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OSW Commentary Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 180 | 26.08.2015 www.osw.waw.pl Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry Justyna Gotkowska On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery sys- tems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group in the aerospace industry. While work on finalising the merger was underway, the German gov- ernment was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. Howe- ver, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, in- cluding also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new compa- nies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn. The lie of the land turers and exporters of systems for land forces and navies. Duopolies of large companies oper- Germany has a strong, state-of-the-art arms ate in these two sectors. Krauss-Maffei Weg- sector: according to SIPRI figures, in the years mann (KMW) and Rheinmetall Defence man- 2010–2014 the country ranked as the third-larg- ufacture tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, ar- est exporter of arms and military equipment moured personnel carriers and artillery for land globally, along with France and China (and after troops, while ThyssenKrupp Industrial Solutions the United States and Russia), which each have (TKIS with the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems/ a five-percent market share)1. TKMS industry cluster) and Lürssen Defence Most defence contractors in Germany are private manufacture boats and warships for the navy. companies that are exclusively German-owned. Germany’s medium-sized arms companies in- They hold well-established positions as manufac- clude Heckler&Koch (small arms), Diehl Defence (guided missiles and air defence systems), MTU Aero Engines and MTU Friedrichshafen (engines 1 Siemon T. Wezeman, Pieter D. Wezeman, ‘Trends in inter- national arms transfers’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2014, and propulsion systems), and there are also http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/ many small- and medium-sized subcontract- measuring/recent-trends-in-arms-transfers OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 180 1 ing companies that occupy leading positions culties in managing the ‘European’ company and in their respective niche military technology in the decentralisation of production (in addition fields, manufacturing subassemblies for the to the diversified and changing national speci- aerospace and shipbuilding sectors as well as fications). Moreover, both the company’s head- land systems (OHB, Rhode-Schwarz, Plath, ESG, quarters and its technology competence centres Atlas Elektronik). have been moved from Germany to France in So far, ’European’ mergers have taken place recent years. The German government, which in Germany’s aerospace industry and, partly, holds 12% of shares in the company (as does in the missile systems sector. Opinions in Ger- France) refused to authorise its further ‘Europe- many of the European consolidation projects anisation’ in 2012, i.e. the planned merger with undertaken so far are negative. The wave of consolidations in the Western European arms industry in the beginning of the XXI century Hitherto the ‘Europisation’ of the arms in- led to the creation of the EADS concern (2000), dustry in Germany mainly took place in the which manufactures aircraft and helicopters air and space sectors. for the civilian and military markets (formed as a result of a merger of companies from France, Germany and Spain; the company was renamed the UK’s BAE Systems4. It feared that the merger Airbus Group in 2014) and the establishment would have brought a further marginalisation of of the MBDA group (through a merger of com- the German production plants within EADS/Air- panies from France, the UK, Italy and Spain in bus Group and a weakening of the market posi- 2001, joined by German LFK in 2005). Both con- tion of other German defence companies (KMW cerns are present in Germany through the man- and Rheinmetall Defence) due to possible bet- ufacturing plants of the Airbus Group divisions ter access of BAE Systems products to European (Airbus, Airbus Defence & Space, Airbus Helicop- markets. The German government could prevent ters)2 and an MBDA subsidiary (MBDA Deutsch- the merger because of its stake in EADS/Airbus land) which manufactures gudied missiles and Group, but Germany also has other instruments air defence systems. However, opinions of these to control the ownership structures of the coun- mergers, especially in the case of Airbus Group, try’s private arms-producing companies. In par- are negative, as German politicians openly ad- ticular, these include the requirement, provided mit3. One problem concerns the fact that major for in the law on foreign businesses, to obtain Bundeswehr’s procurement projects implement- the consent of the Federal Ministry for Economic ed by EADS/Airbus Group (the A400M transport Affairs and Energy before any takeover of some aircraft, the NH90 and Tiger helicopters) have or all shares in a German defence company by been delayed by several years as a result of diffi- a foreign business5. It was probably on this basis that the German government blocked the sale of 2 Airbus (manufacture of civilian aircraft: Hamburg, Bre- the ‘military’ assets of the ThyssenKrupp Marine men), Airbus Defence & Space (military production: Systems (TKMS) to the UAE’s Abu Dhabi MAR Ottobrunn, satellite subassemblies; Friedrichshafen, probes and satellites; Manching, the Eurofighter; Ulm, fund in 2011, only allowing the fund to acquire radars; Bremen, the A400M), Airbus Helicopters (manu- the company’s ‘civilian’ and foreign assets. facture of helicopters: Donauwörth,the H135 and H145, the Tiger and the NH90). 3 Rainer Arnold (spokesman on the defence policy of the 4 Airbus Group is the only arms company in which the the SPD Parliamentary Group), ‘Ausverkauf deutscher German government holds stakes through KfW, the Ger- Panzer an Frankreich verhindern!’, Frankfurter Allge- man government-owned banking group. meine Zeitung, 8 July 2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/ 5 See Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG), Par. 5, Abs. (3), politik/inland/ruestungsindustrie-keine-deutschen-pan- http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ zer-an-frankreich-13690282.html awg_2013/gesamt.pdf OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 180 2 The agreement on the merger of Germany’s ter will replace Rheinmetall Defence as KMW’s KMW and France’s Nexter, signed on 29 July, main partner). As a result, Rheinmetall Defence which established Newco, a holding in which will lose an important co-operation partner, each side holds 50% of shares, means that Ger- and may be forced to seek a merger with a for- many has now overcome its aversion to the eign partner or with a German business (one of consolidation of German defence businesses at those that are currently up for sale) and expand the European level. The Newco holding will be its range of products. Some of German assets Europe’s largest manufacturer of systems for of Airbus Defence & Space have been offered land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group for sale (the manufacturing plants in Ulm, Frie- in the aerospace industry. KWM and Nexter drichshafen and Unterschleißheim, as well as shares in the Atlas Elektronik company)6. Airbus Defence & Space announced in autumn 2014 The merger of KWM and Nexter will lead that it intended to focus on the manufacture to the creation of the largest producer of of military aircraft, missiles, satellites and their systems for land forces in Europe, compa- launch vehicles. It was reported at that same rable with the Airbus Group. time that ThyssenKrupp could sell its shipyards building submarines and vessels, which are part of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS, ship- specialise in the production of systems for yards in Kiel, Hamburg and Emden)7. land troops (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, artillery); their Industry and politics ranges partly overlap and are partly comple- mentary. The merger has been approved by German arms companies, which used to sell their the German government. Already in May this products mainly to the German armed forces and year the German Secretary of State for Defence other EU and NATO states before the economic announced that France and Germany plan to crisis in Europe, have recently been struggling conduct joint capability studies for a new-gen- under the new conditions on the European mar- eration main battle tank that would succeed ket. The crisis has brought about stagnation and the Leopard 2 in use by the Bundeswehr. The reduced defence budgets in Europe, with less joint project will be most likely conducted by spending on new arms and military equipment the new holding. Moreover, the KMW-Nexter in NATO and the EU, which until recently were agreement was signed in Paris, in the presence the main buyers of German exports. Germany’s of the French Defence Minister and the German internal market also shrank as the Bundeswehr Defence State Secretary.
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