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Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs April 27, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary As of January 1, 2015, the United States and its partner countries have completed a transition to a smaller post-2014 mission consisting mostly, but not exclusively, of training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to about 10,000, of which most are trainers and advisers as part of a 13,000-person NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission.” About 1,000 of the U.S. contingent are counter-terrorism forces that continue to conduct combat, operating under a new U.S. “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” that replaced the post-September 11 “Operation Enduring Freedom.” President Obama directed in May 2014 that the U.S. force will shrink during 2015 to about 5,000 by the end of this year, and their presence after 2015 will be exclusively in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield. The post-2016 U.S. force is to be several hundred military personnel, under U.S. Embassy authority. However, in late March 2015, in conjunction with a visit to Washington, D.C by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, President Obama announced that U.S. forces would remain at about 10,000 through the end of 2015. He said there has not, at this point, been a change in the size in the post- 2016 U.S. forces. U.S. officials assert that insurgents do not pose a threat to the stability of the government, but militants continue to conduct high-profile attacks and do not appear close to outright defeat. The insurgency benefits, in some measure, from weak governance in Afghanistan. A dispute over the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan was settled in September 2014 by a U.S.-brokered solution under which Ashraf Ghani became President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was appointed to a new position of Chief Executive Officer of the government. Ghani and Abdullah’s disagreements over new cabinet selections delayed the completion of a new cabinet until April 2015, and even then disagreements between the two leaders have prevented appointment of a new Defense Minister. Governance is also widely assessed to suffer from widespread official corruption, although Ghani has undertaken anti-corruption initiatives since taking office. By engaging regional governments, Ghani is taking significant steps to try to achieve a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and insurgent groups. Ghani’s trips to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China since taking office have had some early success in setting the stage for negotiations in earnest, and Afghan and Pakistani officials indicate that talks between the Afghan government and the insurgent groups might begin later in 2015. However, Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups assert that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights. U.S. policy is to help establish a self-sustaining Afghan economy. U.S. actions include promoting greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns as part of a “New Silk Road” and assisting Afghan efforts to develop its vast mineral resources. Still, despite modest successes in these efforts, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2014, the United States provided about $100 billion to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 60% has been to equip and train the ANSF. About $5.7 billion is being provided in FY2015, including $4.1 billion for the ANSF. The FY2016 request is for $5.3 billion, including $3.8 billion for the ANSF. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 th From Early History to the 19 Century ..................................................................................... 1 th Early 20 Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before September 11 ......................................... 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom.......................................................... 7 Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003................................................................................ 8 Afghan Governance ......................................................................................................................... 8 “National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah .......................................... 10 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ..................................................................... 12 General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 13 Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 14 Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 16 Who Is “The Enemy”? ............................................................................................................. 16 The Taliban ........................................................................................................................ 17 Al Qaeda and Associated Groups ...................................................................................... 17 Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 19 Haqqani Network .............................................................................................................. 20 Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 21 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 22 The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009 .......................................................................... 22 Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown ...................................... 23 McChrystal Assessment and U.S. “Surge” ........................................................................ 23 Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead ............................................................... 24 Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and 2017 Planned Exit ...................................................... 25 Conditions-Based Adjustments to the Post-2014 Force Levels and Missions .................. 27 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................. 28 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 29 Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 31 Size of the ANSF ............................................................................................................... 32 ANSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues .......................................................................... 32 ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 32 The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 33 Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 34 Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 35 Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 38 Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 38 Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation with Insurgents.................................................... 39 Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 42 Pakistan ..................................................................................................................................
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