International Security I: the Context of International Security Syllabus Ay 20

Home , International Security, Security studies

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I: THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYLLABUS AY 20

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE MAXWELL AFB, AL

FOREWARD

This syllabus for the International Security I course for the Air Command and Staff College, Academic Year 2020 (October-December 2019), provides both an overview of the course narrative, objectives, and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included herein is information about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment of joint professional military education core goals.

SIGNED

J. Wesley Hutto, PhD Course Director International Security I

APPROVED

James Forsyth, PhD Dean of Academic Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE FOREWARD 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

COURSE OVERVIEW 4

EXTERNAL GUIDANCE 6

COURSE REQUIREMENTS 9

COURSE ADMINISTRATION 10

COURSE SCHEDULE WHAT CAUSES WAR? DAY 1 Introduction 11 DAY 2 Realism 13 DAY 3 Liberalism 15 DAY 4 Constructivism 17 WHAT INCREASES OR DECREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR? DAY 5 Globalization and Nationalism 19 DAY 6 Environmental Security and Resource Scarcity 21 DAY 7 Nuclear Proliferation 23 HOW DO WE RESPOND TO THREATS IN AN ENVIRONMENT PRONE TO WAR? DAY 8 Grand Strategy 25 DAY 9 Diplomatic and Economic Statecraft 27 DAY 10 Institutions and Alliances 29 DAY 11 Russia’s Resurgence as a Great Power 31 DAY 12 China’s Ascendance as a Great Power 33 DAY 13 North Korea and the Nuclear Threat 35 DAY 14 Iran’s Quest for Regional Hegemony 37 DAY 15 Violent Extremist Organizations: The Non-state Threat 39 DAY 16 Final Assignment Turn-in 41

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course explores the context of international security with a focus on the causes of war. The course highlights myriad challenges involved in operating in a socio-political world with no final arbiter to resolve disputes between states. Specifically, the course examines the grand theories that inform contrasting explanations for international wars, as well as particular components of those theories that may increase or decrease the likelihood of war onset. It then introduces potential US responses to strategic problems in an environment prone to war, and applies these concepts to the two-plus-three (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations). The course affords students the opportunity to cultivate and refine critical thinking skills in assessing where war is likely, as well as how the US may seek to prevent or prepare for war.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the three theoretical traditions of International Relations (IR) and their distinct explanations for war onset. 2. Comprehend these traditions as they apply to specific issues thought to increase/decrease the likelihood of war onset. 3. Comprehend the major challenges facing the US today (two-plus-three) and identify appropriate strategic responses to those threats.

COURSE QUESTIONS

1. How does each IR tradition explain international security and explain the onset of war? 2. What issues in the international environment increase or decrease the likelihood of war? 3. What are potential flashpoints between the US and the two-plus-three, and how might the US prevent or prepare for war during a crisis?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

International Security I: The Context of International Security seeks to develop thoughtful, incisive decision makers at the tactical and operational levels of war with the ability to marry these decisions to higher levels of thought through an understanding of the complex relationships between policy, strategy, and the international environment in which they are developed. This course emphasizes comprehension of the emerging strategic environment as a precursor to acting in the field. The course requires students to think critically about the underlying assumptions that explain war onset, as well as the development and execution of US grand strategy in the contemporary environment.

International Security I has three phases intended to engage the student with existing theoretical frameworks and causal factors that explain war onset, as well as contemporary challenges that drive US grand strategic thinking and execution concerning war prevention and preparation.

Phase I introduces three traditions of International Relations to create a foundation for understanding the underlying causes of war in the international system. Specifically, Phase I explores the structural, domestic, and ideational causes of great power war.

Phase II of the course considers potential drivers of stability and instability in the current strategic environment. It first debates the influence of globalization on peace and war— specifically examining the nationalist backlash against globalism. It then assesses rising environmental insecurity, and whether resource scarcity will drive states toward conflict. Finally, Phase II addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation, and asks whether proliferating states are emboldened to fight wars, making their onset more likely.

Building on themes of Phase I and II, Phase III of the course introduces the concept of grand strategy, as well as its instruments: diplomatic and economic statecraft, and institutions and military alliances. These first three days provide the primary debate in the US over retrenchment and engagement, and explore the use of diplomatic and economic statecraft, as well as institutions and military alliances in meeting those grand strategic goals. Additionally, these instruments of statecraft are examined in the context of the contemporary challenges to the US: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations (two-plus-three). The phase pulls through the theoretical threads from Phase I and Phase II in order to impress upon the students the importance of thinking systematically about potential future conflicts, as well as about developing US approaches to either prevent or prepare for them.

In each of these phases, International Security I employs an approach that requires students to ground theoretical thinking about the world in the current international context. The course methodology uses the disciplines of philosophy, political science, history, and security studies to lay a theoretical foundation through which to consider international security, and then obliges students to build on that foundation by incorporating contradicting logics, and finally asks students to apply these frameworks by considering potential flashpoints that could lead to war between the US and another state, as well as strategies for the prevention or preparation. This methodological approach illustrates how theory explains war onset and influences the formulation of grand strategy and statecraft, and gives students a better appreciation of how US strategic objectives influence military objectives at the operational and tactical levels of war.

In order to create a joint force that is “knowledge empowered, networked, interoperable, expeditionary, adaptable, enduring/persistent, precise, fast, resilient, agile, and lethal,” 1 it is first necessary to develop the leaders with an understanding of the emerging strategic environment. This requires joint officer development approaches that forge joint officers who can think critically and systematically, and who can relate their operations to the strategic context in which they take place. The goal of International Security I is to provide such an education through a study of the causes of war and US grand strategy in both an historical and a contemporary context.

1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Visions for Joint Officer Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2.

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-1)

International Security I: The Context of International Security addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. The course supports the following Joint Learning Areas and Objectives, listed below with points of explanation:

Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.  Lessons ISI – 514, 515 address the topic of US grand strategy broadly.  Lessons ISI – 516, 517, 518, 519 incorporate economic and diplomatic statecraft, as well as international institutions and military alliances as resources to realize political ends.  Lessons ISI – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 discuss the current security challenges to US national interests in the form of the two-plus-three. d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Forces.  Lessons ISI – 500 and 501 directly relates the course to the National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS) and the Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JOE 2035).  Lessons ISI – 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, and 507 approach the US strategic environment from a theoretical standpoint, analyzing the underlying currents and causes of international war.  Lessons ISI – 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 each possess tie-ins to various strategic documents such as the NSS, NDS, and JOE.

Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.  All course lessons seek to convey an understanding of the current security environment prone to war, and in which US grand strategy is developed and statecraft executed. e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.  Lessons ISI – 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, and 519 address components of the whole of government approach, including diplomacy, economic statecraft, and the use of international institutions and alliances.  Lessons ISI – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529 consider how various instruments of power can be used to face contemporary challenges.

Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Joint Execution Processes f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.  Lessons ISI - 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, and 507 present theoretical frameworks for understanding contemporary geopolitics and war onset.  Lessons ISI – 514, 515 discusses US grand strategy broadly.  Lessons ISI – 516, 517, 518, and 519 explore instruments of grand strategy, or statecraft.  Lessons ISI – 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 cover how variations in society, culture, and religion can inhibit US strategic interests across the system.  Lessons ISI – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 indirectly address regional differentiation in security environments.

Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.  Lessons ISI – 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, and 529 all indirectly approach the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment through exploration of its political peers, i.e. diplomacy, economic statecraft, institutions and information, and alliances. e. Communicate with clarity and precision.  All course lessons seek to engage student critical thinking, reasoning, and problem solving in order to develop thoughtful communicators.

JPME SPECIAL EMPHASIS AREAS NOTE: ISI IN BOLD

The CJCS memo, Academic Year 2019-2020 Joint PME Special Areas of Emphasis List also identifies emphasis areas which are addressed is ISI as appropriate.

1. Globally Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

2. Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century a. Lessons ISI – 512, 513, 521, and 522 discuss various aspects concerning the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and the challenges of nuclear proliferation and non-Western nuclear powers.

3. Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

4. Space as a Warfighting Domain

5. The Return to Great Power Competition

a. Lessons ISI – 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 523, 524, 525, and 526 incorporate exploration of the contemporary strategic environment utilizing historical case comparisons. b. Lessons ISI – 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, and 519 provide tools to assist consideration of solutions to and processes of global competition, as well as an appreciation of the role of alliances and partnerships.

USAF Institutional Competencies

ISI finally takes as guidance elements of the USAF Institutional Competencies, Annex 1-1 Force Development list.

Personal: Communicating: Speaking and Writing; Active Listening a. ISI engages in the personal category of institutional competencies through its two written assignments, asking students to clearly communicate their comprehension of course material through application. b. The course structure directly engages and develops student active listening skills, requiring students to process lessons from morning lectures, and factor them in to seminar discussion of the readings.

Organizational: Enterprise Perspective: Global, Regional, Cultural Awareness a. The ISI course objectives require interaction with this competency, as students immerse themselves in readings seeking understanding of the international context at both the global and regional levels. b. Lessons ISI – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 tangentially address culturally diverse environments.

Organizational: Strategic Thinking: Vision; Decision-making a. Because ISI deals strictly with the strategic environment, students are directly assessed on their ability to think strategically when seeking to prevent or prepare for war. b. The ISI final exam requires students to provide a grand strategic “vision” that is adaptable in specific international contexts.

ACSC JPME Program Outcomes NOTE: ISI IN BOLD

1. Articulate the complexity and uncertainty of operational leadership in the profession of arms.

2. Articulate the capabilities and limitations of military force, particularly airpower, in the effective integration of the instruments of national power. a. Phase III of the course encourages critical thinking focused on the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power, and their relation to

current strategic environment. Students’ ability to articulate the integration of the military instrument relies on their understanding of the utility of other instruments of national power.

3. Analyze the effects of the global security environment on the achievement of operational objectives. a. The achievement of operational objectives for strategic success depends on officers’ ability to comprehend the global security environment, its challenges and opportunities, as well as the interests of adversaries. Phase I of the course presents students with three theoretical traditions for understanding the global security environment. Each tradition addresses the environment through a distinct frame to aid students in identifying primary mechanisms driving state behavior. b. The achievement of operational objectives for strategic success depends on officers’ ability to identify the proximate causes of international disputes, conflict, and war. Phase II of the course addresses particular factors, or flashpoints, that increase and/or decrease the likelihood of conflict and war.

4. Apply military theory, operational art, joint concepts, and doctrine to develop effective warfighting plans for multi-domain operations.

5. Apply normative ethical principles in professional military decision making.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. READINGS. Before lecture and seminar, students are expected to complete all assigned readings for the day. Students are encouraged to read the explanation given in the syllabus before reading the assigned books and articles. The syllabus also provides information on current strategic guidance, as it relates to the topic of the day, as well as further suggested reading. While students are not required to read those listed under the further suggested tab for this course, they may wish to address it for further information concerning areas of interest related to the seminar or course assessment tools.

2. LECTURES. Students will attend course lectures relating to assigned readings and seminar. These presentations compliment the readings and seminar discussion, and therefore enhance knowledge of the course concepts. Lectures in the course provide historical and theoretical background to stimulate and enhance learning in seminar.

3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to the success of the course. Students must prepare for each seminar by completing all of the assigned readings. Each member of seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion.

4. WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS. There are two written, graded assignments: a three-page take-home midterm examination and a five-page take-home final examination in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security I course. **Refer to writing rubric in the student handbook**

5. METHODS OF EVALUATION. There are two written, graded assignments in fulfillment of the requirements of the ISI course: 1. A three-page take-home examination worth 40% of the final grade 2. A five-page take-home final examination worth 60% of the final grade **Refer to grading standards as identified in the OI**

COURSE ADMINISTRATION

There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued from the ACSC Book Issue Room; and 2) selected chapters and articles posted to the course Canvas page. ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at the conclusion of the course:  Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2016 [1983].  Ganguly, Šumit and S. Paul Kapur. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010.  Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2008.  Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001.  Reveron, Derek S. and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris. Human Security in a Borderless World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011.  Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.  Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010 [1979].

Please refer any questions to Dr. Wes Hutto (Course Director, [email protected], Office 248) or Lt Col Jonathan Beach (Deputy Course Director, [email protected], Office 251).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I: THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COURSE SCHEDULE

PHASE I: WHAT CAUSES WAR? DAY 1 – COURSE INTRODUCTION

DATE: 15 October

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the difficulty of explaining war onset. 2. Comprehend the differences among the various explanations of the causes of war and peace. 3. Comprehend arguments about the causes of past wars as they apply to the contemporary strategic setting. LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-500 (L): Introduction: Dr. Wes Hutto Overview: This lecture introduces the course, as well as its driving questions and key components. It reviews extant explanations of the causes of war.

CONTACT HOURS: 0.5-hour lecture

ISI-501 (S): Introduction: The War Puzzle Overview: What causes war? There is no one single explanation. “Writers have declared the cause of World War I to have been the Russian or the German mobilization; the Austrian ultimatum; the Sarajevo assassination; the aims and ambitions of the Kaiser…the desire of France to recover Alsace-Lorraine or of Austria to dominate the Balkans; the European system of alliances; the activities of munitions makers, the international bankers, or the diplomats; the lack of an adequate European political order…commercial policies; the sentiment of nationality; the struggle for existence; the tendency of nations to expand…” and many, many others.2 Yet, the stories that we tell ourselves about how wars begin are incredibly important to analyze and evaluate. As Blainey states, if our answers are “based on false generalizations about the causes of war and the causes of peace [their] influence in promoting peace is likely to be limited and indeed haphazard.” In other words, why continue the debate about how wars begin? Because that is how we can maintain peace. “War is inevitable, but particular wars can be avoided. This means living with endless uncertainties and crises.”3 CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

2 Quincy Wright, A Study of War 2nd ed. (1942; repr., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 103. 3 Martin Wight, Power Politics, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (1978; repr., New York, NY: Continuum, 2004), 143.

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Geoffrey Blainey, Causes of War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973), 3-32; 267-290. [EL]

Theory/Extension/Application: Blainey introduces the foundational question of this course, “what causes war between nations?” He provides a series of potential answers, ranging from individual psychology, to demographic change, economic adversity, and civil unrest. He extends this conversation to explore notions of peace, specifically claims that increasing connectivity across peoples, cultures, and states are key ingredients for long absences of war. Finally, Blainey uses discussions of the onset of various wars, primarily World War I, to draw them forward into the nuclear present. Will nuclear weapons prevent another Great War? The answer is as elusive as the causes of the First Great War.

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 1. President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2017). 2. Department of Defense, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2018). 3. Department of Defense, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2016).

DAY 2: REALISM: STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF WAR

DATE: 18 October

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend offensive realism and defensive realism. 2. Comprehend realism in order to better understand the occurrence of war in the international system. 3. Comprehend realist predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-502 (L): Thinking like a Realist – Structural Causes and Systemic Effects Dr. Jim Forsyth Overview: States, regardless of their internal composition, goals or desires, pursue interests however defined, in ways they deem best. Often this pursuit generates a security dilemma between states due to uncertainty and fear, and sometimes this situation erupts into conflict and war. These wars are the continuation of political discourse by other means. How should states seek to avoid war according to realism? How might a realist deal with the rise of China?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-503 (S): Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism and Structural Explanations for Great Power War Overview: The tradition of realism develops around a concern about power and material capabilities. Relations between states are based on a system of self-help, and so each state can only expect the other to do what is best for itself. At its core, realism argues conflict is endemic among states that exist in an anarchic world where they must fend for themselves. States are the essential actors who seek their “rational” self-interest, particularly their security interests, within the anarchical international environment. Great powers are the most important actors in the system. How do great powers seek security, and is it through power maximizing or power misery? What can these competing explanations of great power behavior tell us about the causes of war?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co, 2001), 17-22; 29-54.

Theory: Mearsheimer begins the discussion of realist causes of war by suggesting that great powers are “power maximizers,” suggesting that bipolarity and balanced multipolarity are the most stable forms of international system, as the fear present in that system tends to be less acute, and so great powers will seek power to a lesser intensity. The unbalanced multipolarity in Europe due to the rise of German power at the turn of the century generated much fear in the system, which led to the outbreak of the First World War.

2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Waveland, 2010), 123-128; 161-193.

Extension: Waltz extends the discussion of realist causes of war by suggesting that great powers are “power misers,” and that bipolarity is the most stable form of international system, avoiding military interdependence between multiple great powers, as well as reducing the likelihood of miscalculation that preceded the First World War.

3. Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 155-191. [EL]

Application: Lieber positions offensive realism against defensive realism in an effort to explain the cause of the First World War. He argues that its onset was not the cause of miscalculation and military interdependence, but instead was initiated by a German rising power, looking to maximize its security on the European continent.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Nathaniel Heller, “The Prospect for Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China,” Defense and Security Analysis 19, no. 4 (2003): 329-367. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 1

DAY 3 – LIBERALISM: DOMESTIC CAUSES OF WAR DATE: 22 October

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend how liberalism explains patterns of domestic politics and their impact on international relations. 2. Comprehend liberalism as it explains the occurrence of war in the international system. 3. Comprehend liberal predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-504 (L): Thinking like a Liberal: Domestic Causes of War Dr. Kate Boehlefeld Overview: The internal composition of states defines state goals, desires, and interests. Often, the way that states pursue these interests differs according to domestic factors. Security dilemmas are not inevitable, but rather dependent on the make-up of the interacting states. But domestic politics are not always peace inducing, and can sometimes lead to war onset. These wars are the continuation of domestic political discourse by other means. How should states seek to avoid war according to liberalism? How might a liberal deal with the rise of China?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-505 (S): Domestic Politics and the Onset of Great Power War Overview: One theory alone cannot encompass all explanations for war. Just as a topographical map depicts geographic features and a political map depicts clear delineated boundaries between states, both a maps, attempting to address different segments of reality. Realism’s structural causes of war is countered on this day by liberalism’s domestic explanations for war. These arguments focus on the mechanisms found in domestic politics that drive states toward war. Important factors that stand out include regime type (democracy vs. non-democracy) and aspects of the interagency process, civil conflict, public opinion, and nationalism. Which of these factors can help us explain the onset of the First World War?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 653-673. [EL] Theory: Levy opens up the “black box of the state” to uncover domestic characteristics and processes that can lead to war onset. Two particularly salient characteristics identified are regime type (democracy vs. autocracy) and public opinion.

2. Patrick James and John R. Oneal, “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 307- 311. [EL]

Extension: James and Oneal extend the conversation, placing Levy’s argument in the context of the Realism—Liberalism debate. Read only pp. 307-311.

3. Michael R. Gordon, “Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases,” The Journal of Modern History 46, no. 2 (June 1974): 191-226. [EL]

Application: Gordon applies elements of each reading, demonstrating how the domestic structures of Germany and Britain defined the quality of the politics that drove the two states to war in 1914. In particular, German political elites had an overwhelming incentive to use foreign policy as a method of domestic control (see Levy, p. 666), while in Britain, internal political discord generated a “reactiveness” in British foreign policy (see Levy, p. 660, 665).

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 1-2; 17; 19; 34; 40-42. Summary NDS 2018, 1-2

DAY 4 – CONSTRUCTIVISM: IDEATIONAL CAUSES OF WAR DATE: 25 October

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the components of a constructivist worldview, primarily, the role of identities, norms, and ideas in the international system. 2. Comprehend constructivism as it explains the occurrence of war in the international system. 3. Comprehend constructivist predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-507 (L): Thinking like a Constructivist: State Identity, (non)-Recognition, and War Dr. Wes Hutto Overview: The interests of states are defined by who and/or what the state “thinks” it is. In other words, the stories that states tell about themselves impact the way states pursue goals, desires, and interests. Putting together an identity can be a struggle for survival. States need accounts to describe themselves, but they need to have these accounts accepted by other states. States need to be recognized, and non-recognition can often lead to war. These wars are the continuation of international political discourse by other means. How should states seek to avoid war according to constructivism? How might a constructivist deal with the rise of China?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-508 (S): National Identity and War from (non)Recognition Overview: What realism and liberalism have in common in explaining war onset is the tangibility of their explanations. The traditions are concerned primarily with things like material capabilities and institutional processes to determine the causes of war. In contrast, constructivism points to the intangible aspects of these capabilities and processes—their meaning. The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about how other states will act, what the values of other states are, and how those values inform various national interests. In a word, interstate wars are clashes of identity, and their cause can often be explained by the ideas and stories that the primary actors tell about the states they are representing.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Ole R. Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, no. 3 (September 1962): 244-252. [EL]

Theory: Holsti introduces the core concept of national image and argues that decision-makers act upon their subjectivities, the way they interpret state identities. In this sense, war is not between states, but rather between images of states. Ignore the numbers and statistics, pay attention to the argument.

2. Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656-688. [EL]

Extension/Application: Murray extends this concept, arguing that struggles over identity (or national image) are at the center of power politics. She applies a theory of identity and recognition to the case of German naval ambitions at the turn of the century. Specifically, the story that Germany told itself was that it was a great power, and the non-recognition it received from other great powers drove its power-maximizing behavior.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING 1. Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212. [EL]

2. Iver B. Neumann, “Ringmar on Identity and War,” Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 3 (1997): 309-330. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 1-2; 34; 40-42.

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT MIDTERM ISSUED Due: 12 November Handback: 26 November

PHASE II: WHAT INCREASES OR DECREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR?

DAY 5 – GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM

DATE: 29 October

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the relationship between globalization and nationalism. 2. Identify the impact of globalization on nationalist sentiment and relevant security practices. 3. Infer whether globalization and nationalism increase the likelihood of peace or war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-508 (L): Nationalism, the State and Globalization: Dr. Matthew Schwonek Overview: The nation is conceptualized as a political community, the largest and most powerful with which humans identify and assert themselves. Nationalism as a doctrine is concerned with the relation of the political community to the state. Nationalism is best understood, therefore, as a type of politics. “Nation-states” often require strong borders, and globalization tends to weaken borders. What happens when these forces collide?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-509 (S): Globalization, Nationalism, and War Overview: “Stasis appears in the international community when, in several states, bodies of men acquire loyalties which attach them more to bodies of men in other states than to their own fellow-citizens.”4

“Thus interpreted, all nationalities might develop their talents and supplement one another’s contributions to the cause of human progress…With such a concept, nationalism could be maintained by a system of civic education which creates pride in the national culture and achievements and appreciation of the national character and distinctiveness rather than by organized propaganda designed to develop fear of, contempt of, hostility to, and isolation from other nations. Attitudes of the latter type have, however, proved a stronger stimulant to nationalism than have those of the former.”5

The above quotations are in conflict with one another. The first suggests that communities beyond national borders can be built, and that globalizing processes create peace. The second asserts the primacy of national identities over supranational fealties, and notes the violence that can ensue when those national identities are threatened. When and where are these conflicts most likely to occur? How can they be prevented? How can they be stopped?

4 Wight, Power Politics, 141. 5 Wright, A Study of War, 223.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Stephen G. Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (October 1999): 646-670. [EL]

Theory: Brooks introduces the concept of globalization. He argues that economic globalization has limited the benefits of conquest, resulting in a decline in great power war. This implies that globalization has had a pacifying effect on international relations.

2. Mary Kaldor, “Nationalism and Globalization,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1-2 (2004): 161-177. [EL]

Extension: Kaldor extends this conversation by situating current forms of nationalism as responses to globalization. Kaldor’s “new nationalism” is “regressive” and will contribute to an “anarchic form of globalization, characterized by violence and inequality.”

3. Lars-Erik Cederman, “Blood for Soil: The Fatal Temptations of Ethnic Politics,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 2 (March/April 2019): 61-68. [EL]

Extension: Cederman further extends the conversation arguing that ethnic nationalism has seen an ascendance as a reaction to globalizing processes. Cederman suggests that ethnic nationalism can lead to civil conflict when there exists inequality along ethnic lines, and international conflict when diaspora politics generate hostile interventions abroad.

4. V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security I9, no. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 130-166. [EL]

Application: Gagnon applies ethnic nationalism to the case of Serbia. He challenges Cederman’s conclusions, and argues that political elites use ethnic politics to gain and/or maintain power by rendering ethnicity as the only politically relevant identity. This conclusion falls in line with Kaldor’s argument: nationalism is a political project, created and used for political purposes (and war, of course, is politics by other means).

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING 1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2016 [1983]), 1-48.

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE JOE 2035, 10-14; 30-32

DAY 6 – ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND RESOURCE SCARCITY DATE: 5 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend resource scarcity and its relation to environmental security. 2. Identify how resource scarcity may generate conventional and unconventional conflict. 3. Infer what the rise of environmental threats might mean for the likelihood of future war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-510 (L): Film Overview: TBD

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-511 (S): Drought, Resource Scarcity, and War Overview: The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that by 2040, the interplay between drought and flooding and temperature will dramatically decrease the stability of the world’s food and water supply. The socio-economic effects of this instability will vary across populations according to particular contexts, often dependent on geography and levels of wealth. How should we expect this coming future to impact the likelihood of war? Where might “climate wars” be most likely to occur? How should we respond to their likelihood?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, Human Security in a Borderless World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 103-120.

Theory: Reveron and Mahoney-Norris introduce the concept of environmental security. They argue that climate change has the potential to destabilize conflict-prone environments, as well as the potential to create new challenges for national security.

2. Ole M. Theisen, Helge Holtermann, and Halvard Buhaug, “Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim that Drought Breeds Conflict,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2012): 79-106. [EL]

Extension: Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug extend this argument. They suggest that the inclusion of political factors, such as whether marginalized populations are being affected, is vital to understanding where and when environmental hardships will lead to war onset.

3. Val Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 279-298. [EL]

Application: Percival and Homer-Dixon apply these arguments to the case of violent conflict in South Africa. They demonstrate that environmental scarcity breeds conflict when grievances produced by scarcity are combined with strong collective identities and windows of opportunity to solve them through the use of violence.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING

1. Idean Salehyan, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (2008): 315-326. [EL]

2. Marcus DuBois King, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2016): 153-169.

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE JOE 2035, 12-14; 22-23

DAY 7 – NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DATE: 8 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the different reasons why states proliferate and their connection to the traditions from Phase I. 2. Identify how nuclear proliferation might lead to nuclear emboldening and war. 3. Infer whether nuclear proliferation has a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the international environment.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-512 (L): Does Nuclear Proliferation Stabilize or Destabilize International Relations? Dr. Kevin Holzimmer Overview: This lecture will outline the now-famous debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan over whether or not nuclear proliferation has a stabilizing effect on interstate relations. While Waltz maintains that “more are better,” Sagan argues that organizational flaws within states increase the likelihood of nuclear accidents, creating a destabilized international environment.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-513 (S): Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Emboldening, and War Overview: Eight states have declared possession of nuclear weapons: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, India, North Korea, and Pakistan. The last three developed nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the National Security Strategy (2017) identifies these states as particular areas of concern due to North Korea’s posture, and the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Is nuclear proliferation equally threatening in all cases? The following readings suggest that it is not, yet when states obtain nuclear weapons, they can become emboldened, creating an environment prone to war with devastating consequences.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Scott Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/7): 54-86. [EL]

Theory: There are three main determinants in a state’s decision to proliferate: for security independence, as a result of domestic politics, and for prestige. These determinants align with realist, liberal, and constructivist understandings of state behavior, and will also guide strategists in discerning how best to respond to various proliferating states.

2. Michael D. Cohen, “Fear and Loathing: When Nuclear Proliferation Emboldens,” Journal of Global Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Jan 2018): 56-71. [EL]

Extension: Cohen extends the conversation on proliferation to focus on whether or not obtaining nuclear weapons emboldens states and leaders’ foreign policy positions. He concludes that nuclear emboldenment is less dangerous than most assume.

3. Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 23-60. [EL]

Application: Ganguly and Kapur rehash the primary debate over whether or not nuclear proliferation is stabilizing, applying the arguments to South Asia. Kapur, in particular, argues that nuclear proliferation has emboldened Pakistan to be more assertive in its foreign policy, potentially leading to a destabilizing situation in the region.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: US Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 9-46. [EL]

2. Malfrid Braut-Heggehammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventative Attacks and Nuclear Risks,” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 101-132. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 8; 30 Summary NDS 2018, 3; 6

PHASE III: HOW DO WE RESPOND TO CHALLENGES IN AN ENVIRONMENT PRONE TO WAR?

DAY 8 – GRAND STRATEGY

DATE: 12 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend how realism, liberalism, and constructivism inform the various grand strategy options for the United States. 2. Comprehend the retrenchment-engagement debate in US foreign policy. 3. Infer future options for US grand strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-514 (L): The Enduring Nature of US Grand Strategy: Dr. Kelly Grieco Overview: This lecture provides an overview of the grand strategy debate in the United States. It takes the National Security Strategy (2017) as a starting point for identifying US grand strategic practice, and analyzes the rhetoric versus the reality of US grand strategy in the 21st century.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

LECTURE READING 1. President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2017).

ISI-515 (S): The United States’ Grand Strategy Debate Overview: Phase III transitions from discussing the causes of war into assessing what foreign policy options are available to the United States in war-prone environments. It does this first by introducing the concept of grand strategy, or “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance the state’s national interest.”6 The following readings debate the US’ role in the world, and whether or not it should step out of the leadership position it has held since the end of World War II.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/7): 5-43. [EL]

Theory: Posen and Ross define grand strategy as “relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the US role in the world.” They outline four grand strategy options for the US: neo-

6 Peter Feaver, “What is Grand Strategy and Why Do We Need it?” http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/08/what-is-grand-strategy-and-why-do-we-need-it/

isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Read only through page 43.

2. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016): 70-83. [EL]

3. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Should America Retrench? The Battle Over Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016): 164-169. [EL]

4. Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Open World: What America can Achieve After Trump,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019): 18-25. [EL]

Extension/Application: These three articles first extend the conversation to the present day, and focus on the retrenchment-engagement debate in US foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt put together an argument for offshore balancing, a selective engagement strategy. Brands and Feaver argue that this strategy has been implemented by the US before, and was a failure. Rapp-Hooper and Lissner offer what some might see as a middle way forward.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Patrick Porter, “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the US Foreign Policy Establishment,” International Security 42, no. 4 (2018): 9-46. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017 Summary NDS 2018, 2

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT MIDTERM DUE Handback: 26 November FINAL ISSUED Due: 17-20 December Handback: 14 January

DAY 9 –DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

DATE: 19 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Infer the best practices for the conduct of crisis diplomacy and economic strategy, two components of the interagency process. 2. Predict when diplomatic efforts are most likely to succeed (especially with regards to deterrence). 3. Predict when economic sanctions are most likely to succeed (especially with regards to counter-proliferation efforts).

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-516 (L): Crisis Diplomacy in Contemporary Practice—TBD Overview: This lecture overviews the crisis management process—in both its diplomatic and economic forms—through an interagency framework. It outlines the various departmental and agency conceptions of the US role in the world.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-517 (S): The Interagency Components of Grand Strategy Overview: Today, we assess the interagency options—short of military conflict—that states may use to avoid war and/or achieve strategic objectives set out by their grand strategy.

Diplomacy is potential war. “It is the task of diplomacy to circumvent the occasions of war, and to extend the circumvented occasions: to drive the automobile of state along a one-way track, against head-on traffic, past infinitely recurring precipices.”7 What are the best practices for the conduct of diplomacy? When are diplomatic efforts most likely to succeed in avoiding or preventing conflict?

Economic statecraft is another instrument by which states can achieve strategic objectives short of war. In some cases, states might even use economic statecraft to prepare the future battlefield to their advantage. What are the options available to statesmen for the use of economic power? When is economic statecraft most likely to succeed in achieving strategic objectives?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Harlan Cleveland, “Crisis Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (July 1963): 638-649. [EL]

Theory: In his classic analysis on crisis diplomacy, Cleveland introduces the concept and provides five lessons learned on managing crises in American foreign policy.

7 Wight, Power Politics, 137.

2. Anne E. Sartori, “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International Organization 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 121-149. [EL]

Extension/Application: Sartori extends this conversation to discuss deterrence diplomacy. She argues that deterrence diplomacy is most likely to be successful when a state has a reputation for being honest. She applies her theory to the Korean War to explain why the US dismissed Chinese deterrence efforts prior to crossing the 38th parallel.

3. James P. O’Leary, “Economic Warfare and Strategic Economics,” Comparative Strategy 5, no. 2 (1985): 179-206. [EL] Theory: O’Leary introduces the concepts of economic warfare and strategic economics. He produces an “inventory of techniques” for practicing economic statecraft, including methods for their conduct and the assessment of the likelihood of success.

4. Inwook Kim and Jung-Chul Lee, “Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition: Comparing Sanction Conditions between Iran and North Korea,” Asian Perspective 43 (2019): 95-122. [EL]

Extension/Application: Kim and Lee apply the economic statecraft practice of sanctions to the cases of Iran and North Korea. The authors explain why similar sanctions in both cases achieved such different outcomes in terms of success. They argue that in part, success with sanctions is a function of converting economic pain into political coercive pressure on the targeted regime.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Patrick Regan and Aysegul Aydin, “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5 (October 2006): 736-756. [EL]

2. Edward Fishman, “Even Smarter Sanctions: How to Fight in the Era of Economic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2017): 102-110. [EL]

3. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements,” Security Studies 9, no. 1-2 (1999): 188-218. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 48-50 Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 10 – INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND MILITARY ALLIANCES

DATE: 22 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Infer the potential costs and benefits of participation in international organizations and formal alliances. 2. Predict whether or not alliances deter aggression. 3. Estimate the value of US participation in international organizations in preventing or preparing for war.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-518 (L): The Value of the Liberal International Order—Dr. Mary Hampton Overview: This lecture will engage with liberal institutionalism to explain how institutions help promote and expand interstate cooperation. The international system is linked at many levels and in many areas by institutions and organizations. Institutions can be intergovernmental (IGO), non-governmental (NGO), and transnational, or even ad hoc in nature. All states, including the United States, must account for these institutions and organizations in their conduct of foreign policy. Choosing to ignore, bypass, accommodate, or consult these actors can be a matter of vital importance for the national interest.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-519 (S): The International Components of Grand Strategy Overview: Today, we assess the international options—short of military conflict—that states may use to avoid war and/or achieve strategic objectives set out by their grand strategy. The options presented—international institutions and military alliances—are often thought to be at odds with one another with regards to the traditions: international institutions, a tool for the liberal international order; alliances, a tool to maintain the international balance of power. The following readings reflect this divergence. How do these components help states prevent and/or prepare for war? How do these components correspond to the various US grand strategic options?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS 1. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (Feb 1998): 3-32. [EL]

Theory: Abbott and Snidal introduce the concept of international organizations, investigating their functions and properties. The authors suggest that IOs present a multinational platform for the achievement of foreign policy objectives. They additionally argue that IOs may assist states in establishing common norms and practices that can lead to peace.

2. Kurt Leffler, “The ADMM-Plus and the US Department of Defense: Beyond the ‘Talk Shop’ Paradigm,” Asia Policy 22 (July 2016): 123-130. [EL]

Extension/Application: LTC Leffler extends and applies this conversation to the ADMM- Plus. He argues that engagement in ASEAN’s defense-led mechanisms will continue to allow the US to maintain its role in the Asia-Pacific.

3. James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 63-83. [EL]

Theory: Morrow introduces the concept of military alliances. He argues that alliances have real effects on the decisions that states make regarding intervening in wars, and thus can increase the credibility of deterrent threats made on behalf of allies.

4. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (July 2003): 427-439. [EL]

Extension/Application: Leeds extends this discussion to test Morrow’s argument, and pushes back against the question: “Do alliances lead to peace or to war?” She argues that because some alliances are made for deterrence and others for offensive purposes, they instead can only provide information to state leaders trying to anticipate the behavior of other states. Ignore the numbers and statistics, pay attention to the argument.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutions,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (March/April 2009): 49-63. [EL]

2. Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver, “Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 563-583. [EL]

3. Michael R. Kenwick, John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers, “Do Alliances Really Deter?” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (2015): 943-954. [EL]

4. Songying Fang, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances,” International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 775- 809. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 48-50 Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 11 – RUSSIA’S RESURGENCE AS A GREAT POWER DATE: 26 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the debate on the structural, domestic, and ideational factors explaining increasing Russian aggression. 2. Locate insights from realism, liberalism, and constructivism to identify potential Russian “futures.” 3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching a resurgent Russia.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-520 (L): The Russian State and Foreign Policy—Dr. Andrew Aiken Overview: This lecture will address contemporary US-Russian relations. It will discuss the debate over Russia’s orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Russian foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-Russia relationship, and discuss how the US might obtain its objectives in Eastern Europe without provoking war with Russia.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-521 (S): Russia Resurgent: Causes, Effects, and US Policy Responses Overview: The end of the Cold War marked a beginning of Russian strategic retrenchment. Since the election of Vladimir Putin, however, the liberal optimism surrounding that retrenchment has faded among Western allies, as NATO expansion disrupted relations between Russia and the Alliance. Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, and the 2014 Ukraine crisis brought existing tensions to a head. How should we understand Russian aggression? What are its causes? Have our responses been sufficient for deterring further Russian aggression? How can the US best prepare for and avoid war with Russia?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS Understanding the Threat

1. Elias Gotz, “Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited,” International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2017): 228-253. [EL]

Theory: Gotz introduces the challenge of Russia in the 21st century, outlining the competing structural, domestic, and ideational influences on Russian aggression in its foreign policy.

2. Clifford Gaddy and Michael O’Hanlon, “Toward a Reaganov Russia: Russian Security Policy After Putin,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 205-221. [EL]

Extension: Gaddy and O’Hanlon extend this conversation and propose a typology of future Russian grand strategies after Putin. The authors conclude that the most likely, as well as the most desirable future for Russia in the eyes of Washington would be a “Reaganov Russia”— highly patriotic, militaristic, yet restrained in its use of force against other great powers.

Debating Strategic Responses

3. Emma Ashford, “Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia,” Foreign Affairs 114, no. 1 (January/February 2016): 114-125. [EL]

4. Thijs Van de Graaf and Jeff Colgan, “Russian Gas Games or Well-Oiled Conflict? Energy Security and the 2014 Ukraine Crisis,” Energy Research & Social Science 24 (February 2017): 59-64. [EL]

Application: Ashford addresses the Obama Administration’s response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea—targeted sanctions. She argues that the sanctions have not been effective, and the US should change course moving forward. Van de Graaf and Colgan offer one potential tool, using US energy resources as a “weapon” for coercion of Russia short of war.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014): 77-89. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 2; 8; 14; 25-28; 35; 38; 45; 47-48; 51 Summary NDS 2018, 2; 4; 9

DAY 12 – CHINA’S ASCENDANCE AS A GREAT POWER

DATE: 3 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the national and international context in which China’s rise is taking place. 2. Identify insights from realism, liberalism, and constructivism that inform the US interpretation of the Chinese threat. 3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching China’s emergence as a competitor.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-522 (L): The Chinese State and Foreign Policy—Dr. Michael Kraig Overview: This lecture will address contemporary US-Chinese relations. It will discuss the debate over China’s orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Chinese foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-China relationship, and discuss how the US might obtain its objectives in East Asia without provoking war with China.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-523 (S): China’s Ascent and US Foreign Policy Overview: China’s increasing political and economic heft, along with rapid development in its technological sector have prompted serious debate over whether or not the state is strong or weak. Regardless of the outcome of these debates, China’s pursuit of a “blue water navy” has become a primary concern of US defense officials. As China becomes more assertive in the South China Sea, the likelihood of conflict with the US increases. How should we understand China’s assertiveness in the region? What are its causes? How can the US best prepare for and avoid war with China?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour Seminar

REQUIRED READINGS Understanding the Threat

1. Andrew Scobell, “The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry,” Political Science Quarterly, 133, no. 2 (2018): 199-224. [EL]

Theory: Scobell introduces the potential flashpoint in the US-China relationship, the South China Sea. He examines the geopolitical importance of the body of water for both states, and explores the development of both Chinese and US strategic objectives in the area.

2. Van Jackson, “Red Teaming the Rebalance: The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 365-388. [EL]

Extension: Jackson extends this conversation by using the realist, liberal, and constructivist lenses to conduct a risk analysis of the US pivot to Asia. Accordingly, he disaggregates US

policy toward China into three components: military power, economic liberalism, and institutions. He assesses the benefits and costs of each component.

Debating Strategic Responses

3. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 89- 110. [EL]

Application: Friedberg outlines six strategic options for the US in dealing with the rise of China: offshore balancing, enhanced engagement, reassurance, grand bargain/spheres of influence, better balancing, and containment. He endorses a better balancing strategy, engaging China diplomatically, economically, and politically while continuing to balance against China by lifting up regional allies and partners to place constraints on China.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Chong-Pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (2015): 478-501. [EL]

2. Michael Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 2 (March/April 2016): 125-136. [EL]

3. Haiyang Yu, “Glorious Memories of Imperial China and the Rise of Chinese Populist Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 23, No. 90 (2014): 163-190. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 2; 8; 21; 25; 27-28; 35; 38; 45-48; 50-53 Summary NDS 2018, 2; 4

DAY 13 – NORTH KOREA AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT

DATE: 6 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the historical context within which interactions between the US and North Korea take place. 2. Identify aspects of realism and liberalism to US strategy towards North Korea. 3. Infer options for US foreign policy in preparing for and/or avoiding war over North Korea’s nuclear politics.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-524 (L): The North Korean State and Foreign Policy—Dr. Todd Robinson Overview: This lecture will address contemporary US-North Korean relations. It will discuss the debate over North Korea’s orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on North Korean foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-North Korean relationship, and discuss how the US might obtain its objectives in East Asia without provoking war with North Korea.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-525 (S): North Korea – Rogue Nuclear State? Overview: Despite the Trump Administration’s efforts at summit diplomacy with North Korea, the Kim Jong-Un regime continues to test both short-range and long-range missiles on the peninsula. The National Security Strategy (2017) identifies the nuclear threat and emphasizes the role of US alliances with South Korea and Japan in countering the threat. The NSS goes on to note its goal of “denuclearization of the peninsula.” The following readings suggest that this objective may be farfetched, and even unneeded. What are realistic options for the US moving forward? How can the US best prepare for and avoid war with North Korea?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS Understanding the Threat 1. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): 1-14 (skim); 17-19; 20-38; 52-65; 71-84; 113-133; 150-171.

Theory: Sigal introduces some historical background behind US-North Korea relations. He recounts the 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, and the events leading up to the signing of the General Agreed Framework, the deal that temporarily ended North Korea’s search for the bomb.

Debating Strategic Responses

2. N. D. Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 6 (2017): 621-641. [EL]

Extension: Anderson suggests that North Korea’s interminable pursuit of a preponderant nuclear arsenal is best explained by structural realism. That is, the power of the US and its position on the peninsula is an ever-present threat to the North Korean regime, and as long as the status quo is maintained, North Korea will seek a nuclear capability.

3. Darcie Draudt and John K. Warden, “The Strategic Rationale for Maritime Tension Reduction in the Yellow Sea,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2017): 183-197. [EL]

Application: Draudt and Warden argue that instead of focusing on North Korean CVID, the US should manage the problem by reducing the occurrence of localized conflicts prone to nuclear escalation. The authors turn their attention toward the Yellow Sea disputes between North and South Korea.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Jao Ho Chung and Myung-hae Choi, “Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors? Making Sense of China-North Korea Relations, 1949-2010,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 243-264. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 3; 7; 8; 25-26; 45-28 Summary NDS 2018, 2; 3

DAY 14 – IRAN’S QUEST FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY DATE: 13 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the historical context in which interactions between the US and Iran take place. 2. Identify principles of realism and liberalism as they apply to Iranian behavior. 3. Infer options for US foreign policy in preparing for and/or avoiding war with Iran in the Middle East.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-526 (L): The Iranian State and Foreign Policy—Dr. Christopher Hemmer Overview: This lecture will address contemporary US-Iranian relations. It will discuss the debate over Iran’s orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Iranian foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-Iran relationship, and discuss how the US might obtain its objectives in the Middle East without provoking war with Iran.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-527 (S): Sticks or Carrots for Iran? Overview: This day is concerned with the increasing relative power of Iran in the Middle East. Iran’s industrial strength and the size of its population give it a significant latent power advantage in the region. Between 1979 and 2003, Iran had a regional balancer in the form of Iraq, but the 2003 invasion and subsequent events created significant opportunities for Iran to take a more active leadership role in regional security maintenance, much to the concern of the US and its allies in the region. The following readings debate whether Iran is a revolutionary or rational actor, and provide prescriptive policy responses derived from those assumptions. Notice that these assumptions are informed by principles of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and in turn impact the approaches recommended by the authors. What are realistic options for the US moving forward? How can the US best prepare for and avoid war with Iran?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS Understanding the Threat 1. Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2008), ix- xxiii; 17-29; 47-101; 115-118; 123; 133; 150-166; 193-215.

2. Kayhan Barzegar and Abdolrasool Divsallar, “Political Rationality in Iranian Foreign Policy,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 39-53. [EL]

Theory: Kinzer introduces the historical background behind Iran-US relations. Is Iran a “revolutionary state” or a rational actor? Barzegar and Divsallar argue that Iran is a transitional society, whose actions and policies can be understood according to rational interests.

Debating Strategic Responses 3. Eliot A. Cohen, Eric S. Edelman and Ray Takeyh, “Time to Get Tough on Tehran: Iran Policy after the Deal,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2016): 64-75. [EL]

4. Vali Nasr, “Iran Among the Ruins: Tehran’s Advantage in a Turbulent Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (2018): 108-118. [EL]

Extension/Application: Nasr treats Iran as a rational actor, but places emphasis on Iran as a revisionist state, seeking to overturn the Middle Eastern order. Cohen et al. on the other hand treat Iran as a revolutionary state driven not by pragmatic national interest, but instead according to Islamic ideology. Nasr’s treatment of Iran prompts the author to promote a strategy of cooperative security toward Iran, including it as a security provider for the Middle East. Cohen et al.’s assumption about the nature of the Iranian regime leads the authors to take a more hardline bent, arguing that the US should seek primacy over Iran, rolling back Iranian power and influence through economic sanctions as well as military power.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Ian S. Lustick, “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 653-683. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, 48-50 Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 15 – VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE NON-STATE THREAT DATE: 17 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES 1. Comprehend the varying political, social, cultural, and historical contexts in which VEOs emerge. 2. Identify insights from realism, liberalism, and constructivism to options for integrating counterterrorism policies into US grand strategy. 3. Estimate the value of fighting terrorism using economic statecraft.

LESSON OVERVIEW ISI-528 (L): VEOs and the Non-state Threat—Dr. Melia Pfannenstiel Overview: This lecture will address the current grand strategic question facing the US: how does the United States at once both continue the fight against terrorism abroad, and refocus its main efforts toward great power competition and balancing? More importantly, how does it do this effectively without overextending its resources? The lecture will attempt to answer these questions highlighting various counterterrorism and antiterrorism strategies. It will discuss the value of these strategies through the lens of the engagement-retrenchment debate.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ISI-529 (S): Violent Extremist Organizations—Terrorism and Economic Antiterrorism Overview: For the better part of two decades, the United States has been primarily focused on the counterterror/counterinsurgency fight. The recent NSS has implied an interest on pulling back from these types of conflicts, generally involving US military forces on one side, and non-state actors on the other. What drives these weaker organizations to challenge more powerful state structures? How do we fight these movements short of war?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS Understanding the Threat

1. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379-399. [EL]

Theory: Crenshaw introduces the concept of terrorism. She provides rational explanations for why organizations might engage in terrorist activity. Of note, she includes in her analysis terrorism from political exclusion, the unwillingness on the part of particular governments to prevent the practice, the search for recognition, and to provoke overreaction on the part of the government, generating sympathy for the terrorist group.

Debating Strategic Responses

2. Michael J. Boyle, “The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy,” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 191-209. [EL]

Extension: Boyle attempts to “relocate the war on terror in American grand strategy.” He reframes the fight, aiming to delegitimize the tactic, rather than make war on an ideology. He emphasizes the US-led creation of a global anti-terror regime, in which a rule against “indiscriminate harm against non-combatants” should be enforced.

3. Anne L. Clunan, “The Fight against Terrorist Financing,” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 4 (2006): 569-596. [EL]

4. Seung-Whan Choi, “Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis,” International Interactions 39, no. 2 (2013): 217-245. [EL]

Application: Clunan applies the prescription of creating an “anti-terror regime” specifically to one that focusing on terrorist financing. She argues that ultimately, most states will attempt to avoid the cost of compliance with the regime, no matter its moral framing. Choi demonstrates that a strategy of economic sanctions targeting the states labeled as “terrorist supporters” may actually have the unintended consequence of increasing terrorist activity within those states.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING 1. Emanuel Adler, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing,” Security Studies 19, no. 2 (2010): 199-229. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE NSS 2017, i; 3-4; 7-12; 42; 45 Summary NDS 2018, 3 JOE 2035, 22-23

EXAM DAYS – FINAL ASSIGNMENT TURN-IN WINDOW DATE: 17 – 20 December

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT FINAL DUE Handback: 14 January