DOCSLIB.ORG

Ethnicity, Corruption and Voting Behavior in Afghanistan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ethnicity, Corruption and Voting Behavior in Afghanistan Fall 08 Ethnicity, Corruption and Voting Behavior in Afghanistan David Esmati Abstract. Throughout Afghanistan’s tumultuous decades of war, the constant tug of power among the various ethnicities has made the country one of the most misunderstood places in the world. In a country of roughly 30 million people, Afghans have fought many foreign powers and civil wars trying to establish a representative government that is legitimate and effective. As the international community begins to withdraw their troops by the end of 2014, the stalemate war between the Taliban and the Afghan National Army has once again forced the Afghan government to provide a leader who can form a coalition government embodying the various ethnicities present in the state. Ethnic conflict is still a key variable in understanding Afghanistan’s political landscape. This paper addresses whether the Afghan people actually vote on the basis of merit and qualifications of the individual candidates, or whether they simply favor one candidate over another because they share the same ethnic background. The study assesses Afghanistan’s 2009 elections to highlight variables other than ethnicity which may affect voting behavior. The study concludes that Afghan people do vote along ethnic lines. It also indicates that during the 2009 election, Hamid Karzai had a larger payoff from corruption than did Dr. Abdullah. New York University- International Relations Esmati Introduction In the last decade, Afghanistan has experienced tremendous changes both politically and economically. Since the fall of the Taliban, the Afghan people have had the chance to work alongside the international community in building the country’s infrastructure, state and government. Afghanistan had its first democratically held election in 2009, after more than a decade of civil war. Previous leaders were either killed or forced out of power and exiled.1 Nonetheless, the election of 2009 was the first time that Afghanis went out to voting booths and elected their leader, sparking debate in the country regarding ethnicity, cooperation and the willingness of people to choose a leader who might not be from their ethnic background. For this reason, the issue of ethnic conflict and coexistence will play a major role in the de-escalation of violence and efforts toward further development. Over the course of Afghanistan’s history, the majority of internal conflicts have resulted from ethnic tension, but the issue of ethnicity often has been overlooked throughout development efforts. Time after time, Afghanistan has spiraled into political chaos, with billions of dollars in humanitarian aid lost to corruption and inefficiency. In order for the Afghan people to have a government that can address their political and economic needs, ethnic tension must be at the forefront of any prospective leader’s agenda. It is also important to note that unlike in the United States, there are no major political parties to provide the candidates with an anchor to build on the party’s political ideologies.2 For those who decide to run for President and other senior level positions, Afghanistan’s political nature and the non-existence of a political party force politicians to rely on ethnic support and ethnic-led initiatives to win their constituents’ votes. It is thus critical to assess the role of ethnicity and how it affects both the political and social nature of voters. My hypothesis is that due to the lack of Afghan national identity, Afghanistan’s 2009 election involved ethnic voting and levels of 2 Esmati corruption benefitting one ethnicity more than the other. This paper analyzes these matters by providing a political background and historical context of the many ethnicities in Afghanistan. It then discusses the Afghan civil war after the withdrawal of the Soviets, along with the present tensions among the many ethnicities. Following the ethnic tensions, the election of 2009 will pull together the variables of ethnicity among voters to examine the voting behavior of Afghan citizens. Data analysis will highlight whether the two leading candidates of the 2009 election – Hamid Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah – have received votes based on their merits or on their ethnicity, along with other attributes such as the literacy rate of the population, and which ethnicity benefitted more from corruption. Ethnicities of Afghanistan Figure 1 Source: Afghanistan Election Data 3 Esmati Over the course of history, Afghanistan has experienced significant foreign influence and threats to be conquered by the Turks, Persians, Russians and British. The geography of the state has piqued the interests of Western powers due to its strategic location in Central Asia. Afghanistan shares a border to its West with the Islamic Republic of Iran and with Turkmenistan, both of which have abundant oil and natural energy resources. On the North, Afghanistan shares a border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, also energy-rich states. In the East and South, Afghanistan shares a controversial border with Pakistan. Rough estimates of the ethnic composition today are as follows: Pashtuns 44%, Tajiks 25%, Hazara 10%, and Uzbek 8% (Simonsen, 2006). Since these groups are scattered all over the country, it is evident that by looking at the map of ethnicities, there is a concentration of Pashtuns in the South; and of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks predominantly in the Northern Parts of Afghanistan.3 Pashtuns consist of the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan; historically, they have been the most politically influential. They comprise about 30 tribes, each consisting of a clan or its own lineage. Of the 30, the “five major groups or confederations (are) the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlanri, Sarbani, and Ghurghscht.”4 Most of the Durrani are found in the southwest, from Farah to Kandahar. The Ghilzai reside in the southeastern areas, usually from Kabul to Kandahar. The nomadic (kuchee) lifestyle of Pashtuns has led to negligible literacy rates, with the majority of people living in rural areas. Despite the numerous conquerors of Afghanistan, Pashtuns have showed little interest in following the policies or guidance of external actors. Their strict tribal loyalty has retained their independence and has led them to reject foreign intervention (Wiebke and Frost, 2011). The Tajiks are predominantly of Central Asian origin, sharing a kinship with neighboring Tajikistan. Compared to the Pashtuns, the Tajiks relay “their loyalty to families and community 4 Esmati and live in settled communities rather than leading a nomadic lifestyle.”5 Of the many ethnicities, Tajiks have been able to jockey for power with the Pashtuns. Rulers from the “Tajik led Afghanistan under two brief periods: (i) for nine months in 1929 under Habibullah Khan and (ii) from 1992 to 1996 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani.”6 The Tajiks aligned themselves with the Northern Alliance group, which cooperated with the United States and the international community in an effort to oust the Taliban regime. The Hazaras live mainly in the mountainous central provinces of Afghanistan and are present in the provinces of Jowzjan and Badghis. Since most Hazaras are Shi’a Muslims, they have “historically experienced discrimination and have been seen as the traditional underclass of Afghan society.”7 As a result of political and social repression, the Hazara have managed to unite and form their own resistance groups that protect their interests; their survivability depends on these groups constantly fighting to maintain their own lands (Harpviken, 1997). Lastly, Uzbeks are situated mainly in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. Much like the Turkmens, Uzbeks do not consider Farsi as their first language. Instead, they speak Uzbeki, a Turkic-based language that closely resembles Turkish. Additionally, most Uzbeks are involved in the agricultural facet of Afghanistan, growing mainly grain and vegetables. They live on arable land and are able to buy and sell agricultural products. As a result, “Uzbeks are the successful businessmen, silver and goldsmiths and leatherworkers of Afghanistan8.” For these reasons, Uzbeks in the past decade have been striving for greater political participation and have called for a federal Afghanistan and autonomy for the Northern provinces. 5 Esmati Afghan History After the fall of the Safavid Empire, Ahmad Shah Durrani, regarded as the founder of Afghanistan, took control of Kabul and a vast surrounding area that had belonged to the Persian Empire,9 under whose rule the Mongols, Persians, Turks, and Hindus had been living together. Once Durrani came into power, and believing in ethnic superiority, he filled the army and municipal positions with ethnic Pashtuns. By having a Pashtun majority in all positions of power, the Durranis led a campaign to rid Hazaras of their land and “dispossess the Hazaras of their land and give it to members of their own tribes.”10 On the other hand, the Tajiks saw the rise of the Pashtuns as a direct threat. The Tajiks pledged their loyalty to the Britons and the Russians. In 1892, the British invaded Afghanistan through the route of India. Seeing this as an opportunity to rebalance power in Kabul, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras supported the British in trying to overthrow the Pashtun-led government. However, the British appointed to the throne a Pashtun named Abdur Rahman, who saw this as an opportunity to once again get rid of those who tried to challenge Pashtun supremacy. By bringing in western military equipment, and with the aid of the British, Rahman instilled absolute Pashtun control in Afghanistan which continued with the reign of Abdur Rahman’s grandson, Aminullah. However, Aminullah’s reign came to an end in 1928, with the rise of Habibullah Kalakani, a Kabuli and a Tajik. The Tajiks seized control of Kabul and for the first time in three centuries, gained home rule.11 The Tajik rule of Afghanistan was short lived. Mohammad Nadir Shah, a Pashtun who had joined Kalakani to overthrow Aminullah, favored a Pashtun-led government.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Owner and Publisher/ Sahibi Ve Yayıncısı: Assoc.Prof.Dr./ Doç.Dr Fikret BİRDİŞLİ
    Volume: 2, Number: 3-2020 / Cilt: 2 Sayı: 3-2020 Owner and Publisher/ Sahibi ve Yayıncısı: Assoc.Prof.Dr./ Doç.Dr Fikret BİRDİŞLİ EDITOR-IN-CHIEF/ EDİTOR Assoc. Prof.Dr. Fikret BİRDİŞLİ İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY Phone: +90 422 3774261/4383 E-mail [email protected] MANAGING EDITORS / ALAN EDİTÖRLERİ Political Science Editor/ Siyaset Bilimi Editörü Prof.Dr. Ahmet Karadağ İnönü University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, 44280, Malatya-TURKEY Phone: +90 422 3774288 E-mail [email protected] International Relations and Security Studies Editor/ Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Çalışmaları Editörü Assoc.Prof.Dr. Fikret Birdişli İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY Phone: +90 422 3774261/4383 E-mail [email protected] CONTAC INFORMATION / İLETİŞİM BİLGİLERİ İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY Phone: +90 422 3774261 İnönü Üniversitesi, Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, İİBF Ek Bina, Kat:3, 44280, Malatya-TÜRKİYE IJPS, 2019; 2(3) International Journal of Politics and Security, 2019: 2(3) 2020, 2 (3), / Volume: 2, Number: 3-2020 OWNER / SAHİBİ/ Assoc. Prof.Dr. Fikret BİRDİŞLİ Managing Editors / Editörler Political Science Editor: Ahmet Karadağ International Relations and Security Studies Editor: Fikret Birdişli Editorial Assistance / Editör Yardımcıları English Language Editors: Christopher Trinh, La Trobe University,
    [Show full text]
  • Pashtunistan: Pakistan's Shifting Strategy
    AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN PASHTUN ETHNIC GROUP PASHTUNISTAN: P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER May 2012 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? P ASHTUNISTAN : P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER About Tribal Analysis Center Tribal Analysis Center, 6610-M Mooretown Road, Box 159. Williamsburg, VA, 23188 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? The Pashtun tribes have yearned for a “tribal homeland” in a manner much like the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. And as in those coun- tries, the creation of a new national entity would have a destabilizing impact on the countries from which territory would be drawn. In the case of Pashtunistan, the previous Afghan governments have used this desire for a national homeland as a political instrument against Pakistan. Here again, a border drawn by colonial authorities – the Durand Line – divided the world’s largest tribe, the Pashtuns, into two the complexity of separate nation-states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they compete with other ethnic groups for primacy. Afghanistan’s governments have not recog- nized the incorporation of many Pashtun areas into Pakistan, particularly Waziristan, and only Pakistan originally stood to lose territory through the creation of the new entity, Pashtunistan. This is the foundation of Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan and the reason Pakistan’s politicians and PASHTUNISTAN military developed a strategy intended to split the Pashtuns into opposing groups and have maintained this approach to the Pashtunistan problem for decades. Pakistan’s Pashtuns may be attempting to maneuver the whole country in an entirely new direction and in the process gain primacy within the country’s most powerful constituency, the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Charting a New Path by Eva Gross
    48 2014 R A HM A T GUL/AP/SIPA Afghanistan: charting a new path by Eva Gross Following a protracted dispute over election re- common ground with his former presidential con- sults, a national unity government headed by tender Abdullah Abdullah, who now occupies the President Ashraf Ghani was sworn in in Kabul last post of chief executive in the government. September. This has injected some badly-needed momentum into Afghan politics after months of Restructuring, and drastically resetting the way electoral deadlock and over a decade of Karzai things are done, takes time – and, in a sense, rule increasingly marked by antagonism between Ghani’s mission is a race against the clock. This ap- the president and the West. This new phase repre- plies both to firming up international commitments sents an opportunity also for the EU and its mem- to support the Afghan economy and to providing ber states to tailor their respective approaches and security assistance to counter a still active Taliban commitments to a changing political and security insurgency – while at the same time instilling trust environment that promises greater activism on the in the system on the part of the Afghan public at part of Afghanistan’s neighbours in the months and large. years to come. In an effort to restore confidence in the rule of law in particular, President Ghani has moved to resolve A promising start the $1 billion Kabul Bank scandal that had come to serve as a symbol of corruption in the country. But President Ghani has made accountability and legiti- more can be done: customs for instance, an area that macy the centrepiece of his agenda for cabinet and last year generated 26% of government revenue, is government appointments so as to improve govern- rife with corruption that involves field officials as ance and win public trust.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces
    European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-650-0 doi: 10.2847/115002 BZ-02-20-565-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Helmand, Afghanistan 3 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0 Taliban On the Doorstep: Afghan soldiers from 215 Corps take aim at Taliban insurgents. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector. The following national asylum and migration department contributed by reviewing this report: The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, it but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY
    [Show full text]
  • The a to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance
    The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance 2nd Edition, August 2003 Writer: Shawna Wakefield Editor: Christina Bennett, Kathleen Campbell With special thanks to: Kristen Krayer, Nellika Little, Mir Ahmad Joyenda Cover illustration: Parniyan Design and Printing: The Army Press © 2003 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. Preface This is the second edition of The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance. Our first edition was brought out one year ago at a time of great change in Afghanistan. At that time, coordination mechanisms and aid processes were changing so fast that old hands and new arrivals alike were sometimes overwhelmed by the multiplicity of acronyms and references to structures and entities that had been recently created, abolished or re-named. Eighteen months after the fall of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn Agreement, there are still rapid new developments, a growing complexity to the reconstruction effort and to planning processes and, of course, new acronyms! Our aim therefore remains to provide a guide to the terms, structures, mechanisms and coordinating bodies critical to the Afghanistan relief and reconstruction effort to help ensure a shared vocabulary and common understanding of the forces at play. We’ve also included maps and a contact directory to make navigating the assistance community easier. This 2nd edition also includes a section called “Resources,” containing information on such things as media organisations, security information, and Afghanistan-related web sites. Another new addition is a guide to the Afghan government. As the objective of so many assistance agencies is to support and strengthen government institutions, we felt that understanding how the Afghan government is structured is important to working in the current environment.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities
    Order Code RL34021 Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities Updated November 25, 2008 Hussein D. Hassan Information Research Specialist Knowledge Services Group Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities Summary Iran is home to approximately 70.5 million people who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. The central authority is dominated by Persians who constitute 51% of Iran’s population. Iranians speak diverse Indo-Iranian, Semitic, Armenian, and Turkic languages. The state religion is Shia, Islam. After installation by Ayatollah Khomeini of an Islamic regime in February 1979, treatment of ethnic and religious minorities grew worse. By summer of 1979, initial violent conflicts erupted between the central authority and members of several tribal, regional, and ethnic minority groups. This initial conflict dashed the hope and expectation of these minorities who were hoping for greater cultural autonomy under the newly created Islamic State. The U.S. State Department’s 2008 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, released September 19, 2008, cited Iran for widespread serious abuses, including unjust executions, politically motivated abductions by security forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and arrests of women’s rights activists. According to the State Department’s 2007 Country Report on Human Rights (released on March 11, 2008), Iran’s poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The government placed severe restrictions on freedom of religion. The report also cited violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities. Incitement to anti-Semitism also remained a problem. Members of the country’s non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Baha’is, reported imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on their religious beliefs.
    [Show full text]
  • H.E. Abdullah Abdullah Discusses Peace Talks in Afghanistan United States Institute of Peace (Webcast Only) Wednesday, June 24, 2020 Transcript
    H.E. Abdullah Abdullah Discusses Peace Talks in Afghanistan United States Institute of Peace (Webcast Only) Wednesday, June 24, 2020 Transcript Nancy Lindborg: Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, depending on where you're viewing this livestream. My name is Nancy Lindborg and I am the president and CEO of the U.S. Institute of Peace. And I know there are viewers joining us from all around the world. We're delighted to have all of you here with us today for a very timely and important discussion. We're honored to have with us His Excellency Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who has taken time at this very critical moment in the Afghan peace process to share how he and the High Council for National Reconciliation are preparing for talks with the Taliban. After the keynote address, we'll have a Q&A session moderated by USIP’s Vice President for Asia Dr. Andrew Wilder and we invite you to take part in this event by asking a question through the YouTube livestream in the comments section, and you can also engage with us and with each other on Twitter with today's hashtag #AfghanPeace. At USIP, supporting a sustainable peace process in Afghanistan has been a core priority, and I'm encouraged that in recent months there has been progress towards direct inter-Afghan negotiations. At the same time, violence is rising to unprecedented levels, including increasing and quite disturbing numbers of civilian casualties. And there are other challenges: COVID-19 has exacerbated the struggles that Afghans face, including contributing to increased food insecurity and extreme poverty.
    [Show full text]
  • Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project in Faryab, Afghanistan
    Norad Report 19/2010 Discussion Appraisal of Extended Rule of Law Project in Faryab, Afghanistan Foto: Ken Opprann Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation P.O. Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 OSLO Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway Phone: +47 22 24 20 30 Fax: +47 22 24 20 31 ISBN 978-82-7548-521-0 ISSN 1502-2528 Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the study team. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with those of Norad. APPRAISAL OF EXTENDED RULE OF LAW PROJECT IN FARYAB, AFGHANISTAN Conducted by Senior Advisor Petter Bauck Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in cooperation with Researcher Torunn Wimpelmann Chaudhary Researcher Orzala Ashraf Nemat Senior Researcher Arne Strand Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) October 2010 1 ”My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against their ruler, and they must bear in mind that in establishing a Constitutional Government, introducing more lenient laws, and modelling education upon the system of Western universities, they must adopt all these gradually as the people become accustomed to the idea of modern innovations, so that they will not abuse the privileges and reforms given to them.” 1 1 Quoted in KHAN, M. M. S. M. (Ed.) (1980) The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan Volume 2, Karachi Oxford University Press. P. 9 2 CONTENT CONTENT .............................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • CAPSTONE 20-1 SWA Field Study Trip Book Part II
    CAPSTONE 20-1 SWA Field Study Trip Book Part II Subject Page Afghanistan ................................................................ CIA Summary ......................................................... 2 CIA World Fact Book .............................................. 3 BBC Country Profile ............................................... 24 Culture Gram .......................................................... 30 Kazakhstan ................................................................ CIA Summary ......................................................... 39 CIA World Fact Book .............................................. 40 BBC Country Profile ............................................... 58 Culture Gram .......................................................... 62 Uzbekistan ................................................................. CIA Summary ......................................................... 67 CIA World Fact Book .............................................. 68 BBC Country Profile ............................................... 86 Culture Gram .......................................................... 89 Tajikistan .................................................................... CIA World Fact Book .............................................. 99 BBC Country Profile ............................................... 117 Culture Gram .......................................................... 121 AFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT ECONOMY Chief of State Economic Overview President of the Islamic Republic of recovering
    [Show full text]
  • Afghan Internationalism and the Question of Afghanistan's Political Legitimacy
    This is a repository copy of Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan's political legitimacy. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/126847/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Leake, E orcid.org/0000-0003-1277-580X (2018) Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan's political legitimacy. Afghanistan, 1 (1). pp. 68-94. ISSN 2399-357X https://doi.org/10.3366/afg.2018.0006 This article is protected by copyright. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Edinburgh University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies in "Afghanistan". Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan’s political legitimacy1 Abstract This article uses Afghan engagement with twentieth-century international politics to reflect on the fluctuating nature of Afghan statehood and citizenship, with a particular focus on Afghanistan’s political ‘revolutions’ in 1973 and 1978.
    [Show full text]
  • A Political Biography of King Amanullah Khan
    A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF KING AMANULLAH KHAN DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF iJlajSttr of ^Ijiloioplip IN 3 *Kr HISTORY • I. BY MD. WASEEM RAJA UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. R. K. TRIVEDI READER CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDU) 1996 J :^ ... \ . fiCC i^'-'-. DS3004 CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY r.u Ko„ „ S External ; 40 0 146 I Internal : 3 4 1 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSTTY M.IGARH—202 002 fU.P.). INDIA 15 October, 1996 This is to certify that the dissertation on "A Political Biography of King Amanullah Khan", submitted by Mr. Waseem Raja is the original work of the candidate and is suitable for submission for the award of M.Phil, degree. 1 /• <^:. C^\ VVv K' DR. Rij KUMAR TRIVEDI Supervisor. DEDICATED TO MY DEAREST MOTHER CONTENTS CHAPTERS PAGE NO. Acknowledgement i - iii Introduction iv - viii I THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 1-11 II HISTORICAL ANTECEDANTS 12 - 27 III AMANULLAH : EARLY DAYS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING HIS PERSONALITY 28-43 IV AMIR AMANULLAH'S ASSUMING OF POWER AND THE THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 44-56 V AMIR AMANULLAH'S REFORM MOVEMENT : EVOLUTION AND CAUSES OF ITS FAILURES 57-76 VI THE KHOST REBELLION OF MARCH 1924 77 - 85 VII AMANULLAH'S GRAND TOUR 86 - 98 VIII THE LAST DAYS : REBELLION AND OUSTER OF AMANULLAH 99 - 118 IX GEOPOLITICS AND DIPLCMIATIC TIES OF AFGHANISTAN WITH THE GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND GERMANY A) Russio-Afghan Relations during Amanullah's Reign 119 - 129 B) Anglo-Afghan Relations during Amir Amanullah's Reign 130 - 143 C) Response to German interest in Afghanistan 144 - 151 AN ASSESSMENT 152 - 154 BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 - 174 APPENDICES 175 - 185 **** ** ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The successful completion of a work like this it is often difficult to ignore the valuable suggestions, advice and worthy guidance of teachers and scholars.
    [Show full text]