BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

______) Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest ) Requirements; ) Docket No. FAA-2009-1093 Initial Supplemental Regulatory ) RIN 2120-AJ58 Impact Analysis ) ______)

COMMENTS OF THE AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

On behalf of 51,000 pilots at 35 airlines in the United States and Canada, the Air

Line Pilots Association, International (“ALPA”) submits the following comments to the

Initial Supplemental Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) of its final rule amending existing flight, duty, and rest regulations applicable to certain certificate holders and their flight crewmembers.

COMMENTS

I. One Level of Safety

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) in its RIA recognizes (at 18-26)

that fatigue impacts all pilots regardless of whether they are flying passengers or cargo.

Pilot physiology is the same for both passenger and cargo pilots. As the Chairman of

the National Transportation Board (“NTSB”) stated, “a tired pilot is a tired pilot

whether there are 10 paying customers on board or 100, whether the payload is passengers or pallets.” See Press Release, NTSB, Statement from NTSB Chairman Deborah

A.P. Hersman on new FAA flight and duty time rules (Dec. 21, 2011). Not applying Part 117

to all cargo carriers creates a lesser standard of safety for aircraft that operate in the

same airspace, on the same runways and taxiways, and over the same populated areas

as passenger air carriers.

ALPA, for many years, has encouraged the FAA and the Air Cargo Industry to

support the principle that all U.S. licensed cargo and passenger-carrying carriers should be required to comply with a “single standard,” or “One Level of Regulation” with regard to flight time/duty time regulations applicable to U.S. air carriers.

The present flight time/duty time rules applicable to cargo flying are a patchwork of domestic, supplemental, and flag regulations that have been developed over the past sixty years. The rules usually applied to cargo operations – the supplemental rules – were largely developed over 60 years ago for unscheduled freight operations using piston-powered aircraft. Many of those post-WWII vintage aircraft

had unpressurized cabins, cruise speeds in the 200-knot range, and flight crews

consisting of at least two pilots and often a flight engineer. In the 21st Century, carriers

have used modern technology to decrease cockpit crew size and increase pilot and

aircraft utilization. This has put additional pressures on flight crews. As the overall

system complexity continues to increase, the hazards associated with pilot fatigue in the

industry are greater than they have ever been.

2 Domestic pilots who carry passengers have a flight time maximum of 30 hours in

seven days, while International (Flag) passenger-carrying pilots are allowed up to 32

hours in the same seven days under the current FAA regulations. These current “flight

time” limits only account for the time pilots spend actually operating the airplane. The

current flight time limits do not account for the time pilots spend in pre- and post-flight

duties, the time spent at airports between flights, the time spent going through security

or traveling to and from the airport to hotels, or the time spent in training and other

ground-based duties. Even with the existing 30- and 32-hour weekly “flying time”

limits applicable to pilots carrying passengers, there is wide-spread acknowledgement of the existence of serious pilot fatigue problems throughout the industry and wide- spread acknowledgement that reform of the rules based on modern scientific principles is long overdue. On the other hand, cargo pilots flying under the supplemental rules can fly 48 hours in a six-day period or 60 percent more than domestic passenger-carrying pilots. The clear weight of scientific evidence supports the case that there is no appreciable difference in human performance limitations based upon the fact that a pilot is carrying cargo rather than passengers, and supports the case that a uniform modernization of the flight time/duty time rules including harmonized rules for the cargo industry is overdue, and needed to enhance safety.

ALPA believes there is a pressing need to provide rational working hour limits

for cargo pilots, and for unification of the passenger, cargo, and domestic, and

3 international flight time/duty time regulations to provide for a “single standard,” or

“One Level of Regulation.” These two phrases – “single standard” and “One Level of

Regulation” – mean the same thing, that certain basic rules should be established to provide a baseline regulatory safety net for all air carrier operations. ALPA submits that it is both possible, and necessary, to establish and maintain “One Level of

Regulation” in the area of flightcrew flight and duty time limitations. Some of the specific issues that are unique or predominant in cargo operations are fatigue and rest issues due to the scheduling nature of all-cargo operations and heavy assignment of back-side-of-the-clock (window of circadian low) schedules; human-factor challenges introduced by non-standardized airport infrastructure, crew support and rest facilities; increased workload due to aging aircraft; and the use of Part 91 operations (e.g., tail-end ferry) to position aircraft. In addition, cargo pilots often carry hazardous materials

(increasing the potential danger to the crew and the public in case of an accident).

Despite the presence of these issues, the commonality of human response to fatigue overcomes any operational uniqueness associated with cargo flying and supports a uniform fatigue standard.

Regulators have historically ignored cargo operations – until something goes wrong. This treatment is inconsistent with the guiding principle that a single standard of safety should be applicable to all Part 121 air carriers. With two groups of pilots operating the same, or essentially the same, airplanes in the same airspace and in many

4 instances at the same airports in the same cities while doing the same job, there is no

basis for one group of pilots to have different or less safe fatigue rules.

For well over a decade, the industry has been aware that scientific research has

supported an improvement in the flight and duty time limits for cargo pilots. Applying

the supplemental rules to today’s large jet, two-pilot aircraft operating regular transcontinental flights is not consistent with a single level of safety. Safety in the Air

Cargo Industry would be enhanced by applying the scientifically-based passenger carrier hours-of-service regulations that set limits on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest schedules, and consider human sleep and rest requirements.

Such scientifically-based rules would necessarily include many, if not all, of the needed

adjustments that will apply to passenger-carrying pilots, including a required pre-flight rest period, a reserve rest requirement, and a rational accounting for non-flying duties.

Also, some consideration must ultimately be given to mandating the use of scientific

principles to schedule the rest periods associated with long-haul (trans-meridian) flag operations and back-side-of-the-clock (midnight to 6:00 a.m.) operations. Additionally, risk exposure to back-side-of-the-clock is significantly higher with cargo pilots as they

have more than 60% of their work hours scheduled during this period. Given these

requirements, the fact that the regulations only establish minimum safety standards and

the fact that there is no physiological difference between cargo and passenger pilots, there is simply no rational reason to develop a different set of fatigue rules for cargo

5 pilots. The FAA should act to establish a single level of safety and a lower risk of accidents in all air carrier flying. The practice of applying different standards in the

presumed but unproven interest of granting certain types of air carriers some apparent

flexibility is simply not justified.

While it is accepted that industry-wide overhaul of the fatigue regulations is long

overdue, there are a number of factors in the cargo industry that make the problem

particularly acute. The supplemental regulations were generated nearly 60 years ago,

when air cargo flightcrews were not expected to and did not conduct round-the-clock,

all weather operations in jet aircraft with minimal flight crews in and out of busy

domestic and international airspace. Some things have changed – and some things

have stayed the same – in the freight hauling business, but it cannot be denied that the

cargo airline flightcrews of today face greater risk than passenger crews through a

combination of operational and environmental factors, beyond mere cockpit

performance, or flying, that increase wear and tear on the cargo flightcrews and hence

the tendency for fatigue to become a flight hazard.

In 2013, we once again find ourselves at a crossroads and confronted with a

compelling case that regulatory reform is needed for air cargo carriers. The need for a

uniform fatigue prevention policy for all Part 121 Operations is particularly acute.

There is no distinction between a cargo pilot and a passenger pilot. They fly the same

aircraft, over the same routes, operate in the same airspace, and use the same airports.

6 There is no rational reason to allow different fatigue prevention rules. Providing a

uniform standard for fatigue prevention would be a good start to providing the Air

Cargo Industry with the single level of safety that the NTSB recommends, the public

expects, and the pilots demand.

The clear weight of scientific evidence supports the case that there is no

appreciable difference in human performance limitations based upon the fact that a

pilot is carrying cargo rather than passengers, or operating a charter as opposed to a

scheduled flight, and supports the case that a uniform modernization of the flight time/duty time rules based upon the principle of a “single standard,” or “One Level of

Regulation,” for all airline pilots is overdue and needed to enhance safety. Part 117

should apply to all Part 121 Operations, which includes cargo carriers.

In deciding not to implement Part 117 for all-cargo carriers based on the costs and benefits described in the RIA, the FAA has improperly and arbitrarily avoided

Congressional intent. Congress directed the FAA to issue regulations based upon the best available scientific information to specify limitations on the hours of flight and duty time allowed for pilots to address problems related to pilot fatigue. See Airline Safety and

Federal Aviation Administration Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-216, § 212(a)(2) (Aug 1,

2010) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44701 note). In directing the FAA to address “problems” related to pilot fatigue, Congress did not intend that the FAA limit its rulemaking activity solely to measures that would be cost effective in reducing the probably of

7 accidents in passenger-carrying airline operations. Instead, Congress identified twelve specific factors that the Administrator “shall” consider together with any other matters the “Administrator considers appropriate.” Id. § 212(a)(2).

Airline pilots, including cargo pilots, have long complained of fatigue and

Congress finally heeded those concerns in directing the FAA to implement new scientifically-based regulations. Among the factors the Administrator was required to consider were “the impact of functioning in multiple time zones and on different daily schedules” and “[r]esearch conducted on sleep, fatigue and circadian rhythms.” Id. In drafting new rules, the FAA agreed that modern scientific research showed that the existing flight duty and rest rules did not adequately address the problems associated with fatigue. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest

Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 55852, 55855 (Sept. 14, 2010). The FAA’s analysis of the scientific evidence clearly demonstrated that cargo pilots are particularly subject to negative consequences from fatigue because of a prevalence of long-haul, back-side-of- the-clock, and irregular operations. See id. at 55855, 55861-62, 55867-68. The FAA’s decision to leave cargo pilots subject to the mercy of admittedly inadequate rules on the basis of the RIA is arbitrary and capricious.

The FAA made no attempt to provide any substantive explanation for ignoring established and uncontroversial scientific findings and avoiding Congress’s directive to address the “problem” of pilot fatigue in air cargo operations. See Whitman v. American

8 Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 458, 467-68 (2001) (statutory directive to consider implementation costs must be clear); United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health

Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (final rule arbitrary because no satisfactory explanation given for rejecting expert evidence). Further, in completing the cost-benefit analysis in the RIA, the FAA ignored a number of important factors and substantially underestimated the costs and benefits that it did consider.

II. Failure to Consider Health Benefits of Applying Part 117 to All-Cargo Operations

In performing its cost-benefit analysis, the FAA has concentrated almost exclusively on the financial benefits associated with avoided major airline accidents.

The FAA’s analysis is both arbitrary and incomplete as it fails to consider any other benefits, such as health benefits, that would be gained by applying Part 117 to all-cargo operations.

Daily and weekly work as a cargo pilot is typically characterized by long hours and continuous sitting, in both domestic and international operations. The FAA’s current daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly flight time limits fail to account for time spent by pilots getting to and from hotels or rest facilities, pre- and post-flight duties, time between flights, and training or other required duties, all of which can regularly result in days that repeatedly approach or exceed 16 hours of work-related activity.

Cargo pilots have long complained of fatigue and insufficient rest, particularly during layover periods between flight assignments.

9 The FAA’s RIA notes (at 23) that higher levels of fatigue have been found to be statistically significant predictors of both short- and long-term illness leading to lost

productivity. The RIA also cites (at 22) the fact that published studies have found large

productivity deficits in night-shift workers. The RIA states that fatigued workers are

much more likely to report lost productive time; and it cites a cost to the U.S. economy

of over $130 billion per year caused by lost productive time. Id. at 23. The RIA

concludes (at 72-73) that the final rule would reduce fatigue-related flightcrew payroll

costs by 0.25 percent, resulting in $4.4 million in annual cost savings for cargo-only

operations by reason of reduced fatigue-related sick calls.

A growing body of research across industries indicates that long hours of work

and night work are linked to sleep loss, which in turn leads to a variety of negative

health impacts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) in 2008

identified the following conditions and adverse health behaviors as being associated with insufficient rest: cardiovascular disease, hypertension, obesity, diabetes, high cholesterol, cigarette smoking, physical inactivity, heavy alcohol use, mental distress, depression, and anxiety. See CDC, “Perceived Insufficient Rest or Sleep - - - Four States,

2006,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 57, No. 8, at 200-03 (Feb. 28, 2008); see

also U.S. Dep’t of Transp. Fed. Motor Carrier Admin. (“FMCSA”), 2010-2011 Hours of

Service Rule – Regulatory Impact Analysis, RIN 2126-AB2b, at B-7 to B-20 (Dec. 20, 2010)

(“FMCSA RIA”). It is important to note that the links between sleep loss and many of

10 these negative health effects are not simply correlations; in many cases, scientists have been able to identify the specific biochemical changes associated with sleep deprivation that produce these health effects.

It is important for pilots to remain physically fit in order to remain employed in

the industry. Airline pilots must pass yearly physical examinations (every six months

for those over age 60) and be certified as physically fit to fly. In the past, there was a

perception that airline pilots enjoyed superior health due in part to a high percentage of

individuals that were the product of military pilot selection and physical training. More

recent data have shown that the modern airline pilot’s health may be much more

reflective of the health condition of the general population. For example, during a

recent sample period (2006-2008) long-term disability (loss of medical license plan) claims under a plan offered through ALPA, for individuals over age 40, were over 300%

higher for airline pilots compared to a control population.

The FAA acknowledged “chronic fatigue can cause illness and even death” and

that there are “substantial” health benefits associated with reducing fatigue in pilots,

yet it arbitrarily ignored the health benefits associated with Part 117. See U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., FAA, Regulatory Impact Analysis – Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest

Requirements 7 (Nov. 18, ,2011) (“original RIA”); see also Final Rule, Flightcrew Member

Duty and Rest Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 330, 392 (Jan. 4, 2012). We note that an aging

workforce (the mandatory retirement age for pilots was recently raised to age 65) tends

11 to result in magnified health effects in older demographic groups. ALPA’s loss of

license disability plan experience notes a marked and steady rise in claims for each year

that a pilot is over age 40, with significantly more claims by older pilots. A single long-

term disability caused or contributed to by chronic fatigue can result in substantial costs

to the individual pilot, industry, and society over the FAA’s reference 10-year period, with no associated productivity benefit.

In recently proposing to amend the hours-of-service regulations for motor carriers, FMCSA agreed that health conditions resulting from sleep deprivation and sedentary work are associated with higher health care costs and risk of loss of license due to failure to meet medical standards. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Dkt. No.

FMCSA-2004-19608, 75 Fed. Reg. 82170, 82178 (Dec. 29, 2010).

In reaching its conclusions, the FMCSA RIA included a detailed discussion of the current research related to the negative health effects associated with sleep loss and particularly the biochemical mechanisms that link sleep loss to known negative health outcomes. FMSCA RIA at 4-1 to 5-10 & App. B. The FMCSA RIA found that significant quantitative health benefits would result from reducing the maximum hours of service of drivers (thus increasing rest) by one hour per day. Id. at D-15. FMCSA found that cutting back on extreme work schedules should reduce mortality, not only by avoiding accidents, but also by avoiding the effects of debilitating diseases brought about by overly long hours and lack of rest.

12 FMCSA estimated health benefits by calculating improvements in driver

mortality risk due to reductions in total duty time (and thus an increased opportunity

for sleep). See id. at 5-1. FMCSA noted other possible benefits of increased sleep such as

reduced health care costs, improvements in many chronic medical conditions, and a reduced chance of medical disqualification and lost earnings. Although it discussed these factors qualitatively, FMCSA found that “reduction in mortality risk was the impact that was most easily quantifiable.” Id.

As one example, FMCSA found a health benefit of $2,112 per driver per year, or

$340 million per year for a pool of 160,000 drivers, due to reduced health mortality risk under the proposed new hours of service rule. Id. at D-14 to D-15. An equivalent net health benefit applied to all cargo pilots would result in an overall health benefit of over

$190 million during the FAA’s 10-year reference period. ($2,122 x 8990 pilots x 10 years).

Frankly, given Congress’s statutory directive and the current level of information and knowledge available about the negative health impacts of fatigue, the FAA should have included such an analysis in its RIA. While we are not aware of any existing rigorous evaluation of health costs savings associated with reducing fatigue in the airline industry, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the relative health benefits of such an analysis would substantively differ from those obtained by FMCSA (after all, both agencies are in the same Department).

13 Because ALPA believes the final rule as it applies to passenger airlines was fully

justified on a cost-benefit basis under the FAA’s original RIA, there is no need to delay

implementation of the final rule for passenger carriers. If anything, consideration of the

health benefits to passenger pilots from the Part 117 rule would simply tip the balance

further in favor of a prompt and early implementation of the final rule. However, with regard to cargo pilots, the FAA’s RIA is inadequate and arbitrary as it has failed to

consider the quantitative and qualitative health benefits that will accrue through

implementing Part 117 for all-cargo operations. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n,

Inc. v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d, 188, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (agency must identify responsive action taken to “deal with” problem identified by Congress); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of

the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if it has entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem.).

III. The Benefit Costing of Applying Part 117 to Cargo Carriers is Based on Incorrect Fleet Assumptions

It appears that the FAA, having made its decision to exclude cargo carriers from

mandatory compliance with Part 117, now seeks to, after the fact, bolster its decision by minimizing their benefit savings. The FAA selected two aging aircraft types that are

not representative of the cargo fleet. As we will show, only if representative aircraft are

used will the benefit be a realistic amount.

14 The RIA used two fleet types to determine the FAA’s cost-benefit analysis. For their base case, they used the B-727 (due to the fatal cargo accident occurring in 2002).

This aircraft was flown with a crew of one Captain, one First Officer, and one Flight

Engineer, the typical crew complement for a B-727. For their high-cost case they used a

B-757. The B-757 was flown with a crew complement of one Captain and one First

Officer.

ALPA disagrees with both the FAA base and high-cost summaries of their cost cases, when using only these two aircraft types. Our analysis of the largest cargo carriers in the United States indicates that there are virtually no B-727 aircraft in use.

Only one carrier that we analyzed currently uses any B-727s and this is a declining fleet which is scheduled to be completely phased out by mid-2014. Today less than 3% of the

U.S. cargo fleet analyzed by ALPA includes B-727 aircraft.

ALPA also disagrees with the FAA’s use of B-757 aircraft as the basis for the high-cost case. Our analysis of the largest cargo carriers showed that only three of the largest carriers are using the B-757, comprising approximately 20% of the cargo carriers’ fleets. In fact it could be argued that both the B-727 and B-757 are similar aircraft for purposes of cargo capacity with both aircraft having maximum take-off weights under

260,000 lbs. We also note that both the B727 and B-757 aircraft are out-of-production models which by nature have a far reduced aftermarket hull value in case of total hull loss.

15 Today more than 76% of the cargo fleets analyzed by ALPA, encompass larger,

heavier, and more modern aircraft, most of which are still in production. As an

example, the B-777, which alone comprises more than twice the total fleet by number of

aircraft compared to the B-727, has a maximum take-off weight of greater than 766,000

lbs. In any catastrophic cargo accident going forward, it could be expected that the

aircraft involved would most likely not be a B-727, or to a lesser extent even a B-757. As explained below, using the B-727 and B-757 vastly undervalues the monetary costs of a representative accident.

Analyzing a more realistic fleet type entails much more than just aircraft modernization or maximum takeoff weights. These much larger aircraft are capable of not only handling much larger cargo loads, but also of traveling greater distances which in turn requires augmentation of crews. Therefore, an aircraft on a short-haul flight

(one within the normal range of the B-727 or B-757) would require a single crew complement, yet the aircraft more typically found amongst cargo carriers flying long- haul flights will require double crewing. This doubles the costs involved in potential crew loss-of-life.

ALPA believes that the MD-11 should be used for determining the base case scenario considering the number of active aircraft of this type within the cargo fleets and the phase-out of the B-727. Using this aircraft type, of which there are more than

100 in service (compared to the 20 in-service B-727s), with an allowable cargo capacity

16 up to 101 tons, the base case cargo value increases from $2.7 million to $8.8 million. In addition to the increase in cargo capacity, the MD-11 has extended range beyond that of the B-727 which, if used, could increase the crew complement of three crewmembers (B-

727) to four crewmembers in the MD-11.

In calculating the new base case cost analysis for one accident with no crew fatalities, we would now have up to four serious injuries and a much larger cargo capacity (like the RIA, we would assume 100% capacity). Thus we would have four injuries at $2.6 million (4 X $.65 million), hull value of a replacement of the MD-11 at a mid-range replacement price of $23.5 million (source Aircraft Value Analysis Company,

Aircraft Value Reference) the complete loss of cargo valued at $8.8 million and the major accident investigatory costs of $10.5 million totaling $45.4 million. When we apply the same 75% effectiveness rating, the total is $34.1 million for the MD-11 compared to the RIA estimate of $5.3 million for the B-727. This does not even begin to include accident response, clean-up costs, lost revenue or administrative costs to the carrier and its insurer arising from the accident, much less any potential collateral property damage or loss of life such as would be the case in a runway or midair collision.

For the high-cost case we believe a truer indicator within the industry would be the B-777. While it is not the largest capacity aircraft available within the industry, it is a good median measure for determining both cargo value and potential loss of life. In

17 its analysis, the FAA used the B-757 and determined that based on its capacity the cargo

value would be $3.7 million. Using the B-777 as the high case, the cargo value would increase to $9.8 million (for 112.6 tons). If the FAA instead chose to use the B-747

aircraft, this value would increase yet again to $10.8 million (for 124 tons) in losses. The

larger aircraft has an extended range over the B-757, so the crew complement could

increase from two crewmembers to four depending upon operation.

In calculating the new high-case cost for one catastrophic accident we would

now have up to four fatalities and a much larger cargo capacity (like the RIA, we

would assume 100% capacity). Thus we would have four fatalities at $24.8 million (4 X

$6.2 million), hull value of a replacement of the B-777 at $295.7 million (based on pricing listed by Boeing for the B-777F), complete loss of cargo valued at $9.8 million, and major

accident investigatory costs of $10.5 million – totaling $340 million. When we apply the

same 75% effectiveness rating, the total is $255.6 million for the B-777 compared to the

RIA estimate of $31.4 million for the B-757. (If a B-747 were used the value would increase approximately an additional $58 million for hull value and additional cargo capacity). As with our MD-11 example, this does not include many other readily foreseeable collateral costs.

The following table summarizes the differences between the RIA base case and high case aircraft and the aircraft which ALPA feels are more representative of the cargo industry:

18 Comparison of FAA Base Case & High Case Aircraft to Representative Cargo Industry Aircraft Representative FAA Base Case FAA High Case Representative Base Case B-727 B-757 High Case B-777 MD-11 75% Effectiveness $5.3 Million $34.1 Million $31.4 Million $255.6 Million Estimate Present Value $3.5 Million $22.4 Million $20.6 Million $167.8 Million Discount @ 7% Present Value $4.4 Million $28.2 Million $26.0 Million $211.6 Million Discount @ 3%

Larger aircraft not only comprise three times the numbers of the FAA-analyzed aircraft, in 2011 they were responsible for more than 25 times the available revenue ton miles (“RTM”1) flown by these carriers over that of the B-727 and B-757 combined.

Through the third quarter of 2012 (data for the fourth quarter is not yet available), due to fleet phase-outs (specifically the B-727 models), this ratio increases to more than 31 times the RTM of the FAA-analyzed aircraft fleets. Based on the RTM, it is our opinion

that the FAA used incorrect data when using the B-727 and B-757 as models for the cargo industry. The majority of air cargo, especially when looking at the largest cargo

carriers within the United States, is carried on these larger aircraft and these larger

aircraft should have been used by the FAA in their analysis.

IV. Rest Facilities

In the RIA the FAA assumed that retrofitting cargo aircraft with the same rest

facilities as passenger aircraft would require the same costs to the carrier. We do not

1 RTM information derived from DOT Form 41 and de-identified for purposes of our analysis.

19 believe this to be the case. First, cargo aircraft do not contain the same interior cabin

facilities as the passenger aircraft. The carrier (and industry) cost to engineer, remove, and install new rest facilities would be considerably less than doing so for passenger aircraft.

Second, the FAA assumed that any retrofitted rest facility would add to the basic empty weight of the aircraft and create additional fuel costs for the added weight of the facility. We disagree. There was inadequate information in the RIA regarding the location and design of any retrofit rest facility for cargo aircraft. It is quite possible that any retrofit would not add additional weight to the aircraft but instead might be an even exchange from existing passenger seating. For these reasons we have

conservatively estimated both engineering and downtime estimates to be one-half the

FAA cost valuation.

Due to the nature of cargo operations and the exclusion of passenger travel on

these aircraft, it is our opinion that the industry would not retrofit the numbers of

aircraft for Class 1 seating mentioned in the RIA. We estimate that this number would be approximately half as many retrofits for Class 1. To that end we have conservatively estimated that the fuel burn would be one-half the FAA estimate.

Lastly we believe it is quite possible that the required numbers of Class 1 facilities would be significantly less than the 107 indicated by the FAA. Since many cargo aircraft already have some type of non-passenger seating available outside the

20 flight deck, fewer numbers of Class 1 facilities might be installed than assumed in the

RIA. These already-installed seats in many cases meet the Class 2 requirements, and if adjustments were needed for any of those seats, they would be far less expensive to install than a Class 1 facility. Given our estimates of engineering, down time, fuel burn, rest facility configurations, and numbers of aircraft which might need extensive retrofit, it is our opinion that the overall potential costs to the industry could be as little as half the FAA estimate of $66 million over ten years.

The following tables outline both the FAA estimate and our estimate of the costs to the industry for crew rest facility upgrades/installation/operation:

FAA Table 30: Rest Facilities Total Costs, Cargo-Only Operations Total Nominal Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Year Cost (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) 2012 $3 $3 2013 $48 $6 $0 $54 2014 $1 $1 2015 $1 $1 2016 $1 $1 2017 $1 $1 2018 $1 $1 2019 $1 $1 2020 $1 $1 2021 $1 $1 2022 $1 $1 2023 $1 $1 Total $3 $48 $6 $10 $66

21 ALPA Estimate: Rest Facilities Total Costs, Cargo-Only Operations Total Nominal Engineering Installation Downtime Fuel Year Cost (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) 2012 $1.5 $1.5 2013 $24 $3 $0 $27 2014 $0.5 $0.5 2015 $0.5 $0.5 2016 $0.5 $0.5 2017 $0.5 $0.5 2018 $0.5 $0.5 2019 $0.5 $0.5 2020 $0.5 $0.5 2021 $0.5 $0.5 2022 $0.5 $0.5 2023 $0.5 $0.5 Total $1.5 $24 $3 $5 $33.5

V. The FAA Should Have Used a 20-year Look-Back to Assess the Cost of Accidents

In the RIA, the FAA adjusted their accident history to a ten-year look-back. Even though the cargo industry has a history of relatively safe operations, accidents have occurred. The FAA included a table of fatigue-related accidents which included a 20- year look-back. Within that 20 years there were four fatigue related accidents in the cargo industry. By reducing the look-back to 10 years, the FAA reduced the overall liability within the cargo industry to one accident related to fatigue. ALPA believes that that is an erroneous methodology for two reasons.

First, it is apparent, even by the FAA-included table, that in the last 10 years there was one fatigue-related accident. In look-back years 11-20, there were three

22 fatigue-related accidents, or three times the number of fatigue-related accidents than the

FAA chose to use for this RIA. Since no one can predict any accident, never mind one which is fatigue induced, our opinion is that it would be unwise to discount the probability of one vs. three accidents (whether fatal or injurious) when determining cost benefits to the industry.

Second, it has been our observation that many parties are adverse to discussing and acknowledging fatigue as a human factor in accidents. The new FAA rules provide the ability to enhance scheduling practices and ensuring that fatigue discussions, training, and prevention occur to enhance overall safety within all passenger and cargo operations. We believe that removing the second largest segment of commercial aviation from the rule set is detrimental to and not an improvement for the industry and all related industries.

VI. Scheduling Practices

The RIA uses Cygnus (a computer-scheduling tool) to provide guidance for

comparative differences between the old FAA rule set and the new FAA rule set. The

FAA included discussion regarding how new trips and lines were constructed and then

compared those to baseline current rules provided by cargo companies. We do not feel

this provides a true indication of the impact on pilot scheduling for the new rules. We

feel when cargo is included for the purpose of implementing the new flight time/duty

23 time rules, cargo carriers will modify their marketing techniques to take advantage of

optimization possibilities.

As an example, if cargo carrier “A” today flies from “XYZ” to “ABC” and then requires crew rest (or crew augmentation to continue), it is quite possible that under the new rules the carrier may well be able to continue that crew on to “DEF” before such rest is required (or even double augmentation). This is due to both the potential

extension of the flight time, and the reduction in required rest upon arrival (minimum

required rest is 10 hours regardless of type of operation). We should point out the

Fatigue Risk Management System (“FRMS”) may also help enhance the cargo carrier

optimization.

Another example would be for the same cargo carrier to adjust their markets to

optimize their capabilities of serving any particular market by adjusting their time of

departure/arrival due to potential advantages of block and duty time provided within

the rule. Cargo carriers have greater latitude in these determinations than passenger

carriers due to their ability to alter internal schedules to improve their optimization

practices. These approaches will certainly occur over time. As the Air Force Institute of

Technology concluded when they studied the impact of Part 117 on Department of

Defense contract carriers, which include cargo carriers: “These findings suggest that the airlines are currently running optimally. They run as close to the maximum limitations as possible to increase profit. As the limitations change, it would be assumed they

24 would again find the optimum solution to continue the missions.” See Air Force Inst. of

Tech., CRAF Crew Rest Study: Proposed FAA Changes 17 (Jan. 4, 2011).

Therefore, it is our opinion that when the rules are implemented by the cargo

carriers they will see a greater gain in optimization compared to the analysis provided

within the RIA and a by default a reduced cost for implementing and going forward

with the new rule requirements. Even the RIA admits that it expects the carriers “will

be able to reduce much of the [RIA’s estimated annual crew scheduling] cost” through

optimization. RIA at 68.

All Costs/Savings in $Millions

Representative Crew 10 year per year 10 year per year net cost High Case Rest total cost health health per year B777 over 10 savings savings years 75% Effectiveness $255.6 $33.5 $289.1 $28.9 $190.0 $19.0 $9.9 Estimate Present Value $167.8 $33.5 $201.3 $20.1 $190.0 $19.0 $1.1 Discount @ 7% Present Value $211.6 $33.5 $245.1 $24.5 $190.0 $19.0 $5.5 Discount @ 3%

The cost of applying Part 117 to cargo carriers is nominal. If we accept the FAA’s total cost of applying Part 117 to cargo2 carriers, the net annual cost would range from

2 ALPA believes that the scheduling costs are overstated, see page 22 above, and that the assumption should be for more than one accident using a 20-year look-back which is appropriate, see page 23 above.

25 $1.1 million to $9.9 million which, for the industry as a whole, is a nominal cost. See

Table above. ALPA believes that this cost will be more than made up by scheduling changes to take advantage of the increased flight time allowed by Part 117. Further, if two accidents were assumed, the benefit would outweigh the costs.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Lee Moak, President Air Line Pilots Association, International

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