, and Japan in late October or early November this year. It is true that South Korea under the Park’s leadership has been walking a tight rope between China and the US. But Park’s priority has been the US, and will continue be so for the remainder of her tenure in office.

South Korea has a mixed security outlook in 2016. Whereas President Park is likely to manage bilateral relations with China and the United States relatively well, inter-Korean relations will remain hyperbolic, oscillating between conflict and cooperation. Prospects for a negotiated settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue appear bleak, threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The security dilemma will continue to haunt South Korea throughout 2016.

Professor Chung-in Moon Department of Political Science, Yonsei University.

40 The Regional Security Outlook for 2016: A View From Thailand

Kavi Chongkittavorn

The fluidity of the regional and international security environment has been exemplified by increased tension between the US and China, the world’s two biggest economies. This feature will continue unabated in the years, if not decades, to come due to the unprecedented rise in China’s economic strength and influence over the past three decades. The US—which has been the dominant power in the Asia- Pacific since the end of World War II, is now being challenged both economically and strategically. Unlike Russia, America’s main rival in the past, China’s rise enjoys wider support from networks of developing countries and millions of Chinese A US Marine pilot enters the cockpit of an F/A-18 Hornet, during a training exercise with diaspora around the world. With its the Royal Thai Air Force, 16 February 2015. Source: US Marine Corps. sheer size of population and economy, China’s economic performance is total of 44 committees at various China was first to acceded in 2003, now considered the key indicator of levels, including the summit, along with India. It was only in the well-being of the global economy. ministerial, senior officials, experts 2012 that the US-ASEAN summit Imperative to regional security is and working levels. In comparison, was institutionalized after years of that the Association of South East the US has only 19 committees negotiations due to Washington’s Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries altogether covering the whole gamut hesitations. China and ASEAN have assess and respond intelligently to of their bilateral cooperation. While already held 17 full summits. At the this new international environment. China was awarded the status of moment, Japan, China, South Korea, having a “strategic partnership” India and Australia are all strategic in 2003, the US has not yet been partners with ASEAN. New Zealand ASEAN balances the US-China accorded such a privilege due to “the will become the sixth during the competition lack of substantive contributions” to ASEAN-New Zealand Summit in ASEAN. November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur in Both the US and China are major recognition of Wellington’s enormous dialogue partners of ASEAN. This perception might appear odd, efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. Although the US was among the given the longstanding US military Washington has a lot of catching up first batch of dialogue partner to join presence in the region but makes to do. ASEAN back in 1977, the overall more sense when viewed strictly ASEAN-US relationship is no match from an ASEAN perspective. It took At the end of 2011, the Obama for the one with China that will Washington 18-years to accede to Administration initiated the commemorate its 25th anniversary the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation rebalancing policies towards the of diplomatic relations in 2016. (1976) when ASEAN opened up Asia-Pacific to strengthen its China has the most comprehensive this regional code of conduct for economic and military ties among engagements with ASEAN with a non-ASEAN signatories in 1992. the alliances, friends and even

41 former foes. Now that nearly four often credits the grouping’s collective interdependence into the future years have elapsed, the results effort, especially toughening the will also promote China’s strategic are mixed at best—as the Obama ASEAN joint communique over the values, a consideration that has administration has been jumping South China Sea dispute. At the been essentially absent in the from one international crisis to the same time, Vietnam and the US have region since the end of World War other, especially during its second also boosted their relations in terms II. For China, this is still a work in term. The US has successfully of security and strategic cooperation rapid progress. Huge adjustments deepened and broadened security to new heights, notwithstanding still have to be made to align and, cooperation with the Philippines, their long history as adversaries. hopefully, synergize the combined after years of negligence, following visions of ASEAN and China. Manila’s request for a stronger US As a member of the US-led Trans- security commitment to counter Pacific Partnership (TPP), Vietnam ASEAN’s dilemma China’s growing assertiveness has enjoyed unprecedented support in the South China Sea. Indeed, from Washington, through the This emerging trend constitutes a the enhanced US-Philippines easing of arms supply sanctions strategic dilemma for the members cooperation has already impacted on and other goodwill gestures. Major of ASEAN. Take Thailand as a case Manila’s attitude toward ASEAN, hurdles over sensitive issues such as study. For decades, it has maintained which it helped found in 1967. labor standards and human rights a balanced policy towards the have been worked out to enable two super powers. Thailand is Since the tension over the maritime Vietnam to join TPP when it is ready, America’s oldest regional ally, and stand-off between the Philippines and much to the chagrin of other ASEAN was a bulwark against the spread China over the Scarborough Shoals members who are also the TPP of communism throughout the Cold in 2012, the government of President members. Both the Philippines and War. The fall of the Berlin Wall Beningo Aquino III has opted for more Thailand, the two ASEAN military and an era of enemy deprivation assistance from Washington and in allies of the US, have expressed has reduced Thailand’s strategic the process overlooked the role of interest in joining the TPP. value to the US greatly. This has ASEAN and its effort to engage with consequently pushed Thailand China in managing the conflict after The US rebalancing strategy is away from the America’s security both sides concluded the Declaration undoubtedly essentially to counter radar. The 33-year old Cobra on the Conduct of Parties Concerned the growing influence of China in the Gold exercise—the region’s biggest in the South China Sea in 2002. region. But it is unlikely that it will military exercise—remains the only Its unilateral effort has strained be sustainable over the longer-term significant manifestation of the US- Manila’s ties with ASEAN and has due to China’s proximity, active Thai military alliance. In its early left the impression that ASEAN is a engagement, its huge market and days, this annual exercise, which paper tiger and is not willing to stand its multi-facet cooperation schemes. may have been spared cancelation up against China. Manila’s decision China is the biggest importer of by the Thailand’s military power to seek international arbitration did ASEAN products, and in recent seizure in May 2014, was aimed to not have consensus support within years has also become a major source counter the threats from communist ASEAN. of direct foreign investment. With neighbors. Now it has developed huge infrastructure projects planned into a multinational operation In a stark contrast, Vietnam, which both within the ASEAN framework involving thousands of troops from has a long history of border disputes (known as Master Plan of ASEAN more than two-dozen countries in with China, has relied on a dual- Connectivity) and China’s Belt and the Asia-Pacific including China and track approach. The first priority Road Initiatives, the potential for Myanmar. is to work with ASEAN and engage cooperation is enormous. China collectively. This will continue Since the May 2014 coup, US-Thai to be a slow and long-haul process. The Asian Development Bank has relations have been on hold. China That helps explain why Vietnam’s estimated that ASEAN needs well and other powers have moved diplomatic behavior has been over US$60 billion annually need for decisively to improve their ties careful and consistent, seeking to infrastructure projects. The quick with Thailand. China has been stress, discreetly but forcefully that and successful establishment of Asia the biggest beneficiary as it moves ASEAN should have a central role in Infrastructure Investment Bank quickly to support the military managing this regional conflict. For early this year is a clear barometer administration under the leadership the one thing, Vietnam has never of future China’s indispensable role of Prime Minister General Prayuth belittled ASEAN and its limited in promoting economic growth in Chan-ocha. Both sides have bargaining power. Instead, Hanoi Asia and beyond. Growing economic

42 already achieved unprecedented proceed on its own, especially in the Lumpur, ASEAN leaders need to level of friendship and cooperation, Asia-Pacific where there is fierce be more pro-active in setting the especially in forging closer defense competition from the US. agenda and shaping the outcomes and security ties: a memorandum of discussions among the leaders of understanding for joint military Last year, Beijing proposed that from the US, Russia, China, Japan, exercises has been signed and major ASEAN and China conclude a Treaty India, South Korea, Australia and arms deals are in the pipeline. of Good Neighborliness, Friendship New Zealand., ASEAN is frequently As Thailand focuses on resolving and Cooperation. This marked the criticized for wasteful formalities political polarization, ensuring first time that Beijing put forward and its failure to take clear positions national reconciliation and stability, such a collective security framework, or address serious matters directly, the US continues to press for the challenging the well-established US- especially emerging crises. Last year, early conduct of general elections led strategic framework in place for the issues of violent extremists and and a return to civilian rule. nearly six decades in this part of the Ebola pandemic dominated the Washington’s “take it or leave it” the world. President Xi has made EAS agenda. Fortunately, ASEAN demand has already alienated the clear that ASEAN and China can leaders were resilient enough to top echelons of the Thai military, aspire to a new type of relationship, rise to the challenge. In years to the group that once ensured close especially on security matters— come, ASEAN will have to take defence cooperation with the US. the notion that the security in Asia opportunities to tackle cross-border Anti-US public sentiment has should be handled by Asians. With issues such as irregular migrants, been on rise due to the perception the South China Sea dispute high on violent extremists and terrorism, that Washington is interfering in the ASEAN agenda, it may be some climate change, humanitarian and domestic affairs. Worse, frequent time before any serious dialogue on disaster management. insulting comments from the US this matter could be initiated. Deep State Department rubs salt into the down, there is still a trust deficit that As the date for the declaration of wounds, leaving the region’s closest must be overcome before a serious ASEAN Community—31 December ally without an ambassador on the dialogue on a China-led security 2015—approaches, it is imperative ground for nearly ten-months. framework is placed on the table. that ASEAN leaders display stronger Unsurprisingly, however, ASEAN leadership and the collective political Clearly, Thailand will continue has expressed its willingness to will needed to accelerate further to serve as a conduit for China’s study the Chinese proposal, and for economic, political and socio-cultural inroads into ASEAN as well as the this purpose a working group will be integration. This will constitute mainland Southeast Asia by the set up and led by Indonesia. Russia, the internal dimension of ASEAN virtue of its geostrategic location India and Indonesia have also centrality—the bedrock of ASEAN and friendly relations. The Thai submitted their separate proposals leadership. To succeed,the existing attitude towards both the US and on collective security cooperation. development gap between the new China is being watched closely by These efforts demonstrate succinctly and old members—which remains other ASEAN colleagues. From major powers’ enormous interest to a big stumbling block for a stronger 2012-2015, Thailand served as contribute to the emerging regional community building—must be a coordinator of ASEAN-China security architecture. The question addressed with focus and urgency. relations, and earned praise for is: Does ASEAN have the mettle to Otherwise, a fully integrated and bringing progress to the ongoing take up this formidable challenge? cohesive ASEAN will remain elusive. process to draft a binding code of ASEAN understands full-well that in conduct for the South China Sea. Strengthening ASEAN the decades to come, its main priority Singapore will coordinate ASEAN- is to manage its relationships with the China relations from 2015-2018, and centrality US and China, and evade becoming a will face the daunting task to move hostage or pawn in their contestation ASEAN needs to get its house in the process further. for bigger spheres of influence. order and ensure that the grouping It is difficult to predict what will can speak in one voice on global Kavi Chongkittavorn transpire in the near term. China issues, especially through ASEAN- Senior Fellow, Institute of Security understands well that strong and led platforms, and in international and International Studies, positive ASEAN-China ties are a arena. The grouping must promote Chulalongkorn University. prerequisite for its growing regional ASEAN centrality in every possible and international profile. Without way and whenever it can. At the ASEAN goodwill and trust, it would upcoming 2015 East Asia Summit be extremely difficult for China to (EAS) in November in Kuala

43 Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Options for Peaceful Settlement*

Arif Havas Oegroseno

Tensions in the South China Sea are not new. Territorial claims have been a feature for some time. While under international law, such acts have no legal validity in terms of proof of ownership— especially when they were executed long after the critical date or the date where disputes initially came into being. Despite these legalities, claimant states continue to make national territorial claims, often for domestic or subtle strategic purposes.

Escalations in the South China Sea can be traced back to the 1970s, which were closely tied to regional strategic development. Yet the latest escalation—which began in 2009—is different. As opposed to the situation some forty years ago, Southeast Asia today is China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. Source: UNCLOS.. characterized by a dense network of linkages that have become an hoped by many, engagement in the discussed strategic matters and important platform for regional process has become an important other important regional issues cooperation and cohesion. platform for countries to exchange at the same table with ASEAN. communication. Indeed, there is now an ASEAN- By adopting Association of led security dialogue in addition Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) However, the latest reclamations to US-led security dialogue in the Charter in 2009, the Association on at least six reefs in the South region. has matured and morphed into China Sea by China has been rules-based organization. Since viewed by many analysts as a In recent decades, the socio- China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty major escalation of the dispute. economic conditions of Southeast of Amity and Cooperation in 2010, These analysts feel that this and East Asian countries have also ASEAN-China relations have been new development could dampen changed enormously. Four regional largely positive and have developed relations between China and countries are member of the G-20, into a much more structured ASEAN claimant states and could and ASEAN’s combined GDP of engagement from the Track One to possibly have negative implications US$2.3 trillion is larger than that the Track Two level. Buttressing for the management of the dispute of India or Russia. If ASEAN could the relationship between ASEAN itself. agree on a status similar to the and China is their agreement on a European Union, the Association Declaration of a Code of Conduct Furthermore, ASEAN has could be sitting at the G-20 table. A on South China Sea. While the successfully launched and number of economic organizations progress may not be as fast as managed the East Asia Summit, have predicted that this region will wherein major global powers have become the locomotive of global

44 economic growth, with many mention the settlement of major Resolution of overlapping countries seeing their GDP triple political disputes with external or even quadruple by 2050. Such contributions, as in the case of the claims in the South China Sea prediction in the Asian Century Aceh Peace Process. have rightfully attracted both All territorial sovereignty disputes jubilation and cynicism. Clearly, the strategic environment have been settled through third party in which the tensions between South adjudication or arbitration. Examples The threats of 40 years ago that China Sea claimant states take in our region include the Sipadan- stemmed mainly from regional wars place today is significantly different Ligitan case involving Malaysia and driven by ideological differences from forty years ago in virtually all Indonesia, and the Pedra Branca- among nations have completely respects: regional security, socio- Batu Puteh case involving Malaysia gone. Today, the threats stem economic development, threat and Singapore. Third party from climate change, pandemics, spectrum, as well as the norms settlement requires a voluntary as well as the borderless war and rules governing state conduct mechanism whereby concerned on terrorism. Organized crime at the regional and global levels. parties enter into agreement to syndicates have become much Prevailing norms and conventions set the terms of references and more sophisticated, often moving along with the extensive network modalities before allowing the third faster than states, especially with of political, social and economic party to commence the legal process the lack of regional extradition connections between all states of settling the territorial disputes. arrangements. Countries in the constitutes a natural barrier to region have found that they must tensions escalating into open war. With five claimants countries— work collaborative to address these Brunei, China, Malaysia, the new forms of threat. Philippines and Vietnam—holding New major initiatives overlapping claims to hundreds of natural features in the South China Contrary to some who view the Recently, China launched a massive Sea, the prospect of actually settling international rules of the game in new connectivity program called dispute through adjudication or respect of oceans as designed by and the Maritime Silk Road of the arbitration is very slim. However, for the Western powers, the United 21st Century. This initiative was all claimants are legally obliged to Nations Convention on the Law publicly announced in 2013 in settle the dispute in peaceful manner of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 was Indonesia, the largest archipelago and without resorting to the use or ratified by countries in Southeast in the world. For such an ambitious threat of use of force, as stipulated and East Asia. This represents a program to succeed, China needs by Article 2 of the United Nations global consensus that was achieved the collaboration and support of Charter, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity with the strong participation of countries in Southeast Asia. If and Cooperation and the Declaration developing states. UNCLOS is a Southeast Asia resembled the on the Code of Conduct in the South major legal innovation for states Middle East there would be no great China Sea. The 1970 United Nations like Indonesia and the Philippines, economic achievement in East Asia. General Assembly Resolution 2625 on because it developed the core legal If the Malacca Straits and Singapore the Declaration of Friendly Relations principles for archipelagic waters. were run by ISIS and pirates, double specifically states that “no territorial The global agenda is no longer digit growth in East Asia would be acquisition resulting from the threat being dictated by the established unimaginable. global powers. Countries in our of use of force shall be recognized as region are also playing a strong While on one hand major strategic legal”. role in shaping global norms. changes have taken place and played Since all of the claimant countries an important role in restraining are not likely to bring their case to Furthermore, the culture of the tensions, particularly in the adjudication, they could resort to international law has started to South China Sea, the deeper belief various different dispute settlement take root in this region as seen by in the region is that these strategic mechanisms. Article 33 of the the signing of numerous maritime changes should have played an United Nations Charter describes boundaries treaties, settlement even more decisive role in removing such mechanisms, additional to of disputes by the International the tensions and resolving the arbitration or judicial settlement, Court of Justice, and the relocation dispute once and for all. Territorial as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, of many international organization sovereignty disputes are invariably conciliation, regional agencies or to the region. In addition, colored with nationalism and arrangements, or other peaceful the business of international patriotism, and are correspondingly means of their own choice. arbitration is growing, not to difficult to resolve.

45 It is difficult to imagine the settlement of territorial disputes through negotiation. Indonesia tried this approach in the Sipadan-Ligitan dispute. Both Indonesia and Malaysia were locked in endless exchanges of historical and old-map arguments. Even the idea of co-ownership found little favour. The leadership in both countries was eventually able to look to the bilateral and regional benefits beyond a settlement of the dispute and opted for adjudication by the ICJ.

Enquiry, mediation and conciliation are forms of initial steps towards a deeper negotiation with the assistance of a third party. Since A MV-22B Osprey helicopter lands on the amphibious dock ship USS Green Bay LPD 20), Indonesia is not a claimant state in West Philippines Sea, Philippines, 23 April 2015. Source: US Marine Corps. the South China Sea—the nearest disputed features are over 300 over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the nautical miles from its territory— and agree to jointly develop Philippines, Timor-Leste and the Indonesia is experienced at the resources adjacent to these Solomon Islands agreed to establish practicing neutrality. islands. While this approach was a multilateral partnership—The subsequently endorsed by all the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) —to Article 33 of the United Nations participants in the workshops address threats to the coral reefs Charter also stipulated regional conducted by Indonesia since 1990 in their waters that account for 76 arrangement as means to settle on managing potential conflicts in percent of the world’s known coral disputes. For example, ASEAN’s the South China Sea, a number species. Again, major sectors of the TAC includes a dispute settlement of practical difficulties proved all maritime boundaries between these mechanism. All five claimant states but insurmountable: the area or states remain limited. are party to the TAC. However, exact location of the proposed joint regardless of the mechanisms development; the operators of the In this light, ASEAN and China available to settle territorial proposed joint development; risk could consider entering into a disputes, the most important factor and profit sharing; and dispute dialogue with the CTI and also will always be the political courage settlement procedures. Article 6 with the three managers of the among claimant states to commit of the 2002 ASEAN plus China Malacca/Singapore Straits to get to settling a dispute with the declaration on the conduct of first-hand information and practical involvement of a third party. parties in the South China Sea also experience. These collaborative stipulates that cooperative activities activities must continue to take Unfortunately, although there are may be undertaken pending shape with a view to be applicable to on-going efforts to manage the a comprehensive and durable the disputes in the South China Sea. likely consequences of the territorial settlement. To date, however, not disputes in the South China Sea, a single long-standing cooperative Arif Havas Oegroseno the actual settlement of these activity in this area has been Former Indonesian Ambassador dispute is not on the agenda of any implemented. to Belgium, Luxembourg and the negotiations. European Union On the other hand, Indonesia, High probability of managing Malaysia and Singapore manage to * Adapted from the author’s article, “ State cooperate closely on ensuring the Practices in South East Asia: Possible the disputes in the South Collaboration Amongst Claimants of smooth functioning of the Malacca/ South China Sea Dispute”, originally pub- China Sea Singapore Straits even though not lished in the Indonesian Quarterly, vol.43, all of the maritime boundary and no. 2, 2015. Reprinted with permission. In 1979, China formally proposed sovereignty issues between them to Japan that the two countries set have been settled. Similarly, in 2007, aside the question of sovereignty six countries, namely Indonesia,

46 The ‘Boat People’ Crisis: Promoting Regulation and Mitigation

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Both the Mediterranean and Andaman Sea’s have been beset with similar displacement crises over the past year. In both areas, ‘irregular’ migration has been driven by war, conflict and attendant civil strife, forcing those who felt persecuted and endangered to seek shelter and better livelihoods elsewhere through geographical proximity and commercially-organized people smuggling as well as all other available means of escape. Yet the apparent similarities between the two regions belie at least two fundamental differences. First, the Mediterranean migration crisis stems from intractable civil conflict and communal violence in the Middle East and North Africa with no regional framework of Fishing boat carrying Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants is pulled to shore by Achenese mitigation and regulation. Second, fisherman off the coast of Julok, Aceh, Indonesia, 20 May 2015. Source: Rohingya Blogger. migrants from these violence- infested regions of deep-seated western Rakhine state and from the one hand and transnational tribal tensions who seek refuge in Bangladesh itself—have been crime (human smuggling) on the wealthier and welfare-providing trying to enter countries where other. This essay aims to lay out European countries face opposition economic development is still ASEAN’s limitations and dilemmas from indigenous populations steady and the outlook promising. A in coming to terms with the whose developed economies and portion of the labour pool of Muslim Rohingya/Bangladeshi migratory growth prospects are expanding Rohingya’s and Bangladeshis predicament. Ultimately, irregular at a slower trend growth, with from the Andaman area can thus migration in the Andaman may swathes of recession and fiscal be absorbed, in particular, by be intractable and can only austerity throughout, especially in predominantly Muslim Indonesia be mitigated among origin, the Eurozone countries. and Malaysia. The rest, however, destination and transit countries. would have to find resettlement Prevention of persecution and To be sure, the Andaman sources in third countries or be returned migration at the source—that of irregular migration challenges to their home countries. The is, Myanmar’s Rakhine state are no doubt severe and pose non- Rohingya/Bangladeshi irregular and Bangladesh—would require traditional security concerns and migration challenges can also be economic development and policy priorities for the adjoining addressed, up to a point, within domestic peace and stability that states and parties involved. But the ASEAN framework. So far, ASEAN has neither the capacity the Andaman irregular migrants— ASEAN has not been effective nor authority to provide, or other otherwise known as the Rohingya in handling and responding to broader frameworks. ‘boat people’ from Myanmar’s this humanitarian challenge on

47 The Andaman ‘boat people’ in evident in view of the risks taken the Myanmar authorities will and hardship conditions endured achieve nothing for the boat people. regional perspective that the boat people were escaping Myanmar’s reform pathway is bumpy conditions of poverty and/or and flawed, but still a substantial In May 2015, global news headlines persecution. Moreover, the issue of improvement on conditions and were fixated with the many the boat people became politicized at prospects in the recent past prior to thousands of so-called ‘boat people’ the regional, bilateral and domestic 2011. Evidence from interviews of who were stuck in the vast Andaman levels, while lacking international boat people who landed near Aceh Sea straddling South and Southeast consensus for better handling. That in Indonesia indicated that many of Asia engaged in a risky escape from much was agreed. The rest, however, them were from Bangladesh. Even their homelands in pursuit of jobs became murky and disputed, and Bangladeshi media openly called and better livelihoods. Taking remains to be worked out. for its government to do a better job extreme risks under squalid of eradicating extreme poverty to conditions with an uncertain Myanmar was at the centre of the entice desolate Bangladeshis not to fate, these waves of boat people s controversy. It was conventionally leave in the first place. At one point, shone the international spotlight understood that the vast majority even Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on longstanding regional human of the boat people derive from publicly criticized both middlemen smuggling networks along with the Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where traffickers and the Bangladeshi persecution and poverty of hapless they were a persecuted Muslim immigrants for tainting the victims in western Myanmar and minority whom the country’s country’s image. The narrative of Bangladesh. Tracing their origins, Buddhist majority deeply the boat people was lopsided and handling their sufferings at sea and detested and whom the Myanmar more attention needed to focus on finding longer-term solutions posed government refused to recognize Bangladesh and what it had done regional challenges for the countries with proper citizen and residential and not done to provoke the exodus. involved and for the international rights. The boat people crisis stoked community more broadly. The old wounds of political confrontation For Malaysia, the issue is as much flight and plight of these boat people within Myanmar between the domestic as regional. As chair of in the Andaman Sea became—and military-dominated government and the Association of South East Asian will continue to pose—a conundrum dissident groups inside and outside Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia could which must be overseen and the country who have opposed not afford to let the crisis of the mitigated by a regional framework Myanmar’s reform path since boat people, some of whose remains with international backing that August 2011. Dissident groups were discovered in mass graves on goes beyond any single country. seized on the opportunity to pounce Malaysian soil, derail its regional on Myanmar’s government and the leadership agenda and its chance It has been established that loads opposition alike, not sparing even to shine, especially in the launch of people from the areas in the the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi for year of the ASEAN Community. vicinity of Bangladesh and western not speaking up for the ‘Rohingya’ The ASEAN chairmanship was also Myanmar traversed the adjacent boat people. For most Myanmar seen as a means for Prime Minister sea-lanes in rickety fishing boats people, however, the Rohingya Najib Razak’s to boost his embattled towards Thailand, Malaysia and are not the problem as these are domestic political position, through Indonesia. Their geographic ‘Bengali’ denizens who should be countering the challenges of origins, ethnic makeup, destination returned to Bangladesh. Myanmar corruption scandals and maneuvers aims and future aspirations were was thus lukewarm towards any within the ruling UMNO party a matter of contention among the regional framework to deal with the of the Barisan Nasional coalition countries in question. Whether to boat people because most Myanmar government. Success from ASEAN’s call them migrants, refugees, or people, government and opposition regional efforts and the launch of its asylum seekers, let alone ‘Rohingya’, do not recognize the Rohingya. Community aspirations could shore ‘Bengali’ or ‘Bangladeshi’, is up Najib’s standing. This is why similarly contentious. Yet it was If the global and local dissident Malaysia was more forthcoming unmistakable that the boat people groups want to deal with Myanmar’s in allowing detention centres and were exploited by a hidden, illicit government, opposition and society camps to be set up to accommodate regional trade in labor involving more effectively, they will have to be desperate boat people coming physical maltreatment and abuse by more nuanced and respectful. The ashore. Moreover, Prime Minister avaricious and cruel middlemen, with first step, as ever, is to stop calling Najib himself told a visiting the collusion of corrupt authorities Myanmar ‘Burma’ and Yangon delegation of regional Track Two from the countries concerned. It was ‘Rangoon’. Grinding old axes against representatives that Malaysian

48 industries, particularly its were inclined against allowing entrenched hardships in Myanmar agricultural plantations, needed the the boat people to set foot on Thai and Bangladesh and the absence labor the boat people could supply soil, whereas the other anti-coup of a wider governance framework. but that such an arrangement could and pro-election side were more ASEAN is limited in what it can do not be an official policy. sympathetic. With Malaysia and because of its own non-interference Indonesia more accommodating principle and because Bangladesh Indonesia’s accommodation was towards the boat people, Thailand’s is not an ASEAN member. But the also conspicuous. As the largest geographical luck came into play. May meeting in Thailand showed Muslim country and an up-and- Its military government placed that regional cooperation and coming third largest democracy in naval vessels in the sea to provide governance is viable if efforts and the world, with a freshly elected humanitarian supplies and medical commitments were exerted in key president who wants to prove and other assistance for the boat areas, such as a concerted crackdown himself worthy at home and not to people, while delineating its on human trafficking, for example. be taken lightly abroad, Indonesia position as a transit and facilitation Since that meeting, not much has could hardly turn a callous eye to point. Bangkok also hosted been done, as the Andaman boat the predominantly Muslim boat an international conference on people crisis is seasonal. There may people from the Andaman. For irregular migration attended by 17 well be another upsurge of crisis Indonesia, it was about the spirit relevant governments and a handful proportions in late 2015 or again and community of Islam as much of international organizations on in April-May 2016 unless regional as a humanitarian imperative. 29 May 2015. Thailand’s military pre-emptive measures are put in Because Malaysia and Indonesia regime used its regional role and place. ASEAN already has a full were in agreement over the boat international involvement to plate. The regional organization people’s sufferings in May 2015, address the boat people crisis as a has also been weakened by domestic the dire situation was alleviated way of gaining implicit recognition political tensions and crises in key and ameliorated. The management from the international community. member states, such as Malaysia, and/or resolution of this issue in Thailand, and Myanmar. This the future will similarly require For ASEAN, the stakes were salient means that capacity for regional common purpose between Malaysia and substantive. The ten-member governance is extremely limited. and Indonesia. grouping initially displayed its While the ASEAN Economic usual ineffectual stance towards Community beckons by early 2016, Thailand was another by-standing the boat people. But once the self- ASEAN’s momentum is currently country with direct stakes. It is interest of the ASEAN chair set in weak because of member states’ a notorious transit country that and regional peer pressure from domestic challenges, At the same has spawned a wide variety of international prodding mounted, time, Bangladesh is a principal transnational crimes and the ASEAN came round little by little state in the boat people crisis but trafficking of migrant labor, drugs, toward a more responsive posture. it is not an ASEAN member. As a and other illicit trades. The It did not go all the way in trying result, the boat people crisis is likely intersection between Thailand’s to solve the boat people crisis but to be recurrent and intractable status as a transnational crime haven collective ASEAN efforts among because it crosses lines of history, and its diplomatic miscalculation in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, geography, ethnicity, and religion. deporting Uighur refugees to China with discreet personal diplomacy It is a 21st century imbroglio in July 2015 led to major terrorist and nuanced persuasion, sufficed that requires domestic economic incident in central Bangkok just to entice Myanmar to fully take development, effective regional a month later. Having provided part in the 29 May meeting, responses, and global attention and sanctuary and succor to countless seeking to position solutions for support. Domestic shortcomings, refugees from war and conflict in the boat people issue in a regional such as those found in Bangladesh Indochina in the 1970s and 80s framework. What is needed now and Myanmar, that spill over into and to Myanmar’s minority groups is longer-term international the regional domain can still be fleeing ethnic conflicts, Thailand backing and commitments for near- managed and mitigated to preclude can hardly be accused of cold and term assistance and longer-term unconscionable humanitarian costs. careless treatment of suffering and resettlement. victimized neighbours. The boat Thitinan Pongsudhirak people crisis fed into Thailand’s The crisis of the boat people stems Director, Institute of Security own domestic political polarization. from a thriving but unregulated and International studies, The more conservative and pro- industry of people smuggling Chulalongkorn University. coup segments of Thai society underpinned by grim realities and

49 CSCAP: Keeping it Alert, Agile and Relevant

Ralph Cossa and Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa

As a Track Two organization that counts among its 20 Member Committees—some of the most prominent think-tanks in the Asia Pacific—the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) deliberates contemporary and on-the-horizon issues of strategic concern and formulates policy recommendations for consideration by governments in the region. It does this by gathering renowned field, policy and academic experts to address issues sometimes deemed too sensitive for the governmental track. Significantly, CSCAP also involves officials who participate in their personal capacity and add an important dimension to the discussions. ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. At this meeting, members expressed their confidence in the ASEAN Economic Community. Source: ASEAN, Facebook. The organization specifically, and Track Two more generally, are therefore valued not only for their substantive prescience and CSCAP memoranda are regularly Besides the ARF, CSCAP has also confidence-building process but also submitted to the ARF Inter- contributed specific expertise to the for the cross-fertilization of ideas Sessional Support Group (ISG), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and perspectives in developing Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) and (APEC) forum, such as when it pragmatic policy recommendations. the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). produced a CSCAP memorandum CSCAP Study Group meetings are on “Managing Trade of Strategic The value of CSCAP occasionally held back-to-back with Goods”. In addition to driving the the relevant and corresponding ARF’s deliberations on strategic Since its establishment in 1993, ISG/ISM. The ARF has in fact trade, Memorandum No. 14 was CSCAP has sought to align its encouraged this whenever possible used and referred to in the breakout research to be responsive to the to help drive the Track One process. sessions of the APEC Conference primary challenges in the evolving When this happens, Study Group co- on Facilitating Trade in a Secure strategic environment and to the chairs typically compile a summary Trading Environment in Kuala needs of the ASEAN-led security of key findings and present them Lumpur in October 2013. Earlier, institutions that play a big role to the ARF as their own views CSCAP provided a draft “Statement in it. The ASEAN Regional rather than as a consensus CSCAP of Principles for Northeast Asia Forum (ARF), in particular, has document. The feed-in process to Cooperation” to the Six-Party Talks been a primary focus of CSCAP’s the ARF is additionally facilitated to help build cooperation among its engagement and annual ARF by the convenient overlap in participants. Chairman’s Statements in recent membership of CSCAP’s experts CSCAP’s members also participate years have singled out CSCAP’s and the ARF Eminent and Expert in other Track Two processes contribution to its deliberations. Persons (EEP).

50 such as the Network of ASEAN a changing landscape. Others seek Track Two discussions and its Defence and Security Institutions to address policy gaps in nascent consequent recommendations. (NADI), promoting an exchange and evolving priorities such as bio- This might provide especially in perspectives and bridging security. Some of these matters fall valuable background information the divide between defence and naturally within the purview of the for governments faced with security issues within Track ARF and its Work Plans. Others seemingly intractable issues. Direct Two. The Secretariat for NADI, are taken up by organizations engagement between ARF and for example—which supports like APEC and the ADMM Plus. CSCAP experts would also bring the the ASEAN Defence Ministers Although the issues addressed ASEAN-led framework in line with Meeting (ADMM) Plus process— range across the spectrum of ASEAN’s pledge to be a more people- is manned by CSCAP Singapore’s non-traditoonal and traditional centered organization. lead institution, the S. Rajaratnam security challenges, they all remain School of International Studies. pertinent and timely in the regional Third, CSCAP’s relevance and Similarly, experts from Malaysia’s context. Protection of the marine role as a sounding-board for Track lead institution in NADI are also environment, for example, is One in regional security matters members of CSCAP Malaysia. mutually beneficial to all parties— would be strengthened by greater CSCAP’s engagement with other even, or especially to, claimants to substantive feedback from the regional strategic frameworks, such disputed territories—because, as ARF. Over the years, CSCAP has as the ASEAN Defense Ministers the ARF recognizes, non-traditional produced no less than 27 memoranda Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the security issues can serve as on various security challenges East Asia Summit (EAS), would important and early building blocks confronting the Asia-Pacific. The constitute a natural trajectory for for the cultivation of mutual trust, extent of the ARF’s acceptance of its growth and continued relevance. confidence and consensus in the CSCAP recommendations varies region. with the agenda of the Chair or CSCAP’s activities and Co-Chairs of the ARF ISG, ISM contributions have generated Enhancing the value of CSCAP or SOM. It also depends on the interest in membership beyond the level of relations between CSCAP Asia-Pacific region, with informal and Track Two Member Committees and their queries received from Kazakhstan, respective governments. It must Nepal and Pakistan as well as a While the ARF has been receptive still be pointed out, however, that formal application from an institute to and indeed, welcoming of, with the exception of issue-areas in Bangladesh. While it maintains improved ties with CSCAP, like confidence-building measures an inclusive outlook on membership, several procedural measures and preventive diplomacy, CSCAP’s CSCAP has, however, prioritized would enhance its substantive work and publications have enquiries of interest from parties engagement. First, the provision of achieved only modest visibility within the Asia-Pacific. ample advanced notice by the ARF in ARF statements or summary of ISG/ISM meetings would enable reports. As there are currently Current focus of CSCAP Study CSCAP to plan and convene back- no mechanisms to evaluate the to-back meetings more efficiently. usefulness of CSCAP memoranda Groups This would help CSCAP facilitate presented to the ARF and absent more focused meeting agendas for detailed comments from Track One Study Group reports and the benefit of the ARF and promote on the recommendations produced memoranda constitute CSCAP’s greater personal interaction thus far, CSCAP is unable to fully primary output. In 2015, there between Tracks One and Two on evaluate the value and impact of its were four CSCAP Study Groups specific issues. work. respectively concerned: with energy security; preventive diplomacy; Second, CSCAP-ARF relations might ARF feedback on Track Two’s work non-proliferation and disarmament; be raised to the next level through would also be useful to CSCAP’s and harmonization of aeronautical regularized briefings by the CSCAP own assessments of the Study and maritime search and rescue. Co-Chairs to ARF senior officials or Group program. It would enable A fifth Study Group on maritime even to ARF leaders. This would CSCAP as a whole to make more environment protection was narrow the policy gap between informed assessments on whether approved in September 2015. Tracks One and Two, without to form new Study Groups or extend adding to the bureaucratic layers of the tenure of existing ones. Since Some of these Study Groups focus the former while directly conveying Study Groups require the financial on issues of continued concern amid to leaders the candor underpinning and manpower commitment of

51 CSCAP Member Committees, it is contribution to the security policy important that the process does not debate in the Asia-Pacific. We end up eclipsing the outcome and look forward to a continued close that Study Groups avoid replicating association with the ARF, even as Track One discussions. Where we seek to deepen our involvement appropriate, CSCAP should instead with the ADMM Plus, EAS and identify other emerging issues other regional organizations. to form the basis of future Study Groups and to raise consciousness Ralph Cossa among Track One officials. Council for Security Cooperation in CSCAP could return to existing the Asia Pacific, United States. areas prioritized by Track One if developments suggested that it Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa would be fruitful to do so. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, United States. CSCAP’s engagement with ASEAN- led security institutions should CSCAP Co -Chairs also be complemented by greater public outreach as many people still remain unaware of the work done by CSCAP. The cultivation of closer relations with domestic stakeholders within each Member Committee—government, business, academia, media, and civil society—is crucial for this purpose and for added buy-in to the Track Two process. Where appropriate, CSCAP could also act as a conduit for other stakeholders and non- governmental organizations to contribute to the Track One process.

Perhaps what CSCAP must, but has yet to sufficiently consider, is that in order to engage a wider (and younger) audience and publicize its analyses more extensively, CSCAP must make the technological leap and connect digitally, including via social media applications. Hard- copy memoranda may still have a place in certain distribution circles but CSCAP publications should also be available on Member Committee websites and mobile- enabled for smartphone access. Just as CSCAP responds to the flux of the geopolitical regional environment, so too must it adapt its own communication modes to match the increasingly wired Asia- Pacific region.

We believe that CSCAP has made, and continues to make, a significant

52 CSCAP STUDY GROUPS

Study Groups are CSCAP’s primary mechanism to generate analysis and policy recommendations for consideration by governments. These groups serve as fora for consensus building and problem solving and to address sensitive issues and problems ahead of their consideration in official processes. Recently launched study groups:

• Non-proliferation and disarmament • Energy security • Preventive diplomacy • Harmonising air and sea SAR

Recently concluded study groups:

• Regional Security Architecture • Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific • Principle of Good Order at Sea • Preventive Diplomacy

CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES CSCAP PUBLICATIONS CRSO Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) CSCAP membership includes almost all of the major countries of the Asia Pacific and The CRSO is an annual publication to highlight regional also includes the European Union: security issues and to promote and inform policy- relevant outputs as to how Track One (official) and Australia Track Two (non official) actors can, jointly or separately, Brunei advance regional multilateral solutions to these issues. Cambodia Canada CSCAP Memoranda China CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of European Union Study Groups approved by the Steering Committee and India submitted for consideration at the Track One level. Indonesia Japan CSCAP General Conference Reports Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Since 1997, the biennial CSCAP General Conference, Republic of Korea is designed to be an international forum where high Malaysia ranking officials and security experts from the Asia Mongolia Pacific region meet every two years to discuss security New Zealand issues of relevance and to seek new ideas in response The Philippines to evolving developments in Asia Pacific security. Russia The forum is usually attended by approximately 250 Singapore participants; making it one of the largest gatherings of Thailand its kind. United States of America Vietnam Through its publications, CSCAP’s recommendations have been well received by the ARF. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Associate Member)