YEMEN ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010
Under pressure Social violence over land and water in Yemen
In February 2007 at least a dozen people, including an 11-year-old boy, were killed during a land dispute between tribesmen from al-Baydha and Sanhan that erupted in a southern suburb of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a. A sheikh from Sanhan kidnapped the son of a sheikh from al-Baydha to pressure him into renouncing owner- ship of a large plot of land. The youth reportedly fought back, injuring his kidnapper, and was then killed. The boy’s family rejected mediation and a gun battle erupted, with further killings apparently occurring when injured fighters were taken to hospital. Fighting was only quelled when the government sent tanks to separate the parties.1 This incident was unusual only for its notoriety and for the intervention by the highest levels of government. Typically modest in scale, social vio- lence over land and water in Yemen is nevertheless so pervasive and self- perpetuating that it claims thousands of lives each year and severely inhib- its social and economic development. While escalating political violence in Yemen is rapidly capturing interna- tional attention, more insidious land- and water-related social violence threatens to further weaken commu- nity cohesion and undermine stability. At the national level, collective land grievances are fuelling southern resent- ment and calls for secession. This Yemen Armed Violence Assessment (YAVA) Issue Brief pro- vides an overview of the dynamics and impacts of land- and water-related social violence, highlighting likely future trends. It elaborates on the par- ticular contribution of small arms and light weapons as a cross-cutting factor shaping social violence. The Issue Brief also considers government initiatives Women collecting water from the communal cistern, Shaharah, Hajjah governorate, February 2009. © Gavin Hales
www.yemen-ava.org 1 to contain civilian gun use, and high- criminal violence, resulting in higher inheritance, or some other claim to lights the many linkages between social mortality and morbidity rates per ownership. Disputed land is typically violence and other systemic challenges incident than the other five categories.3 private, but may also involve former confronting Yemeni society. It finds An important caveat is that social vio- or current state property. In a smaller the following: lence is widely under-reported com- number of cases, communal and waqf pared to political violence and thus is (religious endowment) lands are sub- According to Government of Yemen probably far more extensive than has ject to dispute. estimates, violence accompanying been measured and reported to date. Conflicts over land can escalate land and water disputes results in YAVA defines social violence as quickly because of the symbolic and the deaths of some 4,000 people ‘armed violence between non-state economic significance of land, the each year, probably more than the groups, often sustained over a period general lack of a speedy and transpar- secessionist violence in the south, of time, particularly in the context of ent adjudication process, and the highly the armed rebellion in the north, norms relating to collective responsi- armed nature of Yemeni society. On the and Yemeni al-Qaeda terrorism bility and blood revenge’. The most state side, excessive bureaucracy, poor combined. prevalent type of social violence relates state management and record keeping, In the context of political turmoil to disputes over the ownership of, or and corruption exacerbate conflicts and other grievances, land and access to, natural resources such as rather than contribute towards their water disputes have acted as trig- land and water, and border disputes.4 resolution. Simultaneously, customary gers for collective violence and These conflicts appear to play out systems to manage land ownership threaten to spark wider civil unrest. overwhelmingly in rural areas, where and transfers are weakening because Rapid population growth and ex- 71 per cent of the population lives,5 local sheikhs are often no longer per- tensive governance challenges are although urban areas are also affected— ceived as unbiased decision makers, exacerbating resource-related con- especially where new land and prop- as in many cases they benefit from land flicts, yet the government does not erty developments are taking place. concentration. Furthermore, the state appear to have a robust, long-term Significantly, ‘the increased commer- may step in at any time and reverse or plan to address these systemic cialization of land has created new nullify customary judgements.13 problems. relations in rural areas and between The official land conveyancing Since 2007 the Government of the tribes, leading to disputes’.6 (legal registration and transfer of Yemen has actively enforced re- The centrality of land and water in ownership) system itself is highly strictions on gun commerce and shaping conflict in Yemeni society is problematic. Although all private especially gun carrying in urban difficult to overstate. Land and water land sales—typically conducted via areas, reducing the availability of provide the basis for economic liveli- an authorized intermediary14—are small arms and contributing to sig- hoods for a majority of Yemenis. supposed to be officially entered into nificant increases in market prices. Agriculture accounts for 15 per cent of the state land registry, most transfers Nevertheless, gun ownership is gross domestic product and employs are never formally registered and pri- unregulated and gun carrying is 75 per cent of the rural workforce.7 vate conveyancing predominates.15 unrestricted outside urban areas. Land in particular is closely tied to At the same time, conveyancing is Firearms remain an important notions of identity and honour: in subject to widespread fraud and cor- vector of social violence. Arabic, al-ard ‘ard (land is honour).8 ruption, including document fraud Despite government measures to Yet only a very small percentage of (e.g. asserting a false claim to a piece reduce civilian gun use, reports Yemen’s land is economically produc- of land) and the sale of the same indicate that leakage from the tive. Less than 3 per cent is considered property to multiple buyers. The land Yemeni army is an important source ‘prime farmland’; an additional 4 per registry is generally unable to identify of ongoing supplies of military- cent ‘marginal farmland’,9 and less 16 style small arms and ammunition competing claims to pieces of land than 0.3 per cent is ‘planted with per- or expose fraud, with the negative to civilian gun markets. 10 manent crops’. For these reasons, it consequence that it can formalize is coveted and protected ‘with great rather than avert conflicting claims. 11 passion’. The following sections con- As a result of these weaknesses, Situating social violence sider how land and water conflicts claimants extensively use the courts YAVA Issue Brief 1 (May 2010) distin- arise, summarize the available data on to formalize land ownership and guished six broad categories of violence their impacts, and review key Yemeni address competing claims, with one in Yemen: political, social, ransom- and development actor responses to estimate suggesting that 50 per cent related, criminal, domestic, and unin- these problems. of the caseload in primary courts is tended.2 In a non-exhaustive review over land and property rights.17 This of domestic and international media results in ‘overburdened’18 courts, and reports of violence in Yemen over a Land conflict it is not unusual for cases to drag on 12-month period, political violence Land disputes are widely held to be for ten years or more, compounding accounted for the majority of overall the most common cause of armed concerns about corruption and further reported deaths and injuries. The archi- violence in Yemen.12 Land conflicts undermining the legitimacy of the val review indicated, however, that occur when multiple individuals or judicial system.19 Where both the individual incidents of social violence groups make claims on a parcel of formal state and informal customary are more deadly than political or land, whether through purchase, mechanisms are unable to provide a
2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010 timely and legitimate means of estab- Box 1 Ahmed’s land lishing tenure, claimants often resort to violent conflict. A member of a family of farmers living on what is now the outskirts of Sana’a city, Ahmed (a pseudonym) Inheritance issues can complicate inherited land from his paternal grandfather. While he was alive, his grandfather had divided most of his matters further, particularly in the land equally among his three sons, retaining a portion for himself. After his grandfather’s death, this highland areas where inheritance residual parcel was divided among Ahmed and his two surviving uncles, Ahmed’s father having died some constitutes one of the main mecha- years earlier. nisms by which land is acquired, on the basis of the division of an estate In 2004 Ahmed says he was summoned from his house one night by a cousin (a son of one of his two according to Islamic law.20 As average paternal uncles), who demanded that Ahmed renounce his entitlement to his share of the residual land. individual and family land holdings Once outside, and having refused the request in the course of an argument, Ahmed says he was shot at by shrink due to population growth and a second man who had remained hidden. Ahmed summoned a farming colleague, who brought his Chinese- finite productive land resources, fami- made AK-47 and handed the weapon to Ahmed. The attackers left. Later the same night a gun battle broke lies are increasingly desperate to retain out, during which Ahmed estimates that 60 shots were fired at him, one wounding his leg and another their agriculture plots and acquire new hitting him in the chest. He fired back, but could not confirm where his shots landed. land assets (see Box 1). A separate In hospital three days later, Ahmed was visited by policemen who had been tipped off by villagers issue arises when, in contradiction to that a young man had been killed during the gun battle. In due course both Ahmed and his cousin were traditional norms (but following Islamic charged, in Ahmed’s case with murder. While his cousin was found not guilty, Ahmed was convicted and law), land passes from a deceased hus- sentenced to death. The residual piece of land, however, remained in his name. band to his surviving wife. In such instances, the husband’s family may try Source: Author interview with Ahmed, Sana’a Central Prison, August 2010 to retrieve the land and/or keep it in their family’s name. This is said to fre- quently be the cause of armed disputes.21 In some cases, disputed land may private owners, or even (e.g. in the case flow of surface water to downstream 28 involve current or former state lands, of the military ) being used by state users and, increasingly over the last underlining an important political employees for private commercial three decades, access to groundwater dimension to land issues in Yemen that enterprises. In particular, in the after- through the digging of (ever deeper) in turn has fuelled political disaffec- math of the 1994 civil war, northern tube wells, predominantly on private tion, particularly in the south. In the elites allegedly appropriated, or were land.36 With the exception of direct former North Yemen (Yemen Arab preferentially given by the northern rainfall, all water sources are subject Republic), much of the state-owned government, large areas of formerly to the potential for unequal access and land was previously owned by the nationalized southern land, particu- control, key factors that lead competi- 29 imam (the religious leader prior to the larly around Aden and Lahj. At the tion to develop into conflict and armed national level, this remains a key 1962 revolution); in the former South violence. Human-made interventions grievance of southerners against the Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic such as dam construction37 and spate northern-dominated political elite, of Yemen), lands were nationalized in channel ‘improvements’,38 and natural fuelling calls for southern secession.30 1970 by the socialist government that changes such as to wadi (seasonal river) took power after the British withdrawal, morphology and spate events, can all and were previously predominantly serve to interfere with delicate social 22 Water conflict owned by sultans. Other state lands balances and catalyse conflicts.39 include those specifically acquired Yemen suffers from severe and increas- Conflict over rainwater tends to be by the state, as well as beaches and ing water scarcity and, as a result, seasonal and is most common during unpopulated islands,23 forest and competition for water resources is the rainy seasons (approximately desert areas ‘unless proven to be pri- common. This is often manifested as April–May and August–September).40 vately owned’,24 and marahek (moun- armed violence, particularly given the Until comparatively recently,41 tains and slopes that channel rainfall importance of agriculture to the econ- rural areas were overwhelmingly to adjacent agricultural land).25 omy of Yemeni civil society.31 The irrigated by surface water, including No matter where they are located, annual per capita availability of fresh- rainfall and spate water, typically state lands are poorly documented water is 120 m3 for the whole country, managed through locally negotiated and demarcated, giving rise to addi- which is only 10 per cent of the regional tional challenges over and above con- average and less than 2 per cent of the customary approaches. Starting in the veyancing and inheritance issues and global average.32 In the western part 1970s, Yemenis working in Saudi creating ownership conflicts with tribal of the highlands, where 90 per cent of Arabia became aware of the possibili- and private claimants.26 In and around the population is located, the average ties of groundwater extraction and cities such as Aden, Mukalla, Sana’a, is only 90 m3 per person per year.33 were soon buying tube well drilling and Taiz, ‘investors and citizens who There are no permanent rivers.34 equipment, starting in areas such as purchased land from the state have With extremely low levels of rain- Sa’dah.42 Between 1970 and 2003 the often had to pay for it again to settle fall across most of the country,35 conflict percentage of total cultivable land with the tribal/private claimants’.27 over water is intimately connected to irrigated by wells rose from 3 to 37 State lands are subject to misappro- land issues in Yemen. This is due to per cent.43 Groundwater resources are priation, illegal sales, being given to territorial (upstream) control over the now being exploited at a rate that far
www.yemen-ava.org 3 context of widespread political unrest in the south of Yemen. In many cases water disputes may be the trigger for conflict against a background of other grievances.53 Ward has usefully identified five factors that can transform competition for scarce water into conflict, while al-Amry provides a sixth (see Table 1).54
Impacts of land and water conflict Land and water disputes are a chronic, debilitating reality for a great many Yemenis. While mortality data is extremely limited, a recent internal Interior Ministry report estimated some 4,000 violent deaths annually due to land and related disputes.55 These deaths are over and above the roughly 1,000 criminal homicides that are publicly reported (see Box 2). Separately, it was reported that in Ibb governorate alone, where high rainfall means that the land is very productive and social conflict is said to be espe- cially severe, 800 people were sent to prison for homicide offences between January and August 2009 alone, most related to land disputes.56 Individual documented accounts support the extent of land- and water- related violence. As part of a five-year cycle of revenge killings, a land dispute between the Hajerah and Annis tribes in Ibb and Dhamar governorates, south of Sana’a, claimed the lives of more than 30 and wounded 100 in early July 2005 alone.57 Elsewhere, conflict reduc- tion specialists working for the Yemeni Armed tribesman, Amran governorate, Febuary 2009. © Gavin Hales quasi-governmental Social Fund for Development (SFD) described an area in Sana’a governorate where land (and exceeds natural recharge44 and water sources dry up from being used to water) conflicts were resulting in around 49 levels have plummeted in areas such as supply urban areas. This has also two armed violence deaths per week, 45 Sana’a, Sa’dah, and Taiz. Predictions taken place in Abyan, where extracted including while conflict reduction train- suggest that ‘the majority of aquifers water is piped to Aden and locals ing was being carried out.58 Violent [will] run dry in a period of 15 to 50 destroyed well-field pipelines in pro- land disputes are a frequent occurrence 46 50 years’, with potentially devastating test. It also occurs between citizens in areas such as the newer parts of 47 consequences for social stability. and the state, where grievances accu- Sana’a city where new construction is Conflict over access to under- mulate relating to failures in public widespread and land values are rising ground water takes a number of forms. service provision. In June 2009, for rapidly. In all cases the majority of Competition among well owners example, protesters took to the streets victims are men and the associated drawing water from the same aquifer in Lahj to protest the month-long dis- effects of their deaths and injuries on can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’48 of connection of the municipal water family earnings and wider productiv- the aquifer. Conflict can also arise supply.51 Then in August 2009 one ity are devastating. between rural and urban users where person was killed and three injured In addition to mortality and mor- water is taken from rural areas for in Aden in clashes between police bidity, violent land disputes—and urban use. This has occurred in Taiz, and protesters over the same issue.52 associated revenge norms—result in where rural users saw their water These incidents should be seen in the potentially productive land remaining
4 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010 Table 1 Factors transforming water competition into conflict land and water conflict in Yemen.75 In rural parts of the northern highlands, Factor Explanation customary tribal norms and mecha- 76 Predictability More predictable flow creates the conditions for consensus about resource nisms predominate, while in southern of flow management; spate events give rise to intense stress and conflict.59 areas such as Aden and Hadramout the state and its institutions have more Number of users Large shared systems generate more potential for stress as individual control central roles, reflecting both different 60 diminishes. cultural and political histories and the Visibility Surface water flows are easier to measure and manage, but, being visible, may relative presence or absence of state 77 quickly give rise to conflict; groundwater sources are not.61 institutions. Prevailing authority in urban areas such as Sana’a is more fluid ‘Symmetry of cause More direct competition between individuals is more likely to trigger conflict than, and often depends on the specific type 62 and effect’ for example, depletion of groundwater affecting a broad community. of incident or issue and the tribal (or Power relations Large power imbalances between winners and losers tend to mitigate conflicts.63 otherwise) status of the parties con- cerned. As a broad generalization, External The state, donors, and others can trigger conflict when they interfere with existing both customary and state approaches interference water management practices or ignore the management and maintenance implica recognize each other, and indeed may 64 tions of new infrastructure projects. cooperate in pursuit of outcomes sat- isfactory to all parties.78 The processes of modernization— including urbanization and the emer- unused, the destruction of valuable customs and impacted by wide-ranging gence of a market economy—and the crops, and the delay or cancellation socio-economic and political changes. patronage-based Yemeni political model of new investments.65 Research on This section reflects on some of the both have important implications for Yemen’s coffee industry, for example, key dynamics affecting the likelihood customary norms and practices. In highlights the way that ‘multiple and escalation of land and water particular, the legitimacy of key actors, rights to the same piece of land’ have conflicts, including a widening ‘gov- particularly sheikhs, has diminished,79 served to limit investment and have ernance gap’ between the state and while many traditional norms are no even resulted in resource destruction customary regulation, collective 66 longer respected to the extent they once such as tree cutting. Water disputes responsibility and revenge norms, were.80 Factors limiting the capacity can lead to water supplies being small arms proliferation, and the exist- and legitimacy of the state include a impeded or even cut.67 ence of powerful vested interests. traditional resistance to central govern- Customary vs. state authority. ment authority in favour of autonomy;81 The relationship between traditional Social conflict dynamics the limited presence of state institutions customary norms relating to conflict in many—particularly rural—parts of Land and water conflicts are complex and resource management and state Yemen;82 and corrupt, partisan, or phenomena involving long-standing authority is crucial to understanding counter-productive decision making,83 even when there is a clear demand for the state to play a role.84 The fragmen- Box 2 Counting land and water conflict deaths tation of and lack of coordination between government policing and An unpublished Interior Ministry report estimates that approximately 4,000 people die in land and related security institutions serve to further disputes each year in Yemen. These deaths, which probably also include water conflict deaths, are not undermine their effectiveness and included in the published ‘security and justice’ statistics, which indicated 874 ‘intentional murders’, exacerbate the ‘governance gap’.85 138 ‘unintentional killings’, and 24 ‘assaults leading to death’ in 2008.68 Collective responsibility and Three factors likely explain the under-count. First, the published statistics represent only cases that revenge norms. Tribal society in Yemen have been passed to a prosecutor, therefore typically including only those in which a suspect has been is built on the notion of collective identified.69 Second, recorded crimes in Yemen can have more than one victim.70 Third, the number of responsibility and collective action to 86 deaths resulting from security operations or the Sa’dah war is unreported and unknown.71 deal with external threats. At the same time, there is strong adherence to the When pressed on why land and water dispute deaths are generally not recorded in published crime notion of blood revenge (tha’r),87 which statistics, a government official suggested three reasons.72 First, and most importantly, a significant pro- is closely tied to honour. It views the portion of such cases are dealt with by customary rather than formal state mechanisms.73 Moreover, in acceptance of ‘blood money’ compen- many cases the military is used to intervene, raising sensitivities about the impact of state actions. Finally, sation payments as shameful and can the tribal nature and dynamics of many such conflicts can make it impossible to identify who shot whom only rarely be overcome by intense (reducing the likelihood of prosecutorial involvement). As the official put it, ‘it is like a war conflict’. With negotiation and mediation.88 Revenge Yemen’s population of around 23 million, 4,000 violent deaths are equivalent to about 17.4 deaths per may be exacted against male family 100,000 population per year. members or even their fellow tribes- An ongoing hospital-based injury surveillance project being conducted by the Yemeni Ministry of men, e.g. when a murderer cannot be Public Health and Population, with support from the World Health Organization, may provide additional directly targeted.89 This can paralyze evidence in due course, but the YAVA project has been unable to gain access to its data.74 communities and prevent access to schools, health centres, and markets,90
www.yemen-ava.org 5 and even force men to remain con- the rapid escalation of disputes.97 A years it has nevertheless taken signifi- fined to their homes for long periods dispute can begin with a goat straying cant steps to robustly enforce gun- to avoid the risk of being killed.91 The onto a neighbour’s qat plantation and carrying laws in cities and curtail some cycle of violence often escalates and quickly lead to a shooting death.98 gun commerce.100 But the state’s lack becomes protracted, complicating Moreover, violence is often the first of control over many rural (and par- efforts to achieve non-violent resolu- recourse, rather than mediation, as ticularly tribal) areas means that tion. For example, research on con- when one person shoots at another customary laws and norms, although flicts in Marib, al-Jawf, and Shabwa for beginning home construction on weakening, remain the principal check between 2000 and 2005 found that disputed land.99 on the use of small arms there. Gun 79 per cent (129 out of 164) of the con- Although the Yemeni government retailers and larger markets are found flicts had started before 2001 and 410 has not explicitly publicly acknowl- in many areas, although they are out of 612 deaths related to conflicts edged the problem of gun proliferation reported to be concentrated in Sana’a, that had started before 2000; one con- as a factor in social violence, in recent al-Baydha, Shabwa, Dhamar, and flict had even remained unresolved for 92 years.92 Small arms and light weapons use. Box 3 Gun accessibility and social violence in Yemen At a minimum, ‘small arms are a vital component in any effort to protect land Civilian gun commerce in Yemen is robust by most standards, with arms shops sitting beside food, cloth- and exert control over its possession ing, spice, and service outlets in many towns. Estimates from 2007 suggest that there were 300 small gun 93 and use’. Although comparatively shops and 18 more organized arms markets in Yemen,102 while a national survey of more than 2,000 people limited quantitative data exists, fire- found that almost three-quarters of gun owners had bought their guns at a market and almost all of the arms are probably the primary tool remainder from known arms dealers; less than 2 per cent were acquired from friends and relatives.103 used to commit violence in the course Well-known larger markets, such as those in Jihana (in Sana’a governorate) and Sowadia (in al-Baydha of resource-related disputes. As re- governate), and formerly in al-Talh (in Sa’dah), can comprise dozens of weapons vendors selling a wide ported in YAVA Issue Brief 1, civilian gun ownership in Yemen is wide- range of small arms and light weapons, including military-style assault weapons, rifles, rocket-propelled 104 spread, with credible estimates of ten grenades, ammunition, and accessories. Larger weapons, including heavy machine guns, rockets, and million small arms among a popula- artillery, are also reportedly available, although they are no longer openly sold. Specific models of small tion of around 23 million.94 Small arms arms documented by the Small Arms Survey in a sample of arms markets include Chinese, Russian, and proliferation has a complex relation to German Kalashnikov-modelled assault rifles; Mauser K98 bolt-action rifles; Mauser rifle copies known social and political life in Yemen, some- locally as ‘Czech guns’; Chinese hand grenades; Pakistani and French rifles (unknown types); US-produced times acting as a stabilizer in intra- FN FAL rifles; and a range of handguns. In contrast to most other civilian societies, Yemeni citizens are and inter-tribal relations, but as a primarily armed with military-style small arms, notably AK-47 variants. destabilizer when traditional means Interviews and field research conducted in 2009 by the Small Arms Survey indicate that the volume of of controlling armed violence are transactions and weapons prices in gun markets have changed over time. Prior to the first Sa’dah war in 95 weakened or break down completely. 2004, prices were relatively low and all small arms transactions took place in the open, face to face. Since Historically, the long-standing tra- the war broke out—six rounds of fighting have taken place as at mid-2010—prices have steadily increased, dition of civilian ownership and the in some cases up to ten times their previous levels, and transactions involving higher volumes and heavier use of guns have been regulated by non-statutory customary norms. weapons are now conducted in private, although initial contacts are made in common markets. The volume Tribal violence was—and in many of arms and ammunition sales transacted is reported to have dropped considerably over the same period. cases still is—dealt with through dia- Interviews with arms dealers suggest that government intervention is an important reason for these logue, mediation, and arbitration by changes. The government has closed a number of gun shops in main cities since the renewed enforcement sheikhs or others with a reputation and of the 1992 gun law from 2007,105 restricting supply and driving prices up in remaining outlets. According to status as mediators such as a maragha reports, the largest arms market in the country, at al-Talh in Sa’dah, was initially closed in 2004 in the (hereditary highest tribal authority), context of the Sa’dah war,106 although trade appears to have continued to some degree until at least 2007. or members of the sayyid and qadi The government also publicly ‘blacklisted’ a number of high-profile arms dealers in 2009 and restricted 96 (judge) elite classes. Although gun the movement of trafficked goods at the northern border and ports, further reducing inflows of guns to violence is relatively common in Yemen, civilian markets.107 given the level of weapons proliferation The sources of the weapons on sale are diverse. One source is second-hand weapons sold to vendors and the relative absence of state con- by civilians, notably for cash to finance important events, such as weddings. Diversion from military sources trols in much of the country, traditional also appears to be an important vector. Army commanders, military depot keepers, officers, and individual norms have undoubtedly prevented even more frequent violence. soldiers are all reportedly sources of weapons to gun markets in Yemen, often working in cooperation both 108 But a number of analysts have with one another and brokers to facilitate transactions. documented the gradual erosion of Systematic corruption in the military may partly explain the leakages. Military budgets in Yemen are customary norms controlling the use typically controlled by commanding officers and based on the numbers of soldiers under their command. of guns. A wide range of anecdotal To increase their budgets, officers inflate the ranks with ‘ghost soldiers’—men who either do not exist or evidence suggests that recourse to do not serve. Up to one-third of the officially reported 100,000 military personnel in Yemen may be ficti- arms to resolve conflict is increasingly tious.109 Officers pocket or distribute the funds designated for ghost soldiers and supplement their incomes common and that the proliferation of by selling items destined for these soldiers—including firearms. weapons is strongly associated with
6 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010 Amran governorates.101 Gun and complex nature of conflict and result- tions, although widespread education ammunition prices have risen signifi- ing armed violence in Yemen. An about the implications of not taking cantly in recent years. For a discussion important implication is that the reso- action, e.g. to address water consump- of gun accessibility and government lution of political conflicts may often tion in the agricultural sector, may attempts to control gun carrying and require interventions addressing conceivably assist. One of Yemen’s use, see Boxes 3 and 4. resource-related grievances. great strengths, particularly in tribal Vested interests. Many of Yemen’s areas, is the customary emphasis on largest landowners and consumers of ‘responsibilities towards others’ and water are senior sheikhs, politicians, Reflections maintaining social balances.118 and other members of the elite (and Yemen’s land and water problems are One area where the government quite often, several of these at once) primarily viewed both domestically has acted with conviction is in recog- who have used their positions to dis- and internationally through the prisms nizing the threat posed by weapons proportionately capture land, water, of natural resource depletion, economic in civilian hands. Specifically, public and other resources. The rapid expan- sustainability, and development (with authorities have taken action to sup- sion of groundwater exploitation is said occasional references to climate change). press firearms carrying in cities, to have resulted in ‘profound shifts The fundamental resource allocation notably by enhanced enforcement of in economic and political power’.110 and depletion challenges facing the provisions in Law No. 40 of 1992 Importantly, elites are in a position country are indeed dire. Rapid popu- (enacted 1994). Nevertheless, the law to block reforms that might curtail lation growth and diminishing land remains permissive by international the profitability of their investments, and water reserves are placing the standards and neglects rural areas, such as efforts to limit water con- country on a collision course with where most resource-related violence sumption (including curtailing the widespread collective suffering, and takes place (see Box 4). On its own, it cultivation of qat), better record and possible social unrest. Yet a greater cannot possibly reduce all land- and manage state-owned lands, and understanding of the role of armed water-related violence, particularly in improve the legitimacy and transpar- violence associated with land and the context of weakening governance ency of justice processes.111 They are water conflicts could constructively and in the absence of meaningful land also often traditionally arbitrators or inform policy choices and provide and water reform. mediators according to customary added impetus for long-term strategic To date, broader land and water norms, positions that were historically planning. reform efforts have been piecemeal predicated on the status of sheikhs as Some development actors are com- and hindered by competing interests ‘first among equals’.112 It is also signifi- ing to recognize the linkages between among elites and branches of the cant that in Yemeni custom mediators resource management and conflict. executive. The national Water Law and arbitrators are often paid for their For example, the UK Department for passed in 2002, for example, is sup- services, and may therefore catalyse International Development has been posed to regulate water extraction or prolong conflicts.113 increasing its focus on conflict sensi- from wells, and the National Water Linkages to political conflict. tivity, particularly in the context of Sector Strategy and Investment Pro- Given the governance issues raised by land and water resources. The Yemeni gramme (NWSSIP) launched in 2005 the management of scarce resources, quasi-governmental Social Fund for has resulted in very positive moves land and water disputes are often Development, and particularly the towards decentralized water manage- important dimensions of wider con- German Agency for Technical Coop- ment, in particular with the support flicts, particularly political conflict. eration (GTZ), have taken significant of GTZ. These have generated some The discussion above has highlighted steps towards mobilizing conflict sen- consensus regarding the exploitation the way that both the disposal of state sitive forms of development in Yemen. of water resources in areas such as lands and water shortages have in- This is done primarily on the basis of Amran, and are alleged to have averted flamed political tensions in the south bottom-up consensus building, e.g. conflict.119 However, the disconnect of Yemen. In the northern governorate through supporting water user asso- between the Ministry of Water and of Sa’dah, both the disposal of religious ciations and basin committees.117 the Environment, responsible for endowment (waqf) lands114 and compe- Indeed, it seems likely that the key to resource management and domestic tition for water (and land) resources115 addressing land and water disputes water supply and sanitation, and the are reported to have contributed to the will be found through integrated Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, broader tensions that led to the outbreak approaches that set the policy agenda which deals with irrigation efficiency, of civil war in the governorate in 2004. much more strongly at the national dams, and watershed management, Conversely, the May 2008 outbreak of level—possibly with pressure from has ‘left the rate of consumption itself fighting—alleged by official sources international donors—with imple- . . . unaddressed in the agricultural to have been related to the Sa’dah mentation through regulated local sector’, which is responsible for 90 war—at Bani Hushaish, some 20 km accountability structures that draw per cent of water consumption.120 At from Sana’a, has been described as on customs that prioritize consensus the same time, attempts to reform qat ‘more akin to a local land ownership building, dialogue, and social respon- cultivation, a notable contributor to conflict between tribesmen and a prom- sibility. Overcoming vested interests water consumption, have stalled inent military figure’ than a genuine will be central to any strategy such as ‘indefinitely’ in parliament,121 and political conflict.116 This serves to fur- this, particularly in respect of water traditional water management rules ther highlight the overlapping and depletion. There are no simple solu- continue to ‘treat water as an everlast-
www.yemen-ava.org 7 Box 4 Suppressing gun carrying and use Ultimately, the state is not facing squarely the challenges of land and In addition to regulating imports and the trade in small arms, Law No. 40 of 1992, Regulating Carrying Fire- water conflict. The longer public arms and Ammunitions and Their Trade (enacted 1994), restricts gun carrying in the Yemeni capital and authorities delay vital reforms, the more likely that the land and water the capitals of the governorates through a system of licensing (art. 10). Consistent with global norms, conflicts will eventually threaten civilians in these areas who own guns and wish to carry them must apply for a licence; be at least 18 years social—and ultimately political— of age; and be free of serious or consecutive criminal convictions. Prohibited carriers include alcohol and stability. Against a host of competing 122 drug abusers and those with mental and psychological disabilities. economic, political, and security con- Applicants must also demonstrate ‘sufficient reasons and justifications’ for a licence by providing cerns, land and water resource-related proof of their having a ‘political and social position . . . [that] justifies carrying a personal weapon’ (art. 6). social violence in Yemen has received Licences are valid for a single weapon for three years (art. 17); prohibit the transfer of licensed weapons relatively little recognition or system- (art. 13); and must be produced on demand by authorities. Lost or stolen weapons are to be reported within atic attention from policy-makers and 24 hours. development actors. While increasing A number of significant gaps exist in the law. First, no licensing component is required to purchase resource scarcity is widely acknowl- or own (possess) a firearm. National gun laws typically contain a ‘licence to purchase’ system, with an edged, it appears that the chronic and additional component to allow, under certain circumstances, the carrying of weapons in public places.123 low-level nature of most social violence has allowed it to remain off the radar. In contrast, the current Yemeni law takes a near universal right to the ownership of guns as a point of The disclosure by government that at departure. Since 1995 the Yemeni government has been attempting to extend the current regulations. 124 least 4,000 deaths a year result from A number of draft amendments to the existing law have been issued, most recently in 2007, when further land and water disputes, however, restrictions were proposed banning even licensed weapons from a number of locations, including ‘public demands an urgent rethink, as does places and stores . . . [m]osques and schools and the like, and in markets, weddings and public transport’.125 growing evidence about the debilitat- However, ambivalence over allowing the state to enter and search homes to enforce possession restric- ing impact of armed social violence tions, broader concerns from (primarily) tribal groups and interests that wish to remain outside govern- on social and economic development ment authority,126 and specific objections to the clause banning all weapons carrying in public places127 more broadly. have prevented the amendments from moving forward. Second, the ‘licence to carry’ regulations apply only to the largest cities in Yemen, leaving civilians in Notes the rest of the country with little or no legal obligations covering the carrying of their weapons. This was likely in acknowledgement of the state’s limited authority in tribal and rural areas excluded by the law. The This Issue Brief was prepared by Gavin effect is that the state’s enforcement will have little effect on (a) the majority of the Yemeni population, Hales, lead researcher of the YAVA. who reside in rural areas, and (b) areas where resource conflict is particularly acute. 1 Yemen Times (2007); author interview Despite these limitations, the government has enforced the extant law vigorously, especially since with Western diplomats, Sana’a, April 2007. It annulled all existing licences before introducing the new licensing system, forcing all previous 2008; author interview with Yemeni head licensees to reapply to the Interior Ministry, and banned the carrying of rifles, including AK-47s, in urban of international NGO, Sana’a, January 2009; author interview with extractive areas for all but a few exceptions.128 Following a decision by the cabinet in June 2008, the government industry consultant, Sana’a, October 2009. shut down major arms markets in the capital and elsewhere, reportedly closing 250 shops and arresting 2 Small Arms Survey (2010, p. 8). 148 arms traders during 2008.129 The net effect appears to have been that of forcing the arms trade to 3 These results are reported in Small Arms operate on an increasingly closed basis. The government has also added supplemental interventions. In Survey (2010). 4 Social violence also includes religious Aden, for example, all firearms commerce is prohibited; civilian weapons carrying is banned; and all weapons clashes, e.g. those relating to religious and ammunition ownership must be licensed, among other additional restrictions.130 Finally, a short-lived practices or control of religious institutions buy-back scheme was implemented in 2007, which saw the state buying weapons, including ‘mortars, such as mosques and religious schools. These conflicts are not discussed here. surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank shells, rocket-propelled grenades as well as large quantities of mines, 5 CSO (2009a). explosives and ammunition’.131 6 UN (2008, p. 3). 7 CES (2008, p. 77). 8 Lichtenthaeler (1999). 9 World Bank (2006, p. 15). ing, unlimited resource’.132 Meanwhile, and water (priority 9).134 Its pragmatic 10 Library of Congress (2008, p. 5). land reform has been primarily con- approach lacks ambition and urgency, 11 Hydro-Yemen and CARE (2005, p. 19). cerned with the urban investment however, and its political future is not 12 In the governorates of Marib, al-Jawf, and Shabwa, ‘the primary causes of vio- 133 135 climate, but even here progress has promising. The land dispute priority lence and conflict are in fact land claims’ been extremely limited and there reportedly consists of a ‘proof of con- (NDI, 2007, p. 3). Author interviews with appear to be genuine grounds for con- cept’ for strengthening land registration sheikhs, Interior Ministry officials, chiefs cern about how enforcing increased in the upmarket Hadda residential of police, and NGOs in other areas sup- 136 port this claim. compliance with the land registry can neighbourhood of the capital, Sana’a. 13 World Bank (2006, p. 15). avoid triggering conflict. Meanwhile, water will be dealt with 14 In the part of Yemen that comprised the The national ‘Ten-Point Agenda through the implementation of the former North Yemen, private land trans- for Reform’ announced by the Yemeni NWSSIP, which was already govern- actions are typically mediated by a notary public (‘amin); in the former South Yemen, deputy minister of finance, Jalal Yacoub, ment policy and, as has been seen, by a lawyer (World Bank, 2005 p. 13). in 2009, and backed by the president, does not meaningfully address the 15 In the case of Sana’a, estimates suggest mentions both land disputes (priority 5) scale of water over-consumption. that only 20 per cent of all land and prop-
8 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010 erty transactions are recorded by the land municipal water supply and 2 per cent 59 Ward (2005, p. 12). Deaths relating to registry (World Bank, 2005, p. vii), while for industry (CES, 2008, pp. 5, 55). water and related land disputes are said nationally the figure for urban land and 32 Hellegers et al. (2008, p. 33). to peak during the two rainy seasons in property is believed to be 5–10 per cent 33 CES (2008, p. 4). Yemen (author interview with govern- (World Bank, 2009, p. 12). In any case, it 34 Ward (2005, p. 3) provides an excellent ment official, Sana’a, July 2009). It is is argued that registration with the land overview of water management and suggested that spate flooding events, registry ‘does not, in itself, secure title to conflict in Yemen. which are ‘considered the main renewable land’ (World Bank, 2005, p. 5). 35 In 2006 the highest annual rainfall was water resource’, are ‘becoming notice- 16 World Bank (2005; 2006). recorded at Ibb, with 1,276 mm; the lowest ably less predictable during the year. 17 World Bank (2009, p. 12). See also World was in Marib, with only 16 mm; while Further, year-to-year water variability Bank (2008, p. 47). Sana’a recorded 151 mm (CSO, 2009b, can be quite significant as a characteris- 18 World Bank (2006, p. 15). table 3, giving 2006 figures from the Civil tic of an area undergoing an apparent 19 Carter (2009, p. 7, n. 22, citing Yemeni Aviation and Meteorology Authority). change in climate’ (al-Amry, 2008, p. 18). Polling Centre). It should be noted that 36 Hellegers et al. (2008, p. 8). There are an See also Hydro-Yemen and CARE (2005). the legitimacy of the court system varies estimated 45,000 tube wells in Yemen 60 Ward (2005, p. 12). significantly across Yemen. In the former (CES, 2008, p. 5), of which 13,500 have 61 Increasing awareness of groundwater North, customary law or ‘urf has pre- been documented in the Sana’a basin hydrology is exacerbating conflict as dominated, while in the former South, alone (Lichtenthaeler, 2010). Of the latter, users better understand the relationship the courts are much more frequently used only 125 are owned and operated by the between different types of extraction, to resolve land disputes (author inter- Sana’a Local Corporation for Water Sup- e.g. tube wells and springs (Ward, 2005, view, international consultant/Yemen ply and Sanitation (Lichtenthaeler, 2010). pp. 12–13). expert, Sana’a, October 2009). 37 See, for example, Vermillion and al- 62 Ward (2005, p. 12). 20 World Bank (2006, p. 48). Shaybani (2004) and al-Amry (2008, p. 12). 63 Ward (2005, p. 13). 21 A woman does not take her husband’s 38 See, for example, Hydro-Yemen and 64 Al-Amry (2008) highlights a number of name in Yemen and therefore presents a CARE (2005, p. 11). mechanisms by which donor activity potential threat to the territorial integ- 39 Ward (2005, p. 8), citing Dresch (1993), may cause conflict, including the way rity of her late husband’s tribe (and Maktari (1971), and Varisco (2005). that projects and facilities are sited (p. 20) therefore its honour), particularly if the 40 Author interview with government offi and communities are offered ‘a menu marriage did not produce sons (author cial, Sana’a, July 2009. For 2006 rainfall of options’ (p. 19), and comments that interviews with female government data for the main meteorological stations ‘[m]any projects in the water sector do official, Sana’a, September 2009; head in Yemen, see CSO (2009b, table 3). not apply a conflict sensitive approach of Yemeni women’s NGO, Sana’a, 41 Hellegers et al. (2008, p. 8). when planning or implementing’ (p. 13). November 2009). 42 Lichtenthaeler (1999). It was reported elsewhere that a Yemeni 22 World Bank (2005, pp. 12–13). 43 World Bank (2007, p. 20). government water project implemented 23 For fuller details, see World Bank (2005, 44 CES (2008, p. 5). over 30 years ago in al-Jawf triggered a pp. 73–74). The process of appropriating 45 See, for example, Ward, Ueda, and conflict that has since resulted in over land for public works projects such as road MacPhail (2000, p. 5). 70 people being killed (author interview building requires careful handling and 46 CES (2008, p. 5). with international researcher/consultant, may give rise to grievances and poten- 47 Ward (2005, p. 5). Sana’a, November 2009). See also Hydo- tially conflict (see Jennings, 2009, p. 47). 48 Ward (2005, p. 4); Lichtenthaeler (2010). Yemen and CARE (2005, p. 2). 24 This exception is said to be especially 49 Ward (2005, pp. 11–12). As al-Amry (2008, 65 In relation to the minerals sector, for problematic; see World Bank (2005, p. 129). p. 5) clarifies, ‘[a]ccording to traditional example, see MacDonald and Khalil 25 World Bank (2005, p. 129). rules tribesmen have a right over their (2009, p. 52). Land disputes were also 26 World Bank (2005, p. viii). land and the resources attached to this cited as a barrier to investment in Yemen 27 World Bank (2005, p. 129). land, e.g. water. Any transfer of the water by a group of Yemeni expatriates during 28 See, for example, ARD (2006, pp. 4, 10). belonging to tribal land property to other a conference in Sana’a in October 2009 29 It is reported that, ‘[a]ccording to some areas can result in violent conflict. This (Assamiee, 2009). estimates, the Northern elite has taken is especially valid for the transfer of 66 ARD (2005, p. 9). possession of fifty percent of Adeni water from rural areas to urban areas’. 67 See, for example, Hydro-Yemen and land’ (Dahlgren, 2008, p. 50) and ‘the 50 Author interview with international CARE (2005, pp. 14–15), documenting a northern-dominated military flooded hydro-geologist, Sana’a, December 2008. case of a dispute in Amran relating to into the south, appropriating land and According to the same source, the pump- the management of a water pump, which extending the hegemony of northern ing of water from Abyan to Aden con- ultimately resulted in the water source elites in the region’ (Phillips, 2007, p. 8). travenes Yemeni water laws that forbid being cut off. See also Hill (2009), UN (2008), Carter inter-basin water transfers. 68 CSO (2009c). (2009, pp. 17, 27), and HRW (2009, pp. 12, 51 Al-Jaradi (2009). 69 Author interview with Yemeni govern- 19, 66–67). Some of this land in the south 52 Reuters (2009). ment official, Sana’a, July 2009. was given to Yemeni mujahideen veter- 53 Al-Amry (2008, p. 7), for example, 70 Author interview with Yemeni govern- ans of the Afghan–Soviet war, who were describes the way that water ‘[c]onflicts ment official, Sana’a, July 2009; author instrumental in the defeat of the southern on the local level evolve mostly around interview with Western diplomat, Sana’a, Yemeni Socialist Party in the 1994 civil the access to water and very often around February 2010. war (author interview with Western conflicts between families or clans that 71 Author interview with Yemeni govern- diplomats, Sana’a, April 2008). On the are not related to water but to another ment official, Sana’a, July 2009; Ministry latter, see Johnsen (2006), Cheterian (2008), [sic], often for unknown reasons’. of Interior data published by the Central Hafez (2008), and Sharp (2009, p. 2). 54 Ward (2005, p. 12); al-Amry (2008). Statistical Organisation (CSO, 2009c). 30 Since 2007 this dissatisfaction has been 55 Author interview with Yemeni govern- 72 Author interview with Yemeni govern- increasingly expressed through calls for ment official, Sana’a, July 2009. ment official, Sana’a, July 2009. the independence of the former South, 56 Author interview with Yemeni govern- 73 In Yemen crimes are generally only for- under the banner of the Hiraak al-Janubi ment official, Sana’a, August 2009. mally recorded once ‘detected’; i.e. a (Southern Movement). See Dahlgren 57 IRIN (2006). The significance of revenge suspect has been identified and the rel- (2008) and HRW (2009). killings will be considered below. evant file passed to a prosecutor 31 Agriculture is estimated to be responsible 58 Author interview, Sana’a, March 2009. 74 Repeated attempts over a period of more for more than 90 per cent of water use in SFD staff reported a decrease in conflict than a year to access the data produced Yemen, with around 8 per cent used for following the training. by this project were not successful.
www.yemen-ava.org 9 75 For an excellent overview of state and area 25 km from Sana’a, Sana’a, March 94 This estimate, although conservative, is non-state justice in Yemen, see al-Zwaini 2009). More generally, state intervention not without its detractors; see Small Arms (2006). On customary conflict resolution may be too little, too late, and have Survey (2010, p. 13, n. 64) for further in Yemen, see, for example, GTZ (2006) counter-productive outcomes (NDI, 2007, discussion. and al-Dawsari (2008). p. 19; Ward, 2005, p. 24; tribal sheikh con- 95 Miller (2003, p. 39). 76 See, for example, Caton (2005), Weir tributing to a symposium on weapons 96 See, for example, al-Zwaini (2006) and (2007), NDI (2007, pp. 14–15), and Ward carrying hosted by the Yemeni Democ- GTZ (2006). (2005, p. 20, citing al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 81). racy School as part of its Future Leaders 97 The head of an international NGO 77 Author interview with government offi Programme, Sana’a, July 2009), particu- working on conflict eductionr in Yemen cial, Sana’a, July 2009. larly given its ‘top-down’ approach described the importance of access to 78 See, for example, al-Zwaini (2006, (author interview with Yemeni conflict arms in escalating conflict, allowing pp. 11–12). reduction expert, Sana’a, December 2008). people to ‘react quickly’ to provocations 79 It is said that ‘many times tribes want to Regarding water governance, for exam- (author interview, Sana’a, January 2009). resolve conflicts, but no one will come ple, ‘government emerges as a leading Steve Caton, who has written about to arbitrate’, which implies issues with cause of conflict’ (Ward, 2005, p. 24). traditional tribal conflict management capacity within the customary system 84 For example, it is reported that even in approaches in Yemen (Caton, 2005), sug- (author interview with international heavily tribal areas such as the governo- gested that the proliferation of weapons researcher/consultant, Sana’a, November rates of Marib, al-Jawf, and Shabwa, may have fundamentally altered the 2009; see also World Bank, 2006). It is also tribal leaders express support for state traditional balance between symbolic vio- argued that the increasing marginalization intervention, not least because ‘the ability lence—traditionally dominant and used, of the Hashimi religious elite (descendants of tribal leaders to address local problems for example, to catalyse mediation—and of the Prophet Mohammed) has ‘removed was being overwhelmed’ (NDI, 2007, instrumental (or coercive) violence a safety mechanism for dealing with tribal p. 19). This includes, for example, inter- (author interview, Sana’a, June 2009). disputes’, given the traditional role of vention in cases of murder, when the See also, for example, Hydro-Yemen and the Hashimi in mediating in disputes or arrest and detention of the perpetrator CARE (2005, p. 21). providing sanctuaries within which may help communities to successfully 98 Author interview with extractive indus- meetings between belligerent groups maintain truce conditions; the key is try manager, Sana’a, June 2006. could take place (Carter, 2009, p. 23). said to be the need for state institutions 99 Author interview with Yemeni NGO 80 A significant number of interviews have to be sensitive to the local context and manager, Sana’a, January 2009. highlighted the way that traditional norms genuinely act as honest brokers (author 100 These measures have been primarily are weakening, such as restrictions on interview with Yemeni NGO manager, concerned with (a) Yemen’s reputation acts of violence in ‘protected’ locations Sana’a, December 2008). The impact of and therefore ability to attract inward such as markets and mosques and against the absence of state institutions is under- investment and tourism (Saba, 2007), ‘vulnerable’ victims such as women and lined by the finding that, ‘[o]nce blood and (b) the civil war that broke out in children (e.g. author interview with has been shed in an area with no func- the northern governorate of Sa’dah in Yemeni conflict reduction expert, Sana’a, tioning state justice system, it is up to 2004 (IRIN, 2007; Awas, 2009, p. 17). December 2008). These processes are local, tribal conflict resolution systems 101 Awas (2009, p. 16). long standing: Sergeant (1982, pp. 27–28), to manage the issue’ (Hydro-Yemen and 102 IRIN (2007). for example, refers to the weakening of CARE, 2005, p. 3). 103 Al-Hakimi (2009, p. 11). sanctuary (hijra) norms in the 19th cen- 85 For example, Sayigh (2009, p. 12). 104 Small Arms Survey interviews, 2009; see tury as the imams increasingly central- 86 It must be acknowledged that collective also Mudayash (2007). ized their power. A generational change responsibility norms are also a powerful 105 See Box 4 for more details. of decreasing ‘understanding of and check on conflict, as ‘punishments are 106 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells (2010, p. 197). respect for the values of the tribal system’ not imposed upon an individual but on 107 Oudah (2009). is also apparent (interview with Yemeni the collectivity’ (al-Zwaini, 2006, p. 3). 108 Small Arms Survey interviews, Sana’a, NGO manager, Sana’a, September 2009; 87 For example, discussion at donor and 2009. Faris Mana’a, the well-known see also EDC, 2008). NGO ‘conflict forum’, Sana’a, January Yemeni arms dealer and broker—arrested 81 The focus on autonomy by tribes is said 2009. See also al-Zwaini (2006, p. 8). in 2010, but then released under circum- to reflect a ‘need to control their destiny’ 88 Al-Dawsari (2008, p. 3). Al-Zwaini (2006, stances that are not entirely clear—has (author interview with international p. 8) states that blood feuds are ‘the result also claimed that arms are ‘brought from Yemen researcher, Sana’a, June 2009). of a failure (or unwillingness) to engage military garrisons and sold in markets. 82 For example, it is reported that there is in a tribal resolution, and constitute one They are brought discreetly, in a special no court in al-Jawf governorate, the of the major causes of social instability way’ (Elaph, 2010). See also Salmoni, prosecutor for which is based in Sana’a in Yemen today’. It is said that customary Loidolt, and Wells (2010, p. 40). (author interview with Yemeni NGO norms are good at averting conflict, but 109 ARD (2006, p. 4). manager, Sana’a, December 2008; author weak at dealing with conflict once it has 110 Ward (2005, p. 23). interview with government official, started, particularly in revenge cases 111 Parliamentary debate of a draft law that Sana’a, July 2009). (e.g. author interview with Yemeni would include a ban on new qat cultiva- 83 It is, for example, alleged that the state conflict reduction specialist, Sana’a, tion in highland areas has been ‘delayed often acts in a partisan manner, which can September 2009), and that in any case indefinitely’ (Lichtenthaeler, 2010). ‘The even extend to selling or giving weap- customary norms are most effective gaps in the water law provide essential ons to one or more parties to a conflict when the power relations between the benefits to power holders who have an (e.g. author interview with Western NGO respective parties are balanced (author interest in maintaining the status quo. personnel, Sana’a, August 2009; author interview with Yemeni political analyst, Elite groups in cooperation with business- interview with Yemeni NGO manager, Sana’a, October 2009). men, benefit from the low success rate Sana’a, September 2009), and that often 89 A Yemeni NGO manager described this of the water law’ (al-Amry, 2008, p. 11). a policy of ‘divide and rule’ is pursued displacement, saying that if revenge 112 World Bank (2007, p. 37). (e.g. author interview with Western seekers ‘cannot target the killer, then 113 This issue is also highly salient in re- diplomat, Sana’a, June 2009). The latter they will target the next highest profile spect of extortion and protection rackets includes the government creating sheikhs alternative’ (donor and NGO ‘conflict targeting the extractive industries in to counter the power and influence of forum’, Sana’a, January 2009). Yemen (see Small Arms Survey, 2010, existing community leaders, e.g. by pro- 90 NDI (2007). p. 8). Armed violence is often staged by viding individuals with money to buy 91 Hydro-Yemen and CARE (2005, p. 15). individuals to then allow them to demon- influence (e.g. as reported during an 92 NDI (2007, pp. 10, 12). strate that they can provide a solution, author interview with a sheikh from an 93 Miller (2003, p. 43). on the basis of which they will demand
10 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2 October 2010 payment (author interviews in Sana’a Arrabyee, Nasser. 2007. ‘Yemen’s Illegal Fire- al-Hakimi, Abdulsalam A. al-D. 2009. ‘Small with extractive industry executive, April arm Vendors Face Crackdown.’ Gulf News. Arms in Yemen: Social Field Study.’ Sum- 2009; extractive industry security man- 26 April. mary of a paper presented at the Sheba ager, August 2009; Yemeni conflict reduc- Assamiee, Mahmoud. 2009. ‘Expatriates Centre for Strategic Studies workshop on tion specialist, September 2009; extractive Want Law and Security, not Conferences.’ Proliferation of Light Weapons: Feasible industry consultant, October 2009). Yemen Times. 15 October. Solutions, Sana’a, 15 June. Translated from 114 Hamidi (2009, p. 168). Awas, Ayesh. 2009. ‘Government Policy on the original Arabic by Malhani Translation 115 Lichtenthaeler described dwindling Regulating Carrying Arms and Control- Services, Sana’a. water (and land) resources as potentially ling Their Spread.’ Paper presented at the al-Hamdi, Mohammad. 2000. Competition for ‘spilling over into the growing funda- Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies work- Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain. mentalist sectarianism and civil strife shop on Proliferation of Light Weapons: Delft: Delft University of Technology. in the [Sa’dah] region’ (Lichtenthaeler, Feasible Solutions, Sana’a, 15 June. Hamidi, Ayman. 2009. ‘Inscriptions of Violence 1999, cited in Ward, 2005, p. 6). Translated from the original Arabic by in Northern Yemen: Haunting Histories, 116 ICG (2009, p. 5), quoting Al-Sharea, a Malhani Translation Services, Sana’a. Unstable Moral Spaces.’ Middle Eastern Sana’a independent weekly (7 June 2008). Carter, Lynn. 2009. Yemen Desktop Interagency Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. March, pp. 165–87. 117 See, for example, Lichtenthaeler (2010) Conflict Assessment. Document produced Hellegers, Petra, et al. 2008. Incentives to and GTZ (2007). for review by USAID. Washington, DC: Reduce Groundwater Extraction in Yemen. 118 Al-Zwaini (2006, p. 3). Management Systems International. Report 2008-058. The Hague: LEI 119 See, for example, Lichtenthaeler (2010). Caton, Steven C. 2005. Yemen Chronicle: An Wageningen UR. 120 Lichtenthaeler (2010). Anthropology of War and Mediation. New Hill, Ginny. 2009. ‘Yemen: Economic Crisis 121 Lichtenthaeler (2010). York: Hill and Wang. Underpins Southern Separatism.’ Arab 122 There are many exceptions to these and CES (Consultant Engineering Services). 2008. Reform Bulletin. June.
www.yemen-ava.org 11 Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 9. Sharp, Jeremy M. 2009. Yemen: Background DC: Water, Environment, Social and Geneva: Small Arms Survey. and U.S. Relations. Report RL34170. Rural Development Department, Middle Mudayash, Arafat. 2007. ‘The Arms Trade in Washington, DC: Congressional Research East and North Africa Region, World Bank. Yemen.’ Asharq al-Awsat (London). Web Service. 7 July. 11 January. edition, 9 January.
About the Yemen Armed public health records (e.g. hospital admissions data), and media monitoring or ‘incident reporting’. Summaries of Violence Assessment key findings will be periodically released in the form of The Yemen Armed Violence Assessment (YAVA) is a multi- short policy-relevant Issue Briefs, as well as a final report year initiative administered by the Small Arms Survey, an in late 2010. All publications will be made available in independent research project of the Graduate Institute of both English and Arabic. For more information, see International and Development Studies in Geneva. Designed
12 SmallSudan ArmsIssue BriefSurvey Number Issue Brief 6 April Number 2007 2 October 2010