INTRODUCTION Merkeldämmerung Eric Langenbacher Government, Georgetown University Abstract: The elections for the German Bundestag on 24 September 2017 saw heavy losses for the two governing parties—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—and the rise of the right- populist Alternative for Germany (AfD). It took almost six months for a new grand coalition to be formed in light of the extremely fragmented parliament. Despite the good economic situation and relative calm domestically and inter- nationally, much change is occurring under the surface. Most importantly, the country is preparing for the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s long tenure. Who and what will come next? Can the surging AfD be contained? Will Ger- many step up into the leadership role for which so many have called? Keywords: 2017 Bundestag election, Alternative for Germany (AfD), Angela Merkel, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) German Parliament, political parties, Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) Liminal Germany I was recently re-watching the last Harry Potter film and was struck by the scene where Harry speaks with Dumbledore in a kind of purgatory, having to decide to die or go back to the living to try to defeat evil Lord Voldemort once and for all. (Spoiler alert: He chose the latter and was successful). This depiction of that space in-between life and death seems to be a fitting metaphor for German politics right now—seemingly immobile, in a weird kind of transitional stasis, a liminal state, with everything on hold, caught in-between one reality and another. On the surface, everything looks placid—there were even internet memes circulating about how there was no new government in Berlin for almost half a year, but no one noticed. Various international crises bubble up peri- odically, but nothing has been too dramatic. Syria? Brexit? Trump? The Alternative for Germany (AfD)? The economy chugs along nicely. Holidays German Politics and Society, Issue 126 Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 2018): 1–30 © Georgetown University and Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/gps.2018.360101 • ISSN 1045-0300 (Print) • ISSN 1558-5441 (Online) Eric Langenbacher in Mallorca, Rügen, and the Salzkammergut are as popular as ever. The politicians squabble, but Chancellor Angela Merkel will persist There is, however, much brewing underneath the surface. Expectations are rapidly mounting for the new grand coalition government—and not just for programs and policies domestically. Responses to the simmering chal- lenges that have been put on hold essentially for six to twelve months because of the campaign and the caretaker government will have to be dealt with soon. German policy makers will have to respond to French President Emmanuel Macron’s ambitious Eurozone and EU reform proposals includ- ing a joint Eurozone budget, a finance minister responsible to the European Parliament, and a joint military force.1 Despite calls from some quarters that the British elite or public will pull back from the 2016 decision, Brexit will likely happen during the current parliamentary term. Given the ambiguous status of negotiations and the likelihood of a transitional phase, it is unclear how much of a negative impact this will have on the German or European economy—but negative it will be at one point.2 Increasingly illiberal eastern European governments in places like Hungary and Poland need to be con- fronted. Migration and integration are still huge challenges. Presidents Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Donald Trump (despite much wishful thinking) are not going away any time soon. Trade restrictions (including tariffs announced by Trump in March 2018) and a transatlantic trade war are quite possible. The energy transition (Energiewende), wave of automation, and aging population are rapidly advancing realities. More existentially, many have observed that German power has been rising for years. Notable instances include imposing policy preferences dur- ing the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis in 2015. Millions of people are waiting to see if Germany is going to take on a bigger leadership role abroad—whether it can or will help to fill the vacuum—of shrinking Ameri- can leadership. Nevertheless, the country has denied its newfound influence and has shrunk from more conventional power projection as with the 2011 decision not to support allied efforts to oust Gaddafi in Libya. It cannot even bring itself to commit 2 percent of GDP to defense spending—despite a budget surplus. It is the ever-reluctant hegemon. Yet, as much as Germans might not want to take up the mantle of leadership, the alternative—a power or leadership vacuum—could be much worse with proliferating bad actors filling the void and doing substantial damage to the interests of Germany and the liberal democratic community more broadly. Until now, Germany under Merkel has been able to delay a reckoning or a clear acknowledge- ment of the reality of its increased power, as well as the obligations that come with accepting such a role. It is a kind of luxury to take your time, ••• 2 ••• Introduction deciding not to decide. The luxury of Germany’s liminal moment is soon coming to an end. This long-repressed reckoning both domestically and internationally is now at hand. Merkel knows this, as revealed in her 2018 New Year’s address: “Because the world will not wait for us. We must act today to cre- ate the conditions for Germany to thrive ten and fifteen years from now.”3 Yet, Merkel—the greatest survivor in German politics—seems increasingly tired at the age of sixty-three, chancellor going on thirteen years, and Chris- tian Democratic Union (CDU) party leader for the better part of two decades. As intelligent and perceptive as she is, she surely senses her weak- ening position. She might last until the next scheduled elections in 2021, but probably not. The country has started to think seriously about who will come next and what kind of leader the country needs. Rivals are starting to circle the wagons and overtly conspire.4 Certainly, the Federal Republic has had many other moments of transi- tion with a fin de siècle feeling. The waning years of Chancellors Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl come immediately to mind. Nevertheless, something feels different currently. At those previous moments, there was a clear, exciting (to many at least) alternative—leaders who articulated a new vision, or joint project—younger politicians like Willy Brandt and Gerhard Schröder with vigor and momentum. This time, however, there is nothing and no one like that on the horizon. The current crop of politicians preaches more of the same—only with a different face and perhaps better management at the margins. That, of course, is disregarding the Alternative for Germany—which has momentum, but with a pessimistic, dystopian, and retrograde vision. No one seems to want to step up and articulate a clear vision for the coun- try, continent, or world for which so many have been calling. It is indeed the twilight of Merkel (Merkeldämmerung), but what dawn (Morgenrot) is on the horizon? These are the issues surrounding the 2017 Bundestag election and its aftermath that this special issue of German Politics and Society confronts. The Campaign As expected, the campaign was short on drama, although it was perhaps not quite as boring as recent electoral cycles. There were two big develop- ments in the nine months before election day in September 2017. First was the saga of Martin Schulz and his Social Democratic Party (SPD). A promi- nent social democratic politician in the European Parliament—a MEP from ••• 3 ••• Eric Langenbacher 1994 to 2017 and parliamentary president from 2012 to 2017 (although also involved in the domestic party leadership), he was selected as SPD chancel- lor candidate in January 2017, and then replaced Sigmar Gabriel as party leader in March of that year. He seemed like an ideal choice—experienced but not sullied by a leadership role in the red-green or later grand coalition governments. Unlike any prominent minister or parliamentary leader, this would allow him to criticize the out-going government and differentiate the SPD from Merkel’s CDU. At first, Schulz had massive support within the party and the electorate. In fact, he was elected party chair with an unprece- dented 100 percent of the delegates and (re-elected with 82 percent in December 2017).5 Polling from February to April 2017, had the party at or above 30 percent—at one point even with or slightly ahead of the CDU.6 But, from May onwards the party began to slip in the polls. Its electoral program was full of classic social democratic themes, emphasizing justice (Gerechtigkeit) for all. Full employment, more jobs as part of union-negoti- ated wage agreements, expanded European governance, eliminating gender pay differences, and continuing a humane, but Europeanized migration pol- icy were all in there.7 Observers considered these campaign messages to be lackluster, although better than the vague 2013 slogan (“Das Wir entschei- det”—“the we decides” for readers who had forgotten). Common posters included “Time for more justice. Time for Martin Schulz” or a picture of a woman with the message “whoever works 100 percent, should not earn 21 percent less.”8 But, this emphasis on social justice and inequality did not resonate. The party tried to pivot towards a focus on migration and integration closer to election day, but this was too little too late. The many compromises that came with almost continuous governing for fifteen of the last nineteen years have taken a toll—as has competition from the other leftist and populist par- ties. Numerous SPD politicians expressed frustration that so many of their issues have become policy (e.g., minimum wage), but that Merkel typically got all the credit.