sign in sign up
<<
Home , Horst Seehofer, Joschka Fischer, Marieluise Beck, Roman Herzog, Sigmar Gabriel

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES: NUMBER 58 February 16, 2017

Berlin’s Foreign Policy Dilemma: A Paradigm Shift in Volatile Times Liana Fix & Steven Keil

Introduction President of the United States have rein- forced an almost tragic dilemma for Germa- ’s foreign policy over the last dec- ny. After decades of caution and restraint, ades has been a paradox. An economic German political elites are mostly converging powerhouse with the potential for a key lea- on the need for a stronger German leader- dership role in Europe, Germany has often ship role in foreign and security policy. Yet, been accused of being too cautious or un- the institutional order in which Germany can cooperative in addressing European and exercise leadership is at risk of crumbling transatlantic challenges. At the same time, away. The EU, with centrifugal and populist expectations for German leadership have forces on the rise, has become an increasing- only grown as numerous internal and external ly fragile and contested architecture. And crises plague the continent. In response, Ger- now, following the U.S. elections, the transat- many has significantly stepped up its foreign lantic space appears to be in danger of its policy posture, providing new leadership in liberal hegemon abandoning its long-held European affairs and reliable partnership in role as the guarantor of the existing order. transatlantic endeavors. From the conflicts to the refugee crisis, even ’s harshest critics concede that there has been Liana Fix is Program Director Interna- a notable change in Germany’s policy. tional Affairs at the Körber Foundation, with a focus on and Eastern Eu- However, the context in which Germany op- rope. erates has dramatically changed within the past several months. The referendum Steven Keil is Fellow and Program Officer at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., and the election of Donald J. Trump as 45th focusing on security and defense policy.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 1

This poses a host of new questions for Ger- exemplified by Germany’s policy toward Rus- man leadership and the U.S. commitment to sia and reinforced by changes in its security Europe—the backbone of the Euroatlantic policy. Both are key areas of strategic im- security architecture. While it is unclear how portance, relevant to both Germany and Eu- exactly the Trump presidency agenda to- rope. Moreover, they provide evidence that ward Europe will unfold, some of the cam- Germany’s new willingness to take on “more paign and transition rhetoric suggests that responsibility” in foreign and security policy is the approach of a Trump Administration not just talk, but includes a paradigm shift could be very different from that of its pre- from a “culture of military restraint” (Kultur der decessors, effectively calling into question militärischen Zurückhaltung) to a more prag- the commitment of the U.S. to the continent matic use of military instruments. and to the transatlantic partnership.1 The new Administration will in all likelihood de- Nonetheless, Germany’s leadership potential mand that Europe "take on its fair share of is subject to external and internal constraints. the burden," maybe even to the extent of In Europe, desire for German leadership is tying the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article tempered by a continuing fear of German V to its allies’ levels of defense spending.2 This hegemony. German capabilities remain lim- will put pressure on Germany to seek more ited, and will largely restrict it to a European proactive (and European) solutions to securi- role: Germany will never mimic the U.S.’ un- ty challenges. Analyzing and understanding paralleled ability to deploy and project pow- the potential challenges and limits for Ger- er on a global scale. Finally, there is a real risk man foreign policy leadership is therefore that expectations from European partners more critical than ever. Is Germany ready and the U.S. may outpace the ability of the and able to take on a greater leadership role German public to adapt to Germany’s for Europe even under these new circum- changing role. German policymakers need stances? How substantial and how sustaina- to be careful not to overstretch their public ble is Germany’s new foreign policy course, support, and to make sure that it remains sus- in particular given that Germany faces a tainable beyond the upcoming parliamen- populist challenge in the September 24 elec- tary elections in the fall of 2017 against a tions this year? backdrop of rising right-wing political forces. Germany's metamorphosis3 from a problem- This paper argues that Germany has under- maker in the 20th century to a problem-solver gone a significant change in its foreign policy in the 21st century—“from a consumer to a toward a stronger leadership role in Europe,

1 Geoff Dyer and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Trump brands NATO ‘obsolete’ ahead of tough Wisconsin primary,” The , April 3, 2016; William James, “Trump says NATO is obsolete but still 'very important to me,’” , January 16, 2017. 3 Liana Fix, “Eine deutsche Metamorphose. Vom 2 “Transcript: on NATO, ’s Coup unsicheren Kantonisten zur europäischen Attempt and the World,” , July 21, Führungsmacht,“ Internationale Politik 6 2016. (November/December 2015): 56-9.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 2

provider of collective good”4 —should not be German historian Heinrich August Winkler taken for granted. traced the belated development of Germa- ny as a modern nation state since 1789. He The Paradigm Shift argued that German “exceptionalism”—the pursuit of a “special path” (or Sonderweg) in When former Polish Foreign Minister Radek international without regard for inter- Sikorski famously stated in November 2011 national norms and the interests of partners that he feared “German power less than… or neighbors—unfailingly resulted in a catas- 5 German inactivity,” his remarks resonated trophe for both Germany and Europe. In con- powerfully with the political class in Berlin. trast, he argued, the continuity of post-World Spoken by a Pole, these words encouraged War II Western integration represents the German policymakers—many still haunted by golden age of contemporary German histo- the memories of the past—to step up their ry. Understanding the importance of continui- role in Europe and the world. Moreover, the ty is therefore key for understanding German speech contributed to a future narrative of postwar foreign policy. Conversely, volatility German foreign policy engagement based and change are considered to be a poten- 6 on the concept of “responsibility.” This idea tially dangerous deviation from this path.8 would be formally introduced by Federal President in his 2014 Munich The fall of the brought this tension Security Conference speech, and reinforced back to the fore, with fears that a reunified in subsequent speeches by the foreign minis- Germany might be tempted to claim a heg- ter and minister of defense. But apart from a emonic position in Europe.9 Contrary to the new discourse on German responsibility in in- worst predictions, however, post-Cold War ternational affairs, what exactly has changed Germany demonstratively continued the tri- in the substance of German foreign policy? ad of a normative, civilian, and multilateral foreign policy, summarized in the phrase Continuity and stability have been core val- “never again Auschwitz, never again war,” ues of German foreign policy after 1945. In his and “never again alone.”10 Unified Germany 7 authoritative work, The Long Road West, the has proven to be a reliable member of the

4 Charles Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in 8 Sebastian Harnisch, “Change and Continuity on Post- the International Economy,” International Studies Quar- Unification German Foreign Policy,” in New Europe, New terly 25:2 (1981): 242-5. Germany, Old Foreign Policy. German Foreign Policy 5 Radek Sikorski, “ and the Future of the European Since Unification, ed. Webber, Douglas (London: Frank Union,” (speech, Berlin, November 28, 2011). Cass, 2001), 35-60. 6 Hanns W. Maull, “What German Responsibility means,” 9 Gunther Hellmann, “Fatal attraction? German foreign Security and Human Rights 26:1 (2015): 11-24. See also policy and IR/foreign policy theory,” Journal of Interna- “New Power, New Responsibility,” Stiftung Wissenschaft tional Relations and Development 12: 3 (2009): 257-92; und Politik and The German Marshall Fund of the United Volker Rittberger, ed., German Foreign Policy since Unifi- States, Berlin, 2013. cation. Theories and Case Studies (New York: Manches- 7 Heinrich August Winkler, The Long Road West (New ter University Press, 2001). York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Volume I; Heinrich 10 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture: August Winkler, The Long Road West (New York: Oxford Germany, and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security University Press, 2007), Volume II. Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 344.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 3

European and Western world. Still, the path tional interest instead of external constraints. forward has not been without complications. Germany has made a paradigm shift from The conflict in , which marked the first caution and military restraint to a more en- time that German soldiers “shot in anger” in gaged and forward-leaning security posture. active combat operations since 1945, posed It will continue to prefer civilian power,14 but is a serious dilemma to German policy-makers. willing to use military instruments, if it deems it It revealed that these three paradigms could necessary. be mutually contradictory: the use of military force might be necessary to prevent geno- The contours of this paradigm shift to a more cide. The of the Social “responsible” foreign and security policy Democratic Party and the Greens fought an were translated into departmental policy uphill battle to convince their electorate of through the Foreign Ministry’s Review15 and the necessity of military intervention. Then- the Defense Ministry’s new “white book.”16 Foreign Minister exhorted his Both policy reviews stressed that Germany party members to have the “strength to ac- would not depart from its post-war princi- cept responsibility, as difficult as it may be.”11 ples—the commitment to and inter- national law17—but that it will take on greater The roots of today’s debate on German re- responsibility by stepping up the scope of its sponsibility hence go back at least a decade engagement and wielding its toolkit in a and a half.12 The crucial difference to nowa- more flexible way.18 days, however, is that in the discussions of the 1990s and 2000s, breaking the taboo on the use of military force was always framed as a compelling consequence of external con- 14 Civilian power implies: “a) the acceptance of the ne- straints (such as alliance obligations, or pre- cessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of in- 13 venting ). This has changed into a ternational objectives; b) the concentration on nonmili- more deliberate, voluntarist, and strategic tary, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, approach that posits a need for the use of with military power left as a residual instrument serving military instruments out of choice and na- essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international 11 Joschka Fischer, “Rede Joschka Fischers auf dem management.” Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: Außerordentlichen Parteitag in Bielefeld“ (speech, The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs (Winter Bielefeld, May 13, 1999). 1990/91): 92-93. 12 See also: Volker Rühe, Deutschlands Verantwortung, 15 German Federal Foreign Office, “Review 2014 – A Perspektiven für das neue Europe (Ullstein, 1994); Josef Fresh Look at Foreign Policy,” Paderborn, 2015. Janning, "A German Europe – A European Germany? On 16 German Federal Ministry of Defense, “The 2016 White the debate over Germany’s New Foreign Policy,” Inter- Paper: On German Security Policy and the Future of the national Affairs 72 (1996): 33-41. ,” Paderborn, June 2016. 13 As Constanze Stelzenmüller has pointed out, this bina- 17 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Gastbeitrag von Frank- ry paradigm became a trap, making it nearly impossible Walter Steinmeier: Deutschland muss Verantwortung to argue a case for the use of the military instrument in übernehmen,“ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, July 5, 2016. cases other than the prevention of genocide; see “Ger- 18 Patrick Keller and Gary Schmitt, “Germany and the many's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe,” Spider-Man Doctrine,” , February Foreign Affairs (2009): 89-100. 6, 2014.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 4

How are these shifts in Germany’s strategic policy alignments, such as the joint Franco- thinking—significant in themselves—now re- German-Russian “no” to the U.S.-led war flected in policy? Two key policy areas pro- against Saddam Hussain’s . vide concrete evidence: Germany’s relation- ship with Russia and its security policy. Subsequent governments headed by Chan- cellor , whether in coalition “U-Turn” on Russia with the Liberals (2009-2013) or the Social Democrats (2005-2009 and 2013-2017), fol- The Ukraine conflict has led to a fundamental lowed a less cordial, but in substance similar change19 in Germany's traditionally Russia- approach toward Moscow. Rooted in the friendly foreign policy and a deep rupture paradigm of ’s Ostpolitik, Berlin’s with the old German Ostpolitik (literally: East- Russia policy traditionally prioritized econom- ern policy). For the first time, Germany has ic ties, arguing that a change in Moscow taken a leadership role in a conflict situation could be achieved through intensified trade involving Russia. It is holding together an in- relations and people-to-people contacts creasingly contested sanctions consensus in (Wandel durch Annäherung, or change Europe, leading the Minsk negotiations, and through rapprochement). Then-Foreign Minis- providing substantial military reassurance ter, now President and Social Democrat measures to Eastern NATO members. This Frank Walter Steinmeier—formerly Gerhard makes Germany’s Russia policy the most visi- Schröder’s chef de cabinet—modified this ble, but also the most volatile test case for approach into a neo-Ostpolitik narrative of a the general shift in German foreign policy globalized, interdependent relationship seek- from restraint to engagement. ing rapprochement through interlinkages (Annäherung durch Verflechtung). This idea Germany and Russia have long been key was based on the assumption that mutual geopolitical actors on the European conti- interdependence would decrease the risk of nent, bound by historical, cultural, and eco- conflict. nomic ties dating back for centuries.20 After the end of the Cold War, Germany was the The presidency of Dmitry Medvedev raised leading advocate of an inclusive approach hopes that the new Russian leadership could toward Russia in the European security order. provide a direly needed impetus for the The friendship between Germany’s former modernization of the Russian economy and a Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Russian renewed cooperation with the West. Despite President at the beginning of the shock of the Russian-Georgian war in Au- the 2000s represented the heyday of Berlin- gust 2008, Brussels and Berlin therefore quickly Moscow ties and resulted in some notable returned to business-as-usual with Russia. Through bilateral and multilateral “Moderni- zation Partnerships” as an instrument of “inter- 19 Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? linking” Russia, Germany aimed to prove to its Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Rus- sia,” International Affairs 92, vol. 1 (2016): 21-42. European partners that Russia was able and 20 Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, “The Roots of willing to modernize not only its economy, but Germany’s Russia Policy,” Survival vol. 51, no. 2 (2009): also its politics. Both turned out to be an illu- 105-122.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 5

sion, as the return of Vladimir Putin to the feel reluctant about deterrence as a con- presidency, coupled with Duma election pro- cept. A fear of ‘sleepwalking’—the term used tests in 2011, abundantly demonstrated. In by the historian Christopher Clark to describe consequence, criticism of Russia’s increased how Europe’s great powers slid into the first authoritarianism and bleak human rights situ- World War22—into an open conflict with Rus- ation grew in the German public discourse. sia is still shared by many in Germany, in par- ticular among those with memories of the Although Germany was becoming increas- Cold War. ingly disenchanted with Russia, the Ostpolitik policy framework of “change through rap- The turnaround in Germany's Russia policy prochement” remained in place. The “U- was accompanied by a significant increase turn” in German thinking occurred only in in Germany's level of engagement. Germany March 2014, after the shock of the annexa- has always been a key player—next to tion of Crimea, which took most German pol- France and Poland—in shaping European icy-makers by surprise. Berlin became the policy toward Russia. However, until the most important advocate for a common Ukraine crisis, it generally shied away from sanctions policy on Russia. By the downing of taking an exposed role in cases of conflict, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine on often preferring to leave these fights to Brus- July 17, trust in the Russian leadership among sels or other member states. During the 2008 German policy-makers was at an all-time Russo-Georgian War, French President Sar- low. The idea that Russia could be changed kozy took on a leadership role and used through rapprochement disappeared from France’s EU Council presidency to shape a government speeches, as well as the label common European response. “strategic partner.“ The Ukraine conflict in 2014 saw a role rever- Replacing Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, the new- sal. Germany is now leading the diplomatic old reference point for Germany’s Russia response within the main negotiation plat- strategy became NATO’s Harmel Report of form, the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine, 1967, which had sought to balance and rec- Germany, and France). France, under Presi- oncile deterrence with détente.21 It was re- dent Hollande, has been in the back seat in purposed to reassure Germany’s domestic these efforts. This has contributed to raising audience that dialogue with Russia would Germany's leadership profile in Europe. How- not be abandoned while Germany at the ever, the absence of EU institutions and same time advocated for an economic mechanisms in these attempts to mediate sanctions regime and significantly stepped the Ukraine conflict is also symptomatic of a up its efforts on defense, deterrence, and re- more problematic recent trend in Germany's assurance for Eastern European member relationship with the EU. Within Europe, Ger- states. However, many continue to many increasingly tends to create ad hoc intergovernmental coalitions for crisis man- 21 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Rede von Außenminister agement, leaving at best a coordinating role Steinmeier bei den 12. Petersberger Gesprächen zum Thema Sicherheit,” (speech, Konigswinter, October 8, 22 Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe 2016). Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 6

for EU institutions. Merkel has described this tary assistance may have been a fear of un- approach elsewhere as the “new Union dermining European and transatlantic credi- method,”23 arguing that this is the only realis- bility in case rhetoric was never matched by tic way to lay the foundations for consensual action. Lastly, such assistance might well Europe-wide policies within an increasingly have led to a backlash in German public fragile and fragmented EU political land- opinion. Although 46 percent of Germans scape. However, while having the weight of supported a sanctions policy in 2016,27 a ma- Europe behind its back has bolstered Ger- jority continues to prefer dialogue and eco- many's clout in negotiations with Russia, this nomic exchange with Russia.28 has not strengthened the power of the EU as an institution.24 Despite Germany’s reluctance to supply le- thal military aid to Ukraine, it has contributed Some critics have argued that Chancellor substantially to the new NATO Very High Merkel’s rejection of the idea to send lethal Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and will military aid to Ukraine in February of 2015 lead a battalion of combat troops in Lithua- demonstrated that nothing has really nia. Both these moves would have been dif- changed in Germany’s unwillingness to use ficult to imagine before the Ukraine conflict. military instruments.25 But, as the chancellor However, Berlin insisted on two qualifications: emphasized at the 2015 Munich Security First, troop stationing would be “rotational” Conference, her position was not based on rather than “permanent,” and secondly, the traditional German pacifism, but on pragma- resumption of political dialogue within the tism: “The problem is that I cannot imagine NATO-Russia Council. Both conditions were any situation in which improved equipment based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act, for the Ukrainian army leads to President Putin which in 1997 established a working relation- being so impressed that he believes he will ship between NATO and Russia on the basis lose militarily.”26 From her point of view, of respect for the European security order weapons deliveries by the West could have and under the condition that NATO would very likely led to a further escalation of the not station permanent troops in any former conflict without a significant boost for Warsaw Pact countries. Critics of Russia’s ac- Ukraine’s military capabilities. Another reason tions in Ukraine—e.g. in Poland and in the U.S. for her reluctance to use the option of mili- Congress—have argued that the NATO- Russia Founding Act should be considered 23 Angela Merkel, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela invalid, because they say Russia’s actions Merkel at the Opening Ceremony of the 61st Academic have violated European security agreements Year of the in Bruges,” (Bruges, No- like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Ger- vember 2, 2010). many disagrees, because it sees the docu- 24 Liana Fix, “Leadership in the Ukraine Conflict: A Ger- man Moment,” in Europe's New Political Engine: Germa- ny's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, ed. Ni- 27 “Partnerschaft unter Spannung. Wie die Deutschen klas Helwig (FIIA Report 44, 2016), 111-131. über Russland denken,” Bertelsmann Stiftung Institut für 25 Ulrich Speck, “Stopping Putin: Can Merkel Succeed Öffentliche Angelegenheiten, April 2016. Without Force?,” Newsweek, April 2, 2015. 28 “Annäherung oder Abschottung? Repräsentative 26 “Merkel Says ‘Weapons Won't Help' Resolve Eastern Umfrage in Russland und Deutschland,” Körber-Stiftung, Ukraine Crisis,” , February 7, 2015. April 2016.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 7

ment (and the NATO-Russia Council) as an tion policies which Germany helped design important instrument to avoid a Cold War- and implement. style estrangement and block-building be- tween Russia and NATO, and to maintain a Nonetheless, and contrary to many predic- dual strategy of dialogue and deterrence tions, Germany has not been a gateway for toward Russia. Russian influence and attempts to divide the over the Ukraine conflict. In- Germany’s unprecedented recent military stead, it has become the organizer and contributions to deterrence and the reassur- guardian of European unity on a common ance of NATO’s Eastern member states dem- policy toward Russia, including economic onstrate that the country has become far sanctions which come with real costs for EU more willing to use the entire gamut of its for- member states. Germany's Russia policy ‘U- eign policy toolbox in its neighborhood. Fur- turn’ shows that Germany is willing to lead thermore, Germany has been willing to stand the defense of the European project with up to Russia, its former “strategic partner,” toughness and resolve. In the future, Germa- over its violations of the European security ny’s new Russia policy and leadership role order at no inconsiderable cost to its business might be put to the test if the United States, interests. Both Merkel and Steinmeier have under its new President Donald Trump, should reined in German lobby organizations critical decide to break with the current transatlantic of the sanctions against Russia by reminding status quo and the coordinated sanctions them of the primacy of politics.29 regime. Not only will it be more difficult for Germany to keep Europeans united, but However, the II pipeline pro- domestic pressure from business associations ject—which, once completed, would convey and the public might increase out of a fear additional Russian gas directly to Germany of being outrun by the U.S. in a rapproche- through the Baltic Sea, thus circumventing ment with Russia. transit countries as Ukraine—undermines the credibility and legitimacy of Germany’s new Re-conceptualizing Germany’s Security posture on Russia. The German government argues that Nord Stream II is a private busi- Distinctive as the ‘U-turn’ in Germany’s rela- ness project, which has nothing to do with tions with Russia is, the shift in its overall securi- politics. Its critics in NATO—and increasingly ty and defense policy in recent years has within Germany30—point out that this means been no less important. Germany has revised turning a blind eye to the geopolitical impli- its fundamental defense policy documents, cations of this extension to the existing Nord and become much more willing to provide Stream I pipeline: increased dependency on military support through deployments, train- Russian gas in contradiction to EU diversifica- ing, and assistance to alliance and coalition efforts. It is reversing its shrinking security bud- get and dwindling military resources. While 29 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Rede von Außenminister some contributions may seem small relative Frank-Walter Steinmeier anlässlich der Eröffnung des east forum Berlin,” (speech, Berlin, April 9, 2014). to its peers, an examination of the path that 30 Judy Dempsey, “The (German) Politics of Nord Stream Germany’s security and defense policy has 2,” Carnegie Europe, November 3, 2016. traveled shows they are indeed significant.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 8

Germany’s historically motivated obsession have to face up to our responsibility, whether with stability has meant that changes in its we like it or not.”31 security and defense policy have traditionally been the subject of much national debate Germany subsequently sent troops to UN- and anxiety. During the Cold War, Germany’s mandated missions in Cambodia, Somalia, security policy centered on its contributions and Bosnia. Yet the most significant next step to deterrence and territorial defense within came in 1999, when it deployed the Bundes- the NATO Alliance, as well as limited humani- wehr on its first active combat mission in the tarian assistance missions. Following reunifica- air war against the Republic of Yugoslavia, tion, Germany was asked by its Western allies which was attempting to forcibly prevent the to begin shedding its self-restraint, and to independence of its Kosovo province. Three move toward greater military engagement years later, in 2002, Germany joined the U.S.- abroad, namely in the first Gulf War. At the led coalition “Operation Enduring Freedom“ time Germany possessed the largest Europe- to combat at the Horn of Africa and an army in NATO (apart from Turkey), but that at the Hindukush. Shortly thereafter, it also was due to its near-exclusive focus on land- joined NATO’s International Security Assis- based defense of the intra-German border, tance Force (ISAF) in . Both deci- and to the initial merger of the West German sions forced the governing SPD-Green coali- federal armed forces (Bundeswehr) and East tion under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Germany’s Nationale Volksarmee (NVA). It Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer into difficult was in no way suited for expeditionary war- confrontations with the German public. fare, much less outside of Europe. Participation in the war over Kosovo nearly Equally important, the deployment of Ger- brought down the government, with en- man combat troops beyond alliance territory trenched opposition coming from pacifists in (“out of area“) was generally held to be un- both parties. As for the mission to depose the constitutional, as the federal supreme court, in Afghanistan, which had been au- in a landmark 1994 case, agreed in principle. thorized by the UN Security Council and the Yet the court also, and for the first time, clari- North as a measure of legit- fied conditions under which an “out of area“ imate alliance self-defense, several members deployment might be in accordance with of the red-green coalition announced that the Basic Law: a UN or NATO mandate, cou- they would veto German participation. In re- pled with parliamentary approval. As a result, sponse, Gerhard Schröder—who had prom- Germany’s refusal to participate in the U.S.- ised the United States Germany’s “unlimited led coalition to liberate Kuwait (it back- solidarity“ on the day after the 9/11 attacks— stopped NATO operations in the Mediterra- put his own chancellorship on the line and nean instead) set in motion a slow and in- called for a vote of confidence on his deci- cremental, but ultimately significant evolution sion to send 3,900 German troops to Afghani- of its security policy. , Germany’s Chancellor at the time told his country: “we 31 Stephen Kinzer, “War in the Gulf: Germany, Germans are Told of Gulf-War Role,” The New York Times, January 31, 1991.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 9

stan. He won, but barely, with 336 to 326 After the conclusion of the ISAF stabilization votes—just two more than required.32 mission for Afghanistan in 2014 (to which Germany was the fourth-largest troop pro- Pacifist reflexes, the concepts of Zivilmacht vider),35 Germany joined NATO’s follow-on (civilian power), and military self-restraint re- Resolute Support Mission, deploying 980 main powerful factors in Germany’s security troops to provide training, advice, and assis- culture even today. However, Germany’s tance to Afghan forces. The mission’s renew- strategic community—security experts in think al and expansion in 2015 passed with a tanks, academia, and the media, as well as broad majority and mostly without popular many policymakers—had in recent years in- opposition—in marked contrast to earlier de- creasingly criticized this framing as misguid- ployments of the mid-2000s. ed, hypocritical, or at least no longer ade- quate given the proliferation of new security In addition, Germany contributed to the im- challenges. Part of the debate centered on plementation and initiation of NATO’s Rapid the fact that Germany, alone among major Reaction Force (VJTF). It has pioneered the Western powers, does not have a national Framework Nations Concept in NATO, which security strategy process. Some argued that aims to group the development of joint forc- its policies and strategic relationships lacked es and capabilities in the Alliance to increase coherence, while others pinpointed the lack real burden-sharing capacities among - of capabilities (institutional, civilian, and mili- pean allies. Conceptually, this represents a tary) for dealing with new threats and risks.33 lesson drawn from the Libya intervention ex- The annexation of Crimea, the wars in east- perience in 2011, where Europeans were ern Ukraine and , and the refugee crisis, shocked to learn how dependent they were as well as increasing tensions within Europe, on U.S. assets, and how powerless they were have catalyzed a consensus that Germany’s without them. Practically, it attempts to de- security policy will have to evolve, as well as sign and develop force constellations for take on an increased share of Europe’s small to medium-sized operations that would leadership burden. In President Steinmeier’s be undertaken using few or no U.S. assets, words, “Germany has not aspired to be Eu- with a large “framework nation”—such as rope’s indispensable nation, but circum- Germany—supplying most of the operational stances have forced it into a central role.”34 backbone and allowing smaller partners to focus on specialized capabilities.36 Finally, NATO continues to be Germany’s essential Germany will lead the aforementioned bat- military alliance, and Berlin has been quietly talion-sized combat-capable force in Lithua- expanding its contributions in recent years. nia to bolster the credibility of NATO’s deter- rent in the Baltics.

32 Bettina Luscher, “Schroeder wins key confidence vote,” CNN.com, November 16, 2001 35 “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key 33 “New Power, New Responsibility,” Stiftung Wissen- Facts and Figures,” NATO, November 7, 2014. schaft und Politik and The German Marshall Fund of the 36 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “The Framework United States, Berlin, 2013. Nations Concept: Germany’s Contribution to a Capable 34 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global European Defence,” SWP Comments (52), December Role,” Foreign Affairs (2016): 113. 2014.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 10

Europe—more precisely, the European post- gees that European governments are in con- war project of peace, stability, prosperity and trol of national and border security. democratic transformation—has been essen- tial to Germany’s security posture for more Germany is currently participating in four EU than seven decades. Trade with its European missions, including the anti-piracy Naval neighbors is the source of much of Germa- Force Operation Atalanta off the horn of Af- ny’s wealth. The enlargement of the EU after rica, and EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the which is combatting human smuggler net- meant that Germany–the front works in the Mediterranean. Germany has state of the Cold War—suddenly became also deployed troops to assist with the EU “encircled by friends” (as then-Defense Minis- training missions in Somalia and Mali—stability ter Volker Rühe famously put it), thus greatly and governance in sub-Saharan Africa are increasing its security. seen in Berlin as an important factor in check- ing migration flows to Europe. While a Bun- Now, with conflicts multiplying east and south deswehr contingent has been in Mali as a of Europe, German security policy is increas- part of the MINUSMA mission since 2013, the ingly focusing on strengthening not just its German government decided in January own capabilities, but those of the EU’s Com- 2016 to deploy up to 650 additional soldiers mon Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as to Mali following the tragic attacks in Paris, in well. Both President Steinmeier37 and Defense order to free the forces of its close partner Minister von der Leyen—echoing the views of France for the fight against the Islamic a number of their continental European State.39 In January 2017, it expanded the up- counterparts—have emphasized the im- per limit of forces to 1,000.40 portance of greater European defense and security integration, to the point of suggest- Germany has recently also become some- ing that a European defense union might be what more willing to venture beyond the tra- a “logical consequence of European integra- ditional frameworks of the UN, EU, and NATO. tion.”38 The motives behind these initiatives The German government decided in late are complex: concern that the United States 2014 to train and equip Kurdish Peshmerga and the might become less fighting Islamic State forces in Northern Iraq.41 committed to the defense of Europe, recog- Since no UN mandate was involved, some nition that European attempts to make de- critics argued that this deployment was un- fense budgets go father through pooling and constitutional. The fact that the measure sharing are limited by defense technology costs; and, finally, a desire to reassure Euro- 39 “Bundesregierung will bis zu 650 Soldaten nach Mali pean voters unnerved by a recent spate of schicken,” Spiegel Online, November 11, 2015. 40 terrorist attacks and a historic influx of refu- “Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr: Mehr Soldaten nach Mali,” Die Bundesregierung, January 26, 2017. 41 This includes, “anti-tank rockets, thousands of assault 37 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global rifles, mine-clearing equipment, hand grenades, night- Role,” Foreign Affairs (2016): 113. vision goggles, field kitchens, and tents;” Justine Dren- 38 Valentina Pop, “German Defense Minister Supports nan, “Who Has Contributed What in the Coalition Calls for EU Army,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, Against the Islamic State?,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2015. 2014.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 11

nonetheless passed a vote in the Germany’s July 2016 defense and security by an overwhelming majority may be due to “White Book” is the country’s key government reports of an impending Islamic state geno- defense policy document, ordered by von cide against Yezidis.42 Following the terrorist der Leyen and the first of its kind to be pub- attacks in Paris, the Bundestag voted in late lished in a decade. It offers a blueprint for 2015 to join the U.S.-led anti-IS mission, again future strategy, and sets out some bench- without a UN Security Council mandate. marks for future performance; not least, it Since the vote, it has been an active contrib- fleshes out the elements of the “greater re- utor, providing refueling and reconnaissance sponsibility” narrative set out in the Munich aircraft. speeches of January 2014. It underscores that Germany will contribute “early, decisively, Finally, Germany has reversed the near quar- and substantially” to the protection of West- ter-century trend of cutting military budgets ern security. It affirms Germany’s commit- and reducing the overall size of the armed ment to the security of Europe and to NATO. forces. From 2016 to 2017, Germany will boost It states that Russia “will constitute a chal- defense spending by 8 percent.43 Germany lenge for the security of our continent in the also plans to add 11,400 armed forces per- foreseeable future.”47 The document also sonnel and civilian military jobs by 2023.44 Cit- recognizes that the threats faced by Germa- ing Europe’s current security concerns, von ny and its allies are broad and varied, includ- der Leyen remarked that “the armed forces ing cyber-attacks, propaganda, economic have in the past few months been put under pressures, and political destabilization,48 as pressure as rarely before,” recognizing that well as transnational terrorism.49 Germany must spend more to modernize its armed forces.45 Chancellor Merkel herself—in In sum, Germany has made a major effort a rare comment on defense policy—told a since the Munich speeches to set out the el- youth congress of her own Christian Demo- ements of a more robust and responsible se- cratic Party in October 2016 that Germany curity policy, and to match its actions to its would finally have to honor its commitment words.50 However, policymakers and experts to NATO to spend 2 percent of its GDP on de- in Berlin alike are keenly aware of the difficul- fense (it spent nearly 1.2 percent in 2016).46 ties of overcoming the Bundeswehr’s existing weaknesses—and of the immense risks posed by a potential deterioration of Europe’s secu- 42 “Ausbildungsmission im Irak beschlossen,” Deutscher rity environment. A Brexit might well lead to a Bundestag, January 29, 2015. 43 “Acht Prozent mehr für die Verteidigung,” Die Bundesregierung, November 23, 2016, 47 German Federal Ministry of Defense, “The 2016 44 Anton Troianovski, “Germany Plans Modest Boost in White Paper: On German Security Policy and the Future Size of Its Armed Forces,” The Wall Street Journal, May of the Bundeswehr,” Paderborn, June 2016, 32. 10, 2016. 48 Ibid., 39. 45 Stefan Wagstyl, “Germany to Boost Troop Numbers 49 Ibid., 34. for First Time Since Cold War,” The Financial Times, May 50 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “Von Libyen nach 10, 2016. Syrien. Die Rolle des Militärs in einer neuen deutschen 46 “Bundeswehr soll mindestens 20 Milliarden Euro mehr Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” Aus Politik und bekommen,” Zeit Online, October, 15, 2016. Zeitgeschichte (2016), 28-29.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 12

highly ambivalent security relationship be- eign policy in 2014 and 2015,51 as well as in tween the United Kingdom and continental crisis-management efforts during the Ukraine Europe, adding to Germany’s burden. The conflict. However, he drew widespread dis- U.S. election in November 2016 has, for the approval for his comments deploring NATO first time since 1945, raised the possibility that ‘saber-rattling’ on the eve of the 2016 War- the White House may no longer be firmly saw Summit,52 which seemed to contradict committed to the transatlantic alliance and his approval of NATO’s response in the previ- to the defense of Europe. Any and all of ous year. In addition, Social Democrat and these factors may propel the evolution of new Foreign Minister flew to Germany’s security and defense policy even Moscow in October 2015 in the spirit of tradi- farther along the course it chose in 2014. But tional Ostpolitik to encourage unilateral eco- they could also simply overwhelm it. nomic rapprochement.53 Similar positions can also be found within the Christian Democrats How Sustainable? Government policy and and their Bavarian sister party the CSU: Bavar- public opinion ia’s Minister-President also un- dertook a much-criticized trip to Moscow in Is this shift in Germany’s foreign and security early 2016.54 policy based on a cross-party consensus and will it remain sustainable beyond the next Interestingly, attitude splits on the official elections? How are other elite groups re- government line on Russia and NATO are sponding to the shift and what divisions are much clearer along generational lines. Some visible? Recent polls suggest that attitudes do of the strongest resistance to Berlin’s stance not divide neatly along party boundaries, but on Russia’s actions in Ukraine came from rather cut across them. Moreover, differences Cold War-era experts and officials, many of are pronounced along generational lines. whom signed an open letter titled “War again in Europe? Not in our name!”55 The list It was Angela Merkel’s second grand coali- included Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s former tion government that set the shift in Germa- national security adviser Horst Teltschik and ny’s foreign and security policy in motion. On former German President , key decisions—e.g. sanctions against Russia alongside Social Democrats like former or arming Kurdish Peshmerga fighters—the chancellor, former Foreign Minister Steinmeier 51 and Defense Minister von der Leyen (often Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the 51st Munich seconded by President Gauck) have acted Security Conference,” (speech, Munich, February 8, in close coordination. Parliamentary debates 2015). and votes have shown broad support for 52 “Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier on Rela- these developments. But there are important tions between NATO and Russia,” German Federal For- divides within parties and parliamentary eign Office, June 19, 2016. 53 groups. Within the Social Democratic Party Friedrich Schmidt, “Sigmar Gabriel besucht Putin,” leadership, former Foreign Minister Steinmeier Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 28, 2015. 54 “Seehofer übt Schulterschluss mit Putin,“ Spiegel played an essential part in advancing the Online, February 3, 2016. “Munich consensus” on the need for a more 55 “Aufruf: Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem forward-leaning and engaged German for- Namen!,“ Zeit Online, December 5, 2014.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 13

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Erhard right-wing “” (AfD), Eppler, as well as representatives from the founded in 2013, is also critical of the gov- Liberal and Green parties. A counter-letter, ernment’s stance on Russia and calls for a “Securing peace instead of rewarding ex- withdrawal of all U.S. troops and nuclear pansionism”,56 has been initiated by aca- weapons from German territory.60 demics and experts on Eastern Europe, and was signed and supported by younger repre- Should either the Christian Democrats or So- sentatives across party lines. cial Democrats be in a position to form a co- alition with a smaller party after the fall 2017 Within the Green party, a part of the leader- elections, the only available candidates at ship and base has—mainly because of its this point are the Greens and Die Linke. It is strong traditional focus on human rights and not clear whether the liberal Free Democrat- liberal values—actually been ahead of the ic Party (FDP), which failed to reach the entry major parties in its criticism of Russian actions, threshold of 5 percent of the vote at the last well before the outbreak of the conflict over election in 2013, will be able to make it back Ukraine. Green party leader Cem Özdemir into the Bundestag. All of the mainstream and parliamentarians such as parties have said that the right-wing AfD is have been outspoken regarding Germany’s unacceptable for them as a coalition part- new responsibility in confronting Russia over ner. A follow-on would likely Ukraine or Syria. Özdemir has not ruled out continue Germany’s new foreign policy using German military options to help imple- course, but there is little appetite in either the ment a no-fly zone over Syria, even without a CDU or the SPD for a third round of governing UN mandate.57 On the other hand, a strong together.61 pacifist wing within the Green Party58 contin- ues to fear a potential militarization of Ger- Beyond the political elite, how has the tradi- many’s foreign and security policy. Die Linke, tionally risk-averse German public reacted to Germany’s left wing party, is consistent in its Berlin’s more forward-leaning foreign policy? NATO-critical and anti-interventionist posi- Is it just an elite project, or does it have popu- tions; many of its members advocate the dis- lar support? And what potential has the right solution of NATO and a new security alliance wing “Alternative for Germany” to alter the including Russia;59 some have openly sympa- popular mood in 2017 elections? thized with Russia’s actions in Crimea. The Recent surveys and polls show a mixed pic-

ture. Germans seem to be well aware of 56 “Friedenssicherung statt Expansionsbelohnung: Aufruf von über 100 deutschsprachigen OsteuropaexpertInnen Germany’s increased power and its standing zu einer realitätsbasierten statt illusionsgeleiteten both globally and within the European Union. Russlandpolitik,“ change.org. According to a recent survey by the Pew Re- 57 Annet Meiritz, Roland Nelles, “Interview mit Cem Özdemir: Assad und Putin bomben Syrien in die Steinzeit,“ Spiegel Online, October 15, 2016. 60 “Programm für Deutschland,” Alternative für 58 “Katrin Göring-Eckardt: Die Grünen waren nie eine Deutschland, May 2016. pazifistische Partei,” Zeit Online, October 24, 2014. 61 Merkel’s CDU and the SPD governed together 2005- 59 "Programm der Partei, Beschluss des Parteitages der 2009 and 2013-; in between (2009-2013), Merkel gov- Partei DIE LINKE,“ DIE LINKE, October 2011. erned with the liberal FDP.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 14

search Center,62 a majority of Germans think tion for humanitarian reasons even without a their country plays a greater role in the world UN mandate.65 today than it did a decade ago. The survey also shows that Germans are outward-look- However, asked if they prefer more interna- ing and committed to multilateralism and tional engagement or rather restraint in April engagement in the world economy. A poll 2014, at the height of the Ukraine conflict, 60 conducted in October 2016 by the Körber percent of respondents advocated for re- Foundation63 found that 59 percent of re- straint and only 37 percent for more interna- spondents agreed that Germany should ex- tional engagement, with a particularly critical pand its leadership role in the European Un- view of the deployment of German soldiers.66 ion. In a follow-on Körber Foundation poll con- ducted in late 2016, a small shift toward more Clear continuity is found in German views re- engagement can be observed. Forty-one garding the normative dimension of their for- percent of those questioned support more eign policy, and it is still considered to be a international engagement, but a majority of key distinguishing characteristic by the major- 53 percent still prefers restraint.67 Respondents ity of the German population. Sixty-two per- in former East German states are more skep- cent of respondents agree in June 2016 that tical about German international engage- human rights should be one of Germany's ment. most important foreign policy goals.64 A sur- vey from April 2014 demonstrated that These and other polls suggest that Germany’s among younger and more highly educated new foreign policy line is not driven by do- respondents, there is less hesitation about mil- mestic public demand, but by elites from the itary engagement, Germany’s historical past, political center. Nevertheless, public attitudes and increased international engagement. seem to be slowly catching up—particularly These respondents support military interven- among voters affiliated with the main politi- cal parties who have already been in power within federal government coalitions (SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, and the FDP) as well as among younger and more educated voters. 62 Fifty-three percent of respondents thought Germany Support for stronger engagement is the low- should help other countries deal with their problems, 67 est among respondents who prefer percent believe that foreign policy should take into ac- and right-wing populist parties. count the interests of Germany’s allies, 70 percent see global economic engagement as ‘a good thing,’ and 62 percent believe that Germany plays a more important Consequently, ensuring sustainability beyond role compared to 10 years ago. For more results, see the next elections in September 2017 remains Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Divided”, Pew Research Center, June 65 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik: Eine 2016. Studie der TNS Infratest Politikforschung,“ Körber- 63 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf Europa und die Stiftung, May 2014. Außenpolitik: Eine Studie der TNS Infratest 66 Ibid. Politikforschung,” Körber-Stiftung, October 2016. 67 “Die Sicht der Deutschen auf Europa und die 64 Stokes, Wike, Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Außenpolitik: Eine Studie der TNS Infratest Divided,” 2016. Politikforschung,” Körber-Stiftung, October 2016.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 15

a challenge. After the surprise outcomes of long yearned for such a “normalization” of the Brexit referendum as well as the U.S. elec- German foreign policy, having been frustrat- tions, the obvious question is whether the AfD ed by what they saw as German “freeriding.” might do far better in the September 24 na- As a former American official said more than tional elections than its current polling levels two decades ago: suggest.68 Founded three years ago as a eu- ro-skeptical party, the AfD has firmly estab- “It was much easier, after all, for Germany lished itself as a right wing populist force in to be ‘responsible’ during the Cold War, the German political party landscape69 and when others—notably the United States— is now represented in 11 out of 16 state par- were willing to do most of the ‘dirty work’ liaments (with especially good results in Ger- of international security…In the future, many’s East). The party has thrived specifical- Germans themselves will doubtless be ly on anti-refugee sentiments among the confronted by some of these same unsa- larger population. Even if the AfD does not vory but necessary dilemmas in the post- win significant majorities, the experience of Cold War world, and they may be no bet- the past years has shown that they are able ter than the United States at confronting to force a topic on the national debate them.”70 agenda and put the main political parties on the defensive. But will President Trump look to Germany for partnership in the same way that that his Conclusion predecessors George H.W. Bush, , George W. Bush, and Barack Obama did? All Amidst multiple external and internal crises in indications are that his position might be Europe—from Russia’s new assertiveness to more ambiguous, and the feeling might be the threat of internal disintegration—Ger- mutual. If so, the transatlantic partnership many has been vaulted into a foreign policy may enter a troubled new era—and Germa- leadership role. Berlin’s policymakers have ny’s position might become much more diffi- worked hard to adapt and built a solid basis cult and lonely. for advancing strategic thinking regarding Germany’s role in Europe and the world. In a 1994 Foreign Affairs essay, Timothy Gar- These changes indicate that Germany is be- ton Ash argued that Germany had four op- coming the long-anticipated partner the US tions for developing its post-unification for- foreign policy community has been looking eign policy.71 The first would be a “Carolingi- for since the end of the Cold War—a partner an empire” or essentially a United States of that is able to take on a greater leadership North-Western Europe with a deeply inte- role and responsibility in addressing regional grated political and monetary union. The security issues in Europe. U.S. politicians have second was a “wider Europe,” integrating

68 At the end of 2016, it was polling nationally at 13 per- 70 Philip H. Gordon, “Berlin's Difficulties: The Normaliza- cent; See “ARD-Deutschlandtrend,” tagesschau.de, De- tion of German Foreign Policy,” Orbis 38, vol. 2 (1994): cember 12, 2016. 225-243. 69 “AfD-AnhängerInnen,” DIW Wochenbericht 34 (2016): 71 , “Germany’s Choice,” Foreign 711-724. Affairs 73, vol. 73 (1994): 65-81.

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 16

Germany’s central and east European Germany to lead the European project for- neighbors into the European Union, and the ward has become greater than ever. third, a “Moscow first” option pursued at the expense of its neighbors in east and central Europe. The final and fourth option: Germany could aim for “world power” status, overtak- ing Britain as America’ key partner in leadership. This would include a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and being “captain” of a European trading bloc.

Looking back two decades later, it is clear which of these options has materialized. Through a “wider Europe” approach—the option Garton Ash preferred—Germany has ABOUT CUSE: invested its political and economic clout to The Center on the United States and Europe build a “ring of friends” through EU and NATO (CUSE) is the focal point for the Brookings enlargement in its immediate Eastern neigh- Institution’s research on the future of Eu- borhood – setting limits, however, in Georgia rope, its relations with the United States, and Ukraine. The “Carolingian empire” and and the evolving challenges that confront “Moscow first” options can be dismissed giv- them both. CUSE’s team of U.S. and Europe- en Germany’s recent “U-turn” on Russia and an scholars share deep substantive the looming British exit from the EU, which knowledge as well as extensive experience in could be accompanied by additional frag- government, international institutions, mentation in Europe; the “world power" sce- NGOs, and academia. Drawing on their ex- nario is even less likely. Yet even as Germany pertise, the Center offers independent re- search and recommendations for U.S. and takes on more responsibility in a “wider Eu- European officials and policymakers, and a rope,” much of the protest against Germa- series of path breaking books and reports. ny’s leadership role by other European coun- CUSE convenes public forums, conferences, tries has recalled its difficult history—a history and private meetings with primary stake- shaped first by hunger for power (Machtver- holders, including the annual Raymond sessenheit) and then by negligence of power Aron Lecture, featuring prominent French (Machtvergessenheit).72 Against a backdrop scholars and statesmen; and the Daimler of uncertainty regarding the US commitment U.S.-European Forum on Global Issues that in Europe and with an impending Brexit on brings together top diplomats and security the horizon, the line for Germany to walk be- experts. tween dominance and leadership has be- come even thinner. And yet, the need for

72 This dichotomy was famously coined by the historian Hans-Peter Schwarz, in “Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtversessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit“ (: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995).

U.S. – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 17