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ABSTRACT The Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues Mark J. Boone, Ph.D. Directors: Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., and Michael P. Foley, Ph.D. The philosophical schools of late antiquity commonly diagnosed human unhappiness as rooted in some fundamental disorder in our desires, and offered various therapies or prescriptions for the healing of desire. Among these only the neo-Platonic treatment for desire requires redirecting desire towards an immaterial world. Although Augustine agrees with the neo-Platonists on the need to redirect our desires to an immaterial world, he does not adopt their therapy for desire. Instead he adopts a thoroughly Christian approach to the healing of desire. The conversion of desire results from the Trinitarian God’s gracious actions taken to heal our desires. Augustine does not recommend fleeing from the influence of the body, as neo-Platonism encourages, but fleeing to Christ, immersing ourselves in the life of the Church, and practicing the theological virtues. In this dissertation I examine Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), Augustine argues that we must vigorously desire wisdom in order to attain it; that we must have hope in the possibility of attaining wisdom; and that our desire for wisdom must be bound in faith to Christ. In De beata vita (On the Happy Life), Augustine argues that the Trinitarian God is the only perennially satisfying object of desire and shows that the pursuit of God is the activity of a prayerful community of believers who are practicing faith, hope, and charity. In De ordine (On Order), Augustine recommends that the reordering of our desires be pursued through a liberal arts education and through Christian morals. In Soliloquia (Soliloquies), Augustine says that we ought to love God and the soul. He also reminds us to submit to Christ’s authority and practice faith, hope, and love. After discussing these things, I discuss in a concluding chapter the harmony of love for God and love for human beings, pointing to passages in the dialogues that suggest this harmony. The Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues by Mark J. Boone, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation Approved by the Department of Philosophy ___________________________________ Michael D. Beaty, Ph.D., Chairperson Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved by the Dissertation Committee ___________________________________ Michael P. Foley, Ph.D., Chairperson ___________________________________ Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., Chairperson ___________________________________ Robert B. Kruschwitz, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Robert C. Roberts, Ph.D. ___________________________________ David Lyle Jeffrey, Ph.D. Accepted by the Graduate School May 2010 ___________________________________ J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean Page bearing signatures is kept on file in the Graduate School. Copyright © 2010 by Mark J. Boone All rights reserved CONTENTS Chapter ONE THE CONVERSION AND THERAPY OF DESIRE IN THE THOUGHT OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 1 Why Examine the Dialogues’ Philosophy of Desire? 2 Methodological Remarks on Reading the Dialogues 14 The Dialogues and Their Therapies 27 TWO THE DESIRE FOR WISDOM IN CONTRA ACADEMICOS 35 Dueling Visions of the Good for Man: Satisfaction, Happiness, and the Human Good in c. Acad. Book I 36 The Practical Consequences of Belief: c. Acad. Book II 52 Transcending the Skeptics: A New Look at the Desire for Wisdom in c. Acad. Book III 63 THREE DESIRING AND HAVING GOD IN DE BEATA VITA 89 The Prologue: The Port of Philosophy and the Land of the Happy Life 90 What Is to Be Loved? 94 Diagnosis of Misery 103 Prescription for Happiness 105 FOUR THE DESIRE TO KNOW ORDER AND TO BE ORDERED IN DE ORDINE 122 Desiring to Know Order: The Prologue to Ord. 123 Leaves, Mice, and Philosophical Inspiration: Issues and Problems with Order 128 Arguing about Order 137 Paths of Ascent to Order 155 The Stability of Happiness 171 FIVE DESIRING GOD AND THE SOUL IN SOLILOQUIA 176 Who Is Reason? 177 Augustine’s Prayer: The Trinitarian Quest for Reordered Desires 181 To Know God and the Soul 185 Arguments for Immortality 196 Desire in Sol. 204 iv SIX THE LOVE OF GOD AND HUMAN BEINGS 209 Methodology 211 Pagan Perspectives on the Communal Human Self 214 Christian Perspectives on the Communal Human Self 219 The Perspective at Cassiciacum 227 WORKS CITED 241 Primary Sources 241 Secondary Sources 244 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful for the guidance of my directors Michael Foley and Thomas Hibbs and my readers Robert Roberts, Robert Kruschwitz, and David Jeffrey. Above all, I am grateful to my wife Shonda for her support during this process; you are a truly excellent wife. vi CHAPTER ONE The Conversion and Therapy of Desire in the Thought of Saint Augustine In the Foreword to Augustine J. Curley’s Augustine’s Contra Academicos: A Study, Ernest L. Fortin remarks that much of the scholarship on Augustine approaches his early writings with the scholar’s own questions rather than Augustine’s questions.1 Indeed, a large portion of the literature focuses on questions such as “Was Augustine really a Christian at Cassiciacum?”; “To what extent did he repudiate Platonism?”; and “Did he read more Plotinus or Porphyry?” Augustine himself was more interested in questions such as: “What is the nature of the soul?”; “What is the nature of happiness?”; and “How does one become happy?” In this dissertation I shall investigate three questions important to Augustine during his retreat at Cassiciacum in 386: “What ought men to desire?”; “What has gone wrong with their desires?”; and “How do they come to desire the right things?” In this introductory chapter I shall first explain why it is worthwhile to examine the philosophy of desire in the Cassiciacum dialogues (Part One). Then I shall give three remarks on reading the early dialogues concerning their form, their sources, and the worldview of the young Augustine (Part Two). Finally, I shall summarize my findings regarding the healing of desire in the Cassiciacum dialogues (Part Three). 1 Ernest L. Fortin, Foreword to Augustine’s Contra Academicos: A Study by Augustine J. Curley (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), x. 1 Why Examine the Dialogues’ Philosophy of Desire? The analysis of desire is important to ancient and medieval philosophers and makes a fitting object of study in the figure who looms largest in the transition from the ancient to the medieval world. There are at least four reasons for this. First, the theme of desire’s maladies and their healing is central to the Cassiciacum dialogues, but has been neglected in studies of them. Second, an examination of Augustine’s philosophy of desire is a fitting extension to studies on ancient philosophical teachings on desire. Third, Augustine’s early thinking on the status of desire and the means of its renovation will inform his later thought on the subject (for example, in Confessiones). Fourth, insights from Augustine’s philosophy of desire have the potential to inform contemporary debates on the nature of desire. The Importance of Desire to the Early Augustine Many studies on Augustine’s early writings focus overly much on uncovering Augustine’s sources or the nature of his conversion. Opportunities to perform quality exegesis on Augustine’s early writings, to let him speak for himself, have been lost. Among the excellent studies that do let Augustine speak for himself,2 none I have encountered focuses directly on desire, making it a lacuna in even the best sources. Yet desire is an important theme in the dialogues, replete as they are with the language of desire, words such as: amare, appetere, quaerere, velle, cupere, sitire, diligere, libido, 2 To name a few: Michael P. Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Revue des Études Augustiennes 45 (1999); Foley, “The Other Happy Life: The Political Dimensions to St. Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues,” The Review of Politics 65.2 (2003); Phillip Cary, “What Licentius Learned: A Narrative Reading of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Augustinian Studies 29.1 (1998); Edmund T. Silk, “Boethius’s Consolatio Philosophiae as a Sequel to Augustine’s Dialogues and Soliloquia,” Harvard Theological Review 32.1 (January 1939); and Eugene Kevane, “Christian Philosophy: The Intellectual Side of Augustine’s Conversion,” Augustinian Studies 17 (1986). 2 cupiditas, and voluntas. The disordered state of our affections and their need for renewal is a central theme, intertwined with the other central themes at Cassiciacum. Its ubiquity and importance make it a fitting object of study. The literature itself points to the need to fill this lacuna. Various scholars3 have observed that the arguments and intellectual content of the dialogues have an ethical end, the restoration of happiness in men. Since happiness requires the satisfaction of desire, a study of desire in the dialogues is in order. There are at least three other advantages of such a study, to which I shall now turn. Ancient Therapies of Desire The philosophical schools of late antiquity were intensely interested in the problem of desire, that is in the ubiquitous reality of dissatisfaction and the strategies or therapies one can apply to desire to make satisfaction possible. One can tell the story of late antique philosophy in terms of the various schools’ philosophies of desire. After describing some common elements of ancient philosophical therapy, I will trace these elements through the chapters in this story which are most relevant at Cassiciacum: the Epicurean, Stoic, and neo-Platonist schools of thought. Then I shall say why it is helpful to study the same topic in the early Augustinian dialogues. Ancient philosophical therapy is commonly developed according to a medical analogy.
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