Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs December 22, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are coping with a resilient Taliban-led insurgency after the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, stands at about 9,800, of which most are assigned to the 13,000-person NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission” to train, assist, and advise the ANDSF. About 1,000 of the U.S. contingent conduct combat against Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups under U.S. “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” that replaced the post-September 11 “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Amid assessments that the ANDSF is having difficulty preventing gains by the Taliban and other militant groups—exemplified by the insurgent overrunning of the northern city of city of Konduz in late September 2015 and major insurgent gains in Helmand Province—President Obama announced on October 15, 2015, that about 10,000 U.S. military personnel would remain in Afghanistan through almost all of 2016, and subsequently fall to 5,500. The post-2016 force, which will remain at 5,500 for an undetermined time, is significantly larger than the U.S. force of about 1,000 personnel that was previously announced. U.S. officials assert that, despite the apparent deterioration of the security situation, insurgents do not pose a threat to the stability of the government. The government has been allowing local factional militias to regroup in order to help compensate for ANDSF weaknesses. Militias have often been cited for human rights abuses and arbitrary administration of justice, actions that often increase support for the insurgency. The insurgency also benefits from weak and divided governance in Afghanistan. A dispute over the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan was settled in September 2014 by a U.S.-brokered solution under which Ashraf Ghani became President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was appointed to a new position of Chief Executive Officer of the government. Ghani and Abdullah’s disagreements over new cabinet selections delayed the completion of a new cabinet until April 2015, and there is still no permanent Defense Minister or Attorney General, and the head of Afghan intelligence resigned in December 2015. Governance is also widely assessed to suffer from widespread official corruption, although Ghani has undertaken anti-corruption initiatives since taking office Ghani is taking significant steps to try to achieve a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and insurgent groups by engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors. Ghani’s trips to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China since taking office had some early success in producing negotiations between government officials and Taliban representatives. However, further talks were scuttled because of dissension within the Taliban over the benefits of negotiations, a struggle over succession to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Umar, who was revealed to have died in 2013, and defections to a small but growing Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups assert concerns that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights. A component of U.S. policy to help establish a self-sustaining Afghanistan is to encourage economic development and integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Despite modest successes in these efforts, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2014, the United States provided about $100 billion to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 60% has been to equip and train the ANDSF. About $5.7 billion is being provided in FY2015, including $4.1 billion for the ANDSF. The FY2016 request is for $5.3 billion, including $3.8 billion for the ANDSF. The costs to operate a 5,500- person U.S. force in the post-2016 period are estimated at about $15 billion. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 th From Early History to the 19 Century ..................................................................................... 1 th Early 20 Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period .................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities .............................................. 2 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ....................................................................... 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ............................................................... 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ..................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals ..................................................................................... 6 Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before the September 11 Attacks ...................... 6 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ......................................................... 7 Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003 ............................................................................... 7 Afghan Governance ......................................................................................................................... 8 “National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah ........................................... 9 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ...................................................................... 11 General Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 13 Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 14 Religious Freedoms .......................................................................................................... 16 Social and Media Freedoms .............................................................................................. 16 Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 17 Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 17 Who Is “The Enemy”? ............................................................................................................ 18 The Taliban ....................................................................................................................... 18 Al Qaeda and Associated Groups ..................................................................................... 19 The Islamic State Organization. ........................................................................................ 20 Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 21 Haqqani Network .............................................................................................................. 21 Insurgent Tactics ............................................................................................................... 22 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ...................................... 23 The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009 ......................................................................... 23 Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown ...................................... 24 Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead .............................................................. 25 Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Further Drawdown Planned ....................................... 26 Adjustments to the 2015, 2016, and Post-2016 Force Levels and Missions ..................... 27 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................ 29 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 29 Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 31 Size of the ANDSF............................................................................................................ 31 ANDSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues ....................................................................... 32 ANDSF Funding ............................................................................................................... 32 The Afghan National Army (ANA) .................................................................................
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