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Visit to Warsaw SEPTEMBER 2019 VISITVISIT TOTO WARSAWWARSAW ISSUE №2 Table of Contents The outlines of Interviev with Vladimir Zelensky policy Vasyl Bondar, on the Russian direction Deputy Minister, 3 After a triumphal election victory and 9 MFA of Ukraine an unprecedented mandate of public trust, Vladimir Zelensky and his team, Minsk arrangements, no matter how in a different status, faced new chal- critical they are, are the only platform lenges at the state level. for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Donbas. New formats can be processed only when all efforts within Minsk are exhausted. Zelensky's visit to Warsaw: Comments on a Zelensky’s is it normalization visit to Poland 6 of bilateral relations? 11 The fact that Zelensky’s first official On August 31, President Vladimir visit to Poland was to commemorate Zelensky arrived in Warsaw for a the 80th anniversary of the outbreak two-day visit to celebrations marking of the second world war suggests that the 80th anniversary of the outbreak the new Ukrainian president recognis- of World War II. As part of his visit, es the importance of history in Pol- Zelensky met with Polish President ish-Ukrainian relations. Andrzej Duda, Prime Minister Mateusz Moravecki, Senate Speaker Stanislav Karczewski, as well as with many other high-ranking officials and business representatives. 2 UKRAINIAN POINT The outlines of Vladimir Zelensky policy on the Russian direction fter a triumphal election victory and an unprecedented mandate of public trust, Vladimir Zelensky and his team, in a different status, faced new challenges at the state level. The difficult situation inside the country and the foreign policy prevailing over national interests require clear and consistent actions, competent and sometimes unpopular decisions, a willingness to take responsibility and Aset priorities correctly. A particularly difficult task is to find the optimal modal- needs to balance in this coordinate system when ities for the reintegration of certain regions of Donetsk formulating policies and negotiating on the Russian and Lugansk regions, the return of the Crimean pen- factor. insula; build further relations with the Russian Feder- ation amid ongoing confrontation. The leadership of The starting positions inherited from the previous ad- the country found itself in the strict framework of a ministration do not simplify the task. Paradoxically, the previously unresolved problem, where any wrong move Minsk Agreements remain the only mechanism for en- could provoke a wave of public discontent. The desire suring peace in the Donbas, which pose a direct threat to achieve peace and the willingness to make com- to the geopolitical ambitions and the future domes- plex compromises borders on the red lines of national tic political stability of Ukraine. Unfortunately, in pre- interests, while the lack of progress in a peaceful set- vious years, official Kiev did not show proper activity tlement poses a threat of destructive consequences, in providing the world community with its own mod- will not stop the death of Ukrainian soldiers and will el of normalizing the situation in the Donbass. It is not not add growth to the Ukrainian economy. V. Zelensky surprising that the lack of articulation of the Ukrainian VOL. 2 | SEPTEMBER 2019 3 position on the Normandy format site by the admin- The heterogeneity of the political landscape of istration of Petro Poroshenko and the simultaneous Ukraine contributes to the competition of warring manifestation of his commitment to the Minsk pro- camps, while at the same time giving rise to a de- cess made him an uncontested tool for overcoming structive tendency to politicize issues of Donbass, the crisis, not affecting the Crimean case. Crimea and relations with the Russian Federation. Correction of the situation is possible in the case of a They expect from Zelensky victory in the diplomatic clear separation of individual and state political inter- game that was started without him, according to the ests. Starting to shape the contours of the future di- rules approved by others. The first steps of the Pres- alogue between Kiev and Moscow, V. Zelensky more idential Office demonstrate the desire of the head of than once emphasized the need to move the lead- state to move the situation off the ground and take full er of the Opposition Platform - For Life, Viktor Med- control of the entire negotiation process with the Rus- vedchuk, beyond the framework of the newly created sian side. A successfully organized hostage exchange format of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Apparently, in became an indicator of the well-organized and thought- the departure from the practice of using intermediar- ful work of V. Zelensky and his team on the Russian ies with their subjective interests V. Zelensky sees the track. Direct contact at the presidential level has borne possibility of depoliticizing the agenda. fruit, leaving behind the brackets numerous pitfalls of bi- lateral communication - from bureaucratization of deci- V. Medvedchuk himself refuses to put up with the cur- sion-making procedures to behind-the-scenes interven- rent state of affairs. More recently, during the presiden- tion of other interest groups that receive their political cy of P. Poroshenko, the politician acted as a kind of dividends from the current situation. “gray cardinal” in relations with Russia, at the same time using his status to realize business interests in the en- Direct communication is one of the policy elements ergy sector and strengthen his media assets in Ukraine. of V. Zelensky’s office in the Russian direction. The Against the background of the collapse of the political effective implementation of this approach requires course of P. Poroshenko, the party created by V. Med- distance from bilateral negotiations of shadow vedchuk put the themes of reconciliation with Moscow, players from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides hostage exchange and peace in the Donbass as the ba- in order to prevent all kinds of provocations, mis- sis of its political program, managed to consolidate a understandings or harmful information throws. V. fairly large electoral group around itself. Zelensky’s desire to control the ongoing processes Although V. Medvedchuk does not abandon attempts to is dictated by circumstances and is yet another cor- maintain his position through personal contacts in the nerstone of Ze-diplomacy. Russian political establishment, a successful exchange 4 UKRAINIAN POINT without his participation became an alarming bell for his of the results of work in the Norman format or the Tri- political ambitions. If the policy of the Presidential Office partite Contact Group (TGC), exchange negotiations continues to produce results, V. Medvedchuk will begin and details of direct contacts with the Russian author- to lose the political foundation that secured his party ities. Even the strange decisions to return and remove second place in parliamentary elections, which threat- from work in the TKG Roman Immortal, taken in a ens the individual interests of the politician. Without ac- short period of time, are associated with his cess to existing negotiation platforms (TKG and Nor- excessive publicity. man format), without the ability to influence decisions of the President’s Office or adjust official policies of the It should be said about the desire for phased promo- country, V. Medvedchuk and his political project will re- tion and recording of results as another approach of main in the opposition niche with low chances for rat- V. Zelensky in his work. The separation of troops and ings to grow. Narrowing the field for maneuvers leaves the reconstruction of the bridge in Stanitsa Lugansk politics a little chance to play on the topics of "gas nego- was taken as the starting point in the reanimation of tiations", "direct dialogue with the militants of the Ordlo" the Minsk agreements and a kind of model of possible and "criticism of the current government" using informa- coordination for its further implementation along the tion resources, which is highly likely to bring no big divi- entire line of contact. Attempts are being made to link dends. Moreover, against the background of the demon- the organization of work of the TKG and the Norman stration by both sides of the political will to jointly seek a format with the real implementation of the agreements solution to the problems through direct contacts at the reached. highest level, V. Medvedchuk’s attempts to intervene can cause a destabilizing effect and frustrate the progress V. Zelensky emphasized that he opposes peacekeepers emerging after the exchange. in the Donbass, thus excluding this scenario from the list of possible ones. Given the complexity and duration By removing shadow players from the conditional of all the procedures when coordinating the UN mission, playing field and independently formulating the nego- its cost and the additional threat of “freezing” the con- tiation team, V. Zelensky also gives occasion to talk flict, the conclusion suggests itself that the president about the importance of personnel policy in organiz- wants to achieve results using the existing tools in the ing a dialogue with the Russian side. Responsibility for shortest possible lines. preparing the exchange was assigned to his assistant, Although the principles and methods of the president’s Andrei Yermak, who was previously not known to the work are already getting concrete outlines, questions general public, does not have much political or diplo- about the strategic goals that the President’s Office matic experience. Apparently, the president’s personal sets up remain unanswered. Undoubtedly, it is not yet confidence became the main selection criterion in this possible to adequately evaluate the results of V. Zelen- case. In any case, the new methods created a separate sky's work on the Russian track. There remain concerns negotiation channel Yermak - Kozak and the first suc- about the lack of experience of the new team and the cessful case of interaction.
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