The Logic of Defence Assistance to Ukraine. a Strategic Assessment

NO. 42 JULY 2021 Introduction

The Logic of Defence Assistance to Ukraine A Strategic Assessment Dumitru Minzarari and Susan Stewart

The recent debate about providing military assistance to Ukraine has relevance for the efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Minsk Process and the Normandy Format in particular, and thus the search for a resolution to the conflict regarding the Donbas. But it also concerns larger questions of Germany’s role in Europe, and in security policy more generally. It touches on Germany’s ability to adapt to situations in which other countries are willing to envisage military solutions to existing con- flicts. In this sense, it fits into discussions about a more geopolitical EU. And it offers Berlin a way to reinforce its commitment to European security and stability by more actively resisting the redrawing of international borders.

The question of providing military assis- Germany’s Approach to tance to actors in crisis zones has consist- Ukraine’s Security ently been a difficult one for German poli- ticians and policymakers. However, with War between Russia and its proxies in the rising expectations both inside and outside Donbas on the one hand, and Ukraine on the country for Germany to play a more the other, has been ongoing since 2014. robust role in the international arena, this During that time, Germany has made a and related questions are likely to arise variety of contributions to Ukraine’s secu- more insistently with regard to future con- rity. The most visible one is its participation flicts. Thus, the recent debate on sending in the Normandy Format, in which Ger- military assistance to Ukraine should be many and France attempt to manage and seen not only as a sign of the Bundestag promote solutions to the ongoing conflict election campaign heating up, but also as in the Donbas. Berlin has also provided an indication that this topic is going to important input in the Trilateral Contact remain on the political agenda. The case Group, which is another component of of Ukraine points to a set of issues related the “Minsk Process” that is responsible for to Germany’s foreign policy role more agreeing upon concrete measures of con- broadly conceived, and to Berlin’s potential flict regulation and management. Further- contribution to European security. more, Germany has offered medical treat- ment to some of those seriously wounded in the war and has contributed personnel

to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in erate armed escalations. Given Ukraine’s the Donbas, and in Ukraine more broadly. conflict conditions, this means that the It has also made financial and other types most likely outcomes of increased military of assistance available to improve the assistance to Ukraine would be a reduction situation in those parts of the Donbas still in the level of armed violence and a height- under Ukrainian control. ened probability of peaceful negotiations. However, it has been German policy In Russia’s foreign policy toolkit, war not to provide defence assistance to Ukraine represents a valid alternative to other types for a variety of reasons. Beyond a strong of policy. In other words, the Russian mili- pacifist streak in German politics and tary is viewed as just another national society, these reasons have focused on the resource that can be used to acquire desired potential negative consequences for the goods. As do numerous states, Russia development of the conflict. In particular, switches between its persuasive (trade and there has been concern that injecting more diplomacy) and its coercive (military) tools, weapons and other military equipment into depending on which is more cost-effective an ongoing conflict situation would cause in a given case. the conflict to escalate. German policy has In 2014 Russia switched to the military primarily emphasised de-escalation as well tool in the case of Ukraine, in the attempt as efforts to identify a political solution. to ensure the compliance of Ukraine with The approach has been premised on in- Russia’s designs for the region. This hap- creasing the number and effectiveness of pened because Russian leaders believed that the political, economic, and humanitarian the military instrument would be more effi- mechanisms brought to bear on the situa- cient than diplomatic talks. Russia’s mili- tion, while leaving the military component tary build-up in March and April of this largely unaddressed. This has essentially year indicates that this is still the way they coincided with the EU approach, although view the conflict. However, if this tool individual member states, in particular achieves less than expected, while the Lithuania, have provided some military military resources invested degrade more assistance to Ukraine bilaterally. Outside quickly, the Russian leadership could be the EU, the US has been the most substan- induced to reconsider and switch back to tial provider of such assistance, although peaceful talks. One way to make the Rus- the UK and Canada have also been active in sian military tool less effective and less this respect. If Germany were to join these attractive would be by strengthening countries in assisting Ukraine in the realm Ukraine’s military. This approach appears of defence, it would make sense to coordi- feasible since previous Russian foreign and nate with them, as well as with Kyiv, on security behaviour indicates that Russia the types of assistance that could be most is not currently contemplating a full-scale useful. But this issue is secondary to the invasion of Ukraine. question of whether or not to offer such By acquiring additional defence assis- assistance in the first place. tance, a militarily stronger Ukraine can impose more significant costs on Russia while on the defensive, but it cannot win The Role of Defence Assistance against Russia in an offensive operation. Its military capabilities are not adequate for Insights from the field of strategic analysis this – Ukraine could hardly deploy more reveal that military assistance can in fact than 60,000–80,000 troops in the Donbas, be utilised for de-escalation purposes. In at the risk of significantly weakening its particular, crisis bargaining and deterrence- defences in other areas, including on the related studies suggest that visible capabili- border with Belarus. Russia, on the other ties for denial-based deterrence are the hand, can afford to amass at its borders most reliable option for discouraging delib- with Ukraine a force about twice as large.

SWP Comment 42 July 2021

2 It revealed this in April 2021, when it For instance, the combat first-aid kits and deployed more than 100,000 troops in the other medical supplies that Ukraine re- proximity of Ukraine’s borders, in addition quested but failed to receive from Germany to the fighting force already deployed in in 2014 could have significantly reduced the Donbas. This estimation also considers the almost 40 per cent death rate among Russia’s constraints, which are related to wounded soldiers, preserving higher defen- the structure of its armed forces, and the sive capabilities on the Ukrainian side. necessity to cover its very extensive borders. Similarly, improved individual protection Ukraine thus has no chance to succeed equipment for soldiers, such as body in – and therefore no incentive for – a armour vests and Kevlar helmets, would military offensive against Russia. Ukraine is also save the lives of many Ukrainian capable of defeating Russian proxies in the combatants, contributing to a higher cost- Donbas alone, as it proved in August 2014. benefit ratio of Russian military operations. However, it will presumably refrain from Furthermore, secure radio capabilities, bet- attacking, since the Ukrainian army is ter reconnaissance equipment, and night- aware that Russia could always intervene – vision devices that Ukraine previously as it did in 2014, when it sent its military requested could further improve the ability across the border and defeated advancing of the Ukrainian military to reduce its per- Ukrainian troops. Both the 2008 Russian- sonnel losses. Georgian War and Ukraine’s own experi- Some of the highest Ukrainian casualties ence with Russia in the Donbas sent a have come as a result of artillery and sniper strong signal to Ukrainian policymakers fire. Improving the counter-fire capabilities that Russia will respond militarily to an of the Ukrainian military by delivering sur- attempted offensive against its proxies. veillance and target acquisition equipment On the other hand, a militarily stronger would change this drastically. This and Ukraine can affect the attractiveness of an other types of defence assistance have the armed escalation in the Donbas for Russia. dual effect of reducing Ukrainian losses and With modern Western equipment, logistics, increasing costs for the Russian military and training, it can significantly alter the by forcing them to expend more munitions cost calculations and incentives of the Rus- and lose more hardware. The continuous sian military. Evidence shows that even a replenishment of Russian supplies of muni- technologically and numerically inferior tions and military hardware over the last fighting force can pose a challenge if it seven years has not been cheap. And if Rus- skilfully uses the modern system of force sia starts to lose that hardware more fre- employment. Combining this system with quently, while its strikes inflict less damage Western military equipment, Ukrainian on Ukrainian troops, then the military forces can inflict higher levels of damage escalation becomes more costly and delivers on troops attacking them, more quickly fewer benefits. degrading their deployed military capabilities. This should encourage longer ceasefires, at least. For instance, one of the A Better Chance for Diplomacy longest ceasefires in Eastern Ukraine, agreed in summer 2020, came shortly after Increasing the defence capabilities of the US permitted Ukraine to use the Javelin Ukraine would not only reduce its losses, anti-tank missiles it had provided, under but also improve its resolve and signal that the condition that they were to be used resolve more powerfully to Russia. This only in response to attacks in the Donbas. could play a strong role in deterring further A second-tier effect of defence assistance escalation and move the conflict from the is that a better-equipped Ukraine would violent stage to diplomatic talks by affect- also considerably reduce its own losses from ing both Russia’s perception of Ukraine’s Russian attacks, diminishing their utility. determination to continue fighting and its

SWP Comment 42 July 2021

3 expectations about the conflict’s duration ing Ukraine’s defence and resolve against and gains. Defence assistance to Ukraine military attacks in the Donbas, Germany challenges Russia’s expectations of Ukraine’s would be able to strengthen its bargaining propensity to capitulate and accept Russia’s leverage on Russia due its ability to directly conditions regarding the Donbas. As Russian impact Russia’s interests and activities in leaders become aware of Ukraine’s increased its priority geographic area. By providing resolve and its more resilient defence pos- defence assistance to Ukraine, Germany ture, they will adjust their expectations and would progressively create for itself a wider have less confidence in Ukraine’s potential space for a trade-off with Russia. It could capitulation. This could have a critical im- achieve this by conceding to adjust this pact on the crisis bargaining process, in the assistance in the future, although maintain- sense of positively affecting Russia’s willing- ing it at a level sufficient to ensure Ukraine’s ness to negotiate in earnest. effective deterrence ability, thus promoting Thus, by providing defence assistance to a bargaining process on the Donbas that Kyiv, Germany – in conjunction with other discourages armed escalations. This ability states already active in this regard – would to impact facts on the ground would force temper Russia’s decision to escalate by Russia to seek to engage Germany, not only influencing Russia’s expectations about in the economic sphere, but in the security Ukraine’s resolve to resist. If Moscow per- domain as well. ceives Ukraine to be weak and irresolute, If Germany wants to play a prominent then it has an incentive to keep pressure pacifying role in Eastern Ukraine, it needs high by mounting continuous attacks and to reshape Russia’s perception that it skirmishes against Ukrainian troops for a can easily coerce Ukraine into submission constant attrition effect. In the perception through a gradual military attrition of of Russian defence planners – based on Ukraine’s defence capabilities and its the influence operations they have been resolve. Otherwise, the conflict is likely running against Ukraine – this approach to linger for decades, leading to thousands generates continuous news about casual- of additional casualties and a higher risk ties, heightens war fatigue amongst the of military escalation, since Ukraine is un- population, and puts political pressure willing to become a satellite state of Russia. on the leadership. Since Russia perceives In parallel with this strategy, Germany Ukraine as weak, it orchestrates continuous could contribute to the peace process by ceasefire violations and instrumentalises negotiating with Russia and providing an their impact, aiming to erode the Ukrainian “honourable way out” of the Donbas war, population’s desire to resist. making such a retreat more palatable for More active German involvement would Moscow. A peaceful solution to the ongoing not just significantly benefit the peace pro- Russian-Ukrainian War in the Donbas that cess and make armed escalations costlier. does not involve significantly raising the It could also further affect Russia’s expec- costs of Russian military activity seems un- tations regarding the ability of Ukraine to likely. Altering Russia’s cost calculations secure the support of critical players inside is, however, a gradual process, requiring a the EU. Berlin would thereby acquire a continuity of approach with regard to inter- more solid position to negotiate with Mos- national support for the Ukrainian armed cow. Currently, Russia strongly influences forces. the negotiations and their agenda, exploit- ing its Donbas proxies to absorb the costs of its noncompliance with the Minsk agree- Insights for German Foreign Policy ments, thus making its violations easy to sustain. A willingness to provide military assistance By assuming a substantive role – along to Ukraine would thus address multiple with other Western states – in consolidat- issues simultaneously. It would serve as a

SWP Comment 42 July 2021

4 proactive response to the current stalemate German willingness to expand the arsenal in the Minsk Process, in which Russia has of instruments it employs in the current demonstrated inflexibility despite various challenging international environment. It Ukrainian proposals on how to move for- would represent an effective reaction to a ward. This would be an important signal to situation in which other actors (in this case Moscow and Berlin’s allies that Germany is Moscow) are pursuing a military solution. willing to continue to take a certain share It would also make a political solution to of ongoing European responsibility for the conflict more probable by increasing managing the conflict in the Donbas – in the likelihood that Moscow will be willing a situation where Ukraine and other actors to engage in serious and genuine negotia- are increasingly placing greater hopes on tions. Finally, it would constitute a clear © Stiftung Wissenschaft the US administration. Increased US in- response to Russia’s military build-up in und Politik, 2021 volvement would leave Germany and other and near Ukraine in March and April, All rights reserved European actors with less ability to influ- which has only partially been reversed. This This Comment reflects ence the process in Ukraine. Germany’s build-up plainly indicated Moscow’s inten- the authors’ views. assistance would also signal to Moscow that tion to continue relying on military instru- Berlin is unwilling to contemplate trading ments to intimidate weaker actors and co- The online version of long-term European security for short-term erce them to accept its will. This approach this publication contains economic benefits. Currently, some Russian by Russia has already led to borders in functioning links to other officials tend to believe that the opposite is Europe being de facto redrawn. Reducing SWP texts and other relevant sources. true, namely that Germany and other EU the incentives for – and the potential im- countries are unlikely to persist in jeopard- pact of – Russia’s military instruments SWP Comments are subject ising common economic interests for an by offering defence assistance to Ukraine to internal peer review, fact- extended period. This perception embold- would not only raise the chances for a sus- checking and copy-editing. ens Russia’s security policy abroad. Finally, tainable de-escalation. It would also pro- For further information on our quality control pro- Germany would be demonstrating strategic vide a further tangible sign that Germany cedures, please visit the SWP solidarity with EU and NATO member states refuses to accept the redrawing of borders website: https://www.swp- that have been providing defence assistance in Europe and the subordination of smaller berlin.org/en/about-swp/ to Ukraine. states with fewer resources to larger and quality-management-for- Such assistance would not violate Ger- militarily more powerful ones. swp-publications/ many’s obligations under international SWP agreements. There are no restrictions on Stiftung Wissenschaft und military assistance to Ukraine according to Politik the Arms Trade Treaty, which Germany is German Institute for a party to. More specifically, there is no UN International and Security Council prohibition of arms ex- Security Affairs ports to Ukraine, and there is no evidence Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 that the arms exported to Ukraine are to be 10719 Berlin used to violate international law. In fact, Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Ukraine has the right to use arms for self- www.swp-berlin.org defence, and there is abundant evidence [email protected] that Russia used its regular military forces ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 directly and as local proxies to attack ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 Ukraine. doi: 10.18449/2021C42 More generally, military assistance would be evidence of a more strategic approach to European security, demonstrating

Dr Dumitru Minzarari is Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. Dr Susan Stewart is Acting Head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 42 July 2021