AUGUSTINE on SUFFERING and ORDER: PUNISHMENT in CONTEXT by SAMANTHA ELIZABETH THOMPSON a Thesis Submitted in Conformity With
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AUGUSTINE ON SUFFERING AND ORDER: PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT BY SAMANTHA ELIZABETH THOMPSON A Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Samantha Elizabeth Thompson 2010 Augustine on Suffering and Order: Punishment in Context Samantha Elizabeth Thompson Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2010 Abstract Augustine of Hippo argues that all suffering is the result of the punishment of sin. Misinterpretations of his meaning are common since isolated statements taken from his works do give misleading and contradictory impressions. This dissertation assembles a comprehensive account of Augustine’s understanding of the causes of suffering to show that these views are substantive and internally consistent. The argument of the dissertation proceeds by confronting and resolving the apparent problems with Augustine’s views on sin and punishment from within the broader framework of his anthropology and metaphysics. The chief difficulty is that Augustine gives two apparently irreconcilable accounts of suffering as punishment. In the first, suffering is viewed as self-inflicted because sin is inherently self-damaging. In the second, God inflicts suffering in response to sin. This dissertation argues that these views are united by Augustine’s concern with the theme of ‘order.’ The first account, it argues, is actually an expression of Augustine’s doctrine that evil is the privation of good; since good is for Augustine synonymous with order, we can then see why he views all affliction as the concrete experience of disorder brought about by sin. This context in turn allows us to see that, by invoking the ii notion of divinely inflicted punishment in both its retributive and remedial forms, Augustine wants to show that disorder itself is embraced by order, either because disorder itself must obey laws, or because what is disordered can be reordered. In either case, Augustine’s ideas of punishment may be seen as an expression of his conviction that order in the universe is unassailable. It is hoped that these observations contribute to a greater appreciation not only of Augustine’s theory of punishment, but also of the extent to which the theme of order is fundamental to his thought. iii In memory of George Snell. requiescat in pace iv Acknowledgments Special thanks are due to the following individuals. My early fascinating conversations with Claudia Eisen Murphy validated my ideas and consolidated the framework of my argument. Larry Schmidt has been an ever loyal friend, cheerleader, and surrogate father, always ready to read and discuss ragged bits and pieces of my work as well as to meet for lunches and state-of- the-world rants. He has never failed to affirm my ability and my sanity when I have at times doubted both. Brad Inwood has been my constant link to the philosophy department and to academe. Without his unflagging interest and incisive down-to-earth advice, this thesis would never have been completed. He has shown kindness far beyond the call of duty more times than I can count. My supervisor, John Rist, has consistently maintained his lightning fast response time to my questions and draft revisions, despite his being across the Atlantic, which he so generously traversed to be present at my thesis defence. Lastly, I thank my mother whose boundless patience and love have sustained me through numerous challenges, of which this dissertation has been the least. v Contents Abbreviations. vii Preface. x Introduction. Augustine’s Problem: Suffering as Punishment.. 1 PART I: The Natural Account. 33 Chapter 1. Evil and Dependence: The Foundation and Scope of the Natural Account.. 34 Chapter 2. Order and Existence: What Goodness is. 50 1. Augustine’s Dualism: Unity and Order. 53 2. The Sharing of Order: The Hierarchy of Goodness. 74 Chapter 3. Order and Experience: What Goodness is like. 89 Prolegomenon: Happiness and Love as Organizing Principles. 91 1. Happiness and Order. 97 2. Suffering and Disorder.. 114 PART II: The Legal Account. 134 Chapter 4. The Problem Revisited: God and Disorder. 135 Chapter 5. Retributive Punishment: Good for the Universe. 161 Chapter 6. Remedial Punishment: Good for the Sinner.. 180 Concluding Remarks. 206 Bibliography.. 211 1. Texts and Translations. 211 2. Secondary Works. 214 vi Abbreviations (as in Fitzgerald 1999) b. vita De beata vita cat. rud. De catechizandis rudibus civ. Dei De civitate Dei conf. Confessiones corrept. De correptione et gratia dial. De dialectica div. qu. De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus doc. Chr. De doctrina Christiana duab. an. De duabus animabus en. Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmos ench. Enchiridion (ad Laurentium) de fide spe at caritate ep. Epistulae ep. Jo. In epistulam Joannis (ad Parthos) tractatus c. ep. Man. Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti ex. Gal. Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas f. et symb. De fide et symbolo c. Faust. Contra Faustum Manicheum c. Fort. Acta contra Fortunatum Manicheum gest. Pel. De gestis Pelagii vii Gn. litt. De Genesi ad litteram Gn. litt. imp. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber Gn. adv. Man. De Genesi adversos Manicheos Jo. ev. tr. In Johannis evangelium tractatus c. Jul. Contra Julianum c. Jul. imp. Contra Julianum opus imperfectum lib. arb. De libero arbitrio mag. De magistro mor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae at de moribus Manichaeorum mus. De musica nat. b. De natura boni nat. et gr. De natura et gratia ord. De ordine pecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum perf. just. De perfectione justitiae hominis pers. De dono perseverantiae quant. De animae quantitate retr. Retractationes s. Sermones s. Dom. mon. De sermone Domini in monte Simpl. Ad Simplicianum viii sol. Soliloquia spir. et litt. De spiritu et littera Trin. De Trinitate util. jejun. De utilitate jejunii vera rel. De vera religione ix Preface In The Augustinian Revolution in Theology, Thomas Allin writes that Saint Augustine of Hippo “is par excellence a penologist” (1911, 129).1 This statement is not meant as a compliment. The target of Allin’s criticism is Augustine’s conviction that all suffering has its origin in the sin of the sufferer; all suffering is essentially punishment.2 Allin contends that this view is itself evil (24-25) and in this he is not original. Versions of his objection were known to Augustine in his own time and are echoed today. Critics have argued against Augustine’s view on the grounds that it is repugnant (it is a cruel attempt to “blame the victim”); that it is unchristian (a punitive God is not the God of Christianity); or that it is patently untrue (suffering all too obviously bears no correlation to the merits or misdeeds of individuals).3 What they hardly ever ask, however, is what exactly Augustine means by it. This is on one level not surprising. The idea that those who suffer must have brought that suffering on themselves has an ancient and universal lineage.4 For this reason it is perhaps too easy to assume we know what Augustine means when he says that all suffering is a punishment: as the story from Genesis goes, human beings sin and God punishes them (Gn 3). And yet Augustine has much more to say than just this (as indeed, in his view, does scripture): so much more, in fact, that one would expect scholars to engage in some systematic discussion of it. To 1 Allin penned his condemnation of Augustine’s influence on Western theology almost 100 years ago; but since he expresses himself with a useful forthrightness and as his views are by no means passé, I have used his comments to represent a fairly common view that Augustine is obsessed with sin and punishment in a myopic and simplistic way (see note 3). 2 Allin and many critics who share similar views (see note 3) tend to target a composite of views for which Augustine, largely through such criticism, has become notorious. This composite includes original sin, the damnation of children who die unbaptised, and predestination. However, it becomes clear that the underlying claim rejected by critics is his view that those who suffer (which suffering includes damnation) have brought their suffering on themselves through sin. In other words, unlike Augustine they believe there is innocent suffering. Allin himself identifies this root criticism when he characterizes Augustine as a “penologist.” For a similar view see Kirwan 1989, 76-77. 3 A critic of Augustine’s own time was Julian of Eclanum who believed Augustine depicted God as a monster (c. Jul. imp. 1.48). For modern versions particularly of the first view see, for example, Solomon (1999, 125-6); of the second view, Kirwan (1989, 77), Burnaby (1938, 204-206), and Pagels (1988, chaps. 5-6); and of the third view, Schilling (1977, 94) and Burnaby (1938, 206). The tenor of both Allin’s (1911) and N.P. Williams’ (1929) books is that many of Augustine’s most distinctive views are unchristian. More recently Gerald Bonner has commented on Augustine’s “brutality,” although it is not clear whether he does so as a devil’s advocate (2007, 13-19). 4 For an overview of this idea as found in the Judeo-Christian tradition see Schilling 1977, 119-145. x see the complexity of his view (or views), we need only sample a few of his claims on the topic: sin is directly harmful to the physical body; the punishment of sin includes a tendency to sin more; suffering follows sin because sin is inherently self-damaging; suffering is the result of divine punishment; God is not – and cannot be – responsible for the damage caused by sin; the purpose of the punishment of sin is wholly accomplished by our suffering, even though we gain no personal benefit from it; by our suffering God means ultimately to heal us of our suffering.