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DEMOCRACY AS HARASSMENT:

THE SUCCESS OF INTERPELLATIONS IN KUWAITI PARLIAMENT AND HOW

TO GET PAST THE "CRISIS" RHETORIC

By

Anne Nunn Hamilton

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

International Affairs

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I o~ W. ~dtn a...___, -~ ~of the School oflntemational Service d 3o f}o ~ :2.001 Date 2009

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by

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2009

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED DEMOCRACY AS HARASSMENT:

THE SUCCESS OF INTERPELLA TIONS IN KUWAITI PARLIAMENT AND HOW

TO GET PAST THE "CRISIS" RHETORIC

BY

Anne Nunn Hamilton

ABSTRACT

Kuwait is a unique example of a quasi-democratic system where the legislative branch exerts significant influence over the executive such that ministers are frequently replaced directly or indirectly via the interpellation process. Many observers claim that confrontation via interpellation has created a "crisis," the result of arbitrary allegations and competition between parliamentary blocs. Such arguments advocate or support an end to the democratic experiment in order to ensure the state's economic viability and social cohesion. Historical and quantitative analyses of interpellations, the actors, and the issues addressed since Kuwaiti independence in 1963 reveals four key elements which explain the post-invasion upsurge in the use of interpellation. Recommendations address the weaknesses of the current process and suggest how lawmakers could craft a more effective interpellation strategy to strengthen Kuwaiti democracy.

11 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

LIST OF TABLES ...... iv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... v

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. METHODOLOGY ...... 3

3. KUWAITI DEMOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT ...... ?

4. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERPELLATION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ...... 18

5. HISTORICAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 70

6. "CRISIS" RHETORIC IN KUWAITI AND REGIONAL POLITICS ...... 88

7. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CONFRONTATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ...... 97

8. CONCLUSION: OVERCOMING THE IMP ASS BY OVERCOMING THE RHETORIC ...... 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 123

111 TABLES

Table Page

1. Interpellations filed and outcomes for the pre-dissolution period, 1963-1974 ...... 41

2. Interpellations between the first and second unconstitutional dissolutions of Kuwait's National Assembly, 1981- 1986 ...... 45

3. Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present...... 60

lV LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. Interpellations and their outcomes during the pre-invasionperiod, 1963- 1985 ...... 74

2. Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present ...... 75

3. Participation by multiple parliamentary blocs in interpellation since 1963 ...... 79

v CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On March 18, 2009, the Emir of Kuwait dissolved the National Assembly,

Kuwait's Parliament, for the third time in a year. This most recent dissolution was the result of a remarkable four requests filed within a three month period by Islamist and populist MPs to interpellate (istajwaba) the Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser. None of these requests resulted in a questioning session and this was the first time MPs had dared to confront the successor to the Emir. MPs alleged that Sheikh Nasser, a member of the Al-Sabah royal family, had failed to address the global economic crisis, that he had knowledge of misappropriated funds, and that he had even permitted the demolition of a mosque. Almost immediately, both regional and local papers and opinion makers claimed that Kuwait was entering period of political "crisis" and that Kuwaitis would quickly grow weary of the "grillings." MPs in opposition to the interpellations castigated the MPs who had brought the allegations. The whole scene was a familiar response on the part of the government and its supporters to what is irrefutably a constitutionally sanctioned process common to parliamentary systems worldwide.

MPs have interpellated government ministers nearly fifty times over the last four decades over issues such as economic performance and development plans and government provisions for public services. Filing requests to interpellate members of the Kuwaiti Cabinet is in keeping with MPs' constitutionally sanctioned role as

1 2

representatives of Kuwaiti citizens. However, this confrontational procedure continues to be perceived as problematic and blamed for vitriolic critiques of MPs and government domestically and regionally. Some argue that the National Assembly is making itself an obstacle to important government work; rather than respecting the function of legislative checks on executive authority, they hold that such checks are obstructionist and a nuisance rather than a necessary function of balanced, democratic governance. Publicly stated arguments for unconstitutionally dissolving the National

Assembly have emerged based on this perception.

If the future of this democratic procedure is at stake, it is necessary to explore what exactly is the "crisis" and what is its cause. An exploration of why and how ministers are interpellated will reveal whether the parties involved are engaging in

superfluous antagonism or simply the operation of Kuwait's nascent democratic architecture. This study surveys the forty-five year history of interpellation in order to determine which actors and issues were and are the cause of these confrontations and why this process continues to be a problem for government and parliament. CHAPTER2

METHODOLOGY

This study analyzes how and why the use of interpellation in the Kuwaiti parliament has increased overtime. A historical overview of the frequency of interpellation and a quantitative analysis of the intensity of each confrontation reveal that precedents have been achieved consistently overtime and that the most recent spike in interpellations can be explained through a long-term view of the changing political realities in the post-invasion period.

To contextualize these arguments, a comparative regional political analysis will

explain the uniqueness of the Kuwait experience and what this means for the

democratization process both domestically and regionally. A comparative study of

parliaments develop will demonstrate the challenges faced by the Kuwaiti legislature whose power is significantly curtailed by executive privilege.

The evolutionary characteristics of the interpellations process will be illustrated through a codification of parliamentary blocs, the stated causes for the interpellation

and their outcomes. The intensity of the confrontations will be measured using a

formula, which takes into account the position of the minister interpellated, whether he

or she was questioned and faced a no-confidence vote as a result. A statistical analysis

will reveal an increase in frequency of filing interpellations, and an increase in their

intensity.

3 4

Finally, a discourse analysis will show the political usage of the crisis rhetoric, who employs it and to what purpose both within Kuwait and the Gulf region. By situating the Kuwaiti experience within the Gulf context, I will argue that the "crisis" is as much about the regional political climate and broader national identity issues as it is about the slipping of a specific authoritarian grip. Through discourse analysis, it is easily discemable that the pervasive embrace of the "crisis" rhetoric during such episodes of political theater is in part a result of their implications for neighboring Gulf states.

Ultimately, this study provides an explanation for why a current impasse has developed between the legislature and executive and why a conclusive resolution to the vast majority of interpellations eludes Kuwait's democratic self-actualization.

For over 40 years MPs have been using interpellation to confront the government and increasingly the government has complied, allowing its ministers to be

"grilled" publicly including members of the ruling Al-Sabah have been allowed to sit for questioning and no-confidence votes. However, despite the increased efficiency of the procedure itself, an historical survey reveals that the procedure is not just obstructed

by rhetorical opposition and government intransigence, and is also weakened by the

absence of strategic considerations on the part of MPs who file the requests. The

literature surrounding Kuwait's political evolution is not extensive which means the

literature addressing the interpellation process is even more limited. A handful of

scholars like Michael Herb, Jill Crystal and Mary Ann Tetrault have issued prescient

studies ofthe country's political culture and history. Herb's comparative analysis of the 5

monarchy-parliament dynamic elucidates the commonalities between Kuwaiti and early European case studies. Crystal's historical analysis of the political development of the Gulf nation state traces the intricacies of political maneuvering taken on by the monarchy in order to consolidate power and the politically ill-fated incompetence which led to the Iraqi invasion and the subsequent Kuwaiti popular revival. Tetrault's

sociological approach to the pre-invasion period contextualizes this popular revival within the private spaces of Kuwaiti citizens during the second unconstitutional parliamentary suspension. Nathan Brown has explored the structure of Kuwait's

constitution and institutions and remains a keen observer of how the recent dissolution

of cabinet and parliament has played out. Greg Gause has provided keen insights on

Islamism and Gulf politics. However, the degree to which these scholars have explored the practice of interpellation as the preeminent mechanism of confrontation that

precipitates a political "crisis" is limited. Though there have been analyses of individual

interpellations in Kuwait's parliament, there has yet to be a substantial study of Kuwaiti

parliamentary interpellation as the single method of confrontation available to

parliamentarians and how it contributes to the rhetoric of"crisis."1

The current characterization of the situation as a "crisis" and the accompanying

rhetoric assume that a full overhaul of the current system in Kuwait is the necessary

corrective. This paper will lay out the proposed solutions to the "crisis" and

demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses. I hope to demonstrate that interpellation is

1 Salih, Kamal 0, "Parliamentary Control of the Executive: Evaluation of the interpellation Mechanism, Case Study Kuwait National Assembly, 1992-2004," Journal ofSouth Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 29, (Spring 2006): 65. 6

ultimately effective and essential to the development of Kuwaiti democracy because

each instance of this procedure includes both substantive and frivolous allegations, the

latter enabling observers to infer a lack of clarity on the part of the active parliamentary

blocs, which file and/or support each interpellation. In particular, an analysis of how these procedures play out in practice reveals how the "crisis" rhetoric that surrounds the

political impasses serves a particular agenda to the detriment of serious political debate

and democratization. CHAPTER3

KUWAITI DEMOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

A constitutional monarchy is a monarchy with "an elected parliament that has not wholly usurped the monarch's power to determine the composition of the ministry."2 The term has also been used to denote a democracy that features a symbolic monarchy such as that of Great Britain. Constitutional monarchy in the eighteenth century was a categorization whose use was akin to that of electoral democracy in the present day. The British system of the mid-eighteenth century featured a monarchy with real powers over the formation of government and parliament and was exported to

Europe in the nineteenth century after the British system had developed full parliamentarianism. The successful adoption of constitutional monarchy as a system in

Western Europe and subsequently in South America and Eastern Europe is due to the balance allowed by the parliamentary system between limited liberalization and substantial royal power. In a similar vein, Kuwaiti parliamentarism has permitted the

"gradual weakening of the dynastic monopoly of power" while the increasing influence of the parliament on executive behavior has "not proven to be incompatible with family

2 Herb, Michael, "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World," Middle East Journal. 58, (Summer2004): 117.

7 8

rule."3 Stability within the parliamentary system is held to be the optimal transition model through empirical research done by Linz and Stepan which demonstrates that constitutional framework of parliamentarism "favors" democratic transition and consolidation."4 The Kuwaiti experience demonstrates this stability remarkably well.

Before the introduction of the constitution of 1963, Kuwait was an authoritarian monarchy only mildly constrained by a merchant class. However, unlike other Gulf monarchs who gained their constituencies through conquest and subjugation, the AI-

Sabah emerged in the mid-eighteenth century as the leading family from a group of

dominant Sunni families. The mythology that emerged from the time of this ascension

is that the Al-Sabah were chosen by consensus and that their rule was uncontested by the rival families who were occupied with their own administrative portfolios for the nascent state. The significance of this narrative is that it provides existential legitimacy to the Al-Sabah rule as a long-standing consensus institution, a claim that cannot be

credibly made by the Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, for example, who use coercive

mechanisms to contain opposition. The Al-Sabah narrative conveys a normative ethos

of mutual respect between ruler and ruled. 5

3 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1999) 45.

4 Linz, Juan and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems ofDemocratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.1996) 14 7.

5 Crystal, Jill, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 114. 9

However, this unique status as chosen rulers would not prevent the merchant

families from creating their own representative assemblies in 1921 and 193 8 in response to the authoritarian rule of Mubarak Al-Kabir Al-Sabah. The first attempt at the creation of a constitution occurred in 1938 was a prime example of how the merchant

class peacefully coerced the Al-Sabah into a power-sharing dynamic. According to

O'Donnell and Schmitter there is "no transition [from authoritarianism] whose

beginning is not the consequence- direct or indirect- of important divisions within the

authoritarian regime itself."6 In Kuwait, the merchants were able to alignment with a

dissident branch of the Al-Sabah and force the dictatorial Mubarak to call an assembly to craft the "Basic Law."7 This assembly, with encouragement from the British,

"usurped much of the emir's authority and built a nascent bureaucracy."8 This Basic

Law enjoyed the "origin legitimacy" of being constructed by a representative body and

consisted of five articles, including one remarkable one that declared the assembly

"president" to be the "executive authority in the country."9 The Emir resisted the

ratification of this document at first but eventually agreed. However, as soon as the

assembly attempted to control the allocation of government revenue, the Emir dissolved

6 O'Donnell, Guillermo and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) 35.

7 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) 45.

8 Herb, Michael, "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy," Comparative Politics, 37, (April2000): 301.

9 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002) 109. 10

it and arranged for new elections to be held. With a new assembly the Emir found his constitutional drafts repeatedly rejected. In his frustration, he accused the assembly of seeking support from Iraq (which insisted that Kuwait was an integral part of its national territory), dissolved the parliament, and abandoned the constitutional experiment altogether. A coalition of Al-Sabah sheikhs seized the bureaucratic apparatus and closed down the assembly and divided its institutions among themselves.

Members of the ruling family have since relinquished authority of some of these institutions through the appointment of non-royal individuals to cabinet positions.

Regardless, the key ministries of defense, oil and diplomacy still remain in the Al-

Sabah portfolio. 10

After this seizure of government bureaucratic structures, the ruling family explored methods of strengthening its resilience to opposition. Individual Al-Sabah members began to associate with a variety of constituencies across the political spectrum and through the distribution of ministerial posts to members of some of these constituencies, the Al-Sabah sought alliances and compliance with its executive authority. Indeed, these seemingly disparate groups all enjoyed associations with members of the ruling family that fostered a sense of popular legitimacy. However, just as such alliances have consolidated the Al-Sabah monopoly on executive powers,

so too have they served to undermine it. Associations with divergent constituencies remain to this day and have done their part to contribute to family fragmentation.

10 Herb, Michael, "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy," Comparative Politics, 37, (April2000): 314. 11

Despite the failure of the first constitutional experience, a second one was initiated a few decades later when external pressures began to loom on the horizon.

Written shortly after independence from Britain in 1961, the Kuwaiti constitution was a bold concession made by the monarchy to gain added legitimacy for this tiny city-state, which was feeling the pressure from larger regional players and an ongoing existential threat from neighboring Iraq. 11 The Kuwaiti constitution is a product of these factors

and reflects the liberal tendencies of Emir Abdallah al-Salim and his tolerance of

opposition groups. Having been an active participant in the 1938 assembly, Emir

Abdullah, along with leading merchants and a fresh crop of Western-educated young

professionals pushed successfully to hold elections for "Founding Assembly" (Al-

Majlis Al-ta 'sisi). 12 The Emir consulted with a team of Egyptian constitutional law

experts to compile the first draft which was then sent to a committee within the

Founding Assembly which revised it and sent it to the full assembly for final approval.

Members of the original Assembly maintain that the constitution is a "contract

between the Emir and Kuwaiti citizens about how the country should be governed" and

that it gave "formal articulation to previously accepted constitutional practices."13 The

ratification of this constitution established a mandate for the expression of constitutional

life that would tolerate the dominance of the Al-Sabah as long as this expression was

11 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) 111.

12 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002) 76.

13 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002) 39. 12

unhindered. Additionally, the 1962 constitution aimed to accomplish three things.

First, it aimed to cultivate a sense of nationality, which created a space in which to frame who was and who was not "Kuwaiti." Citizenship laws continue to be a rigid system with few entry possibilities for those who are not from Kuwaiti patrilineage.

Secondly, the constitution built political institutions through the formal articulation of electoral laws and rules for the composition of cabinet and National Assembly.

Thirdly, the document provided a framework for relations both internal and external of the ruling family. Seats in the National Assembly, though not off-limits, have never been contested for by members of the Al-Sabah.

Standard parliamentary systems provide for parliamentary appointment of the members of the Cabinet, which takes many forms. In the British system the Queen appoints the member of the legislature who is leader of the largest party (usually in the

House of Commons) to form the government. This government must be acceptable to the lower House of Commons who, after the appointment of ministers retains the ability to question them. In contrast to this, the Kuwaiti constitution mandates the appointment of the Cabinet by the Emir without parliamentary approval but retains the ability to question the ministers. 14 The lack of parliamentary involvement in the selection of ministers produces a procedural obstacle to cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. However, cabinet appointments are not entirely cut off from

14 According to Article 56 for the Kuwait Constitution of 1961: (1) The Amir also appoints Ministers and relieves them of office upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. (2) Ministers are appointed from amongst the members of the National Assembly and from others. Available on the internet at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl!kuOOOOO _.html 13

parliamentary influence as the post-invasion National Assembly demonstrated when they influenced the demotion of several ministers who had, in their estimation, acted unpatriotically during the Iraqi invasion. 15

Procedurally, the Kuwaiti constitution calls for up to 65 members in a popularly elected parliament where up to fifteen members can hold seats by being appointed cabinet ministers. At least one member of the cabinet must be an MP. This leaves 50

seats within the National Assembly to be filled by popularly elected deputies. The number of ministers must be less than a third of the assembly. Additionally, parliament

is given the task of approving the Emir's choice of his successor which accomplishes the dual tasks of preventing a crisis of succession and giving the Emir's post an added

popular legitimacy.

Structural aspects of the Kuwaiti parliamentary system vary greatly from the traditional framework of constitutional monarchy and these variances explain in part the

current impasse between the legislature and executive. However, the government has

not always permitted the full realization of the Constitutions provisions for legislative

power. Government refusal to allow the interpellations of Cabinet members has

represented a serious obstacle to the full realization of Kuwait's semi-democratic

system. Therefore, while it is clear that the constitutional framework of Kuwait is

lacking there are also strictures imposed on the full exercise of legislative powers by the

government.

15 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1999) 98. 14

In spite of setting the regional benchmark for liberality in the region, the constitutional powers of the National Assembly are significantly hamstrung due to their exclusively negative capability in what some have termed a "reactive model."16 They are permitted standard tools to both create and block legislation. They are also permitted supervisory methods of questioning of ministers (interpellation), the formation of committees and holding debates over issues of concern. However, their remaining negative capabilities are problematic. They can vote a lack of confidence in individual members of the cabinet via interpellation, but they cannot select members of the cabinet. Such an arrangement creates a nebula of guesswork in which the Emir must calculate the proclivities of the assembly informally. Significantly, the no- confidence votes allowing for parliamentary removal of a Cabinet minister are only voted on by MPs, not ministers. According to Article 101 of the constitution, removing confidence in a minister requires "a majority of the members of parliament, excepting those who serve as ministers." 17

The ability to interpellate was the one parliamentary power intended to add a modicum of popular control over executive decision-making and MPs continue to take full advantage of this course. The power to vote "no confidence" in cabinet ministers and the prime minister via interpellation and the power to block legislation remain the only two checks and balances built into the constitution. Thus, in spite of the stated

16 Salih, K. 0., "Parliamentary Control of the Executive: Evaluation of the interpellation Mechanism, Case Study Kuwait National Assembly, 1992-2004," Journal ofSouth Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 29, (Spring 2006): 47.

17 Article 101, Kuwaiti Consitution, Available on the internet at, http://www .servat. unibe.ch/law/icl/kuOOOOO _.html 15

purpose of the interpellation mechanism, the interpellations themselves and even the filing process to hold one have been essentially interpreted as a symbolic vote of "no confidence," which explains the Al-Sabah resistance to the actual questioning.

Positively speaking, this threat of interpellation also functions as an indirect exercise of coercion that has helped the government avoid a political impasse with parliament.

The same interpellation process described above can be used to remove a Prime

Minister, however, this removal can only be carried out with approval of the Emir, who, if he refuses, can dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections. Should the newly elected parliament again rule no-confidence in the same PM, a resignation is forced. However, ultimately the removal of a PM is only possible through a declaration by parliament that they cannot work with him and such a step has never been taken.

This is due to the fact that up until 1990 the Prime Minister was always a member of the royal family, which prevented any parliament from interpellating him, which was and to some extent remains a political taboo. Additionally, the trend for protecting cabinet ministers indicates that a no-confidence vote in a PM from a second parliamentary group will be avoided because subsequent elections typically produce a parliamentary composition that does not render the same ruling on the minister in question. However, just for good measure, the minister in question is frequently swapped out in the interim period anyway.

Given this constitutional framework, the ruling family's approach toward popular participation outside parliament is characterized by cautious gestures toward full parliamentarism with unintended consequences. However, the institutions of the 16

legislative branch as laid out in the Kuwaiti Constitution have insured the current impasse by not mandating parliamentary approval or appointment of the Cabinet. The powers of the National Assembly being so constrained, it is little wonder that the two avenues available for exercise of oversight over the executive branch have been used many times. However, although nearly 50 members of the Cabinet have been put in the hot seat since the constitution's adoption and up until 2009, not one had been an Al-

Sabah. 18 With the executives of the country effectively off limits until recently, the refusal of the ruling family to permit the cross-examination of its members has been the primary cause of parliamentary dissolutions and the gridlock that has become such a problem during the most recent Emir's reign.

The ability to check the actions of the executive are central to the parliament's efficacy, question executive branch regarding breaches of the pubic trust and hold votes of no-confidence on the Cabinet and its members is essential and takes many forms.

The British parliament checks the executive by cross-examining Ministers of the Crown during "Question Time" or during meetings of parliamentary committees. In both cases,

Ministers are asked questions by members of the Houses, and are expected to provide sufficient answers. German, Spanish and Israeli parliaments may hold "constructive votes of no-confidence" which require a positive majority to vote in favor of an alternative government effectively a motion of confidence for a new candidate. This

18 At the time of writing, the interpellation oflnterior Minister Sheikh Jaber occurred, making this the first time a family member had submitted to the no-confidence vote. Sheikh Jaber received the vote of confidence by a wide margin which the government interpreted positively and reflects the pro­ government composition of the new parliament. 17

process can avoid government instability by providing a quick alternative to the outgoing government. Constitutionally, the Kuwait parliament has the power to interpellate and hold a vote of no-confidence, but cultural norms of power distance have prevented full exercise of this check on the executive in the past.

The historical and quantitative analysis of this study will elucidate the changing legislature-executive dynamics that have developed gradually over the past 40 years and how the confrontational nature of interpellation has evolved into an efficient method of power balance in the post-invasion period. CHAPTER4

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERPELLATION

IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

This study will cover the history of interpellations and demonstrate just how infrequently the filing of a request to interpellate actually led, firstly, to interpellation, and, secondly, to a vote of no-confidence. It should be noted that the number of requests filed to interpellate is distinct from the number of interpellations that actually took place and the number that actually led to a no-confidence vote. The data reveal that there is a growing acceptance on the part of the ruling family and government to the legitimacy of interpellations.

The process of interpellation can be strategically tricky. The various coalitions m the National Assembly may hold very different opinions on the need for the interpellation and the way in which it will be conducted. However, the MP who filed the motion is typically the point person in arbitration over the process and goals. For example, the most recent interpellation request was filed by MP Musallam Al-Barrak against interior minister Sheikh Jaber in June 2009. Preparations included a debate over the need for the interpellation, which was questioned by some liberal and one Shi'ia

MPs. MP Al-Barrak held consultations with other MPs to select the other three who

18 19 would argue in favor of the interpellation. 19 Strategically, Al-Barrak made a point to select MPs from particular constituencies and particular tribes, specifically one MP from the Al-Mutairi, Al-Barrak's own tribe.

The outcome of an interpellation is frequently predictable to both participants and observers. A vote of "no confidence" may be taken or not depending on whether the MPs are convinced that violations of the law occurred. However, despite their regularly predictable outcomes, the interpellations themselves can be quite dramatic and a certain level of theatricality is involved in cases where the minister has not anticipated certain questions. For example, the Al-Barrak interpellation of June 2009 was anticipated to include a bombardment of surprise inquiries aimed to unite MPs against the interior minister. Such quick impact was important to skeptical MPs such as Dr.

Hassan Johar, who said that he had reservations about the "grilling" and that the first part of the interpellation would be the most crucial in deciding his position?0 As it turned out, accusations of spying on MPs were lodged against the Interior Minister.

Such surprising claims can sometimes have the desired result of shocking other MPs into alliance with the opposition. In such cases, the minister in the hot seat must have a credible defense or face an assured no-confidence vote.21

19 Saleh, A .. Stage set for another 'grilling season.' Kuwait Times, June 20,2009. Available on the internet, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read _ news.php?newsid=MTizMDAwMjMwMQ==, Accessed on June 20, 2009.

20 Saleh, A .. Stage set for another 'grilling season.' Kuwait Times, June 20, 2009. Available on the internet, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_ news.php?newsid=MTizMDAwMjMwMQ==, Accessed on June 20,2009. 20

Once an interpellation has taken place, within eight days a no-confidence vote must be taken. The no-confidence motion must have gained at least 25 votes or a simple majority of elected MPs who are not members of the cabinet in order to pass. If a motion is approved by the majority, then the minister would be automatically dismissed. However, an approval has never occurred in Kuwait's 47 years of democracy. Procedure dictates that if the no-confidence vote is passed, the minister is dismissed, but again this has never happened. Forty-nine MPs who are not members of the cabinet will be allowed to vote in the no confidence motion, and 25 votes will be needed for it to pass, regardless of how many MPs attend the session. In the past, either the motions have failed to pass or the minister has resigned before the vote. On other occasions, the cabinet has resigned en masse or the prime minister has reshuffled the cabinet to avoid the no confidence motions."22

The royal family has only recently allowed a senior member to face a vote of no-confidence, with the vote held regarding Interior Minister Sheikh Jaber. However, the position of Prime Minister is still yet to be challenged in this way, and the most recent dissolution in March 2009 is a typical case in point. The Emir intervened, as he did on previous occasions, to prevent his nephew, PM Sheikh Nasser, from being interpellated. Royal ministers do not get the same protection as the PM and a total of

22 Calderwood, James, Fresh Crisis for New Parliament. The National, June 22, 2009. Available from internet, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle? AID=/2009060 1/FOREIGN/705319845, Accessed on 22 June 2009. 21 eight royals have gone through the interpellation although only one has been subjected to a no-confidence vote.

Historically both the National Assembly, through Emiri suspension, and the

Cabinet, through submitting its own resignation, have been disbanded only five times

(twice unconstitutionally) over the 46-year parliamentary experiment. During this same period, the Cabinet has endured 48 interpellations with only just over 20 percent of the requests against members of the ruling family. Even fewer than 20 percent of the interpellations which made it to the questioning stage actually made it to the no­ confidence vote, which is the expected and constitutionally mandated outcome according to the constitution.

To most authoritarian rulers such unpredictability would seem destabilizing and a direct challenge to their authority. However, despite these direct challenges to the ruling family, the interpellation motions continue to be filed. This indicates that despite government resistance to the process, interpellations remain central to lawmakers as a means of coercion. An analysis of the history of Kuwaiti parliamentary interpellations is essential should reveal why lawmakers have and continue to file for interpellations, and why the "crisis" characterization is misleading in the context of long-term Kuwaiti political development

A historical overview of the interpellation process for the purposes of this study will employ two methods. First, a historical political narrative contextualizes the upheavals and evolution of Kuwait's political process since the nineteenth century and helps to explain the ability of opposition parties to influence and/or strong-arm the 22 monarchy. Second, an examination of the history of interpellations maps out the patterns of confrontation by analyzing what was at issue, who were the actors, and what was the outcome. Both overviews situate in a long-term perspective the two periods of parliamentary suspension and how they were made possible through the exploitation of a divided and disorganized opposition without mobility or resources and how political jockeying among various parliamentary actors obscures the importance of the

interpellations process. Significantly, the post-invasion era features an emboldened

National Assembly confronting a divided and indecisive monarchy through the

interpellation mechanism. Through this chronological overview, it becomes possible to

observe two things. First, the evolution of the interpellation procedure in terms of how

it is used and by whom and, second, a pattern of increasing cooperation with

interpellations on the part of the ruling Al-Sabah family and members of the cabinet.

That members of the ruling family and their cabinet appointees have, over time, have

been willing to endure the interpellation process illustrates the extent to which this

procedure has become normalized over time and managed rather than suppressed.

Kuwait has experienced three distinct periods of political evolution, consisting

of the periods before, during and after the Iraqi occupation in 1990-91. The first

constitutional period began after the 1963 document was ratified. Subsequently

constitutionalism was suspended twice (in 1976-1980 and 1986-1990) by the monarchy

when it found itself tussling with A National Assembly it could not pacify. The final

suspension period was punctured by the Iraqi invasion in 1990, and resulted in a new

era of popular political mobilization on the part of Kuwaiti citizens who, with 23 international support, successfully coerced the government to return to restore parliamentary normalcy. As a result, this second period was essential for the development and maturation of a popular yet divided political will. The third and current period began with the reinstatement of the full parliamentary system in 1992 and features the legislative and executive gridlock most recently lamented in the "crisis" rhetoric.

Before we examine the interpellations, we must first review the issues they address (both stated and unstated), the parliamentary blocs within the National

Assembly, and key political agendas which operate beneath the surface of the interpellations.

Codification of Kuwaiti Parliament's Interpellations

The Issues: Analysis of Motivations

Understanding the reasons, both stated and unstated, for the interpellations filed by MPs are crucial to framing an argument against the "crisis" rhetoric which postulates that the process is somehow being abused by MPs who file baseless accusations against government members for personal or political gains. A closer look at the reasons for interpellations will reveal that there is a complex series of interests at play in such confrontations and that the reductive rhetoric of "crisis" provides little insight into the significance of specific interpellations or the process itself.

The nature of the patterns of interpellations reveal a back-and-forth balancing act for MPs who file interpellations both in order to appease constituents as well as to 24 assert legislative authority in problem areas. Stated issues for the filings overlap with each other as do the unstated motivations. For example, an interpellation of the oil minister is an economic issue and thus distinct from interpellations which stress concerns about social services provisions which focus on citizenship and its ample benefits. However, clearly the relationship between the oil industry and its revenues are what make such social services and benefits possible. Therefore, these two issues are not as distinct as they may at first glance appear.

In the tables below, the issues have been codified as follows:

Five interpellations filed in the National Assembly were done so using an appeal to Islamic morality (ISL) and were, with one exception, filed by Islamists, usually

Salafist, but also HADAS and Shi'a MPs. These issues are typically involving "moral" standards and their reinforcement as with the interpellation of Information Minister,

Saud al-Nasir al-Sabah, over the presence of banned books at a Kuwaiti book fair.

However, occasionally, the filings are against measures, which supposedly uphold

Islamic values such as gender segregation in schools. These cases are filed by liberal

MPs and result in inter-parliamentary member conflict. Kuwait's national identity as a

Muslim nation is evoked in most cases to galvanize support for any initiative claiming to protect the national interest. Interpellations filed concerning Islamic morality issues are not always filed by Islamists but are typically initiated by them and they remain in

staunch support of these interpellations.

Religious conservatism is a common justification used by Salafist and other conservative MPs who file interpellation particularly when a pattern of one-upmanship 25 between parliamentary candidates can escalate religious rhetoric. Many of the filings for interpellation stem from the filer's own or his community's fundamentalist interpretation of the hadith. An example of such an interpellation would be the interpellation of Education Minister Nouriya al-Soubeeh, which many liberals took to be an attack on women's leadership and civil rights. Given that the MPs who criticized her had made statements against female leadership, the liberals' accusation is not unfounded. Such stances put the conservatives in opposition with not only other parliamentary blocs but also with the government itself, which has pushed through several major pieces of legislation (i.e. women's voting rights and desegregation of schools) without the consent of parliament.

Kuwait's national identity as a Muslim nation IS typically evoked during interpellations that address Islamic interests and continues to galvanize support for any initiative claiming to protect the national interest. Interpellations filed concerning

Islamic morality issues are not always filed by Islamists but are typically initiated by them and they remain in staunch support of these interpellations.

Religious conservatism is a common motivation of Salafist and other conservative Muslim MPs. Many of the filings for interpellation stem from a fundamentalist interpretation of the hadith on the part of the filer or his community. An example of such an interpellation would be that leveled against Education Minister

Nouriya al-Soubeeh in 2006, which many liberals took to be an attack on women's leadership and civil rights. Given that the MPs who criticized her had made statements against female leadership, the liberals' accusation is most likely on the mark. Such 26 stances put the conservatives in opposition with not only other parliamentary blocs but also with the government itself, which has pushed through several major pieces of legislation (i.e. women's voting rights and desegregation of schools) without the consent of parliament.

Government corruption (COR) allegations focus on mismanagement of state funds by a ministry. Corruption in the Kuwaiti government takes the form of nepotism, systems of patronage, rewarding of contracts to friends, and inaccurate reporting.

Interpellations that seek to address government corruption are particularly enticing to the public which broadly assumes that corruption is endemic and takes many forms in the government. MPs who file these requests are opposition groups from varying constituencies, not just liberal or hadhar groups. Corruption is the most common issues raised in interpellation hearings. 23

Advocating nationalism and national identity (NAT) in Kuwait has been political controversial until recently due to the regional associations with nationalist and frequently revolutionary parties in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon. MPs using nationalist concerns to justify interpellations defend their stance through appealing to national unity or claiming that a minister took AN action which is a threat to national unity.

These claims can be rather elaborate and even absurd. The perceived "threats" to national unity typically prove to be essentially expressions of political pluralism -- an

unstated issue -- which challenge the preferred hierarchy of Kuwaiti national identity

23 Out of 48 interpellation filings, 24 were related to allegations of corruption according to the definition here. 27 that holds allegiance to the ruler and God to be paramount. Additionally, these filings address the interests of Kuwaiti nationals, nationalization issues and issues of foreign nationals working in Kuwait and conflicts that are perceived to result from a large majority of migrant labor in the population. Therefore, even though a nationalist appeals are made in such cases, the real motivations typically lie in economic interest

instead of political interests.

An excellent example of this phenomenon was embodied in the interpellation of

Saud al-Nasir al-Sabah, Minister of Information in March 1998 in which proponents

claimed that books should be banned and their publishers fined because they threatened

"national unity". The MPs who filed the request were Islamists (Ikhwan and Salafists) who were asking to ban books unfavorable or contrary to Islam (such as books on other

ideological creeds such as secularism or Communism). However, the interpellation was

successful not because the super majority of MPs agreed that insults to Islam were

insults to the Kuwaiti nationality, but because they characterized the publication of such texts as an "insult" to God.

Social services (SOC) in Kuwait are a hot commodity among citizens who are

essentially provided for cradle-to-grave by the massive windfall incomes of their state's

national wealth. This issue is the direct articulation of the economic issues related to the

national identity issue above. Interpellations filed over social services disputes tend to

focus on the inadequacy of state social services for Kuwaiti nationals. Tribal and badu

political blocs will typically file requests related to social services or other state

assistance but frequently these issues are of concern to MPs across the board. 28

Tribal groups in parliament are particularly focused on the robustness of the state provisions of social services. This category typically covers the motivation of conservative and tribal MPs to defend the economic patronage system of the Kuwaiti government from which their constituencies benefit. The liberal hadhar constituents' independent and entrepreneurial tradition clashes with this interest over economic reforms (e.g. relieving restrictions on businesses). This conflict arising from criticism of government handouts represents one of the starkest divisions in Kuwaiti society.

Tribal involvement in parliamentary politics means that elements of this demographic group will enter into political debate including the interpellation process, such as in the controversy over tribal primaries. Reprisal for the exclusion (XCL) of a tribe/sect in government can manifest itself in the filing as an unstated reason for interpellation. Allegations of reprisal are never confirmed by the tribal MPs who spearhead the interpellation, however it has been long understood as a motivation for the interrogations. If the government is formed, as it typically is, without a minister from one particular tribe or other, sometimes MPs of that excluded tribe will be prone to interpellate a cabinet member.

For example, the interpellation of the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor,

Hamad Al Rajib, in November 1983 was filed by Meshari Jassem Al-Anjari, Khaled

Sultan bin Essa and Khaled Salem Jamiyyan and alleged irregularities in the distribution of housing units. Another request quickly followed in April 1984 regarding the

Minister of Electricity and Water, Khalifa Al-Khalif. The request was filed by Ahmed

Fahd Tjim and concerned the non-arrival of low-salinity water to the homes of low- 29 income citizens. In both cases, reprisal for exclusion of the tribe was named as a primary motivation for the interpellation. These two requests resulted in neither an interpellation nor a vote of confidence and were the two confrontations that directly preceded the second unconstitutional suspension of government.

Due to Kuwait's rentier condition, it is no wonder that the subject of petrochemicals (OIL) played a substantial role m parliamentary opposition as articulated in interpellations. Several grillings were filed on the basis of concerns about finance and oil. Sometimes these issues were related to foreign oil companies and

Kuwaiti economic protectionist policies. For instance, in June of 1974, Minister of

Finance and Oil, Abd al-Rahman al-Atiqi was filed against and eventually interpellated by Abdullah Naibari, Ahmed Yousef Al Nafisi, and Khaled Salem Marzooq who cited concerns about the relationship between Kuwait and international oil companies. They maintained that the level of oil exports WAS too high (the opposition wanted Kuwait to

export less to raise prices) and that the number of Kuwaiti workers in the oil company

WAS not sufficient. This interpellation was only the second to actually result in a vote

of no-confidence and the last one to occur before the first unconstitutional suspension of the National Assembly. Concerns over Kuwaiti income where typically associated with the oil industry meaning that any business partnerships or reforms that might affect this

sector are heavily scrutinized and frequently delayed.

Political opposition (OPP) to the government is both a stated goal of some

parliamentary blocs as well as an accusation leveled at proponents of interpellation by

pro-government critics. The later is embodied in the personal attacks on MPs who file 30 interpellations, which allege undue antagonism toward the government. These attacks on MPs are precisely the kind used by proponents of the "crisis" rhetoric to trivialize the issues brought to the fore through interpellation. Personal accusations that an MP is out for political gain through political posturing are used by opinion-makers, other MPs and government ministers to deflect the scrutiny. When political opposition for its own sake is a stated goal of the interpellation, it is usually included in a bundle of accusations with antagonism towards government thrown in for good measure. Since it is broadly acceptable to criticize the government (with the exception of the Emir) in

Kuwait, the populist platform can, in particular, gain from such rhetoric.

The Parliamentary Blocs

The roles of parliamentary blocs in the interpellation process has changed overtime and reveals a The parliamentary blocs profiled below represent groups which have sustained influence either by being elected to the National Assembly or by contributing substantially to the debate over controversial political issues. This list does not include groups did not sustain beyond the first unconstitutional dissolution in 1974.

Occasionally, there will be gaps in the information due to either ambiguity regarding the political alliances of MPs or a simple lack of information available.

The Arab Nationalist bloc (AN) which, though it filed the first interpellation in parliamentary history, it did not sustain a presence in the National Assembly beyond

1971 and most of its members joined the liberal camp. It is important to note that choice of political affiliation in Kuwait plays along the different types of political 31 cleavage - most commonly by origin/geography or by ideology - and even though they overlap, they do not map out exactly the same when it comes to political choices of constituents. As described below, each bloc in the National Assembly will have a diverse base and/or alliances with other blocs which also hold platforms that are contradictory to each other.

Muslim Brotherhood or the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait (IKH), also known as the HADAS movement, is a Sunni Islamist group whose popularity has waned dramatically. ICM suffered serious defeats during the last three elections in

2008 and 2009 (they now have only one member in the NA) which has prompted recent reorganization and a search for fresh leadership. However, they have traditionally been highly organized and influential particularly at the universities, where strong student affiliates bolstered their success in the 2006 elections. A major affiliate is Al-E'tilafiya, a Kuwait University party that has been winning KU's student union elections since they were first held.

Politically, HADAS is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al­

Muslameen) in Egypt and was previously known as the Islamic Guidance Society and the Social Reform Society. They are enigmatic in terms of their vision which is stated as "democracy as policy" and "sharia as methodology" and their method of implementation of this ideology is not clear. Their platform states that they seek to establish a "counseling principle" in place of the National Assembly and would push to amend the Kuwaiti constitution with popular consent to comply with Sharia law in this 32 respect. Essentially, they advocate transforming the National Assembly into a less powerful body which would be "consultative."24

HADAS members believe in democracy as long as it does not exceed the limits drawn by Islamic teachings essentially sublimating constitutional to religious law.

Additionally, they advocate against women being elected to the assembly, as it conflicts with their interpretation of Sharia with regard to who may govern and make decisions for the nation. Develop "social, educational and informative systems" with "quality

Islamic thinking" that "keeps pace with aspirations of development, progress and civilization. "25

The rhetoric of HADAS remains somewhat nebulous. The vague 'counseling principle," it is claimed, will result in justice and equality in line with "principles of democracy" but there is no indication of how this might actually happen. It is also unclear how a "National Islamic unity" based on "multi-political parties" could exist and still sustain a diversity of political perspectives. Islamic unity is advocated as a regional and geopolitical goal and it is unclear what this might look like or how

HADAS might augment the current international strategy currently in use by Kuwaiti leadership. 26

Salafist Groups (SAL) make up the most conservative parliamentary block and are particularly interested in moral and Islamic issues, which focus on the "character" of

24 Islamic Constitutional Movement (HADAS), June 30, 2009, Available from http://www.icmkw.org/; Internet; Accessed June 30, 2009.

25 Islamic Constitutional Movement (HAD AS), 2008 Election Booklet.

26 Islamic Constitutional Movement (HAD AS), 2008 Election Booklet. 33

Kuwait as an Islamic nation. The Salafist bloc as of 2008 includes groups such as

Hizb al-Umma, and Traditional Salafis. Previously, there have been also the Scientific

Salafis and plain Salafis. Of the current fifty elected members of National Assembly, three belong to the Islamic Salafi Alliance. Salafist opposition to the government was prominent particularly during the recent "crisis," prompting a news anchor to comment,

"Some people say that you [Salafis] as a legislative authority are trying to exploit your position to pester the government in an arbitrary way.',n MP Walid Al-Tabataba'i a prominent Salafist and initiator of his share of requests for interpellation defends interpellation on the ground that "there has to be accountability and questioning. That is our duty. We are exercising our role." Al-Tabataba'i also expressed concern that,

"Democracy in Kuwait is retreating. There used to be intentions in the states of the region to hold elections and elect parliaments. In Qatar there were intentions to have a parliament and it did not materialize. In Saudi Arabia, most of the area countries are

. ,28 re t reat mg ...

The paramount political objective of the Salafis is to enforce Sharia law in the country. Members believe that this is the only way to govern the country and ranks it as the first objective among its 15 priorities. The application of Islamic law is also considered as a means to accomplishing social security. It claims on its website,

"Nothing other than the application of God's word is competent of the making of a

27 Al-Tabtaba'l, Walid, "Al-Jazeera interview with Walid al-Tabtaba'i, Salafi MP in Kuwait's National Assembly," Interview by Jamal al-Rayyan, (November 17, 2008) Al-Jazeera.

28 Al-Tabtaba'I, Walid, "Al-Jazeera interview with Walid al-Tabtaba'i, Salafi MP in Kuwait's National Assembly," Interview by Jamal al-Rayyan, (November 17, 2008), Al-Jazeera. 34 blessed, secure society." The Alliance also suggests solutions to the problems of housing, employment of Kuwaiti youth, and inflation among other issues. Its reform agenda is said to be derived solely from the Quran and Sunna. Rhetorically, Salafis say that by instituting Sharia, the country can thrive and compete with other nations in the region. Although they advocate women equality when it comes to job opportunities and income, it states that the jobs "should be suitable for women's abilities and physiological nature."

Though badu groups make up a significant portion of these parliamentary blocs' constituencies, Salafi leadership is hadhar and they have traditionally held more seats

from inner hadhar districts. As a result, the Salafists can potentially find alliances with many other groups depending on the issue such as Sunni groups like HADAS and

liberals.

The Liberals (LIB) political platform is progressive reform. Groups making up the liberal block include the National Democratic Alliance (at-Haalef al-Wattani ad­

Dimeqraatti) and the Popular Action Bloc. NDA has launched the TV channel Nabeeha

Tahalof and publishes the daily newspaper Al-Jarida. They are prominent in the first,

second, and third electoral districts. They are much criticized by Islamists, but strongly

backed by young liberal Kuwaitis. P AB and its supporters taut a political platform that

is nationalistic and oppositional to the ruling family. MP Mohammed Al-Sager

criticized the attitude of some ministers concerned with parliamentary queries noting 35 that they did nothing to prove them wrong.29 The NDA is often accused of immorality and of wanting to tum Kuwait into a non-Islamic state. It refutes these accusations by stating that it adheres to the Constitution's articles, which state it derives most of its rules from Islam.

The liberal bloc supported co-education and the desegregation of all educational institutions and full political rights for women. Member were among the first to propose coeducation legislation. They are staunch supporters of the legalization of political parties. In an interview with Ali Al-Rashed, months before he defected from

NDA, "We need parties, governed by a law so that their size and funding and foreign links can be made clear"30

Though some of their major positions such as full political rights for women are shared with the ruling family, members of the liberal bloc continue active opposition.

They were the parliamentarians most represented in the main protests of the 2006

Orange Revolution (Nabeeha Khamsa) which stressed the importance of uniting

Kuwaiti citizens under the umbrella of the one country, rather than dividing them into sects and tribes. This series of protests were politically challenging for the government even though the political platform of the liberals is in line with major currents in the ruling family.

29 "Local News Secrets ofPM's meeting with parliamentary blocs," Kuwait Times, 23 May 2007.

30 Al-Rashed, Ali, "Interview with Ali Al-Rashed, National Assembly member and candidate," Interviewed by Michelle Dunne, Arab Reform Bulletin, (May, 2008), Internet, available from http://www.camegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=downloadArticlePDF&article=20497, accessed 25 January, 2008. 36

Demographically, members of the liberal bloc are generally the urban elite descended from the merchant class, which helped establish and build Kuwait before the colonial period. This hadhar group identifies as the "real" Kuwaitis whose interests are more enlightened and who fought off invasions before the founding of Kuwait as a nation state. Historical evidence proves that they did fight, however, their narrative excludes the participation of badu groups who assisted greatly in the defeat of ibn Saud in the early 20th century. Although it is true that most liberals are hadhari, the two groups cannot be equated, in particular because many members of the hadhar demographic side with the Islamists. Also while liberal leadership often pulls from traditional "merchant" families, their ranks also include many middle class professionals and technocrats.

Tribal Groups (TRI) and tribal ties are the strongest of ties when it comes to political preferences, and most determinate of factors regarding who voters will select.

This designation can apply across parliamentary blocs. It is important to indicate this influence because some grillings will find traction among tribal members crossing different parliamentary blocs.

The Shi 'ites (SHI) have sided with both liberals as well as Islamists over various

1ssues during interpellations. Shiites are divided between conservative and liberal agendas, some are Islamists, and some are liberals. The majority in the recently elected

2009 parliament Islamists, however, it is still difficult to predict how they will vote or whom they will side with regarding an interpellation request. Demographically, many prominent merchant families are Shi'ite, and all Shiites are hadhar. Shi'a groups 37 include Shi'a Liberals, Islamist Shi'a groups like the National Islamic Alliance and the Shirazi Group (followers of the Ayatollah Shirazi). Alliances with Shi'a groups have enabled other parliamentary blocs to push successfully for interpellations, particularly those that relate to hadari interests such as private sector business and liberal values.

The Lead up to the First Unconstitutional Dissolution (1963-1976)

Political blocs began to file for interpellation beginning with the first elected parliament in 1963. Members of the Arab Nationalist bloc filed and pursued five out of the six interpellations that occurred during the pre-dissolution period. The Arab

Nationalist bloc were part of a movement which enjoyed significant popularity throughout the region at the time (1960s) as an opposition group to Arab monarchies.

Early observers of the proceedings of the National Assembly describe MPs "actively participating in the formulation of public policies. The members appeared to be fully informed about what was going on and often unearthed information not included in the original government proposals."31 This description indicates a willingness on the part of MPs to pursue information and policy debate without reservations as to any repressive actions the government might take.

However, the government did not consent to g1ve this inquiry any formal recognition at first. The first interpellation filed in May 1963 established the practice

31 Baaklini, Abdo 1., "Legislatures in the Gulf: The Experience of Kuwait 1961-1976," International Journal OfMiddle East Studies, 14 (August 1982): 370. 38 on the part of the government of avoiding the formal questioning procedure altogether by having the minister, in this case, the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, respond to the accusations privately with accompanying promises to change government practices.

This was an opaque process, which provided little if any insight into the reasoning behind the filing or how it was specifically addressed. However, overtime we observe that this practice gave way to the actual public questioning.

The second interpellation was boldly filed by another Arab Nationalist, Rashid

Al-Awhid, against a member of the ruling family, Jaber AI Ali AI Sabah, who was serving as Minister of Electricity and Water. This filing also failed to result in a questioning session. By going after a ruling family member, the 1963 parliament took a chance given that the interpellations procedure had been shrugged off by Minister of

Social Affairs and Labor, Abdullah Al Rawdan, who was not a member of the ruling family. This was also a time where interpellation was recognized by many as a tenuous constitutional procedure that, though permitted, could create acrimony between the two branches of government. The National Assembly was dissolved and new elections were called for 1967.

The second National Assembly succeeded in not only brushing aside government attempts to prevent a questioning from taking place but managed to hold for the first time a formal, public interpellation. The minister in question was Khalid AI

Jasser, Justice Minister, not a ruling family member, who was questioned over inaccurate crime reports and alleged missing files from the Ministry of Justice. The result of this interpellation, though it did not go to a vote, would become the first of a 39 series of concessions granted to the National Assembly over time by the government via the interpellations process.

After making this concession, however, the government decided to call for new elections and the 1971 parliament followed up on the precedent that had been set with the previous interpellation. Beginning in 1973, parliamentarians filed three separate interpellations with two of them against the Minister of Finance and Oil (12/73 and

6/74). Additionally, the Minister of Commerce and Finance, Khalid Al Adsani, (5/74) was interpellated, questioned and faced the vote of no-confidence. Significantly, the first interpellation filed against the Minister of Finance and Oil, Abd Al Rahman Atiki, was not successful at all with the interpellation discussed but not held. However, after the following successful interpellation of Al Adsani, MPs were emboldened enough to file to question Atiki again which resulted this time in the full interpellation and no­ confidence vote. However, the ruling family seems to have been disturbed by the ability of parliament to gain concessions from them because they decided to unconstitutionally dissolve the parliament indefinitely for the first time.

This period was significant for two major reasons. Primarily, the period had allowed MPs to established a trend of pushing past the political boundaries of confrontation with the government in spite of unknown consequences, a trend that

continues to this day. Secondly, the government revealed that it would not preempt

such confrontation initiated by MPs but instead would punish them after the fact. The

second trend has been particularly beneficial to parliaments since then which are

allowed the opportunity to publicly confront government officials unhindered. Also, 40 the ruling family has been reluctant to grant full constitutional exerc1se of the interpellation mechanism, however, not only their unwillingness to prevent it but their

increasing tolerance for the no-confidence vote demonstrates that these early

interpellations effectiveness were readied Kuwaiti politics for the normalization of

confrontation at an early stage.

Development continued up until the Emir first unconstitutionally dissolved the

parliament in the summer of 1976. The use of interpellations filed and carried out

during this pre-dissolution period differs significantly from the two periods that

followed: The period between the two unconstitutional dissolutions (1976-1986) and

period after the second dissolution (1992- present). The first period differs in two major

respects: frequency of MPs' use of interpellation and those MPs' political affiliation. TABLE 1: Interpellations filed and outcomes for the pre-dissolution period, 1963-1974.

Date Majlis Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed Event 05/29/63 1963 Minister of Social Affairs and Labor No No The minister's response to First Who: Abdullah Rawdhan; Filed by Mohammed the filing was deemed interpellation AN Ahmed Rasheed, an Arab Nationalist adequate and the request filed in National What: to interpellate was Assembly N/A withdrawn 02/22/64 1963 Minister of Electricity and Water Jaber AI No No It was agreed that the First AI-Sabah to Who: Ali AI Sabah; Filed by Rashid Saleh AI issue would be resolved be filed against for AN Tawhid, an Arab Nationalist; Alleged through discussions interpellation What: irregularities in the delivery of electricity without an interpellation soc and water and the collection of fees 11/3/68 1967 Justice Minister Khaled AI Jassar; Filed Yes No Minister requested that a First Who: by Sulaiman Yusuf AI Duwikh (AN), committee be set up to interpellation to AN Mubarak Hamad AI Ayyar (IN D) and investigate but the take place but did What: Nasser Sinhat Usaima (IND); Alleged that Council rejected this not go on to a vote COR the Ministry had issued incorrect of no-confidence information on crimes and the loss of the files ofthe Ministry staff 12/08/73 1971 Minister of Finance and Oil, Abd AI No No Interpellation was N/A Who: Rahman Atiqi; Filed by Khaled Masoud discussed but not pursued AN AI Fuhaid; Alleged irregular record keeping What:

in Customs Journals regarding Kuwaiti COR, I non-classified salaries OIL

..j:::._. TABLE 1 (Con't): Interpellations filed and outcomes for the pre-dissolution period, 1963-1974.

Date Majlis Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed Event 04/19174 1971 Minister of Commerce and Industry, Khalid Yes Yes Final vote- 13 for First Who: ai-Adsani; Filed by Abdullah Naibari, Ali withdrawing confidence; interpellation to AN Mohamed Al-Ghanim, Sami Al Sanim; 0 to retain; 3 0 go on to a vote of What: Alleged 1) the rise in prices, 2) the abstentions; Thus the no-confidence SOC; implementation of the law regulating move to withdraw COR companies, 3) discrimination between confidence failed. citizens in the granting of agencies for importation of goods. 05/21174 1971 Minister of Finance and Oil, Abd AI Yes Yes 19 to withdraw Second Who: Rahman Atiqi; Filed by Abdullah Naibari, confidence; I to retain interpellations to N/A Ahmed Yousef AI Nafisi, Khaled Salem confidence in the go on to a vote of What: Marzooq; Alleged concerns about the minister; 13 abstentions; no-confidence; NAT, relationship between Kuwait and many absences. Two who Last OIL international oil companies, the high level of demanded a vote of interpellation oil exports from Kuwait (the opposition confidence did not turn up before the first wanted Kuwait to export less to raise prices) for the vote. unconstitutional and the number of Kuwaiti workers in the oil dissolution of company. The vote of no confidence did not parliament result in the resignation of the minister and an unconstitutional dissolution quickly followed. Sources: Herb, Michael, Kuwaiti Politics Database, http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfhldatabase/database.htm, Internet, accessed 10 August 2009. National Assembly, Kuwait, Official website, http://www.majlesalommah.net/run.asp?id=l88, Internet, accessed 23 November 2009.

.j::>. N 43

The Lead Up to the Second Unconstitutional Dissolution (1980- 1986)

The 1981 majlis, entered the National Assembly ready to match the previous majlis in the number of confrontations initiated. They filed a total of three interpellations and all three were denied in exchange for private discussion, an indication of the government's reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the process. Significantly, the interpellations were filed by, first, an independent Islamist, second, allied liberal and

Salafist MPs and, third, an unaffiliated MP. These diverse affiliations of the 1981 majlis

filers differ from the persuasions of those filing in the 1985 majlis who consistently come

from the Liberal bloc and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Between May 1985 and June 1986, MPs filed five interpellation requests; four of them were filed on June 1, 1986, days before the second unconstitutional dissolution.

Three out of five requests alleged corruption of the ministries in question and two of the

three were for members of the ruling family who served as Ministers of Justice and of Oil

and Industry. The MPs scored a precedent when one of the interpellations directed at the

ruling family members resulted in an actual questioning session, the first time an Al

Sabah had undergone this procedure. The feverish pitch of the interpellations directly

preceded the second unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly.

Even though only one interpellation was brought to an actual questioning session

during this period, the questioning of Sheikh Salman Al Sabah, Minister of Justice,

proved once again that the MPs could achieve concessions through direct confrontation

with the government via interpellation. Despite the fact that it would be another two

decades until an Al Sabah minister would face a no-confidence vote, MPs, including pro- 44 government representatives, took the opportunity of usmg the constitutionally sanctioned tools at their disposal despite the threat of unconstitutional suspension.

During the second period of parliamentary suspension beginning in 1986 and until the Iraq invasion in 1990, the ruling family enjoyed unfettered autonomy to decide domestic and international policy and procedures. They permitted the formation of the partially emir-appointed National Council but that body enjoyed only the right to be consulted with far fewer powers than the constitutionally guaranteed National Assembly.

During this time, elections for the National Council were boycotted by the pro- democratic opposition who refused to compete for the portion of the National Council elected seats allotted by the emir. The popularity of diwaniyya, or private political gatherings (literally "petitioning"), soared and, despite police confrontations and efforts to curb private political space, were flush with popular support attracting 2,000- 3,000 demonstrators at one rally. Popular sentiment and the protection of private space during this time allowed opposition to the unconstitutional suspension of the National Assembly to foment considerably?2

Under these circumstances, the reinstatement of the constitutionally guaranteed

National Assembly might seem imminent, however, it is not clear what measures the ruling family might have taken had Iraq not invaded in 1990. Nevertheless, an overview of parliamentary interpellations during the 1980-1986 period illustrates a continuation of the MPs' insistence on the interpellation process as a means to confront the government and, in the case ofthe 1985 majlis, the ruling family.

32 Tetrault, Mary Ann, Stories of Democracy, Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 120. TABLE 2: Interpellations between the first and second unconstitutional dissolutions ofKuwait's National Assembly, 1981- 1986.

Date Majlis Event Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 01127/82 1981 Health Minister Abdul No No Case was First interpellation filed Who: ISL Rahman AI Awadi; Filed by transferred to the after the unconstitutional (indep) Khalifa Talal AI-Jari (ISL); Constitutional dissolution of parliament; What: NAT, Alleged that minister had Court; Interpellation filed but OPP harmed the national image Interpellation not questioning not pursued abroad. pursued 11/29/83 1981 Minister of Social Affairs and No No Request for Who: LIB, Labor Hamad AI Rajib; Filed interpellation SAL by Meshari AI Anjari (LIB), withdrawn What: SOC. Khaled Sultan bin Essa (SAL) COR and Khaled Salem Jemi'an (GOY); Alleged excesses in the distribution of housing units 04/30/84 1981 Minister of Electricity and No No Request for Who:N/A Water, Khalifa AI Khalif; interpellation was What: SOC filed by Ahmed Fahd Tejim withdrawn in (N/A); The non-arrival of exchange for a low-salinity water to low- discussion income districts.

..j:::.. VI TABLE 2 (Con't): Interpellations between the first and second unconstitutional dissolutions ofKuwait's National Assembly, 1981- 1986.

Date Filed Majlis Event Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code

06/01186 1985 Minister of Finance, Jasim No No Vote avoided by This preceded the second Who: LIB Mohammed AI Khorafi; Filed by unconstitutional unconstitutional What: COR Nasser Al-Fahad AI Bannai (LIB), dissolution of dissolution of parliament. Khamis Talik Aqib (ind), Sami parliament One of four interpellations Ahmed AI Munayes (LIB); in June 1986. Alleged breaches of security for the Kuwaiti Fund Shares. 06/01186 1985 Minister of Communications, Isa No No Vote avoided by This preceded the second Who: LIB AI Mazidi; Filed by Mohammed unconstitutional unconstitutional What: COR Suleiman, Faisal Abdul-Hamid, dissolution of dissolution of parliament. Ahmad, Yacoub Baqer; Alleged parliament One of four interpellations irregularities in collection of fees in June 1986. for telephone service subscribers 06/01/86 1985 Minister of Oil and Industry Ali No No Vote avoided by The third AI Sabah to be Who: LIB, IKH Khalifa AI Azbi AI Sabah; Filed unconstitutional filed against What: OIL by Meshari AI Anjari (LIB), dissolution of Abdullah AI Nafisi (IKH), Jassim parliament Qatami (LIB); Alleged improper events that took place at the oil installations. ------

.j;:,. 0\ TABLE 2 (Con't): Interpellations between the first and second unconstitutional dissolutions ofKuwait's National Assembly, 1981- 1986.

Date Filed Majlis Event Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code 06/01186 1985 Minister of Education, Hasan AI No No Vote avoided by This preceded the second Who: TRI, LIB Ibrahim; Filed by Rashid Saif AI unconstitutional unconstitutional What: COR Hujailaan (TRI), Ahmed AI dissolution of dissolution of parliament. Shariaan (LIB); Alleged financial parliament One offour interpellations an administrative irregularities in in June 1986. the policy of the Ministry. Sources: Herb, Michael, Kuwaiti Politics Database, http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfh/database/database.htm, Internet, accessed 10 August 2009. National Assembly, Kuwait, Official website, http://www.majlesalommah.net/run.asp?id=188, Internet, accessed 23 November 2009.

,J::.. -....} 48

Kuwaiti Popular Political Revival during the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation (1990-1992)

The second unconstitutional dissolution was interrupted by the invasion of Iraq in

1990 which galvanized the pro-parliamentary movement which was germinating in the

legally protected private space. The second unconstitutional dissolution was a blow to reformists and opposition leaders who had accomplished significant political gains during the interim period via the interpellation procedure. Strategically, MPs of the Liberal bloc

and Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, knew that they had struck a nerve within the

government from the previous pre-dissolution period in 1971 with the interpellation of the Oil Minister which resulted in a loss of the no-confidence vote. The second

dissolution only confirmed that the government was at a tipping point with regards to their adherence to the constitution they had adopted decades before. By demonstrating

once again that a parliamentary coalition could be organized such that a no-confidence

vote could be lost by a minister, opposition MPs confirmed that they were not simply

democratic window-dressing for the regime.

Although political activism and support for the National Assembly as an

institution, was vigorous before the invasion, the experience of the Iraqi invasion and

occupation makes it very clear that a threat as great as national absorption into Iraq was

enough to induce a political revival among Kuwaitis who were forced to reconsider their

rights and responsibilities as citizens as well as the authority and legitimacy of those who

had ruled them uncontested for centuries. Though Iraq had formally recognized Kuwait

in 1963, issues of their shared border and the Rumeila oil field were still unresolved on

the eve of the Iraqi invasion in August 1990. Kuwaiti leaders had been optimistic that the 49

support (diplomatic, monetary and logistical) they had provided to Iraq during its war with Iran would somehow translate into a treaty that would establish a full resolution to remaining claims. Instead, tensions grew over Iraqi allegations of slant drilling by Kuwait and a number of other intensified grievances. 33

On the morning of August 2, 1990, Kuwaitis were startled to hear gunshots, and those who were not informed by relatives and friends abroad would not know the country's fate until the following day. Due to state control of the media, news of Iraqi troop movements was not received by most Kuwaitis who were taken completely by

surprise by the invasion. The top military and government officials immediately exited the country in droves, and the royal family took refuge in the Saudi resort town of Taif.

This desertion by their military leaders and rulers was met with limited sympathy by

Kuwaitis who only excused the Emir as a revered symbol of Kuwaiti nationhood who

should be protected. However, many Kuwaitis who were left behind began to question the regime's absolute hegemony over affairs of the state when they were so quick to relinquish control of their country.

During the occupation, organization and leadership by Kuwaiti citizens both at home and abroad flourished. About a third of Kuwaiti citizenry was abroad on vacation

at the time of the invasion, and they were joined by the exiles. In London and

Washington, D.C., exiles quickly and skillfully organized themselves into the Free

Kuwait Association (FKA) and the Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK), respectively.

These groups coordinated demonstrations, appeals to the U.S. and U.K. governments, and

33 Crystal, Jill, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 81. 50

clearly demonstrated that Kuwaiti citizens could orgamze their own affairs without

guidance from the ruling family. The CFK organized fact-finding visits to Houston, TX

in order to formulate a strategy for fighting well fires. In London, the Kuwaiti Petroleum

Industry (KPI), the oil industry-in-exile, developed strategies for rebuilding after the

anticipated Iraqi withdrawal. These proactive Kuwaitis were building expectations for

increased involvement in their country's public affairs after the occupation ended.

Advocating for and promoting their national interests abroad and in exile and the high

stakes which drove their activities, and that the government had failed to protect them,

were realizations which would play out boldly upon their return horne.

The industriousness of these self-appointed leaders-in-exile made the Al-Sabah

monarchy nervous. They quickly organized a summit of exiles in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,

in October 1990 during which conciliatory speeches were made by the Prime Minister

and Crown Prince, as well as opposition leader 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Saqr, who was

persuaded to do the same. The regime pledged to reinstate the constitution after the war

and occupation ended and to set up a consultant body that would include members of the

opposition to organize and manage rebuilding. In exchange, the opposition agreed to

support the continuing rule of the al-Sabah farnily. 34

Though freed from Iraqi rule, Kuwait was devastated by the war and occupation,

having paid some $50 billion in cash for the military campaign to oust Iraqi forces from the country. Damage to the oil industry and the costs of reconstruction put further

constraints on the course of action taken by, and political options open to, the royal

34 Tetrault, Mary Ann, Stories ofDemocracy, Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 34. 51

family after their return from exile. After the occupation ended in February 1992, the regime reneged on its pledge to open the National Assembly and declared martial law.

They instituted a handpicked gatekeeper to block the involvement of opposition leaders in the reconstruction plans. The international community and press, in particular those of the United States which led the military coalition against Iraq, began to agitate for the opposition• • , s re1ormtstC' • agend a. 35 Local and international pressure finally forced the government to honor their pledge to reinstate the National Assembly and hold elections in October 1992. Much to the displeasure of the regime, the opposition, represented by liberals and Islamist groups, took 35 out of 50 parliamentary seats in the October 1992 elections. In this way, the post-invasion era was poised for a parliamentary shift characterized by an increased willingness on the part of MPs to express opposition through the constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms.

After the Iraqi Invasion: Back to Business As Usual? (1992- Present)

The elections of 1992 ushered in the current parliamentary period which features increased confrontation by way of interpellation requests filed and increasing numbers of interpellations ending up in questioning sessions and/or a vote of confidence.

Significantly, the current era has been absent of unconstitutional dissolutions of the

National Assembly. This would seem to imply an increased tolerance on the part of the monarchy of the interpellation mechanism as a challenge to executive authority. But it would be too simplistic to assume that this restraint is part of more liberal governing

35 Crystal, Jill, Oil and Politics in the Gulf Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 70. 52

strategy or that it is a significant break from past behavior. For example, the constitutionally guaranteed result of the vote of no-confidence has yet to be realized for, despite the steadily increasing frequency of interpellations filed, there has not been a

symmetric increase in the number of questionings or votes of no-confidence resulting from these filings and there still has yet to be a minister removed through the no-

confidence vote process.

Two things have become clear since the Iraqi withdrawal. First, that the ruling

family is simply not good at repression as represented by the political impasse,

particularly, during the tenure of the current Emir. Empowered civil society groups and a

diverse network of mobilized political actors make up a popular opposition to

constitutional suspension which continues to stand in the way of an unconstitutional

dissolution, the mechanism previously used to counter parliamentary noncompliance.

Instead of cracking down on decent the Al Sabah have permitted the parliamentary

confrontations to take place which can certainly be seen as a democratic concession.

Regardless, this does not alleviate the need for decision-making regarding the

development projects which have been put off due to popular pressure vis a vis the

National Assembly and the interpellations. However, to say that popular pressure on the

government via the interpellation process has stymied critical domestic decision-making

is not a fair characterization of the nature of the impasse?6 Nor is the characterization of the situation as a "crisis" created by MPs to harass the Cabinet, a fair one in light of

36 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1999) 102. 53

interpellations which include (the majority) serious allegations related to corruption and other irregularities which cannot be addressed through any other avenue.

This post-liberation state of affairs has produced a reinstatement of parliament and augured resurgence in MP influence over government action. The intricacies of this relationship have snow-balled into the government-legislative impasse we see today.

However, despite the aggravation of this impasse, another parliamentary suspension is virtually impossible given the developments since the Iraqi invasion.37

When the 1992 majlis convened, it would not file an interpellation until two years later. However, this interpellation was the first in eight years and the first to be held after the Iraqi invasion. This period was politically contentious as well due to the public criticism of the ruling family's handling of the invasion and on-going parliamentary

investigation into its causes. Beginning with the 1992 majlis the government demonstrated an immediate consent to interpellation when the Emir allowed the

Education Minister to endure a questioning as well as the no-confidence vote. Outside

pressures that had agitated for the reinstatement of the National Assembly and internal

skepticism of the way the government had handled the invasion and its political fallout had changed the balance of power and would have contributed greatly to the willingness

of the Emir to step aside. However, there was not a consensus as to whether the behavior

of the parliament was acceptable leaving one critic to write, "looming economic

difficulties and political infighting have joined forces to insure that critical decisions,

37Herb, Michael, "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy," Comparative Politics, 37 (April2005): 302. 54

from industrial to foreign policy, are put off as long as possible."38 This characterization of the Kuwaiti political landscape, an early incarnation of the "crisis" rhetoric, would continue to gain momentum as the number of interpellations filed began to mount with the next group of MPs.

The elections of 1996 resulted in a strong showing of Islamist candidates who were more than willing to bring cabinet members, including two Al-Sabah members, to the parliamentary chamber for questioning. Sheikh Saud and Sheikh Mohammed Al­

Khalid became the fourth and fifth Al-Sabah members, respectively, to be the subject of an interpellation and the first two since 1985. The subjects of the filings were predominantly derived from concerns surrounding Islamic morality (ISL) and corruption

(COR) and allegations grew more articulate and specific. These developments varied from the earlier parliamentary periods which were focused on generalized corruption

(COR), petrochemical industry issues (OIL) and social services (SOC), with few exceptions.

The 1999 parliament was particularly aggressive. It filed a record eight interpellation requests during its tenure of which the last was filed against the Prime

Minister, which set another precedent even though the questioning did not go forward.

Shi'ite MPs spearheaded all the requests with the exception of the interpellation against

Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber who was targeted by the liberals (LIB). Shiite MPs enjoyed support from Sunni Islamists, liberals, and tribal MPs in all but two cases suggesting that there was a broad consensus among parliamentarians that these "grillings" were widely viewed as justifiable. Additionally, three out of the five interpellations which resulted in

38 "Kuwait puts off the inevitable," Middle East International, 503, June 23, 1995, 2. 55

votes of no-confidence produced an outcome favorable to the government. The other two no-confidence votes resulted in resignations of the ministers. The cooperation among

MPs from multiple blocs had not been exhibited before in the formal interpellation process which suggests that the Shi'ite MPs who drove many of the interpellations were particularly determined to cultivate guarantees of support prior to an interpellation or were addressing issues deemed paramount by the rest of parliament.

Subsequent parliaments were nearly as active in making use of the interpellation mechanism. The 2003 parliament filed six requests but only half resulted in questioning and only one went on to a vote of no-confidence. The support of these motions was not as diversified as in the 1999 parliament with liberal and Islamist MPs acting alone in their interpellation requests. However, there was some collaboration. Members of HADAS partnered with Salafists for an interpellation of the Minister of Information and HAD AS was joined by tribal and Shi'a MPs for the interpellation of the Health Minister. Both of these motions resulted in resignations even though neither of them moved to the no­ confidence vote. The one interpellation that did make it a vote of no-confidence was

survived by the Minister of Finance who nevertheless resigned afterwards.

The 2006 filed seven requests of which four resulted in questioning and two ended in no-confidence votes. This parliament also succeeded in becoming the first to question a member of the ruling family, Oil Minister, Sheikh Ali. Previously, eight Al­

Sabah members had been the subject of interpellation but Sheikh Ali became the first to face the questioning. Liberal MP Al-Shabiya from the National Action Bloc brought the motion forward and gained support from the Salafist and other blocs during the 56

questioning. Corruption was once again the prominent allegation with four out of seven cases related to irregularities in accounting, private contracts, and even prostitution.

Perhaps encouraged by the 2007 breakthrough with Sheikh Ali, the 2008 parliament, filed four requests directed at the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser. All four requests were spearheaded by Islamists but supported by tribal and Salafist MPs, and all four alleged corruption as their primary thrust. These four interpellations resulted in the swift dissolution of the National Assembly and a call for elections. Remarkably, no less than three dissolutions of parliament have occurred under the current Emir, Sheikh Sabah

Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah who rose to the position on January 2006, after a succession crisis. The frequent requests for the interpellations of Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister have caused much speculation on the part of government supporters, the public and the press. Such proliferation of this confrontational process has served to fuel criticism of MPs that these threats of interpellation have prevented government decision-making and is the sole cause of government stagnation.

The situations which precipitated the recent dissolutions include: In March 2008, two Shiite MPs attended the funeral and commemoration of Hezbollah member, Imad

Mughniyah, who was killed in a car bomb in Damascus. Their attendance was controversial due to the allegations against Mughniyah which included masterminding the attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the attack on the Israeli

Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992. In November 2008 the regime welcomed Iranian cleric, Sayyed al Fali, which upset the Salafist MPs significantly. The allegation was that security measures were sidestepped to expedite the entry of al-Fali which might have 57

been taken seriously had the sectarian nature of the controversy (al-Fali is a Shi'ite whose presence made the Salafist Sunnis nervous) not been central to the allegations.

A year later, in March 2009, the National Assembly was dissolved because members of the ICM and Popular Action Bloc MPs requested an interpellation of Prime

Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah regarding the use of public funds by the

PM's office. The ICM coupled their request with further criticism specific to the government's economic performance, development plan and previous suspensions of parliament. Alongside ICM were the sharp-tongued members of the Popular Action Bloc who slammed the government's provision of public services and finance and threatened their own (and third) filing for interpellation.

All three of these scenarios drew ire from observers who branded each as frivolous allegations (or controversies in the Mughniyah case) that were not in the national interest and used by blocs of the National Assembly to pick fights with other blocs or with the ruling family. This accusation continues to beleaguer the opposition candidate in the National Assembly.

Strong arguments have been made in defense of both the government and the

National Assembly members. Given the historical and unbroken trend of not relinquishing a ruling family member to interpellations, those who maintain that the situation is a "crisis" have argued that the filing is a mere exercise in antagonizing the executive branch. However, there is equal frustration that this exercise of constitutional procedure is falsely interpreted as a personal assault on the Al Sabah family character and, therefore, unconstitutionally forbidden to operate. Recently, this is made even more evident as media and outgoing MPs have said that the emir may likely return to an 58

established pattern of appointing the Crown Prince as PM, a tradition previously upset in

2003 (still interpreted as a liberal break through). The rationale for reinstatement of this tradition is that MPs will be less likely to file for interpellation out of respect for his position as the future king. It seems unlikely that reinstatement of this law would serve to prevent interpellation of the PM because of the constitutional provision for it. Indeed, given the increased boldness of MPs, the chance that they would file to interpellate the

Crown Prince-cum-PM would not be a chance the AI Sabah would want to take. The exposure of the Crown Prince to the possibility of interpellation would serve to truncate the power distance between legislature and the ruling family.

After the parliament was dissolved most recently in March 2009, the outgoing

Cabinet issued an emergency decree to push the stimulus bill which will allow investment firms to receive much-needed loans- an attempt to diversify the income potential of this OPEC exporter. Debates continue as to whether the stimulus package would have been approved by parliament. Approval was unlikely since the outgoing parliament was dominated by Islamists and tribal politicians who are dispassionate about private sector development and foreign direct investment and oppose scaling back

Kuwait's social welfare state. Also, given that the request to interpellate the PM was over alleged financial irregularities, approval of a budget from this Cabinet was (and most like will still be) dubious at best.

The newly elected parliament of 2009 achieved a historical precedent. In June,

liberal MPs successfully interpellated the Minister of the Interior, Sheikh Jaber AI Sabah, which resulted in a vote of no-confidence. This achievement by the MPs is as much an indication of the ruling family's weakness of position, for despite the traditional social 59

forces that have kept the family's cohesion intact, there are still fissures. Leading observers claim that the recent requests for interpellation originate from enmities among

Al-Sabah members. 39

Post-invasion parliamentary politics in Kuwait smce the restoration of the

Constitution has developed into a unique system of confrontation between the National

Assembly and the regime with regular interpellations of ministers including the Prime

Minister. In the course of this process, the government and its supporters have withstood the public scrutiny while developing a posture of righteous indignation at such effrontery, which is assisted by cultural norms of power distance. Such maneuvering and cultural conditions have assisted the development of the "crisis" rhetoric which supports the government and its allies by calling into question the MPs motives for exercising the interpellation mechanism despite its constitutionality.

39 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1999) 114. TABLE 3: Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 02/07/95 1992 Minister of Education, Ahmad Rabe'i, a liberal Yes Yes The vote was 21 First interpellation to go on Who: and elected member of the parliament; Filed by against Rabe'i, to a no-confidence vote since SAL, TRI Mefrij Nahar AI Mutiri; Alleged irregularities in 17 for, and 4 1974 and only the third in the What: the University of Kuwait, and outsourcing abstaining. history of parliamentary life COR, OPP 07/05/97* 1996 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Yes No Only got 8 out Spurred the Council of Who: Nasser ai-Rawdhan; filed by Sami Al-Menies of the necessary Ministers to observe that some LIB (LIB), Ahmed Mulaifi (Independent Islamist) and 10 votes to government ministries needed What: Meshari Mohammed Usaimi (LIB); It was sponsor the to be overhauled; Al-Rawdan COR alleged that Al-Rawdan 1) did not apply state law motion of no- promised to report every 6 in the interest of the public; 2) Failure to collect confidence; months as to the deficiencies in and preserve public funds collection that did not Questioning the Finance Ministry and grant kick-backs to the state; 3) Failure to execute was discussed present solutions to these laws enacted to prohibit a monopoly on land and the deficiencies; However, he demarcated for future housing development. 4) suggestion was resigned a month after the Failure to implement law No. 90 which made to close interpellation. lslamists were guaranteed a pension for an insured person who the debate and against the no-confidence vote performs a risky or difficult job after he retires was approved and believed that the after 20 years; 5) alleged corruption at Kuwaiti accusations were Airways Corp. subordinate to the Minister of unsubstantiated; Finance.

0'\ 0 TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 03/11198* 1996 Interpellation of Saud al-Nasir ai-Sabah, No No The no- Fourth AI-Sabah to be Who: Minister of Information; Filed by Dr. Waleed AI- confidence vote filed against; Caused a SAL, IKH Tabtebae, Mohammed Al-Alim and Dr. Fahad AI was sure to pass. legal and political What: Kunna; Result of the failure of the ministry of However, the controversy over banning ISL information to prohibit censored books from government ofbooks which was appearing at Kuwait's book fair. The minister resigned before undergoing an assessment admitted that the ministry made a mistake. the vote of as to its constitutionality. I Opponents within the NA and the government confidence was tried to block the interpellation since the question held. of banning books was stiii being investigated by the Education Committee (citing Article 80); They claimed a dangerous precedent would be set and the instrument of interpellation would be threatened as a political right of MPs 06/01198 1996 Interior Minister Mohammed AI-Khalid AI- No No Request was Fifth Al-Sabah to be filed Who: SHI Sabah; filed by Hussein Al-Qailaf withdrawn after a against What: private meeting N/A with the government.

0\ ...... TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 04/15/99 1996 Minister of Justice, Islamic Institutions and Yes No Twenty MPs requested Who: SHI Affairs, Ahmad Khaled Al-Kulaib; filed by a vote of confidence What: ISL Abbas Hussein Khadhary (SHI); Alleged failure but the parliament was to revise the responsibilities towards the dissolved on the same brotherhood of the Holy Quran day. 12/01/00* 1999 Minister of Electricity and Water and Minister of Yes Yes He survived the The first of three Who: SHI, State for Housing, Adel Khaled AI-Subieh, a interpellation. interpellations which, TRI, ISL member ofHADAS; Mohammed Nasser AI- in quick succession, What: SOC Hamad Al-Barrak, Marzouq Al-Habayni (TRI) went to a no- and Waleed Khaled Fahd AI Jarri filed because of confidence vote. Housing issue and a violation of Article 131 of the Kuwaiti Constitution and other allegations. 01/27/01 1999 Minister of Justice Saad AI Hashil; Filed by Yes Yes Resulted in discussions The second of three Who: SHI Hussein AI Qallaf; Alleged I) Abuses in the of how to transform the interpellations which What: COR ·udiciary, Ministry of Justice, 2) Conservation Commission on Legal succeeded in moving issues worthless checks, 3) Ntalq conservation and Legislative Affairs; into a no-confidence issues, 4) drug trafficking findings were vote. discussed and a vote was taken and AI Hashil resigned.

0'1 N TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 11/24/01 1999 Minister of Justice Ahmed Baqer; Filed by Yes Yes Nearly the same The parliament of 1999 Who:SHI Hussein AI Qallaf; AI Qallaf interpellated Baqer process resulted as had succeeded in bringing What: using the same allegations as he applied to AI :ffom the interpellation three consecutive COR Hashil ofBaqer's predecessor ministers to a vote and who resigned. a total of four ministers to a vote. 03/03/02 1999 Minister of Education and Higher Education No No Questioning was Who: Assistant Haroun Rashid; Filed by Hassan discussed and he SHI, LIB Jawhar; Alleged breach of university regulations promised to the What: and the principle of equality and non-application Council by the Minister ISL of the law regarding gender segregation. of Education 05/26/02 1999 Minister of Finance and Planning Minister and Yes Yes Just before his His opponents largely Who: Minister of State for Administrative Development appointment in 1999 he came :ffom tribal SHI, ISL, Affairs YousefHamad AI-Ibrahim; Mubarak was the assistant districts or were TRI; Fahd Dowaila and Musalim Mohammed AI secretary general of the Islamists; As minister of What: Barrak; Alleged "complacency and alienation of liberal Tajammu al- finance he attempted to ECON, state property" causing financial loss to the state, Watani ai-Dimuqrati. carry out reforms XCL deviation from the application of the law of the He survived the vote. favored by liberals and national employment; financial excesses of the hadar. General Authority for Investment and Development Fund.

0'\w TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 11/26/02 1999 Minister of Electricity and Water and Minister of Social No No Discussed Who: Affairs and Labor Talal al-Ayyar; Filed by Hussein AI- interrogation SHI Qallaf; Alleged violation of the principle of justice and What: equality COR 01/11/03 1999 Minister of State for Affairs of the Council of Ministers, Yes Yes Liberals and Shi'a He is Mutayr and pro- Who: Muhammad Dhaifallah Sharar, Filed by Abdullah voted to remove government with SHI, Naibari; Sought details and the approval of the cabinet confidence, "lslamist LIB; on the Pearls of the Lagoons Project. Bedouin and inclinations"; First of What: Islamists voted for two times that Sharar COR Sharar. Minister was interpellated surrived. 04/27/03 1999 Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Jaber No No Attorney Sixth Al-Sabah Who: Mubarak AI Hamad AI Sabah; Filed by Ahmed Nassar withdrawal member to be filed LIB AI Hariaan; Accusations violation of the principle of debated without against; First Prime What: equality; Installment of 33 faculty appointments in the questioning Minister to be filed N/A Military. against. 03/22/04 2003 Minister of Finance, Mahmud Nuri; Filed by Musalim Yes Yes Survived vote but Who: Mohammed AI Barrak; Alleged that he 1) abandoned his resigned soon ISL responsibility to the Minister of State holdings, 2) in the afterwards What: contradictions of the calculation results of the depository COR to the central bank; 3) hired a private company to collect fees from drivers in the port Abdaly

0\ +:>- TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 11/21/04 2003 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Yes No Questioning Second of two Who: Cabinet Affairs and Minister of State for National concluded and the times Sharar was LIB Assembly Affairs Mohammed Dhaifallah Sharar; Audit Bureau interpellated; He is What: Filed by Ahmed Mulaifi and Ali AI-Rashed; Alleged commissioned a report Mutayr and pro- COR, that Sharar ignored the questions, Excesses in the form on the abuses and the government with OPP of agriculture and corruption in municipal funds. minister pledged to "lslamist tackle them inclinations" 12/10/04 2003 Minister oflnformation Abdullah Mohammed No No He submitted his Who: Abulhasan; Filed by A wad AI-Kold, Ali Faisal a!- resignation prior to the IKH, Muslim (IKH), Walid AI-Tabtabai (SAL); Otherwise discussion of the SAL the constitution Contravention of the Amiri Decree on interrogation What: the Ministry of Information, Violation of the law on JSL, publications and publishing, Violation of the provisions oflslamic Sharia, Breach of the principle of cooperation between the branches 12/27/04 2003 Justice Minister Ahmed Baqer; Filed by Jamal No No Discussed the Who: Hussein AI Omara (pro-government); Alleged violation interrogation and the Pro- of the provisions of the Constitution in respect of the Council decided to put Governm Public Authority for Minors Affairs, Lack of defending forward ent the interests of the people, and a number of violations recommendations to What: ofunspecified laws. address the terms of COR, questioning NAT

0\ Vl TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 03/24/05 2003 Health Minister Mohamed Ahmed Jarallah; Filed by Yes No He submitted his Third minister Who: Daifallah Abu Ramia; Concerning Administrative resignation after in that TRI, ISL negligence and failure to address the problem of questioning; contributed government to What: sexual assaults; Deterioration of health conditions; to the accusation that be ousted by COR, Minister in the complacency of deadly medical errors; parliament was interpellation. SOC, The contribution of the Ministry of Health in the combative. XCL spread of addiction; Abuse of public funds 05/15/06 2003 The Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser AI-Mohammad No No The Cabinet was SeventhAl Who: AI-Sabah; Filed by Ahmed AI-Saadoun, Ahmed dissolved as was the Sabah to be IKH Mulaifi, Ali Faisal ai-Musalim; Concerning Transform parliament before the filed against What: the law of the five districts to the Constitutional Court, interpellation OPP which shows the government delaying implementation as promised by the House. 12/03/06 2006 Information Minister Mohammad AI Sanousi; Filed No No He submitted his Who: by Ali Faisal al-Muslim; Alleged encroachment on resignation prior to the IKH civil liberties and a breach the principle of cooperation discussion of the What: between the government branches. interpellations OPP 06/10/07 2006 Health Minister Ahmad al-Abdullah Al-Sabah; No No Discussed interrogation Eighth AI- Who: ISL, Filed by Adel Abdul-Aziz AI Saraawi (ISL), Abdullah and a request was made Sabah to be LIB AI Roumi (LIB), Muslim Mohammed AI Barrak to measure. He resigned filed against What: (LIB); Concerning the issue of oil tankers prior to the discussion OIL, of demand COR, OPP

0\ 0\ TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 06/25/07* 2006 Interpellation of Oil Minister, Shaikh Ali Jarrah Al-Sabah Yes No The three Ninth Al-Sabah Who: by Kutla al-Shabiya, the Kutla al-Amal a!- Watani (LIB), In an members of the to be filed LIB; interview in al-Qabas he said that Shaykh Ali Khalifa, accused Salafi bloc against; First What: of stealing millions of dinar in public money, was his announced their Al-Sabah to be COR; "professor and advisor." MPs accused Oil Minister of support for interpellated; OIL irregularities in his former position as chairman of a bank in withdrawing National Action which accounts were opened for paper companies used to confidence, and Bloc brought the embezzle millions of public funds in the KOTC case; Many Muhammad filing but Islamists left Parliament after the nine hour grilling showed Mutayr members were photographs picturing Oil Ministry employees with prostitutes divided on the on a government-sponsored trip to Japan. issue; 08/25/07 2006 Health Minister Masouma Saleh AI Mubarrak; Filed by No No She submitted First female Who: Walid Tabtabai (SAL) and Ali Faisal al-Muslim (IKH); her resignation minister to be SAL Concerning financial and administrative irregularities at the on the day of interpellated What: Ministry of Health, Jahra hospital fire and the deterioration of questioning. COR, health services soc 10/22/07 2006 Finance Minister Bader Mishari Humaidhi; Filed by Yes No The cabinet was Who: Dhaifallah Buramiya; Concerning the excesses of the Central reshuffled and ISL, TRI Bank and the General Authority for Investment; the transfer of Humaidhi was What: sums of money to fake companies in order to Atia; Delaying assigned to the COR the implementation of court ruling Ministry of Oil

--

0\ -....) TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 10/22/07 2006 Minister of Justice, Islamic Institutions and Affairs Yes Yes Minister, was relieved Who: SAL Abdullah M'atuq AI M'atuq; Filed by Ali Saleh al- from his post in a What: Walid Tabtabai; Alleged constitutional violations historical precedent NAT and concerns over the territory of stateless bidoun; Also questioned costs and financing of mosques; Alleged waste of public money, Breaches of the Committee for the Promotion of moderation 01/22/08 2006 Vote of confidence in Nouriya Al-Soubeeh, the Yes Yes The 27 MPs who backed The interpellation of Who: minister of education and higher education. Soubeeh included 9 AI-Soubeeh was IKH, SAL Concerns over sexual assault cases at the Ardhiya lslamists, 8 liberals, and 3 widely thought by What: ISL Primary School for Boys from the Popular Action liberals to be an Bloc, 6 independents and attack on the the speaker himself. He Education Minister survived the vote. because she did not wear a hijab. 11/01/08 2008 The Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser AI-Mohammad No No Cabinet dissolved Tenth Al-Sabah to Who: IKH, Al-Sabah; Filed by Ali AI-Walid Tabtabai (SAL), followed by dissolution of be interpellated; The SAL Abdullah AI Bergish Hasher, Mohammed Hatif a!- National Assembly; first of four What: Mutairi (IKH); Alleged that security restrictions had reelections scheduled for interpellations filed COR, NAT been waived; "Loss of prestige of the State"; May2009. against Sheikh Increasing rates of financial and administrative Nasser corruption.

0\ 00 TABLE 3 (Con't): Interpellations and their outcomes during the post-invasion period, 1992- present.

Date Majlis Event* Questioned Voted Outcomes Significance Code Filed 03/02/09 2008 The Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser AI- No No Cabinet dissolved Second of four Who: Mohammad AI-Sabah; Filed by Faisal al- followed by dissolution interpellations filed against IKH Musalim; Alleged excesses in the expenses of ofNational Assembly; Sheikh Nasser. What: the Office of the Council of Ministers reelections scheduled COR forMay2009 03/02/09 2008 The Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser AI- No No Cabinet dissolved The third of four Who: Mohammad AI-Sabah; Filed by Nasser Jassem followed by dissolution interpellations filed against IKH Al Sana' (IKH), Zahir Jumaan Herbish (IKH), ofNational Assembly; Sheikh Nasser. What: Abdul Aziz ai-Shayji (lKH); Alleged Loss of reelections scheduled NAT, prestige of the State, Failure to rescue economy, for May 2009 COR Reluctance to deal with financial crisis, Excesses in the expenses of the Office of the Council of Ministers against constitutional provisions 03/09/09 2008 The Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser AI- No No Cabinet dissolved The fourth of four Who: Mohammad AI-Sabah; Filed by Mohammed followed by dissolution interpellations filed against SAL, Hatifal-Mutairi (SAL); Alleged demolition of a of National Assembly; Sheikh Nasser. The previous TRI mosque in the area of Al Fenitis reelections scheduled three filings had been filed What: for May2009 by ICM members. ISL 06/08/09 2009 Vote of confidence in the Minister of the Yes Yes Minister survived the Eleventh AI-Sabah to be Who: Interior, Sheikh Jaber AI Sabah; Filed by vote with 30 voting for interpellated and First AI- LIB Musallam Mohammed AI Barrak and 16 voting against Sabah to endure a vote of What: him. no-confidence. OPP ------L .... ------Sources: Herb, Michael, Kuwaiti Politics Database, http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfhldatabase/database.htm, Internet, accessed 10 August 2009. National Assembly, Kuwait, Official website, http://www.majlesalommah.net/run.asp?id=188, Internet, accessed 23 November 2009.

0\ \0 CHAPTERS

HISTORICAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The effectiveness of the interpellation procedure can be observed in the increase of its use overtime by multiple parliamentary blocs to confront government ministers including the Prime Minister. The parliament's increased use of this procedure can be explained by four factors. MPs have received encouragement through the precedents achieved during both the pre-invasion and post-invasion periods and have been willing to intensify their pressure on the government to undergo questioning and no-confidence votes. The loss of face by the ruling family during and after the Iraqi invasion has given the MPs a strengthened legitimacy and contributed to divisions within the ruling family thus compromising their ability to present a unite front against interpellation. This disunity among the ruling family has been met with increased collaboration among parliamentary blocs to pursue interpellation, which helps to explain why an unconstitutional dissolution has not been pursued. Finally, the outcomes to many interpellations do not resolve the issues central to the allegations and, combined with these other conditions, insures continued confrontation. These four factors combine to explain why interpellations have become more intense and frequent such that the current impasse has developed.

70 71

Precedents and Increasing Intensity of Confrontation

Pre-dissolution period ( 1963-197 6) confrontations included the first filing against a member of the ruling family and the first two votes of no-confidence. Before the first unconstitutional dissolution of parliament, two constitutional dissolutions had occurred which appear to have strengthened the majlis' pursuit of interpellation. Given that two of the three final grillings were the very last to take place before the unconstitutional

dissolution,

To illustrate the correlation between the intensity of interpellation and

parliamentary dissolutions, each interpellation has been given a score according to

whether the minister in question is a member of the ruling family, whether the

interpellation resulted in a questioning session and/or a no-confidence vote, and whether

that vote's outcome was supportive of the government. Each interpellation is calculated

as + 1 base point based on the rationale that this is a relative increase in intensity of

confrontation between the government and the legislature. Additional points are added or

subtracted as follows:

(+2) if the minister in question is a member of the ruling family (2R)

(+ 1) if the interpellation request results in a questioning session ( 1Q)

(+ 1) if the interpellation request results in a vote of no-confidence (I v)

(-1) if the vote of no-confidence results in a show of confidence (-1 c)

(+ 1) if the vote of no-confidence results in a show of no-confidence ( 1Nc)

(+ 1) if the vote results in the resignation of the minister (1 R) 72

For example, regarding the April 19, 1974 interpellation filed against the Minister of

Commerce and Industry, Khalid Al-Adsani, resulted in a questioning session and a vote of no-confidence (the first in parliamentary history) which he survived.

The formula is calculated as:

IKA = 1 + 1Q+Iv-1c

IKA = 2

A second example, the June 25, 2007 interpellation filed against Sheikh Ali Jarrah Al­

Sabah, Oil Minister, resulted in a questioning.

The formula is calculated as:

IsA = 1 + 2R + 1Q

IsA = 4

Once each value is calculated, it becomes clear that the intensity of interpellation has escalated overtime meaning that parliamentarians have become more aggressive.

Parliamentarians have consistently set precedents with interpellations. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the intensity of interpellation in the pre-invasion and post-invasion periods, respectively, with the parliamentary dissolutions marked. To further illustrate the success of interpellation overtime, precedents have also been marked to show the incremental accomplishments of the National Assembly. These precedents include the first interpellation filed in the National Assembly (1963), the first to target a member of the ruling family (1964), the first to result in questioning (1968), the first to result in a no­ confidence vote ( 1971 ), and the first ruling family member to be questioned as the result of an interpellation (1985). In the post-invasion period the first precedent was the 1995 73

vote of no-confidence which was lost by the minister, then came the first interpellation to result in the questioning of an Al-Sabah (2007), and the first Al-Sabah to face a no­ confidence vote (2009).

The figures illustrate a noticeable change in pre-mvas10n and post-invasion interpellation frequency, intensity, and the government response. Interpellation Intensity in Relation to Parliamentary Dissolution (Pre-Invasion Period} 7

6

r::::: 0 5 ~ ..!!! a; 4 ...c. I ~ o Intensity Q) • Dissolutions -r::::: 3 -0 A Precedents ·c;;~ 2 sr::::: r::::: 1

0 ·~ ~ ~ I I I .J• ~ "''t 1.() co 1'-- co 0> 0 ...... N ~ "''t 1.() N ~ "''t 1.() co co co co co co co co 1'-- 1'-- 1'-- 1'-- 1'-- 1'-- co co co co co 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> ......

FIGURE 1: Interpellation Intensity in Relation to Parliamentary Dissolution (Pre-Invasion Period). This timeline demonstrates the number and intensity of interpellations (Y -axis) filed and pursued in the pre-invasion period according to year (x-axis) compared to parliamentary dissolutions constitutional and unconstitutional (pink squares). Five total dissolution occurred during the 1963-1986 period including the only two unconstitutional dissolutions in 1976 and 1986.

-....l +:- Interpellation Intensity in Relation to Parliamentary Dissolution (Post-Invasion Period)

14 I 0 0 I 12

r:::: 0 10 :;::; C'G Gi Frequency ...c. 8 D (I) -11- Dissolutions r:::: - 6 __.,_ Precedents -0 A 0 0 0 ~ U) 4 r:::: (I) I r:::: • - 2 0 - --- N ('() L() CD 1'-- ro (J') 0 ...... N ('() L() CD 1'-- ro (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (J') (J') ""'"(J') (J') (J') (J') (J') (J') 0 0 0 0 0""'" 0 0 0 0 0 ...... N N N N N N N N N N

FIGURE 2: Interpellation Intensity in Relation to Parliamentary Dissolution (Post-Invasion Period). This timeline demonstrated the number and intensity ofinterpellations (Y-axis) filed and pursued in the pre-invasion period according to year (x-axis) compared to parliamentary dissolutions constitutional and unconstitutional (pink squares). Six total constitutional dissolutions occurred during the 1992-2009 period.

-....) VI 76

Loss of Face by the Ruling Family

Although support for democracy was vigorous before the invasion, the experience of the Iraqi invasion and occupation (as explored above), inspired an unprecedented reconsideration of the authority and legitimacy of the absolute rule of the Al-Sabah family. This meant that the exercise of unconstitutionally dissolving the parliament was rendered less acceptable. MPs in the post-invasion period were newly endowed with a mandate to check the actions of the government and ruling family whose power-distance greatly atrophied since 1992. There were three reasons for this shift in balance of power between the executive and legislature during and after the Iraqi invasion that influence the success and intensity of interpellation.

First, the invasion had a considerable impact upon the Al-Sabah family's ability to justify continued suspension of the constitution. Through a newfound sense of ownership regarding the direction of their country, Kuwaitis grew increasingly possessive

of their constitutional rights in the aftermath of the invasion and this forced the

government reconsider the political consequences of an unconstitutional suspension. As

a result, the option was effectively taken off the table as a possible response to future

conflicts with the legislature.

Second, Kuwaitis, whether living as exiles abroad or as citizens of an occupied

state, were situated in an environment that forced them to confront the failure of their

leaders to provide security. With a sense of being left to fend for themselves, these

citizens began to seek a return to constitutional rule with its avenues for popular oversight

of government activities like the National Assembly. The protests of late 1980's had 77

demonstrated the degree to which average citizens demanded participation in government and this insistence on popular involvement was amplified by the failure of the ruling family to prevent the Iraqi invasion by diplomatic, military or other means.

Third, the veneer of the regime's diplomatic prowess was shattered by what most

Kuwaitis saw as reckless provocation against Iraq's dire postwar economic interests when Kuwait set the price of its oil higher than the agreed OPEC price.40 Additionally, accusations from Iraq that Kuwait was side-drilling also fed into the conviction held by many Kuwaitis that the government was not acting responsibly with their country's interest at heart, but instead acting out of a short-sighted self-interest, which effectively collapsed the power-distance the government had traditionally sought to foster will guarantees of peace and reliable governance.

The political consequences of an unconstitutional dissolution in the post-invasion period would be significantly more detrimental to the ruling family and government than it was 25 years ago. The political fall-out of the Iraqi invasion and the subsequent domestic and international pressures to return to parliamentary life create an environment in which the ruling family is most likely to allow the interpellations to go forward in order to relieve the impasse.

Increased Participation in Interpellation

The post-invasion period has seen increased participation of a variety of parliamentary blocs in the process of interpellation, which helps explain why there have

40 Tetrault, Mary Ann, Stories ofDemocracy, Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 80. 78

been so many. In some cases, MPs still file interpellation without partnering with other blocs and frequently this can be quite effective. However, collaboration among MPs for an interpellation produces the optimal result: questioning session followed by a vote of no-confidence. In some cases these collaborations have been effective without questioning and voting (2003 parliament) and typically lead to the resignation of the minister in question.

Increased collaboration among MPs and participation in the interpellation process also explains the unwillingness of the Emir to dissolve parliament unconstitutionally even though calls for this action have been made. In the pre-invasion period, majlis 1-5, the collaboration among blocs was limited, particularly during the period before the first unconstitutional dissolution (Majlis 1-3). In Figure 1, the parliamentary blocs' participation in interpellations demonstrates the diversity of the challenge to executive authority.

It should be noted that, in spite of this increase in collaboration among MPs, there has not been a lack of parliamentary bloc infighting in the post-invasion period. Despite the partnering between groups such as the Shi'ite and the Liberals, there are still accusations exchanged regarding interpellation between the Salafists with Tribalists and the Liberals, for example (see the following section Interpellation Allegations

Unresolved). However, this infighting does not detract from the importance of increased collaboration and participation in the interpellation process which has, overall, been quite effective at challenging the government further with a semi-united front. Participation of Parliamentary Blocs in Interpellation

Ill Arab Nationalists 7 •lslamists

6 Pro-Govt D Liberals 5 .... ~4 II Salafists 0 0 ...CI)- ·- .c ..!!! 3 •lkhwan EGi :::l c..z z ... Liberals Cl) Ill Tribal -.!:1 Arab Nationalists 0 • Shi'ite

.,_ <"") tr) ,...... ,_ C\J '<:;/" 0) 0 .,_ .,_C\J II Pro-Govt .!!} .!!] .!!] .!!} .!!} .!!] .!!} .!!} Cl) .,_ ::;:. ·":;, ::;:. -~ ::;:. ·":;, ::;:. ::;:. § .f!! ;Jg .!!}

FIGURE 3: Participation ofParliamentary Blocs in Interpellation. This figure illustrates the diversity and frequency of interpellations and participation by multiple parliamentary blocs in the filings since 1963.

.....:] '-0 80

Interpellation Allegations Unresolved

Despite MPs increasing success and use of the interpellation mechanism many of the allegations at the center of these interpellation are deflected, obfuscated, or denied by the minister during the questioning. Since these allegations are not adequately addressed the first time, repeated interpellation attempts have been made to pursue the same line of questioning (most recently regarding the Prime Minister). During the pre-invasion period, so few interpellations actually made it the questioning phase (less than 24 percent) and very little information is available about these sessions, that it is not clear whether these cases resulted in outcomes acceptable to the MPs filing. An unconstitutional dissolution of parliament followed the 1974 interpellations, which reached the stage of questioning and were the first to reach the stage of no-confidence vote. This suggests that the interpellations were marginally effective as they were intense enough to result in a suspension of parliament, however, regional tensions and suspicion of political decent were influencing the ruling family at that time in a way that is not possible in the post-invasion period. In the post-invasion period, more than half of interpellation requests result in questioning and several ministers were interpellated more than once, which demonstrates how many of the issues at the center of the interpellations were not resolved. An analysis of select interpellation questioning sessions reveals several key ways in which the questioning of a minister gets derailed or obscured in a way that leaves serious allegations unanswered. This examination will clarify why the interpellations are so contentious and do not resolve the issues they were intended to address. 81

Two elements of the interpellation will be analyzed. Firstly, the way that the allegations are presented and the extent to which they can be substantiated is crucial in order to explain their outcome. Secondly, the response of the ministers undergoing the interpellation. The behaviors of ministers in question include obfuscation and/or deflection of the allegations as well as the tacit admission that some irregularities may have occurred but that the minister was unaware and/or something is being done about it.

Analyses of both of these elements will demonstrate how and why interpellations, though they succeed in bringing in a minister to task initially do not necessarily result in a resolution to the issues, whether corruption, social services deficiencies, or Islamic affairs, that are behind the allegations.

Case 1: July 5, 1997, The Interpellation of Finance Minister, Nasir Al-Rawdan

The Al Rawdan case demonstrates how challenging it is to prove some of the major allegations of interpellations and, therefore, how easy it is for a minister to avoid answering an allegation. Because Kuwait has not passed a public information access law, the government is not obligated to respond to MP inquiries either related or unrelated to an interpellation request. Thus, the lack of transparency and the dearth of laws related to government disclosure have put MPs in a difficult position and almost insures confrontation via interpellation.

Five allegations were made against Al Rawdan. First, it was alleged that he permitted individual landowners to hedge before selling their land at a higher price to the government. Even though a 1994 law had explicated prohibited such a practice, MPs 82

maintained, the Finance Minister had not enforced the law. Secondly, the minister allowed private interests to benefit from state financing because he supposedly created policies regarding the rent of government land which were beneficial only to certain small groups. The Council of Ministers Decision No. 471 had laid out how these benefits should be distributed across all groups, however, the minister had appeared to distribute selectively. Thirdly, the minister was cited for failure to execute a law which provided pensions for Kuwaitis who perform difficult jobs in hazardous conditions after 20 years.

Fourthly, the MPs accused the minister of not following guidelines for the Kuwait

Investment Authority with regards to two deposits in the International Tunisian Bank and the Bahrain & Middle East Bank. Finally, they attacked the inertia of an audit ofKuwait

Airways Corporation which had refused to submit its yearly financial report for 1995-

1996. According to unofficial inquiry results, KAC's purchase of two government aircraft was riddled with irregularities and members of the Board of Directors had allegedly stole an estimated $244,000.

In his defense, the Minister stated that the interpellation was a personal attack on him that was without merit. He then went on to say that his predecessor was responsible for the lapse in law enforcement. However, he quickly moved to defend himself against the last allegation by stating that he had formed an investigative committee, which had found no irregularities but had referred the matter to the Attorney General's Office for good measure. Regarding the fourth allegation, the minister claimed that the inquiry was

"unnecessary" because a "settlement" had been reached with the banks and that a fifty- 83

five percent repayment rate from the International Tunisian Bank was deemed

satisfactory. 41

The Finance Minister's response to the allegations can be viewed as part of a

pattern of behavior on the part of ministers who are the subject of questioning. The minister attempted to deflect the allegations (for example, claiming that the allegations

are personally motivated) and made the tacit admission that some irregularities may have

occurred but that something is being done about it. Essentially, Al-Rawdan blamed his

predecessor for the lapses in procedures, claimed ignorance and passed the responsibility

to law enforcement. For MPs who were seeking clarification of the Minister's activities, this response clearly did not meet their standards because Al-Rawdan was interpellated just over a year later using similar accusations.

Case 2: November 4, 2000, Interpellation of Housing and Electricity Minister Dr. Abel Al-Subieh

MPs criticized Al-Subieh for the failure of the General Corporation of Housing

Welfare (under his ministry's auspices) to enforce compliance with Laws No. 47 (1993)

and No. 27 (1995), which set guidelines and deadlines for private firms to invest in real

estate development on government land. MPs alleged that the minister had outright

stated his opposition to enforcing Law 27, which set deadlines for private firm

applications. Related to this was the second allegation that the minister had decided,

apparently without challenge from the government, to raise the price of the land titles and

government-constructed housing (upwards of 25%) which affected poor citizens. In this

41 Salih, Kamal 0., "Parliamentary Control of the Executive: Evaluation ofthe Interpellation Mechanism, Case Study Kuwait National Assembly, 1992-2004." Journal ofSouth Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 29 (Spring 2006): 59. 84

same vein, the minister was criticized for raising rent, in general, in low-income districts like Al-Jahra and Al-Sulibia. The third allegation concerned the redefinition of the

"Kuwaiti family" to exclude Kuwaiti males who marry non-Kuwaiti women, which deprived these families of their rent allowance and from applying for land titles. The minister himself had redefined this characterization without input from parliament.

The remaining three allegations centered on alleged violations of a number of constitutional laws and articles. The fourth critique concerned the minister's request that residents of newly built areas shoulder the cost of necessary infrastructure in violation of

Law No. 57 (1995), which provides government funding for these services. Fifthly, the minister was cited for neglected management of natural resources according to constitutional Article 152. Lastly, it was also alleged that he violated Article 131 as well by negotiating government contracts on behalf of a company he owned while holding public office.

In his defense, Al-Subieh did not address every allegation. Instead, as to the first and fourth allegations, the he simply stated that there was a lack of funding for the housing and infrastructure projects and asked that the government shovel out more funds to help with the growing demand for housing. Otherwise, he implied, the private sector would be the only option for financing. Essentially, the minister was requesting a new system to be developed to finance the growing demand when he suggested that a special fund be set up to include a welfare program for widowed and divorced women.

Overall, he suggested, up to KD two billion be raised to solve these housing problems.

He also claimed that the laws addressed by the first allegation had not been implemented 85

at the same time the law was published (a time span of three months) and that those applying after January 1, 1994 (the date of enactment) would have to wait up to eight years for their land grant. Also, he commended himself for granting fifty-one percent of the housing requests made.

In defense of the third allegation, the minister stated simply that full Kuwaiti couples (Kuwaiti husband and wife) would be given precedence to Kuwaiti males who married non-Kuwaiti women. Essentially, the minister claimed that no discrimination had been made against Kuwaiti males who married to foreign women, but instead there was an overgrown demand for housing which had forced the ministry to redefine their priorities and that these mixed couples were necessarily placed in the second tier of applicants.

The minister defended the final accusation by referencing the interpretation of

Article 31 by the Ministry of Trade, which would permit his negotiation of government contracts because he gained the company through inheritance. He also claimed that the number of bids put forth by his company (presumably still negotiated by him) since he assumed office in 1999 was cut by fifty percent

Al-Subieh tacitly admitted that errors had been made regarding funds for construction projects to meet the housing demands. In doing so, he also attempted to frame the allegations as personal attacks in attempt to deflect scrutiny. He also claimed that he needed more time and, indeed, new programs and funds to carry out the processes for which he had been responsible. The defense of Al-Subieh was particularly instructive as it confirmed every allegation leveled at the minister but through an obfuscation of the 86

source of the problem. As a result, his successor was interpellated using three out of five of these allegations.

These two examples from the post-invasion period illustrate how inadequate responses by ministers to allegations have effectively contributed to an increase in frequency of interpellations filed. Because Kuwait does not have the laws necessary to force disclosure of ministerial expenses, MPs are dependent on the willingness of the ministers to disclose the financial information relevant to many cases. The two cases above demonstrate a common practice of avoidance, obfuscation, and tacit admission of guilt by ministers who do not provide concrete evidence that might prove they have not been involved in corruption. As a result MPs are unconvinced and continue to pursue these same lines of questioning which contributes to the sense that Kuwait is in a political

"crisis."

As the interpellation process is increasingly normalized through rhetoric and practice, the ability of the government to justify suspension of the constitution becomes increasingly unfeasible particularly in light of popular political mobilization after the

Iraqi invasion. We have seen that the frequency with which the requests are filed have maintained a regular and, lately, an increasing frequency to which the government has responded by permitting its ministers, including ruling family members, to be questioned and undergo no-confidence votes. Given these historical precedents that continue to be achieved and the constraints on the ruling family, there is little reason not to expect the 87

government to allow interpellation of the Prime Minister, who recently said he would face questioning.42 Such a precedent would be in keeping with long-term political trends.

The intensity of the confrontation between the National Assembly and the government during the post-invasion period has recently been characterized as a "crisis" due to political stagnation. However, this oversimplification of the evolution of interpellation obscures the fact that this procedure is a fixture of parliamentary life, which has been increasingly successful in exposing the inadequacies of the government to legislative and public scrutiny.

42 Calderwood, James, "Kuwait's PM urged to face public" The National, 23 Nov. 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091124/FOREIGN/711239837/1 011, internet, accessed 23 November 2009. CHAPTER6

THE "CRISIS" RHETORIC IN KUWAITI

AND REGIONAL POLITICS

We have seen that the constitutional provisions for interpellation and evolution of the process over time have increased the modicum of political power MPs can exercise over the government. As the regional leader in the development of dynastic rule, the

Kuwaiti experience has proven that the monarchy can exist alongside the parliament with its tradition of executive control in tact. 43 Therefore, the latest and frequent characterizations of the Kuwaiti political impasse as a "crisis" deserve serious attention.

The recent and frequent dissolutions of parliament have instigated a string of accusations that the process is superfluous or abused. Such rhetoric should be examined in detail to determine who is characterizing the process in this way and why.

Generally speaking, there are three main currents within the critique. The first is a cultural-exceptionalist rhetoric, which maintains that Gulf countries and Arab societies and general are somehow ill equipped for participatory democracy for cultural and historical reasons. The second current consists of critiques which take a moral approach to criticizing MPs for breach of ethics and self-aggrandizing in what might be characterized as arbitrary antagonism of the government. This current denies that there is any constructive aspect to the interpellation of cabinet ministers and to parliamentary

43 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999) 24. 88 89

debates and characterizes them as obstructionist and even supercilious. The third current includes those critiques which point to economic repercussions and the threat of constitutional suspensions as potential outcomes that should prevent the confrontation altogether. Such an approach legitimizes the status quo as an acceptable political stasis, which is clearly unacceptable to reformers and, given Kuwait's political history, impossible to reasonably expect.

Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia in particular, often site khususiyya (special characteristics), to justify the continuation of autocratic policies and resist the use of the word democracy. 44 These cultural-exceptionalist arguments for continuing authoritarianism are undermined by Kuwaiti successes since Kuwaitis and Saudis originate from related tribes from a common geographic location with linguistic and religious commonalities. The limitations of the khususiyya rationale demand the use of other arguments against liberalization. For example, Saudi Interior Minister Prince

Nayef recently said that the Gulfs largest country with 25 million people simply had no need for elections as its Shura Council was appropriately a fully appointed body.

Additionally, in May 2009 as Kuwait was preparing for fresh elections, the Saudis

decided to delay municipal elections for two more years effectively snuffing out the only

indication of liberalization toward popular participation.

44 Hammond, Andrew, "UN Watchdog Disappoints Saudi Women Journalists," Reuters, 18 Feb. 2008, http:/ /blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2008/02/18/un-watchdog-disappoints-saudi-women-journalists/, internet, accessed 25 November 2009; "Saudis push anti-militant line in Ramadan TV shows," http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/769464.html, internet, accessed 4 June 2009. 90

These powerfully held concerns were further evinced by the 2006 elections to the

Federal National Council in the United Arab Emirates, where less than one percent of the native population was eligible to vote. Dubai ruler and UAE vice-president Sheikh

Mohammed said in an interview that, "Our leadership does not import ready-made models that may be valid for other societies but are certainly not suitable for our society."45 This swipe at Kuwait exemplifies the resistance to popular political participation and Gulf rulers eagerness to frame democracy as a neo-colonial structure without legitimacy within the Gulf context. The Kuwaiti system undermines these arguments by directly challenging the "special circumstances" of the Gulf "culture" argument.

Other Gulf Arab rulers dismiss the idea of popular political participation when they observe the ups and downs of the Al-Sabah's experiment in Kuwait. 46 Resulting from this situation was regional commentary in state-dominated media and official statements that cited Kuwait as an argument for the continuation, and even the strengthening, of autocratic rule. This sentiment was further bolstered by the violence following Shi'ite Iran's 2009 elections, which exacerbated Gulf fears of instability due to the perceived threat from Islamist groups and, in some states, a Shi'ite majority.

Therefore, when the Kuwaiti system experiences an impasse, advocates for authoritarianism are quick to point to the limitations of the parliamentary system which

45 Hammond, Andrew, "Kuwait's democracy troubles Gulf Arab rulers," The National, 24 June 2009, World, B4.

46 Hammond, Andrew, "Kuwait's democracy troubles Gulf Arab rulers," The National, 24 June 2009, World, B4. 91

brings us to the second current of the "crisis" rhetoric. Kuwaitis are bombarded by outspoken regional and domestic commentators and journalists who blame Islamist and tribal MPs for choosing to pursue what are described as limited and petty agendas at the expense of much-needed national development plans by voting down legislation and filing endless interpellations. While it is true that historic ties of tribe, family, and religious sectarianism persist as the defining factors in this mosaic society with stratified and conflicting interests, it is not accurate to ignore the gravity of the topics addressed by interpellation.

For example, when MPs filed four interpellation requests against Prime Minister

Sheikh Nasser in early 2009, and the Kuwaiti regime balked at this challenge, other Gulf regimes' schadenfreude was expressed throughout early March and until new parliamentary elections in June 2009 by editorials reprimanding the majority Islamist

MPs for moral poverty. On of the most virulent critique came from Dr. Ahmad Al­

Baghdadi, for the UAE's Al-Ittihad, who wrote with some contempt after the March 2009 dissolution: "The noise made by the religious groups in ... Kuwait keeps getting louder in an atmosphere wracked by attempts ... to outdo each other." He goes on to say "those religious MPs keep ignoring the real problems ... like poverty, unemployment, absence of transparency, moral decadence ... "47 Al-Baghadi's critique articulates the annoyance and vilification of this quasi-democratic institution both within and outside Kuwait.

However, the reasons cited by Kuwaiti MPs as the impetus for those filings include

47 Al-Baghdadi, Ahmad, "National Assembly grills for gain." Al-Ittihad, 31 March 2009, Politics. 92

security and financial concerns, which are vociferously downplayed by Al-Baghdadi as minor issues in contrast to unspecified social injustices.

Presumably Al-Baghdadi's critique includes Islamist MPs who are challenging the Kuwaiti government to report on unaccounted public funds for opaque government projects. Such challenges to the government are also interpreted as the result of tribal squabbling and special interests. MP Musallam Al-Barrak, a tribal MP was accused of using the Interior Minister's focus on tribal primaries as the underlying reason for interpellating him even though there was no evidence that Al-Barrak participated in a primary. 48 An Asharq A lawsat editorial described questions being "fired" at an unwitting

Sheikh Nasser from an independent Islamist MP over the use of public funds by the PM's office as if these questions were not worth such recognition. After the dissolution of

March 17, the Kuwaiti Emir lamented a "decline in parliamentary practice and its consequences have undermined pillars of security and stability of our community, making me feel danger, real danger." Such assessments encourage the denial of the constitutionality and procedural legitimacy of the confrontations as well as the possibility of real democratic reform coming from the government.

The third current within the "crisis" rhetoric, includes two elements. Firstly, there is the argument that dire economic and financial repercussions will result from this impasse due to perceived political instability by would-be investors. Forecasts of

48 "Could MP Musallam Al-Barrak or anyone who currently supports the parliamentary interpellation agains" Arab Times Kuwait, Public Opinion, 30 March 2009, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/client/faqdetails.asp?faid=l776&faqid=7, internet, accessed on 2 August 2009. 93

economic ruin have been interpreted as justification for silencing the opposition as they evoke images of Kuwaiti democracy languishing in irrelevance next to a stagnant economy. On June 11, 2009, this argument was supported when Moody's, a prominent and widely respected risk analysis firm, reported a negative outlook for Kuwait.

Additionally, MEED, a regional business intelligence website characterized the Kuwaiti situation as the result of "political wrangling and suffocating bureaucracy" which has created a backlog of "mega-projects."49 Additionally, economists such as Dubai Standard

Chartered Bank's Monica Malik reinforce the idea of political systemic failure through the observation that new elections would not produce "political stability."50 The second dimension to this current is the argument that confrontations between the executive and legislature via the constitutional framework of interpellation are somehow a blow to

Kuwaiti stability and even Kuwaiti democracy. These arguments are unique to the royal family and its supporters. While it is true that the impasse does obstruct economic plans, this is a secondary concern for Kuwait's parliamentarians who insist on establishing themselves as a force to be reckoned with regarding their country's development.

Even members of the parliament have adopted versions of the "crisis" rhetoric and its critique of the parliament to which they belong. However, these critiques typically can be traced to these representatives' constituencies' special interests, which

49 Salisbury, Peter, "Kuwaiti Bond cuts are not enough," MEED, 17 July 2009, http://www .meed. com/sectors/ constructionlkuwaiti-bond-cuts-are-not-enough/2 03 803 7 .artie le, internet, accessed 20 July 2009.

5°Calderwood, James, "Kuwait's Parliament dissolved," The National, 19 March 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20090319/FOREIGN/97955859, internet, accessed on 21 March 2009. 94

vary widely between class, sect and tribe. Thus, the MPs themselves will adopt the

"crisis" argument if it is potentially advantageous for them politically, especially if they seek to derail another MP. However, these same MPs will use the mechanism of interpellation to call a minister to account. This phenomenon supports the argument that

MPs agendas are narrow and obstructionist to the national agenda while simultaneously reinforcing the "crisis" rhetoric. However, the circumstantial adoption of the rhetoric by

MPs with special interests does not attribute substance to the argument so much as it demonstrates profligate abuse of it as a political tool of convenience. Therefore, it can be said that the MPs behavior reinforces the elements of the "crisis" rhetoric that undermines the exercise and even the principle of their own perogrative of calling government officials to account.

Given that the Kuwaiti constitution provides for the interpellation of Ministers and the Prime Minister, it is somewhat remarkable that MPs are being criticized so vociferously for exercising the prerogative. For some, the complaint is that this coercive mechanism is overused and has evolved away from its intended use to become a "scare tactic."51 As explored above, this "crisis" has been characterized as the result of parliamentary combativeness and the idea that the confrontation between cabinet and parliament is somehow destabilizing as though the constitutional provisions and their exercise are somehow emergency measures that are not intended to be used as regular checks on executive authority.

51 Al-Zaydi, Mshari, "The Democracy of Kuwait," Asharq Alawsat, 6 March 2009. 95

Particularly after the recent interpellation of Interior Minister and ruling family member, Sheikh Jaber, and the successful outcome, regional views of the Kuwaiti system have become somewhat less critical. However, the uniqueness of the Kuwaiti position will continue as long as the status quo in the other authoritarian states continues and this insures that each time the Kuwaiti system reaches an impasse, the evocation of "crisis" and all the fears it provokes, will erupt again.

Considering that Arab Gulf rulers are some of the most authoritarian in the world, it IS understandable that they should reluctant to give the Kuwaiti model any consideration. The so-called "crisis" in Kuwait does not have a precedent in any of the other Arabian Gulf states. However, the Kuwaiti model should not be misconstrued as unsalvageable because of its innovations as some observers have suggested. Kuwait's efforts at political reform and development may not impress some, but its impasse could not be called a "crisis" any more than did its precedents.

There are certainly exceptions to the "crisis" rhetoric. Other writers and commentators took the impasse in stride by complimenting the exercise of the constitution and criticized the unwillingness of the Prime Minister to submit to questioning. 52 Some reflected on the numerous parallels between Kuwait and other

52 Turki al-Rasheed, a Saudi columnist who has observed Kuwaiti elections and ran a program to encourage Saudis to vote in 2005, said the ruling family could not have both power and immunity from accountability. "You cannot have royal protection and be a salaried employee," he said, disagreeing that Kuwait set a bad example of democracy in the region. "We don't want decoration, we want to question people who call the shots." Quoted in Andrew Hammond, "Kuwait's democracy troubles Gulf Arab rulers," The National, 24 June 2009. Additionally, MP and National Assembly Speaker, Jassem Al­ Khorafi, "denied describing arguments among MPs during the past term as a "phenomenon," stressing that matters are being treated appropriately and citing many similar parliamentary disagreements around the 96

breakthroughs. 53 Others reflected on relationships among ruling family members and

how interpellations were being encouraged by these covert influences, supposedly

symptomatic of deep rifts within the Al-Sabah. 54

53 Brown, Nathan, "Moving Out of Kuwait's Political Impasse", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Web commentary, June 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23320, internet, accessed on 4 July 2009.

54 Laessing, Ulf, "Rifts in political elite worsen Kuwait crisis" Reuters, Fri Dec 5 at http://www .reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE4 B41 HK20081205?sp=true CHAPTER 7

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CONFRONTATION

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Hundreds of years of democratic evolution around the world reveals that constitutional monarchies, through fits and starts, have tended to ultimately arrive at full parliamentarism. Indeed, scholars cite particularly the tensions between legislature and executive as the main instigator of successful transitions. 55 There are clear indications that Kuwait has started down this path and leaning toward a transition to full parliamentarism which could lead it to become, in effect, the first Gulf, and possibly even the first Arab, democracy. The key mechanism behind such a transition is the process of interpellation.

In order to measure whether the Kuwaiti impasse between legislature and executive is truly unique, we must look into the experience of other constitutional monarchies where a transition to full parliamentarism evolved through similar fits and starts. Because the transitions literature holds a dearth of information on the transitions of constitutional monarchies to democracies, comparatives are challenging. 56 Indeed, scholarship literature that follows transitions of constitutional monarchies and the

55 Linz, Juan and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.1996): 78.

56 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002): 45. 97 98

significance of constitutional documents has been out of fashion for some time. As

Nathan Brown observes, "We have trouble envisioning nonconstitutionalist democracies or nondemocratic constitutionalist systems."57 However, recent studies shed light on the success and challenges of this type of transition in various regions and are relevant to the

. . 58 K uwmt expenence.

Recently compelling arguments have been made that, g1ven the security imperative of the Gulf states in particular, monarchism in the Arab states facilitates a smoother democratization with less of the risks associated with transition. 59 Given the

Iraqi invasion, concerns about Kuwait's security and political stability are understandable but have been used as convenient excuses for suspension of constitutionally guaranteed rights (as was done right after the Iraqi retreat). The ruling family has reluctantly caved in to public demands for the constitutional mandates of representation and has resisted recent temptation to suspend the National Assembly indefinitely because of public outcry.60

Despite the umqueness of Kuwait's security situation and skepticism towards cross-regional measures, the architecture of its parliamentary system derives directly from the European experience and can be viewed in light of comparative experiences. As

57 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002): 51.

58 In his January 2002 article, Thomas Carothers addresses definitive and sudden transitions inS. Europe and Latin America where elections augured a democratic transition.

59 See Herb, Michael, 2000; Brynen, Rex, et. al., 1998; Posusney, Martha Pripstein, 2002.

60 Herb, Michael, Interviewed by AnneN. Hamilton, 21 May 2009. 99

a reading of its constitution reveals, the Kuwaiti model is derived from the standard dynastic monarchy with a particular set of provisions, which limit the choices of the institutions it creates. 61 Therefore, in spite of it's unique attributes, analysis of the

Kuwaiti model through comparatives will help to simultaneously moderate expectations of its political liberalization and underscore the constitutional barriers to a return to full authoritarianism. Without such observations the likelihood that Kuwait will suffer a

"gradualism whose small steps trace the sad contours of an unvirtuous circle" which does not provide "a real path forward" is difficult to gauge. 62 Comparisons will reveal the degree to which the Kuwaiti impasse between government and National Assembly, however rare it is in the region, is not unique as far as constitutional monarchies are concerned and certainly not a crisis as assailants of its system claim. Therefore, the experiences of constitutional monarchies such as Spain and Norway, as well a Great

Britain though fully democratic today were not fully democratic states in the not so distance past, nor was it always assumed that they would ultimately become democratic.

Just as much of the literature on the Arab monarchies today foretells of authoritarian stagnation in the Gulf, it is clear that in reviewing Kuwait's history, the potential for a full transition to parliamentarism is not so imaginary.

Over the course of its evolution and particularly since the Iraqi withdrawal, the

Kuwaiti monarchy has been a reluctant but consistent liberalizer. Its suspension of the

61 Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Noncontitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospect for Accountable Government. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2002): 67.

62 Bromberg, Daniel, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," The Journal ofDemocracy, 13 (October 2002): 66. 100

constitution immediately following the liberation in 1991 revealed an unremarkable ability to renege on promises of liberalization using the "national security" excuse as so many other states have done to justify partial or full suspensions of liberal institutions and reform. 63 The emotional crescendo of the recent March 2009 dissolution featured a serious consideration by the Al-Sabah of an unconstitutional dissolution in order to push through key legislation that was "in the national interest."64 Though the constitutional guarantee of a National Assembly has survived the recent turmoil, the willingness of the regime to consider an unconstitutional course of action demonstrates the fragility of the would-be parliamentary system in the face of executive frustration. This threat of unconstitutional dissolution, though widely considered to no longer be a possibility given the popular will, means that despite the historical precedents (1974 and 1986) there has been no formal or institutional mechanism put in place to stop it.

Due to this limitation on constitutional exercise, the Kuwaiti system might be called a "hybrid" as some scholars have been prone to do since the end of the Cold War. 65

Historically, seven European countries monarchies with variances of authoritarian transition increasingly permitted democratization measures which eventually resulted in a

63 Recent democratizers regularly suspend constitutions under the rubric of "national security" during or after a crisis situation as Egypt had after the assassination of Sadat and Israel has had since 1948.

64 Tetrault, Mary Ann, Stories ofDemocracy, Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 135.

65 See Karl, Terry Lynn, 1995; Diamond, Larry, 1999; Thomas Carothers, 1999; Collier, David and Steven Levitsky, 1997. 101

full surrender of power.66 In the cases of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the

Netherlands, a notable lack of government interference in elections rendered the nascent parliaments highly successful m extracting further concessions towards full parliamentarism. It is clear that the Al-Sabah have demonstrated a tolerance for graduated political liberalization measures through his push for women's suffrage, surrender to the call for constitutional parliamentarianism after the Iraqi withdrawal, and resisting the call to unconstitutionally dissolve parliament indefinitely, among other measures.

In the European examples above were successful cases in which the transition was slow. In each of the five cases, the full transition was preceded by a lengthy period of negative parliamentary power over the cabinet. In this state, the monarchy had to bear in mind parliamentary preferences when appointing its cabinet. Also, in each case movement from partial to full parliamentarism did not require augmentation of the constitution as long as one of two powers were given to the parliament: "the power to remove ministers or (more commonly) the power to block legislation, particularly the budget."67 Even though these negative powers could affect a paralysis of government, the monarchy still retained the power of appointing ministers. Full parliamentarism was achieved in these cases when the monarchies realized that parliamentary support was

66 Britian, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg all experienced the surrender of their monarchies to parliamentary rule. Herb notes that, significantly, all these countries were successful in their transitions and that all demonstrated a lack of government manipulation of the electoral process.

67 Herb, Michael, "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World." Middle East Journal, 58, (Summer 2004): 120. 102

critical to the governing ability of the cabinet. The resulting parliamentary appointment of the ministers took the guesswork out of cabinet appointments.

In line with the struggles of Kuwaiti opposition groups, several of these cases experienced royal disregard for the constitution. In Norway and Denmark, monarchies resisted and reneged on promises of reform. Opposition in these two cases took the form of street protests, strikes and even rifle clubs which threatened national stability. These cases represent a clear parallel to the Kuwaiti experience between the suspension of the constitution in 1986 and the declared state of emergency directly following Iraqi withdrawal in 1991.

Three major explanations have been posited as the primary explanations for the confrontation. Firstly, observers site a feisty legislature and weak executive which they typically attribute to the absence of formal political parties with which the government can force a coalition. Secondly, the delay of economic reforms is seen to erupt from the supposed irreconcilable economic interests of various electorate constituencies. And thirdly, the impasse is caused by an obstructionist royal family that is said to operate both overtly and covertly to stifle the exercise of the constitutionally sanctioned mechanism of interpellation. The real story is, in fact, far more complex.

The Feisty Legislature and Weak Executive

The lack of a decisive majority at both the royal and the parliamentary registers is said to be at the heart of the impasse between executive and legislature. Therefore, direction and leadership endowments are circumvented by the determining factors of 103

tribe, sectarian and family affiliations, personal ties and nepotism, which also influence the Cabinet. This means that in order for the government to ease the passage of bills and projects, it needs a parliamentary majority. As one op-ed explains, "in spite of their de facto existence and operation, parties are still banned. Consequently, the government ends up with no party ... to uphold its programmes."68 However, this is not the complete picture. Though it is a fact that parties continue to be outlawed, certain political blocs and the cooperation among them has resulted in a strong pro-government alliance which would serve to support its projects and to support ministers and the PM despite

interpellation.

Presently, the government of Kuwait lacks the "institutionalized cooptative and

coercive capabilities" that would enable it to force its agenda through parliament.69 Thus, the inability on the part of the Al-Sabah to face down parliament is a particular weakness

of the monarchical character. Within the ruling family itself, the stalemate with

parliament represents enduring splits, which render its agenda vulnerable to the

opposition. Resistance to interpellation is due to the fear of some members that an

irreversible precedent would be set whereby family members are regularly interpellated

when they sit as PM. Even so, not all family members concur on this issue. Sheikh

Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah, who has been reappointed Prime Minister as of May

2009 has said he is willing to face lawmakers in interpellation.

68 Al-Aissi, Shamlan, "Kuwaiti Democracy Falters Again," Al-Ittihad, 9 March 2009, Politics.

69 Crystal, Jill, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 4 7. 104

Government critics allege that the government's resistance to the requests for interpellation has squandered support and served to exploit latent suspicions and tottering loyalties of MPs and their constituents. The choice not to face down interpellation requests has also served to bolster the parliamentary opposition which is increasingly systematic in its filing for such requests.

There are several problems with the above argument. Firstly, a decisive majority of Islamists are currently in parliament, and yet the body "lacks direction, leadership and a mandate" which contradicts the claim that working majorities would solve the lack of cooperation. 70 Also, there is no guarantee that a supportive majority would stem the tide of requests for interpellation.

Many observers have suggested that the "crises" can be mitigated by an increase in the number of royalist MPs elected to parliament. Despite the logic of such a remedy, arguments for a pro-government parliamentary majority obscure the fact that confrontations between the parliament and government are instigated as much by royal family members using the MPs as proxy actors as they are by individual MPs.71

Additionally, if the new elections were expected to bring a change in the impasse via an increase in pro-government MPs, events of the parliamentary opening on May 17, 2009, confirmed that they would not. Calls for national unity by the Emir Sheikh Sabah Al­

Ahmed Al-Sabah and his assertions that it was no longer possible to leave Kuwaitis frustrated at the political tension were in vain. While the Emir cited the "imbalances and

71 Herb, Michael, Interviewed by AnneN. Hamilton, 21 May 2009. 105

crises" of the previous parliament, and as new MPs and government ministers took the constitutional oath, fourteen Islamist and tribal MPs walked out in protest against the government. MP Musallam Al-Barrak said the government has blamed the Assembly for stalling development and coming to the assembly with no program or development plan.

Another problem with the argument that the Al-Sabah will never submit to a no­ confidence vote is that it this trend was recently upset by the successful interpellation and overwhelming vote of confidence in the royal Interior Minister Sheikh Jaber, which shattered the glass ceiling of royal immunity.

Still another tangent of this argument is in logical contradiction with its main premise. By all accounts, the composition of the National Assembly before its March

2009 dissolution would have rendered a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister Sheikh

Nasser Mohammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah had he agreed to undergo the interpellation. It is widely agreed upon that the PM should have honored the requests for interpellation filed in 2008 and 2009 since at both times, the government enjoyed majority support in parliament. 72 However, both times this parliament was dissolved. If the government enjoyed majority support in these cases and still did not relent, what would be different with the legalization of political parties.

Still other elements argue that the impasse is the result of a lack of political will on both sides. This could ultimately result in further concessions such as the interpellation of the PM and would seem to auger further progress toward full parliamentarism.

72 Herb, Michael, Interviewed by AnneN. Hamilton, 21 May 2009. 106

The interpellation of Al-Rawdan demonstrates several key traits of the interpellation process in the post-invasion era. First, the MPs bundled accusations both seemingly trivial and non-trivial into a single interpellation of Al-Rawdan. This bundling has two distinct effects, firstly, that the accusations are extremely difficult to prove, and, secondly, bundling makes the accusations, as a body, look sloppy and arbitrary. Second, even though MPs have increasingly collaborated on interpellations, the infighting among blocs has not ceased. In this case, Islamist MPs from another parliamentary bloc accused those MPs filing the interpellation of ulterior motives, in this case, the pursuit of a parliamentary dissolution, which they claimed was aimed at lessening the influence of the

Islamist bloc. Such infighting among parliamentary blocs contributes to the growing sense that interpellation is a divisive force and assists critics who seek a cessation to the process through evocation of a national crisis.

Economic Stagnation and Division Among the Electorate

For over a decade, serious economic initiatives have been held up in parliamentary debate. Plans to explore northern Kuwait for oil have been delayed due to disputes between parliamentary blocs which represent splits within the ruling family.

This is understood when we consider that opposition to foreign firms' development of

Kuwaiti assets. Additionally, plans to privatize some state-owned firms have met with equal opposition from MPs. Kuwait's government has been providing employment guarantees to its citizens, paying off consumer debts, and otherwise serving as a generous

benefactor swollen with oil revenues. That these economic reform bills languish in 107

circular parliamentary procedures means that financial bellwethers like Moody's and

Forbes will not issue favorable reviews and discourage foreign direct investment.

The Kuwait's traditional patronage system cum representation-without-taxation is, in many ways, simply incompatible with private sector and foreign direct investment

(FDI). Being that Kuwaiti citizens are accustomed to government support and employment and the oil bust of the 1970s a distant memory, vast constituencies such as less affluent Kuwaitis, including most of the tribal fourth and fifth electoral districts, could care less for FDI opportunities lost and oppose private sector assistance since it doesn't pay taxes or hire Kuwaitis at the same cushy wages as does government. Even though descendants of the original merchant families, the hadhar and secular constituencies are not guaranteed to support privatization despite many influential members having stakes in the private sector.

To further complicate the neopatrimonialism of Kuwait's economy, sociocultural divisions are strongly represented in the outcomes to parliamentary elections and in debates and explain opposition for Cabinet decrees including the budget and economic stimulus. Support for or against interpellations plays out along the lines of tribe, sectarian and family affiliations, personal ties and nepotism. The stagnation of government projects that results from parliamentary dissolution and parliamentary restraint of Cabinet activity via interpellations has caused significant frustration for more

Kuwaitis who either are invested in the private sector or are members of the wealthy merchant class who dislike parliament as an institution. Still others feel the contractions 108

of the world economy and, depending on which class, have their private sector projects grind to a halt.

An organized opposition has been allowed to carry on partially due to the rentier condition which allows a regime to maintain itself without having to extract revenue from the citizenry. However, despite the regime's program of wealth distribution and pressure on the merchant class to bow out of politics, for example, this group has maintained solidarity through economic institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce, the stock market, and the social institutions of majlis and intermarriage. The Iraqi invasion further galvanized the opposition with the addition of the wealthy merchant class whose economic interests were threatened. They reentered politics in a strong rebuke to the regime's agenda of depoliticization.

A preeminent characteristic of the Kuwaiti electorate is the tribal/ settled binary as practiced in the hadhar-badu dichotomy. 73 Although this dichotomy's historical validity is rigorously questioned it is simultaneously used to exclusively define identities and determine political preferences and voting patterns. 74 Both descended from the same upper Arabian tribes, what distinguishes hadhar from badu families is their time of migration to what 1s now Kuwait. The original merchant families of the Kuwaiti chieftaincy set up a lucrative pearl-diving business and were thus able to exerc1se significant political and economic influence. Since the decline of the pearl industry and

73 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991): 52.

74 Longva, Anh Nga, "Conceptualization and Practice," in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications. Eds. Butenschon, Nils A., et. al. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000): 181. 109

the arrival of oil, this group has enjoyed dominance of the economic private sector and a share of oil wealth, granted by the government. Socially liberal, this group makes up the opposition blocs in the National Assembly which push to broaden Parliamentary powers.

The badu in contrast, are by and large newly minted citizens of Kuwait encouraged to immigrate during the 1960s and 70s in order to build a more populous Sunni Arab state to ward off existential threats from Iraq and Iran. Badu are accused by hadhar of milking state welfare which they maintain dominates the badu political agenda to the exclusion of national concern. Badu vote conservative and find affinity with Islamist parties such as the Salafis, which are antithetical to hadhar secular, liberal values. Hadhar are suspicious of badu loyalties and some are resentful of what they see as badu enjoyment of hadhar-built prosperity.

When the new parliament was sworn in on May 17, 2009, these various divisions were expressed loudly. Four MPs from a single tribe walked out because the new government has no representative from their tribe. Other Islamist MPs walked out at the presence of female MPs Aseel Al-Awadhi and Rola Dashti and Education Minister

Mudhi Al-Humoud for not wearing the headscarf, saying they violated the election law which requires women to comply with sharia law. Clearly, these divisions represent the preeminence of ideological beliefs and political approaches and how they collide within a parliamentary institution.

To further illustrate how these cleavages commandeer parliamentary proceedings, in June 2009 after the elections, liberal opposition MPs presented a draft bill which would hold accountable those who issue sectarian and tribal statements that "undermine 110

national unity and are deemed offensive to some groups." Al-Ghanim, a member of the

Nationalist opposition, explained "we drafted this bill after noticing the rampant issuance of sectarian and tribal statements, which instigated conflicts among various groups and weakened national solidarity."75 This bill stipulates tough punishment on anyone who violates the law, such as imprisonment. It is not clear whether this draft bill suggests

guidelines for judging what is "offensive" but it is clear that such a proposed law would have significant impact on these MPs' tribal opponents.

There is no evidence that disproves the influence of these cleavages on economic reform and parliamentary gridlock. Given their proclivity to disrupt parliamentary

proceedings and their interest in passing laws that incriminate opposition MPs, it is relatively impossible to dismiss these divisions as superficial or easily transcended.

Al-Sabah Obstructing Constitutional Exercise

It appears to be a foregone conclusion on the part of those who engage in the

"crisis" rhetoric that Kuwaiti MPs should not interpellate a member of the ruling family.

These critics, as explored above, do not consider constitutional procedure to be

paramount to respect for social norms surrounding status (markaz) and are typically

nationals of states which appeal to cultural exceptionalism (khususiyya) in order to

downplay agitation for popular participation. Arguments that characterize interpellations

as needless attacks ignores the fact that the royal in question (whether PM or Minister)

75 Ibrahim, Abubakar A., "Bill challenges attacks on national unity," Arab Times, 17 June 2009, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/kuwaitnews/faqdetails.asp?faid=l757&faqid=9, Internet, Accessed on June 17, 2009. 111

happens to occupy a seat of power that carries this risk. The unwillingness of Al-Sabah to permit the constitutional provision of interpellation from being exercised is supported by this argument. However, it does not represent the whole story of royal resistance.

The ruling family itself has endured its share of inner disputes. According to

Mary Ann Tetrault, Kuwaitis are wholly aware of the fissures between the two major branches and are "aware of the maneuvering," however, they prefer as do the Al-Sabah,

"that these conflicts remain behind closed doors."76 The jockeying between the branches of Al-Jabir and Al-Salim reached a feverish pitch during the succession crisis of January

2006. The panic ensued when the declining health and advanced age of the line of succession resulted in a hiccup in traditional alternation between the branches. This resulted in the succession of an Al-Salim to an Al-Salim and the Al-Jabir line effectively missing their tum. Rivalry and tensions have yet to entirely cease and are alleged to be behind some of the interpellations filed.

In the most recent confrontation between the parliament and the PM, many

Kuwaitis believe that members of the al-Sabah family, who were unhappy with Sheikh

Nasser, encouraged the confrontation with help from MPs. Though the royal family is concerned that reputations of its members, such as Sheikh Nasser, would be damaged, there are still indications they are not entirely against the threat of interpellation as an indirect check on the behavior of its less favored members.

76 Tetrault, Mary Ann, "Three Emirs and a Tale of Two Transitions," Middle East Report Online, http://merip.org/mero/mero021006.html; Internet, Accessed on 25 November 2009. 112

Thus, the argument that Al-Sabah members are obstructing the exerc1se of constitutional procedure to prevent unsavory cross-examination of its members 1s incomplete at best and certainly illusory. A cursory examination ofinterfamilial tensions reveals that the interpellation mechanism finds strong support among some royals and is, most probably, used by some Al-Sabah to wage campaigns against rival members.

After nearly two decades of uninterrupted partial parliamentarism, two significant parliamentary features have endured. Exceptional for the region, Kuwait has enjoyed reasonably free and fair elections and near universal suffrage, which could be claimed after women gained the right to vote in 2006 and certainly further validated in the 2009 elections when four women gained parliamentary seats. However, other prerequisites for parliamentarism have yet to be met. These include the recognition of political parties, which remain illegal in Kuwait. Additionally, the monarchy appoints its own membership to fill the positions of prime minister and other Cabinet members to the exclusion of the National Assembly. MPs are still not given the authority to determine leadership of the executive branch or draft and introduce legislation. Strong support for the constitution across the Kuwaiti political spectrum includes many of the members of the ruling family. 77 However, agreement over the interpretation of legislative powers is elusive. With the parliament excluded from virtually all possible avenues of direct influence on the ruling family quite intentionally, it is very unlikely that the rulers will hold on to power and prevent parliamentary control over to the elected representatives of

77 Herb, Michael, "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy." Comparative Politics, 37 (April2005): 305. 113

their nation. Regardless, it is actually quite likely that the current impasse will be damaging enough both domestically and to the global reputation of Kuwait that the regime will be likely to liberalize rather than to suspend the constitution again (see next section).

Despite the partial introduction of parliamentarism and the exercise of parliamentary structures, including the National Assembly, great obstacles remain to the full exercise of the constitutional rights with which they are endowed. Case in point is this recent as well as the preceding impasses regarding the petition for and the act of interpellation, which continue to meet resistance with the ruling family whose members are still off-limits to this method of inquiry. In particular, the Emir remains immune from direct inquiry or threat of inquiry. Unable to realize the full exercise of this power,

Kuwaiti legislature cannot observe it's true degree of usefulness.

Since adopting the constitution, the Al-Sabah monarchy has proven to be resilient and remains stable such that, it has been argued, any further liberalization toward increased democracy will occur with the monarchy in place. 78 Herb argues that even if parliament were to gain a significant opposition majority, history has shown that if its strength is perceived to threaten cohesion among the royal family, the Emir has not hesitated to suspend the constitution. These constitutional and unconstitutional strictures on legislative power have not been the only hindrance to the exercise of Kuwait's embryonic parliamentarism. Unconstitutional dissolutions of parliament during the years

78 Herb, Michael, "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 58 (Summer 2004): 121. 114

197 6 -1980 and 1986- 1990 saw a regression in parliamentary evolution and attempts to repress increasingly organized popular agitation. The later period in particular saw a remarkable shift in the attitude of Kuwaitis regarding two major political elements: First, their entitlements and responsibilities as citizens and, second, their perception of the limitations of the ruling family's diplomatic gravitas and defensive capabilities which became glaringly obvious during the Iraqi invasion. Thus, the post-invasion period has seen a remarkable spike in the frequency of interpellations filed with no relative decline in the number of questionings and no-confidence votes resulting from interpellation. CHAPTER8

CONCLUSION: OVERCOMING THE IMPASSE BY

RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERPELLATIONS AS

NORMATIVE AND LEGITIMATE

As democracy activists and others have pointed out, if the lesson being learned from interpellation is that democracy is too troublesome for a monarchy to undertake, then the wrong lessons are being drawn from this situation. Deputy Faysal al-Musallam, spokesman of the Reform and Development Bloc in the Thirteenth parliament, has stressed that he will not stop following up on the file of the expenses of his Highness

Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Muhammad Al-Sabah's office. He pointed out that he was responding to the demands of a number of deputies and citizens to set a deadline for receiving a detailed answer responding to these allegations. In an interview with Al-

Jarida, Al-Musallam said "what hurts me is that I do not feel that there is an answer for this. "79 If the PM is interpellated successfully (i.e. If the result is questioning and a no- confidence vote) this will be yet another in a long line of democratic developments which demonstrate the ruling family's increasing willingness to undergo public examination by elected representatives.

79 Al-Musallam to Al-Jarida: Govt. parties use sectarian file for political. 2009. AI Jarida Online. August 18.

115 116

Based on the socio-economic and political conditions of Kuwait and the historical relationship between executive and legislature, the comparative experiences of other recent democratizing nations suggests that Kuwait's impasse is hardly unique among democratizing nations. Kuwait's political impasse is distinct for the region precisely because the Kuwaiti system itself is distinct. Even if gridlock and power plays are nothing new to the Kuwaiti experience, the Kuwaiti model is certainly unique to the Gulf and the cultural norms and historical narrative particular to Kuwait are defining the exercise of political power and style of governance, as well as the nature and pace of reform. However, a close reading of the political factors that cause the impasses also suggest that a fresh approach, if implemented, can overcome the pattern of lurching from

"crisis" to "crisis."

While it is true that important government projects are being affected by the conflicts between parliamentarians and the government, it is not certain that the interpellation process is the root cause of project delay and other administrative dysfunctions. While the "crisis" rhetoric contributes to and is designed to promote the assumption that MPs are to blame for stalling development, a closer look reveals that the interpellations are complex and difficult to resolve due to the unwillingness or inability of the ministers in question to provide a substantive or satisfactory response to serious inquiries. Such a lack of resolution frustrates MPs as well as the public expectations they were elected to represent.

The National Assembly is not necessarily destined to stay interlocked in struggle with the government into the foreseeable future. How the pattern of impasses will be 117

overcome depends a great deal on whether a formula can be developed that is acceptable to lawmakers and government alike. If a lessening of tension and increased cooperation is considered essential for progress then several steps must be taken to give the interpellations process a new level of legitimacy and institutionalized authority among the public as well as regional analysts.

The key would be to reconceptualize interpellation as a normal and indeed normative constitutional process in Kuwait that is not only legitimate but also necessary for good governance. As long as the government and its supporters are able to frame these limited, fledgling parliamentary checks and balances on executive authority as divisive, disruptive and prompted by unworthy ulterior motives, interpellation will remain vulnerable to the accusation of the reckless or irresponsible manufacture of unnecessary "crises" and disruptions to the proper administration that are contrary to the national interest. The key to breaking out of this pattern of interpellation leading almost inevitably to impasse and "crisis" is to normalize the process, as is slowly happening, such that the claim that a legitimate interpellation involving substantive interrogatories is invalid or unacceptable will lose its credibility and the government will have no choice but to try to provide constructive, meaningful answers and be willing to hold those responsible for mismanagement or corruption to account. In a region in which unchecked authoritarianism is both traditional and defines all other present systems in the Arabian

Gulf, the normalization of routine parliamentary interpellation of ministers, including possibly royal family members, would constitute an impressive breakthrough for power sharing between representative assemblies expressing popular will and input on the one 118

hand and traditional ruling families on the other. It would introduce into the Gulf States for the first time a sustained and practical application of the principle of the consent of the governed.

If a number of crucial steps are taken, MPs could effectively overcome the

"crisis" rhetoric, normalize the process, and begin to move forward in a manner that guarantees their constitutionally mandated authority. In order to achieve this reconceptualization and the normalization of the process, the MPs who file interpellations must think more strategically. First of all, when MPs consider the interpellation of a minister, particularly the Prime Minister, the allegations must be specific and directly related to the minister's portfolio. They should also be specific in scope, pointed rather than rambling, and limited to a logical progression of interrogatories that investigate a particular issue of unquestionable public concern. The past pattern of presenting interpellations that suggest or result in crazy quilts of interrogatories that mix the serious with the trivial and sometimes seem disconnected from each other is a gift to all those who would dismiss the interpellations as unworthy of serious respect. When the interpolations are focused and limited only to the most serious questions that follow logically upon each other in a clear pattern and avoid political non-sequiturs, MPs can strongly bolster not only each individual interpellation, but also the integrity of the process itself as a normative government function and Parliament as an institution. By doing so, the allegations will be less vulnerable to being characterized as trivial or random because the interrogatories would be irrefutably substantive, and the process itself would to develop a much stronger sense of gravitas and responsibility. What MPs 119

most importantly need to avoid is the sense that there are acting irresponsibly, recklessly or abusing their authority in order to strengthen the institution of the Parliament and its power of interpellation. This will require a serious campaign to frame future interpellations in a way that reshapes public and regional perceptions of the legitimacy and the political value of the process to the Kuwaiti national interest. Interpellations now frequently perceived as disruptive, need to become perceived as not only legitimate, but also constructive and indeed indispensable.

Secondly, parliamentary blocs that file an interpellation request must work to form solid majorities that support the request. Simultaneously, these MPs must work with other and even rival lawmakers to establish a new framework for dissenting opinions so that they remain professional and respectful of the interpellation procedure as a legislative mechanism of crucial importance to all blocs and to the institution as a whole. Though some blocs may be opposed to a specific interpellation on political grounds, the procedure has been used by all parties to accomplish their respective goals and if the parliament as a body can cultivate buy-in from all blocs on defending the process, this would lessen the credibility of the "crisis" rhetoric as a government counterattack. MPs in general and Parliament as an institution, including those most supportive of the royal family, no matter how divided they may be politically nonetheless have a vested interest in protecting and developing their institutional authority and the prerogatives the Constitution provides to them. Parliamentarians need to think not only in terms of their political affiliations but also their institutional imperatives, and work together at times to defend the prerogatives of their branch of government. 120

Thirdly, MPs should focus on passmg transparency legislation that mandates government disclosure of financial allocations. Such disclosure would take some of the guesswork out of the interpellation process by providing evidence for the investigative bodies and MPs who are questioning the minister. It would make interpellations more focused and pointed, better informed, less frequent and more credible.

After the most recent elections, the emergence of a somewhat evenly distributed

"mosaic" parliament has given some observers hope that the impasses will be lessened to a degree that will permit MORE progress on development projects. I have argued that the accusation that interpellations are primarily responsible for administrative gridlock, project delays and decline in investor confidence in Kuwait are inaccurate, and that a much more significant factor than efforts by parliamentarians to exercise their constitutional authority to interrogate the government has been the governments' reaction to these efforts by promoting a false sense of "crisis" in order to avoid answering inconvenient, embarrassing or presumptuous questions from a weak and fledgling legislative branch that is unique in the Gulf region. Both the government and the parliament, some argue, now have greater opportunities to focus on restarting developmental projects that will prepare Kuwait to become a financial and commercial hub in the region. 80 However, until there is some progress ON the interpellation process

80 Aljenfawi, Khaled, 'Cooperate on development; Mosaic parliament a good common ground," Arab Times-Kuwait. 23 May 2009, Available from Internet, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/kuwaitnews/pagesdetails.asp?nid=32496&ccid=9; accessed 27 May 2009. 121

itself, the "crisis" rhetoric and the stalled government projects could continue to detract from the real opportunity for political development unlike any in the region.

Kuwait's monarchy has made it clear that it wants the trappings of democracy and has slowly but steadily moved in the direction of liberalization, democratization and reform in a manner completely unmatched by any of its Gulf neighbors. However, it clearly remains uncomfortable with the practical application of shared authority and parliamentary checks and balances on executive power. The key to further democratic reform and political pluralism in Kuwait in the near-term almost certainly depends on the fate of the interpellation process. Parliamentary interpellations of government ministers have been generally perceived as the source of gridlock, impasse and "crisis," since the government has been able to frame many if not most of these instances as petty, irrational, disruptive or otherwise illegitimate and unworthy. As a consequence, it has been able to repeatedly dissolve parliament in order to put a stop to inconvenient or objectionable interpellations with parliament sharing at least some, if not most, of the blame. Therefore, while in fact the "crises," and the impasses that have undoubtedly interfered with administration and development projects are the result of the government's refusal to allow Parliament to exercise its constitutionally mandated function in order to protect ministers and the entire administration from potentially embarrassing interrogatories, public and regional perception has tended to blame the parliament rather than the government. These perceptions can be transformed if the interpellation process is more carefully managed by Parliament as a unified institution that not only pursues the political interests of its various blocs but also its institutional 122

authority and prerogatives, and proceeds with interpellations with an eye to reconceptualizing public and regional perceptions of the nature of the process from a disruptive force to an indispensable tool of transparency and good governance through the development and responsible application of checks and balances on executive authority. Given its constitutional structure, it seems clear that the next phase in the development of Kuwaiti democracy should be the institutionalization and normalization of regular, focused, pointed and responsible interpellations of ministers, including the

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