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Home , Apatheia, Ataraxia, De Otio, Epicureanism, Hermarchus, Seneca the Younger

The Emotional Intelligence of Epicureans:

Doctrinalism and Adaptation in Seneca’s

Seneca’s frequent and often appreciative references to have proved baffling even to so confident an interpreter of as Pierluigi Donini. In the context of a wide-ranging historical analysis which I have long admired, Donini remarks on how exceptional it was for any major thinker of the to be influenced by ; Seneca, he says, was “a completely peculiar and isolated instance.”1 In the continuation of his essay, Donini effectively demolishes the old model of the history of ancient constructed by and Karl Praechter, according to which Seneca and several other authors of the early were seen as “eclectic” who accepted elements of competing systems—Stoic,

Epicurean, or Platonist—with little regard for the coherence of the result. Even Seneca,

Donini insists, cannot be assimilated to that model. “In my judgment,” he writes, “there is either no in Seneca or there is a hint of a further widening of the of the term.”2

Vigorous research over the last several decades has done much to increase our awareness of Seneca’s real intellectual integrity; few today would wish to speak of him as an “eclectic” .3 Yet the historical puzzle presented by Epicurus’ sizeable

1 Donini 2011: 204. (The essay was first published in 1988.) 2 Donini 2011: 209. 3 Seneca’s orthodoxy on the main outlines of Stoic doctrine was established in Rist 1980; the argument has been extended in Cooper 2004; Inwood 2005; Wildberger 2006; Graver 2007: 125-32. The works collected in Damschen and Heil, eds. 2014 offer comprehensive guidance to the issues with further bibliography. 2 role in the Epistulae morales is still with us. Some partial solutions have been suggested,4 but none that does to the full depth and complexity of the problem, or that respects the firmness of Seneca’s convictions and the fineness of his intellect. For the is that Seneca’s response to Epicurus in this, his longest and most elaborate work, operates on several different levels at once. It is an interestingly layered reaction, and its multiple layers, like geological strata, sometimes tend in opposite directions.

To resolve the apparent contradictions in his attitude, one has to keep in that Epicureanism as known to first century CE Romans was much more than a of philosophical doctrines. It was also a certain manner of living, the abstemious personal habits and communal of the school in in the third century; moreover, it represented a certain way of viewing philosophy itself, as a means to tranquility and an activity more important than public service; and, further, a certain method of teaching philosophy, through brief, authoritative pronouncements with injunction to reflect daily upon their application. Insofar as these aspects of Epicurean thought and practice are conceptually independent of one another, they might evoke quite different reactions in a single thoughtful observer. This, I mean to argue, is what we find in the Epistulae morales. Seneca’s fundamental objections to Epicurus’ hedonist system of did not preclude his finding other elements of Epicureanism that he could accept and even embrace. Not only the personal habits of early Epicureans, but also some features of the school’s educational method and even some of its characteristic claims could be absorbed into his way of thinking without detriment to his Stoic adherence.

In particular, Seneca appears to have been attracted by a number of Epicurean assertions having to do with the inner of the human . These include claims

4 Works dealing specifically with the issue include Mutschmann 1915, Schottländer 1955, Motto and Clark 1968, André 1970, Inwood 2007c; and see Setaioli 1988: 172-248; Mazzoli 1989: 1872-3. A list of references may be found in Ferguson 1990: 2280-2.

3 about the efficacy of certain therapeutic arguments and techniques, the claim of KD 4 that corporeal is always either mild or short, the assertion of KD 34 and 35 that malefactors are tormented by anxiety, and several others. I argue here that Seneca understands this series of statements not as normative claims at the level of doctrine but as mere descriptions of typical human reactions. He therefore considers himself justified in drawing upon them as a repository of cultural concerning the characteristics of the psyche. Indeed, insofar as he concedes that the reactions Epicurus describes do actually occur, he feels himself required to resolve any appearance of conflict with Stoic psychology, just as any philosopher must do all he can to make sure that his theory accords with the phenomena of human . He therefore makes an effort to integrate the Epicurean into his own system, supplying alternative explanations for them as needed. In this regard—but only in this regard—Epicureanism becomes for Seneca a legitimate realm of philosophical discovery and an opportunity for philosophical creativity.

Epicurean Doctrine in the Letters

In contrast to some of Seneca’s earlier works, notably the De uita beata and , the Epistulae morales make little effort to argue against the central theses of Epicurean ethics. Seneca does not contend here, as he did in those works, that Epicurus is wrong to treat as the goal of all rational behavior and that virtuous conduct ought not to be regarded merely as a means to attain a pleasurable life. Only as concerns the ultimate basis of friendship, a topic not treated in the earlier works, does he present specific argumentation against an Epicurean position. On this point, however, his objections are clearly and vigorously expressed, and the complaint is laid out right away in Ep. 9, which dominates the initial phase of the correspondence both in length and in intellectual substance. Thereafter his objections are again muted as concerns

Epicurean itself. That his position on that issue remains hostile appears

4 mainly in scattered remarks that seem to presuppose of his earlier views. In

Ep. 33.2, for instance, he takes it for granted that most readers would consider Epicurus to have “professed effeminacy” (mollitiam professo) just as he himself had remarked in

Ben. 4.2.4 and Constant. 14.5; in Ep. 48.2, if he were consulting his own interests alone he would be “talking like an Epicurean” (tamquam Epicureus loquor); in 88.5, the Epicurean typically “praises civic repose while living amid songs and parties” (laudantem statum quietae ciuitatis et inter conuiuia cantusque uitam exigentis; cf. Ben. 4.2.1). At 90.35 it must be Epicurean philosophy that “situates the citizen outside his community and the gods outside the world, making the instrument of pleasure” (quae ciuem extra patriam posuit, extra mundum deos, quae uirtutem donauit uoluptati) for this is essentially the summary of Epicurean doctrine Seneca had recently given in Ben. 4.2 and 4.19.

A more oblique form of criticism is implied in several passages in which a point of agreement between Stoics and Epicureans is treated as an a fortiori argument for the rightness of the Stoic view. In these it is repeatedly assumed that the view of Epicurus is less likely to be correct than that of the Stoic school; if even he upholds a particular claim, then the same claim is yet more defensible when asserted by Stoics. Concerning pain, for instance, he twice reuses an argument he had put forward in Constant. 16, to the effect that when one remembers Epicurus’ famous deathbed letter, the Stoic view that pain cannot impair the blessedness of the wise ceases to strain credulity. The structure of the argument is made especially clear in Ep. 92:

Incredibilia nobis haec uidentur et supra humanam naturam excurrentia; maiestatem

enim eius ex nostra inbecillitate metimur et uitiis nostris nomen uirtutis inponimus.

Quid porro? non aeque incredibile uidetur aliquem in summis cruciatibus positum dicere

‘beatus sum’? Atqui haec uox in ipsa officina uoluptatis audita est. ‘Beatissimum’ inquit

‘hunc et ultimum diem ago’ Epicurus, cum illum hinc urinae difficultas torqueret, hinc

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insanabilis exulcerati dolor uentris. Quare ergo incredibilia ista sint apud qui

uirtutem colunt, cum apud eos quoque reperiantur apud quos uoluptas imperauit?

We find these things incredible and beyond human . That is because we

measure virtue’s grandeur by our own weakness and confer its name on our own

failings. But wait—don’t we find it equally incredible that someone undergoing

extreme torment should say “I am happy”? Yet those words have been heard

within the very workshop of pleasure. “This final day of my life is the happiest,”

said Epicurus, when he was experiencing the double torture of urinary blockage

and an incurable ulcer of the stomach. Why, then, is such an attitude incredible

in the case of those who cultivate virtue, seeing that it is also found in those who

follow pleasure’s commands?5

A similar argument in Ep. 66.45-6 gives occasion for Seneca to display some depth of knowledge concerning Epicurean ethics. Pushing a difficult Stoic case for the equality of all goods, he notes that Epicurus, too, is committed to the thesis, since Epicurus’

“highest and happiest good” (summum illud beatumque) consists in freedom from pain in the body and freedom from disturbance in the mind, and these conditions, once fulfilled, cannot be increased in degree any more than the Stoic goods can.6 None of this connotes positive approval of Epicurus’ views. Quite the contrary: Seneca’s point is

5 Ep. 92.25-26 (and compare 66.47-48). Note, however, that the principal targets of the polemic in Ep. 92 overall are not Epicurean but Peripatetic philosophers. A careful reading make clear that it is the latter who are called degeneres et humillimae mentis in the continuation of 92.26. (Translations from the Epistulae morales are from Graver and Long [forthcoming] throughout; other translations are my own.) 6 The argument is interesting not only for its opportunism but also because it suggests an awareness on Seneca’s part of a in structure between kinetic and . Epicurus does not maintain the equality of all goods, i.e., of all : kinetic pleasures differ in magnitude. Seneca’s point, however, is that some Epicurean pleasures are defined by privation (κατὰ στέρησιν; cf. Ep. 87.39), and that privation is a non-scalar in the same way as consistency is.

6 proven just in that his thesis is also accepted within the less correct philosophical system. Considered on their own terms, the Epicureans’ and do not even qualify as goods: “I will never call freedom from pain a good: a cicada has that, and so does a flea. I will not even say that a quiet, untroubled existence is a good: what is more leisurely than a worm?” (Itaque indolentiam numquam bonum dicam: habet illam cicada, habet pulex. Ne quietem quidem et molestia uacare bonum dicam: quid est otiosius uerme?).7

Meanwhile, it should be recognized that the objections a philosopher might have to an ethical system need not apply to the forms of behavior promoted by that system.

Seneca fully acknowledges that the Epicurean system ultimately favors quite an austere style of life, with meals of barley-gruel or bread and water, pleasures mainly of the intellectual variety, and many injunctions toward cheerful endurance of pain and discomfort.8 Strictly in terms of conduct, he can recommend Epicurean practice to his contemporaries—provided they imitate the Epicureans’ actual manner of living and not the indiscriminate pleasure-seeking which Epicureanism is sometimes wrongly assumed to condone.9 But even the restricted recommendation extends only to the behavior as such, not to the hedonistic basis of the behavior. The point is best understood with reference to the behaviors of friendship as mentioned in Ep. 9. Both

Epicureanism and encourage their adherents to cultivate personal friendships, and this must include the performance of favors (beneficia), the usual stock in trade of

Roman amicitiae.10 The Epicurean version of such friendly conduct is firmly rejected not

7 Ep. 87.19; compare Ben. 4.13.1. 8 In this connection see especially Ep. 18.9-11, 21.10, 25.4. 9 For the misinterpretation see Ep. 21.9-10, 123.10-11; De uita beata 12.3-13.3 insists that it is the Epicureans who are at fault for it. 10 Seneca in Ep. 9.8-10 doubts whether the Epicurean will perform beneficia damaging to his own interests, such as sitting by the other’s bedside in times of illness or assisting him when in prison or in want, and later dying for him or following him into exile. The performance of more ordinary benefits is nonetheless

7 for the actions themselves, but for the Seneca the Epicurean would give for them. The Epicurean forms a friendship (parauit amicum) for reasons of self-interest,

“to have someone to sit beside him in illness, or to assist him in prison or in need” (ut habeat qui sibi aegro adsideat, succurrat in uincula coniecto uel inopi). 11 His generosity is essentially a business transaction (negotiatio ... quae quod consecutura sit spectat, Ep. 9.10) and hence not a friendship at all. The Stoic, Seneca thinks, will likewise form friendships, but for a different : he seeks “to have someone whom he himself may sit beside in illness, whom he himself may liberate from an enemy’s capture” (ut habeat aliquem cui ipse aegro adsideat, quem ipse circumuentum hostili custodia liberet) and in general, to have an opportunity to exercise the virtue of generosity that would otherwise be latent in his character.12 In other words, the ethics of Epicurus remain irremediably flawed even if the behavior they promote is outwardly identical to those of the Stoic wise person in the same situation. Virtue in Seneca’s mind cannot be instrumentalized: if one behaves temperately or justly only in order to secure a pleasurable existence, the conduct is not really virtuous at all.

The point extends likewise to the approval expressed in several of the early letters for Epicurus’ position on the philosophical retreat. As earlier in , Seneca reminds his readers that the Stoics’ general position on service to the human community does not preclude removing oneself from the world for the purposes of study and writing. Such a retreat may be chosen either when there is some impediment to public service or when the retreat itself can be rendered beneficial to others through intellectual discovery or useful forms of writing. It is the latter form of justification that

implicit in his expression amicum parare. Compare 81.11-12, where gratitude for favors received is the attitude of the Epicurean as well as the Stoic. 11 Ep. 9.8, quoting Epicurus’ letter against . Seneca does not appear to be familiar with the alternative Epicurean accounts of friendship that are reported by in Fin. 1.66-70. 12 Ep. 9.8; and compare Ep. 109.1-3.

8 supplies the generic imperative for the Epistulae morales themselves; they are to be written in such a way as to “benefit the greater number” (prodesse pluribus, Ep. 8.1) by providing remedies for the moral ills of Seneca’s contemporaries.13 In terms of conduct, both what he represents in his own person and what he recommends to Lucilius, Seneca thus finds himself in agreement with the letter in which Epicurus urges Idomeneus to give up his career in government service in order to practice philosophy (Ep. 21.3-4,

22.5-6). But this is only a de facto agreement, for in the Epicurean case he regards the retreat as a of base self-interest, with no prior acknowledgement of social responsibility. Had his own retreat been represented in these terms, he would be, as

Lucilius alleges, “lowering himself to Epicurean maxims” (ad Epicureas uoces delaberis,

Ep. 68.10).

Epicurean Discursive Practices

Seneca’s advocacy of the philosophical retreat in the Epistulae morales does not, then, make any concession to Epicurean ethics; if anything, his version of the retreat represents a criticism of theirs. Similarly, it would be a mistake to see a concession to

Epicurean doctrine in the frequent use of quotations from Epicurus and members of his circle in Letters 1-29. This regular discursive practice is a point of considerable interest, however, for it suggests recognition on Seneca’s part of the psychological efficacy of

Epicurean teaching methods, even where he expresses reservations about the substance of what Epicurus had to teach.

The practice is introduced in Ep. 2.4-6 as a recommendation to Lucilius, and by implication to every reader, for a particular manner of reading philosophical texts.

When the goal is to improve one’s character, one should not range widely through large numbers of books but should concentrate on just a few; then, from those few, one

13 See also Ep. 68.1-2 and compare De otio 6.5.

9 should select each day some useful precept to memorize and ponder at length. In offering an initial example drawn from his own reading of Epicurus, Seneca states clearly that the choice of authors does not make him an adherent of Epicurean philosophy: soleo enim et in aliena transire non tamquam transfuga sed tamquam explorator (“for it is my custom to cross even into the other camp, not as a deserter but as a spy”). Nonetheless, the preference for Epicurean authors in the letters that follow is quite strongly marked: of 38 tags quoted in this way in Letters 2-29, 27 are identified as from the writings of Epicurus, Metrodorus, or an unspecified Epicurean author.

This preponderance of Epicurean authors can hardly be ascribed to Epicurean leanings on the part of Lucilius, as has sometimes been inferred.14 Lucilius is never represented in the Epistulae morales or elsewhere as holding any Epicurean beliefs; his commitments are rather to his career in government, to his literary projects and, increasingly as the letters proceed, to Stoicism. The two remarks that give Lucilius a proprietary interest in Epicurus (inuideas licet, 20.9; Epicuri tui, 23.9) should instead be recognized as part of a pattern of playful utterance that Seneca develops in connection with the excerpted maxims. Seneca begins early on to speak of the quotations from

Epicurus and others as a kind of commodity, a “payment” (peculium, 12.10) or “little gift” (munusculum, 10.5, 16.7) enclosed with each letter, a “present from ”

(munus15 Graecum, 15.9). Lucilius is soon coopted into the game, teased for peeking

14 This suggestion by Schottländer 1955: 136-7, rightly resisted by Mazzoli 1989: 1972-3, has been defended by Miriam Griffin 2007a: 91, primarily on the basis of 20.9 and 23.9, but see below. It is not the case that Lucilius “is clearly represented as speaking for Epicurus” in 20.11: the words seem to be addressed to Epicurus himself (although the text is corrupt), but the objection is one that might be voiced by anyone. Griffin notes that since Lucilius appears to be a Stoic in the and De prouidentia, the alleged Epicurean Lucilius of the Epistulae morales must be Seneca’s creation. He would then be a surrogate for the popularity of Epicurean views within the wider audience that Seneca expects to reach with the Epistulae morales. But it would surely be a strange gesture for a Stoic author to publicly assign Epicurean views to a friend who did not actually hold such views. 15 Accepting Haase’s emendation.

10 ahead (24.22), and even for demanding outright, “Pay what you owe!” (redde quod debes,

18.14). To pay him, Seneca must “get a loan from Epicurus” (ab Epicuro mutuum sumam,

17.11); hence whatever Seneca might find in Epicurus’ writings is already by implication owed to Lucilius: “you know whose money-box I use” (scis cuius arca utar,

26.8). When Seneca speaks of “your Epicurus,” then, he is referring to his adherent’s expected “gift,” not to his supposed philosophical adherence.16

But if Epicurus is not invoked in the early books of letters for the sake of his philosophical views, then why is he invoked at all? A partial answer explored in an essay by Brad Inwood has to do with Seneca’s literary ambitions for his work.17 The manner in which Seneca speaks of Epicurus’ letter to Idomeneus in Ep. 21.3-6 makes it clear he regards Epicurus’ correspondence as a classic of philosophical writing: not only his letters but also the name of his addressee will live forever in the esteem of readers, alongside the works of Cicero and Vergil. One should remember at this point that the collection of Epicurean letters known to Seneca and his contemporaries may have been rather different in style from the three letters we have extant today; they were at least more personal in tone, less technical and (from what little we can tell) less difficult to construe.18 Seneca may well have found in them an important model for his own project in philosophical letter-writing.

16 apud , 8.51 (SVF 3.474), cited by Setaioli in this connection (2014: 245), does not have any bearing on the question of Lucilius’ philosophical adherence. It does show an openness on the part of Chrysippus to using arguments from a rival philosophical school in a therapeutic context, but only in addressing persons in the immediate grip of strong (see further Graver 2007: 196- 201). 17 Inwood 2007c; earlier Mazzoli 1989: 1857; Rosati 1981. 18 Inwood 2007c: 142-5. In addition to the collection of personal letters, of which he knows at least eight in some detail (Ep. 9.1, 9.18, 18.9, 21.3, 22.5-6, 52.3-4, 79.15-16, 81.11-12, 98.9, 99.25-26), Seneca must also have access to a gnomologion (referred to in Ep. 13.17), some or all of the Principal Doctrines (Apocol. 8, De uita beata 7.1, Ep. 30.14) and apparently also the Letter to Menoeceus (Ep. 14.17, 66.45). The evidence is systematically reviewed in Setaioli 1988: 171-256.

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But there is more at issue in these early letters than Epicurus’ status as an epistolographer. Seneca is surely also interested in Epicurus’ particular manner of handling written texts as a vehicle for philosophical training.19 Epicurus himself had urged the importance of memorizing brief summaries of his doctrines which would then be available for constant reflection.20 That exercise would naturally be facilitated by the provision of gnomologia, including the Principal Doctrines, which, whether or not they were compiled by Epicurus himself, must have circulated under his name by at least the first century BCE.21 Seneca’s frequent quotations from Epicurus may be meant to recall this characteristically Epicurean way of reforming a person’s character through meditation on brief ethical sententiae. His encouragement to Lucilius to “rehearse daily”

(cotidie meditare, Ep. 4.5 and 16.1) is strongly reminiscent of Epicurus’ injunction to

Menoeceus to “rehearse these and the related precepts day and night”

(µελέτα…ἡµέρας καὶ νυκτός, Ep. Men. 135). That advice is then reinforced by the provision of daily maxims: quod mihi hodierno die placuit “something I liked today,” Ep.

4.10; huius diei lucellum “the little profit I made today,” 5.7; diurnam mercedulam “the daily dole,” 6.7. For whether or not the letters were ever sent singly to Lucilius before being circulated as a set, the reader is clearly meant to imagine them arriving once a day, each with some matter for meditation enclosed.

The actual content of his selections will not, however, be like what Epicurus himself would supply to the pupil; that is, key doctrines of the Epicurean system such as are contained in the letter to Menoeceus or the Principal Doctrines. Instead, Seneca favors bland, non-specific admonitions that might be accommodated to virtually any philosophical system, like “become a slave to philosophy, that you may gain true

19 This suggestion was made already in Griffin 1992: 352; see also Schmid 1955: 130. For the therapeutic dimension of Seneca’s project in general, see esp. Setaioli 2014. 20 Ep. Hdt. 83; Ep. Men. 135. 21 , col. 43, 20-1.

12 liberty” (philosophiae servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera , Ep. 8.7) or “ beyond bounds begets insanity” (inmodica ira gignit insaniam, 18.14). Usually the actual quotation is accompanied by a few words of explication and further reflection, which will sometimes carry the thought in a new direction; for instance, Ep. 20.10-11 argues against Epicurus’ emphasis on literal poverty, and Ep. 25.4-6, on “do everything as if

Epicurus were watching you” (sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus) suggests using instead some admired figure from ’s past like Cato or Laelius.22

This matter of the Epicurean maxims in Ep. 1-29 can serve to illustrate what I mean by a layered response on Seneca’s part. At one level, the level of therapeutic method, Seneca shows real insight into Epicurean texts and appreciation for what they have to offer, even while at another level, the level of philosophical doctrine, he remains resistant. Moreover, the willingness he shows to speak favorably about Epicureanism brings out much already about the nature of his adherence to Stoicism. Clearly he does not regard that adherence as the kind of commitment that should make him reluctant to link his authorial voice to achievements of the rival philosophical school. Further remarks on the subject in Ep. 33 also illustrate his readiness to adapt a point drawn from

Epicurean texts to make it accord with characteristic Stoic emphases. In that letter, we find Lucilius asking for the earlier procedure to be continued, using Stoic maxims in place of Epicurean ones. Seneca replies that suitable maxims can indeed be found in abundance in Stoic texts, but he also expresses new reservations about meditative reading itself: it sacrifices the tight logical structure of good philosophical writing, he says, and fosters a subservient attitude in the learner. He does not rescind his earlier

22 “Cato” in Ep. 25.6 is probably Cato the Elder, who appears as a model of old-style in 51.12, 87.9-10, and probably 11.10; compare 95.72, where the two Catos are named together. More puzzling is the interpretation given in 22.13-16 for the Epicurean dictum known to us as Vatican 60. Here Wolfgang Schmid has argued that Seneca is fully aware of Epicurus’ intended meaning, since he expresses it in his own voice in Ep. 102.24, so that 22.15-16 must be a deliberate misconstrual (Schmid 1955).

13 encouragement to Lucilius to adopt the Epicurean technique, but he now maintains that that manner of reading is suitable only for beginners. Thus while he does promise to send “in heaping handfuls” (plena manu) the extracts Lucilius requests, the move to

Stoic texts is accompanied by a shift in emphasis, from regularity and receptivity toward critical assessment and reasoning. Again, the point at issue concerns the psychological efficacy of the reading method, rather than the doctrinal content of the readings; but the method itself is now also to be revised.

Epicurus on Psychic Phenomena

I turn now to a group of instances in which Seneca expresses even more clearly his respect for certain elements of Epicureanism. In these, he goes so far as to show himself in agreement with specific assertions marked as coming from Epicurean sources, sometimes even repeating later on in his own voice a view identical to that of Epicurus.

Yet even in these there is nothing to suggest that he is being drawn into the ambit of

Epicurean thought. His acceptance of the points in question is premised rather on the assumption that Epicureans are capable of providing accurate observations of how human operate under certain conditions. Just for that reason he is willing to take these claims on board for his own study of human nature and its prospects for philosophical advancement.

Just as Seneca had favored the Epicurean strategy of teaching through brief, memorable maxims, so also he cites with approval Epicurus’ practical assessment of the differences among pupils: some make good in philosophy without aid, some like Metrodorus easily follow where another leads, and some, like , need a mule driver to send them in the right direction (Ep. 52.3-4). He also recommends to

Lucilius some ascetic practices he knows about from Epicurean texts, such as restricting one’s diet on specified days (Ep. 18.7-9) or visualizing some good person as a constant spectator for one’s actions (Ep. 11.8-9, 25.4-6)—though in the latter case he again marks

14 the practice as suited primarily for beginners in philosophy. Another thought he regards as particularly helpful for progressors is that the demands of our physical nature can be satisfied with little expenditure.23 This characteristically Epicurean utterance appears early among the maxims, at Ep. 4.10 and again at 16.7, and resurfaces several times, at Ep. 25.4, 39.5, 78.27, 110.18, and even as late as Ep. 119.5-7, where a direct quotation confirms that Seneca still has in mind the Epicurean origins of the thought.24

Because the letters to Lucilius are presented as therapeutic in purpose, it will not always be possible to say whether Seneca includes a claim because he believes it to be true or because he regards it as therapeutically efficacious. On certain issues, however, there is a distinct emphasis on the therapeutic efficacy of the claim. Consider his handling of the Epicurean arguments against the fear of death. These are presented especially in Ep. 30, where they are framed as a conversation with Seneca’s friend

Aufidius Bassus. Frail and elderly, Bassus is contemplating the approach of death with the aid of philosophia—that is, Epicurean philosophy, as is eventually made explicit

(Epicuri praeceptis obsequens, 30.14). Giving his own version of Bassus’ words, Seneca reports a series of arguments that run parallel to those in the Letter to Menoeceus and in

Book 3 of : that it is foolish to fear what you will not be present to , that nature reshuffles and reuses our components, though without any continued consciousness on our part, and that the sated diner is content to leave the banquet.25 It is these and related arguments that have enabled Bassus to face his own impending death

23 As Wildberger observes (2014: 313), even this characteristically Epicurean recommendation takes on a different significance in Seneca. For the Epicurean, the restriction of desires is essential and is understood quantitatively; for the Stoic, limitation ultimately requires an alteration in the nature of desire. 24 Letter to Menoeceus 127-8, Principal Doctrine 21. One can hardly suppose (with Lana 1991: 285) that Seneca’s interest in Epicureanism waned after Ep. 92; clear references in fact continue practically to the end of the extant collection (123.10). 25 Ep. 30.5-6, 9-12; cf. KD 2; Ep. Men. 124-6; Lucr. 3.830-42.

15 with tranquility, and they have a similar effect on Seneca as a character within the letter

(30.7). Moreover, these same arguments are soon taken up in the therapeutic discourse offered to Lucilius and given in Seneca’s own voice. It is precisely the argument from

Letter to Menoeceus 125 that is given in Ep. 36.9 (mors nullum habet incommodum; esse enim debet aliquis cuius sit incommodum: “death holds no disadvantage, for a disadvantage must be that of some existing person”26). Seneca also accepts the symmetry argument as known to us from Lucretius 3.832-43 and 972-77, for he offers a more or less exact version of it in Ep. 54.4-5, applying it to his own situation.

If anything can give grounds for a reading of Seneca as an eclectic philosopher, it should be this trick of taking up an Epicurean claim and representing it soon afterwards in his own authorial voice. Much the same thing happens with Epicurus’ well-known dictum on the brevity of severe pain in Principal Doctrine 4. Again, we hear it first in the conversation with , where it is specifically labeled as a teaching of

Epicurus (Ep. 30.14). The remark is distinctive enough that when we find it elsewhere in the Epistulae morales we should not hesitate to credit it to Epicurean influence. And we do find it three times, at Ep. 24.14, 78.17, and 94.7. But even more impressive is the clear resemblance between the claim of Epicurus quoted in Ep. 97.13, that wrongdoers invariably experience anxiety about the possibility of punishment (potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi non potest: “it can happen that the wrongdoer is concealed, but never that he has confidence of concealment”), and the same claim when given to us in Seneca’s own voice at the end of Ep. 105 (nocens habuit aliquando latendi fortunam, numquam fiduciam: “the wrongdoer sometimes has the chance of concealment,

26 Reading aliquis with the MSS. A longer version of the , again taking very much the Epicurean form, is given in Ep. 99.29-30, where it is used without attribution as a preferable alternative to Metrodorus’ Epicurean view on the management of grief. Compare also Ep. 4.3.

16 but never the confidence,” 105.8). Seneca can hardly be unaware that he is quoting

Epicurus’ words,27 yet he gives no explicit indication of this in the second passage.

Yet even in these cases there has been no alteration in the Stoicism that structures

Seneca’s thinking. His attitude is better described as philosophical opportunism, a willingness to make use of convenient points from another system to support the position to which one is antecedently committed. Concerning wrongdoer anxiety, the alleged phenomenon in fact becomes an argument against Epicurean ethics. Although

Epicurus’ point is eleganter dictum, the role wrongdoer anxiety plays in his system seems to Seneca quite misleading. For him, an intelligent agent does not refrain from harming others merely because he wants to avoid subsequent anxiety, but rather because the act is inherently wrong: sceleris in scelere supplicium est (Ep. 97.14). The anxiety serves only as a secondary penalty. Indeed, the persistence of this anxiety tells in favor of the Stoic view that justice exists in nature:

Illic dissentiamus cum Epicuro ubi dicit nihil iustum esse natura et crimina uitanda esse

quia uitari metus non posse: hic consentiamus, mala facinora conscientia flagellari et

plurimum illi tormentorum esse eo quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac uerberat,

quod sponsoribus securitatis suae non potest credere. Hoc enim ipsum argumentum est,

Epicure, natura nos a scelere abhorrere, quod nulli non etiam inter tuta timor est. Multos

liberat , metu neminem. Quare nisi quia infixa nobis eius rei auersatio est

quam natura damnauit?

27 He had struggled in Ep. 97.13 with his translation of Epicurus’ Greek, giving two versions; the second, ideo non prodest latere peccantibus quia latendi etiam si felicitatem habent, fiduciam non habent, is in some respects even closer to 105.8.

17

We should disagree with Epicurus in that he says there is nothing that is just by

nature and that the reason one should refrain from misdeeds is that one cannot

avoid anxiety from them; we should agree with him, though, that the wrongdoer

is tormented by and that his worst penalty is to bear the hounding

and the lash of constant because he cannot trust those who guarantee him

security. This is proof in itself, Epicurus, that we have a natural horror of

misdeeds: every criminal is afraid, even in a place of safety. Fortune exempts

many from punishment, but none from anxiety. Why, if not because we have an

innate aversion to what nature has condemned?28

An innate aversion is one that develops in us naturally, as part of the teleological process by which rational form their conception of the human good.29 At this point Seneca’s Stoicism puts him directly at odds with Epicurean thought.

Since the effort to combat the fear of death was a priority for Stoic as well as

Epicurean therapy, Seneca could adopt various Epicurean arguments in that area without for the most part creating any complication for his doctrinal position.

Specifically as concerns the argument of Ep. Men. 125, however, there is a significant point at issue. That essential Epicurean argument relies directly on the annihilation of the psyche through dispersal of its atoms at the moment of death. By contrast, at least some Stoics, with Seneca sometimes among them, asserted that although the of ordinary humans are destroyed at death, the souls of the wise ascend to a dwelling in the upper air where they remain until the next time of conflagration.30 But Seneca also

28 Ep. 97.15-16. It should perhaps be pointed out that the word conscientia refers only to one’s awareness of what has been done; it is not equivalent to “moral .” 29 Ep. 120; for discussion see Inwood 2005: 271-301. 30 The Stoic position is attested in Diog. Laert. 7.157 and Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15.20.6 (Long and Sedley 1987: 1.318 = 53W); Seneca echoes it especially in Ep. 79.12 and 92.30-4. For those who fail to achieve

18 expresses considerable uncertainty about postmortem survival in general, most clearly at Ep. 24.18: mors nos aut consumit aut exuit; emissis meliora restant onere detracto, consumptis nihil restat, bona pariter malaque summota sunt (“Death either consumes us or sets us free. If we are released, then better things await us once our burden is removed; if we are consumed, then nothing is waiting for us at all: both goods and are gone”31). The reason for this uncertainty is never made clear. Seneca may mean that since he does not know whether he will achieve the of Stoic wisdom during his lifetime, he cannot now determine which postmortem condition awaits him; or he may be adopting the agnostic stance of in ’s . Either way, his lack of on this point sets him at odds with Epicurus, for whom the utter dissolution of the psyche is an incontrovertible consequence of . For Seneca, the appeal to postmortem nonexistence has a speculative basis that moves it very far from its

Epicurean origin. It is not associated with any sort of argumentation on the nature of death as a physical , even if such argumentation might have been available within the Stoic system. Without that, it lacks nearly all the argumentative force it would have had for an Epicurean like Bassus.

The borrowing from Epicurus is again unproblematic as concerns Principal

Doctrine 4, for here too the Stoics and Epicureans are alike concerned to address a widespread and understandable human fear. In this connection, I would like to draw attention to the presence in Seneca of a second Epicurean strategy for the management of pain, this time involving the manipulation of attention. Here we lack a direct attestation in the extant writings of Epicurus; we do however have clear evidence in a report by Cicero, at Tusc. 3.32-33, which must be based on an Epicurean source.32 Cicero wisdom in life, death brings dispersal “into the Whole”; that is, dissolution (Ep. 71.16, 76.26). Further to the issue, see Smith 2014: 358-59. 31 Ep. 24.18; cf. 65.20, 88.34. 32 For the Epicurean material in Cicero, see Tsouna 2009: 261; Graver 2002.

19 credits Epicurus with a double expedient for easing distress: “distracting the mind from the thought of , and redirecting it to the contemplation of pleasures”

(auocatione a cogitanda molestia et reuocatione ad contemplandas uoluptates). His of auocatio and reuocatio has the ring of technicality, and for this and other reasons I think

Epicurus did indeed posit a psychological capacity for redirecting one’s attention away from evils and fixing one’s mind upon goods in the past or future.33 As Cicero presents it, the evils concerned would be instances of personal bereavement, and the goods would be bodily pleasures. But this must be Cicero’s interpretation, conditioned by polemics and by his own subject matter in Tusculan Disputations 3. The likelier

Epicurean doctrine is the one implied by the deathbed letter to Idomeneus, in which the present is bodily pain and the goods to which one directs one’s attention are mental pleasures such as the memory of conversations with friends.

With this in mind, let’s look at what Seneca says in Ep. 78. The topic is the endurance of bodily pain. Seneca has just paraphrased Principal Doctrine 4; now he suggests what seems to be the same Epicurean expedient as was reported by Cicero: illud quoque proderit, ad alias cogitationes auertere animum et a dolore discedere. There are the same two components: distracting the mind from suffering (Cicero’s auocatio) and redirecting it toward goods (Cicero’s reuocatio).34 At the same time, though, the specific ways Seneca suggests of manipulating one’s attention are distinctly different from what we know or can infer for Epicurus. Epicurus, naturally, has in mind directing one’s thoughts toward remembered pleasures, which might be mental pleasures such as the

33 The capacity called ἐπιβολή; see Graver 2002. 34 The reference to the Epicurean strategy in this passage is much clearer and more direct than in the passages cited in this connection by Armisen-Marchetti 1986 and Wacht 1998: 526-28. See further Wildberger 2006: 123-4, 664; Setaioli 2014: 247-48.

20 memory of philosophical discussions with friends.35 Seneca replaces various forms of pleasure by thoughts connected with virtuous character or virtuous conduct:

Cogita quid honeste, quid fortiter feceris; bonas partes tecum ipse tracta; memoriam in ea

quae maxime miratus es sparge; tunc tibi fortissimus quisque et uictor doloris occurrat.

Think of honorable deeds, brave deeds you have performed; reflect on what is

good in your character. Let your memory range over everything you have most

admired. Then bring to mind some great example of and victory over

pain. (Ep. 78.18).

He differs from Epicurus also on the practice of directing one’s thoughts toward future causes of pain or distress, what Cicero calls the praemeditatio futurorum malorum (Tusc.

3.29). Epicurus is familiar with that technique, but recommends against it, arguing that it is counterproductive.36 Seneca, however, frequently recommends such “pre-rehearsal of future ills” as a way of preparing oneself to face trials with fortitude. “Fix your mind on whatever it is that you are afraid might happen as a thing that definitely will happen. Whatever that evil is, take the measure of it mentally and so assess your fear”

(quidquid uereris ne eueniat euenturum utique propone, et quodcumque est illud malum, tecum ipse metire ac timorem tuum taxa, Ep. 24.2). In so doing he is again in accordance with the

Chrysippan position as known to us from Cicero, Tusc. 3.52 and 3.59.

35 This is stated in Cicero’s account and is also present by implication in the deathbed letter to Idomeneus. The emphasis on pleasures derived from past experience is found also in Ben. 3.4.1-2, where Epicurus is named. See also Ep. 81.11-12 on the gratitude of the wise in Metrodorus. 36 Cic. Tusc. 3.32.

21

The Limits of Opportunism: Rejecting the Phenomena

Because ethical systems need to be grounded in the of human nature, Seneca is theoretically required to find a place in his thinking for such psychic phenomena as he concedes actually occur. For the same reason, however, he can also reject an Epicurean claim when he finds that Epicurus and his colleague Metrodorus stray outside the bounds of sound empirical . This happens on two occasions, both on points where the Epicurean claims (assuming they are accurately reported) would seem to be driven by a priori commitments in ethics, as part of their endeavor to show that a hedonically conceived is available to the wise person in every possible situation.

The first of these claims becomes an issue in Letters 66 and 67, in the context of a treatment of extreme pain due to torture. Here Seneca understands Epicurus to have said that a wise person is able actually to derive pleasure from such an experience:

Epicurus quoque ait sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, ‘dulce

est et ad me nihil pertinet’. Quid miraris si ego paria bona dico

iacentis,> alterius inter tormenta fortissime stantis, cum quod incredibilius est dicat

Epicurus, dulce esse torreri?

Even Epicurus says that the wise person, if roasted in the bull of Phalaris, will

say, “It is pleasant; it does not matter to me at all.” Why are you surprised, then,

if I say there is equivalence in goods between one

standing up to torture, when Epicurus says what is even harder to believe, that it

is pleasurable to be tortured? (Ep. 66.18)

Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat, ‘malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in delicis habeat.

Torqueor, sed fortiter: bene est. Occidor, sed fortiter: bene est.’ Audi Epicurum, dicet et

‘dulce est’. Ego tam honestae rei ac seuerae numquam molle nomen inponam.

22

Attalus the Stoic used to say, “I would rather have fortune keep me in its

encampments than in luxury. I am tortured, but courageously; it is well. I am

slain, but courageously; it is well.” Listen to Epicurus; he will say also “It is

pleasant.” I, however, will never call such a stern and honorable deed by so soft a

name. (Ep. 67.15)

The specific words dulce est distinguish this claim from the one mentioned above, in which Epicurus holds that the wise person can maintain his state of blessedness in times of pain: here, the wise person does not merely find a compensatory pleasure but somehow takes pleasure in the torture itself. We may well wonder whether Epicurus can have said anything quite so extreme, but the Romans must have had a text to that effect, since Cicero quotes the same remark a number of times, notably at Tusc. 2.17.37

For the purposes of his own argument, Seneca finds it advantageous that Epicurus should take this view: it lends itself to an a fortiori argument of the same kind as he builds elsewhere out of the deathbed letter. How could anyone deny plausibility to the

Stoic view that courageous endurance is valuable, when there is someone who is ready to believe it is even pleasurable? But this willingness to make use of the Epicurean claim does not at all mean that he accepts it as true. Quite the contrary, he presents it as a startling assertion that makes the normative human being of the philosophers into a

37 Cicero’s account has the same content as Seneca’s, but is worded differently in Latin, as if independently translated from the same Greek source (Tusc. 2.17: in Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet “quam suave est, quam hoc non curo”). Compare Pis. 42: sapientem etiam si in Phalaridis tauro inclusus succensis ignibus torreatur, dicturum tamen suaue illud esse seque ne tantulum quidem commoveri; Fin. 2.88: at eum nihili facit; ait enim se, si uratur,“quam hoc suaue!” dicturum; also Tusc. 5.31, 75; Fin. 5.85. Although Usener 1887: 338-9, sect. 601, groups all these passages together with Diog. Lart. 118, the latter reports a somewhat different Epicurean claim, that the wise person is eudaimōn while being twisted on the rack but will cry and groan; this would seem to say that he feels pain from the torture but can find compensatory pleasures.

23 bizarre creature that is no longer human. It is precisely to avoid this implication that his

Stoic account is careful to state that the wise person feels pain just as ordinary people do

(Ep. 71.27, 71.29, 85.29).

He is even more dissatisfied with a claim made by Metrodorus concerning the experience of grief. This time he takes the trouble to quote his source in the original

Greek, demonstrating that the language he finds objectionable really is present in the

Epicurean text.

Illud nullo modo probo quod ait Metrodorus, esse aliquam cognatam tristitiae

uoluptatem, hanc esse captandam in eiusmodi tempore. Ipsa Metrodori uerba subscripsi.

Μητροδώρου ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀδελφήν. Ἔστιν γάρ τις ἡδονὴ <λύπῃ

συγγενής, ἣν χρὴ θηρεύ>ειν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρόν.38 De quibus non dubito quid

sis sensurus; quid enim est turpius quam captare in ipso luctu uoluptatem, immo per

luctum, et inter lacrimas quoque quod iuuet quaerere? Hi sunt qui nobis obiciunt

nimium rigorem et infamant praecepta nostra duritiae, quod dicamus dolorem aut

admittendum in animum non esse aut cito expellendum. Vtrum tandem est aut

incredibilius aut inhumanius, non sentire amisso amico dolorem an uoluptatem in ipso

dolore aucupari?

I do not by any means approve of what Metrodorus says, that there is a pleasure

which is akin to sorrow, and that in situations like this one should try to catch

hold of that pleasure. Metrodorus’ exact words are as follows: “For there is a

pleasure akin to grief, which one ought to hunt for in this moment.” I am not in

38 “For there is a pleasure akin to grief, which one ought to hunt for in this moment.” The Greek of the fragment is partially corrupt in the MSS and is not otherwise attested; it has been restored by editors to match Seneca’s Latin rendering (see Reynolds 1965 ad loc.).

24

any doubt as to what view you will take of these words. For what could be more

shameful than to try to catch pleasure in the very midst of grief—indeed through

grief—and to go looking for something delightful even amid one’s tears? And

these are the people who reproach us for excessive rigor and complain that our

teachings are harsh, just because we say one should either not admit grief into

the mind or else cast it out quickly. Which, pray tell, is harder to believe, and

which is less human: not to feel grief when one loses a friend, or to try to snare a

pleasure right in the midst of grief?39

What Seneca understands Metrodorus to have said is rather different from the usual

Epicurean recommendations for neutralizing mental pain. Now it is not that one can direct one’s mind toward pleasures elsewhere to offset the current distress, but actually that one can derive pleasure from one’s circumstances at the time of bereavement, a pleasure akin to grief (λύπῃ συγγενής); or, as Seneca has it, “in the midst of grief, indeed through grief” (in ipso luctu uoluptatem, immo per luctum).40 It is not at all easy to imagine what

Metrodorus has in mind here. To be sure, some people do indulge in maudlin sentimentality over deceased acquaintances to a degree that suggests pleasure, and it is imaginable that even the recently bereaved might experience some corporeal pleasure in the moment of giving way to tears. But these would be strange pleasures to recommend. Given the wording of the sentence Seneca quotes, however, the Roman author can hardly be blamed for assuming that the intended claim is some psychologically strange one, positing some novel form of pleasure that has to be hunted for, and urging the bereaved to take up the hunt. On that basis he finds it far less

39 Ep. 99.25-6. I treat the passage and its context in more detail in Graver 2009: 248-51. 40 Clay 1998: 66 connects it with the “peculiar form of pleasure” (ἰδιοτρόπῳ ἡδονῇ) mentioned in Plut. Non Posse 16.1097e.

25 satisfactory than the Stoic position on or the impassivity of the wise. For as

Seneca he often remarks, Stoic apatheia does not alter or abridge the capacity for affective response which the wise person has by virtue of his humanity.41

A question might be raised, however, as to whether Seneca’s own approach to does not come rather close to the Metrodoran expedient. In this same letter, consoling Marullus, he speaks of a form of weeping “to which we give egress when we revisit the memory of those we have lost and find an element of sweetness in our sorrow—when their enjoyable conversation comes to mind, their cheerful presence, their loving services” (quibus exitum damus cum memoria eorum quos amisimus retractatur, et inest quiddam dulce tristitiae cum occurrunt sermones eorum iucundi, conuersatio hilaris, officiosa , Ep. 99.19). Unlike the involuntary tears that assail even the wise at the moment of burial, these sweeter tears are a voluntary movement: “the eyes let themselves flow just as in joy” (oculi uelut in gaudio relaxantur) and even the wise may indulge in them. Similarly, in an earlier consolation to Lucilius, Seneca remarks that although there is necessarily a twinge or “biting” (morsus) in remembering loved ones who are lost, “even this brings a kind of pleasure” (hic quoque morsus habet suam uoluptatem, Ep. 63.4). Such remarks were undoubtedly conventional in consolatory writing, but philosophers could interpret them according to their own lights, and in

Seneca’s case the interpretation given is firmly along Stoic lines. The morsus and involuntary tears are only preliminary sensations, short-lived and insignificant, while the pleasure in which the wise may indulge is a manifestation of eupathic joy. Such joy, a psychic uplift in response to the mind’s real and integral goods, is a favorite Senecan theme in other contexts42; here, it is derived from the thought of the friend’s good

41 See Ep. 9.2, 11.1, 57.3-4, 71.29, with Graver 2007: 93-101. 42 Notably in Ep. 23.2-6, 27.3-4, 59.1-2, 59.16, 76.27-29, 2, Constant. 9, De uita beata 3-4. Seneca does not have any Latin equivalent for the Stoic term εὐπάθεια.

26 qualities. This is quite different from what Seneca finds in Metrodorus—a pleasure that comes through grief. For the Epicurean, the pain of grief is inevitable, but intelligent management can ensure a preponderance of pleasure in any given moment.43 For the

Stoic, the mental uplift the wise person in considering the friend’s is the only legitimate affective response one can have.

Seneca’s attitude toward the doctrines, practices, and insights of Epicurus and his colleagues in the Garden is indeed complex, with multiple notes of irony and some difficult rhetorical maneuvering. Yet there is an underlying coherence to it that repays careful study. The Roman Stoic’s hostility toward Epicurean and ethics coincides with respect for Epicureans’ personal conduct and with a real appreciation for their educational method and insights in the realm of inner experience. These aspects of his response are not at variance with one another, but they do contextualize and condition one another. When Seneca endorses an Epicurean claim, he does so always with an implied stipulation that the endorsement does not commit him to the larger postulates of the Epicurean system. Conversely, when he objects, even strenuously, to

Epicurus’ hedonism, to his views on the gods, and to his conceptions of friendship and justice, he does so as one who is nonetheless capable of speaking favorably of the

Epicureans’ actual behavior and of what might be called their emotional intelligence.

This is to say that his adherence to Stoicism is ultimately not a matter of partisanship, but simply of conviction: he accepts the Stoic positions, but feels no need to be protective of them. Among his contemporaries in the early Empire, Seneca emerges as a vigorous thinker, accustomed to making fine distinctions, sure of his own views but capable, too, of open-minded and creative engagement with a rival system.

43 See Plut. Non Posse 1101ab; Warren 2004: 39-41; Graver 2002: 157.

27

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