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Home , Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Abderrahim Zouari, Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari, Adil Douiri, Ahmed Abdul Khaleq, Ahmed Hassan Mekky

Special Report

The dynamics of democracy in the

March 2005

The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 St, London SW1Y 4LR The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.

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Symbols for tables “n/a” means not available; “–” means not applicable The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 1

Contents

3 At-a-glance: Middle East and North Africa

5 Overview: Prospects for democratic reform

8 Index of Political Freedom

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34 Palestinian

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48 Ye m e n

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The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 3

At-a-glance: Middle East and North Africa

Political and social indicatorsa /family Political Life expect- Adult Health exp Human Dev in power (yrs) freedom b ancy (yrs) literacy (%) (PPP US$)c Index rankd Algeria 6 4.30 69.5 68.9 169 108 Bahrain 33 4.90 73.9 88.5 664 40 Egypt 23 3.85 68.6 55.6 153 120 Iran 16 3.40 70.1 77.1 422 101 Iraq 9 months 5.80 60.7 n/a n/a n/a Israel 4 8.80 79.1 95.3 1,839 22 Jordan 49 4.45 70.9 90.9 412 90 Kuwait 44 5.95 76.5 82.9 612 44 Lebanon 6 6.70 73.5 86.5 673 80 Libya 36 1.75 72.6 81.7 239 58 Morocco 49 5.05 68.5 50.7 199 125 Oman 34 4.45 72.3 74.4 343 74 Palest’n Terr 2 months 6.10 72.3 90.2 n/a 102 Qatar 33 4.90 72.0 84.2 782 47 Saudi Arabia 73 1.75 72.1 77.9 591 77 Sudan 5 3.25 55.5 59.9 39 139 Syria 34 2.35 71.7 82.9 427 106 Tunisia 17 3.10 72.7 73.2 463 92 UAE 33 3.25 74.6 77.3 921 49 15 4.60 59.8 49.0 69 149

Economic indicators, 2004e Population Nominal GDP GDP/head Inflation Current-acc’t Public debt (m) (US$ bn) (US$) (%) (% GDP) (% GDP) Algeria 33.4 76.3 2,290 4.6 16.9 35.5 Bahrain 0.7 10.0 13,590 2.2 3.2 63.1 Egypt 73.3 76.6 1,040 11.3 4.9 95.6 Iran 69.8 148.9 2,130 14.9 4.7 27.5 Iraq 25.9 33.7 1,300 7.0 -5.7 n/a Israel 6.8 117.2 17,223 -0.4 0.1 104.0 Jordan 5.6 10.9 1,930 3.4 -0.2 82.6 Kuwait 2.6 49.4 18,900 1.0 24.8 28.9 Lebanon 3.7 17.3 4,670 1.5 -23.2 213.5 Libya 5.7 25.2 4,460 2.9 43.0 11.8 Morocco 31.1 53.1 1,710 1.7 1.3 71.3 Oman 2.7 23.6 8,790 0.2 10.8 10.5 Palest’n Terr 3.6 3.3 917 3.0 n/a n/a Qatar 0.7 23.6 31,740 4.0 35.5 61.8 Saudi Arabia 25.0 236.1 9,460 0.8 15.8 74.8 Sudan 34.4 19.2 560 9.0 -3.0 100.3 Syria 18.2 22.3 1,230 2.1 3.0 84.8 Tunisia 9.9 28.3 2,840 3.6 -1.5 58.0 UAE 4.3 90.1 20,750 3.6 15.1 16.8 Yemen 20.7 14.0 675 12.5 4.9 45.8 a Social indicators: UN Development Programme. b Economist Intelligence Unit index, 1 to 10; 10=most free (see page 5). c Per head. d UNDP, out of 177 countries. e Actuals and EIU estimates.

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The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 5

Overview: Prospects for democratic reform

One of the intended consequences of the US invasion of Iraq, or so some of its advocates said, was to impart the values of freedom and democracy to the “broad Middle East”. In the chaotic aftermath of the invasion, the assertion that ’s departure would have a wholesome, catalytic effect on the of the appeared misplaced. Yet there are now signs that the message of zero-tolerance for tyranny and terrorism (whether Islamist or state- sponsored) is seeping into the consciousness of the . The region’s dictators and absolute monarchs have been forced to take note of both the changed international mood and of the latent power of their own people.

Bush provides the theme The simple appeal of the US president, George W Bush, for the spread of freedom and democracy in the Middle East has provided a unifying theme. This survey attempts to show how that theme is relevant to the many different regimes across the Middle East and North Africa region. A basic issue for any democratic transformation in the Middle East must be the method by which it is pursued—through gradual reforms initiated by the existing regimes, or by more radical remedies, either through the application of external pressure or through popular uprisings. In the case of Iraq, the US and its allies, including a substantial bloc of Iraqi opposition groups in exile, concluded that Saddam’s regime was irredeemable. Reaching that conclusion was made easier by Saddam’s failure to comply unambiguously with UN resolutions requiring Iraq to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. In the event the WMDs did not exist. But keeping alive the belief that they might exist was one way for Saddam to sustain his reign of terror. Similar considerations are at work in the two other states—Syria and Iran—that are most at risk of externally induced regime change. Saddam had to come clean on WMD, and risk revealing himself as an emperor with no clothes. In a similar fashion, Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, is being forced to pull his forces and intelligence agents out of Lebanon, while Iran has a limited period to negotiate its way out of a showdown with the West over its nuclear programme. For the rulers of Syria and Iran, caving in to pressure means the risk of losing face; resisting these demands means inviting retribution in the form of international sanctions and possible military attack. This may ultimately lead to the breakdown of one or both of these regimes, opening the way for a complete reconstruction of the political system on Iraqi lines. In the short term, however, the pressures on Syria and Iran are more likely to result in increased state repression rather than any moves towards democracy (with Syria more vulnerable to a coup d’état).

Issues for all countries The painful process of building a democratic system from scratch in Iraq has brought out into the open a number of critical issues that are relevant for other states in the region. These include dealing with sectarian and ethnic minorities, the role of , and federalism. The model that is being applied is based on a distribution of power among the various groups according to a negotiated formula—similar in many respects to the Lebanese system, where Christians,

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Muslims (Sunni and Shia) and hold specific posts in the government and military. Yet the intricate details of the Iraqi process have been of less sig- nificance in the broader sense than the mere fact that some 8m people turned out to vote in often terrifying circumstances for rival candidates with genuine distinctions between them. Arab satellite television ensured that this reality was witnessed throughout the region. In the past, the state monopoly over the media in most Arab countries would have meant that such evidence of popular participation in politics received scant coverage. Walid Jumblatt, a leader of the Lebanese opposition, has acknowledged that the Iraqi election had a galvanising effect on the groups in Lebanon that succeeded in toppling the government of Omar Karami after the assassination of the respected former prime , Rafiq al-Hariri, on February 14th. The political intervention of the US and has given the Lebanese the opportunity to rid their country of the corrosive influence of Syria over its political life. It will now be up to the various Lebanese groups themselves to use the existing parliamentary structure to create a stable and sustainable democratic system. The face a similar challenge in dealing with the legacy of Yasser Arafat. The election of as the new president of the Palestinian Authority was a promising first step, and the apparent commitment of the Israeli prime minister, , to engage in serious peace negotiations provides a glimmer of hope for the future. The Palestinian legislative elections in July will be the first test of whether the momentum can be sustained. The main Islamist group, , has indicated that it intends to contest these elections, and the results of the recent municipal polls indicate that it will do well. The prospect of Hamas securing a strong bloc in , if not an outright majority, will pose difficult questions for both Mr Abbas and for Israel. The Palestinian president has officially welcomed the inclusion of Hamas in mainstream politics, but he may not be prepared to see the Islamist movement secure a dominant position. That might be hard to avoid unless Fatah, the nationalist movement created by Mr Arafat, can effect a transition to a new generation of leaders. Fatah’s own elections in August will be a crucial test of Palestinian representative politics.

Monarchs and autocrats The Iraqi, Lebanese and Palestinian experiences have provided the most dramatic recent examples of democratic change. Elsewhere in the region change is coming more slowly, but it is coming nevertheless. In eight of the Arab countries—the six Gulf states, Jordan and Morocco—hereditary rulers hold sway. Some form of democratisation is under way in all of these states, but the ruler retains considerable powers. Elected play important roles in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and (most recently) Bahrain, although Morocco is the only one of these states to have active party politics (soon to be redefined according to a new ). Of the states embarking on political reforms, Saudi Arabia has particular significance given its critical position in the world oil market. The municipal elections now going ahead in Saudi Arabia mark an extremely tentative first step. Yet the Saudi government has shown with its economic reform programme that it is capable of carrying out radical changes, albeit at a very gradual pace, and the extent of the changes that have occurred in Saudi Arabia over the past few years should not be easily dismissed.

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The remaining Arab countries—Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—have been run for many years as quasi-military dictatorships, with political participation focused on dominant single parties. The most extensive, and bruising, experience with democratic reform has taken place in Algeria, where the attempt to integrate Islamist groups into the mainstream backfired spectacularly when the generals intervened to cancel the parliamentary election in January 1992, sparking off a brutal civil war. , elected president in 1999 as the candidate of the military powers-that-be, has managed the considerable feat of outmanoeuvring his politicised generals in securing re-election last year. He has now to establish whether he has merely installed an elective civilian dictatorship in place of a military one. The critical tests will be whether he manages to find a way to bring the banned Front Islamique du Salut back into the political system and whether he is content to leave office when his allotted two terms end in 2009.

Even Egypt has responded The Egyptian president, , is now contemplating his fifth six-year term in office. But in a belated acknowledgement of the ebbing tolerance for even relatively benevolent dictatorships, Mr Mubarak has called for the to be changed to allow for the direct election of the president when his current term ends in September this year. In so doing he has taken up the challenge laid down by Mr Bush when he said: “The great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East.” If Egypt does indeed blaze a trail for democracy, it will have to entail a more radical reform than Mr Mubarak’s tinkering with a single article of the constitution. The limitations of the Egyptian experiment are a reminder of how far most countries in the Middle East have yet to go before democracy can take root. It is also important to recognise that the few hundred active participants calling openly for Mr Mubarak to leave—under the banner of “kifaya”, an word for “enough”—do not amount to an expression of “people power” as recently demonstrated in . Even in Lebanon, where much larger numbers of protestors took to the streets to put pressure on the government to resign, it is too early to talk of a popular consensus on how to create a free democratic system. Something is certainly stirring in the Middle East, but the resilience of the existing state structures should not be underestimated.

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Index of Political Freedom Score( out of 10) 1) Israel 8.80 2) Lebanon 6.70 3) 6.10 4) Kuwait 5.95 5) Iraq 5.80 6) Morocco 5.05 7=) Bahrain 4.90 7=) Qatar 4.90 9) Yemen 4.60 10=) Jordan 4.45 10=) Oman 4.45 12) Algeria 4.30 13) Egypt 3.85 14) Iran 3.40 15=) Sudan 3.25 15=) UAE 3.25 17) Tunisia 3.10 18) Syria 2.35 19=) Libya 1.75 19=) Saudi Arabia 1.75 Note: 10=most free, 1=least free. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

An increasingly wide “democratic gap” has opened in the Middle East between countries with largely free and fair political systems and those burdened with repressive regimes, according to a new Index of Political Freedom from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Although Israel, unsurprisingly, comes first, three countries that have undergone political transformations in recent months—Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon—finish in the top five. Worryingly, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, comes last, despite a series of municipal elections now under way. Israel scores 8.8 out of 10 in our index thanks to a political system that allows for the free election of leaders and that benefits from a robust opposition, a free press, an independent judiciary and strong legal and property rights. Lebanon finishes a surprising second, owing in large part to the historic changes of the last month. The unprecedented demonstrations against the government—which forced the resignation of the prime minister and contributed to the pull-back of Syrian troops—was startling evidence of growing democratic sentiment. The path ahead for Lebanon is, however, neither straight nor sure. See individual country pages for an assessment of each political system.

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Methodology The Index of Political Freedom was based on responses by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Middle East and North Africa analysts to 15 indicators on political and civil liberties. These covered the following topics:

• election of the ;

• election of parliament;

• fairness of electoral ;

• right to organise political parties;

• power of elected representatives;

• presence of an opposition;

• transparency;

• minority participation;

• level of corruption;

• freedom of assembly;

• independence of the judiciary;

• press freedom;

• religious freedom;

• rule of law;

• property rights.

Each question was scored from one to five, where one represented the least liberty and five the most. All indicators were weighted equally. Scores were converted to a 10-point scale, where 1 equals the least political freedom and 10 the most.

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Algeria

Political history and culture Algeria bears the scars of a turbulent and violent political history. A genuinely popular struggle for independence from France was led by the Front de libération nationale (FLN). Having defeated the French, the FLN continued to trumpet its “revolutionary” credentials as a means of maintaining its political dominance, while at the same time sinking into corruption and mismanage- ment. Faced with violent street protests in the late 1980s, it unexpectedly introduced sweeping democratic reforms. With Islamists on the brink of an historic election victory, the Algerian army stepped in and ended the democratic experiment, in the process plunging the country into a bloody cycle of violence, from which it has only recently emerged. A civilian government was finally restored in 1999 when Abdelaziz Bouteflika secured the presidency in a general election. Mr Bouteflika’s success in dampening the flames of the Islamist insurgency earned him a further sweeping victory in April 2004. Algeria’s political culture is complex. Most Algerians remain alienated from the political process; the term “hogra” (contempt) is often used to describe the relationship between rulers and ruled. Rioting over poor living conditions and unemployment is commonplace. However, the rampant factionalism within the political elite lends Algerian politics a certain sense of democracy, or at least pluralism. There is a vibrant press, which, though often manipulated by various factions, is outspoken and challenging. There is an array of political parties, including some mainstream Islamist ones, although the FLN has reasserted its dominance of the political scene in recent years.

Recent reforms Mr Bouteflika has spent much of the past year replacing the still-influential conservatives in the military with his own supporters, many of whom are keen to liberalise the economy and attract foreign investment. Allied to a likely amnesty offer to remaining Islamist insurgents, this will continue to win the president popular plaudits. However, although neutralising the malign influence of the military elite is clearly welcome, other political tactics are more illuminating. Mr Bouteflika hobbled the campaign of his main election rival by abusing state finances, by exploiting the state media and, most effectively, by manipulating the notoriously weak-willed judiciary. His rivals in the FLN have been cowed and the party is beginning to look like a “cheerleading” vehicle for the president. Ominously, the president is preparing a law that would require press to operate in a more “responsible” manner.

Outlook for democratisation Mr Bouteflika is beginning to display the classic signs of a president whose successes have gone to his head. He is craftily positioning himself as someone who can deliver both peace and economic reform—strikingly similar to Tunisia’s venerable dictator, Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali. The subtext is that democratisation will have to take a back seat. With his political rivals on the defensive and the US (which sees Algeria as a vital ally in the “war on terror”) in no mood to interfere, there is a chance that the president will rewrite the constitution in to allow himself to stand for a third term in 2009—a tactic used by Mr Ben Ali.

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Algeria: Political structure

Official name People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1976, revised in 1989 and 1997

Legislature Bicameral; the lower house, the Assemblée populaire nationale, with 380 members, was first elected in June 1997, replacing the Conseil national de transition set up in May 1994; the upper house, the Conseil de la nation, which has 144 seats, was formed in December 1997, with two-thirds of its members elected through municipal polls and the remainder appointed by the president

National elections May 30th 2002 (legislative); October 23rd 2002 (provincial and municipal councils); April 9th 2004 (presidential); next legislative elections due by May 2007 and presidential elections due in April 2009

Head of state President, currently Abdelaziz Bouteflika, elected for a second term on April 9th 2004; Mr Bouteflika is also defence minister

Executive Council of Ministers presided over by the prime minister, who is appointed by the . Most recent reshuffle: April 2004

Main political parties Front de libération nationale (FLN), previously the sole legal party; Rassemblement nationale démocratique (RND); Front des forces socialistes (FFS); Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie (RCD); Mouvement de la réforme nationale (Islah); Mouvement de la société pour la paix (Islamist); Parti de travailleurs; Ahd 54 party; Front islamique du salut (FIS), banned in March 1992

The government Prime minister

Key ministers Agriculture Saïd Berkat Communications Boudjemaa Haichour Culture Khalida Toumi Employment & national solidarity Djamal Ould Abbas Energy & mining Chakib Khelil Finance Abdelatif Benachenou Foreign affairs (minister of state) Health & population Abdel-Hamid Aberkane Housing Mohammed Nadir Hamimid Industrial & economic reconstruction El Hachemi Djaaboub Interior & local government (minister of state) Noureddine Zerhouni Justice (minister of state) Tayeb Be laiz Labour & social security Tayeb Lo uh Moudjahidine (war veterans) Mohammed Cherif Abbes National education Boubekeur Benbouzid Parliamentary relations Mahmoud Khoudri Posts & telecommunications Ammar Tou Public works Amar Ghoul Religious affairs & endowments Bouabdellah Ghlamallah Small & medium-sized enterprises Mustapha Benbada Tourism & handicrafts Mohammed Kara Trade & commerce Noureddine Boukrouh Transport Mohammed Meghlaoui

Central bank governor Mohammed Laksassi

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Bahrain

Political history and culture Two factors have played a central role in Bahrain’s recent political development: the rule of a Sunni minority over a Shia majority, and the strong influence of neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Bahrain was granted formal independence from the UK in 1971, and the head of the Sunni ruling family, Isa bin Salman al- , became . A constitution was passed in 1973, followed by an election to a . Thirty members of the 44-seat assembly were elected directly by male citizens, and the remaining 14 seats were reserved for members of the cabinet. However, the assembly was dissolved in 1975 after unrest prompted by the government’s decision not to allow the formation of trade unions. The impasse continued during the 1980s and broke out into sporadic unrest in the mid-1990s. The government clamped down, imprisoning political opponents and many activists went into exile.

Recent reforms The relaunch of a process of political reform in Bahrain predates the September 11th 2001 attacks that sparked the democratisation initiatives of the US president, George W Bush. Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa became emir upon the death of his father in 1999 and immediately embarked on a process of national reconciliation. Political prisoners were freed and exiled activists began to return. In February 2001 a Charter (NAC) was passed with the support of more than 90% of the electorate, laying out a blueprint for turning Bahrain into a constitutional . A mood of optimism prevailed. However, a year later the unilaterally enacted a new constitution that provided for a bicameral National Assembly in which an appointed consultative chamber would have the same legislative rights as the elected chamber. Opposition groups protested vehemently, arguing that as the king appoints the consultative chamber this arrangement in effect gives him a built- in majority. When the king refused to back down, a coalition of four opposition groups—including the main Shia group—boycotted the October 2002 parliamentary elections, Bahrain’s first in three decades. Turnout in the elections stood at just over 50%—marking a substantial downturn in popular support for the process of reform since the NAC referendum. Since then a fragile process of dialogue has ensued.

Outlook for democratisation Despite fulsome praise from the US for the process thus far (and the reward of a pending free-trade agreement), Bahrain’s confessional composition makes it one of the more difficult countries in the region in which to introduce democracy. If the ruling family allowed a powerful Shia-dominated parliament to emerge, it would put at risk its own pre-eminence. Sunni Saudi Arabia would also resist, fearing the impact on its sizeable Shia minority. The king and the opposition will continue to seek a compromise. Despite the shortcomings of King Hamad’s reform programme, opposition activists are aware that Bahrain is a considerably freer state than it was under the rule of King Isa. The king is anxious to calm decades of debilitating domestic strife and has gained a reputation as an Arab reformer—a tag he would be loath to lose. However, the process is currently stuck, and if a satisfactory compromise is not found more radical opposition activists may push dissent beyond boundaries deemed acceptable, prompting a backlash and a breakdown of the political process.

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Bahrain: Political structure

Official name Kingdom of Bahrain (before February 14th 2002, known as the )

Form of state

Legal system Based on a newly amended constitution published in 2002. The previous constitution was drawn up in 1973

Legislature Bahrain has a bicameral legislature, the National Assembly (al- al-Watani), consisting of 40 elected members who sit in the Chamber of Deputies, and a Consultative Council of the same size appointed by the king; the first legislative session was held in December 2002; an unelected 30-member body, the Shura (Consultative) Council, which had no legislative powers, was formed in 1992 and dissolved in 2002

National elections Municipal, May 2002; legislative, October 2002

Head of state Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa succeeded to the throne in March 1999 following the death of Sheikh Isa, Bahrain’s ruler since 1961; he changed his constitutional status to king from emir in February 2002; Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa is prince

Executive Cabinet, headed by the prime minister, appointed by the king (most recent reshuffle, November 2002)

Main political parties Political parties are not permitted, but political societies have been sanctioned formally since late 2001

The government Prime minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa

Key ministers Deputy prime minister & Islamic affairs Abdullah bin Khaled al-Khalifa Deputy prime minister & foreign affairs Mohammed bin Mubarak al-Khalifa Cabinet affairs Mohammed Ibrahim al-Mutawa Commerce Ali Saleh Abdullah al-Saleh Defence Khalifa bin Ahmed al-Khalifa Education Majid bin Ali al-Nuaimi Electricity & water Abdullah bin Salman al-Khalifa Finance & national economy Abdullah Hassan Saif Health Nada Hafadh Information Nabil al-Hamer Industry Hassan bin Abdullah Fakhro Interior Rashid bin Abdullah bin Ahmed al-Khalifa Justice Jawad bin Salem al-Arayed Labour & social affairs Majid bin Mohsen al-Alawi Municipal & agricultural affairs Mohammed Ali bin al-Sheikh Mansour al-Sitri Oil Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa Public works & housing Fahmi Ali al-Jowder Transport & communications Ali bin Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa Minister of state for foreign affairs Mohammed Abdel Ghaffur Minister of state for Shura Council & chamber of deputies affairs Abdel-Aziz Mohammed al-Fadil Minister of state Abdel-Hussain bin Ali Mirza

Head of the Royal Court Ali bin Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa

Central bank governor Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Khalifa

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Egypt

Political history and culture When President asserted Egyptian control over the Suez Canal in 1956, he finally won Egypt full independence and sovereignty over its own after two-and-a-half millennia of foreign interference and outright domination. Egypt has been a republic since the Free Officer’s Revolution in 1952 when the monarchy was overthrown. However, the overthrow was not a popular uprising but rather a military coup d’état. Nasser, who became president in 1954, and his successor both ruled until their deaths. The incumbent, Hosni Mubarak, has served for 24 years. Until now, parliament has selected the presidential candidate who then stands alone in a popular referendum. No post-revolutionary Egyptian president has permitted a viable opposition. The president enjoys overwhelming powers. He can pass legislation by decree, and repeal it.

Recent reforms Over the past quarter of a century Egypt has (along with Saudi Arabia) been the US’s key Arab ally. However, the governance of Mr Mubarak has endured unaccustomed scrutiny from the US since the September 11th 2001 attacks in which an Egyptian national played a lead role. Simultaneously, there have been increasingly daring calls for change from within Egypt, including direct criticism of the president. From late 2004 a movement that has become known as “Kifaya” (enough) has for the first time provided a platform for opposition activists to press for change, demanding direct presidential elections, a limit to the number of terms in office a president can serve and an end to the emer- gency laws that give the security forces a free hand in matters considered of nat- ional security. The regime has made some small concessions, but Mr Mubarak had appeared to resist meaningful change. Then, in late February, days after dismissing calls for constitutional reform as “futile”, the president ordered that constitutional changes be made to allow for direct presidential elections.

Outlook for democratisation Despite the measure, there is no real prospect of any candidate other than Mr Mubarak winning the next presidential election, due by October. Years of one- party domination have ensured that there is no opposition figure with anything approaching a popular standing. Parliament, which will approve candidates (who must come from the legal, but toothless, opposition parties), is dominated by Mr Mubarak’s National . The key question is whether Mr Mubarak will permit the necessary reforms to allow for a credible contest in the next presidential election, due in 2011. These must include loosening tight restrictions on the formation of political parties, allowing greater media freedom and reeling in emergency laws that limit protest. Such far- reaching steps do not tally with Mr Mubarak’s cautious approach during his quarter century in office. However, there are two reasons why Mr Mubarak may allow the process to proceed: first, to placate the US; second, and more important, to improve the chances of securing the presidency for his second son, Gamal Mubarak. Gamal has played an increasingly prominent role in domestic political affairs, but Egyptians have strongly opposed hereditary succession. A process under which Gamal stands as one of many candidates may be the best way to lend legitimacy to his accession.

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Egypt: Political structure

Official name Arab Republic of Egypt

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1971

National legislature Unicameral Majlis al-Shaab (People’s Assembly) of 444 directly elected members and ten additional members nominated by the president. Deputies serve for a five-year term. All candidates contesting the elections now run as individuals. The president may dissolve the Assembly only if he gains the support of the people in a referendum. The National Democratic Party has a decisive majority in the Assembly

Electoral system Universal direct suffrage

National elections Next elections due by October 2005 (presidential) and October-November 2005 (legislative)

Head of state President, nominated by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and elected by referendum. Currently Hosni Mubarak, who was re-elected for a fourth six-year term in 1999

National government Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister. The president is responsible for appointing and dismissing ministers. The Assembly can require a minister to resign if it passes a . Should a motion of no confidence in the prime minister be passed against the president’s wishes, the matter may be put to a referendum. Last cabinet reshuffle: July 2004

Main political parties National Democratic Party (NDP, the ruling party); Socialist Labour Party (SLP; suspended since May 2000); Socialist ; ; National Progressive Unionist Party (Tagammu); Democratic Nasserist Party; Al Ghad

Prime minister

Key ministers Civil aviation Defence Mohammed Hussein Tantawi Electricity & energy Hassan Ahmed Younes Finance Youssef Boutros-Ghali Foreign affairs Ahmed Abul Gheit Foreign trade & industry Rashid Mohammed Rashid Housing & new communities Mohammed Ibrahim Suleiman Interior Habib al-Adli Information Anas al-Feki International co-operation Fayza Abul Naga Investment Mahmoud Mohieddin People’s Assembly affairs Kamal al-Shazli Sameh Fahmy Planning Osman Mohammed Osman Public works & water resources Mahmoud Abdel-Halim Abu Zeid Social affairs & social insurance Amina al-Guindy Supply & internal trade Hassan Khedr Telecommunications & IT Tarek Ka me l Tou ri s m Ahmed al-Maghrabi Transport

Central Bank governor Farouk al-Okdah

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Iran

Political history and culture The post-revolutionary Iranian political system is a strange amalgamation of elected institutions and unanswerable, unelected bodies peculiar to Iran’s Islamic system of government. The president is directly elected and selects a cabinet of ministers to run government affairs. The Majlis (parliament) is also directly elected and passes or rejects government legislation and proposes laws itself in line with the practice in parliamentary democracies. However, the principle of velayat-e faqih (rule of the supreme Islamic jurisprudent) ensures that the president and parliament are ultimately subordinate to Iran’s unelected Islamic institutions. This system of government, introduced following the overthrow of the Pahlavi in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, confers ultimate power on the vali-e faqih, or supreme leader. Bolstering the position of the conservative clerical establishment (and the supreme leader) is the , a kind of super-charged upper parliamentary chamber, vetting laws for compliance with Islamic law and the constitution as well as candidates for public office. The highly politicised and powerful judiciary is also dominated by the conservatives.

Recent reforms Recent trends in Iran have been away from, rather than towards, democ- ratisation. The surprise landslide victory of the liberal Mohammed Khatami in the 1997 presidential polls (and again in 2001) and the election of a reformist dominated Majlis in 2000 suggested that the might liberalise from within. There was strong popular demand for a loosening of social and political restrictions. Reformist newspapers multiplied. Initially caught offguard, hardliners have fully wrought back control. The Guardian Council consistently blocked the reformists’ legislative agenda while the judiciary closed down liberal publications. Mr Khatami’s supporters were tried on political charges and imprisoned or forced from office. Conservative militia and the security forces dealt brutally with the only mass uprising (student protests in 1999). The coup de grace came in parliamentary elections in early 2004. Amid sweeping disqualifications of reformist candidates, the conservatives seized back control.

Outlook for democratisation The prospects for democratisation in the near term are poor. Mr Khatami has to stand down at the next presidential election (set for June), having completed the maximum two terms in office; he is certain to be replaced by a more conservative figure. The current Majlis has so far proven radically conservative; moves towards democracy are unthinkable. Besides this, there is little popular momentum for change—high oil prices have helped the regime paper over a range of economic difficulties. US President George W Bush’s words of support for the Iranian people have some impact, but they are undercut by the US’s determination (for fear Iran is seeking to build weapons) to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear fuel programme seen in Iran as a legitimate right. A US military strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities would probably harden that consensus. Wider efforts by the US at destabilisation (including the extremely distant prospect of a full-scale invasion) may have greater success in allowing opposition voices room to manoeuvre and even fuel regional calls for autonomy. However, under this scenario the path towards democracy may well lead through chaos.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 17

Iran: Political structure

Official name Islamic Republic of Iran

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1979, which was amended in 1989

Legislature Majlis-e-Shuray-e Islami (National Assembly) of 290 members. All candidates for the Majlis must be approved by an Islamic screening committee. All Majlis legislation must be approved by the 12-member Guardian Council, six of whom are appointed by the rahbar and six by the Majlis. The Expediency Council mediates between the Majlis and the Guardian Council

Electoral system Universal adult suffrage

National elections Next elections: 2008 (legislative), mid-2005 (presidential)

Leader (rahbar) Ayatollah

Head of state President, elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term for a maximum of two terms. Mohammed Khatami was elected in May 1997 and re-elected in June 2001, starting his second term on August 8th

Executive The post of prime minister was abolished in 1989. A new cabinet was approved by the Majlis in August 2001

Main political parties The conservative Abadgaran Iran-e Islami bloc holds an outright majority in the Majlis. The Second of Khordad (May 23rd) coalition, which dominated the 2000-04 Majlis, represents reformist interests

President Mohammed Khatami

Vice-presidents Mohammed-Reza Aref (first vice-president) Mohammed-Ali Abtahi Gholamreza Aqazadeh

Key ministers Agriculture Mahmood Hojjati Commerce Mohammed Shariatmadari Defence & logistics Economy & finance Education Energy Foreign affairs Kamal Kharrazi Industries & mines Ishaq Jahangiri Information (intelligence) Interior Abdolvahed Mousavi-Lari Islamic culture & guidance Ahmed Masjed-Jamei Justice Ismail Shoushtari Labour & social affairs Nasser Khaleqi Oil Bijan Namdar Zanganeh

Speaker of the Majlis Gholam Ali Haddad Adel

Plan & management organisation Hamid Reza Baradaran-Shoraka

Head of presidential office

Central bank governor Ebrahim Sheibany

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 18 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Iraq

Political history and culture Iraq's last experience of a relatively broad choice of political parties in a legislative assembly election was in 1954, before the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958. Given that executive power resided with King Faisal and his directly appointed prime minister, the sovereign authority of the elected Iraqi parliament was qualified. In the 1960s party political divisions were less a debate than a street and military assertion by those literally fighting for control of the country. Baath Party rule in Iraq under Hassan al-Bakr (1968- 79), Saddam Hussein's predecessor, was not comprehensive. However, it laid the groundwork for a highly politically repressive regime. After Saddam removed all competition, the political culture of the country was highly authoritarian and designed to benefit an increasingly narrow alliance of Sunni Arab clans. In the early 1990s Shia influence still operated clandestinely in the south, and some independent tribal and Sunni Islamic authority re-emerged. The consequences of the partial Islamisation of Iraqi political life are being felt today in the importance of radical Iraqi Sunni Islamists in the insurgency.

Recent reforms The US-led coalition overthrew Saddam’s regime by military force in April 2003 and has since sought to encourage a representative system of government. Following January's relatively open elections to a national legislative assembly—the first in 50 years and in which an estimated 8m Iraqis voted— political negotiations are under way, and are expected to lead to the assumption of power by a government led by a Shia Islamist prime minister. The new government will also include secular Shia, as well as Kurdish and some Sunni Arab representatives. These different groupings will have to agree a permanent constitution to replace the transitional one introduced in mid-2004, which formalised the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the north of the country under a federal structure envisaged as operating in other if desired.

Outlook for democratisation In the context of a Sunni Arab insurgency that continues to be fed by a sense of political dispossession by this formerly favoured minority, and the lack of representative Sunni Arab figures within the government and legislative process, Iraq's progress to a stable and genuinely pluralistic polity will be difficult. The new government is only scheduled to stay in office until December, when a second round of elections under the new constitution are due. Its priority, in partnership with the US-led coalition, will be ending the insurgency with both security and, possibly, political incentives. The government will also seek a compromise over oil-rich Kirkuk, which is claimed by the KRG, and over the status of Islam in the legislative system. With a political process that is still subject to considerable foreign (ie, US) influence, and with popular legitimacy subject to oil-fuelled patronage and corruption, politics in Iraq has echoes of the past. This is not democracy underpinned by the rule of law, but elections are broadly shaping the make-up of government. The federal and decentralised political decision-making structure that is evolving in Iraq may owe more to the threat of Kurdish secession and the ongoing Sunni Arab insurgency than to constitutional niceties, although the influence of the Shia religious establishment is likely to remain pervasive.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 19

Iraq: Political structure

Executive An interim government was given “full authority and responsibility” to rule Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 1546. The prime minister enjoys executive authority in the government, whereas the positions of the president and the two vice-presidents, who make up the Presidential Council, are largely ceremonial. Following the January 2005 Transitional National Assembly elections, new appointments to the Presidential Council and to the government (including prime minister) could be announced by end-March 2005

Main political parties and armed The main Shia Arab-led parties are: Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq factio ns (SCIRI); Islamic Dawa; Islamic Dawa-Iraq Organisation; Islamic al-Fadeela (Virtue) Party, Islamic Action Organisation; (Iraqi) Hizbullah and Mithaq al-Shia. Moqtada al-Sadr has a loose-knot faction entitled Jamiaat Sadr al-Thani. Kurdish “secular” parties include the Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish . Among the Sunni Arab Islamist parties are the Iraqi (a descendent of the ) and the Iraqi United National Movement, while the Muslim Scholars Association, allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, also has national reach. Among the representatives of other minorities are Iraqi Turkoman Front and Assyrian Democratic Movement. Among parties without an overt sectarian identification are ; Iraqi National Accord; Free Officers; ; Iraqi Independent Democrats; and the Baath Party. Most of these parties have their own militias or armed affiliates. In addition to these more coherent parties, Sunni armed “resistance” factions include Saddam’s Fedayeen, al-Awdah, and Jaish Mohammed. Kurdish Islamist militias include Ansar al-Islam and Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMIK). Among the identifiably foreign Islamist groups present are Tawhid & Jihad organisation and Islamic Army in Iraq

President Ghazi al-Yawar Vice presidents Ibrahim Ja’afari Rowsch Shaways

Prime minister Ayad Allawi Deputy prime minister Barham Saleh

Key ministers Agriculture Sawsan Sherif Defence Hazem Shaalan al-Khuzaei Education Sami Mudhafer Electricity Ayham al-Sammarai Finance Adel Abdel-Mahdi Foreign affairs Health Ala Abdel Sahab al-Alwan Industry & minerals Hajim Hassani Interior Falah Mohammed al-Naqib Justice Dohan al-Hassan Oil Thamir Ghadban Planning Mahdi al-Hafidh Public works Nesreen Mustafa Berwari Labour and social affairs Layla Abdel-Latif Telecommunications Mohammed Ali Trade Mohammed al-Joubri Wat er & i r r igat i o n Abdel-Latif Rashid

Minister of state for security affairs Qasim Daoud

Central Bank governor Sinan al-Shabibi

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 20 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Israel

Political history and culture Israel is a democratic republic with a 120-seat parliament, the , elected under a system of proportional representation. The country’s population is predominantly Jewish but is very diverse in ethnic, religious, cultural and social backgrounds. Israel’s political landscape changed dramatically after the 1967 war, when Israeli troops captured territories from its Arab neighbours. The military remains outside the political arena, but numerous senior officers have carved out significant political careers after leaving the military. -wing party emerged as the strongest party after the 2003 national election. Its leader, Ariel Sharon, formed a right-wing coalition, but his plans for unilateral disengagement from the left him with a minority government, forcing him to find new partners in early 2005. Despite the fragile nature of his government, Mr Sharon’s initiative has a fairly broad base of support. Ties with the US are a cornerstone of foreign policy and the US is Israel’s favoured broker of any Middle East settlement.

Recent reforms Israel has a vibrant democracy. In recent years the highly representative electoral system has tended to underline the fragmentation of Israeli politics, with the two main political parties, Likud and Labour, together able to muster only about half the seats in parliament between them. There have been moves to slowly increase the share of the vote (currently 1.5% of the total) required to obtain a Knesset seat, but progress has been slow, ensuring that continue to depend on the whims of smaller parties to shore up their support, often making progress on both security and economic issues subject to their demands. At some 18% of the population and divided along ethnic and religious lines, the Arab population has failed to form a cohesive political bloc.

Outlook for democratisation Recent developments in the region could have a weighty impact on Israel’s diplomatic and security climate. Israel has backed the US’s stance on greater democratisation in the region—and in fact argued that political reform was a precondition to relaunching substantive peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Although the recent presidential election in the Palestinian Authority has produced a leadership that appears more committed to both domestic reform and implementing changes intended to improve Israeli- Palestinian ties, the full consequences of democratisation there could well see groups opposed to a final settlement with Israel politically empowered through elections; this would also be true in other Arab states with which Israel would like to strengthen ties. Moreover, although Syria’s increasing diplomatic isolation should make Israel’s northern border more secure and possibly force Syria to reduce its backing for militant Palestinian groups based in the country, the uncertainty that will surround a redeployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon will generate concerns, at least in the short term, regarding the response of Hizbullah, the Syrian-Iranian backed Lebanese group, to the changing political dynamics. In addition, Israel may be concerned that US pressure on Iran could just as well create national unity if the country feels cornered, possibly leading to an acceleration of the country’s nuclear programme and increasing the strategic threat to Israel.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 21

Israel: Political structure

Official name State of Israel

National legislature Unicameral Knesset of 120 members directly elected by proportional representation for a four-year term. Universal direct suffrage over the age of 18

National elections Parliamentary election: January 28th 2003. Next elections must be held before November 2006

Head of state President, elected by Knesset majority for a five-year term. Currently

National government Cabinet, responsible to the legislature; Likud formed a with , and the (NRP) on February 28th 2003. In June 2004 the National Union was ejected from the coalition and two (out of six) NRP members also left. The remaining four NRP members quit the coalition in November, leaving the government with a 55-member minority government. On December 1st the prime minister dismissed Shinui's five government ministers, leading to the party's exit from the coalition and leaving only the 40-member Likud in government

Main political parties Likud (Yisrael Ba'Aliya immigrant party has merged with Likud); (consists of Labour Party and ); Shinui; ; National Union (consists of right-wing and Tkuma and immigrant party ); National Religious Party (NRP); ; United Torah (includes Agudat Israel and Degal Hatora); ; ; (labour now merged with Labour); Balad (Arab party)

Prime minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) Key ministers Agriculture & rural development (Likud) Defence (no party affiliation but aligned to Likud) Education, culture & sport (Likud) Finance Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud) Foreign affairs (also deputy prime minister) (Likud) Health Danny Naveh (Likud) Immigrant absorption (also acting minister of housing & construction) (Likud) Industry, trade & labour (also holds the communications & deputy prime minister's portfolios) (Likud) affairs (Likud) Tourism (also acting internal security minister) (Likud) Transportation (also deputy minister of finance) (Likud) Minister without portfolio (Likud)

Speaker of the Knesset

Central bank governor David Klein

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 22 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Jordan

Political history and culture Jordan is a young country, created by the Great Powers in the wake of the first world war. Its politics have been dominated by the Hashemite , whose main steward, King Hussein, led Jordan through a turbulent first few decades when Arab nationalist sentiment was rife. King Hussein used his considerable charm and wit (and a certain ruthlessness) to maintain an independent kingdom when at times it seemed that regional predators would swallow it up. The price of Hussein’s success was a constriction of political debate: representative politics was stymied by a near-permanent “”. His son and successor, King Abdullah II, has continued in similar vein. After much dithering, King Abdullah revived the largely toothless parliament, but clamped down on those who have dared to criticise Jordan’s close ties with the US. The main political cleavage in the country is communal. The original “East Bank” Jordanians, who have tribal or Bedouin roots rub along (often uneasily) with Jordan’s majority Palestinian population, most of whom are refugees from the 1948 or 1967 wars. The Palestinians have been frozen out of jobs in the civil service or military, but form the core of the country’s business community; a restive minority continues to stew in refugee camps and are natural supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is tolerated by the regime and even has parliamentary representation. However, careful gerrymandering has ensured that their seats are few.

Recent reforms King Abdullah says he is keen to foster a Western- democratic culture, and on one level there is evidence of this. He recently announced plans for directly elected local councils in an effort to devolve more decision-making responsibility away from to the . The king is also frustrated by Jordan’s messy tribally-based parliament, where the vast majority of MPs are only interested in securing “pork belly” for their constituents. The king would like to see MPs reform themselves into -of-centre and left-of- centre blocs, in order to give more coherence to both parliament and the cabinet (and, one suspects, to give a more vocal counterweight to the noisy ). However, there has been little appetite for this in a country where tribal roots are deep. More instructive are the king’s battles with the vibrant professional associations (representing lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc). The regime wants to stop them from making “political” statements and has recently enforced a ban on their right to hold meetings.

Outlook for democratisation That the government is prepared to muzzle the associations in such a heavy handed manner shows just how sensitive the king is to criticism of his close alliance with the US. The prospects of a change in royal outlook are not good. Regional tensions continue to resonate deeply in Jordan and provide the excuse for a tight royal grip. Moreover, most Jordanians appreciate the country’s vulnerability and appear broadly content with the . External pressure for change is minimal; Jordan has cultivated a “tolerant” image and it enjoys strong support in the US Congress and administration.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 23

Jordan: Political structure

Official name Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Form of state Constitutional monarchy

National legislature Bicameral National Assembly: a directly elected Chamber of Deputies of 110 members and a Senate of 40 members appointed by the king. Under the constitution, senators are selected from among prominent political and public figures

Electoral system Direct universal suffrage

National elections Last election June 2003; next election due by September 2007

Head of state King Abdullah ibn Hussein al-Hashemi

National government Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the king; ministers are appointed by the king on the advice of the prime minister. The Council of Ministers, which was reshuffled in October 2004, is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies

Main political organisations Active parties include: Jordanian ; Popular ; Future Party; Unionist Arab Democratic Party; Islamic Action Front (IAF); Democratic Party of the Left; National Constitutional Party; and pan-Arab nationalist, Baathist and Communist parties. The professional associations are also politically influential

Prime minister & defence Faisal al-Fayez

Deputy prime minister & minister of state for prime ministry affairs & government performance Marwan Mouasher

Key ministers Agriculture Sharari Shakhanbeh Awqaf & Islamic affairs Ahmed Hilayel Communications & IT Nadia Saeed Culture & government spokesperson Asma Khader Energy & natural resources Azmi Khreisat Education Khalid Touqan Environment Yousef Shureiqi Finance Mohammed Abu Hammour Foreign affairs Health Saeed Darwazeh Higher education & scientific research Issam Zabalawi Industry & Trade Ahmed Hindawi Interior Samir Habashneh Justice Salahadin al-Bashir Labour Amjad al-Majali Municipal affairs Amal al-Farhan Planning & international co-operation Bassam Awadallah Political development Munther Shara Social development Riyad Abu Karaki Tourism & antiquities Alia Hattough-Bouran Transport Soud Nsairat Wat er & i r r igat i o n Hazem Nasser

Central Bank governor Ummaya Touqan

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 24 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Kuwait

Political history and culture Kuwait has been ruled as an independent hereditary emirate since 1961. Since then the executive powers of the ruler, from the Al Sabah family, have been largely exercised by his government, according to the constitution that defines them. Kuwait held its first parliamentary elections in 1963. The National Assembly (parliament) holds legislative authority, and legislative proposals, which are usually authored by the executive, cannot be made without reference to it, except in extraordinary cases. Political parties are illegal, although distinct ideological trends organise openly. The press includes a diversity of opinion and even mainstream titles can be critical of the government. Executive power resides with the emir, and appointments to the government are in the gift of the prime minister. The emir is under no obligation to appoint from the elected (and non-Al Sabah) members of parliament, and has never done so. As a result, considerable authority rests with the ruler, and the most senior ministerial positions are held by the ruling Al Sabah. The right to vote is held by Kuwaiti nationals, or those with long- term residency, who are male, over 21 and not in the police or armed forces.

Recent reforms In 2003, for the first time in Kuwaiti history, the office of crown prince and prime minister were separated. This was, in effect, a constitutional innovation; it made the government more accountable to parliament, as the prime minister could be more readily questioned (by not being the formal heir) and held accountable for a government that would now formally be his responsibility. The latest session of parliament was opened last year with another commitment by the emir to women's enfranchisement, and parliament began debating the issue again in March. The US, which has obvious sway, is undoubtedly committed to Kuwait removing this long-standing infringement from its constitution. However, despite the fact that the government can marshal a majority of elected MPs, it may not wish to force the issue on tribal allies or to alienate the Islamists, who are a powerful force within the country. Constituency reform, which would make corruption more difficult, is more likely to be approved before the current parliamentary term ends in 2007, although official proposals have sought to maximise the strength of tribal areas and could thus aid the government's future financial influence.

Outlook for democratisation The last election, in 2003, allegedly saw the most manipulation of any election in Kuwait. The government can, if it wishes, mobilise support on most issues it is committed to. The result is that different Islamist trends are now the only effective, organised opposition in parliament, and they too can be influenced by official patronage. If constituency reform was to proceed in a manner that boosted urban (non-tribal) representation, then stronger representation for reformers, both Islamist and , could occur. This in turn would aid those liberals who publicly urge the legalisation of political parties and a prime minister and government made up largely of members drawn from parliament. Given the vested interests in maintaining a leading Al Sabah role in the government, such a radical political departure is unlikely, even when family leadership passes to the younger generation.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 25

Kuwait: Political structure

Official name State of Kuwait

Form of state Constitutional emirate

Head of state The emir, chosen from the Al Sabah family. Currently Sheikh Jabr al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, who acceded in 1977

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1962, as amended or suspended by emiri decree

Legislature Unicameral National Assembly of 50 elected members plus appointed cabinet ministers. The assembly has been dissolved three times by emiri decree, in 1976, 1986 and 1999

National elections July 5th 2003, with the next elections scheduled for July 2007. Women are currently not allowed to vote. Voting takes place in 25 constituencies that elect 50 MPs out of around 67 seats in the National Assembly

Political groupings No political parties are allowed, although informal groupings exist. The main Sunni Islamist ones are the Salafi groups—the Islamic Popular Grouping and the New Salafi bloc—and the Muslim Brotherhood (known as the Islamic Constitutional Movement). The main Shia Islamist group is the National Islamic Alliance. The National Democratic Grouping is a liberal, pro-reform group. Most deputies sit as independents, and many are loyal primarily to their tribal interests

Executive Power is exercised by the emir through a Council of Ministers (new cabinet appointed after July 2003 elections), headed by a prime minister who is chosen by the emir

Council of Ministers Crown prince Sheikh Saad Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah Prime minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah First deputy prime minister & interior minister Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah Deputy prime minister & defence minister Sheikh Jabr al-Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah Deputy prime minister & minister of state for cabinet affairs & National Assembly affairs Mohammed Daifallah al-Sharar Awqaf & Islamic affairs Abdullah al-Maatouq Communications & administrative development & planning Sheikh Ahmed al-Abdullah al-Ahmed al-Sabah Education & higher education Rashid Hamad Mohammed al-Hamad Energy Sheikh Ahmed al-Fahad al-Ahmed al-Sabah Finance Mahmoud Abdel-Khaliq al-Nouri Foreign Sheikh Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah Health Mohammed Ahmed al-Jarallah Housing & public works Bader al-Humaidi Information Faisal al-Hajji (acting) Justice Ahmed Yaaqoub Baqr Social affairs & labour Faisal al-Hajji Trade & industry Abdullah al-Rahman al-Tawil

National Assembly speaker Jassem al-Khorafi

Central Bank governor Sheikh Salem Abdel-Aziz Saud al-Sabah

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 26 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Lebanon

Political history and culture Lebanon is a republic with a quasi-democratic political system based on power- sharing between the country’s confessional groups. There are few Western-style parties, with leaders instead drawn from the heads of a small number of political families, acting under the tutelage of neighbouring Syria—though this is now changing. Under the Lebanese system, the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. The country has suffered repeatedly from domestic factionalism and regional instability, which led to a civil war from 1975 to 1990. Syria’s military defeat of the Christians marked the end of the civil war, with members of parliament agreeing in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to change the constitution, giving more power to Muslims—an agreement later known as the Taif Accord. A power struggle in recent years between the pro-Syrian president, Emile Laboud, and the former prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, paralysed decisionmaking.

Recent reforms Lebanon’s political reawakening in March 2005—evident in public protests in Beirut, the forced resignation of the pro-Syrian prime minister, Omar Karami, and the pull-back of Syrian troops—has its roots in political developments six months earlier. Syria’s brazen decision in August to extend the term of Mr Lahoud for another three years was a shock to many Lebanese and earned a sharp rebuke from Western governments and a UN resolution demanding the withdrawal of Syrian control. The attempted assassination of a close associate of the influential Lebanese opposition leader, Walid Jumblatt, presumably by Syrian agents, was taken as further evidence of Syria’s malign influence. But the tipping point for many Lebanese was the February 2005 assassination of the popular Mr Hariri. His death by a massive bomb was widely blamed on Syria and has served to unify most religious and political factions in the country— though not Hizbullah, the Shia organisation that led the guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation and which is close to Syria.

Outlook for democratisation Lebanon’s political future, at least in the short term, will depend largely on the outcome of the planned May 2005 parliamentary election and the reaction to it. The anti- is expected to do well in the voting, and could win a majority of seats in parliament. But while the Syrian president, Bashar al- Assad, has accepted that he has no choice but to pull his forces out of Lebanon, he is not going quietly. Mr Assad would like Syria to retain a significant presence in Lebanon during the conduct of the Lebanese parliamentary elections—potentially influencing its outcome. In that vein, Hizbullah and several other groups held a large demonstration in mid-March essentially in support of Syria—and to deliver the message that solidarity with Syria is widespread in Lebanon. A more open, democratic political system in Lebanon, therefore, is not assured. If opposition groups dominate the election, however, and can form a broad government of national unity, including Hizbullah, the outlook for democratisation would be encouraging. But if Syria, or groups within Lebanon close to Syria, feel threatened by the outcome of the election, a more chaotic—or even violent—outcome is possible.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 27

Lebanon: Political structure

Official name Republic of Lebanon

Form of state

Legal system Based on the 1926 constitution (with amendments incorporated in 1990) and the Civil Procedure Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code

National legislature Under the electoral law of July 16th 1992, the unicameral National Assembly has 128 seats equally divided between Muslims and Christians

Electoral system Universal direct suffrage over the age of 21

National elections Next elections due in May 2005 (legislative) and November 2007 (presidential)

Head of state The president, currently Emile Lahoud, was elected in November 1998 for a six-year term by the National Assembly. Under an unwritten agreement, the president must be a Maronite Christian

National government The prime minister is chosen by the president after consultation with parliamentary deputies; the government is then chosen by the designated prime minister and the president. Ministers need not be members of the National Assembly, but are responsible to it. The prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim. The current government was appointed in October 2004

Main political organisations Hizbullah (Shia), Amal (Shia), National Liberal Party (Christian), (Christian), Kataeb Party (largest Christian party), Progressive Socialist Party (mainly Druze), Syria Social Nationalist Party

Prime minister Omar Karami (Sunni Muslim)

Deputy prime minister Issam Fares (Greek Orthodox Christian)

Key ministers Agriculture Elias Skaff (Greek Catholic Christian) Defence Abdel Rahim Mrad (Sunni Muslim) Economy & trade Adnan Kassar (Sunni Muslim) Education Sami Minkara (Sunni Muslim) Energy Maurice Sehnaoui (Greek Catholic Christian) Finance Elias Saba (Greek Orthodox Christian) Foreign affairs Mahmoud Hammoud (Shia Muslim) Health Mohammed Khalifeh (Shia Muslim) Industry Leila Solh (Sunni Muslim) Information Elie Ferzli (Greek Orthodox Christian) Interior Suleiman Franjiyeh (Maronite Christian) Internal refugees Talal A rslan (Druze) Justice Adnan Addoum (Sunni Muslim) Labour Assem Kanso (Shia Muslim) Public works Yasin Jaber (Shia Muslim) Telecommunications Jean-Louis Cordahi (Maronite Christian)

Parliamentary speaker Nabih Birri (Shia Muslim)

Central bank governor Salameh (Maronite Christian)

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 28 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Libya

Political history and culture Libya was formerly a federal monarchy, whose king, Mohammed Idris al- Sanusi, was ousted in a coup in 1969. The putsch, driven by the broader pan- Arab Nasserist movement, was led by a 27-year-old army captain, Muammar Qadhafi. The newly proclaimed Libyan Arab Republic became an exemplar of Arab socialism, promoting self-sufficiency and outlawing foreign ownership. Over the next few years, Colonel Qadhafi refined this ideology and in 1977 announced the establishment of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ("state of the masses"). The system is unique and based on the political philosophy of Colonel Qadhafi's Green Book, which blends socialist and Islamic theories, rejecting parliamentary democracy and political parties. Instead, it calls for direct representation by the people, to be exercised through popular congresses. With the establishment of the jamahiriya, factory workers throughout the country supposedly "spontaneously" assumed control of businesses and by 1979 the private industrial sector had all but disappeared.

Recent reforms After years of political and economic isolation, recent events have wrought considerable change to the Libyan political scene. Libya has shaken off its mantle as a pariah state and re-integrated itself into the global community. While Libya’s reintegration could—to some extent—be considered as a response to exogenous political pressures, it was also a calculated move designed to alleviate the negative impact of 30 years of political and economic seclusion. In that sense, it is very much an economic dynamic, requiring economic—rather than political—reform. This shift in ideology, which now allows private enterprise and foreign commercial participation, has been presented as the natural progression of the jamahiriya system (Colonel Qadhafi calls it “popular ”) which still ostensibly remains the cornerstone of the Libyan polity. Indeed, politically speaking, Libya’s decision to negotiate with the West merely required a realignment of policy. Therefore, while the outward face of Libya has changed considerably, the internal political dynamics remain the same.

Outlook for democratisation As part of its reintegration into the global economy, the Libyan authorities have made public their clear intention to reform the economy, intentions that have yet to be translated into action. Equally clear, however, is the government’s categorical dismissal of the need for political reform. Indeed Colonel Qadhafi has gone so far as to say that political reform is unnecessary since the jamahiriya system is the most democratically developed in the world, one that other democracies should use as a model for emulation. He sees elections as a regressive step, since “all the people are in power now”. As long as Colonel Qadhafi remains the “Brother Leader”, political reform will remain a pipe dream. The only hope for political reform will therefore only ever come after Colonel Qadhafi’s demise. However, even then it will be far from guaranteed. The immediate post-Qadhafi era will be characterised by tension and uncertainty as various sociopolitical forces assert themselves and compete for authority. The period could also see a reawakening of grass-roots political activism after years of inertia as the public senses a chance to force real political change.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 29

Libya: Political structure

Official name The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Form of state Since 1977 Libya has been a jamahiriya (republic of the masses) in accordance with the Third Universal Theory propounded by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi in his Green Book, which is a blend of socialist and Islamic theories inspired by tribal traditions. The jamahiriya system defines the political and social order, which is also governed by the Holy Quran. The General People's Congress is the highest legislative body. In 1992 Colonel Qadhafi changed the political structure by dividing Libya into 1,500 mahallat (communes), each with its own budget and legislative and executive powers, formerly vested in the Basic People's Congresses. The mahallat and the congresses are supervised by revolutionary committees directed by secretaries, who are chosen personally by Colonel Qadhafi

Head of state Colonel Qadhafi was appointed supreme leader by the General People's Congress in March 1990 after taking power in a coup in 1969

Executive In 2000 Colonel Qadhafi abolished most central government executive functions, devolving responsibilities to the 26 municipal councils that make up the General People's Congress. Centralised control is maintained in the areas of the economy, finance, defence and security, energy, infrastructure, foreign affairs, social security and trade, all of which report directly to the prime minister's office

Legislature The General People's Congress, delegates to which are chosen by the Basic People's Congresses

Key ministers Secretary of General People's Committee (prime minister) Shokri Ghanem Deputy prime minister Ali Baghdadi al-Mahmudi Assistant secretary for services Maatuq Mohammed Maatuq Economy & foreign trade Abd al-Qadir Bilkhair Energy Fathi bin Shatwan Finance Mohammed Ali al-Huwaiz Foreign affairs & international co-operation Mohammed Abderrahman Chalgam Justice & public security Mohammed Ali al-Misurati Planning Taher al-Hadi al-Jehaimi

Secretariat of the General People's Tou ri s m Umar al-Mabruk al-Tayyif Congress Head of Higher Planning Council Abdel-Hafez Zleitni Secretary (speaker) Zenati Mohammed Zenati Assistant secretary Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Foreign affairs Suleiman Sasi al-Shahumi Popular Congresses Ibrahim abd al-Rahman Abjad Popular Committees Ibrahim ali Ibrahim Social affairs Amal Nuri Abdullah Safar Trades unions, & vocational associations Mohammed Jibril al-Urfi

National Oil Corp chairman Abdullah Salem al-Badri

Central Bank governor Ahmed Munaisi Abdel-Hamid

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 30 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Morocco

Political history and culture Morocco was ruled by the Alawi dynasty from the mid-17th century until 1912, when the kingdom became a Franco-Spanish “”. Colonial domination by in the north and France in the south lasted until 1956 when the Alawi monarchy was restored under King Mohammed V. The ruler most responsible for building Morocco is King Hassan II, who combined a skilful foreign policy with ruthless suppression of domestic dissent. King Hassan survived a number of coup attempts in the 1970s and later sought to introduce elements of democracy while retaining overriding power. His son, Mohammed VI, who acceded to the throne in 1999, pledged himself to the rule of law, a multiparty system and greater respect for human rights (particularly those of women). While variable progress has been made towards these goals, King Mohammed retains overarching control of political and economic policies. Slow to anger, Moroccans are generally fond of their monarchy—despite the abuses committed by King Hassan—and King Mohammed’s more liberal approach has won the support of younger Moroccans. Nevertheless, Islamist militants have fed off the social alienation that is widespread in the shanty- that ring major , such as . Rampant corruption and bureaucratic mismanagement have also fuelled support for more moderate Islamist groups, such as the Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD), which trebled its seats to become a leading force in parliament in the 2002 election.

Recent reforms The government has presented a aimed at strengthening the existing political system by encouraging Morocco’s many small parties to merge into more coherent blocs. Some elements of the bill are clearly progressive; controversially, however, the bill denies legal status to parties that run under the banner of , language or region. This might oblige parties that have traditionally represented the Berber-speaking community to review their manifestos. It certainly threatens the future of the moderate Islamist PJD, although a compromise whereby the PJD agrees to drop overtly Islamist language might yet be reached. Other recent reforms include granting women equal rights with men in marriage, divorce and the care of children. Restrictions on the press have also been eased, albeit only slightly.

Outlook for democratisation Human rights and press freedom will slowly improve, although government efforts to root out Islamist radicalism (which have intensified since the Casablanca bombings in 2003 with the arrest and trial of hundreds of suspects) may result in continued human-rights abuses. Genuine parliamentary democracy will be restricted until the king agrees to surrender some of his overwhelming constitutional powers, which is unlikely in the short to medium term. Some in Washington might like to nudge the king towards more meaning- ful democratic reforms, but the US administration is as conscious as anyone that the main winners would be the country’s biggest Islamist movement, al- Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Charity), which is currently banned. Al-Adl wal- Ihsane are regarded with deep suspicion by the US and for this reason Washington is likely to continue pushing the current Moroccan system— imperfect as it is—as the “model” for other Arab states to follow.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 31

Morocco: Political structure

Official name Kingdom of Morocco

Form of state Constitutional monarchy

Legal system Based on French and Islamic law and French legal procedure

National legislature Bicameral system, consisting of a directly elected 325-seat lower House of Representatives and a 270-seat upper Chamber of Advisers indirectly elected by an

National elections Last elections: September 2003 (local); September 2002 (House of Representatives); Chamber of Advisers elected every nine years; next national election: November 2007

Head of state King Mohammed VI

Administration There are 39 provinces and eight urban ; real power is in the hands of governors appointed by the Ministry of the Interior

Executive The king appoints the prime minister, who chooses a Council of Ministers that is then approved by the king; a new prime minister was appointed in early October 2002 and a new government approved shortly afterwards

Main political parties Loyalist: Rassemblement national des indépendants (RNI); Union constitutionelle (UC); Mouvement populaire (MP); Mouvement national populaire (MNP); Alliance national (AN); Left and centre-left: Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP); Parti Istiqlal (PI); Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS); Gauche socialiste unifiée (GSU); Islamist: Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD). The country's largest Islamist movement is the banned al-Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Charity)

Prime minister

Key ministers Agriculture, rural development & maritime fishing Mohand Laensar Communication & government spokesperson Mohammed Culture Defence Aberrahman Sbai Education, higher education, & scientific research Habib el-Malki Employment & vocational training Energy & mining Mohammed Boutaleb Equipment & transport Finance & privatisation Foreign trade Mustapha Mechahouri Foreign affairs & co-operation Mohammed Ben Aïssa Health Mohammed Cheikh Biadillah Industry, trade & economic modernisation Interior Mustapha Sahel Justice Mohammed Bouzoubaa Public-sector modernisation Mohammed Boussaid Religious endowments & Islamic affairs Ahmed Toufik Social development, family & solidarity Abderrahim Harouchi Territorial planning, water & environment Mohammed el-Yazghi Tourism, handicrafts & social economy

Central bank governor Abdellatif Jouahri

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 32 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Oman

Political history and culture Oman has been ruled by the Al Bu Said tribe since the 1700s. In 1970 Qaboos bin Said al-Said became , and after a rebellion in the south was quelled, the country focused on economic issues. Political development and democ- ratisation were not part of this agenda, as the sultan was able to rely on the loyalty of most Omanis because of the close tribal structure and the popularity of the economic transformation that he was leading. Sultan Qaboos, who has now been in power for 35 years, rules as an absolute . Despite constitutional undertakings to protect freedom of association, formal political parties are not allowed in Oman, although a number of identifiable interest groups play an important role in society and policymaking. The royal family in Oman is relatively small and members enjoy fewer privileges than in other Gulf states.

Recent reforms In 1990 the sultan established a new Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council). The Majlis was initially appointed, but the selection process has been gradually evolving, culminating in 2004 in direct elections by universal suffrage. In 1996 the sultan approved Oman’s “Basic Law”—in effect the sultanate’s first ever constitution. The document addresses the responsibilities of the state toward its citizens, including provision for public health, public education and defence. It also promises citizens equal treatment under the law, and offers some guarantee of religious freedom and freedom of the press. The new legal framework and the evolving selection process for the Majlis al-Shura have not, however, been sufficient to address the aspirations of some young Omanis who express frustration at the lack of power granted to the Majlis, and at the increasingly difficult employment situation. In addition, unlike their counter- parts in the 1980s and early 1990s, young Omanis now have significantly greater access to uncensored media. Many have also been educated by expatriate teachers from Egypt and other Arab states, where political issues have a history of more open discussion.

Outlook for democratisation Democratisation has made little headway in Oman. Most residents, steeped in traditional Arab tribal structures, are generally satisfied with the . Sultan Qaboos is considered to be a fair, responsive and generous ruler. As in some other Gulf states, the sultan is developing elected institutions, but they have limited powers—which may explain why turnout in last year’s Majlis election was so poor. Policy towards women is, however, progressive, and women have been members of the Majlis al-Shura since 1994 and have voted in all elections since 1997. Politicisation is still at an early stage and there is no sense of movements emerging that could pose a real challenge to the political system centred on the sultan. Nevertheless, Omanis held pro-Palestinian protests following the outbreak of the intifada (uprising) in September 2000 and demonstrated against the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both instances the protests were peaceful and relatively small, and would have been of little significance in many other countries in the region. However, they are the first examples of popular political activism in recent Omani history and were noted carefully by the government.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 33

Oman: Political structure

Official name Sultanate of Oman

Form of state Monarchy

Legislature There is no national legislature. New representatives to the 83-member Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) were elected by universal suffrage in October 2003. Next election 2006. New representatives to the advisory Majlis al-Dawla (State Council) were appointed in late 2003

Head of state Qaboos bin Said al-Said assumed power in July 1970

Executive The sultan rules by decree, assisted by a Council of Ministers. The most recent cabinet reshuffle occurred in April 2004

Main political parties Political parties are not permitted

Adviser of the sultan Sayyid Shihab bin Tariq al-Said

Personal representative of the sultan Sayyid Assad bin Tariq al-Said

The government Prime minister, minister of defence, finance & foreign affairs Qaboos bin Said al-Said Deputy prime minister for cabinet affairs Fahd bin Mahmoud al-Said

Key ministers Agriculture & fisheries Salim bin Hilal al-Khalili Awqaf & religious affairs Abdullah bin Mohammed al-Salimi Commerce & industry Maqboul bin Ali bin Sultan Diwan of the Royal Court Ali bin Hamoud al-Busaidi Education Yahya bin Saud bin Mansour al-Salaimi Heritage & culture Haithem bin Tariq al-Said Housing, electricity & water Khamis bin Mubarak isa al-Alawi Environmental, regional municipal affairs & water resources Abdullah bin Salim al-Rowas Health Ali bin Mohammed bin Moussa Higher education Rawya bint Saud al-Busaidi Information Hamad bin Mohammed al-Rashdi Interior Saud bin Ibrahim bin Saud al-Busaidi Justice Mohammed bin Abdullah al-Hinai Manpower Juma bin Ali bin Juma National economy Ahmed bin Abdel-Nabi al-Makki Oil & gas Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhi Palace Office affairs Ali bin Majid al-Maamari Social affairs development Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaeea Tou ri s m Rajha bint Abdulameer Minister responsible for defence affairs Badr bin Saud bin Hareb al-Busaidi Minister responsible for foreign affairs Youssef bin Alawi bin Abdullah Minister responsible for legal affairs Mohammed bin Ali bin Nasser al-Alawi

Central Bank executive president Hamoud bin Sangour al-Zadjali

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 34 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Palestinian Territories

Political history and culture Following the 1967 war, the and Gaza Strip came under the overall administration of the Israeli government. The leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, became head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, under the terms of the 1993 Oslo accords. Mr Arafat’s position was confirmed in 1996 when he and his Fatah faction gained clear majorities in presidential and legislative elections. The Palestinian public had grown increasingly disillusioned with a leadership perceived to be corrupt and autocratic, but the issue was sidelined with the outbreak of the intifada (uprising) in September 2000. In November 2004 Mr Arafat died. The transition to a new leadership passed smoothly, with the PLO veteran, Mahmoud Abbas, elected PA chairman in January 2005. He has since attempted to crack down on security and to relaunch the peace process with Israel.

Recent reforms Under Israeli and US pressure, Mr Arafat was forced to accept the appointment of a prime minister in April 2003, and to increase economic transparency. However, the first holder of the prime ministership, Mr Abbas, resigned months later after a power struggle, to be replaced by Ahmed Qureia, who laboured under similar constraints suffered by his predecessor, including Mr Arafat’s insistence on retaining control over security. Following Mr Arafat’s death, reforms have accelerated. Municipal elections—the first vote since 1996—saw a strong turnout. Presidential elections on January 9th saw Mr Abbas affirmed as PA president in a largely free and fair poll despite some shortcomings, including a boycott by Islamist groups (unlike in the municipal elections, where Hamas performed strongly). Elections for seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) are to be held on July 17th. The PLC is working on a new election law based on a mixture of proportional representation and a system to allow for broader representation. It has also flexed its muscles by rejecting Mr Qureia’s first proposed new cabinet. On August 4th the Fatah central committee is to hold its first election since 1989.

Outlook for democratisation The smooth transfer of power, acceleration of political reform and declaration of a Palestinian-Israeli ceasefire since Mr Arafat’s death are encouraging signs. However, democratisation will also highlight the challenge of being caught between Israeli and US demands for reform and improvements in security, and the political demands of militant groups. Mr Abbas may find he lacks the political mandate to crack down on militant groups, particularly since these have political institutions that are important players in Palestinian society. Hamas, for example, may gain 20-30% of the vote in national elections and demand a power-sharing role, a development that would not be welcomed by the US and Israel despite their encouragement of reform. Elections must become regular if democratic gains are to be consolidated, while other institutions such as the judiciary have to be strengthened and the primacy of the rule of law entrenched. Nevertheless, the Palestinians have laid the groundwork for a functioning democracy in the Middle East, despite the many external constraints that they face. By doing so, they have provided populations elsewhere in the region with an example to follow.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 35

Palestinian Territories: Political structure

Palestinian Authority (PA) The PA is the over-arching political authority encompassing an executive arm (the cabinet) and legislative arm (the Palestinian Legislative Council; PLC). President, or chairman (rais), Mahmoud Abbas following the death of Yasser Arafat, who had held the post since 1996

Cabinet PA cabinet (originally appointed and headed by the rais, but from 2003 appointed by the prime minister) responsible to the legislature. Cabinet resigned September 2002. New cabinet under prime minister appointed April 2003 but resigned in September 2003, and emergency cabinet appointed by the PA chairman in October 2003 under the prime minister, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala). Full cabinet ratified by PLC on November 12th 2003. A new cabinet was sworn in on February 24th 2005

Assembly Unicameral PLC made up of 88 members directly elected on a multimember constituency basis

Electoral system Universal direct suffrage over the age of 18 National elections January 20th 1996; presidential and legislative elections were due in 2000, but were not held because of political difficulties and were postponed numerous times. Presidential elections were held on January 9th 2005 to find a successor to Mr Arafat. Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) garnered 62.3% of the vote. Parliamentary elections expected July 17th 2005

Head of assembly Speaker of the PLC, elected by assembly members for a five-year term; Rahwi Fattouh since November 2003. He served as interim president when Mr Arafat died

Main political groupings The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is the umbrella for a number of factions, including: Fatah (mainstream faction led by Farouq Qaddoumi since Mr Arafat's death); the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP, former Palestine Communist Party); the for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). FIDA is a social-democratic breakaway from the PFLP. Outside the PLO are the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad. -based radical factions running bases in Lebanon include: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command; Fatah Revolutionary Council; and the Popular Struggle Front

The government Palestinian Authority chairman (rais) Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen; Fatah) Prime minister Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala; Fatah) Deputy prime minister (& information minister Nabil Shaath (Fatah)

Key ministers Agriculture Waleed Abed Rabbo (Fatah) Civil affairs Mohammed Dahlan (Fatah) Economy Mazen Sonnoqrot (Independent) Education Naim abu El-Humos (Fatah) Finance Salam Fayyad (Independent) Foreign affairs Nasser al-Kidwa (Fatah) Health Thihni al-Wiheideh (Fatah) Housing & public works Mohammed Ishtayyeh (Fatah) Interior Nasser Yousef (Fatah) Justice Farid al-Jallad (Independent) Planning Ghassan al-Khatib (Palestinian People’s Party) Social affairs Hassan abu Libdeh (Fatah) Telecommunications Sabri Seidam (Fatah) Tou ri s m Ziyad Bandak (Fatah) Transport Saad al-Deen Khorma (Fatah) Governor of the Palestine Monetary Authority Amin Haddad has resigned but remains as deputy governor until a replacement is found

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 36 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Qatar

Political history and culture Before 1995 Qatar was a , with political power resting almost solely with the emir. In 1995 Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani seized the throne in a palace coup. Previously, as crown prince, Sheikh Hamad had, in effect, run the affairs of state (his father was largely uninterested in day-to-day policymaking), and following his accession he embarked upon a wide-ranging programme of economic and political reform. Of late he has come to be seen as a vocal champion for reform—not only in his own country but also across the region—much to the chagrin of neighbouring regimes.

Recent reforms Real evidence of a tangible reform process—in which considerable legislative power will be devolved away from the emir—first became apparent in 1999 with the establishment of a Constituent Assembly. It was tasked with drafting a new constitution for the state, including provisions for an elected parliament. Unlike in Bahrain, it appears that the emir has accepted the vast majority of the changes recommended. The new constitution will overhaul the traditional patronage structure of the state, whereby most of the important posts in the government have been monopolised by the pre-eminent families. At the centre of the body politic will be the new Shura Council, which will be two-thirds elected—with universal suffrage for men and women and no gender-bar on standing for election—and which will have the right to propose legislation. Limits on the Council’s power remain: one-third of its members will still be appointed by Sheikh Hamad; organised political parties will not be allowed; and the emir can postpone indefinitely a bill’s implementation should he judge the legislation to be against the “national interest”. However, there is seemingly no bar on the range of topics it is allowed to debate, and compared with other consultative councils in the region its influence is likely to be considerable. Elections to the Council are planned before the end of this year.

Outlook for democratisation The emir is likely to remain progressive in his outlook, and has stated that further changes to the constitution are possible. His political programme is extremely popular in this predominately young country, with the referendum in April 2003 on the new constitution passed by 96% of voters. An economic reform programme has been pursued in parallel, which has left Qatar with one of the highest GDP per head ratios in the world. The ongoing industrialisation process will further enrich the tiny emirate, making it one of the most politically and economically liberal states in the Arab world. This liberal stance is also reflected in the high-profile US presence in Qatar—the emirate hosts a massive US air base at Al Udeid and is home to US central command in the region. Qatar’s strengthening ties with the US in many respects stem from its unprompted pursuit of reform, permitting the emirate to remain outside the scope of US criticisms directed at fellow Arab states for their failure to change.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 37

Qatar: Political structure

Official name State of Qatar

Form of state Emirate

Legal system Based on provisional constitution of 1970, to be updated in line with the new constitution in June 2005

Legislature No elected legislature. An appointed 35-member Consultative Council, or Majlis al-Shura, is empowered to debate legislation, summon ministers and make recommendations to the Council of Ministers, but in practice does little. However, in April 2003 a new constitution was passed in a nationwide referendum and a law enacting the charter signed in June 2004. The document calls for the creation of a 45-member national parliament, two-thirds of whose members would be directly elected by universal suffrage. It will be implemented in June 2005

Head of state The emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, succeeded to the throne in June 1995. In October 1996 he appointed as his heir his third son, Sheikh Jassem bin Hamad al-Thani. However, in August 2003 Sheikh Jassem unexpectedly resigned his position to be replaced by his younger brother, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani

Executive Cabinet, headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the emir (new appointments were last made in June 1999; minor reshuffles in August and December 2003, and March 2004)

Main political parties Political parties are not permitted

Government Prime minister Abdullah bin Khalifa al-Thani Deputy prime minister & foreign affairs Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani Deputy prime minister & energy, industry, electricity & water Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyeh Deputy prime minister Mohammed bin Khalifa al-Thani

Key ministers Communications & transport Ahmed bin Nasser al-Thani Defence Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani Economy & trade Mohammed bin Ahmed al-Thani Education Sheikha bint Ahmed al-Mahmoud Endowments & Islamic affairs Mohammed bin Abdel-Latif al-Mana Finance Youssef Hussein Kamal Interior Abdullah bin Khaled al-Thani Justice Hassan Abdullah al-Ghanem Labour, social affairs & housing Falah bin Jassem al-Thani Municipal affairs & agriculture Sultan bin Hassan al-Dousari

Key ministers of state Cabinet affairs Mohammed bin Isa al-Muhannadi Emiri diwan Hamad bin Suhaym al-Thani Foreign affairs Ahmed Abdullah al-Mahmoud Internal affairs Hamad bin Nasser bin Jassem al-Thani

Central Bank governor Abdullah bin Khaled al-Attiyeh

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 38 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Saudi Arabia

Political history and culture There is very little electoral tradition in the kingdom, and what civil space exists is largely occupied by a highly conservative form of Islam and by extensive and influential tribal organisation. These together have traditionally formed part of the backbone of the regime, with the Islamic establishment alone controlling the legal process. The decision in 2004 to conduct elections for half the seats on the country's municipal authorities was undoubtedly a response to US pressure. So were previous and highly controversial steps in the early 1990s to write a Basic Law (tantamount to a constitution) and form a Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). However, domestic pressure for greater accountability has been building from radical Islamists as well as from liberals. For its part the Saudi regime is responding to these pressures at its own pace, dusting down long-shelved plans for municipal elections, and cautiously engaging in dialogue with disparate political trends in the country.

Recent reforms Municipal authorities have limited powers, and elections, so far at least, have excluded women. However, the current election debate has, by Saudi standards, been quite forthright, and a fairly disparate array of candidates has been allowed to stand. Although organised electoral slates contradict current election regulations, they have been in operation. Islamist radicals secured a more or less clean sweep in the Riyadh election in February, and appear to have done well in elections in early March in Eastern and the south- west. The ruling family expects that greater participation in decision-making will be sufficient to satisfy both the US and those domestic Islamist radicals who are willing to pursue peaceful change but who have very different ideas to the ruling Al Saud and to about where the process should be heading.

Outlook for democratisation Those close to the liberal wing of the Al Saud argue that the first steps in what will, in effect, be political parties are in place and that the family must decide how it is going to deal with this eventuality. There is little indication, however, that the Al Saud have begun this adjustment, or have decided what legal processes will underpin it. This exercise could easily stall, especially if further attacks by Islamist militants give ammunition to those senior family members who have misgivings about political reform. Extending the election principle to the Majlis by 2009/10, as has been suggested, is expected to be preceded by an expansion and rotation of its membership this year, and the possible granting of meaningful legislative powers. A partly elected Majlis could become a platform for elected representatives, possibly including women, to demand more powers and greater governmental accountability. At the same time, the enthusiasm of the Shia minority—located in parts of the oil-rich Eastern Province—for the municipal process suggests that should they be unable eventually to express their views at the national level, a renewed wave of popular frustration could erupt. On the assumption that the greatest beneficiaries of an ongoing electoral process will be Sunni Islamist radicals, the key will be the extent to which the ruling family and the US are prepared to countenance legislative pressure for transparency over Al Saud finances and, in the longer term, the creation of an Islamic constitutional monarchy by stealth.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 39

Saudi Arabia: Political structure

Official name Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Legal system Based on the sharia (Islamic law) and the Basic Law (1992); no written constitution

National legislature There is no elected legislature. A Consultative Council was appointed in August 1993 and held its inaugural session in December that year. It can now initiate legislation

Head of state The king, Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud, acceded to the throne in June 1982. Since apparently suffering a stroke in late 1995, King Fahd has granted more responsibility to the de facto ruler and crown prince, Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud

National government Council of Ministers, headed by the king, who holds the post of prime minister. The Council of Ministers exercises both legislative and executive powers

Main political parties Political parties are not permitted

Council of Ministers Prime minister King Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud Deputy prime minister Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud Second deputy prime minister, minister of defence & aviation Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud

Key ministers Agriculture Fahad bin Abdel-Rahman Balghnaim Civil service Mohammed bin Ali al-Fayez Commerce & industry Hashim bin Abdullah bin Hashim Yamani Culture & information Fouad bin Abdel-Salam bin Mohammed Farsi Economy & planning Khaled bin Mohammed al-Gosaibi Education Mohammed bin Ahmed al-Rashid Finance Ibrahim Abdel-Aziz al-Asaf Foreign affairs Saud al-Faisal bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud Health Hamed bin Abdullah al-Manie Higher education Khaled bin Mohammed al-Anqari Interior Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud Islamic endowments Saleh bin Abdel-Aziz Mohammed & guidance bin Ibrahim al-Sheikh Justice Abdullah bin Mohammed al-Sheikh Labour Ghazi al-Gosaibi Municipal & rural affairs & public works & housing Mutaab bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud Petroleum & mineral resources Ali bin Ibrahim al-Naimi Pilgrimage Iyad bin Amin Madani Social Affairs Ali al-Namla Telecoms & information technology Mohammed bin Jamal al-Mulla Transport Jabara bin Eid al-Seraisry Wat er & e l e ct r i ci t y Abdullah al-Hussayen

Key officials Director of General Intelligence (New appointee to be confirmed) Speaker of the Consultative Council Saleh bin Abdullah bin Humaid President of the Board of Grievances Nasser bin Hamad al-Rashid President of the Supreme Judicial Council Salih bin Mohammed al-Lihaydan

Central bank governor Hamad Saud al-Sayari

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 40 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Sudan

Political history and culture Since gaining independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has been wracked by civil war and political instability, which has pitted the northern elite— predominantly Arab Muslims—against the mainly Christian, black African southerners. Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Beshir has been president of Sudan since he gained power in a coup d’état in June 1989. Although head of state, he was for much of this period the junior partner to Hassan al-Turabi, the founding father of the ruling National Congress (known then as the National Islamic Front). With the support of the military, Mr Beshir mounted a de facto palace coup in late 1999, imposing a state of emergency and sidelining Mr Turabi. Mr Beshir was re- elected to serve a second five-year term as president in December 2000.

Recent reforms In spite of the repressive nature of Lieutenant-General Beshir’s regime, which has stamped out dissent and ruthlessly quelled any sign of unrest, political reforms have been implemented during his tenure, ostensibly designed to broaden popular participation in political decision-making. The constitution was changed, allowing for the election of the president every five years and establishing a federal system of government that divided the country into 26 states. A system of popular congresses in a pyramid structure reminiscent of the Libyan model was also instituted, later widened by the creation of a 300- member National Assembly. Despite the reforms, however, Sudan is still a highly centralised polity and Mr Beshir heads a highly autocratic regime. Nevertheless, peace negotiations between the northern regime and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) were instigated in 2002 and finally resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement in early 2005, which will effect wide-ranging political reform.

Outlook for democratisation The peace deal, when implemented, will bring wholesale changes to the Sudanese political scene. Under the agreement, the south will hold a self- determination ballot on whether to remain part of a unified Sudan or secede and become an independent state. The ballot will be held after a six-year interim period during which national power will be shared between the current regime, the SPLA and other opposition groups on an equitable basis, within a federal political structure. Mr Bashir will remain president, and the leader of the SPLA, John Garang, will serve as the powerful vice-president. Parliamentary elections will be held after three years, although the distribution of power between the main groups will remain the same. In addition to sharing power in the national government, the two parties will also share resources. The government of the south will be entitled to half of the revenue from Sudan's burgeoning oil industry and will also be able to raise taxes. The country will operate under a dual monetary system, where sharia law will apply in the north and conventional banking practices in the south.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 41

Sudan: Political structure

Official name Republic of Sudan

Legal system Under the constitution, sharia (Islamic law) is applicable countrywide in both civil and criminal cases. In practice, much of southern Sudan is exempt

National legislature A 400-member National Assembly (parliament), of which 264 members are elected and 136 are appointed by the president

National elections December 2000 (presidential and parliamentary); next elections due to be held in 2005

Head of state Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Beshir, who took office following a 1989 coup and was sworn in as president in October 1993; elected in March 1996 for a five-year term; re-elected in December 2000

National government A joint military-civilian cabinet, the Council of Ministers, last reshuffled in February 2001

Main political parties All political parties were banned following the June 1989 coup that was backed by the National Congress (NC). The NC, known as the National Islamic Front (NIF) until it changed its name in 1998, is the ruling party

Main opposition groups The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), its military wing, are led by Colonel John Garang. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) brings together Mr Garang's SPLM with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Sudan Allied Forces (SAF), another southern guerrilla force. The Popular National Congress (PNC) and the are leading northern opposition groups

The cabinet President & prime minister Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Beshir First vice-president Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha Second vice-president Moses Machar

Key ministers Agriculture & forests Mazjoub al-Khalifa Animal resources Riek Gai Kok Cabinet affairs Al-Hadi Abdalla Commerce Mekki Ali Balail Culture & tourism Abdel-Basit Abdel-Majid Defence Bakri Hassan Salih Education Ali Tamim Fartak Energy & mining Awad Ahmed al-Jaz External trade Abdel-Hamid Musa Kasha Federal relations Nafie Ali Nafie Finance & national economy Zubayr Ahmed al-Hassan Foreign affairs Mustafa Uthman Ismail Health Ahmed Ballal Uthman Industry & investment Jalal Yousif al-Dagir Interior Abdel-Rahim Mohammed Hussein Justice Ali Mohammed Uthman Yassin Labour Alison Manani Magaya Science & technology Al-Zubar Beshir Taha Social welfare & development Samia Ahmed Mohammed Transport Mogo Ajak

Central bank governor Sabir Mohammed al-Hassan

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 42 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Syria

Political history and culture The set up in Syria during the French mandate, which ended in 1946, had weak foundations, and the period after independence was marked by a series of military coups. The Arab nationalist Baath Party seized power in 1963, and after two more coups the wing of the party headed by Hafez al-Assad took control in 1970. The Assad regime has brought stability to Syria, but at the cost of suppression of human rights and a poor economy. The constitution was amended in 1973, providing additional powers to the president and declaring the Baath to be the leading party in the state and society. This is reflected in the built-in majority that the party holds in the elected People’s Assembly and in the National Progressive Front (NPF), which debates policy issues. Other parties are permitted to operate, but the Baath holds quotas of seats in parliament and the NPF that ensure its control. Members of the Alawi minority (which accounts for around 12% of Syria’s population) hold most key positions in the intelligence services, which wield ultimate political control. Among the Alawis, the clan of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, who assumed power in 2000, are well represented in high positions in the regime.

Recent reforms There have been no significant reforms to the Syrian political system in recent times, although Bashar al-Assad has attempted to foster economic liberalisation. There has been some discussion of reviewing the constitutional amendments that give the Baath Party special status.

Outlook for democratisation The principal demands of Syrian human rights groups are for the abolition of the emergency powers of detention that have been in force since 1963 and for granting citizenship rights to some 200,000 essentially stateless Syrian . These groups are barely tolerated. They are permitted limited space to express their views, but their leaders are regularly arrested. Many of their members came to prominence after the accession of Bashar al-Assad to power in mid- 2000 in what was called the “Damascus spring”. They organised “salons” to discuss political reforms, but these meetings were later outlawed, and several leaders were arrested (they remain in jail). The other main strand of opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which staged an insurrection between 1979-82, culminating in the brutal assault by regime forces on the central of Hama. The Muslim Brothers have kept a low profile since then, but would be likely to build up a strong body of support should any opening of Syrian politics occur. The Baath has been considering political reforms in the lead-up to a party congress that is supposed to be held later this year. Among the proposals under discussion is an amendment to the 1973 constitution that would place the Baath on an equal footing with other parties. There is some doubt as to whether the congress will go ahead. Even if it does, it may well shy away from this albeit modest political reform as the regime strives to create a sense of national solidarity around itself in its confrontation with the West. Fear of the security services and an appreciation for the relative stability that Syria has enjoyed since 1970 mean that a popular uprising is unlikely. Of more concern to Mr Assad is the danger of a coup, possibly from within his own family circle.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 43

Syria: Political structure

Official name Syrian Arab Republic

Form of state Republic

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1973

Legislature 250-member Majlis al-Shaab (People’s Assembly) directly elected for a four-year term

Electoral system Universal adult suffrage

National elections 2003 (legislative), 2000 (presidential); next elections due by 2007 (legislative)

Head of state President, directly elected for a seven-year term. The president appoints the vice- presidents, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. Bashar al-Assad, who was elected president unopposed in July 2000, also holds the posts of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and secretary-general of the Baath Party. The vice-presidents are Abdel- Halim Khaddam and Zuheir Masharka

Executive The prime minister heads the Council of Ministers, a large number of which are drawn from the Baath Party and its partners; last reshuffle in October 2004

Main political parties Seven parties form the ruling National Progressive Front (NPF): Arab Socialist Baath Party; Arab Socialist Party; Arab Socialist Unionist Party; Communist Party; Syrian Arab Socialist Union Party; Unionist Socialist Democratic Party; Union Socialist Party

Prime minister Mohammed Naji al-Otari Key ministers Agriculture & agrarian reform Adel Saffar Awqaf (Islamic endowments) Mohammed Ziyad al-Ayoubi Commerce Ghassan al-Rifai Communications & technology Mohammed Bashir al-Munajjid Culture Mahmoud al-Sayed Defence Hassan Turkomani Economy & foreign trade Amer Lutfi Education Ali Saad Electricity Munib Assad Sayeem al-Daher Finance Mohammed al-Hussein Foreign affairs Farouq al-Sharaa Health Maher Hussami Higher education Hani Murtada Housing & construction Nihad Mshantat Immigrant affairs Buthaina Shaaban Industry Ghassan Tayyara Information Mehdi Dakhlallah Interior Ghazi Kenaan Irrigation Nader al-Buni Justice Mohammed al-Ghafri Local administration & environment Hilal al-Atrash Oil & mineral resources Ibrahim Haddad Presidential affairs Ghassan Lahham Social affairs & labour Diyala al-Hajj Aref Tou ri s m Saadallah Agha al-Qalah Transport Makram Obeid

Central Bank governor Adib Mayaleh

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 44 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Tunisia

Political history and culture Tunisia is headed by the president, Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, who has been in office since 1987. He was re-elected to a fourth five-year term in October 2004 with 94.49% of the vote. Tensions between the government and the banned Islamist Hizb al-Nahda party led to a massive crackdown in the early 1990s. Electoral laws assign seven authorised opposition parties seats in parliament (37 of 189), but the president and his party, the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD; who hold the remaining parlaimentary seats), dominate most institutions, making the country effectively a one-party state. Critics of the regime are routinely jailed and laws on association and expression are highly restrictive, but many Tunisians see limited political freedoms as a price worth paying for the stability and the social and economic development that Mr Ben Ali’s rule has brought. Tunisia is valued by Western governments as a “moderate” Arab state and an ally in the “war on terror”, and they have refrained from applying serious pressure for reform.

Recent reforms The recent presidential “contest” was designed to provide the appearance of increased pluralism, while guaranteeing the regime’s continuation in power. Both EU and US officials have begun to call for faster political reform, but criticism is still muted in order to keep relations warm and to avoid stiffening the Tunisian government’s resistance to change. Mr Ben Ali has promised to enhance political freedoms, but such pledges should be considered little more than rhetoric since he has made similar promises previously, and little has come of these. He has also announced elections to establish an upper house of parliament that will scrutinise legislation passed by the lower house. The new body will have around 120 members, one-third elected by local councils, one- third by professional associations and one-third nominated by the president. Since the RCD controls all local councils and dominates the professional associations, the upper house will be controlled by the regime, and is unlikely to challenge government policy.

Outlook for democratisation The nature of the regime conflicts with the stated policy of the US government, of promoting greater democracy through its Middle East Partnership Initiative (whose North African headquarters are in ). In the short term the Tunisian government will make modest cosmetic changes that give the impression of positive action, while maintaining its overall repression and playing on inter- national concerns over Islamist radicalism to mute even the limited criticisms of its allies. Nevertheless, a growing number of Tunisians have begun to question the theory that security and prosperity can only be had at the expense of political freedom and will demand faster political liberalisation. As access to international media has increased, and amid an awareness of developments in other Arab states, domestic pressure is likely to grow, but the process is unlikely to result in a radical transformation of the political climate in the near future and will take years to produce results. Home-grown pressure for reform will prove to be the most powerful locomotive for change in the longer run given the reluctance of Tunisia’s international allies to take forceful action.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 45

Tunisia: Political structure

Official name Republic of Tunisia

Legal system Based on the constitution of 1959

Legislature Chamber of Deputies: 189 members elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage, 37 of which are elected by proportional representation from those parties that fail to win seats under the first-past-the-post system; parties must be recognised officially in order to contest elections; in 2002 the constitution was altered to allow for the establishment of an upper house, the Chamber of Advisers

National elections October 24th 2004 (presidential and parliamentary); next presidential and parliamentary elections will be in 2009; a constitutional amendment removed the three-term limit for presidents, and the maximum age for a presidential candidate was raised from 70 to 75

Head of state President, elected by universal suffrage, for five-year terms; currently Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, who seized power in November 1987; Mr Ben Ali won presidential elections held in April 1989, March 1994, October 1999 and October 2004

Executive Council of Ministers, presided over by the head of state, who is also head of the executive; if the council does not receive the support of the Chamber of Deputies, it may be dissolved by the president, after which elections for a new assembly would be held; the most recent cabinet reshuffle took place in November 2004

Main political parties Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD); Mouvement des démocrates socialistes (MDS); Parti de l’unité populaire (PUP); Parti démocratique progressiste (PDP), formerly the Rassemblement socialiste progressiste (RSP); Harakat Ettajdid (HE), previously the Parti communiste tunisien (PCT); Parti social libéral (PSL); Union démocratique unioniste (UDU); Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés (FDTL); Hizb al-Nahda (not officially recognised, although its candidates stood in the 1989 elections as independents)

The government Prime minister Mohammed Ghannouchi

Key ministers Agriculture & water resources Mohammed Haddad Commerce Communication Montasser Ouaili Culture Mohammed Aziz Ben Achour Defence Hedi M’henni Development & international co-operation Mohammed Nouri Jouini Education & training Mohammed Raouf Najjar Employment Chedli Laroussi Finance Mohammed Rachid Kechiche Foreign affairs Abdelbaki Hermassi Health Ridha Kechrid Industry, energy & SMEs Interior & local development Rafik Belhadj Kacem Justice & human rights Béchir Tekkari Public works & housing Slaheddine Belaid Religious affairs Boubaker El Akhzouri Social affairs Rafaâ Dekhil Tou ri s m Tijani Haddad Transport Wome n, fam ily & ch ildre n’s affa irs Saloua Ayachi Labben Minister of state

Central bank governor Tao ufi k Ba ccar

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 46 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

United Arab Emirates

Political history and culture The UAE is a of seven Gulf sheikhdoms led by the wealthiest of these, . Most UAE nationals are descended from two tribal groupings, the Qawasim and the Bani Yas, which emerged as leading powers in the 18th century. There was little in the way of economic development or outside interest in the area until oil was discovered off the coast of Abu Dhabi in 1958. Although the UAE has a full complement of institutions for the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, in practice all important decisions are made by the ruling families of the emirates, particularly Abu Dhabi. The Supreme Council is the highest federal authority and comprises the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates. It has the power to decide policy, elect the federal president and his deputy, and make all major appointments. Despite latent rivalries between emirates and among tribal groupings, the UAE leadership has a strong grip on power. There is no organised political opposition.

Recent reforms Greater attempts are being made by the government to establish proper structures of state and to develop institutions that have credibility in their own right, and not merely as a proxy for a ruling family. While tradition dictates that national bodies—which are appointed by —take decisions in the interest of citizens, the deliberations of these institutions are not transparent or accountable. This leaves considerable scope for inefficiency as instances of incompetence, corruption or excessive red tape are hidden from public view and are rarely open to challenge. In November 2004 the UAE witnessed its first transfer of power since the country’s formation, following the death of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, who had been ruler of Abu Dhabi since 1966 and president of the UAE since 1971. The transfer of power was smooth. The easy transition has largely dispelled long-standing fears in some quarters that inter- emirate rivalries might threaten to destabilise the federation, particularly given the spectacular growth of as global centre for trade, tourism and finance.

Outlook for democratisation There is no strong appetite for political or democratic reform in the UAE, and few meaningful changes are contemplated. UAE nationals are generally content: the country is exceptionally wealthy, thanks to oil, and the emirates have managed their money wisely. Generous redistribution policies towards UAE nationals and a zero-income-tax regime for nationals and expatriates promotes stability. The group of essentially tribal rulers who govern the UAE is well- regarded, especially within their own emirates. When Sheikh Zayed died last year, there were genuine outpourings of grief. There is also little sign of any political opposition from among immigrant groups, who comprise an estimated 80% of the population but who enjoy far fewer rights than UAE citizens. Expatriates, most of whom have better economic opportunities in the UAE than in their home countries, have little incentive to change the system. Nor would they be likely to remain long in the UAE if they tried, as any sign of dissent would lead to deportation. The security forces keep a close eye on the foreign community, particularly the large contingent of Muslims from and Bangladesh. UAE governments have made it clear they will not tolerate intercommunal tension or political activity of any kind.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 47

UAE: Political structure

Official name United Arab Emirates

Form of state Federation of seven emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Qaiwain and

Legal system Based on the 1971 constitution

National legislature Unicameral of 40 appointed members representing the separate emirates; it has a consultative role only

Head of state The president is elected from among its number by the Supreme Council of Rulers, which is formed by the hereditary rulers of the seven states; Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi was re-elected for a seventh five-year term in December 2001. He died on November 2nd 2004, and his son (and ruler of Abu Dhabi), Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al- Nahyan, was elected as UAE president on November 3rd 2004

National government Council of Ministers led by the prime minister, all appointed by the Supreme Council of Rulers; each state is represented by at least one minister, with senior posts allocated to the larger emirates; the Council of Ministers initiates legislation for ratification by the Supreme Council of Rulers, which is also a policymaking body and meets formally about once a year. Last cabinet reshuffle November 1st 2004

Main political parties Political parties are not permitted

The government President Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan Prime minister & vice-president Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum Deputy prime minister Sultan bin Zayed al-Nahyan Deputy prime minister Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahyan

Key ministers Agriculture & fisheries Said Mohammed al-Raqbani Communications Sultan bin Said al-Mansouri Defence Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum Economy & planning Lubna al-Qassimi Education Nahyan bin Mubarak al-Nahyan Electricity & water Humaid bin Nasser al-Oweis Energy Mohammed bin Dhaen al-Hamli Finance & industry Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum Foreign affairs Rashid Abdullah al-Nuaimi Health Hamad Abdel-Rahman al-Madfaa Information & culture Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan Interior Saif bin Zayed al-Nahyan Justice, Islamic affairs & endowments Mohammed Nakhira al-Dhaheri Labour & social affairs Ali bin Abdullah al-Kaabi Petroleum & mineral resources Obeid bin Saif al-Naseri Presidential affairs Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan Public works & housing Hamdan bin Mubarak al-Nahyan Supreme Council & GCC affairs Fahim bin Sultan al-Qassimi

Ministers of state Cabinet affairs Said Khalfan al-Ghaith Finance & industry Mohammed Khalfan bin Kharbash Foreign affairs Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahyan

Central Bank governor Sultan bin Nasser al-Suwaidi

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 48 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East

Yemen

Political history and culture Field Marshal was appointed president of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) united. He retained power following victory in the 1994 civil war, in which the south attempted to secede from . Mr Saleh was most recently reconfirmed as president in the country’s first direct presidential election in September 1999. The ruling party remains generally secular in its outlook, although it is tested by extreme religious elements both from within and without parliament. Government control is weak outside urban areas, where tribal loyalties remain fierce. Poverty is endemic, with 45% of the population living on less than US$2 a day.

Recent reforms Yemen claims to be one of the most democratic states in the Middle East. The constitution declares that “the political system of the Republic of Yemen is based on political and partisan pluralism”. When promulgated in 1990, the con- stitution established Yemen as the first multi-party parliamentary democracy on the . Since 1990, the country has held one direct presidential election and three parliamentary elections, the last of which, in April 2003, was declared largely free and fair by international observers. While these moves towards political liberalisation appear far-reaching in a region known for more autocratic systems of government, they have, in reality, had limited impact on political plurality, since the cult of the president is such that he still retains ultimate political authority. Sporadic attempts at judicial reform have been ineffective and the judiciary is generally perceived to be corrupt. Most of Yemen’s recent reforms have been in the economic sphere, under the guidance of the IMF. However, implementation has been patchy, with the government often using the poor security climate as an excuse to defer the more sensitive reforms.

Outlook for democratisation The nature of Yemeni society is such that traditional tribal allegiances remain one of the most powerful socio-political dynamics. At the local level tribal forces dominate municipal life, while at the national level parliament remains subject to tribal influences and the electorate, in particular those in rural areas, vote along tribal lines. In this respect, the authority of Mr Saleh is paramount: he has proved adept at balancing competing tribal influences in order to maintain political control. These factors legislate against any further liberal- isation of the political infrastructure, as such a move may upset the delicate balance of power within government. Furthermore, these social forces result in weak political control in Yemen, particularly outside of the main conurbations. This lack of central government control contributes to a weak security environment, and as long as security remains a concern in Yemen, political liberalisation will be a distant prospect. Indeed, concerns over domestic security have led to the government trying to tighten its control wherever it has been able to do so. Recent moves to curb the independence of the press, through the harassment and detention of journalists, provide the most visible evidence of such behaviour. They also demonstrate worrying signs of political regression rather than progression.

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005 The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East 49

Yemen: Political structure

Official name Republic of Yemen

Form of state Republic, unified on May 22nd 1990

Legal system Under the constitution approved in May 1991, sharia is the principal source of law

Legislature Unicameral assembly directly elected for a six-year term

National elections September 1999 (presidential); April 2003 (parliamentary). Next parliamentary election in 2009; next presidential election due by September 2006. First local elections held in February 2001; no date set for next elections

Head of state President (directly elected for a seven-year term): Ali Abdullah Saleh (GPC); vice-president: Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi

Executive Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister

Political parties There are 22 legal parties, four of which are represented in parliament: the General People’s Congress (GPC, the ruling party); the Islamic Reform Party (Islah, religious-based party with tribal and Islamist wings); the Arab Socialist Baath Party; and the Nasserist Unionist Party. Important opposition groups without parliamentary representation include: the League of the Sons of Yemen; the Union of Popular Forces; and al-Haq

Government Prime minister Abdel-Qader Ba-Jammal Deputy prime minister & minister of finance Alawi Salih al-Salami

Key ministers Agriculture & irrigation Hassan Omar Suwaid Culture & tourism Khaled Abdullah al-Ruweishan Defence Abdullah Ali Aleiwa Electricity Abdel-Rahman Tarmum Fisheries Ali Mohammed Majur Foreign affairs Abu Bakr Abdullah al-Qirbi Human rights Amat al-Alim al-Susua Information Hussein Dhaifallah al-Awadi Interior Rashad al-Alimi Justice Adnan Omar al-Jifri Labour & social affairs Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi Local administration Sadeq Amin abu Ras Oil & mineral resources Rasheed Barabaa Planning & international co-operation Ahmed Mohammed Sufan Public health & population Mohammed Yahya al-Naami Public works & roads Abdullah Hussein al-Dafi Social security & civil affairs Hamoud Khaled al-Sufi Teachi ng & education Abdel-Salam al-Jufi Trade & industry Khaled Rajeh Sheikh Transport Omar Mohsen al-Amudi Water & environment Mohammed Lutfi al-Iryani

Central Bank governor Ahmed Abdel-Rahman al-Samawi

Speaker of parliament Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar

Special Report March 2005 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2005