Western Economic and Political Sanctions As Instruments of Strategic Competition with Russia – Opportunities and Risks

chapter 13 Western Economic and Political Sanctions as Instruments of Strategic Competition with Russia – Opportunities and Risks

Joachim Krause

Abstract

This chapter deals with the efforts of the eu and the us to put pressure on Russia since March 2014. It addresses the question whether or not there was a consistent strategic logic behind Western sanctions against Russia. It looks at the effects of the sanctions and how far have they actually contributed to the economic plight of the Russian economy. It asks whether there were indications that Western sanctions might drive Russia into a military escalation. The author arrives at the conclusion that most Western governments have been more or less incapable of dealing properly with the kind of strategic challenge Russia is posing today and that sanctions have been pre- dominantly symbolic in nature with no clear idea on what is to be done if sanctions fail to change the course of Russian policy or, even worse, if they drive Russia into seeking a military solution.

Keywords

Russia – European Union – economic sanctions – Western strategic policy

1 Introduction

Since the occupation and annexation of the Crimea in February and March of 2014, the Western community (i.e. the eu, nato as well as the broader Western world) has imposed both political and economic sanctions on Russia. The intention of these sanctions was often expressed in vague and general language, but they were understood as measures taken in reaction to the unlawful annexation of the Crimea. More sanctions were imposed after the incursions of Russian regular and irregular military and Federal Security Service (fsb) units in various parts of the Ukraine and the de-facto secession (possibly foreboding eventual annexation by Russia) of Donetsk, Luhansk and other cities in the

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Donbass area in Southeastern Ukraine. These sanctions obviously have the pur- pose of restoring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukraine. In December 2014, a group of sanctions were imposed by the us, Canada and the eu in order to force Russia to keep to the provisions of the Minsk ceasefire agreement of 7 September 2014. When in February 2015 the second Minsk ceasefire was concluded, the Western community has continued to uphold the sanctions pending a major shift in Russia’s foreign policy, which has not taken place. The sanctions policy, however, has not found unanimous support in the Western world. There are many voices in Europe demanding an easing of the sanctions in order to give Russia a real chance to fulfil the provisions of the Minsk agreements, which foresee, inter alia, the withdrawal of irregular forces from the contested area of the Eastern Donbass. Some observers seem to be concerned with the possibility of Russia suffering too much under the burden of sanctions. The governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria have already voiced their concern and the Syriza-led government of Greece has struck a pro-Russian tone. One is left with the impression that leading political actors have only a limited understanding of the nature of sanctions diplomacy. German Foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, and the High Representative of the eu for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mrs Federica Mogherini, have stated that Western sanctions should not force Russia onto its knees. German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has added that it never was the intention of using sanctions to force Russia into economic disaster. He added that the economic downfall of Russia would cause havoc for other European States as well, since we are all interdependent. Vice Chancellor Gabriel even claimed that sanctions should not be used to start a new ‘cold war’. This reasoning was shared by leading Socialist politicians as well as by business representatives. It was Chancellor Merkel who insisted that sanctions should be uphold as long as there was no significant change in Russia’s policy towards the Ukraine. She avoided referring to the possibility that Russia could succumb to economic disaster. Sanctions’ diplomacy is a kind of coercive diplomacy. Usually, such a form of diplomacy means that one has to use economic levers until the other sides gives in – even if (or because) the other side would otherwise face economic havoc and disaster. Unlike other forms of coercive diplomacy, sanctions avoid the use of military force or even the threat of the use of military force (deterrence) even in light of a direct or indirect military threat. At least in Germany and Italy, the very idea of using military force or of applying deterrence is politically so compromised that sanctions almost came as a default solution after the Russian acts of aggression against the Ukraine. It is to be feared, however, that Western sanctions against Russia not only lack a comprehensive