Follow the Water: Emerging Issues of Climate Change and Conflict in Peru

Home , Arequipa, Condesuyos Province, Huaylas Province, Islay Province, Lake Conococha, Municipalities of Peru

CMM Discussion Paper No. 5 June 2012 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Jeffrey Stark, Sergio Guillén, and Cynthia Brady.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The field research team would like to acknowledge the important contributions of Claudia Rohrhirsch and Fernando Chávez of USAID/Peru, who coordinated the team’s meetings and provided valuable guidance and input during the study. The team also would like to extend its sincere thanks to Dr. Karen Kraft and her colleagues at AEDES, who provided gracious assistance and made key interviews possible in Arequipa Region, and to the TMI team in Huaraz.

CREDITS: This report was written by Jeffrey Stark of the Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS) based on field research in Peru conducted by Jeffrey Stark, Sergio Guillén, FESS consultant, and Cynthia Brady, Senior Conflict Advisor, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID.

COVER PHOTO: FESS MOUNT HUASCARÁN, ANCASH REGION, PERU

Follow the Water: Emerging Issues of Climate Change and Conflict in Peru

CMM Discussion Paper No. 5

DISCLAIMER Discussion Papers have been commissioned by the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to initiate or advance consideration of important issues of conflict prevention or peacebuilding. As such they are not official documents. The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ...... iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 1

INTRODUCTION ...... 9

METHODOLOGY ...... 13 Areas Visited and Organizations and Individuals Interviewed ...... 14

THE PERUVIAN CONTEXT ...... 17 Political Instability, Economic Crisis, and the Extractives Boom ...... 17 Climate Change and Human Security ...... 23

FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD ...... 27 Lima: Emerging Institutional Arrangements to Address Climate Change and Conflict ...... 27 Santa River Basin: Increasing Risks of Climate-Related Conflict and Efforts To Organize a Collective Response to Water Management Challenges ...... 33 Highland Areas of Arequipa Region: Regional Government and Local Communities in Search of Institutional Resilience ...... 43 The Economics of National Government Policies and Civil Society Participation ...... 50

KEY FINDINGS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ...... 53 Key Findings ...... 53 Strategic Considerations ...... 56

RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 57

RESOURCES ...... 61 Appendix I: Climate Change and Conflict Assessment Framework (CCAF) ...... 61 Appendix II: List of Persons and Organizations Consulted ...... 66 Appendix II:I Climate Change and Conflict: Thinking About Water Management Issues...... 69 References ...... 70

ACRONYMS

AAA Administrative Water Authority AEDES Association Specializing in Sustainable Development ALA Local Water Authority ANA National Water Authority ARMA Regional Environmental Authority of Arequipa CAF Conflict Assessment Framework CAN Andean Community CCCAF Climate Change and Conflict Assessment Framework CENAPRED National Center for Disaster Prevention CEPLAN National Center for Strategic Planning CONDESAN Consortium for Sustainable Development of the Andean Eco-Region CMM Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation EIA Environmental Impact Assessment ENSO El Niño Southern Oscillation ESAF Environmental Security Assessment Framework FESS Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability INDECI National Institute for Civil Defense IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPROGA Institute for the Promotion of Water Management MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance MEM Ministry of Energy and Mines MINAM Ministry of the Environment MOCICC Citizens Movement to Confront Climate Change NAPA National Adaptation Programs of Action PCM Presidency of the Council of Ministers

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PNH Huascarán National Park PRONAGCC National Program for the Management of Climate Change PUCP Pontifical Catholic University of Peru REMURPE Network of Rural Municipalities of Peru SENAMHI National Meteorological and Hydrological Service SERNANP National Service for Natural Protected Areas TMI The Mountain Institute UNASAM National University of Ancash Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo UNDP United Nations Development Program UNECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change USAID United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION In 2007, the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that rising global temperatures will contribute to an upsurge in severe storms, floods, droughts, glacier melt, and sea level rise. Soon thereafter, a number of policy studies concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the natural hazards and environmental stresses associated with climate change will trigger or amplify conflict, especially in vulnerable or unstable areas of the developing world.1 Among the projected scenarios were severe resource scarcity, dramatic increases in internal and external migration, disease outbreaks, and a host of destabilizing social and political effects. Other scholars cautioned against assertions of direct causal linkages between climate change and conflict. For example, Halvard Buhaug of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) countered that “African civil wars can be explained by generic structural and contextual conditions” related to “political exclusion, poor economic performance, and changes in the international system.” In the context of this debate, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) asked the Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS) to conduct case studies with two main purposes: 1) to help fill the gap in knowledge regarding how climate-related vulnerabilities interact with the dynamics of fragility, instability, and conflict in specific locations around the world and 2) to identify target areas and opportunities for USAID to improve the provision and coordination of programmatic interventions that can address climate change and conflict vulnerabilities. The first of the case studies was Uganda, focusing on the so-called Cattle Corridor and the area of Karamoja. The second was the case of Ethiopia, focusing on the relationship between climate change and conflict among pastoralists and agropastoralists in Oromia, Somali, and Afar National Regional States. Those studies confirmed the importance of both political and historical context and social and institutional responses in understanding the origins and potential trajectory of climate-related conflict (see www.fess-global.org). The third case is the present study, which examines potential links between climate change and conflict in the central and southern highlands of Peru, focusing in particular on selected areas of the regions of Ancash and Arequipa, respectively. In the highland areas of both regions, the effects of glacier loss and other climate change impacts have contributed to existing problems of water scarcity and access and, in some instances, added new threats to water quality, with important implications for human health and agricultural production. Both Ancash and Arequipa are home to extensive irrigated agriculture, by far the greatest water user. Industrial mining predominates in Ancash, while small-scale, informal-illegal mining has a stronger presence in some parts of Arequipa. Despite very different characteristics, both forms of mining are growing and contributing to water pollution and water competition, as well as generating conflict with local populations. Through increased weather variability, climate change is affecting the hydrological regime in these regions, which intensifies competition between and among upstream and downstream users trying to protect their water needs and interests.

The Andean highland populations are much poorer than their coastal compatriots, and their ability to influence national or regional water use politics and strategies is generally much lower than that of large-scale agro- exporters or investors in high-value mining projects. Many citizens in the Andean highlands feel their needs and voices do not receive an adequate response from either state authorities or representatives of extractive industries. This study explores how the effects of climate change on water quantity, quality, and access may be factoring into aspects of localized instability, fragility, and conflict in Peru. To help guide the methodological approach, FESS developed a seven-phase framework—the Climate Change and Conflict Assessment Framework (CCCAF). The framework emphasizes one of the main conclusions of recent conflict analysis: conflict is always the result of the interactions of multiple political, economic, social, historical, and cultural factors, and these must be taken into account in any analysis. Moreover, the quality of governance and the resilience of political, economic, and social institutions all mediate the relationship between environmental change and conflict in important ways. The influence of climate change and climate-related policy and program responses on instability and conflict can only be understood within this web of relationships. To conduct the study, a three-person field research team composed of two FESS researchers and one senior conflict advisor from USAID/CMM, accompanied by one or at times two colleagues from USAID/Peru, interviewed more than 50 persons from national and regional government, civil society organizations, international organizations, local communities, and the private sector. After initial meetings in Lima, the team traveled to Huaraz and Canrey Chico in Recuay, Ancash. There, field visits focused on climate change impacts in the Santa River Basin, especially the Cordillera Blanca and Callejón de Huaylas. The team also traveled to Arequipa for meetings in the regional capital as well as Condesuyos province. Interviews also were held with elected officials from communities in La Unión and Caylloma provinces. These field interviews were followed by a return to Lima and another round of meetings with key national ministries and nongovernmental organizations. While noting the constraints on time and geography, the study team believes the report effectively identifies a number of key issues and dynamics at play in the climate-conflict relationship throughout the highlands as well as elsewhere in Peru.

THE PERUVIAN CONTEXT Peru’s geography can be roughly divided into three zones: the arid plains of the Pacific coast; the mountainous highlands or sierra of the Andes; and the tropical jungle or selva of the Amazon Basin. These three regions are home to culturally and ethnically different majority identity groups, each with very different ecological endowments. The Andean highlands are populated by Amerindian-mestizo descendants with deep roots in Amerindian cultural practices and traditional forms of social solidarity. The Amazonian Basin is much more sparsely populated, with inhabitants who largely self-identify as indigenous people. These Amazonian groups, to an even greater extent than their Andean compatriots, traditionally have held views on ownership, resource access, labor, and political power that are a far cry from the perspectives of the urbanized, westernized, and globalized inhabitants of the coast. These fractures of ethnicity, identity, economic power, and culture have made state-building extremely difficult in Peru. The weakness of the political system and its inability to give effective voice and representation to the nation’s diverse population has led to correspondingly weak government institutions. In the 1980s, Peru was swept up in the Latin American debt crisis, and the nation’s economy plummeted. The 1980s and early 1990s also saw an upsurge in illicit coca production and political violence. The rise of a violent, self-proclaimed revolutionary movement, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, was a serious and direct challenge to the state. In 1997, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright released the first U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the Shining Path was included. It was in this deeply troubled national context that Alberto Fujimori was able to ascend to the presidency in 1990. Fujimori dissolved congress and suspended the constitution in a so-called “self-coup” in 1992. He implemented an extensive privatization program that reversed statist economic structures but also facilitated cronyism and corruption. The mining sector was thrown open to foreign investors with generous tax provisions and minimal royalty requirements. Between 1990 and 1997, mining investment increased twenty-

2 fold. In 1992, Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the Shining Path, was captured in a dramatic blow to the terrorist movement. But it became increasingly clear that, under Fujimori’s direction, military and intelligence personnel had engaged in widespread human rights abuses, corruption, and killings. Fujimori was eventually convicted and imprisoned for human rights abuses, embezzlement, wire-tapping, and bribery. The 1980s had ended in hyperinflation; the 1990s ended in political and institutional disarray. The promotion of foreign investment in the extractives sector was intensified under President Alan García (2006-2011). Once in office, García set aside campaign commitments to increase the tax and royalty obligations of mining companies and struck agreements with major mining companies to pay into a “voluntary fund” for five years. Mining-related public protests increased. Economic growth took off, and increased investment in the extractives sector, aided by high international mineral prices, played an important role in that growth. Yet, complaints about the environmental costs of poorly regulated mining activities proliferated, and there was very little evidence that mining brought lasting benefits to affected communities. Community- company relationships were frequently tense and sometimes explosive. Mining communities suffered damages to both the supply and the quality of their water resources. Social conflicts related to environmental matters and extractive industries started to increase significantly. In 2009, a confrontation in Bagua province in the Amazon over oil and gas exploration dramatized conflict in the extractives sector. Both civilians and police died in the resulting clash, and there were divergent accounts of the incident, including who was at fault. Hence, Peru faced a paradox. As rapid growth began to move the country forward, the most dynamic economic sector was also the greatest generator of conflict. García’s successor, President Ollanta Humala, a former army officer, campaigned on a platform of greater social inclusion for Andean and Amazonian groups, as well as a more equitable distribution of the revenues generated by the extraction of the nation’s mineral resources. However, President Humala’s efforts to craft a balanced national discourse with respect to the minerals sector and social justice did not alter the tangible conflicts of interest and extractive industry-community antagonisms at the local level. The country’s existing institutional structures and capacities also remained inadequate to the task of addressing many of these conflicts. For many Peruvians, the historical legacy of the extraction of natural resources, largely for the benefit of foreign interests, traces a trajectory of injustice and resentment from the gold-seeking Spanish conquistadores to the vast sugar estates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the twenty-first century Andean mines and Amazonian gas and oil projects. High levels of social and economic inequality still create a strong sense of deprivation among vulnerable groups in both the cities and the countryside. These economic, social, and political rifts are deepened or ameliorated by other factors that condition specific conflictive situations. Given Peru’s heavy dependence on its natural resource base for its well-being and stability, climate change is a major conditioning factor, and its effects, which already can be seen and felt, are likely to be increasingly consequential.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY Peru is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, with seven of the nine vulnerability characteristics recognized in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): low coastal zones; arid and semi-arid areas; exposure to floods, droughts, and desertification; zones prone to natural disasters; areas of high urban pollution; fragile mountain ecosystems; and significant economic dependence on the production and export of fossil fuels. Few countries are as ecologically diverse as Peru, both in terms of biodiversity and distinct climatic zones. Peru holds 71 percent of the world’s tropical highland glaciers, and the dry Pacific coastal region, which is home to approximately 55 percent of Peru’s nearly 30 million people, has only 2 percent of the nation’s water resources. Extreme weather events and related phenomena have been increasing in frequency, intensity, and duration, sometimes occurring at unusual times of the year. These include floods, flash floods, landslides, droughts, freezes, hailstorms, and El Niño-related occurrences. In the 1990s, when measured in terms of extreme climate events and mortality, Peru ranked among the ten most vulnerable countries in the world. Peruvian glaciers have diminished in size by 22 percent since 1980. Some 95 percent of Peru’s population uses water

3 resources that originate in the high Andean regions. Along the Pacific coast, about 80 percent of total water resources are used for irrigated export agriculture. The mining sector also is a significant consumer of water. In the cities, water originating in the highlands is used for human consumption. In the poor, rural highland agricultural sector, irrigation is based on low technology, and water availability for irrigation is decreasing due to constraints on quantity, quality, and access. The interests of these myriad water users are diverse and often contradictory. Water management in the agricultural sector raises complex questions about irrigation rights, appropriate technology, and upstream- downstream distributions. Public concerns about mining companies’ privileged water access and water pollution caused by mining operations can lead to protests that disrupt or even shut down mining projects. Under Peru’s 2009 Water Resources Law, the availability of water for human consumption is considered a human right. As climate-related threats to adequate water supplies increase, imperiling human health, undermining traditional livelihoods, hampering the growth of key economic sectors, and complicating the development of essential infrastructure, the potential for conflict among stakeholders with competing needs and divergent interests is likely to increase.

FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD New Institutional Responses to Climate Change Under the new government of President Humala, Peru’s national government is undertaking a number of important new institutional efforts to respond to climate change, some of which anticipate possible linkages to conflict. One major challenge is the collection of weather and hydrological data and the communication of accurate information to the public. The new Water Resources Law requires the National Water Authority (ANA) to participate in the creation and management of a hydrological network. However, there is currently no up-to- date national inventory of water resources or an information system to gather and disseminate data. Much of the data on Peru’s water basins is 20 to 25 years old, if it exists at all. Efforts are now being made to consolidate weather and hydrological data from both public and private sources. With concern growing over the potential for glacial lake outbursts as a result of melting glaciers, the institutional arrangements for disaster response and risk management also are being updated and revamped. The most authoritative tracking of social conflicts in Peru is done by the Defensoría del Pueblo or Ombudsman’s office in Lima. According to the Ombudsman, more than half of the conflicts in the country are classified as socio-environmental conflicts. Most of these are water conflicts, and a majority of them are related to conflicts involving extractive industries. The Ombudsman’s office is investigating climate change in the context of human rights, focusing on water availability, water quality, and access. Social conflicts in Peru are often managed through the Office of Social Conflict Management at the Prime Minister’s Office (PCM), which has responsibility for the coordination of dialogue among relevant stakeholders in government, civil society, and the private sector. The evolving policy agenda of the PCM places potential climate-conflict linkages in the broader context of concerns about diminishing water resources and expanding extractive industry activities. Conflicts between communities and extractive industry companies are at a high level in Peru, and they are likely to increase in number. The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) estimates that the value of mining project investments expected in the next decade is in the range of $40 billion to $50 billion. With high metal prices, large mining companies that generally operated at an altitude of 4,000 to 5,000 meters are moving to lower altitudes with higher populations and more complex and more easily mobilized communities. The impacts of climate change on water scarcity and water quality are bound to be important factors within this context, with significant implications for both potential conflict and the stability and overall investment climate of the mining sector. The recently established Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) has a number of direct responsibilities in relation to climate change issues, but it is just beginning to assert its institutional presence within the Peruvian government. MINAM sees climate change affecting Andean populations in very tangible ways, including the migration of farmers and pastoralists in response to warmer and drier conditions. Competition is increasing 4 over reduced and poorly managed water resources. MINAM also sees the intersection of inefficient water management, climate change, and mining as a volatile mix. The central challenge for MINAM is to find ways to harmonize economic growth and environmental protection while defining its institutional authority. Staff at all of the relevant state institutions expressed awareness and concern about the relationship between climate change and the potential for conflict, especially those conflicts involving water resources. However, the institutional responses to that awareness and concern are generally either in their early stages or on the drawing board. Hence, there is a large need for capacity building and improved coordination among Peru’s key institutional actors.

Climate Change, Water Management, and Conflict: Quantity, Quality, and Access The Santa River Basin in Ancash Region is one of the areas most affected by climate change. The scope of climate change effects include but go significantly beyond diminishing water supply. With the loss of one-third of the glaciers of the Cordillera Blanca, and as highland temperatures increase and precipitation becomes more erratic, highland pastures, wetlands, and prairies are losing their capacity to provide their usual sponge- like regulation and filtration of water flows and groundwater recharge. The observed micro-climate changes include prolonged droughts, more intense and shorter precipitation periods, and more intense frosts. Mining is a constant presence in the area, and the mining canon provides funds to regional and local governments. Yet, these funds are rarely used to address environmental threats, ecological restoration, or climate change adaptation. Rather, preference is given to immediate and politically popular projects, such as town soccer stadiums or bricks-and-mortar infrastructure. This is a disappointing outcome for the growing number of local advocates of urgent measures to reverse water insecurity and conflicts in the Santa River Basin. Little attention has been given to the problem of climate change and water quality, but it is a looming issue, and one with potentially serious implications for conflict in Ancash. As the glaciers recede, water and oxygen combine with sulfur in the newly exposed surfaces to make sulfuric acid. The sulfuric acid releases the toxic heavy metals found in the exposed rocks, and they are then carried by glacier melt into surface and ground waters. In addition to its harmful effects on human health, contaminated water is potentially a huge problem for irrigated agriculture. At the same time, toxic heavy metals also are produced by mining activities throughout the region. The uncertainties about the source of any specific instance of contaminated water could lead to finger-pointing and serious conflicts. In the judgment of local experts, the issue of water quality is “a time bomb.” Conversely, concerns about melting glaciers and water scarcity appear to be somewhat exaggerated or misplaced. Researchers and government officials in Ancash agree that problems of water scarcity are less related to absolute shortages than poor management of water supplies, especially in agriculture. Existing water rights are inefficient and inequitable, and those who benefit are resistant to change. High basin areas are the source of water while the lower basin agricultural areas are both the largest consumers of water for irrigation and the home to the main centers of administrative and political influence. Yet, highland water conservation is the essential challenge that must be addressed if sustainable water supplies are to be maintained for water users downstream. The current dysfunctionality of water management is a reflection of the fact that the politics and cultural underpinnings of water governance in Peru are thorny and complex. Regional water governance policy reforms and project initiatives will need to be crafted and implemented with extreme sensitivity to their potential for unintentionally generating conflict. Integrated water basin management, starting with micro-basins and moving to sub-basins and macro-basins, is regarded by many regional water experts to be the crucial mechanism for achieving sound water management. It is also clearly one of the keys to conflict prevention and mitigation in Ancash, especially in the context of climate change. Because of its naturally arid climate, climate change challenges are perhaps even more daunting in Arequipa Region. Cutting across Arequipa Region is the Ocoña River Basin, whose waters originate in the snow and

5 ice cover of Coropuna, a snowcapped mountain that has been greatly reduced in size by the effects of global warming. Desertification has advanced in some parts of the region, while the highlands have seen a reduction in wetlands, springs, and lakes, as well as an increase in extreme weather events that have led to landslides, floods, and crop losses. In the highland pastoral areas, as water supplies decrease, the remaining water is prone to contamination that produces illnesses in both people and their cattle. In some areas, as a result of changing weather patterns, the variety of food crops that are traditionally produced is diminishing, and those yields that are realized are losing nutritional value. Malnutrition is common. In an open meeting in Chuquibamba in Condesuyos province, a discussion of climate change produced an outpouring of worries, complaints, and laments concerning changes in the area’s weather, landscapes, and livelihoods. Participants agreed that there are many consequences of recent changes in the climate for plants, animals, and humans. In the highlands, pastures no longer grow as they once did, and the milk production of camelids (llamas, alpacas, vicuñas) and cattle (goats, bovines) is declining. Skin cancer is on the rise. Increasing population and the search for firewood for sale has contributed to deforestation. This has resulted in erosion and further loss of water resources. The water for irrigation is decreasing due to these climatic and environmental transformations, and scarcity is producing localized conflicts among water users. As in Ancash, water scarcity is greatly aggravated by poor water management that is inefficient and often contentious. Small farmers who benefited from the land reforms of the 1970s did not receive water rights in sufficient quantity to meet their irrigation needs. As a consequence, the rights to use water for irrigation are still disproportionately concentrated in a few hands. Illegal, small-scale, artisanal, and “informal” mining is a serious concern in Arequipa, as well as many other regions in the country, and it leads to many conflicts over both water supplies and water quality. In some areas, informal mining has lead to a proliferation of wells that are depleting the water supply, and the chemicals used in mining are contributing to water contamination. Water conflicts are not limited to the level of individuals or competing economic interests. There are also cross-border conflicts with neighboring regions. One such recent conflict was the “war over water” on the border between Arequipa and Moquegua, the region that lies to its south. A second regional violent conflict has taken place between Arequipa and Cuzco over the use of water for irrigation projects in Arequipa. Regional institutions such as Arequipa’s Regional Environmental Authority (ARMA) and the regional Ombudsman’s office are trying to develop their capacities to prevent and manage water conflicts, and they recognize that climate change is an increasingly important contributing factor. However, they are significantly constrained by limited human and financial resources. At the same time, there are clear opportunities to build on resilient community attitudes. In Condesuyos, for example, community representatives agreed to form committees to address water, environmental, and climate challenges through three issue-areas: reforestation; improved irrigation; and environmental education. Communities and municipalities generally have strong capacity for self-organization but lack resources and technical expertise. If these emerging and evolving efforts at the regional and community level can be brought into a set of working relationships focused on improving social cohesion and institutional performance, there could be significantly enhanced prospects for managing and mitigating the growing potential for water conflicts caused in part by the effects of climate change.

The Trajectory of Climate Change and Conflict in Peru There is strong agreement, extensive oral testimony, and convincing evidence that highland areas of Peru are experiencing serious negative impacts from climate change, well beyond the highly publicized risks of glacier melt. While there is significant variation among specific micro-climates and micro-watersheds, the general effects include continuing glacier retreat, warmer temperatures, more erratic and intense weather events (droughts, rains, frosts), significant changes in seasonal precipitation patterns, deteriorating highland ecosystems, soil degradation and desertification, increasing water scarcity, water contamination (acid rock drainage), and more frequent natural hazards (floods, landslides, glacier lake outbursts). These are long-term climate trends that are not going to go away. 6

These stresses and hardships add significantly to conflict potential all along the watersheds that extend from the highland paramos (alpine tundra ecosystems above the timberline) to the middle basin small producers and on to the lowland agro-export plantations dependent on abundant irrigation. Because water is crucial to the well-being and basic daily needs of Peru’s citizens as well as the requirements of the country’s agricultural, mining, and energy sectors, competing stakeholder interests are producing conflicts over water scarcity related to quantity, quality, and access that intertwine with other grievances (e.g., poverty, poor governance, social marginalization) that increase the chances of social mobilization and physical confrontation. Climate change is not yet the dominant reason for water scarcity (inefficiency in water use in the agricultural sector is the leading factor) but it is a major contributor, and it is likely to steadily increase in importance in the coming years. The continuing expansion of the mining sector also will add to water stresses. At present, the clear trend is toward increasing conflict linked to the accumulating effects of climate change. The increasing water requirements of mining and export agriculture are at loggerheads with the reality of climate change trends. Some highland communities are headed toward ecological and economic crisis. Mining companies are moving their operations into lower altitudes, where they encroach upon fragile ecosystems that are essential for the regulation of the natural water regime. In this context, a proliferation of local social explosions, whose cumulative effects could have ramifications for national stability, is entirely possible. The new institutional arrangements in Peru’s national, regional, and local governments (e.g., MINAM, ANA, Water Basin Councils, Environmental Councils, ARMA, and the semi-autonomous Ombudsman) are steps in the right direction, but they will require time, course corrections, and much better institutional coordination before they become fully effective. Decentralization is one of the main reforms now underway in Peru and still needs further consolidation. In the meantime, support for improved and participatory water management is both an important form of climate adaptation and one main pathway toward reducing conflict. There are emerging opportunities and a variety of bright spots to build on, including the ongoing work on climate adaptation by the USAID Mission’s existing partners in Ancash and Arequipa. There is considerable capacity in Andean communities for self-organization to take further steps to not only increase resilience but also to institutionalize dialogue to reduce conflicts, climate-related and otherwise. In fact, joining the agendas of strengthening resilience and promoting conflict prevention would strengthen both. As detailed in the full report, there are a number of new (or reinvigorated) governmental and nongovernmental institutions and organizations staffed with well-informed and committed personnel keen to collaborate on issues of climate change and conflict. This represents an important window of opportunity for the creation of a variety of new partnerships that can be forged to promote conflict prevention and conflict mitigation in Peru. Recommendations based on the findings of the study can be found on page 57.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the Fourth Assessment increased authoritarianism and be attributed to climate or other Report of the Intergovernmental radical ideologies” (CNA environmental factors” (Mazo Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Corporation 2007). 2010). predicted that rising global temperatures will contribute to an As discussion of these issues In the context of this debate, the upsurge in severe storms, floods, moved forward, divergent Office of Conflict Management and droughts, glacier melt, and sea methodological approaches began Mitigation (CMM) of the U.S. level rise. In vulnerable areas of to call into question the plausibility Agency for International the developing world, extreme of some of the claims that were Development (USAID) asked the weather is expected to intensify being made. A study published by Foundation for Environmental pressures on land and water the National Academy of Sciences Security and Sustainability (FESS) resources, disrupt agricultural combined climate model to synthesize the emerging production, and threaten food projections with historical linkages literature and discussion about security.2 between civil war and climate change and conflict temperatures in sub-Saharan linkages and to review the current Soon thereafter, a number of Africa to project “a roughly 54% state of knowledge. FESS found policy studies concluded that there increase in armed conflict that upon closer examination, “the is a strong likelihood that the incidence by 2030” (Burke et al. analysis and discussion of the natural hazards and environmental 2009). Conversely, making use of climate-conflict relationship to date stresses associated with climate “a host of different model is very largely conceptual, change will trigger or amplify specifications and alternative schematic, and deductive,” and conflict, especially in vulnerable or measures of drought, heat, and noted the potential for “costly unstable areas of the developing civil war,” Halvard Buhaug of the initiatives” in response that “run world (CNA Corporation 2007, Peace Research Institute Oslo ahead of firm evidence that they Campbell et al. 2007, Smith and (PRIO) rejected this assertion and are meeting their stated Vivekananda 2007, Fingar 2008, found that “African civil wars can goals” (Stark et al. 2009). UN 2009).3 Among the projected be explained by generic structural scenarios were severe resource and contextual conditions” related Recently, the urgency and scarcity, dramatic increases in to “political exclusion, poor complexity of the climate change internal and external migration, economic performance, and adaptation agenda faced by disease outbreaks, and a host of changes in the international developing countries was destabilizing social and political system” (Buhaug 2010). Similarly, emphasized in a new report by the effects (Campbell and Weitz in a broad review of the dynamics IPCC. In November 2011, the 2008). The CNA Corporation of “climate conflict,” Jeffrey Mazo IPCC issued a “Special Report on envisioned a confluence of factors argued that, “Just as no specific Managing the Risks of Extreme that might overwhelm weak or weather event can be definitively Events and Disasters to Advance flawed systems of governance and attributed to climate change Climate Change Adaptation public institutions, setting the because of normal variation within (SREX).” The IPCC report team stage for “internal conflicts, a complex system, specific social noted with “high agreement” and extremism, and movement toward or political developments cannot “robust evidence” that inequalities

9 within and among countries, The third case is the present reflected in frequent protests, including “socioeconomic, study, which examines potential many citizens in the Andean demographic, and health-related links between climate change and highlands feel their needs and differences and differences in conflict in the central and southern voices do not receive an adequate governance, access to livelihoods, highlands of Peru, focusing in response from either state entitlements, and other factors,” particular on selected areas of the authorities or representatives of pose serious challenges for regions of Ancash and Arequipa, extractive industries. This study climate-related disaster risk respectively (see Figure 1). In the explores how effects of climate management and adaptation highland areas of both regions, the change on water quantity, quality, (IPCC 2011). effects of glacier loss (the and access may be factoring into Cordillera Blanca in Ancash and aspects of instability, fragility, and The main purpose of this case Coropuna in Arequipa) and other conflict via a number of social, study is to help fill the gap in climate change impacts have economic, and political pathways knowledge regarding how climate- contributed to existing problems of that often intertwine, eliciting related vulnerabilities interact with water scarcity and, in some responses that mitigate or the dynamics of fragility, instability, instances, added new threats to intensify potential and actual and conflict in specific locations. water quality, flora and fauna, food conflict. Toward that end, USAID/CMM safety, and human health. While asked FESS to conduct case Arequipa is significantly more arid studies on climate change and than Ancash, both regions are conflict in selected countries, with home to extensive irrigated a view to producing findings agriculture, by far the greatest relevant to Agency and Mission water user. Industrial mining interests and programs. The first predominates in Ancash, while of these was the case of Uganda, small-scale, informal, and illegal focusing on the so-called Cattle mining has a stronger presence in Corridor and the area of some parts of Arequipa. Despite Karamoja. That study confirmed very different characteristics, both the importance of both historical forms of mining are growing and context and social and institutional contribute to water pollution and “This study explores how responses in understanding the water competition, as well as origins and potential trajectory of generating conflict with local effects of climate climate-related conflict in those populations. change on water two geographic regions (Stark and 4 quantity, quality, and Mataya 2011). The second was Through increased and erratic the case of Ethiopia, focusing on weather variability, climate change access may be factoring the relationship between climate is affecting the hydrological regime into aspects of change and conflict among in these regions, which intensifies instability, fragility, and pastoralists and agropastoralists in competition between and among Oromia, Somali, and Afar National upstream and downstream users conflict via a number of Regional States. In that case trying to protect their water needs social, economic, and study, the combined effects on and interests. The Andean political pathways that pastoralists of increasingly highland populations of Ancash often intertwine….” frequent droughts (thought by and Arequipa are much poorer many experts and pastoralists than their coastal compatriots, and alike to reflect climate change), their ability to influence national or political tensions over regional water use strategies is administrative boundaries, and generally much lower than that of national economic policies aimed large-scale agro-exporters or at rapid growth and transformation investors in high-value mining were found to intertwine in ways projects. In both regions, the that contributed to conflict (Stark decentralization of political power et al. 2011).5 is an incomplete and weakly institutionalized process. As

Figure 1: Map of Peru (Ancash and Arequipa Regions Highlighted)

SOURCE: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HTTP://WWW.LOC.GOV/RESOURCE/G5311F.CT001861/

METHODOLOGY

To help guide the methodological environmental change and conflict identified. In Peru, these criteria in approach to these climate change in important ways. Even combination with consideration of and conflict case studies, FESS discontented populations whose USAID’s programmatic interests developed a seven-phase grievances find inadequate or resulted in a focus on the highland framework—the Climate Change aggravating institutional responses areas of Ancash and Arequipa and Conflict Assessment will be unable to engage in violent Regions. Framework (CCCAF). The conflict if they lack the requisite framework provides a process for resources for organization and Phase two seeks to ground the considering a wide variety of mobilization. Shocks or fast- study in the specific context of the background data that supply moving and unanticipated events country or region under study. context for analysis of the climate- also may open windows of Understanding how climate conflict nexus. It relies in part on vulnerability or opportunity that change may be contributing to FESS’s Environmental Security animate or inhibit conflict. conflict in any specific country or Assessment Framework (ESAF) region first requires knowledge methodology, while integrating The purpose of the CCCAF is to about the relevant national context core components of USAID’s serve as a tool for analysis and to and areas of contention and Conflict Assessment Framework raise relevant, case-specific conflict. All societies not only are (CAF). Both the ESAF and CAF questions about these variables. marked by such cleavages but emphasize one of the main However, it is not a formal also possess a range of coping conclusions of recent conflict template for the structure of the mechanisms or resiliencies that analysis: conflict is always the report itself. can be employed to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Formal and result of the interactions of Each phase of the CCCAF multiple political, economic, social, informal political, economic, and (attached as Appendix I) provides social institutions respond to historical, and cultural factors, and new information that may be these must be taken into account threats in ways that are more or relevant to earlier phases. Thus, less successful in resolving or in any analysis. The influence of while presented sequentially, the climate change and climate- mitigating complaints and real or phases of the CCCAF provide a perceived injustices. The degree related policy and program continual feedback mechanism for responses on instability and of a country’s or society’s revisiting and revising preliminary resilience is pivotal in determining conflict can only be understood information and findings. within this web of relationships. the pathways toward or away from The first phase of the CCCAF violence. The existence of grievances reviews conflict-prone areas of the related to the impacts of climate Governance, in particular, is often selected country that have of decisive importance. Where change does not mean they will experienced extreme climate necessarily result in conflict. The citizens perceive political and variability (e.g., droughts, floods, social institutions to be legitimate, quality of governance and the and unseasonal temperature resilience of political, economic, representative, accountable, and fluctuations). Patterns of conflict responsive, the potential for and social institutions all mediate within these areas with potential the relationship between violent conflict is reduced linkages to climate effects are then significantly. Yet, even where

13 governance is weak or corrupt and Phase five identifies the relevant programmatic gaps, and target grievances and resentment are at stakeholders from government, areas and opportunities to improve high levels, large-scale conflict still civil society, and affected the provision and coordination of may not occur if angry individuals communities and solicits their interventions that can address or groups lack the means to perceptions and experiences of climate change and climate- marshal effective collective action the impacts of climate trends and related conflicts. It focuses on and engage in organized protest natural hazards. It investigates ways that USAID’s development or violence. whether and how these impacts assistance could make a positive intertwine with citizen grievances, contribution toward filling current Phase three links environmental stakeholder interests, mobilizing programmatic gaps. and socioeconomic factors to ask factors, and the potential for Recommendations suggest viable how climate change may be conflict. Stakeholders are asked to approaches and responses for posing threats to essential describe their own response USAID and other development resources, livelihoods, food capacities and those of other organizations. security, and cultural values in the stakeholders and to give their areas under study. For example, perceptions of the political, social, in poor rural areas of developing and institutional responses to AREAS VISITED AND countries, extreme weather and climate-related challenges. Phase ORGANIZATIONS AND increased pressures on land, five also is devoted to gathering INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED water, forests, and rangelands can the available empirical data about From October 10, 2011 to October undermine agricultural climate variability and climate 21, 2011, a three-person field productivity, provoking food crises, change in the areas under study. research team composed of two threatening livelihoods, and FESS researchers and one senior placing populations at risk. Phase In phase six, based on the conflict advisor from USAID/CMM, three focuses more specifically on synthesis of all of the data and accompanied by one or at times the capacity and effectiveness of field research, scenarios are two colleagues from USAID/Peru, formal and informal mechanisms developed to illuminate potential interviewed more than 50 persons for environmental governance and futures. These scenarios are not from national and regional natural resource management. Is predictions but ways of government, civil society natural resource management, envisioning plausible future organizations, international whether that of the state or outcomes and their accompanying organizations, and the private traditional authorities, reducing or levels of potential conflict. The sector. Additional meetings were contributing to the potential for scenarios include consideration of held with community groups. After conflict? windows of vulnerability and initial meetings in Lima, the team opportunity (or triggering events). The fourth phase of the CCCAF traveled to Huaraz and Canrey looks more closely at the The CCCAF concludes in phase Chico in Recuay, Ancash. There, responses of affected seven by bringing together the field visits focused on climate communities and individuals to contextual impacts of change impacts in the Santa River climate variability, extreme environmental and climate Basin, especially the Cordillera weather events, and their change, relevant core grievances Blanca and Callejón de Huaylas. consequences. It asks how social, and drivers of conflict, patterns of In the following week, the team human, physical, financial, and resilience and mitigating factors, traveled to Arequipa for meetings natural capital and assets are windows of vulnerability or in the regional capital as well as used to build resilience or coping opportunity (triggers), and Chuquibamba in Condesuyos, strategies for communities and projected future climate Arequipa. Meetings in Arequipa social groups. It also seeks out vulnerabilities in order to provided the opportunity to hear second-order (or unintended) determine the links between firsthand from local elected consequences of coping strategies climate change and potential officials from communities in La and their impact on traditional conflict as well as those between Unión and Caylloma as well. forms of social organization and climate change and adaptive These field interviews were community or group relations with resilience. Phase seven identifies followed by a return to Lima and state authorities. lessons learned, good practices, another round of meetings with

14 key national ministries and j. Given current environmental nongovernmental organizations. trends, what is your vision of Because of the limited time and the future 10 years from now geographic scope of the field with/without future research, this report can only be interventions (in addition to considered a preliminary current coping mechanisms)? diagnostic of climate change and conflict linkages in selected areas of the highlands of Peru, although the team believes the report effectively identifies a number of issues and dynamics at play throughout the highlands as well as elsewhere in the country.6 Interviews followed a loosely structured format that permitted the natural flow of conversation and discussion of each person’s or organization’s responsibilities and priorities. Within that format, the following basic questions were addressed, followed by more in- depth discussion: a. Has the environment/climate changed in recent years? b. What have been the impacts of environmental/climate change? c. How have local people responded or tried to cope? Who is doing what? d. How have local and national government responded? e. Are there conflicts in your area of interest or responsibility? f. If so, what is causing them and how serious are they? g. Has environmental change contributed to potential or actual conflict? h. Is environmental/climate change of greater or lesser importance in relation to conflict? How and why? i. What further responses are necessary to deal with the negative consequences of climate-related change? 15

THE PERUVIAN CONTEXT

POLITICAL INSTABILITY, areas historically have exercised ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND THE the greatest power in commerce EXTRACTIVES BOOM and politics. The Andean Since the Great Depression of the highlands are populated by 1930s, Peru has experienced Amerindian-mestizo descendants numerous cycles of political with much deeper roots in instability and economic crisis, Amerindian cultural practices and often followed by political and traditional forms of social “Although replete with economic reforms that have solidarity. The Amazonian Basin is significant local shown initial promise, only to falter much more sparsely populated, or fail shortly thereafter. Marked with inhabitants who largely self- variations, Peru’s asymmetries of political and identify as indigenous people. geography can be economic power among groups These Amazonian groups, to an roughly divided into with distinctive histories and even greater extent than their three zones: the arid cultures have resulted in one of Andean compatriots, have the weakest and most volatile traditionally held views on plains of the Pacific political party systems in Latin ownership, resource access, coast; the mountainous America, alongside persistent labor, and political power that are highlands or sierra of poverty and inequality. a far cry from the perspectives of the urbanized, westernized, and the Andes; and the Although replete with significant globalized inhabitants of the coast. tropical jungle or selva local variations, Peru’s geography of the Amazon Basin. can be roughly divided into three With the capital, Lima, as the hub, zones: the arid plains of the the coastal economy served as These three regions are Pacific coast; the mountainous the center of gravity for trade and home to culturally and highlands or sierra of the Andes; modern services in twentieth- ethnically different and the tropical jungle or selva of century Peru. However, in northern Peru and the central majority identity groups, the Amazon Basin. These three regions are home to culturally and highlands, enclave economies each with very different ethnically different majority identity developed around foreign-owned ecological groups, each with very different sugar plantations and mining endowments.” ecological endowments. Settled by enterprises. Infrastructure was the Spaniards, who defeated the provided by the entrepreneurs, indigenous Incan population (soon and much of the work was done thereafter nearly decimated by by wage labor—often seasonal disease), the large urban areas of workers who moved between the coast are predominantly plantations or mines and populated by a mestizo-hispanic subsistence farming in peasant population. The Spanish-speaking villages. While elites in the cities groups residing in these urban had access to political power, the

17 rural population had low levels of exemplified in the disagreements opened the way for political representation and between two of the country’s “presidentialist” governance in organization, although protests iconic political figures, José Carlos which the executive exercised and strikes were not uncommon in Mariátegui and Víctor Haya de la powers far outweighing those of the highlands (Long and Roberts Torre. While Mariátegui argued for congress or the judiciary. From the 1998). In political and commercial indigenismo’s vision of full peasant 1950s until the late 1970s, terms, the Amazon remained a and Indian participation, Haya’s economic growth was fairly steady relative backwater. views were more hierarchical and in Peru, although industrialization elitist, and he struck a more was promoted by often inefficient

Figure 2: GDP per Capita Growth

SOURCE: CENTRAL RESERVE BANK OF PERU, ANNUAL REPORT 2010.

These fractures of ethnicity, paternalistic posture toward state-run companies. The identity, economic power, and groups in the countryside (Angell preponderance of large landed culture made state-building 1998). This was of no small estates for sugar and livestock extremely difficult in Peru. As consequence for modern Peru, as production made access to land counterweights to the the party created by Haya, the for subsistence production a major preponderant influences of export- Alianza Popular Revolucionaria issue for estate laborers and oriented urban elites, radical and Americana, or APRA, became the campesinos. In 1968, General reformist political leaders one longstanding institutionalized Juan Velasco announced the developed discourses in the early- political party in the nation. formation of the Revolutionary to-mid twentieth century around Unfortunately, for long periods of Government of the Armed Forces, themes of anti-imperialist time APRA also was distrusted by and the following year the Velasco nationalism, Marxism, and the Peruvian military, thus adding government issued an Agrarian indigenismo, the latter a further destabilizing influence. Reform Law that expropriated all emphasizing the need to landholdings of more than 150 incorporate not just urban workers The weakness of the political hectares of irrigated land. Many but also peasants, Indians, and system and its inability to give enterprises were nationalized, agricultural workers in the effective voice and representation including those in the mining country’s political life. The failure to the nation’s diverse population sector. While millions of hectares to distill these discourses into a led to correspondingly weak were turned over to cooperatives, consensus political program was government institutions and only some peasants benefited

from the land reform. The society akin to China, the Shining government, concerned about Path adopted a ruthless Maoist maintaining agricultural export ideology. Throughout the 1980s, levels, retained many of the after the failures of agrarian reform existing large-scale production and in the midst of the worsening structures and ultimately excluded economic crisis, the Shining Path thousands of rural laborers destroyed bridges, electrical (McClintock 1981; De la Peña systems, and water infrastructure. 1998). In a reign of terror, its cadres killed members of the police, civil As seen in Figure 2, in the 1980s servants, and thousands of other Peru was swept up in the Latin citizens, mainly peasants.7 Shining American debt crisis, and the Path guerillas forged linkages and nation’s economy plummeted. In alliances with narcotraffickers. The 1985, APRA finally managed to state lost control of large areas in gain the presidency in the person the provinces of Ayacucho, of the young and charismatic Alan Huancavelica, and Apurímac, and García. Initially, President García Lima was hit with explosions and became something of a Latin blackouts. The governments of American folk hero for resisting Fernando Belaúnde and Alan the painful economic prescriptions García responded inconsistently to “The weakness of the of the international financial these attacks but each eventually political system and institutions and by adopting a set authorized military responses that its inability to give of “heterodox” reforms aimed at sometimes resulted in human protecting vulnerable social rights abuses, including killings of effective voice and sectors. However, after a brief large numbers of peasants in the representation to the period of renewed growth, the countryside. nation’s diverse economy collapsed, and García left office in 1990 amid It was in this deeply troubled population led to hyperinflation, severe national context—the failure of correspondingly indebtedness, and growing García’s APRA government, weak government poverty. profound economic crisis, surging coca production, and atrocities institutions....” The 1980s and early 1990s also committed by a brutal saw an upsurge in illicit coca revolutionary movement—that production and political violence. Alberto Fujimori was able to Spurred by U.S. demand, rising ascend to the presidency in 1990. prices, and links to the Colombian President Fujimori took strong drug cartels, Peru became the actions on all fronts. A political largest coca producer in the world. outsider with no established party Not until an aggressive interdiction base, Fujimori dissolved congress campaign was launched in 1995 and suspended the constitution in did production decline a so-called “self-coup” in 1992. He significantly. then accelerated a host of free The rise of a violent, self- market reforms and put into full proclaimed revolutionary implementation an extensive movement, Sendero Luminoso, or privatization program that Shining Path, was a serious and reversed statist economic direct challenge to the state. With structures but also facilitated origins in the political thought of cronyism and corruption. The young university lecturers in the mining sector was thrown open to southern Peruvian highlands of foreign investors with generous Ayacucho, who saw the Andean tax provisions and minimal royalty heartland of Peru as a feudal requirements. Between 1990 and

1997, mining investment country, came to office in 2001 increased twenty-fold (World Bank with high hopes and expectations 2005). By the mid-1990s, as that he would, at last, be the economic liberalization took hold, president to squarely address the economy stabilized and began poverty and the needs of Peru’s growing rapidly. Fujimori Andean population. authorized the military to shoot down aircraft to disrupt the While the country’s party system narcotraffickers’ “air bridge” remained fragmented and between Peru and Colombia. unstable, the demands and Coca prices fell, as did coca organizational capacity of civil production. He also encouraged society had been strengthening. In the military to strike aggressively order to obtain IMF assistance to against the Shining Path and revive the economy, Toledo promoted the use of peasant agreed to further privatizations, militias in support of including several he had promised counterinsurgency. In 1992, not to implement during his Abimael Guzmán, the leader of campaign. Protests, sometimes the Shining Path, was captured in violent, followed, and President a dramatic blow to the Toledo was forced to backtrack revolutionary movement. and apologize for his actions and the lack of transparency in his However, as the decade privatization process. Objections proceeded, Fujimori came under also began to intensify, especially increasing scrutiny and criticism. among highland and indigenous His controversial efforts to groups, over the expansion of the “The 1980s had ended in perpetuate his term in office mining sector and the hyperinflation; the 1990s reinforced perceptions of him as development of the huge Camisea anti-democratic and authoritarian. natural gas project in the Amazon ended in political and By the late 1990s, economic area of Cuzco. While Peru had institutional disarray. ” growth had ground to a standstill. opened the pathway to increased Corruption increased, while foreign investment, there was a institutions were weakened. It marked institutional lag in became increasingly clear that, environmental protection and under Fujimori’s direction, military oversight and an increasing public and intelligence personnel had awareness of the mining sector’s engaged in widespread human abysmal environmental legacy. rights abuses and killings. Fujimori Overseen by the Ministry of was eventually convicted and Energy and Mines (MEM), imprisoned for human rights environmental impact abuses, embezzlement, wire- assessments were lacking in tapping, and bribery. quality, public participation, and enforcement. During President The 1980s had ended in Toledo’s administration, annual hyperinflation; the 1990s ended in GDP per capita growth recovered political and institutional disarray. and averaged above 5 percent, Fujimori’s decade in office ended and efforts were made to reach with scandal, disputed electoral out to Andean communities, but results, a presidential resignation- for much of his time in office he cum-dismissal, and the was an unpopular president, appointment of an interim having disappointed public caretaker government. With new expectations that he would elections, Alejandro Toledo, the transform the nation’s political first indigenous president of the

20 culture and bring about historic years of political and economic in Figure 4, which shows its change. crises, real per capita GDP in dominance in Peru’s private 2005 was essentially the same as investment projects as of 2010, The promotion of foreign it had been in 1975. Economic with over $5 billion in new money investment in the extractives growth took off in President entering the country. In 2011, it sector was intensified after the García’s second term of office, was reported that future mining return to office of an ideologically with per capita GDP increasing by investments in Peru—now the reformed Alan García (2006- 6.8, 7.7, and 8.9 percent in 2006, world’s second largest producer of 2011). The populist president of 2007, and 2008, respectively copper, silver, and zinc—might the 1980s returned as a champion (Central Reserve Bank of Peru total as high as $42 billion of free markets and free trade in 2010). Between 2000 and 2010, (Rathbone 2011). the first decade of the new the percentage of Peruvians living century. Just before taking office, on less than $4 per day decreased However, as new investments and President García published a from 49 percent to less than 30 favorable mineral prices brought monograph on the “sierra percent. Increased investment in higher national revenues, local exportadora” that emphasized the and the expansion of the mining-related conflicts continued unrealized mineral export potential extractives sector, aided by high to increase in number. While the of the Andean highlands (García international mineral prices, complaints about the 2005). Once in office, García set played an important role in that environmental costs of poorly aside campaign commitments to growth. Aided by an ever stronger regulated mining activities increase the tax and royalty commitment to free trade, proliferated, there was very little obligations of mining companies eventually including a free trade evidence that mining brought and struck agreements with major agreement with the United States, lasting benefits to affected mining companies to pay into a growth in the smaller but higher communities. Community- “voluntary fund” for five years. employment agricultural sector company relationships were Mining-related public protests was also strong, as exports grew frequently tense and sometimes increased. (Bebbington et al. from $300 million to $2.5 billion explosive. Mining communities 2007). over the same time frame suffered damages to the supply (Rathbone 2010). and quality of their water At the same time, economic resources, toxic effects from growth accelerated significantly in The dynamism of the mining and untreated tailings and acid mine Peru. As seen in Figure 3, after 30 hydrocarbons sector can be seen drainage, and recurrent labor Figure 3: Real GDP per Capita in Peru

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM CENTRAL RESERVE BANK OF PERU, ANNUAL REPORT 2010.

Figure 4: Private Investment Projects

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM CENTRAL RESERVE BANK OF PERU SURVEY 2010. disputes, while social funds from began to move the country sector but was less onerous than mining companies were distributed forward, the most dynamic many had feared. To promote in ways that were often perceived economic sector was also the social inclusion, he moved in his to be clientelistic or paternalistic greatest generator of conflict. first month to achieve passage of (Bebbington et al. 2007). a new Law of Prior Consultation This was the situation that, while ambiguous in terms of In 2009, a confrontation in Bagua encountered by García’s implementation and liable to province in the Amazon over oil successor, Ollanta Humala, upon generate unrealistic expectations, and gas exploration dramatized assuming the presidency in July required in principle substantive conflict in the extractives sector. 2011. President Humala, a former consultations with indigenous and Indigenous communities blocked army officer of leftist leanings who originary peoples before mineral roadways for two months to had once led a brief military revolt, and hydrocarbon projects would protest the entry of oil and gas campaigned on a platform of be allowed to go forward. companies without proper greater social inclusion for Andean consultation with affected and Amazonian groups, as well as Yet, President Humala’s efforts to communities. President García’s a more equitable distribution of the craft a balanced national government ordered the police to revenues generated by the discourse with respect to the intervene to remove the extraction of the nation’s mineral minerals sector and social justice protestors. Both civilians and resources. Many businesspeople did not alter the tangible conflicts police died (32 in total) in the and investors looked upon Humala of interest and extractive industry- resulting clash, with the two sides as potentially radical and community antagonisms at the giving highly divergent accounts of unreliable, but he assembled a local level. In November 2011, the the incident. moderate cabinet that placed a Ombudsman’s monthly report number of well-known and trusted stated that, of 220 social conflicts The so-called Baguazo made figures in key positions, and he in the country, 125 were “socio- clear that conflict around the asserted that his government environmental” conflicts, defined extraction of mineral resources would be both pro-business and as conflicts having to do with “the entailed not just conflict between pro-environment. President control, use, and/or access to the companies and communities but Humala negotiated a new tax environment and its resources,” also conflict between communities regime for windfall profits that including “political, economic, and the state itself. Hence, Peru discomfited some in the mining social, and cultural components.” faced a paradox. As rapid growth

Most of these had to do with improved, is still subject to the extractive activities. Moreover, the uncertainties of weak political country’s existing institutional parties and largely untested structures and capacities political leadership. remained inadequate to the task of addressing many of these These economic, social, and conflicts. While the MEM is in the political rifts can be deepened or contradictory position of both ameliorated at any time by other promoting and regulating mining, circumstantial factors that the environment ministry, only condition specific conflictive created in 2008, is charged with situations. In a country like Peru, environmental protection but is which is so dependent on its weak and still evolving. Many of natural resource base for its well- the relevant governmental being and stability, climate change competencies and mandates is a major conditioning factor, and regulating the mineral sector are its effects, which already can be poorly defined or overlapping, both seen and felt, are likely to be between ministries and between increasingly consequential. different levels of government. “In November 2011, the Although Peru has made both CLIMATE CHANGE AND Ombudsman’s monthly political and economic progress in HUMAN SECURITY report stated that, of recent years, it still is Peru is highly vulnerable to characterized by cleavages that climate change impacts, with 220 social conflicts in are often associated with conflict. seven of the nine vulnerability the country, 125 were The historical legacy of the characteristics recognized in the ‘socio-environmental’ extraction of natural resources, 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change conflicts, defined as largely for the benefit of foreign interests, traces a trajectory of (UNFCCC): low coastal zones; conflicts having to do injustice and resentment from the arid and semi-arid areas; with ‘the control, use, gold-seeking Spanish exposure to floods, droughts, and and/or access to the conquistadores to the vast sugar desertification; zones prone to natural disasters; areas of high environment and its estates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the twenty- urban pollution; fragile mountain resources….’” first century Andean mines and ecosystems; and significant Amazonian gas and oil projects. economic dependence on the Differing economic and cultural production and export of fossil values bring into conflict the fuels (MINAM 2010). Peru is also interests of identity groups that one of the countries most directly range from (and beyond) urban affected by the El Niño Southern elites to Andean campesinos and Oscillation (ENSO), experiencing Amazonian indigenous increased temperatures from El communities.8 These conflicts are Niño every four to five years, as channeled through the contested well as periodic colder exercise of state power and the temperatures associated with La country’s heavy reliance on the Niña. These variations often have export economy. High levels of significant disruptive effects on social and economic inequality still agriculture and other productive create a strong sense of relative activities, and the El Niño effect is deprivation among vulnerable expected to increase in frequency groups in both the cities and the as a result of climate change countryside. Peru’s political (Obregón et al. 2009). democracy, though much

Few countries are as ecologically ranked among the ten most diverse as Peru, both in terms of vulnerable countries in the world biodiversity (containing 84 of 117 (Adger et al. 2004). identified global biological zones) and distinct climatic zones Perhaps the best known and most (representing 28 of 32 identified dramatic manifestation of climate world climates). While Peru has change in Peru is glacier melt. In the second largest Amazon forest, recent years, glacial retreat has it also holds 71 percent of the been measured in three major world’s tropical glaciers. The dry areas: the Cordillera Blanca in Pacific coastal region, which is Ancash, the Coropuna snowcap in home to approximately 55 percent Arequipa, and the Salkantay of Peru’s nearly 30 million people, snowcap in Cuzco. Between 1980 has only 2 percent of the nation’s and 2006, glacier retreat in the water resources (MINAM 2010). Cordillera Blanca was 33 percent; between 1988 and 2006, glacier Peru’s Second National loss for Coropuna was 50 percent; Communication to the UNFCCC and in the Salkantay snowcap, notes a number of signs of climate approximately 28 percent of change at the national level over glacier cover was lost in just four the previous 42 years. Rainfall has years (2003-2007). Overall, increased along the coast and Peruvian glaciers have diminished northern sierra, while decreasing in size by 22 percent since 1980. in the northern Amazon. Maximum Should current trends continue, and minimum temperatures have Coropuna is projected to lose all of “Some 95 percent of been increasing at around 0.2ºC its glacier cover in 20 years. Peru’s population uses per decade over almost all of the According to the Ministry of the country. Dry spells have been Environment (MINAM), “by 2025, water resources that increasing in intensity more than Coropuna will have a remaining originate in the high have wet spells. Cold nights have ice cap that is no longer capable Andean regions.” been decreasing, while warm of producing surface runoff nights have been increasing, sufficient to meet the water needs especially in the sierra. These of the zone.” Indeed, along with trends are projected to accelerate extreme weather, these landscape in the next two decades. changes, discussed in greater Moreover, there has been detail in the findings below, are increased deviation from the norm certain to pose threats to human in seasonal patterns, with seasons security in Peru, most notably with arriving both earlier and later than respect to water resources. Some normal. 95 percent of Peru’s population uses water resources that Especially noteworthy are extreme originate in the high Andean weather events and related regions. In the rural highland phenomena that have been agricultural sector, where increasing in frequency, intensity, approximately 60 percent of the and duration, sometimes occurring population is classified as poor, at unusual times of the year. irrigation is based on low These include floods, flash floods technology, and water availability (huaycos), landslides, droughts, for irrigation is decreasing due to freezes, hailstorms, and El Niño- constraints on quantity, quality, related occurrences (MINAM and access. Along the Pacific 2010). In the 1990s, when coast, where most of Peru’s agro- measured in terms of extreme export production is located, about climate events and mortality, Peru

80 percent of total water resources melting glaciers. The number of are used for irrigated agriculture. glacial lakes in Peru has In the cities, water originating in increased, and increasing water the highlands is used for human volume can burst open natural consumption. About 70 percent of dams created by glaciers or Peru’s increasing energy needs terminal moraines. Glacial lake are met by hydropower, which is outbursts (aluviones) produce threatened by both glacier melt massive floods of liquid mud that and drought associated with El carry rocks and ice. In 1941, a Niño (MINAM 2010). glacial lake outburst from Lake Palcacocha destroyed part of the The mining sector also is a city of Huaraz, killing some 5,000 significant consumer of water. people (Carey 2010). Elsewhere in Although it consumes only about 2 the Cordillera Blanca, triggered by percent of total national water an earthquake, a rock and ice resources, the mining industry avalanche from Huascarán Norte operates in highland areas in killed approximately 23,000 people “Climate change which water scarcity is a crucial in Yungay in 1970 (USGS contributes to glacier issue for irrigation users and local pubs.usgs.gov). Climate change is communities. Mining concessions melt and eventually an increasing the underlying are not required to provide conditions that produce or absolute reduction in analyses of projected water contribute to such natural water availability in exploitation, despite the industry’s disasters. Similarly, increased ice legacy of frequently fouling rivers, melt has contributed to what highland areas, but lakes, and streams with toxic other factors, such as MINAM terms an elevated risk of tailings and runoff. Nor is the downstream rivers overflowing inefficient water mining sector subject to water use their banks and flooding nearby management and quotas, as are irrigation users. areas. Illegal or informal mining, which is pollution from mining, on the rise, also contributes toxic Hence, the economic costs and intertwine with the contaminants to water supplies, cumulative threats to human effects of climate including mercury used in security resulting from climate change to create the amalgamating gold. Here, the change in Peru are potentially issues having to do with water enormous, and the majority of overall context of limited scarcity commingle, since water them are linked to water quantity water access and scarcity in highland communities and water quality, as well as availability.” often has to do with not only an issues of water management and absolute reduction in available disaster risk reduction. Water is water resources but also the crucial to the livelihoods and availability of usable water health of millions of Peruvians, the resources. Climate change functioning of the fast-growing contributes to glacier melt and mining sector, the irrigation needs eventually an absolute reduction in of both agricultural smallholders water availability in highland and large-scale agro-exporters, areas, but other factors, such as and the provision of hydropower inefficient water management and for the country’s rapidly growing pollution from mining, intertwine energy needs. with the effects of climate change to create the overall context of However, the interests of these limited water access and myriad water users are diverse availability. and often contradictory. Water management in the agricultural Human security also is threatened sector raises complex questions by increased water flow from about irrigation rights, appropriate

25 technology, and upstream- downstream distributions. Public concerns about mining companies’ privileged water access, and water pollution caused by mining operations can lead to protests that can disrupt or even shut down mining projects. Large-scale hydropower projects are often highly controversial in terms of both their environmental impacts and compensation issues, and in the context of water scarcity, these controversies may be intensified (Avalos 2008). Under Peru’s 2009 Water Resources Law, the availability of water for human consumption is considered a human right. Water shortages, especially in urban areas, could easily provoke volatile political crises. As climate-related threats to adequate water supplies increase, imperiling human health, undermining traditional livelihoods, hampering the growth of key economic sectors, and complicating the development of essential infrastructure, the potential for conflict among stakeholders with competing needs and divergent interests is likely to increase. In the findings that follow, emerging issues in the relationship between climate change and conflict are explored through examples from field research in Lima and selected areas of Ancash and Arequipa Regions.

FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD

LIMA: EMERGING these two issue-areas— water and conflicts that appear to have INSTITUTIONAL extractive industries—intersect. plausible linkages with climate ARRANGEMENTS TO change, with a view toward Given the predominance of these developing a kind of climate ADDRESS CLIMATE socio-environmental conflicts and CHANGE AND CONFLICT change checklist that might be their resource-related used for early warning and to Socio-Environmental Conflicts characteristics, the Ombudsman’s guide appropriate responses. and Divergent Cultural Values office is aware of and concerned Although by no means the only about the role that climate change Most of the conflicts reported by source of information, the most may play in triggering or the Ombudsman fall under the authoritative tracking of social aggravating them. Most conflicts competency of the national conflicts in Peru is done by the are localized to specific areas, government, and they are often Defensoría del Pueblo or such as a basin or watershed. managed through the Office of Ombudsman’s office, which With the system already in place Social Conflict Management at the compiles reports from the nation’s to map and classify conflicts, it Prime Minister’s Office (PCM),11 respective regions to produce a would be possible in principle to which has responsibility for the monthly report.9 These social incorporate localized climate coordination of dialogue among conflicts are then classified as change data and thus analyze the relevant stakeholders in active, latent, or resolved, as well climate-conflict relationship in government, civil society, and the as categorized by type: socio- greater depth. However, private sector. As with the environmental, territorial, illicit downscaled data on weather and Ombudsman’s office, engagement coca, labor, electoral, communal, water resources is still very on climate change issues is seen and other. In recent years, more limited. Rolando Luque, by the PCM as important, but than half of the conflicts in the ombudsman for prevention of according to Victor Caballero, country have fallen consistently social conflicts, stated that, as a Chief of the Office of Social into the category of socio- starting point, the Defensoría was Conflict Management, the environmental conflict. For preparing a report on climate Peruvian government is not yet example, in November 2011, out change and human rights, institutionally prepared to respond of 220 identified conflicts, 125 or focusing on water availability, effectively to climate change and 57 percent were socio- water quality, and access. The conflict issues, especially as they environmental conflicts. According Ombudsman’s office also is intertwine with the complexities of to staff at the National Water interested in possible climate extractive industry controversies. Authority (ANA), the majority of change linkages to other conflict- Nevertheless, he stated that these are water conflicts, and related issues, such as land use climate change and conflict issues according to Carlos Monge of disputes and migration caused by are finding a place on the Humala Revenue Watch Institute, a environmental change. Staff at the government’s evolving policy majority of them are related to Ombudsman’s office noted that it agenda. This is reflected, for conflicts involving extractive would be possible, even in the example, in concerns about industries.10 In fact, in most socio- absence of enhanced climate diminishing water resources, environmental conflicts in Peru, data, to begin to code those climate-related shifts in the

27 agricultural frontier, and the and recent revisions to the law to incommensurate values that possible need for no-go zones in may continue to make community- easily generate conflict over the alpine wetlands and prairies that company relations problematic. proper use of natural resources. play an important role in According to Jaime Gálvez, the Moreover, due to some of the sustaining and regulating existing head of community social funds same cultural disjunctures, those hydrological systems. for Antamina—regarded by many community-company consultations as one of the most socially that do occur often involve the Caballero noted that a responsible mining companies in wrong participants. The research fundamental challenge faced by Peru—the revenues lost by mining suggests that “values mapping” the government of President companies because of the newly and training can help to avoid Humala on environmental issues increased obligations of the canón conflicts and identify key is a legacy of citizen mistrust and minero are likely to make social individuals who can cross cultural the state’s lack of public credibility funds such as the Fondo Minero bridges effectively. Without better on natural resource management Antamina no longer viable. awareness of the problem of issues. In response, the However, according to other divergent cultural values and government is seeking to increase interviewees, the added operating needs, he believes that conflict will and diversify the institutional costs resulting from the new levies increase as Peru’s use of natural mechanisms that provide public are often exaggerated and resources and the impacts of information and facilitate dialogue represent more a redistribution of climate change intensify. For and meaningful public funds toward the central example, the new Law on Prior participation. Toward this end, the government than a large increase Consultation, although well- Water Resources Law of 2009 in the overall royalties and intended, requires assiduous and envisions the creation of voluntary payments paid by mining skillful attention to issues of decentralized water authorities— companies. These interviewees conflict sensitivity that are likely to suprabasin Administrative Water believed that mining companies, surpass the institutional capacity Authorities (AAAs) and Local despite their complaints about of the various government Water Administrations (ALAs)—as their tax obligations, would have to ministries and agencies with well as water resources basin continue to provide social funds to consultative responsibilities under councils that will involve national, affected communities simply as a the law. Thus, dialogue regional, and local authorities, matter of retaining the necessary undertaken without a full along with civil society and private “social license” to maintain their appreciation of these cultural and sector participants. A similar operations. The contribution of normative fault lines may generate process is anticipated for climate change to water scarcity rather than mitigate conflict. multilevel environmental and the resulting increase in the commissions. One especially potential for social conflict with Evolving Engagement with important challenge, he noted, is mining companies over water Climate Change Issues: Water, the need for national authorities to resources is likely to add to those Weather, and Disasters work more closely with the 12 pressures. The pattern of growing regional presidents. engagement with climate change Professor Jorge Yamamoto of the issues unfolding within the context The PCM sees equal potential for Pontificia Universidad Católica del conflict mitigation through of emerging institutional Perú has been conducting arrangements can be found in improvement in the conduct and research on the communication community relations of extractive several other key government gap between extractive companies agencies and ministries. At the industry enterprises, which have and local communities. That both historically neglected the National Water Authority (ANA), research may have useful lessons Estrella Asenjo, Advisor to the environmental damages they have for conflict mitigation and climate caused and failed to understand General Secretary, and Jorge change adaptation initiatives. For Baitez, Director of Water and effectively engage the example, Yamamoto notes that communities in which they Resources Conservation and differences in the “cultural matrix” Planning, agreed that the central operate. Controversies over the between (and even within) use of the canón minero (the axis of climate change effects in Andean, Amazonian, and coastal Peru is water (e.g., glacier loss, legally mandated mining tax or Peruvian populations often leads levy) have contributed to conflict, wetlands, watersheds, lakes).

They believe there are significant exists at all. Information is challenges for ANA to meet its fragmented. SENAMHI staff noted obligations as the agency that, in addition to private responsible for water under Peru’s companies, universities and NGOs climate change strategy. ANA also have important data on sees a clear relationship between Peru’s water resources but, water scarcity, mining, and currently, there is no centralized conflict, especially as the repository or process to capture extractives sector continues these non-government sources of expanding. As one interviewee data and information. remarked, “a glance at the map of existing mining and oil Given the anticipated increase in concessions makes it seem as severe weather events resulting though the entire country has from climate change, the conflict been concessioned.” But the potential of natural disasters is largest immediate tasks for ANA another area of major concern. are institutional and informational. Here, too, the Peruvian Besides the decentralization government is cognizant of the “...INDECI staff was highly process now underway, the new dangers but is only just beginning to put in place the institutional attuned to the potential Water Resources Law requires ANA to participate in the creation arrangements that will need to linkages among climate and management of a hydrological respond to future crises. Under a change, water issues, network. However, there is no up- new law passed in May 2011, the to-date national inventory of water National Institute of Civil Defense natural disasters, and (INDECI) will no longer be the lead conflict. Their most resources or an information system to gather and disseminate agency dealing with natural immediate concern was data. ANA staff noted that this is disasters and risk management. the increasing number an instance where actors outside The National Center for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) is in charge of and volumes of glacial government also can make a contribution. For example, private planning, and the National Center lakes now being formed companies working on water for the Prevention of Disasters (CENAPRED) will be in charge of as a result of melting services, mining, and hydropower 13 glaciers and the growing have a great deal of information risk prevention. However, INDECI remains responsible for potential for glacial lake that could and should be incorporated into Peru’s water disaster preparedness, response, outbursts.” resources inventory. and rehabilitation, and regional and local governments are At the technical level, the primary responsible for the execution of responsibility for climate and water the necessary actions. information falls upon the National Meteorological and Hydrological In an interview with the research Service (SENAMHI). However, team, INDECI staff was highly SENAMHI faces a problem attuned to the potential linkages common to many meteorological among climate change, water agencies in developing issues, natural disasters, and countries—the growing attention conflict. Their most immediate to climate change has placed concern was the increasing increasing demands upon its number and volumes of glacial services without a corresponding lakes now being formed as a increase in budget resources. result of melting glaciers and the According to staff at SENAMHI, growing potential for glacial lake much of the data on Peru’s water outbursts. In their estimation, there basins is 20 to 25 years old, if it are now 14 or 15 lakes in Ancash that are in danger of producing

29 flash floods of the sort produced some moment, and water conflicts 70 years ago by Lake Palcacocha. can be expected to increase in the In fact, Lake Palcacocha itself has years ahead. MEM estimates that now returned to a water volume the value of mining project roughly equivalent to that at the investments expected in the next time of that disaster. Some glacier decade is in the range of $40 lakes have the added instability of billion to $50 billion, representing a lying along geological fault lines. huge expansion of the sector. At In the view of INDECI present, with rising metal prices, interviewees, there is an large mining companies that underappreciated risk of a glacial operated at an altitude of 4,000 to lake outburst producing a natural 5,000 meters are moving to lower disaster of major proportions, even altitudes with higher populations as Peru reconfigures its basic and more complex and more institutional mechanisms to easily mobilized communities. A respond to and address such a further contributor to conflict is the disaster. practice of smaller mining companies to initiate exploration Conversely, citizens feel and then sell their rights to larger threatened by large and sudden mining companies. Frequently, the water withdrawals from major smaller companies, working in a “The impacts of climate glacier lakes, as was the case in more speculative “start-up” mode change on water 2009 with the lowering of lake with a short time horizon, raise the levels in Lake Parón to supply the expectations of affected scarcity and water Cañón del Pato hydroelectric communities and pass these quality are bound to be facility operated by Duke Energy. community expectations along to important factors...with In that instance, farmers acted to larger companies that are not significant implications shut down the company’s prepared to meet them on a long- hydraulic machinery out of fear of term basis. for both potential the loss of their primary water conflict and the stability source. Communities in Huaylas Disputes over water will continue Province also feared that to arise due to its finite nature and and overall investment increased flows produced by the many competing uses, and climate climate of the mining release of lake waters would change will almost definitely add sector.” erode downstream irrigation additional stresses, but these systems. The changes in the disputes need not turn violent or number and size of glacier lakes intractable. Therefore, the brought about by climate change challenge for MEM is to find ways are making these water to encourage cooperative management issues ever more outcomes and to work with sensitive and prone to conflictive companies and communities to outcomes. help them manage conflict and avoid crises. This way of framing Mining, Water, and Conflict the near-to-medium term outlook At the Ministry of Energy and for mining and water conflicts, Mines, José Luis Carbajal, the which might be characterized as Director General of Social suboptimal-but-realistic, points to Management, observed that water a very tense conflict environment is “a very emotional issue and in affected areas for the situations evolve from conflict to foreseeable future. The impacts of crisis very rapidly.” In his climate change on water scarcity experience, nearly all water and and water quality are bound to be mining conflicts have violence at important factors within this

30 context, with significant He believes that the early stages According to Rosa Morales, implications for both potential of implementing the law are likely MINAM’s Director General for conflict and the stability and to be “explosive,” as poorly Climate Change, Desertification, overall investment climate of the prepared ministries try to and Water Resources, donors are mining sector. determine whether consultations mostly focused on climate are under their authority or not, mitigation, but the public in Peru is The MEM is especially troubled by how required consultations are to more concerned with the need for the explosion of artisanal, be done, and whether they have climate adaptation. Under her “informal” mining, which also the appropriate capacities to direction, the Climate Change Unit enters into competition and conflict implement the consultations and in MINAM is approaching over the use of water, among respond to public feedback and adaptation as a form of risk other resources. Artisanal mining concerns. management. The identification of is not merely “informal” but also risks is to be done through a illegal. In March 2012, a legislative Harmonizing Economic process of natural and social decree (Article 307-A) was added Development and vulnerability mapping. The results to the Penal Code to establish a Environmental Protection of that mapping will contribute to variety of sanctions, including While the Ministry of the the formulation of climate prison terms of up to 10 years, for Environment (MINAM) has a adaptation pilot projects and artisanal mining not authorized by number of direct responsibilities in address the broader challenge of proper government authorities or relation to climate change issues, land use planning. However, she resulting in environmental damage it was established only in 2008, noted that in relation to climate such as pollution of irrigation and it is just beginning to assert its change “the main issue is water.” systems or the fouling of water institutional presence within the intended for public consumption. Peruvian government. MINAM has The decentralization of Originally small-scale in both an intersectoral role and its legal environmental responsibilities to scope and the number of miners, framework is still evolving. As the regions is another major this sub-sector has grown very Eduardo Durand, the Director of challenge for the Climate Change rapidly, now reaching perhaps as the Office for Cooperation and Unit. More staff is needed at the many as 500,000 small-scale International Negotiations, put it, regional level to act upon the miners. While regional MINAM is still “trying to get powers vested at that level, governments have had oversight understood.” including issues such as forests responsibility, their enforcement of and land titles. MINAM would like laws and norms has been severely MINAM sees climate change to see its own staff in the capital lacking. Firearms, labor abuses, impacts affecting Andean working less on projects and more violence, and the use of toxic populations in very tangible on neglected public policy issues, chemicals such as mercury and ways—for example, while potato but the lack of budgetary cyanide are widespread. In the and corn cultivators are moving to resources often requires the nearly lawless environments higher altitudes as temperatures former at the expense of the latter. where illegal miners operate, increase, alpaca herders are being disputes over natural resources driven to lower altitudes in search One central challenge faced by have the potential to become of moister grass, resulting in MINAM is the need to harmonize lethal very quickly. increased potential for competition economic growth and over a shrinking resource base. environmental protection. Absent José Luis Carbajal also expressed However, the abundance of micro- that balance, socio-environmental concern about the new Law of climates and the tremendous conflicts will continue to grow in Prior Consultation, noting that in diversity of ecosystems and number, driven in part by the many areas in the high Andes and communities in the highlands pose increased awareness of the Amazon “the collective a difficult challenge in terms of indigenous groups of their rights memory of exploitation” leads mapping these trends through and state incapacity or many communities to say “no” to empirical data collection and unwillingness to enforce those new mining and hydrocarbon analysis. Improved science and rights. projects almost as an automatic technology are essential to help response. In his view, the activities Nonetheless, Durand sees the forestall resource conflicts and possibility of progress in a number of some activist NGOs have address these gaps. served to reinforce this disposition. of areas. Companies can move 31 toward models of responsible resources. However, the mining, with better information institutional responses to that systems and increased energy awareness and concern were efficiency. To date, responsible generally either in their early mining has been more a discourse stages or on the drawing board. than a reality. Similarly, Most of the interviewees saw the inappropriate and inefficient climate-conflict linkage enmeshed irrigation systems are wasting to a large degree in the large amounts of water, but better intersection of mining and water technology and improved water conflicts. management could achieve large savings in water use. Even if some There is a clear consensus that glaciers disappear entirely, there is an urgent need for more effective water management could and better climate data as well as fill the gap and generate viable the mapping of socio- alternatives to mitigate the environmental vulnerabilities reduction in water supply. under conditions of climate change. There also is an interest Unsurprisingly, MINAM believes and readiness to move forward on “...two trends appear to be that certain key functions not developing early warning clear. First, climate currently within its purview should mechanisms and adaptation be brought within its institutional measures to avert or mitigate change is likely to authority. For example, climate-related conflicts. A new continue to place environmental impact matrix of institutions is being additional stresses on assessments for mining projects developed to address natural water resources…. have been handled through the disasters. However, there is a very Ministry of Energy and Mines, not large need for capacity building Second, the continuing MINAM. Water issues are dealt and improved coordination among expansion of the mining with by ANA under the Ministry of the key players at both national sector is likely to bring Agriculture, not MINAM. If MINAM and subnational levels in this still- more conflict….These is to make a contribution to evolving climate change agenda in dispute resolution, more order to animate and sustain their two trends will likely institutional power will be required. efforts. interact in ways that After the cabinet shuffle in the reinforce or amplify the Humala government in December In the meantime, two trends 2011, the efforts of the new appear to be clear. First, climate country's conflict Minister of the Environment, change is likely to continue to dynamics.” Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, in trying to place additional stresses on water address the crisis over Newmont resources and sensitive highland Mining’s Conga project in ecosystems in Peru. Second, the Cajamarca reflected a potentially continuing expansion of the mining larger role for MINAM in mining sector is likely to bring more and water disputes.14 conflict for the foreseeable future. These two trends will likely interact The Need for Capacity Building in ways that reinforce or amplify and Coordination the country’s conflict dynamics. In Lima, interviewees at all of the However, an opportunity exists to relevant state institutions engage with and support Peru’s expressed awareness and emerging institutional responses concern about the relationship to climate change in ways that between climate change and the help to reduce the prospects for potential for conflict, especially conflict. those conflicts involving water

SANTA RIVER BASIN: erratic, highland pastures, INCREASING RISKS OF wetlands, and prairies are losing CLIMATE-RELATED their capacity to provide their CONFLICT AND EFFORTS TO usual sponge-like regulation and ORGANIZE A COLLECTIVE filtration of water flows and groundwater recharge. This is RESPONSE TO WATER endangering entire highland MANAGEMENT ecosystems in and around the CHALLENGES Park. Poor people are moving into Environmental Problems, higher reaches of the area, often Informational Gaps, and Limited having received titles or access as Resources patronage rather than on the basis The Santa River Basin in Ancash of prudent land use. Illegal miners “Diverse stakeholders in Region (the Basin also is partly also are moving into these located in La Libertad Region) is ecologically sensitive areas. and around Huaraz one of the areas most affected by Villanueva pointed out that these identified climate climate change in Peru. The Basin poorly regulated high-altitude change as an already is the most extensive on the settlements are not merely adding evident and tangible Pacific slope, ascending from sea to environmental stresses but also level to 22,205 feet at the peak of often are unsafe to the residents threat.” Huascarán. The Santa River flows themselves. As glacier lakes south to north between two increase in water volume, these ranges, the Cordillera Negra to the migrants are exposed to increased west and the Cordillera Blanca to risk of glacial lake outbursts. the east. The Cordillera Blanca is The condition of the Andean high, the highest tropical mountain range in the world (Obregón tropical montane vegetation and cloud forest soils known as the “The observed micro- 2009). The Santa River traverses the inter-Andean valley known as paramo exemplifies how climate climate changes the Callejón de Huaylas. This change can interact with and included hotter days valley is the home to several accelerate already occurring urban areas, including the city of landscape changes and threats to and colder nights, water supply. In these natural recurring and prolonged Huaraz. The field research team conducted interviews in Huaraz ecosystems, water is collected droughts, more intense and surrounding areas. from rainfall and fog interception and shorter (moisture absorbed from fog and Diverse stakeholders in and dew by the vegetation), while the precipitation, and more around Huaraz identified climate amount consumed by the intense frosts.” change as an already evident and vegetation and lost due to tangible threat. Ricardo evapotranspiration is low. Villanueva, the Head of Therefore, the water yield of the Huascarán National Park (PNH) drainage basin (surface runoff and within the National Service for ground water outflow) has been Natural Protected Areas found to be comparably greater (SERNANP), emphasized the than for other types of land use scope of observed climate change (Célleri and Feyen 2009; Tobón effects, which he said include but 2009). At the local level, go significantly beyond diminishing ecosystem degradation has water supply. With the loss of one- resulted from overgrazing, third of the glaciers of the expansion of the agricultural Cordillera Blanca, and as highland frontier, drainage of wetlands, temperatures increase and burning of pastures, and precipitation becomes more deforestation of shrublands. The

33 observed micro-climate changes environmental knowledge and these funds are rarely used to included hotter days and colder governance capacity in this area. address environmental threats, nights, recurring and prolonged In his view, one of the first and ecological restoration, or climate droughts, more intense and most urgent tasks is to determine change adaptation, despite their shorter precipitation, and more “what we have in the house” in centrality to the availability and intense frosts. A Quechua terms of an inventory of highland quality of water resources urgently expression has been coined by water resources, flora and fauna, needed for agriculture, mining, campesinos to refer to these livestock, and human occupation and human consumption. One changes—chirimanta and use of the land. Without this main stumbling block is the ruphaymanta, the cold and heat of basic knowledge, making informed manner in which the “participative the Andes—which have always decisions about land use and budget” is used to decide how existed, but never in as extreme a sharing water resources is funds from the mining canon are

CYNTHIA BRADY

ABOVE: An appeal for just distribution of taxes on mining enterprises in Ancash Region. form as seen now. These extremely difficult. This viewpoint used. Requirements for the conditions reflect the impact of the was reinforced by Jorge Recharte, preparation of project proposals interplay between global climate Director of the Andean Project of considered under the participative and local micro-climate alterations The Mountain Institute (TMI), who budget are onerous. But the (Torres and Gómez 2008). stated that, “in terms of greater challenge is that public information, it’s a desert.” TMI awareness and political Although the Huascarán National itself, an international NGO, is one preferences do not align with Park staff is asked for advisory of the main providers of environmental or climate change opinions on water use in the area, information to MINAM on the initiatives whose benefits may be decisions are made by the ALA, Andean paramos. perceived to be vague or in the which is generally more inclined to distant future. Rather, preference approve water use requests, given Mining is a constant presence in is given to immediate, practical, its mandate. Villanueva observed the area, and the mining canon and politically popular projects, that this is part of a more provides funds to regional and such as town soccer stadiums or generalized deficit of local governments. However, bricks-and-mortar infrastructure.

Given the persistent intersection of and at times torrential. Frosts also oxygen combine with sulfur to mining activities with water have become more common. This make sulfuric acid. The sulfuric conflicts of various sorts, this is a has both impacted agriculture and acid releases the toxic heavy somewhat ironic and disappointing affected pasture grasses. In metals found in the exposed outcome for local advocates of response, TMI is looking at the rocks, and they are then carried by urgent measures to reverse water water retention of different pasture glacier melt into surface and insecurity and conflicts in the grasses, and some communities ground waters. Traces already can Santa River Basin. are raising improved cattle breeds be found in the Rio Santa. In better able to withstand the addition to harmful effects on Climate Change and Water changes in weather and climate. human health, contaminated water Quality: A “Time Bomb?” is potentially a huge problem for Staff from TMI took the field At Canrey Chico, there appeared irrigated agriculture and high-value research team to the highland to be potentially serious problems exports like asparagus. The area around Canrey Chico in affecting water quality. Community situation is complicated Recuay, Ancash. There, TMI is leaders said they had observed considerably by the fact that toxic implementing projects with three changes in the appearance and heavy metals also are produced goals: improved pastures; mineral content of the waters of by mining throughout the region, improved water quality through the Rio Negro. This observation including mining taking place in restored wetlands; and applied was confirmed by TMI’s scientists protected areas. So, the problem research comparing improved in at least two locations. One is twofold: First, are toxic heavy water management in two paired explanation is that when the metals present in the water supply basins. Discussions began with glaciers recede and moraine is and to what extent? Second, are the community leaders of Canrey exposed, heavy metals with toxic they being produced by climate- Chico, who described a process of effects such as lead, mercury, related glacier melt or by mining learning and engagement over the arsenic, and cadmium can be operations? While techniques do past 20 years that has led to released into the water. TMI exist for the remediation of the improved pastureland and a confirmed that natural exposure presence of heavy metals in water reduction in conflicts. Key to these was the cause at one test site, sources, they require careful efforts has been the creation of an while in the second location the planning, significant technical improved water management toxicity could be traced back to a capacity, and effective group and increased production mining operation. In both cases, implementation. resulting from better agricultural the heavy metals present in the practices. The community water supply of communities could In the meantime, only limited president also noted that the produce serious health research is being conducted to community turned down an consequences through better understand the dimensions expression of interest from a contamination of drinking water, of the problem or the scope of the mining company six years ago in milk, and agricultural produce. challenge, and no government favor of protecting their health and Community leaders believe this institutions are taking action or way of life, an unusual act for a process may already be setting policies to address it. If this poor community in that area. happening in Canrey Chico, but looming problem is left While revenues might have been more study is needed to determine unaddressed, the question will lost, he said, residents were happy both the possible level of eventually become “who is to to be living free of conflict. Public contamination and the source. blame” and, in terms of conflict, “how will public grievances be services also have improved, and Professor Julio Palomino, an some young people who had manifested”? Obviously, the environmental scientist at the uncertainties about the source of emigrated to the coast have Universidad Nacional de Ancash returned. any specific instance of Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo contaminated water could lead to Nevertheless, both the Canrey (UNASAM), confirmed and serious conflict. Water resources Chico community leaders and TMI expanded upon the climate-related with toxic heavy metals produced staff noted climate-related threat posed to water quality. He “naturally” by climate change problems faced by the community. stated that many water sources could easily be attributed by In addition to the melting glaciers, now have traces of heavy metals. affected communities or seasonal rains have been erratic As the glaciers recede, water and

agricultural producers to higher predicted changes (percentage altitude mining operations. Water variation) in annual rainfall over contaminated by mining activities the Santa River Basin by the year could be alleged to be the 2030. On an annualized basis the “naturally” occurring consequence variation is not large, ranging from of glacier melt. Government a maximum 10 percent increase in authorities operating in this the upper basin to a maximum 10 ambiguous context will be hard percent decrease in the lower pressed to formulate a coherent basin, with most areas response to citizen grievances. experiencing a variation of 5 Palomino states flatly, “The issue percent or less. of water quality is a time bomb.” However, as shown in Figure 6, Climate Change and the picture is quite different for the “...the uncertainties about Institutional Weaknesses of projection of rainfall in 2030 over the source of any Water Users the Santa River Basin during the specific instance of One of the most important traditional heart of the rainy stakeholders groups in the season from December to contaminated water Callejón de Huaylas is the Water February. At this crucial time of could lead to serious Users Board (Junta de Usuarios). the year, reduced rainfall is conflict. Water The Callejón de Huaylas Water projected for the entire basin, with the most populated agricultural resources with toxic Users Board is made up of some 35 commissions, which administer areas falling in the range of a 15 heavy metals produced 650 irrigation canals used by percent to 20 percent decrease. ‘naturally’ by climate approximately 70,000 farmers. These projected changes, it change could easily be Agricultural production in the area should be remembered, are apart from the impact on water attributed by affected includes beans, carrots, corn, and squash. Producers are struggling resources of melting or communities or with a number of climate and disappearing glaciers at higher agricultural producers water-related difficulties. In the altitudes. to higher altitude mining past, very little irrigation was Conflicts over water scarcity needed between October and among water users in the Callejón operations. Water April, but according to Gaudencio contaminated by mining de Huaylas tend to take place Villavicencio, the president of the between those already coping with activities could be Water Users Board, “it now rains limited water supplies and more alleged to be the only half as much,” and there is favored beneficiaries. The Water little or no rain between October ‘naturally’ occurring Users Board distributes water first and January. Some people have to major canals, which results in consequence of glacier abandoned their plots because of conflicts with communities who melt. ” water scarcity. At the same time, use smaller canals with less water. he stated that many people in These conflicts may find their way Carhuaz have stopped planting into court or be expressed in because of the greater frequency actual physical confrontations. In and unpredictability of frosts. With either case, the pressures that production down, some people lead to such conflicts appear to be have emigrated from the region. increasing. These reports of shifts in weather Despite its large membership, the and the seasonality of rainfall may Callejón de Huaylas Water Users be harbingers of climate changes Board is relatively weak in terms that become more permanent over of both institutional capacity and time, as can be seen in Figures 5 influence. Villavicencio said that and 6. First, Figure 5 shows the the Water Users Board had

Figure 5: Predicted Change (Percentage Variation) in Annual Rainfall by 2030, Santa River Basin

SOURCE: SENAMHI submitted 111 project requests to he acknowledged that the Water pollution from mining. The Water the Ancash Regional Government Users Board also needs help to Users Board believes both formal over the past four years, but only improve its capacity to formulate and informal mining have 10 projects were approved and and submit proposals and introduced mercury and lead into are being currently implemented. complaints. With respect to the water supplies. In Anta, local While the Board views this as a latter, the Board has been quite health authorities determined that marked lack of attention on the ineffective in getting a response to water was unsafe for human part of the regional government, members’ complaints about consumption. However, both the

Figure 6: Predicted Change (Percentage Variation) in December–February Rainfall by 2030, Santa River

SOURCE: SENAMHI. Ministry of Energy and Mines and improved water management and By law, the region requires the Ombudsman’s office climate change adaptation have recipients of funding to operate determined that there was no faced a number of obstacles. To within an elaborate institutional water contamination. Hence, the encourage collaborative resource framework and to establish local factual basis of these potentially management, TMI is working with offices. This has proved to be a serious concerns remains unclear, the Commonwealth of laborious process, and although while public grievances remain Municipalities in three watersheds, the Commonwealth has made unaddressed. including the Santa River Basin. incremental progress in building The Commonwealth has tried to the requisite capacities, much Challenges of Regional and access funds from the more remains to be done. Local Water Governance participatory budget in Ancash Initial efforts to organize a Region but by late 2011 it had only Larger structural political problems collective response to the need for received funding for three projects. also make coordination on water

38 management issues difficult. The Huaraz), loss of endemic species, Portocarrero argues that Andean basic asymmetry hampering and cultivators migrating to higher water management needs to take action is that the high basin areas altitudes for agricultural an entirely new strategic direction. are the source of water, while the production. Cesar Portocarrero, He stated that it is far more cost lower basin agricultural areas are former director of the Huaraz effective to store water in smaller, both the largest consumers of Glaciology Unit of ANA, noted high altitude lakes than massive water for irrigation and the home that, despite significant glacier dam projects near the coast. For to the main centers of loss, water scarcity issues are example, according to his figures, administrative and political generally not connected by the saving water in a highland lake influence. For example, the public to climate change but rather would cost 3 cents to 10 cents per Chavimochic irrigation project is viewed simply as water cubic meter, while a dam on the managed by the downstream governance problems per se. coast costs $1 to $15 per cubic water users, who prioritize plentiful Water issues are highly meter. At the same time, water access and persuasively contentious and water-related Portocarrero did not minimize the communicate their needs to conflicts are numerous, but the growing significance of climate powerful political supporters. Yet, problem is not one of absolute change. He emphasized the water conservation and the scarcity. The more immediate importance of such measures as prevention of overgrazing in the problem is extremely poor water highland reforestation and small upper basin are the essential management in the agricultural lake reservoirs as responses to challenges that must be sector, which consumes some 80 broader changes in the overall addressed if sustainable water percent of the total water supply. hydrological regime. Portocarrero supplies are to be maintained for ANA analyses suggest that also highlighted the dangers of water users downstream. traditional irrigation is using 5 to 7 glacier melt avalanches and the Moreover, the failure to regulate times the water necessary for need for drainage tunnels, dams, and store water flows in the upper cultivation, a situation that could and glacier lake-lowering basin has serious implications for be rectified with modernized drip measures (Haeberli et al. 2011).15 the long-term viability of water irrigation. Though less Overall, he sees the fundamental infrastructure in the lower basin. consequential for the overall challenge of improved water One local academic reported that hydrological balance, water also is management as “not scientific but estimates are that removing wasted as the result of poor social.” sediment from the Chavimochic infrastructure in urban settings. canal due to the high sediment David Ocaña, the Ancash content of the Santa River would Climate change does complicate Regional Coordinator for CARE, cost 10 million soles water scarcity, however. Julio also cautioned that the task of (approximately $3.7 million). Palomino directed attention to how promoting more efficient use of Water basin councils will need to the specific timing and location of water through modernized find ways to integrate and balance water shortages drives conflict. irrigation and improved agricultural these competing upstream and Seasonal rainfall patterns appear practices is more complex than downstream water management to be increasingly erratic, and the might be immediately apparent imperatives and political realities. key factor for stability is the and requires close attention to availability of water at the actual sensitive issues of governance While glacier melt and water moment in time that it is needed. and public expectations. For scarcity are often viewed as the Similarly, water deficits may be example, CARE has found that the main problems resulting from spread unevenly across water transference of successful climate change, municipal officials basins. In the Santa River Basin, irrigation technology from the from Carhuaz cited a number of the Cordillera Blanca has both coast to the sierra is not a other manifestations of climate glacier and rainwater supplies, straightforward matter because of change, including changes in while the Cordillera Negra is the much more atomized land seasonal rain and frost patterns, dependent on rainfall. While there holdings in the highlands. The an increase in agricultural pests, are some efforts to transfer water average irrigated plot in the sierra diseases moving to higher across basins, this is often a is about one-half hectare, while altitudes (e.g., bartomelosis), contentious process, and inter- plots near the coast may be as phytosanitary problems, basin conflicts are likely to large as 50 hectares. Traditions opportunistic species (e.g., a become more acute as and customary practices also play surge in the rat population in mismanaged supplies dwindle. an important role in changing 39 water use practices. Ocaña noted districts like San Marcos benefiting that farmers generally seek to far more than many other poorer retain their allotted hours of areas, thus generating grievances irrigation rights even after among the population. Second, technological improvements local governments frequently have reduce the time needed to achieve difficulty executing their budgets, the same or better results, often especially in their first year in leading to some users wasting office. The last administration in water while other users go without. San Marcos could only execute 20 percent of its budget in its first Hence, at present, the primary year, although the rate improved problem and contributor to conflict over time. In fact, the lack of is not absolute water scarcity but capacity of local governments to poor water governance, a problem execute their budget was a that in principle could be problem mentioned by a number addressed through demand-side of interviewees throughout the management interventions and the field research. Hence, poor water strategic application of management at the local level is development resources. However, the result of a tangle of factors, the current dysfunctionality of including skewed and squandered “Water issues are highly water management is a reflection financial resources, lack of contentious and water- of the fact that the politics and attention, and low implementation related conflicts are cultural underpinnings of water capacity. governance are thorny and numerous, but the complex. Regional water The key question is how to forge a problem is not one of governance policy reforms and social consensus in support of the absolute scarcity. The project initiatives will need to be appropriate institutional crafted and implemented with arrangements and technical more immediate extreme conflict sensitivity. measures at both the regional and problem is extremely local levels. Integrated water basin poor water management Similarly, the local political system management (or integrated water has failed to respond well to the resources management), starting in the agricultural need for improved water with micro-basins and moving to sector, which consumes management and water sub-basins and macro-basins, is some 80 percent of the conservation. Revenues from the regarded by many water experts total water supply.” mining canon have been devoted to be the crucial mechanism for to patronage-based job creation linking effective social participation rather than pressing with practical and appropriate environmental concerns. In the scientific technologies for sound district of San Marcos, for water management.16 It is also example, which has grown clearly one of the keys to conflict wealthy rapidly as a result of prevention and mitigation in mining funds derived mostly from Ancash, not to mention the central Antamina, citizens are hired to do organizing principle promoted by public works at salaries far over those environmental experts with market rates. According to Dante whom the research team met. For Cruz of ProParticipación, a local the Santa River Basin, this means NGO, the situation has become so creating and supporting efforts distorted that teachers take leave that enable the effective to engage in these jobs. participation of all stakeholders in Two other concerns also are the upper, middle, and lower basin problematic. First, the distribution communities. of the revenues from the mining canon is very uneven, with a few

Poor Governance, Weak of information sharing, and Conflict Management, and New communication between private Water Basin Initiatives companies and communities is The national Ombudsman’s extremely poor and unreliable. monthly reports show that Ancash When the Local Water Authority is consistently one of the most did serve a rumor control function conflictive regions in the country, in the Lake Conococha dispute by and most of the conflicts are providing needed public related to water scarcity, water information, tensions were quickly contamination, poor governance, lowered. Second, the media tend and extractive industries. Two to inflame issues rather than recent high-profile cases provided provide key information to the examples. The first was Duke public. Third, leadership and clear Energy’s excessive water institutional mandates are withdrawals from Lake Parón and lacking—in some cases, leaders the resulting takeover of the of campesino groups are actually “Integrated water basin company’s hydraulic machinery by not representative of anyone, and management (or angry and exasperated farmers in others uncertainties about from Huaylas Province. The institutional competencies lead to integrated water second was a more recent conflict collective inaction. Public officials resources concerning the use of the waters have very little training in dealing management), starting of Lake Conococha by with resource conflicts. Fourth, Chancadora Centauro, a gold there are two major lacunae in with micro-basins and mining company. Lake Conococha dealing with climate change and moving to sub-basins is important to citizens of the water conflicts—the lack of a and macro-basins, is region both as a source of water regional environmental authority regarded by many water for agriculture and for cultural and the absence of any sort of reasons. In this case, protestors land use planning. Without these experts to be the crucial alleged that the mining company key elements of policy planning mechanism for linking had failed to consult all of the and regulatory enforcement, effective social communities affected by their suboptimal outcomes and chronic participation with operations, which residents feared disputes are almost inevitable. would deplete and contaminate practical and the lake waters. In December Rodríguez recognizes the linkage appropriate scientific 2010, protestors were met with between climate change and conflict and its growing technologies for sound tear gas, shots were fired, one demonstrator was killed, and three importance. She has been in water management.” were injured. It was this act of discussion with Ricardo Villanueva violence that threatened to turn of Huascarán National Park about the situation into a larger and the possibility of conflict mapping more explosive confrontation. for highland areas within Ancash. They believe that identifying and These and other cases reflect a tracking conflict patterns within number of important deficiencies areas vulnerable to climate in conflict management in the change can be a powerful tool in region. First, there is a huge lack conflict prevention and conflict of reliable information. According management. At present, they to Editha Rodríguez, the Chief of lack funding to proceed with such the Ombudsman’s office in a project. Ancash Region, while individual offices may have pieces of However, Rodríguez shared relevant information, governments information with the research team at all levels do not have a culture about the Foro Agua Santa, a much larger, multistakeholder

41 initiative. The Foro Agua Santa is defining and highly conflictive organized by a group of issue everywhere, but the central organizations from civil society, concern of the population is water, academia, and government, whether it is related to the including such participants as degradation of the paramos or UNASAM, ALA-Huaraz, sedimentation in large-scale SERNANP, CARE, Huaylas downstream irrigation projects. municipality, large-scale commercial enterprises, water TMI’s most recent work is its users organizations, and The program “From the Peaks to the Mountain Institute, among others Coast” (De las Cumbres a la (see foroaguasanta.org). The Foro Costa), which tries to address the aims at creating space for challenge of climate change dialogue among all the adaptation through the stakeholders, public and private, development of effective local as well as upstream and institutions (see downstream, in the Santa River cumbrescosta.mountain.pe). The Basin. According to the Foro’s program is implemented in program document, this dialogue conjunction with the Network of hopes to mobilize an effective Rural Municipalities of Peru response to the recognition that (REMURPE) in Ancash and Piura “the basin is sick and increasingly regions. In Ancash, TMI is vulnerable” with “water supply supporting the development of a exceeded by growing demands of commonwealth of communities within the Santa, Fortaleza, and “...mining remains a multiple users, both in the upper defining and highly and middle basin as well as zones Pativilca basins with a view toward along the coast.” These conditions enhancing their collective capacity conflictive issue are driven by population growth, to better manage Andean highland everywhere, but the environmental degradation, ecosystems. TMI hopes that the central concern of the mining, and climate change, with entire program will be informed by the consequence that “all of these new data on climate change in the population is water...” processes are affecting the water high mountain areas generated by regime of the basin and an Andean Community (CAN) generating conflicts among the initiative among mostly non- actors.” governmental organizations that is served by an executive secretariat The Mountain Institute, with the based at the Consortium for support of USAID, has taken a Sustainable Development of the leading role in supporting the Andean Eco-Region launch of the Foro Agua Santa. (CONDESAN) in Lima. This is in line with its mission objectives over the past 15 years The Peaks to the Coast program of working with mountain goes beyond local interests to try communities to improve natural to link highland and coastal resource management, strengthen communities in mutually beneficial livelihoods, and preserve fragile dialogue and action. As an mountain ecosystems. Many of example, Recharte remarked upon the lessons learned by TMI derive TMI’s experience with dialogue from earlier work aimed at involving the irrigation users of increasing dialogue between San Lorenzo, a middle basin area communities and mining located in Piura. Through those companies. According to Jorge discussions, farmers in San Recharte, mining remains a Lorenzo became better informed about the close linkages between

the conditions of the highland HIGHLAND AREAS OF paramos and the lower AREQUIPA REGION: watersheds crucial to their needs. REGIONAL GOVERNMENT As a result, they recognized their AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES own interests and became IN SEARCH OF advocates for the environmental INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE concerns of highland communities and were able to add their political Climate Change and Social influence in the consideration of Vulnerabilities those issues. In Arequipa Region, challenges of climate change are daunting. The The sorts of collaborative climate is arid, and water dialogues represented by the Foro management is a critical issue. Santa Agua and From the Peaks Glacier water is essential for to the Coast seemed to the field irrigation and human consumption. research team to be key “bright Cutting across Arequipa Region is spots” that could be built on in the Ocoña River Basin, whose beginning to address important waters originate in the snow and climate change and conflict ice cover of Coropuna, a linkages. In Ancash, not only is “In Ancash, not only is snowcapped mountain that has climate change already evident been greatly reduced in size by climate change already and extremely likely to increase the effects of global warming. The evident and extremely but through its effects on both Ocoña River Basin is a crucial likely to increase but water quality and water quantity it productive zone that is bordered is inextricably linked to water by desert to both the north and the through its effects on conflicts, which are the main south. Both daytime and nighttime both water quality and source of tensions and instability maximum temperatures have water quantity it is in the region. Water conflicts are increased in Arequipa, and as a often linked to citizen fears about inextricably linked to consequence of more frequent the effects of mining on water drought some farmers have water conflicts, which availability and water quality—and abandoned their lands. are the main source of mining is continuing to expand Desertification has advanced in tensions and instability throughout the region. Climate some parts of the region, while the change also is altering the highlands have seen a reduction in the region.” agricultural and pastoral frontiers, in wetlands, springs, and lakes. thus driving localized migration Other manifestations of climate that contributes to competition. change have included an increase Jorge Recharte noted that TMI in extreme weather events, has focused so far on climate including frosts, freezes, and hail, change adaptation, but he as well as downpours that have observed that in order to achieve led to landslides, floods, and crop its goals with respect to losses. Competition and conflict sustainability, preventing conflict over scarce water is on the rise, could be added as an essential involving the competing interests component of the agenda of the of pastoralists, irrigation users, Peaks to Coasts program and the communities, and both legal and efforts of REMURPE. With the illegal mining operations. deepening interrelationships among climate change and the In Arequipa, the nongovernmental other conflict factors identified organization most directly above, there would appear to be a engaged with communities to compelling logic for taking this address the issues of climate next step. change and climate adaptation is the Association Specializing in

Sustainable Development low in many areas. When natural local leaders and regional and (AEDES). It was clear to the field hazards such as landslides and local governments, and research team that, under the floods strike, they are sometimes incorporation of traditional direction of Dr. Karen Kraft, amplified by poor water knowledge in climate change AEDES has developed high levels management practices, and the adaptation. With funding from of trust in its working relationships response capacity of local USAID, AEDES will work with with highland communities government is very limited, producer families and threatened by climate change. resulting in the loss of life and municipalities in La Unión, AEDES staff provided details livelihoods. Condesuyos, and Caylloma about climate change effects and provinces for the next three years how they interact with the social Irrigation is essential to on managing climate risks and vulnerability of affected agriculture, but in many areas promoting local development. populations in the region. there is very weak organization and management of irrigation Although AEDES does not While poverty is the fundamental systems. Moreover, the whole currently work directly on conflict contextual vulnerability, there are issue of water rights is one fraught issues, its staff shared with the also a wide variety of micro- with the potential for conflict. field research team preliminary climates, livelihoods, and types of When land reform was carried out conflict mapping that they have crop production affecting in Arequipa (and elsewhere) in the done for the areas in which they community level vulnerabilities 1970s, it was not accompanied by are working in the Ocoña River and resiliencies. The Ocoña River a redistribution of water rights. Basin. The great majority of these Basin itself can be divided and Therefore, the rights to use water conflicts (29) were water conflicts, classified into 22 different for irrigation are generally arguably affected directly or ecological or livelihood zones. inefficient, inequitable, and still indirectly by climate change. Other High altitude peasant families disproportionately concentrated in conflicts (16) were categorized as have little or no access to basic a few hands. Those small farmers disputes over mining and water, services, while those in the middle who benefited from the land mining, land ownership, basin may have water, sanitation, reform did not receive water rights boundaries, and water pollution. In and electricity, if they live in more in sufficient quantity to meet their principle, it would be possible to urban areas. irrigation needs. The inequalities refine conflict mapping exercises among irrigation users and of this sort to identify and analyze In the highland pastoral areas, as uncertainties about water supply, climate-conflict linkages and water supplies decrease, the whether organizational or climate- propose climate adaptation remaining water is prone to related, create insecurities that interventions that also might avert contamination that produces contribute to conflict. or mitigate conflict. illnesses in both people and their cattle. In some areas, as a result In response to the negative effects Regional Environmental of changing weather patterns, the of climate change on landscapes Governance: A New Resource variety of food crops that are and livelihoods as well as the for Conflict Management? traditionally produced is institutional shortcomings that fail One of the weaknesses in diminishing, and those yields that to provide—or hinder—community environmental governance in Peru are realized are losing nutritional resilience, AEDES works with is at the level of regional value. Malnutrition is common. community groups and government. This makes Arequipa With the decline and diminishing municipalities on a broad an interesting case, as it is the appeal of traditional livelihoods, spectrum of activities to confront only region to have its own there is a marked migration of climate change. These include Regional Environmental Authority young people toward towns or research on ecosystems, (ARMA), with a much broader artisanal mining centers, and monitoring of glacier retreat, mandate than the natural schools are closing in some areas environmental education, resources management offices where the student population has assistance in strategic planning, found in other regions. For decreased sharply. Left behind is soil and water conservation, example, according to the a vulnerable and aging population. reforestation, improvement of manager of ARMA, Aníbal Díaz, The resilience of the local irrigation, promotion of organic and Gladys Márquez, its conflict population to natural hazards is production, capacity building for

specialist, ARMA approves EIAs said that conflict remains latent for all issues within its purview, rather than resolved. and it is seeking to build its capacity to anticipate and prevent A second regional dispute is conflicts. Given the centrality of taking place between Arequipa water issues, Arequipa also is and Cuzco. One of the most establishing the Water Institute, important economic development which will have key responsibilities initiatives in Arequipa is the “The inequalities among in implementing water projects in massive Majes Siguas II irrigation irrigation users and the region, such as the project. According to Díaz, there are 38,000 hectares to be added uncertainties about construction of dams and irrigation canals. in the latest expansion of the water supply, whether project. However, authorities in organizational or As a relatively new authority, Cuzco Region (notably, Espinar ARMA has a varied and complex Province) have objected that climate-related, create agenda that places a large burden citizens there were not properly insecurities that on a small staff. To date, the consulted and might be left without contribute to conflict.” region’s climate change strategies water once the infrastructure is in have focused mostly on place. Díaz felt that the irrigation establishing and enforcing project should take priority over protected areas and supporting what he perceived as Cuzco’s less biodiversity. However, Díaz and pressing needs, but he recognized Márquez said that climate change the volatility produced by the is clearly contributing to water differing regional and individual scarcity and the entire array of perspectives. water conflicts in the region. Some of these are cross-border conflicts Although fewer in number than in with neighboring regions, while Ancash, there also are water others involve water issues and conflicts between large mining both legal and illegal mining. As companies and communities in drought and increasing Arequipa. In one highly temperatures place further controversial case, farmers from pressures on water supplies, the Tambo Valley blocked the “...climate change is climate change is increasingly part road between the city of Arequipa of the mix. and Islay Province to protest clearly contributing to Southern Copper’s Tia Maria open water scarcity and the One such recent conflict was the pit copper mine. Production in the entire array of water “war over water” on the border valley includes agro-industrial rice conflicts in the between Arequipa and Moquegua, and sugar cane plantations as well the region that lies to its south. In as smaller crops of olives and hot region....One such that dispute, the Ministry of peppers. Producers feared that recent conflict was the Agriculture divided water the Tia Maria mining operations in 'war over water' on the management of the Tambo Valley the mountains would divert water border between water basin between the two and contaminate both water and regions. The governor of Arequipa soil in agricultural areas near the Arequipa and protested that no other watershed coast. After clashes between Moquegua....” in the country was divided protestors and police resulted in between two administrations in several fatalities, the Peruvian such a manner. Eventually, the government announced the situation was calmed by a cancellation of the mining project negotiation ensuring Arequipa’s in April 2011, citing inadmissible access to increased water flows in deficiencies in the mine’s the dry season. However, Díaz environmental impact assessment.

PANORAMIO ABOVE: The Coropuna snowpeak seen across the paramo, Arequipa.

Illegal, small-scale, artisanal, and The regulation and oversight of environmental conflicts, she said “informal” mining is an even small-scale, artisanal, and informal that assistance to communities greater concern in Arequipa than mining is the responsibility of the and organizations to help them in Ancash, and it leads to many regional government, but lack of review and understand EIAs would conflicts over both water supplies capacity combined with the be highly beneficial. For example, and water quality. ARMA dispersed and growing numbers of in the case of the Tia Maria mine, estimates there are now 30,000 artisanal miners makes this an civil society groups were only illegal miners in Arequipa, driven extraordinarily difficult task. given 30 days to review a highly in part by rising gold prices. In complex EIA. some areas, informal mining has According to Gladys Márquez, lead to a proliferation of wells that ARMA would like to place more More generally, both Díaz and are depleting the water supply. emphasis on conflict prevention Márquez noted ARMA’s need for Water contamination also is an than other institutions. The more staff and financial resources. issue. Such chemicals as mercury, Ombudsman’s office must wait for For example, just to visit an area cyanide, boron, and arsenic have conflicts to become manifest, of water conflicts in the highlands been detected in streams. Some while ANA processes existing often requires a full day’s travel. of these are more likely to have cases through tribunals. Lacking Clearly, there are also limits to the been produced by industrial clear alternatives, communities kinds of conflicts in which ARMA mining (climate change does not sometimes ask ARMA to intervene can play a central role—for appear to be a significant factor), in conflicts, even though it does example, disputes between but mercury and cyanide are used not have the necessary authority. regional governments must be in informal mining to amalgamate As a result of this demand, she resolved at a higher level—but it gold. Some of these toxic observed that ARMA’s staff was has considerable potential for contaminants have been found in badly in need of conflict training. conflict prevention at the local shrimp, which is a major food With respect to building capacity in level. The field research team was commodity produced in Arequipa. civil society to deal with impressed by ARMA’s

engagement with emerging another highly problematic issue; climate-conflict linkages and its some issues fall between the focus on conflict prevention. As cracks because no institution is such, it may be an emerging deemed responsible for them. model of one viable institutional Enforcement also is sometimes response to the intersection of suspect. The Ombudsman’s staff climate change, water-intensive gave the example of an EIA large-scale projects in the mining approved by the Ministry of Mines and agricultural sectors, and and Energy that was referred to conflicts over diminishing water the UNDP for review, whereupon it supplies. As with all of the received more than 100 critical Defensorías, the mandate of the observations of deficiencies. At Arequipa Ombudsman’s office is the same time, the Ombudsman’s one of horizontal accountability— staff believes that in response to to be “a stone in the shoe of the this mistrust and growing socio- authorities,” as one staff person environmental concerns, people put it. Although the Ombudsman’s are becoming better organized office seeks to serve a conflict and more prepared to confront early warning function when state authorities. possible, in practice disputes require that several criteria be The Ombudsman’s office has great concern about water issues, “Illegal, small-scale, fulfilled before they are termed a “conflict.” These include the which dominate the many socio- artisanal, and ‘informal’ involvement of more than one environmental conflicts reported to mining is an even actor, some form of public the office. Moreover, the office greater concern in demand, and the manifestation of recognizes that climate change is very likely to have an important Arequipa than in some sort of “outburst.” As a result, more than 50 percent of impact on water conflicts. In 2012, Ancash, and it leads to conflicts involve some act of the Ombudsman’s office will be many conflicts over violence prior to their listing in the conducting a study to better office’s monthly reports. However, determine the nature and extent of both water supplies and climate-related linkages to social water quality.” the Ombudsman’s office tries to provide public information and conflicts. One example cited by support dialogue to dispel rumors, the Ombudsman’s staff involved which are one of the main conflict Aracel, a gold mining company. triggers in Arequipa. The provision Aracel is seeking to set up of accurate information on operations in the already resource conflicts is one of the threatened wetlands near the most badly needed services in the source of the Cotahuasi River. region. Here, as in other instances, one main pathway to conflict appears Environmental conflicts have to be the intersection of climate become more acute in Arequipa in change, fragile ecosystems, recent years. According to Manuel depleted and degraded water Amat, the Head of the resources, and the water demands Ombudsman’s office, public trust of extractive industries. of government institutions is low, in part because when agreements With 109 districts to cover in to resolve conflicts are reached Arequipa Region, the the compliance rate is low, and it Ombudsman’s office is yet one is often the government authorities more institution stretched thin. who fail to fulfill the agreement. However, the staff has a clear Institutional competence is focus on socio-environmental issues as a central concern, and

they indicated an interest in decreasing due to these climatic partnering with like-minded and environmental organizations. With additional transformations, and scarcity is support, they feel they can move producing localized conflicts forward on what the research among water users. team found to be an evolving but well-articulated agenda for the Mining, especially the expansion future that explicitly plans to take of informal mining, was identified into account the linkages between as a growing irritant and source of climate change and conflict. water conflicts in relation to both water supply and water Environmental and Climate contamination. One participant Challenges at the Community posed the dilemma succinctly: Level: Crisis or Resilience? “Mining requires water, and there In an open meeting in is no water.” A colleague added, Chuquibamba in Condesuyos “Informal miners will take water no Province attended by a diverse matter what, for good or for bad.” “In an open meeting in group of more than 40 participants Another said simply, “Mining is Chuquibamba in from highland communities in conflict.” As the water supply becomes ever more unpredictable Condesuyos Province surrounding districts, a discussion of climate change produced an and scarce, grievances related to attended by a diverse outpouring of worries, complaints, the intersection of mining and group of more than 40 and laments concerning changes competition for water will likely be participants from in the area’s weather, landscapes, aggravated. highland communities in and livelihoods. Participants The sense of approaching crisis agreed that, in addition to the was expressed in a number of surrounding districts, a obvious shrinkage of Coropuna’s statements made by the discussion of climate snowcap and resulting water attendees. As one participant put change produced an scarcity, temperatures are it, “We don’t have an increasing and frosts occur with outpouring of worries, environmental culture. Everyone is greater intensity. As in Ancash, suffering from climate change and complaints, and laments rains have become less reliable no one is doing anything.” A concerning changes in and more forceful in the rainy representative from the local the area’s weather, season. There are many agricultural association said, “We consequences of these changes landscapes, and are not mindful. We do not for plants, animals, and humans. reforest, and we need to stop livelihoods.” In the highlands, pastures no using agrochemicals.” Several longer grow as they once did, and participants complained about the the milk production of camelids ways in which governments are (llamas, alpacas, vicuñas) and contributing to conflict. The budget cattle (goats, bovines) is declining. of the provincial municipality is Skin cancer is on the rise. Even distributed very inequitably, and the frogs of the wetlands have favored organizations monopolize disappeared. Increasing benefits, thereby angering those population and the search for who feel marginalized. The head firewood for sale has contributed of the local water users board to deforestation through the exclaimed, “This community is clearing of tola (shrubs) and about to die and has been headed queñuales (hardy layered-bark toward a collapse for some time trees of the polylepsis species). now. Coropuna no longer has a This has resulted in erosion and snowpeak—it is a little hat. This is further loss of water resources. an emergency.” The water for irrigation is

However, just as striking as the issue of how to prevent and source of competition for sense of urgency imparted by the manage conflicts was largely left diminishing water supplies and participants about climate change hanging. Water conflicts were aggravating social relations. As in and conflicts was their resilient seen as within the purview of the Ancash, large-scale commercial attitude and determination to take water users board, but many producers along the coast require steps to address the situation. conflicts fall outside of its increasing amounts of water. Several main areas for action competence. In a separate Water conflicts with Moquegua were identified. One top priority conversation with Manchego, the and Cuzco Regions continue to was reforestation, including the research team asked him how he simmer. Flawed governance, replacement of eucalyptus with dealt with conflicts brought to his institutional gaps, and a lack of pines, in order to combat water attention by constituents. He said clarity about institutional authority scarcity and its effects on that he tried to resolve them add to citizen frustrations. vegetation and animals in high through his own influence and altitude communities. A second good offices, and if that were not On the other side of the ledger, was related to water management, possible he referred the however, there are clear including improved irrigation, complainants to what he thought opportunities to build on resilient water conservation, and more to be the relevant institutional community attitudes, new rational water distribution. A third, authority. This somewhat ad hoc institutional opportunities, and the linked to the other two, was a approach also seemed to possibility of forging new critical need to educate reconfirm the gap, or at least partnerships to advance conflict communities about climate disconcerting fuzziness, in prevention and mitigation. change, environmental change, managing conflicts in Arequipa, Communities and municipalities and their options for adaptation. even as water-related conflicts, generally have strong capacity for There was a clear consensus on linked in part to climate change, self-organization, although the urgent need for raising seem very likely to increase in resources and technical expertise community awareness and number. However, the highland are often limited. Relatively new empowering citizens to shift from communities of the Ocoña River institutions like ARMA and the behaviors that aggravate negative Basin are not lacking in their Ombudsman’s office in Arequipa climate change effects to those resolve to address their have a strong commitment to that mitigate them. environmental and climate addressing environmental conflicts challenges. It was clear to the field and a clear sense of the relevant Underlying the discussion of these research team that support to issues, although they, too, have issue-areas was an even more strengthen highland communities’ resource constraints. AEDES fundamental exchange among organizational capacities has appears to be successfully participants about mechanisms for strong potential to advance both implementing a comprehensive self-organization, from the level of climate adaptation and conflict set of programs to advance neighborhoods up to communities prevention and mitigation. climate adaptation. If these and towns. In the words of one emerging and evolving efforts participant, “We need to be talking In Arequipa Region, conflict is at could be brought into a more about these things all the time.” At lower levels than in Ancash, but it coherent set of working the conclusion of the meeting, the appears likely to increase, driven relationships or collaborative participants agreed to form in part by climate change. Water partnerships focused on improving committees coordinated by Angelo scarcity and the deterioration of social cohesion and institutional Manchego, the mayor of ecosystems in the sierra are performance, there could be Condesuyos province, to follow up threatening livelihoods and driving significantly improved prospects on the three identified themes: some highland communities for managing and mitigating the reforestation; improving irrigation; toward crisis. Climate-related growing potential for conflicts and educational projects. water scarcity exacerbates linked to the harmful effects of tensions around poor water climate change. Yet, despite this positive outcome management and the inefficient and fairly extensive discussion of and inequitable distribution of the problems of water conflicts water for agriculture. Informal and among irrigation users, illegal mining is creating a new communities, and miners, the

CYNTHIA BRADY ABOVE: An open meeting to discuss the effects of climate change in Chuquibamba, Arequipa. THE ECONOMICS OF adaptation. The policy is to be the costs. Even though NATIONAL GOVERNMENT implemented through the use of quantification goes beyond the POLICIES AND CIVIL increased information, clearly scope of this short study, it is clear SOCIETY PARTICIPATION defined institutional roles to the field research team that the As a concluding note, two areas of (designated national agencies), negative effects of climate change strong influence are worth special and tangible incentives created by and conflict pose what are mention in relation to efforts to various economic instruments. potentially very high costs for the Peruvian economy. avoid climate-related conflict in Javier Roca, the Director General Peru: 1) central government for International Economic Affairs, At a minimum, climate change perspectives on the economics of Competitiveness, and Productivity, effects are likely to include such climate change and conflict and 2) said that in order to frame policy factors as huge losses of civil society participation and the Peruvian government will be ecosystem services in the Andean advocacy in relation to those producing something akin to its highlands, reduced agricultural issues. “own version of the Stern Review,” and pastoral productivity, loss As in most countries, the ministry the famous 2006 study on the of livelihoods in the countryside, that controls the purse strings— economics of climate change led rural-to-urban migration, increased the Ministry of Economy and by Sir Nicolas Stern of the United public health problems, and more Finance (MEF)—is in many ways Kingdom. This is a fairly ambitious frequent and costly natural the most powerful in Peru. The statement about which one might disasters. MEF intends to emphasize risk be forgiven for some degree of skepticism, if one recalls that the As for conflict, it is almost management, market axiomatic that its costs regularly mechanisms, performance main conclusion of the Stern Review’s cost-benefit analysis was surpass original estimates. In the measures, and accountability to Peruvian case, the key factor drive the nation’s climate change that the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweigh linking climate and conflict may be policies for both mitigation and the intensification of water

conflicts related to water quantity, private partnerships wherever water quality, and water access in possible. Ministries and the extractives and agricultural governments that achieve goals sectors. As mining concessions for sound environmental move from exploration to active management will be rewarded by operations in more and more continued or additional funding. areas of the country already The country’s districts have been experiencing climate-related prioritized based on estimates of stresses, the potential for conflict their present capacity. will increase. As shown by the state of emergency declared by The MEF is very aware, Roca President Humala in relation to the said, of the potential for climate- Conga project in December 2011, related water conflicts. From the such conflicts may have national MEF’s point of view, the failure to ramifications. If they become price water is the main obstacle to chronic, they can have a more its rational use. As he said, from “In the Peruvian case, the permanent chilling effect on the an economic point of view, “it does key factor linking entire investment climate for have a price, like it or not.” The climate and conflict may extractive industries in the country, MEF also recognizes, however, that some conflict is inevitable in be the intensification of with very large negative economic consequences. From a relation to water issues. First, in water conflicts related to sociocultural point of view, it is addition to the effects of climate water quantity, water also worth remembering that there change, as the country moves is a kind of congruence in the forward with economic quality, and water development, there will be more access in the extractives resentment of Andean populations toward mining and their feelings of pollution. Second, there are and agricultural sectors. helplessness in the face of climate intercultural conflicts between the As mining concessions change—both are woes visited “two logics” of the central upon them by wealthy outsiders.17 government in Lima and move from exploration campesino communities in the to active operations in According to Roca, the executing Andean highlands. Dialogue and more and more areas of agencies for climate adaptation positive incentives based on the country already will be coordinated through a tangible results are the National Program for the mechanisms that are seen as experiencing climate- Management of Climate Change bridges to overcome these related stresses, the (PRONAGCC) run as an conflicts. potential for conflict will interagency process (MEF, MINAM, Ministry of Foreign How and whether this entire increase.” Affairs, and regional and local process will work in practice government representatives) remains unclear. There would under the prime minister’s office certainly appear to be many points (PCM). The idea is to mainstream of tension between MEF’s vision climate change into government of central government planning for policies. The MEF will provide climate change and conflict based funds to designated national on risk management and market authorities and regional and local principles and the norms and governments, but they will be held priorities of MINAM and other accountable for identified regional and local authorities. benchmarks and measurable Moreover, based on the research results. Ministries will be asked to team’s observations during the map risks, develop a management course of this study, information plan, and produce an investment flows from the center to lower plan that incorporates public- levels of government tend to be weak at best, there is limited

51 capacity to implement those courses and training materials on of dialogue with them is likely to policies at lower levels of integrated water resource be an important asset. government, and there is management. However, IPROGA considerable potential to has done conflict mapping and These two sides of engagement aggravate existing fault lines with intends to do further research on with civil society—expert policy poorly applied policies. But the linkages between climate input and diverse citizen whatever the outcome, the policy change and water scarcity. In participation—are important framework described by the MEF short, IPROGA is a civil society contributions if progress is to be will heavily condition the organization that has the potential made on issues of climate change implementation of all aspects of to be a tremendous resource for and conflict. It is sometimes easier Peru’s climate change policies. governments, donors, and other to include the former rather than stakeholders on climate-related the latter, but both are essential. A second strong influence on conflict issues. This is especially true given Peru’s issues of climate change and still-evolving democratic conflict will be the way in which The Citizens’ Movement on institutions and the many civil society participation and Climate Change (MOCICC) is an institutional weaknesses identified advocacy engages on these umbrella organization composed throughout this report. issues. Many of these interactions of over 50 organizations that will be at the regional or local include NGOs, educational level, but Lima-based NGOs will institutions, and citizens’ groups have important exchanges with (REMURPE is an important government at the national level member). Its profile is generally in that connect to and influence the line with that of citizen advocacy other levels. Two NGOs with groups, and its members’ activities whom the field research team met and projects (generally not exemplify two very different sides undertaken as MOCICC) address of the potential input from civil a wide array of climate change society organizations. policy issues, from national and regional climate strategies to food The Institute for the Promotion of security, land use, and the Water Management (IPROGA) is establishment of no-go zones in a non-governmental public policy ecologically sensitive areas. organization dedicated to MOCICC is especially interested research, training, and public- in the effects of climate change “From the MEF’s point of private dialogue in support of and conflict in Amazonia, as well view, the failure to price improved water management. In as the potential effects of sea level water is the main addition to its own professional rise in Peru’s coastal cities. While obstacle to its rational staff, IPROGA has formal MOCICC’s membership does not institutional linkages with a wide generally have the scientific or use.” array of other well-regarded professional expertise of IPROGA, organizations (for example, TMI it involves a more diverse universe and AEDES are both members, of stakeholders affected by climate among many others). Although change and conflict impacts. It IPROGA has conducted research would be easy to overlook on the theme of climate change MOCICC given its fairly weak level and conflict, it has taken to date a of organization and expertise, but circumspect approach to the that would be a mistake. As issues, noting the relative absence climate change effects increase in of reliable empirical data on scope and intensity, it can be climate change. Instead, its anticipated that MOCICC and primary focus has been on other advocacy groups will analysis of the social, institutional, become more vocal on climate and economic factors related to change issues, and a track record water conflict as well as providing

KEY FINDINGS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Based on field research in Lima, impacts of climate change, Ancash, and Arequipa, the exacerbated by weak following section briefly sets out environmental governance and some key findings and strategic fragile state-society relationships considerations that the research in the areas studied. team wishes to highlight for the attention of the USAID These climate effects are Mission to Peru. This provides the exposing growing numbers of context and logic for the people to increasing Recommendations that follow. environmental stresses and serious hardships, including “There is strong threats to agricultural and pastoral agreement, extensive KEY FINDINGS livelihoods, lack of water for There is strong agreement, irrigation, degraded pastures, oral testimony, and extensive oral testimony, and reduced productivity of highland convincing evidence convincing evidence that highland crops and cattle, human health that highland areas of areas of Peru are experiencing hazards and diseases, and natural Peru are experiencing serious negative impacts from disasters. These stresses and climate change, well beyond the hardships add significantly to serious negative more well-publicized risks of conflict potential all along the impacts from climate glacial melt. While there is watersheds that extend from the change, well beyond the significant variation among highland paramos to the middle more well-publicized specific micro-climates and micro- basin small producers and on to watersheds, the general effects the lowland agro-export risks of glacial include continuing glacier retreat, plantations dependent on melt….These stresses warmer temperatures, more erratic abundant irrigation. and hardships add and intense weather events (droughts, rains, frosts), significant Although not addressed in this significantly to conflict changes in seasonal precipitation report, these effects will threaten potential….” patterns, deteriorating highland the human security not only of ecosystems, soil degradation and communities in the Andean desertification, increasing water watersheds but also increasingly scarcity, water contamination (acid in the Amazonian regions and rock drainage), and more frequent coastal urban areas (where there natural hazards (floods, has been even less attention to landslides, glacier lake outbursts). understanding the threats from These are long-term climate climate change). trends that are not going to go However, there is a huge lack of away. Rather, the consensus empirical data about climate projections are for the continuing change at the level of Andean and accumulating negative

53 river basins and watersheds. The mobilization and physical collection and compilation of confrontation. accurate hydrological data and downscaled climate data is Although less well recognized, urgently needed to facilitate the including by government, issues of development of appropriate water quality and the climate adaptation measures. contamination of water by toxic heavy metals also are potentially The Government of Peru is explosive. This is especially true pursuing two logical and because toxic heavy metals are reasonable goals that are produced by both mining nevertheless certain to come into processes and acid rock drainage conflict: 1) the promotion of mining resulting from glacier melt. The investments and 2) the promotion uncertainties and blurring about of sustainable development (i.e., manmade versus “natural” causes environmental protection and are likely to lead to rumors and social inclusion). For the finger pointing that can easily foreseeable future, the mining trigger conflict in communities that boom will continue, and many have a tradition of mobilizing for “These two trends— citizens will protest the real and collective action to seek redress increasing climate perceived environmental and for grievances. change impacts and the social costs of mining, including hydrocarbons. Thus, although there are a variety ongoing expansion of of important problems presented extractive industries As long as international prices by climate change, in relation to remain high, informal and illegal conflict the main (although not poorly regulated for mining also will continue to exclusive) problem is water. social and expand, accompanied by a Climate change is not yet the environmental corresponding increase in dominant reason for water scarcity protection—will environmental and social conflict. (inefficiency in water use in the agricultural sector is the leading intersect in ways that These two trends—increasing factor) but it is a major contributor, make conflict, primarily climate change impacts and the and it is likely to steadily increase ongoing expansion of extractive conflicts over water in importance in the coming years. resources, both more industries poorly regulated for Therefore, improved and social and environmental participatory water management is frequent and more protection—will intersect in ways both an important form of climate volatile.” that make conflict, primarily adaptation and one main pathway conflicts over water resources, toward reducing the possibility of both more frequent and more social conflict. (See Appendix III volatile. for a chart laying out some of the Because water is crucial to the main dynamics and challenges in well-being and basic daily needs water management). of Peru’s citizens as well as the It is important to note that conflicts requirements of the country’s related to climate change can agricultural, mining, and energy involve actors other than citizen sectors, competing stakeholder groups, communities, and interests are producing conflicts companies. There already have over water scarcity related to been significant inter-regional quantity, quality and access that disputes (e.g., Arequipa- intertwine with other grievances Moquegua and Arequipa-Cuzco), (e.g., poverty, poor governance, and these may be repeated social marginalization) that elsewhere. Of a different nature, increase the chances of social

but also worth noting, are the Although difficult to quantify, the many institutional conflicts about economic costs of climate change climate change and the respective in Peru are almost certainly going competencies of differing levels of to be very large.18 Estimating the government (national, regional, costs of conflict associated with local), as well as similar conflicts climate change is more between and within government problematic. However, if the ministries and agencies. added stresses on Peru’s hydrological systems caused by The new institutional climate change lead to increased arrangements in Peru’s national, conflict with extractive industries regional, and local governments and the withdrawal of some (e.g., MINAM, ANA, ALA, Water portion of the billions of dollars Basin Councils, Environmental anticipated in investments in the Councils, ARMA, Law of Prior near to medium term, the Consultation, and the semi- economic impact could be autonomous Defensorías) are enormous. “There is considerable steps in the right direction, but they will require time, course Despite these alarming but capacity in Andean corrections, and much better plausible scenarios, there are communities for self institutional coordination before emerging opportunities and a organization to take they become fully effective. In the variety of bright spots to build on, short term, they will be inadequate including the ongoing work on further steps to not only to their assigned tasks. A large climate adaptation by the increase resilience but body of literature suggests that Mission’s existing partners in also to institutionalize conflict increases in incomplete or Ancash and Arequipa. There is dialogue to reduce evolving democracies, and this considerable capacity in Andean may well be applicable to the communities for self-organization conflicts, climate-related handling of climate change in to take further steps to not only and otherwise. In fact, Peru. increase resilience but also to institutionalize dialogue to reduce joining the agendas of Indeed, at present the clear trend strengthening resilience conflicts, climate-related and is toward increasing conflict linked otherwise. In fact, joining the and promoting conflict to the accumulating effects of agendas of strengthening prevention would climate change. The increasing resilience and promoting conflict water requirements of export strengthen both.” prevention would strengthen both. agriculture and mining are at Field interviews also identified a loggerheads with the reality of number of new (or reinvigorated) climate change trends. Some governmental and non- highland communities are headed governmental institutions and toward ecological and economic organizations staffed with well- crisis. Mining companies are informed and committed personnel moving their operations into lower keen to collaborate on issues of altitudes, where they encroach climate change and conflict. There upon fragile ecosystems crucial to clearly are new partnerships that larger and more numerous can be forged to promote conflict communities. In this context, a prevention and conflict mitigation. proliferation of local social explosions, whose cumulative effects could have ramifications for national stability, is entirely possible.

STRATEGIC The main decision for the Mission CONSIDERATIONS is whether to establish a process The Mission’s current of engagement on climate change programming does not address and conflict issues because of climate change and conflict, their likely impact and the although climate-related conflict probability that they will increase has the clear potential to in significance over the near to negatively impact the Mission’s medium term. This comes down to democracy and governance a focus on two key sets of issues: initiatives and support for 1) how to explicitly enhance economic growth. conflict sensitivity (e.g. minimize negative impacts and maximize Because of the linkages of positive ones for peace and climate-related conflict to other security) of existing programs, political, economic, social, and especially those related to the institutional issues explained at climate adaptation agenda; and 2) length in this report, climate where to prioritize climate-related adaptation efforts are important investments that will explicitly and necessary but not sufficient to attempt to prevent or minimize address climate-related conflict. conflict. In the team’s judgment, for all of It should be noted that this will the reasons cited above, the include consideration of a set of Mission will shortly face a classic climate change and conflict choice of “getting ahead of the challenges in the Amazon that are curve” on climate-conflict issues or quite different from the Andes but taking a “fire brigade” approach to similarly complex and these conflict issues as they arise, consequential, especially given probably in a much less tractable the Amazonian focus of the form. Mission’s country plan for the next five years. That being said, it also is the team’s judgment that it is neither necessary nor advisable to make large Mission investments in new initiatives to explicitly address climate-conflict linkages (which are inherently cross-sectoral and complex, lending themselves to multiple entry points). Rather, a window of opportunity exists to build on the Mission’s existing work in various sectors to engage constructively in a number of areas at a relatively low cost and to use that as a learning experience to build the Mission’s capacity to deal with a set of issues that are very likely to be part of the Mission’s operating environment for a long time to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this participants. The purpose of  Encourage and support TMI report, there are six key areas for these meetings should be to and AEDES to hold regional the Mission to consider where identify actions in the workshops on climate USAID can take actions that will climate-environment area in change issues that actively help to reduce the potential for support of conflict bring together competing conflict linked to climate change in prevention, management, stakeholders and the Andean highlands and and mitigation. perspectives and solicit the watersheds of Peru: ideas and participation of II. Build on the climate change local representatives from I. Foster leadership on the work of two strong partners, government, communities, issue of climate change and The Mountain Institute (TMI) and non-governmental conflict, recognizing it as a and the Asociación organizations for whom this long-term challenge that will Especializada para el is an important issue and affect overall development Desarrollo Sostenible with whom communities will goals and outcomes: (AEDES), by adding conflict need to work constructively objectives to their scope of to solve climate change  Introduce the Mission’s work: attention to the issue of challenges. climate change and conflict  Encourage and support  Encourage and support the through a roundtable or work by TMI and AEDES to development of a core workshop that brings map and analyze the working group or steering together and solicits the causes of conflict in the committee from each of ideas and participation of areas where they are these regional workshops to key representatives from working on climate change identify actions in support of government and non- issues. This should include conflict prevention, governmental organizations “bright spot” partnerships of management, and for whom this is an the type described in the mitigation. important issue. A summary following section and should version of this report could consider the development III. Through both the Mission in serve as a background of conflict training for their Lima and TMI’s and document. staff and interested AEDES’s respective stakeholders. presences in Ancash and  Form a core working group Arequipa, encourage and or steering committee from  Continue to encourage and support collaborative the initial workshop to support TMI’s work with the working relationships develop and announce a Foro Agua Santa in Ancash among institutional and series of regularly as a promising model of organizational “bright scheduled meetings on stakeholder involvement in spots” of the sort identified climate-conflict issues to be integrated water basin in this report: held at venues identified or management. sponsored by the

 Develop appropriate the Andes. This could V. Collaborate with ongoing mechanisms for include stakeholder efforts of other collaboration with the workshops or community- organizations and donors to Ombudsman’s Office and based initiatives specifically advance and disseminate encourage and support the focused on this topic in scientific knowledge of coding of conflicts for Lima, Huaraz, or Arequipa. climate change in the linkages to climate change Appendix III provides Peruvian Andes: (and possibly the elements of a possible development of a climate- agenda.  Collaborate to increase conflict checklist) by the awareness and help in the Ombudsman’s office in  Through TMI and capacity dissemination of climate Lima. building with local change data and research government, encourage and findings produced by the  Working with TMI, support discussions and Andean Community (CAN, encourage and support the initiatives to address the represented by mapping and analysis of the looming and highly CONDESAN in Lima) and causes of environment- conflictive problem of water other organizations such as related conflict by the quality (toxic heavy metals IPROGA, PUCP, and Huascarán National Park caused by either mining or UNASAM. (PNH) and the climate change) in the Ombudsman’s office in Santa River Basin.  Consider sponsoring Huaraz in order to training for journalists determine where climate  Through AEDES, working in both print and change adaptation encourage and support electronic media on the interventions might serve discussions and initiatives current state of knowledge dual purposes. to address the highly about climate change in the conflictive problem of water Peruvian Andes, with a  Working with AEDES, conflicts and related special focus on linkages to encourage and support the problems caused by the conflict and the need for mapping and analysis of the rapidly expanding informal, conflict sensitivity in causes of climate-related illegal mining sector. reporting. conflict by the Ombudsman’s office in  Through TMI and AEDES, VI. Expand the Mission’s Arequipa. encourage and support expertise to include discussions and initiatives understanding of emerging IV. Make improved water to address improved water climate change and conflict management a central focus management as a means of issues in the Amazonian of the Mission’s efforts to promoting disaster risk regions of Peru: address both climate reduction. change and conflict:  Working with USAID/CMM, develop next steps to  Through the Mission and conduct a study on climate TMI and AEDES, change and conflict in the encourage and support Amazonian regions that are discussions and initiatives the principal geographic to advance integrated focus of the Mission’s work watershed management in over the next five years.

Endnotes

1. As the dependent variable and central concern of this study, “conflict” refers in its strongest sense to widespread, deadly violence. However, conflict management and mitigation requires attention to the precursors of violent conflict, including the emer- gence of group grievances, the organization of the material and social capacity for collective action (mobilization), and the impact of triggering events. In that larger context, the term “conflict” is often used here in the looser sense of opposing interests that give rise to social and political tensions and protests. 2. According to the IPCC, “climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified…by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer” (IPCC 2007). 3. See endnote 1 above. 4. The full report can be found at http://www.fess-global.org/Publications/Other/Climate_Change_and_Conflic_%20in_Uganda.pdf. 5. The full report can be found at http://www.fess-global.org/Publications/Other/Climate_Change_and_Conflic_%20in_Ethiopia.pdf 6. The report does not cover climate-conflict relationships in the Amazonian regions of Peru, nor does it address climate change and conflict in the country’s more heavily populated urban areas and coastal zones. These relationships are likely to be consequential and are deserving of separate study. 7. In 1997, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright released the first U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organiza- tions, the Shining Path was included. 8. Obviously, each of these identity group clusters can be further disaggregated into a number of other socioeconomic and sociocultural subgroups with relevant characteristics and distinctive interests and concerns. 9. Social and environmental conflicts also are tracked by units within such national and regional bodies as the National Water Au- thority (ANA), the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM), and the Arequipa Regional Environmental Authority (ARMA). Some interviewees felt that the Defensoría’s estimate of socio-environmental conflicts understates their true numbers and significance because of its criteria involving minimum levels of stakeholder mobilization. These observers argued that better information about early stage or latent conflicts could serve an important early warning function. 10. According to Magdalena Guimac of the Institute for the Promotion of Water Management (IPROGA), who coordinates projects related to the monitoring of water conflicts, the Ombudsman’s monthly reports also miss or do not include many water conflicts. 11. The Prime Minister is the President of the Council of Ministers, and his office is referred to as the Presidency of the Council of Ministers or PCM. 12. The lack of effective coordination and cooperation between national and regional institutions with resource-related responsibilities was a theme heard on numerous occasions by the research team during the field study. 13. According to a number of interviewees, CEPLAN itself has been a very weak institution in recent years, a situation that the Hu- mala government is trying to rectify. The salient point in this context is that planning in relation to natural disasters is just one of many strategic planning challenges faced by CEPLAN. 14. The Conga project is an extension of Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America. The U.S. firm Newmont Mining Corpora- tion is the majority owner of the project, which would affect four high-altitude lakes and entail the construction of reservoirs. Pro- testors asserted that the project would severely deplete water resources and create pollution that would harm agriculture. In De- cember 2011, in view of the protests and complaints about the inadequacy of the environmental impact assessment (including the resignation of the deputy environment minister), President Humala declared a 60-day state of emergency in the provinces of Ca- jamarca, Celendin, Hualgayoc, and Contumaza. 15. For example, according to David Ocaña, Ancash Region Coordinator for CARE, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooper- ation (SDC), known as COSUDE in Spanish, has financed a disaster risk reduction project to use tunnels in one glacier lake to reduce the risks posed by impact waves of ice and rock avalanches. 16. For example, the Global Water Partnership, which is comprised of development agencies, governments, NGOs, and research organizations in 161 countries, states that “integrated water resources management is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social wel- fare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.” 17. The heads of the Water Users Boards in both the Callejón de Huaylas and Chuquibamba posed the same question to the field research team: “This is a global problem caused by the industrial countries… What are they doing about it?” 18. By way of very rough comparison, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimates that the costs of “extreme events associated with climate change” in Ecuador, a smaller neighboring Andean country with half the population, will be in the vicinity of $413 million annually by the year 2050, exclusive of the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems (UNECLAC 2009).

RESOURCES

APPENDIX I: CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (CCCAF)

Phase I: Identification of Country Study Areas Through official documents, secondary literature, and expert interviews, develop a list of subnational regions or communities in conflict-prone areas that have experienced extreme climate variability (e.g., droughts, floods, unseasonal temperature fluctuations). Where possible, identify instances of conflict within these areas that may have had direct or indirect linkages to climate variability.

Phase II: Profile of the Study Areas Analyze the linkages among economic, social, and environmental factors through the collection of qualitative baseline and trend data (include quantitative data, when available). Information collection will be guided by the Qualitative Profile, which follows Phase VII below. Compile background information on the areas’ weather and climate patterns and predicted future changes in climate. Develop a preliminary assessment of potential political, economic, social, cultural, and historical cleavages that may contribute to instability or conflict. Develop a preliminary assessment of the governance capacity and resiliency mechanisms of existing political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. Identify the key concerns, grievances, and tensions that may be present. The profile should focus on the local unit of analysis but incorporate national, regional, and international influences.

Phase III: Analysis of Critical Climate Change Concerns Identify which underlying issues, sectors, and resources potentially influenced by climate change are critical to stability. How are they critical? Who is affected when these are threatened? Who is affected when these are well managed? What have been and what could be the potential consequences? Assess the impact of governance, with special attention to environmental governance,1 on the identified issues, sectors, and resources. What mitigating or exacerbating role does it play?

1. Environmental governance is defined as the traditions and institutions by which power, responsibility, and authority over natural resources are exercised.

Phase IV: Assess the Impact of Climate-Related Events Confirm with selected communities the nature and characteristics of a specific climate-related event or specific period of climate variability. Investigate the responses applied to the recent climate-related event in the study areas. What range of response options did affected people and communities consider? What responses were applied? Who did affected people and communities reach out to for help? Were resilience-building strategies used? What were the results of those strategies? What role did social, human, physical, financial, and natural capital assets play in exacerbating the potential for conflict or mitigating conflict/building resilience? Assess why results were linked to improved resilience versus conflict potential. How did core grievances and social/institutional resilience play a role?

Phase V: Perspectives of the Affected Populations and Communities Identify stakeholders interested in and affected by the climate-related event(s). Collect information about the stakeholders’ concerns, core grievances, and points of conflict; degree affected by the climate-related event(s); their response capacity; their perceptions of the social and institutional responses to the climate-related event(s); the means and resources for violent conflict; and the social, human, physical, financial, and natural capital assets that mitigated or prevented conflict. Seek to identify the indicators of resilience versus conflict potential and the indicators of vulnerability to conflict.

Phase VI: Generate Future Scenarios Develop scenarios based on the potential impact of similar climate-related events on the affected people or communities based on predicted future climate change patterns. What might be windows of vulnerability and opportunity?

Phase VII: Complete Final Report Identify lessons learned, best practices, programmatic gaps, and target areas and opportunities to improve the provision and coordination of interventions that can address climate change and climate-related conflicts in vulnerable regions or communities. Provide a comprehensive assessment of the case study areas that explains the impacts of climate variability, core grievances and drivers of conflict, mitigating factors and windows of opportunity, projected future climate vulnerability, and the links between climate change and potential conflict or climate change and adaptive resilience. Incorporate scenarios that suggest areas of future vulnerability to conflict and recommend potential ways in which international development assistance could make a positive contribution toward filling current programmatic gaps. The primary focus of recommendations will be on approaches and responses that are within USAID’s manageable interest. This will include mapping existing Mission and Agency programs and priorities against potential climate-related causes of conflict in order to identify gaps and possible areas of intervention. A broader set of recommendations for local, national, and international stakeholders in government, civil society, and the private sector will be included in an expanded and publicly available version of the report.

QUALITATIVE PROFILE Enviro-Sustainability Profile Land and Agriculture What is the size of the land area under study?

Approximately what percentage is employed for agriculture? What kind and level of inputs are used by farmers, if any (e.g., irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides)? What is known and what is perceived by the inhabitants about the degree of land degradation? What is the type of land on which people are farming (hilly, flat, forested) and what techniques are they using? What is the average size of farming plots? What is the state of land tenure (practices and ownership) including differences between men and women, and what is the general predicted trend for land ownership rights and plot sizes in the future? What are some of the challenges with respect to soil conditions (e.g., erosion, salinization, and desertification)? Is climate change contributing to land degradation? If so, how? Land and Forests To what extent is the area forested? What is the historical and future trend of forested areas in the area under study? Is there a high or low rate of dependency on fuel wood or biomass? Is climate change a factor in the condition and sustainability of forested areas? Water Sources and Availability Where do the communities receive water from (e.g., well, collection, pipe)? Are there any sustainability concerns in relation to water withdrawal? Will current water withdrawal practices be affected by climate change? If so, how? Water Use What are the primary uses of water (e.g., agriculture, domestic, industrial, hydropower diversion)? Which uses withdraw the most water? Are there any planned projects, changes in population, or other factors that might change the current water usage? Water Quality How do communities and health officials perceive the quality of water? Is it known to be relatively clean or contaminated? If polluted, what are the sources/causes? What water-borne diseases are endemic to the area? How will climate change affect water quality? Energy What sources of energy are used and at what levels (e.g., biomass, hydroelectric, fossil fuels, biofuels, solar)?

Where do the energy sources originate from (e.g., local forest or ground cover, public or private electricity agency)? What sectors consume the most energy (e.g., household, agriculture, industry, transportation)? Is climate change affecting current or future sources of energy? Is climate change anticipated to change energy demand in the study area? Natural Hazards Are there local or national authorities responsible for monitoring and responding to hazards (e.g., earthquakes, droughts, floods)? What is their response capacity? What are the most serious natural hazards likely to occur in the area under study? How frequently do natural hazards occur and what is their average level of intensity? How prepared are communities to respond to a hazard event? Is climate change contributing to the frequency or severity of natural hazards? Econo-Environmental Profile General Economic Indicators What is the estimated level of income for the average family in the area under study? Is the area’s income more, less, or similar to the country’s GNI or GDP per capita? Is the region experiencing economic growth, stagnation, or loss? What is the level of employment/unemployment? Is the informal sector critical to livelihoods? What factors are contributing to economic stability or instability? Sectoral Breakdown What economic sectors employ people and what is their relative importance to the local economy (e.g., agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, public administration)? To what extent are key economic sectors of the economy susceptible to climate change (positive or negative)? What economic roles do women play in the economy versus men? Are certain economic sectors dominated by specific ethnic groups? Do divisions of labor result in instability or tensions? Are there economic opportunities for youths? If not, do they remain without jobs, migrate, etc.? Does the area produce any important exports for the country? To what extent are these exports providing stability to the local economy? How critical is the natural resource base to any export sector?

Socio-Environmental Profile Livelihoods What is the estimated total population of the area? How rural versus urban is the area under study? Is the population growing, decreasing, or remaining stable? Are there obvious forces affecting the demographic profile (e.g., migration, health, economic decline, conflict)? What is the relationship between arable land and historical, current, and future population? What is the age distribution of the population? What ethnic or tribal groups live in the area? Is there a history of grievance among these groups? Are there internally displaced persons or refugees inhabiting the region? In what numbers and from where? What is the prevalence of female-headed households? Education What is the literacy rate for the area and to what extent is it functional? What is the level of primary and secondary enrollment? What are the differences by gender for literacy and enrollment rates? How many teachers work in the area under study, serving how many students? How does the area compare in relation to the country as a whole? Food Security Is the area known for chronic or severe undernourishment and periodic food shortages? How does the area compare to the country as a whole? What are the primary items of consumption (e.g., cereals, fruits, vegetables, meats, other)? Has this changed recently? What food items are grown locally? Does the area have access to markets where local or regional food products are sold and traded? Does the community or do individual households have a food reserve? Is climate change affecting food security? Health What health care facilities does the area under study have access to? How easy is it to reach a doctor or health center? What are the primary diseases endemic to the area (e.g., malaria, cholera, TB)?

To what extent is HIV/AIDS prevalence a concern, and what is the general level of awareness? How does access to health care compare with the rest of the country? Do inhabitants have access to an improved water source? Are there any sanitation facilities in the area? Are changes in the climate contributing to new health problems or exacerbating the prevalence of existing diseases?

APPENDIX II: LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

Government of Peru

Victor Caballero Aurora Riva Patrón Chief, Office of Social Conflict Management Chief, Office of Strategic Development, International Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM), Prime Cooperation and Investments Minister’s Office Ombudsman’s Office of Peru Eduardo Durand Editha Mariela Rodríguez Director, Office of Cooperation and International Chief, Ombudsman’s Office Negotiation Ancash Region Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) Representatives of the Municipal Government Rosa Morales Municipality of Carhauz, Ancash Director General, Climate Change, Desertification, and Water Resources Aníbal Díaz Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) Manager Regional Environmental Authority of Arequipa Other Climate Change Staff (ARMA) Specialists in REDD, Adaptation, and CDM Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) Gladys Márquez Conflict Specialist Ing. Oscar Felipe Regional Environmental Authority of Arequipa Hydrology Engineer (ARMA) National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI) Carlos Vargas Appointee to Direct the Water Institute Ing. Juan Arboleda Regional Government of Arequipa Hydrology Engineer National Meteorology and Hydrology Service Miguel Angel Manchego (SENAMHI) Mayor, Condesuyos Province Arequipa Iván Lanegra Associate Defender for the Environment, Public Mario Eduardo Mena Services, and Indigenous People Mayor, Caylloma District Ombudsman’s Office of Peru Condesuyos Province Arequipa Rolando Luque Associate Defender for the Prevention of Social Bernardo Carrazco Conflict and for Governability Mayor, Andaray District Ombudsman’s Office of Peru Condesuyos Province Arequipa

Tomas Wuile Ayñayanque Jorge Baitez Mayor, Chichas District Director Water Resources, Conservation, and Condesuyos Province Planning Arequipa National Water Authority (ANA) James Casquino Estrella Asenjo Mayor, Tanaquihua District Advisor to the General Secretary Condesuyos Province National Water Authority (ANA) Arequipa Marta de Guadalupe Masana Rufina Manchego Head of Risk Evaluation Studies Unit Mayor, Iray District National Institute of Civil Defense of Peru (INDECI) Condesuyos Province Col. Rafael Campos Angel Ybarhuen Advisor District Mayor National Institute of Civil Defense of Peru (INDECI) Condesuyos Province Arequipa Javier Roca Fabián Director General Fermin Llerena International Economic Affairs, Competition, and Mayor, Salamanca District Productivity Condesuyos Province Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) Arequipa Jose Luis Carbajal Director General Office of Social Management Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM)

Civil Society Organizations in Peru

Juan Luis Dammert Víctor Sánchez Coordinator, Citizenship and Socio- Environmental President Issues Citizens Movement on Climate Change (MOCICC) Environmental Rights Society of Peru Representative Ricardo Villanueva Solidarity Forum Peru Chief of Huascarán National Park Huascarán National Park Gaudencio Villavicencio President, Water Users Board Fidel Rodríguez Callejón de Huaylas Municipalities Program Junta de Usuarios del Callejón de Huaylas The Mountain Institute Dante Cruz Jorge Recharte Program Manager Director, Andean Project ProParticipación The Mountain Institute Ancash Region María Teresa Becerra Cesar Portocarrero Responsible for Environmental Area Former Head of Glaciology Unit National Andean Community (CAN) Ancash Region Dr. Karen Kraft and Staff Executive Director Association Specializing in Sustainable Development (AEDES)

Donors and Implementers

Bruce Abrams Magdalena Guimac Chief, Democratic Initiatives Office Water Governance Project Coordinator USAID Peru Institute for the Promotion of Water Management (IPROGA) Martin McLaughlin Economic Growth and Environment (EGE) José Luis López Follegati USAID Peru Advisor CARE Peru Fernando Chávez Economic Growth and Environment (EGE) David Ocaña USAID Peru Coordinador Departamental Ancash CARE Peru Claudia Rohrhirsch Program Manager, Democratic Initiatives Office Carlos Monge USAID Peru Revenue Watch Institute, Latin America Regional Coordinator Cornelia Scholvin-Virreira Revenue Watch/Propuesta Ciudadana Conflict Transformation Advisor, GIZ Institute for the Promotion of Water Development (IPROGA)

Private Sector

Jaime Gálvez Delgado Manager Antamina Mining Fund

Academics

Jorge Yamamoto Edwin Julio Palomino Professor and Social Researcher Dean, Faculty of Environmental Sciences Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) National University of Santiago Atúnez de Mayolo (UNASAM)

Community Consultations

Mayors and approximately 40 Community Leaders Community President and Two Community Leaders Chuquibamba, Condesuyos Province Canrey Chico, Ancash Arequipa

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for

for the clear all waste

and assessment, greater integrated are

broader

‐

higher,

ANA, MINAM, drinking

role for

with to

quality, Andes for

risk competency

solid

universities

institutional responsive assess

reduced

capacity and differences

efforts regions Possible underway

due

to integrated

and

to high

Push management

push

and

country’s management strong water

build

floods Authority a

Strengthen and and on to

vital and stations, the capacity

raising ‐ cultural strengthen control, Directorate

sewage institutional flash with initiative different

sectors.

country’s or Water strategies

by government

the preventive the and downstream flood

WATER MANAGEMENT

impacts

the the

supply

planning

these Quality

of resources

manage

management

seasonality recovering

strengthen

Address environmental

monitoring

strengthen in

awareness

institutional

to increased

Institute

to to regional

and

needs Adaptation Promote and Water agencies with the generated Direct

and reduced

irrigation,

Implement

Strengthen Need changed Need Strengthen to integrated the resource and processes regulation

infrastructure

Essential

management

Strengthen

conserving Degraded Better water sediments permit

research. of monitoring

for

contamination and

of flows)

competency

Insufficient

(i.e., use further nor

Private

over regional the

hydrological

hazards

remediation

and level debris making

‐ management ‐ environmental importance

and

water strengthened

impacts regulate. water

high

glacier

efficient

Conduct health be

years regions.

collected

te for responsibility stores

to of

rted

to to (GLOFs, regarding

to basin

20 decision Strengthen enforce particularly ‐

MINAM and Strategic

the

dive to due Amazon)

uses CT: THINKING ABOUT

Widespread

manage

microclimate mid ensuing

than neither of

needs in

capacity

environmental

resource hazards

and ba

sins

legally obstacles use

access

melt network

metals for

competency

as cycle

coordination

and

affecting substances. (including

water

by managing competing

assess

natural basin

primarily

their

rain

and

regions) canon

different glacier to

rights

contaminants.

in and and

consumption) national term

basin exposed other

management

‐

for monitoring

decades of

downstream

from

into and activity outdated and long

other water

mining data

for water

seasonal

degradation limited

between

industries demand

incidence flow

and depleted

Lacking

higher/lower

information waste

competences metals

drainage

(i.e.,

quality

Consequences inefficient information

Agriculture Other drinking

acknowledging

Higher ANA Solid sewerage Acid retreat information

Depletion Changes Cyanide uncontrolled Ecosystem abandoned incorporated

management Heavy authorities allocation

Increased Increasing conserved Conventional Unequal resources over and water

impact

and adequate be tensions

and

Sites government. of and available to

on inventory

Lack irrigation Concerns need Negative Importance political

SENAMHI

hazards

collection

stations Resources Clarify data Disparities Natural Mining

Basins

Liabilities

Basins

Industries/Human within

Mining

Rainfall Contamination

Across

Rainfall Other Activities Scale Scale/Informal ‐ ‐ Melt

Natural Solely Small Large Environmental Management

Transfers

Glacier Sources Management

Water Water Water Information

APPENDIX III: CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLI ISSUES Sources Contamination

Extractive Industries Drivers and

Quantity

69 Distribution, Governance Availability, Water Water Water Quality

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