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ISSUE BRIEF

WATER, SECURITY, AND CONFLICT

PETER GLEICK AND CHARLES ICELAND

HIGHLIGHTS ▪▪ A wide range of -related risks undermine -being and can contribute to political instability, violent conflict, human displacement and migration, and acute insecurity, which in turn can undermine national, regional, and even global security. ▪▪ Political instability and conflicts are rarely caused by any single factor, such as a water crisis. Instead, water crises should be seen as contributing factors to instability. ▪▪ While water risks have threatened human civilizations over millennia, today’s global and economic expansion—together with threats from —create a new urgency around an old problem. ▪▪ We classify water and security pathways under three broad categories: diminished or quality, increased water demand, and extreme events. ▪▪ Water risk is not only a function of hazards, such as extreme and , it is also a function of a community’s governance capacity and resilience in the face of natural hazards. ▪▪ No single strategy is sufficient to reduce water risk. Instead, multifaceted approaches will be needed.

WRI.ORG EXECUTIVE SUMMARY migration, and food insecurity are much more likely if governance is CONTENTS Context weak, is inadequate, 2 Executive Summary Water has played a key role and institutions are fragile. in through- Although water risks are grow- 3 Introduction out history, but attention to ing worldwide, there are many water-related threats has been 4 Water in a risk-reducing options avail- Dynamic World growing in recent years due to able to decision-makers. Some increasing water risks. Water of these options include imposing 5 A Water and Security demand has increased sharply in water demand caps in water-stressed Classification System many regions of the world as a result regions; replacing water-inefficient of population growth and economic schemes with more effi- 8  Reducing Water-Related expansion. Water supply is expected cient irrigation (irriga- Risks to Global Security to decline in the mid-latitude regions tion accounts for 70 percent of water 10  Concluding of the world because of climate withdrawals worldwide); planting Observations change, which is also expected to water-efficient and -resistant alter the timing of water availability crops; introducing social safety net 11  Appendix A: and increase the severity of drought programs; reducing global food Some Definitions and flood events. The destruction loss and waste; reducing popula- of natural habitat and the discharge 12 Endnotes tion growth rates; implementing of untreated municipal, industrial, urban measures; 13 Bibliography and agricultural into our investing in and is rendering much of and technologies; engaging 15 Acknowledgments our and in negotiation of watershed agree- unusable. These increasing pressures ments; improving water data and on water are undermining information systems; investing in and contributing to , dikes, and levees; protecting conflict, migration, and food insecu- and restoring , includ- rity in many parts of the developing ing and ; and helping world. countries strengthen their gover- A water and security classifica- nance systems. tion system: multiple water and security pathways. There are many pathways leading from water About This Paper risk to water insecurity (which in This paper summarizes our current turn may lead to conflict, migration, understanding of water and security 1 or acute food insecurity ). Three threats and their links to conflict, general pathways include diminished migration, and food insecurity. It water supply or quality, increased is intended for professionals in the water demand, and extreme flood defense, , and develop- events. Each of these pathways ment fields. We review the key includes subpathways, and mul- drivers behind growing water risk, tiple subpathways often coincide to describe and illustrate water and undermine water security in a given security pathways, and present watershed. A region’s capacity to approaches for reducing water- handle “water shocks” also influences related risks to global security. outcomes. Water-related conflict,

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1. INTRODUCTION We define water security as the realpolitik and superpower , capacity of a population to as the Cold waned, to an evalu- 1.1. Background safeguard sustainable access to ation of other threats to national and Water has long been a factor in ▪▪ adequate quantities of acceptable international stability, such as security and conflict, going back to quality water for sustaining live- security, transboundary environ- ancient times and continuing to the lihoods, human well-being, and mental , conflicts over water present day. Insufficient water due socioeconomic development; resources, climate change, and other to prolonged drought has contrib- environmental threats (Brown 1977; ensure protection against water- uted to the collapse of civilizations Ullman 1983; Myers 1986; Mathews ▪▪ borne pollution and water-relat- (Iceland 2017). Access to water has 1989; Gleick 1989a; Gleick 1989b; ed disasters; and been a trigger of conflict. Water has Gleick 1990; Homer-Dixon 1990). been used as a and a tool of ▪▪ preserve , upon The fundamental concept, now war. But pressures over water are which clean water availability widely accepted, is that political growing, due in part to new factors, and other services instability and violence, especially including rapid population growth, depend (adapted from UN-Water at the local or regional level, do widespread environmental degrada- 2013). not have purely political roots but tion, rising consumption from an The ongoing academic and institu- are influenced by economic, demo- expanding middle class in much tional debate about these definitions graphic, and social factors that are of the global South, and human- will continue to result in redefini- themselves sensitive to and induced climate change. These new tions and refinements, and we look environmental conditions (see, for pressures make it increasingly urgent forward to that discussion. example, Barnett and Adger 2007; that solutions to water tensions be Hsiang et al. 2013; Ratner et al. found and implemented. This paper 1.3. Environmental Threats as 2013). summarizes our current understand- Issues As an example of an early discussion ing of water and security threats and of this issue, the concept of “environ- their links to conflict, migration, and is vital for all economic mental security” was a central topic food insecurity. It is intended for and social activities, from the at a November 1991 symposium at professionals in the defense, diplo- production of food and energy to the U.S. National War College, “From macy, and development fields. We the maintenance of natural ecosys- Globalism to Regionalism: New Per- review the key drivers behind grow- tems that provide basic services for spectives on American Foreign and ing water risk, describe and illustrate . Yet freshwater resources Defense Policies.” More recently, the water and security pathways, and are limited, unevenly distributed in U.S. Office of the Director of National present approaches for reducing space and time, increasingly con- Intelligence (DNI), working with the water-related risks to global security. taminated or overused, and poorly managed. These constraints, coupled broader U.S. intelligence community, with growing populations and econo- released an analysis of global and 1.2. Water as Both a Resource regional water security issues that and National Security Issue mies, are putting more and more pressure on water, even in regions concluded the following: As background, this paper discusses where natural were During the next 10 years, water a broad set of security issues and previously considered abundant. ▪▪ problems will contribute to concepts. The concept of security has Such pressures increasingly have instability in states important to different meanings and connotations political and security implications. US national security interests. for different communities, and for These concerns are not new. Begin- Water shortages, poor water the purposes of clarity, we provide in ning in the late 1970s and early quality, and floods by them- Appendix A a set of definitions of the 1980s, researchers concerned about selves are unlikely to result in terms used in this paper. international security and conflict state failure. However, water began to shift their focus from problems—when combined with poverty, social tensions, environ-

ISSUE BRIEF | August 2018 | 3 mental degradation, ineffectual influenced in part by — leadership, and weak political has had profound political impacts In 2017, the institutions—contribute to social in Europe (Iceland 2017). The brunt disruptions that can result in of the growing global refugee crisis, global forcibly state failure. however, has been borne not by displaced The lack of adequate water will European and other global North ▪▪ be a destabilizing factor in some countries, but by global South coun- population grew countries because they do not tries themselves. In 2017, the global have the financial resources or forcibly displaced population grew to 68.5 million technical ability to solve their to 68.5 million individuals. Of these internal water problems. In ad- 25.4 million were refugees, 40.0 mil- individuals. dition, some states are further lion were internally displaced people, 5 stressed by a heavy dependency and 3.1 million were asylum seekers. on water controlled by up- civil war in 2011. Over this same stream nations with unresolved 2. WATER IN A period, ’s population rose from water-sharing issues. approximately 8 million to nearly DYNAMIC WORLD 40 million. Nigeria’s population ▪▪ A water-related state-on-state Even in a static world, conditions expanded from 45 million in 1960 to conflict is unlikely during the in many watersheds would result in nearly 190 million today. has next 10 years. Historically, water tensions over water resources. Yet the grown from 450 million people in tensions have led to more water- world is not static—it is experiencing 1960 to over 1.3 billion people today. sharing agreements than violent dynamic and rapid changes in demo- More than half the world’s popula- conflicts. However, we judge that graphics and environmental condi- tion now in urban areas, and as water shortages become more tions. Populations are growing rapidly the estimates there acute beyond the next 10 years, and shifting from rural to urban are nearly 30 megacities with popu- water in shared basins will centers, economies are expanding or lations exceeding 10 million (PRB increasingly be used as leverage; changing their focus, and the impact of 2018). These population increases the use of water as a weapon or a changing climate is beginning to be put far greater pressures on fixed to further terrorist objectives felt—all this adds additional pressures water resources and infrastructure, also will become more likely on the world’s freshwater resources and these pressures are likely to con- beyond 10 years (DNI 2012). (Stocker et al. 2013). While there are tinue in coming years (FAO 2016a). Since the publication of the DNI opportunities for fundamental changes report in 2012, the world has wit- in policy and strategy that can reduce 2.2. Economic Growth nessed destabilizing conflict and water-related tensions (and these are The middle class in many global migration.2 In 2015, over 1 mil- discussed in this brief), most of the South countries is expanding very lion refugees streamed into Europe, current changes appear to be worsen- rapidly. As per capita incomes rise, precipitating political crises within ing these tensions rather than reducing people tend to demand more energy, and among European Union (EU) them. goods, and services, and to consume member states.3 Most of the refugees more meat-intensive diets. This came from , Afghanistan, Iraq, 2.1. Demographics in turn leads to an increase in per and northern . In May 2017, a Populations are growing very rapidly, capita water “footprints”—a measure German government report warned especially in Middle Eastern coun- of the amount of water required that up to 6.6 million migrants were tries, Africa, and parts of southern to produce the suite of goods and waiting to cross into Europe from Asia. These demographic trends services consumed by an individual Africa and the , includ- contribute to pressures on water (Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012). ing refugees from Syria and Iraq, but resources. For example, Syria saw a Because most human water use is for also economic migrants from Libya, fourfold increase in population from agricultural irrigation, and because Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Bangladesh, around 5 million in 1962 to approxi- a substantial fraction of global grain Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gambia.4 mately 20 million at the start of the production goes to feed animals, a This prolonged migration crisis—

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shift to more meat-intensive diets While water-related security events from 2010 to 2012. Severe greatly increases global demand for may begin as localized crises, some drought and its conse- water (and other natural resources) have spillover effects that can quences contributed to state and can also put upward pressure on threaten national, regional, and failure in Syria beginning in global food prices (Liu et al. 2008; global stability. When these events 2011 (Gleick 2014). Brueckner et al. 2018). On the other occur in transboundary river basins, hand, economic growth also offers they can precipitate disputes (or □□ Drought in countries strong positive benefits, including a cooperation) between upstream and that can influence global reduction in poverty, improvements downstream countries (e.g., India grain and food prices in human health, and increased local and over the ; or (e.g., and other capacity to mitigate crises. , , and over the countries around the world, 8 Blue ; or , Syria, and Iraq 2010). In 2010–11, food 2.3. Climate Change over the and ). prices spiked due in part to droughts in Russia, Ukraine, State-of-the-art climate science indi- Water problems do not necessarily , and Argentina and cates that impacts on water resources lead to conflict, migration, or acute torrential storms in , from human-caused climate changes food insecurity. We acknowledge the , and (Mitch- will include alterations in precipita- opportunities for improved negotia- el 2008; Dillon and Barrett tion patterns (such as declines in tion, communication, and coopera- 2016). The Middle East and rainfall in the mid-latitude regions tion that characterize many water region is one of of the world and changes in snowfall challenges. This makes it even more the top food importers of the and dynamics), increased vital that we understand and iden- world and is thus highly vul- water losses from higher evaporation tify those water-related issues that nerable to changes in food driven by rising temperatures, and do lead to security threats and that supplies and food prices. effects on . Observa- we develop effective strategies for Some experts believe that tional evidence indicates that many addressing them. the 2011 food price spikes of these changes are already hap- There are many ways to categorize played a role in the Arab pening (Allen et al. 2014; USGCRP causal factors behind water and (d’Amour et al. 2016; 2014), and can lead to worsening security threats (see, for example, de Werrell et al. 2015). pressures on water resources by Bruin et al).6 Three general pathways WATER CONTAMINATION: altering water supply, demand, include the following: and quality, and by worsening the Water rendered useless Diminished water supply or □□ consequences of extreme events such by industrial pollution ▪▪ quality as floods and droughts. or human wastes (e.g., ▪▪ Increased water demand São Paulo, ongoing).9 São 3. A WATER AND SECURITY Extreme flood events Paulo’s Billings ▪▪ is considered far too pol- Each pathway has subpathways, CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM luted to use for public water some of which we list here, including supplies. The reservoir’s 3.1. Water and Security recent examples for each: Pathways dismal condition worsened Diminished water supply or the problems of a two-year Numerous recent water events have ▪▪ quality from drought that reduced water contributed to social and political DROUGHT: supplies in São Paulo’s pri- insecurity—from large-scale chronic mary water system, Can- water stress and record-breaking □□ Drought in failed states tareira, to dangerously low drought in the Middle East, to dev- or drought that contrib- levels. At the drought’s most astating floods in , to local utes to state failure (e.g., critical juncture, officials 7 saltwater intrusion into that Somalia, 2010–12). Nearly were forced to contemplate provide for urban water supply, such 260,000 people died during the once unthinkable pros- as in Jakarta. the famine that hit Somalia pect of the Cantareira sys-

ISSUE BRIEF | August 2018 | 5 tem running dry—a scenario diversions of water upstream required more water than that would have left nearly for intensive horticulture, is available on an average half of the metropolitan combined with over- annual basis. This led to region’s 20 million residents abstraction of groundwater dramatic without reliable water. beneath the swamp have of groundwater and falling caused it to desiccate” groundwater levels. When □□ Saltwater intrusion (Madgwick et al. 2017). Syria’s worst drought in in aquifers (e.g., Ja- recorded history hit in 2006 10 LOSS OF NATURAL CAPITAL: karta, ongoing). Excessive to 2011, Syria was vulner- groundwater pumping along □□ degradation able and unprepared. The coastlines is contributing (e.g., Ethiopia).13 In many result was the migration of to saline contamination of parts of the world, overgraz- up to 1.5 million farmers many freshwater aquifers, ing and removal of trees and their families from the which are vital for cities such have left bar- countryside to Syrian cities. as Jakarta. ren and degraded. Without This was a destabilizing fac- DAMMED/DIVERTED WATER:11 vegetation cover, topsoil is tor—one among many—that lost. becomes cracked played a role in the timing River alteration by □□ and covered by hard crust, and severity of Syria’s civil dams, in the absence and is unable to retain war, which began in 2011 of political agreement rainwater. The Tigray region (Femia and Werrell 2013; (e.g., Ethiopia, ongoing).12 of northern Ethiopia is a Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. Ethiopia’s construction of case in point. Land degra- 2015; Iceland 2017). It is the Grand Ethiopian Renais- dation once forced many to important to emphasize that sance —Africa’s larg- emigrate, but the land—and this conflict was fed by a est—is already straining re- its people—have come back complex array of social, po- lations between Ethiopia and following 20 years of res- litical, and economic factors Egypt. Some 85 percent of toration efforts, including and made worse by ineffec- the water that flows into closing the land to ; tive and inappropriate water Egypt originally falls as building gabions (mesh resource governance. in the Ethiopian highlands cages filled with rocks) in and feeds the Blue Nile. chasms to slow the flow of □□ Chronically stressed ur- ban areas (e.g., Cape Town, Water diversions in the rainwater and to build up □□ ongoing).14 Cape Town, a city absence of agreement the behind them; and of four million people, faced (e.g., , ongoing). planting trees to slow the de- the risk that its municipal The once extensive Lorian structive velocity of surface water system would have to Swamp fed by the Ewaso water when it hits the valley. be shut down in mid-2018 Nyiro River in Kenya Increased water demand due to (“Day Zero”). While has historically provided ▪▪ eventually pushed back that sustenance for pastoralists. □□ Chronically stressed threat, the crisis was precipi- People fleeing conflict in irrigated areas (e.g., tated by a growing popula- Somalia took refuge in Syria, 2011). Syria’s food tion, a severe three-year the area until recently, self-sufficiency policies led to drought, lack of alternative forming the world’s largest a dramatic increase in food sources of water supply, and refugee camp. “However, production beginning in the responses that were only the swamp is now a source 1960s, but these policies partially effective.15 of out-migration, since were not sustainable, as they

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□□ Rising water and land These pathways sometimes operate 3.2. The Role of Governance in pressures in rainfed in combination to produce a crisis. Water Security areas (e.g., Darfur, 2003). For example, there were multiple Many factors influenced the droughts and floods in large grain- Most water crises do not end in con- Darfur conflict, including exporting countries in 2010, which flict, migration, or acute food insecu- resource scarcity driven by together cut food production and rity. Instead, people muddle through prolonged drought condi- helped trigger a global food price until the crises recede. Some crises tions and desertification, spike. In the Syria example, drought even generate cooperation among together with population exacerbated the problems of chroni- local or regional parties. Under- growth. This in turn pre- cally high water demand and poor standing why water crises lead to cipitated a decline in food agricultural policies. adverse outcomes in some places and better outcomes in others will help availability and unsettled It is also often the case that slow- inform strategies for reducing the long-standing agreements onset and rapid-onset events risks of conflict. Why, for example, between nomadic herders converge to produce a crisis. For did Syria sink into civil war following and sedentary farmers (- instance, pollution in 16 a record-breaking five-year drought, land 2017). São Paulo compounded the effects of while Jordan and Lebanon avoided Extreme flood events a devastating drought to produce a strife following that same drought ▪▪ water scarcity crisis in 2015. Under- (Adams et al. 2018)? This requires □□ River floods, flash standing the multiple pathways and integrating analyses of meteorologi- floods, and coastal timelines at work in a crisis will help cal and resource-related events with storm surges can affect decision-makers to better tailor their the diverse social, political, and human health and safety responses. (e.g., South Asia, 2017).17 economic dynamics at play. In August 2017, devastat- We can postulate—based on research ing rainfall across South conducted by Wolf and his colleagues Asia led to more than 1,200 (2003) on transboundary basins— deaths and directly affected that when rapid change, either on the more than 40 million people institutional side or in the physical in northern India, southern system, outpaces the institutional Nepal, northern Bangladesh, and southern Pakistan.

□□ Floods can affect indus- trial production and the global economy (e.g., , 2011).18 Thailand’s worst flooding in half a Understanding why water crises lead century produced economic damages of roughly $46 bil- to adverse outcomes in some places lion ( 2011). The automotive and electronics and better outcomes in others will help industries were hit hard, and global supply chains inform strategies for reducing the for some key products were disrupted for months. risks of conflict.

ISSUE BRIEF | August 2018 | 7 capacity to absorb that change, the for the use of water as a weapon (von stage is set for possible water insecu- Lossow 2016). The Syrian govern- THE rity. Therefore, when we go looking ment has been accused of cutting off BOX 1 CHRONOLOGY for water insecurity, we need to be water supplies to regions under rebel on the lookout for large-scale water- control and of reducing flows or cut- The issue of water and security is related change and low capacity to ting dam releases during with receiving more attention because of handle such change (this is what the the IS or rebel groups. In some cases, the growing evidence that natural Water, Peace, and Security [WPS] water has been used to improve resource degradation is a root consortium is attempting to do via political relationships in the region, cause of conflict, migration, and the development of a near real- with the IS providing additional acute food insecurity. Numerous time global early warning system and water for areas scholars are now researching these for potential water-related threats under its control (Vishwanath 2015). and related issues (e.g., the links be- to human security—more on this The use of water as a tool of conflict tween climate change and conflict). further on in this brief). in the region also includes explicitly We need to better understand the targeting civilian water systems criti- links between water and security to cal for supplying safe water, as well diagnose problems early and pro- 3.3. Water as a Weapon or as and irrigation systems pose timely and effective solutions. Casualty of Conflict that support the agricultural sector, In an ongoing effort to better un- derstand the connections between The examples above illustrate the thus worsening the dislocation and water resources, water systems, notion of water as a trigger of (pos- forced migration of communities. and international security and sible) conflict. But water can also Dozens of such attacks have occurred conflict, the Pacific Institute initi- be a weapon or casualty of conflict. in Yemen with dire consequences, ated the Water Conflict Chronologya The majority of entries in the Pacific including a massive outbreak of project in the late 1980s to track and Institute’s Water Conflict Chronol- cholera (Balakrishnan 2017). categorize events related to water ogy (see Box 1) over the past several and conflict. The Pacific Institute not decades has been in the latter two 4. REDUCING WATER- only continually updates this event categories, with extensive destruc- database but is also working on an tion of civilian water systems in RELATED RISKS TO analysis of the context, history, data, areas experiencing conflict, war, and GLOBAL SECURITY and especially recent trends related violence. to water and conflict. This database 4.1. Multipronged Approach This has been especially apparent and other similar ones are crucial Needed in the context of the continuing for developing a water and security violence in the Middle East, where A variety of options are available early warning system (more on that to reduce water-related security further on in this brief). numerous cases of the use of water as both targets and of risks. Some of these options include Note: a The Water Conflict Chronology is avail- conflict have been reported. Built imposing water demand caps in able at www.worldwater.org/water-conflict/. water infrastructure in the form of water-stressed regions; replacing Source: Gleick 2018. water and wastewater , pump- water-inefficient irrigation schemes ing stations, and dams has been with more efficient irrigation tech- attacked. Water has been used as a nologies (irrigation accounts for 70 weapon through both deprivation percent of water withdrawals world- and intentional flooding. The UN wide); planting water-efficient and Secretary General reported in 2016 drought-resistant crops; introducing that occupying and controlling major social safety net programs; reducing dams on the Tigris and Euphrates global food loss and waste; reducing Rivers was an explicit tactic of the population growth rates; imple- Islamic State (IS) (United Nations menting urban water conservation 2016; Vishwanath 2015), and in a measures; investing in wastewater video it released, IS explicitly called treatment and reuse technologies;

8 | Water, Security, and Conflict

engaging in negotiation of watershed and security pathways identified dams and other infrastructure. For agreements; improving water data previously in this brief, along with example, there is no agreement allo- and information systems; investing specific strategies that can be applied cating the of the Tigris and in dams, dikes, and levees; protect- at scale. Euphrates river basin among the key ing and restoring natural capital, parties, no functional multinational including forests and wetlands; and 4.2. International Law council where disputes concerning helping countries strengthen their the watershed can be heard, and no A separate set of strategies related governance systems. comprehensive data collection or to diplomacy, law, international sharing of basic water conditions. No single strategy is likely to work agreements, and security policies can When feasible, efforts to initiate or consistently or broadly across also be central to risk reduction. At a restart negotiations on such agree- regions and problems, but some global scale, efforts to develop funda- ments would be valuable. fundamental principles and guide- mental principles for transboundary lines can be useful. Most broadly, watershed management have led to whether or not problems with water the drafting, adoption, and ratifica- 4.4. The Water, Peace, and or extreme climate events are likely, tion of the 1997 UN Convention on Security Project strong strate- the Law of Non-navigational Uses Many water-insecure countries lack gies provide resilience—the ability to of International Watercourses. This the expertise and financial resources recover from disruptions or stresses. convention establishes standards required to improve their water secu- For water resource management, and principles for best practices rity. The Water, Peace, and Security key strategies include those related around joint basin management, (WPS) project is designed to assist to Goal 6 of the United Nations data sharing, and conflict resolution, water-insecure countries by provid- Sustainable Development Goals and while not universally accepted, ing them with technical expertise. (SDGs), such as ensuring access for the fundamental concepts in the This initiative is being undertaken all to water, sanitation, and hygiene; convention are widely respected. by World Resources Institute (WRI), expanding nontraditional sources Broader international humanitarian IHE-Delft, Deltares, the Hague Cen- of supply; improving water-use laws, including the 1977 Protocols ter for Strategic Studies, Wetlands efficiency and reducing demand; and to the Geneva Convention, set rules International, International Alert, using more effective water manage- and standards for the protection the Pacific Institute, and Oregon ment approaches, including smart of civilians and critical infrastruc- State University, and is supported by economic and pricing strategies, ture—like water supply and irrigation the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign community engagement, and conflict systems—during conflicts. Affairs. The project has the following resolution. These approaches have four components: been synthesized in descriptions 4.3. Agreements among Understand. of a “soft path for water” (see, for Nations in Shared Basins ▪▪ example, Gleick 2002 and Gleick □□ Develop an online near real- 2003). An application of these kinds The long history of cooperative time global early warning of strategies could have reduced the transboundary water agreements on system for potential water- role that water played in the recent specific rivers or for distinct water- related threats to human Syrian civil war: more efficient sheds, described extensively by Wolf security (to be hosted on agricultural water use would have and colleagues (2003), provides tools WRI’s new Resource Watch19 permitted greater food production and models for nations that want to platform). and the retention of rural jobs; poli- share water resources (Wolf 1997; cies to more effectively manage vari- Giordano et al. 2014; Subramanian □□ Implement on-the-ground able supplies could have lessened the et al. 2014). Indeed, part of the rapid assessments to verify economic costs of the drought. The problem in the Middle East region is and further research the Pacific Institute and WRI are plan- the lack of such specific agreements threats and identify possible ning a follow-up paper to develop a on levels of withdrawals, seasonal interventions. “solutions framework” that can be standards for river flows, and rules used to address the multiple water to govern management of large

ISSUE BRIEF | August 2018 | 9 ▪▪ Mobilize. ▪▪ Identification of key global 5. CONCLUDING □□ Conduct outreach to global hotspots and drivers of water OBSERVATIONS “3D” audiences (diplomats, insecurity Concerns over the current state of defense, and development Development of preliminary water resources worldwide have experts), as well as to na- ▪▪ recommendations for reduc- led the United Nations, the World tional governments of global ing water insecurity, tailored to Economic Forum, the European South countries where we specific identified hotspots Union, the , and other identify threats. Armed with this information, we governmental and nongovernmen- ▪▪ Support. will work to mobilize national and tal organizations to highlight the □□ Provide training and ca- international support for water risk- importance of water-related threats pacity building—and share reducing measures. to global security and the need to information on effective develop strategies to manage water solutions and best prac- 4.5. Effective and Legitimate resources more effectively. In part tices—to help global South Governance Systems Are this reflects the vital importance countries cope with current Crucial for Success of water for human and environ- and future crises and avert mental health and for the health of There are many things we can do potential destabilizing con- local and regional economies. But it right now to help vulnerable coun- flict, migration, or acute food also reflects a long history of politi- tries improve their water security insecurity. cal tensions and violence associ- (see, for example, Iceland 2017). The ated with poor water policies and Dialogue. greatest challenge we face, however, management. ▪▪ is not technical but political. Many □□ Convene water dialogues New factors, including rapid popula- countries that are prone to water among key stakeholders at tion growth, widespread environ- insecurity also lack adequate political international, national, and/ mental degradation, the growth and governance structures. Without or subnational levels, to try of the middle class in many global an effective or legitimate state, tech- to defuse tensions and pave South nations, and human-induced nical measures alone will likely fail.20 the way for solutions. climate change contribute to water Key outputs of the “Understand” security risks and make it increas- component of the project include the ingly urgent that solutions to water following: tensions be found and implemented. Development of actionable These solutions include diplo- ▪▪ sources of data, analysis, and matic, economic, and management visualizations approaches as well as the application of new technologies for monitoring and using water. There are many things we can do to reduce water- related risks, but it is vital for local, national, and international leaders to take decisive action before crises erupt, while conditions still permit us to act.

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APPENDIX A: SOME WATER CONFLICT: There are three categories of Vulnerability. These are the conditions mak- water-related conflicts: ▪▪ ing people more or less susceptible to the DEFINITIONS Where access to, or control of, water is a impacts of the hazard. For example, wealthy ▪▪ “trigger” or a contributing factor in a conflict. people can migrate out of an area suffering Many terms in the field of water and security from a bad drought, whereas poor people are studies are bandied about without concrete ▪▪ Where water or water systems are used as less able to do so (for additional details see definitions. We therefore offer some definitions “weapons” or “tools” during conflicts, such UN-OOSA 2017).24 for how we use specific terms. as when water is intentionally released from a dam for a military purpose, or when One cannot focus only on the physical problem, HUMAN SECURITY: This term generally refers to such as prolonged drought. One also needs to overall human health and well-being, including water systems are cut off to apply political or military pressure. assess society’s readiness for the drought and economic and social conditions conducive to its ability to respond once it arrives. Some soci- a positive quality of . It includes “people’s Where water or water systems are uninten- eties and institutions are much better prepared 21 ▪▪ freedom from want and freedom from fear” tional or intentional “casualties” of conflicts, for hazards than others, either because they take and the security of individuals from threats that including where water systems are targeted measures to reduce exposure (e.g., they don’t include disease, poverty, violence, and human during or conflicts. grow thirsty crops in drought-prone areas), or rights abuses. These categories are described in more detail in because they are less vulnerable to the ravages WATER SECURITY: Capacity of a population the comprehensive Water Conflict Chronology of drought (e.g., because they are covered by to of the Pacific Institute (described in Box 1 of this crop loss insurance). safeguard sustainable access to adequate brief), which identifies over 550 different water RESILIENCE: “The capacity of individuals, com- ▪▪ quantities of acceptable quality water for conflict events throughout history. munities, institutions, businesses, and systems sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and WATER EVENT: A situation in which water risk . . . to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter what socioeconomic development; materializes and contributes to political, eco- kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they ensure protection against water-borne pollu- nomic, or social insecurity. Water events include experience. Shocks are typically considered ▪▪ tion and water-related disasters; and water conflicts, but they also include events single event disasters, such as fires, earth- such as water-related migration and famine. quakes, and floods. Stresses are factors that ▪▪ preserve ecosystems, upon which clean wa- pressure a [community] on a daily or reoccurring ter availability and other ecosystem services How large does an event have to be to be basis, such as chronic food and water shortages, depend (adapted from UN-Water 2013). considered a “water event”? Does it have to be an overtaxed transportation system, endemic large enough to affect a village, a city, a country, Water insecurity contributes to human inse- violence or high unemployment. [Community] re- or the whole world? Researchers need to know silience is about making a [community] better, in curity, either directly (e.g., farmers do not have the answer to this question to conduct quantita- access to sufficient water to support livelihoods) both good times and bad, for the benefit of all its tive studies. The section on water and security citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable.”25 or indirectly (e.g., drought leads to food price pathways provides selected examples of what spikes, which hurts the urban poor; and drought we consider “water events.” They range from leads to violent clashes between farmers and events that affect pastoralist societies and cities, pastoralists over increasingly scarce resources). to whole countries, to the whole world. NATIONAL SECURITY: The condition of peaceful WATER RISK: A combination of both the prob- governance and the absence of violent conflict ability and the consequences of a water-related for a formal state. The concept of national event (Schulte 2014). security also refers to the role of national gov- ernments in providing security for citizens and It is also important to break “risk” down into its institutions.22 component parts. Risk is often seen as a func- tion of the following three variables: GLOBAL SECURITY: A broader set of conditions of mutual safety, lack of violence, and a positive ▪▪ Hazard. This is the process or phenomenon quality of life for groups of states and the inter- that causes harm; a drought or flood, for national community. Global security “includes example. military and diplomatic measures that nations Exposure. This refers to the people, infra- and international organizations . . . take to ensure ▪▪ structure, or other tangible assets located in 23 mutual safety and security.” the hazard-prone area.

ISSUE BRIEF | August 2018 | 11 ENDNOTES 11. “Water grabs,” or other similar actions would 18. For more on this flood event in Thailand and also belong in this category. the country’s hard-hit tech sector, see PRI Global 1. Or any number of additional negative 12. For more on growing international tensions Post, December 16, 2011. https://www.pri.org/ outcomes for human security, such as loss of resulting from the new dam on the Nile, see BBC stories/2011-12-16/tech-world-still-shudders- wealth or income, declining health, etc. News, February 24, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/ after-thai-floods. 2. Some types of migration represent beneficial news/world-africa-43170408. 19. Resource Watch is available at https:// adaptation responses. We are concerned here 13. For more on land restoration in Ethiopia, see resourcewatch.org/. with destabilizing migration. (Manchester, UK), June 21, 2017. 20. Nisha Krishnan, WRI, personal communica- 3. For more information on the migrant crisis, see https://www.theguardian.com/global-devel- tion, May 2018. BBC News, March 4, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/ opment-professionals-network/2017/jun/21/ 21. Derived from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s news/world-europe-34131911. land-restoration-in-ethiopia-this-place-was- “Four Freedoms Speech” (technically the 1941 abandoned-this-is-incredible-to-me. 4. For additional information on this leaked State of the Union address). Adapted by other German Government report, see the Telegraph 14. On Cape Town’s emergency water restrictions authors to address economic and development (London), May 23, 2017. to avert the “Day Zero” disaster, see CNN, Febru- issues. See also, Newman (2010) and Tadjbakhsh ary 1, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/01/ and Chenoy (2007). 5. For more on , see UNHCR africa/cape-town-water-crisis-intl/index.html. Global Trends. http://www.unhcr.org/global- 22. For a definition of “national security,” see trends2017/. 15. Beginning in 1999, Cape Town’s water demand Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na- leveled off, the result of successful demand tional_security. 6. The de Bruin et al. report has helped shape management initiatives; see https://www.green- 23. For a definition of “global security,” see Rand our thinking about the pathway approach. http:// cape.co.za/assets/Water-Sector-Desk-Content/ ww.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publica- Corporation: https://www.rand.org/topics/ CoCT-WCWDM-presentation-Z-Basholo-Western- global-security.html. ties/3039%20Linking%20water%20security%20 Cape-Water-Forum-160204-2016.pdf. While more threats%20to%20conflict_DEF.pdf. could still be done to reduce inefficient use and 24. Risk can also be seen as “consequence” 7. For more on Somalia’s drought, see Voice of unaccounted for water, the city’s efforts to dras- times “likelihood,” where: (i) “likelihood” is the America (VOA), January 17, 2018. https://www. tically curtail water use during the current crisis probability of occurrence of an impact that voanews.com/a/un-half-of-drought-hit-somalia- were a key factor in staving off Day Zero. affects the environment, and (ii) “consequence” needs-aid-in-2018/4211838.html. is the impact if an event occurs. http://www. 16. Some scientists (e.g., Kevane and Gray, 2008) perseus-net.eu/site/content.php?artid=2204. 8. For a discussion of the nexus of climate dispute this theory, arguing that “data on rainfall change, food supply, and instability in the Middle patterns only weakly corroborate the claim that 25. Adapted from 100 Resilient Cities’ definition East, see Scientific American, March 4, 2013. climate change explains the Darfur conflict that of resilience. http://www.100resilientcities.org/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ began in 2003.” On the other hand, we know that FAQ/. climate-change-and-rising-food-prices-height- water has been a root cause of many conflicts in ened-arab-spring/. this region going back decades. A study that ex- amined the causes of over 40 conflicts in Darfur 9. For more on Brazil’s water quality problem, from 1930 to 2000 indicates that “competition for see Circle of Blue, August 12, 2016. https://www. pastoral land and water has been a driving force circleofblue.org/2016/south-america/brazil-rio- behind the majority of local confrontations for -one-many-water-challenges/. the last 70 years” (UNEP 2007). 10. For more on intrusion in Jakarta, see 17. For more information on this South Asian Jakarta Post, June 7, 2013. http://www.thejakarta- flood event, see the Guardian (Manchester, post.com/news/2013/06/07/seawater-intrusion- UK), August 30, 2017. https://www.theguardian. grows-capital.html. com/world/2017/aug/30/mumbai-paralysed- by-floods-as-india-and-region-hit-by-worst- monsoon-rains-in-years.

12 | Water, Security, and Conflict

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14 | ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS ABOUT WRI We are pleased to acknowledge our institutional Dr. is a world-renowned expert, in- World Resources Institute is a global research orga- strategic partners, who provide core funding novator, and communicator on water and climate nization that turns big ideas into action at the nexus to WRI: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issues. In 1987 he cofounded the Pacific Institute, of environment, economic opportunity and human Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and which he led as president until mid-2016, when well-being. Swedish International Development Cooperation he became president emeritus. Our Challenge Agency. Peter developed one of the first analyses of Natural resources are at the foundation of We would like to thank the people who reviewed climate change impacts on water resources, economic opportunity and human well-being. But this issue brief: Morgan Shimabuku, Pieter van the earliest comprehensive work on water and today, we are depleting Earth’s resources at rates der Zaag, Kitty van der Heijden, Edward Davey, conflict, and defined the basic human need and that are not sustainable, endangering economies Rutger Hofste, Deborah Drew, Nisha Krishnan, right to water­­—work that has been used by the and people’s lives. People depend on clean water, Edoardo Borgomeo, Cheryl Rosenblum, Betsy United Nations and in human rights court cases. fertile land, healthy forests, and a stable climate. Otto, and Laura Malaguzzi Valeri. Craig Hanson Also, he pioneered and advanced the concepts Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a and Aaron Wolf provided input on the Water and of the “soft path for water” and “.” sustainable planet. We must address these urgent, Security Classification System. These people Peter received the prestigious MacArthur global challenges this decade. helped strengthen the manuscript but are not “Genius” Fellowship and was elected to the U.S. Our Vision responsible for any of its deficiencies. National Academy of Sciences. He serves on the boards of numerous journals and organizations, We envision an equitable and prosperous planet and is the author or coauthor of many scientific driven by the wise management of natural ABOUT PACIFIC INSTITUTE papers and 11 books. Dr. Gleick holds a B.S. from resources. We aspire to create a world where the actions of government, business, and communi- The Pacific Institute envisions a world in which and an M.S. and Ph.D. from the ties combine to eliminate poverty and sustain the society, the economy, and the environment University of , Berkeley. for all people. have the water they need to thrive now and in Charles Iceland is Director, Global and National the future. In pursuit of this vision, the Institute Water Initiatives with WRI’s Food, Forests, and Our Approach creates and advances solutions to the world’s Water Programs. He previously directed the COUNT IT most pressing water challenges, such as unsus- project at WRI. Charles is now imple- tainable water management and use; climate menting the Water, Peace, and Security Initiative We start with data. We conduct independent change; environmental degradation; food, fiber, with several European and American partner research and draw on the latest to and energy production for a growing popula- organizations. This new project will develop an develop new insights and recommendations. Our tion; and basic lack of access to freshwater and online near real-time global early warning sys- rigorous analysis identifies risks, unveils opportuni- sanitation. Since 1987, the Pacific Institute has tem for potential water-related threats to human ties, and informs smart strategies. We focus our ef- cut across traditional areas of study and actively security, to be hosted on WRI’s new Resource forts on influential and emerging economies where collaborated with a diverse set of stakeholders, Watch platform. the future of will be determined. including policymakers, scientists, corporate Charles previously partnered with several major CHANGE IT leaders, international organizations such as the multinational corporations, including Mondi We use our research to influence government poli- United Nations, advocacy groups, and local com- Group, Rio Tinto, Akzo Nobel, and BC Hydro, cies, business strategies, and civil society action. munities. This interdisciplinary and nonpartisan to develop, road test, and apply an innovative We test projects with communities, companies, and approach helps bring diverse interests together methodology for assessing corporate risks and government agencies to build a strong evidence to forge effective real-world solutions. More opportunities stemming from ecosystem change. base. Then, we work with partners to deliver information about the Institute and its , change on the ground that alleviates poverty and directors, funders, and programs can be found at Prior to that, he worked at the World Environ- strengthens society. We hold ourselves account- www.pacinst.org. ment Center, where he developed innovative supply chain environmental management pilot able to ensure our outcomes will be bold and programs for Alcoa, Johnson & Johnson, Dow enduring. Chemical, and General Motors. SCALE IT Charles earned his undergraduate degree from We don’t think small. Once tested, we work with Yale University and a master’s degree in interna- partners to adopt and expand our efforts regionally tional affairs from Columbia University. and globally. We engage with decision-makers to carry out our ideas and elevate our impact. We measure success through government and busi- ness actions that improve people’s lives and sustain a healthy environment.

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