Globalization and the Study of International Security Author(S): Victor D

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Globalization and the Study of International Security Author(s): Victor D. Cha Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 391-403 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/425352 Accessed: 24-01-2019 15:35 UTC

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This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:35:03 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms ? 2000 Journal of Peace Research, lvol 37, no. 3, 2000,pp. REVIEW391-4(03 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) ESSAY [0022-3433(200005)37:3; 391-403; 0126321 RS SA k -

Globalization and the Study of International Security*

VICTOR D. CHA

Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

In spite of the plethora of literature on security and globalization, there is relatively little work written by security specialists that interconnects the two. In the case of security studies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the 'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and constructionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, it has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globalization. 'lThis essay explores how the processes ofglobalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. It argues that non- physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm. Tlhese security effects translate into certain behavioral tendencies in a state's foreign policy that have thus far not been studied in the literature. First, globalization creates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic ('intermestic) issues such that national governments increasingly operate in spaces defined by the intersection of internal and external security. Second, globalization puts unprecedented bureaucratic innovation pressures on governments in their search for security, and creates multi- lateralist pressures to cooperate with substate and transnational partners rather than traditional allies. Third, globalization makes the calculation of relative capabilities extremely complex and non-linear. Finally, globalization compels contemplation of new modes of fighting as well as renders commonly accepted modes of strategic thinking and rational deterrence increasingly irrelevant. The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity.

Introduction regional peace.1 The former dynamic has been discussed so widely in scholarly and At the threshold of the 21 st century, two top- popular circles that it has reached the ignoble ics have dominated the study of international status of 'buzzword', familiarly used by many relations in the USA: globalization and the to refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trend 'new' security environment after the end of in the world, but hardly understood by any.2 the Cold War. The latter has been the object This essay explores how the processes of of intense debate, largely dominated by those globalization have fundamentally changed arguing about the relative importance of the way we think about security. In spite of structural, institutional, and cultural variables the plethora of literature on security and for explaining the likelihood of global or 1 'I'he works here are too numerous to mention. See Lebow & Risse-Kappen (1995); Brown (1995, 1996); Katzenstcin (1996b); L,ynn-Jones (1993); Buzan et al. * Thanks to Samuel Kim, Robert I,ieber and Robert (1997b). Gallucci for comments and Balbina Hwang for research 2 For a recent insightful work in the non-academic litera- assistance. ture, see Friedman (1999).

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globalization, there is relatively little work sovereignty in that sovereign choices have to written by US security specialists that inter- be made to accommodate these interdepend- connects the two. In the case of security ent ties. Globalization processes are not just studies, this has been in no small part about linkages but about interpenetration. because the field remains entrenched in the As Guehenno noted, globalization is defined 'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and not just by the ever-expanding connections constructionist research programs. In the between states measured in terms of move- case of the globalization literature, this has ment of goods and capital but the circulation stemmed from a relatively stronger focus andon interpenetration of people and ideas the social and economic processes of globali- (Guehenno, 1999: 7). It affects not only zation. The 'new' security environment in external sovereignty choices but also internal the 21st century will operate increasingly sovereigntyin in terms of relations between the the space defined by the interpenetration public and private sectors (Reinicke, 1997). between two spheres: globalization and Contrary to popular notions of globalization, national identity. this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to exist in the traditional Weberian sense (i.e. monopoly of legitimate authority over citi- Security and Globalization zen and subjects within a given territory). Globalization is best understood as a spatial Instead, globalization is a spatial reorganiza- phenomenon.3 It is not an 'event', but tiona of production, industry, finance, and gradual and ongoing expansion of interac- other areas which causes local decisions to tion processes, forms of organization, and have global repercussions and daily life to be forms of cooperation outside the traditional affected by global events. Comparisons are spaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takes often made between globalization at the end of the 20th century and the period before place in a less localized, less insulated way as World War I when the developed world wit- transcontinental and interregional patterns criss-cross and overlap one another.4 nessed unprecedented high volumes of trade The process of globalization is analytically across borders and movements of capital distinct from interdependence. The latter, as that led to the dissolution of empires and tra- Reinicke states, denotes growth in connec- ditional structures of governance. However, tions and linkages between sovereign enti- these analogies are not accurate because the ties. Interdependence complicates external process of change at the turn of the 20th century was driven by, and had as its final outcome, nationalism and the consolidation 3 Sec Held (1997: 253). As Rosenau (1996: 251) writes, 'It of statehood. A century later, statehood and refers neither to values nor structures but to sequences notions of sovereignty are not so much that unfold either in the mind or behavior, to interaction processes that evolve as people and organizations go under attack by so-called 'globalization about their daily tasks and seek to realize their particular forces' as empires were, but are being modi- goals.' fied and re-oriented by them. In short, the 4 See Mittelman (1994: 427). Or as Goldblatt et al. (1997: nation-state does not end; it is just less in 271) note: 'Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human organization and interaction to control. Activity and decisions for the state a transcontinental or interregional level. It involves a increasingly take place in a post-sovereign stretching of social relations across time and space such space (Reinicke, 1997; Rosenau, 1996). In that day-to-day actixvities are increasingly influenced by this sense, globalization is both a boundary- events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and broadening process and a boundary- institutions can have significant global reverberations.' weakening one (Rosenau, 1996: 251).

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Much of the literature on globalization would be discussions on 'rogue' or 'pariah' has focused on its economic rather than states as this term is a function of the end of security implications.5 In part, this is becausethe Cold War; at the same time, however, the the security effects of globalization often spread get of information and technology expo- conflated with changes to the international nentially raises the danger of these threats. security agenda with the end of Cold Similarly,War the end of the Cold War provides Superpower competition.6 It is also because, the permissive condition for the salience of unlike economics where globalization's weapons of mass destruction as the Soviet effects are manifested and measured every- collapse directly affected the subsequent day in terms of things like international capi- accessibility of formerly controlled sub- tal flows and Internet use, in security, the stances such as plutonium or enriched ura- effects are inherently harder to conceptualize nium. But an equally important driver is and measure. To the extent possible, the globalization because the technologies for ensuing analysis tries to differentiate globali- creating these weapons have become easily zation from post-Cold War effects on secu- accessible (Falkenrath, 1998). Finally, at the rity. As a first-cut, one can envision a far end of the 'globalization-security' spec- 'globalization-security' spectrum along trum might be the salience of substate which certain dialogues in security studies extremist groups or fundamentalist groups would fall. For example, the notion of selec- because their ability to organize transnation- tive engagement, pre-emptive withdrawal, ally, meet virtually, and utilize terrorist tactics democratic enlargement, or preventive has been substantially enhanced by the glo- defense as viable US grand strategies for the balization of technology and information. coming century would sit at the far end of While the US security studies field has made this spectrum because they are predomi- reference to many of these issues, a more sys- nantly security effects deriving from the end tematic understanding of globalization's of bipolar competition rather than from security effects is lacking.9 globalization.7 Progressively closer to the middle would be arguments about the 'debel- Agency and Scope of Threats licization' of security or the obsolescence of war which do not have globalization as their The most far-reaching security effect of glo- primary cause, but are clearly related to some balization is its complication of the basic of these processes.8 Also in this middle range concept of 'threat' in international relations.

5 Examples of the non-security bias in the US literature This is in terms of both agency and scope. on globalization include Mittelman (1994); Goldblatt et al. Agents of threat can be states but can also be (1997); Reinicke (1997); Rosenau (1996); Nye & Owens non-state groups or individuals. While the (1998); Talbott (1997); Falk (1997); Ohmae (1993); Held vocabulary of conflict in international secu- (1997). ' Representative of works looking at changing definitions rity traditionally centered on interstate war of security at the end of the Cold War are Walt (1991); (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and Gray (1992); Deudney (1990); Chipman (1992); Nye national armed forces), with globalization, (1989); Lipschutz (1995). terms such as global violence and human 7 For debates on selective engagement and pre-emptive drawback strategies, see Layne (1997); Ruggie (1997). Sec also Huntington (1999); Betts (1998). On preventive x For the seminal work, see Mueller (1989). See also Man- defense see Carter & Perry (1999). European international delbaum (1999); Van Creveld (1991). relations literature that has looked at the post-Cold War 9 For a more comprehensive and useful characterization effects of security (as distinct from globalization's effects of security studies, see Buzan (1997a), although this cate- on security) include Kirchner & Sperling (1998); Leather- gorization takes the post-Cold War rather than globaliza- man & Vayrynen (1995); Buzan (1997a). tion as its point of departure.

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security become common parlance, where category are things such as viruses and pollu- the fight is between irregular substate units tion. Because of human mobility, disease has such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, become much more of a transnational secu- cults and religious organizations, organized rity concern.11 Global warming, ozone crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets aredepletion, acid rain, biodiversity loss, and not exclusively opposing force structures radioactiveor contamination are health and even cities, but local groups and individuals environmental problems that have intensi- (Buzan, 1997a: 6-21; Klare, 1998: 66; Nye, fied as transnational security concerns pre- 1989; Vayrynen, 1998; Waever et al., 1993). cisely because of increased human mobility Similarly, security constituencies, while and interaction (Matthew & Shambaugh, nominally defined by traditional sovereign 1998; Vayrynen, 1998; Zurn, 1998). borders increasingly are defined at every Globalization also has given rise to a 'skill level from the global to the regional to the revolution' that enhances the capabilities of individual. Or as Buzan (1997a: 11) notes: groups such as drug smugglers, political ter- 'What can be clearly observed is that the rorists, criminal organizations, and ethnic state is less important in the new security insurgents to carry out their agenda more agenda than in the old one. It still remains effectively than ever before (Arquilla & central, but no longer dominates either as the Ronfeldt, 1996; Brown, 1998: 4-5; Godson, exclusive referent object or as the principle 1997; Klare, 1998; Rosenau, 1998: 21-23; embodiment of threat'. Thus the providers Shinn, 1996: 38). It is important to note that of security are still nationally defined in the widening scope of security to these trans- terms of capabilities and resources; however, national issues is not simply a short-term fix- increasingly they apply these in a post- ation with the end of bipolar Cold War sovereign space whose spectrum ranges competition as the defining axis for security. from nonstate to substate to transstate The threat posed by drugs, terrorism, trans- arrangements. For this reason, security national crime, and environmental degrada- threats become inherently more difficult to tion has been intensified precisely because of measure, locate, monitor, and contain globalization. Moreover, the security solu- (Freedman, 1998a: 56; Reinicke, 1997: 134). tions to these problems in terms of enforce- Globalization widens the scope of secu- ment or containment increasingly are rity as well. As the Copenhagen school has ineffective through national or unilateral noted, how states conceive of security and means. 12 how they determine what it means to be Globalization has ignited identity as a secure in the post-Cold War era expand source of conflict. The elevation of regional beyond military security at the national and ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue level."? Globalization's effects on security has generally been treated as a function of scope are distinct from those of the post- the end of the Cold War. However, it is also Cold War in that the basic transaction pro- a function of globalization. The process of cesses engendered by globalization - instan- globalization carries implicit homogeniza- taneous communication and transportation, tion tendencies and messages,13 which in exchanges of information and technology, combination with the 'borderlessness' of the flow of capital - catalyze certain dangerous phenomena or empower certain groups in 1l For example, the re-emergence of tuberculosis and malaria as health hazards has been related to the develop- ways unimagined previously. In the former ment of resistant strains in the South (because of black- 10 See Buzan (1997a). For applications, see Haas (1995); market abuses of inoculation treatments), which then re- (:ha (1997). entered the developed North through human mobility.

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:35:03 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Victor D. Cha GLOBA,IZA'TION AND SEC(URI''Y 395 globalization phenomenon elicits ainformation cultural and technology assets. For pluralist response.'4 example, Nye & Owens (1998) cite 'infor- At the same time, globalization mationhas made power' as increasingly defining the us both more aware and less decisive about distribution of power in international rela- our motivations to intervene in such ethnic tions in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the conflicts. Real-time visual images of horror revolution in military affairs highlights not and bloodshed in far-off places transmitted greater firepower but greater information through CNN make the conflicts impossible technology and 'smartness' of weapons as to ignore, creating pressures for interven- the defining advantage for future warfare.'5 tion. On the other hand, the hesitancy to act These non-physical security aspects have is palpable, as standard measures by which always to been a part of the traditional national determine intervention (i.e. bipolar competi- defense agenda. Indeed, concerns about the tion in the periphery) are no longer appropri- unauthorized transfer of sensitive technolo- ate, forcing us to grope with fuzzy gies gave rise to such techno-nationalist insti- motivations such as humanitarian interven- tutions as COCOM during the Cold War. tion. However, the challenge posed by globalization is that the nation-state can no longer control the movement of technology and Non-Physical Security information (Simon, 1997). Strategic alli- Globalization has anointed the concept of ances form in the private sector among lead- non-physical security. Traditional definitions ing corporations that are not fettered by of security in terms of protection of territory notions of techno-nationalism and driven and sovereignty, while certainly not irrelevant instead by competitive, cost-cutting, or in a globalized era, expand to protection of cutting-edge innovative needs. The result is a transnationalization of defense production 12 As Matthew & Shambaugh argue, it is not the luxury that further reduces the state's control over of the Soviet collapse that enables us to elevate the impor- these activities.16 tance of transnational security but the advances in human More and more private companies, indi- mobility, communication, and technology that force us to. See Matthew & Shambaugh (1998: 167). A related exam- viduals, and other non-state groups are the ple of how security agency and scope have changed is the privatized army. These groups are not a new phenomenon 14 As Falk (1997: 131-132) states, 'The rejection of these in international politics, dating back to the US revolution- globalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associated ary war (i.e. Britain's hiring of Hessian soldiers) and the with and expressed by the resurgence of religious and eth- Italian city-states (of the 14th century (i.e. the condottiers). nic politics in various extremist configurations. Reveal- However, their salience today is a function of the changes ingly, only by retreating to premodern, traditionalist wrought by the globalization of technology. Increasingly, orientations does it now seem possible to seal off sover- national armies are retooled to fight high-intensity, high- eign territory, partially at least, from encroachments asso- technology conflicts and less equipped to fight loxv-inten- ciated with globalized lifestyles and business operations'. sity conflicts in peripheral areas among ethnic groups See also Mittelman (1994: 432); Guehenno (1999: 7); and where the objectives in entering battle are unclear. This Waver (1993). development, coupled with the decreasing Cold War era 15 These are defined in terms of things such as ISR (intel- emphasis on the periphery and the absence of domestic ligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance), C41, support for casualties in such places, has made the and precision force that can provide superior situational 'jobbing-out' of war increasingly salient. See Shearer awareness capabilities (e.g. dominant battlespace knowl- (1998); Silverstein (1997); Thomson (1996). edge; 'pre-crisis transparency'). See Nye & Owens (1998); 13 Examples of homogenization impulses include the dif- Cohen (1996); Freedman (1998b); Laird & Mey (1999). fusion of standardized consumer goods generally from the Freedman correctly points out that the emphasis on infor- developed North; Western forms (If capitalism (and not mation and technology is not in lieu of, but in conjunction Asian crony capitalism); and Western liberal democracy with, superior physical military assets. The former cannot (not illiberal democracy). compensate for the latter. See Freedman (1999: 51-52).

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producers, consumers, and merchants of anoted earlier, these phenomena of glo- US$50 billion per year global arms market balization most dangerously manifest them- (Klare & Lumpe, 1998). The end of the Cold selves as the threat posed by substate actors War has certainly been a permissive condi- with violent intentions. Through the Internet tion for the indiscriminate, profit-based and the privatization of formerly secured incentives to sell weapons or dual-use tech- national assets (e.g. plutonium or highly nologies to anybody. But globalization of enriched uranium), these groups are now information and technology has made barri- able to start substantially higher on the learn- ers to non-state entry low and detection ing curve for building a weapon of mass costs high. Moreover, while enforcement destruction. Building an inefficient fission authorities still have the benefit of these weapon capable of killing 100,000 in an technologies, two critical developments haveurban center or cultivating cultures for bio- altered the equation: (1) Absence of discrim- logical use is child's play relative to the past ination: over the past two decades, the pri-(Falkenrath, 1998: 54-55; Carter & Perry, vate sector, rather than the government, 1999: has 151).19 Thus in a globalized world, become the primary creator of new technol- information and technology increasingly are ogies, which in essence has removed any therel- currency of non-physical security. ative advantages state agencies formerly possessed in terms of exclusive access to Propositions for Security Behavior eavesdropping technology, surveillance, and encryption.17 Governments once in the posi- If non-physical security, diversification of tion of holding monopolies on cutting edge threats, and the salience of identity are key technologies that could later be 'spun off' in effects of globalization in the security realm, the national commercial sector are now con- then how might this translate in terms of a sumers of 'spin-on' technologies. (2) Volume state's foreign policy? The literature on glo- and variety: the sheer growth in volume and balization in both Europe and the USA variety of communications has overwhelmed remains conspicuously silent on this ques- any attempts at monitoring or control tion. Globalization authors might argue that (Mathews, 1997; Freedman, 1999: 53).18 As this criticism is inappropriate because it suggests an ideal endstate at which a 'globalized' 16 As Goldblatt et al. point out, MNCS now account for country should arrive. However, the point a disproportionately large share of global technology here is not to suggest that there will be a sin- transfer as a result of EDI; joint ventures; international patenting; licensing; and knowhow agreements. This gle uniform model, but that as globalization means they are more in control of transferring dual-use processes permeate a state's security agenda, technologies than traditional states. See Goldblatt et al. this might be manifested in certain general (1997: 277-279). inclinations and contours of behavior. Put 17 On the growing commercial pressure for liberalization of encryption technology, see Freeh (1997). See also another way, we should observe globaliza- Falkenrath (1998: 56-57); Corcoran (1998: 13). On the tion processes altering in some cases, and growing reliance of the US Defense Department on commercial technological advances compared with the 1950- 1970s, see Carter & Perry (1999: 197-198). 19 In the case of biological weapons, effective delivery 18 The results of this are well known: instantaneous com- requires some form of aerosol spray technology. But the munication by facsimile, cellular phone, satellite phone, point is that such technology, if it were perfected, would teleconferencing, alpha-numeric pagers, e-mail, computer most likely be the result of commercial needs and there- modems, computer bulletin boards, and federal express fore easily available to anyone. In a related vein, Hoffman are the norm. Approximately 250,000 Global Positioning (1997) has found positive correlations between the spread System satellite navigation receivers are sold each month for of information and technology and the lethality of terror- commercial use. ist attacks.

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:35:03 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Victor D. Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURI1TY 397 creating in other cases, new sets of ons, security satellite-tracking technology, and interests for states. cutting-edge document-forging equipment hijack vessels in the South and East China seas with millions of dollars worth of cargo Intermestic Security (Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999). First, the globalization and security These literature groups operate transnationally; plan- asserts but does not elaborate how ning security may occur at one destination, tracking decisions increasingly take place outside of the ship the at another, the attack launched traditional purview of sovereignty. from Globali- another port, and the cargo off-loaded zation creates an interpenetration ofat yetforeign another port. These acts fall under the and domestic issues that national purview govern- of local law enforcement, but they ments must recognize in developing are policy.clearly 'intermestic' security issues. The One example of this 'intermestic' attacksapproach occur in overlapping sovereign to security policy might be an acceptance waters or international waters, and some- that the transnationalization of threats has times receive the tacit consent of govern- blurred traditional divisions between internal ments where the pirated vessels are and external security (Katzenstein, 1996a). clandestinely ported. Moreover, if targeted The obverse would be the frequency with cargos move beyond luxury autos and video which a state adheres to 'delimiting' security, cassette recorders to strategic goods such as formulating and justifying policy on the basis plutonium, then distinctions between exter- of 'national security' interests rather than nal and internal security and criminal and universal/global interests (Moon Chung-in, strategic threats disappear (Falkenrath, 1998; 1995: 64). Examples of the former are Euro- Guehenno, 1999: 11). pean institutions such as Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accord, which represent Multilateralism an acknowledgment that domestic issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, Second, the globalization literature acknowl- and immigration increasingly require trans- edges that security is increasingly conceived national cooperation. TREVI was composed of in post-sovereign, globalized terms, but of ministers of the interior and justice of EC does not delineate how the modes of obtain- member-states whose purpose was to coor- ing security should change. As noted above, dinate policy on terrorism (at Germany's ini- globalization means that both the agency and tiative in 1975) and international crime. The scope of threats have become more diverse Schengen Accords also represented a con- and non-state in form. This also suggests vergence of internal and external security that the payoffs lessen for obtaining security with regard to common standards border through traditional means. Controlling pollu- controls, pursuit of criminals across borders, tion, disease, technology, and information asylum procedures, and refugees (Katzen- transfer cannot be easily dealt with through stein, 1998: 11-14). In Asia, one might see national, unilateral means but can only be environmental pollution and transnational effectively dealt with through the application crime as issues where international and of national resources in multilateral fora or domestic security converge ('Special Focus: through encouragement of transnational China and Hong Kong', 1996). However, in cooperation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi the near future, maritime piracy is the most Annan intimated, US bombing of targets in likely focal point. These are cases where sub- Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings of state actors armed with sophisticated weap- two US embassies in Africa is a unilateral

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piecemeal approach far inferior to concerted and migration issues, and law enforcement global efforts at denying terrorists sanctuar- (Talbott, 1997: 74). In a similar vein, the US ies, financing, and technology and encourag- State Department's Foreign Service Institute ing their extradition and prosecution.20 now has a new core course for FSOs on Thus one would expect globalized secu- narcotics-trafficking, refugee flows, and rity processes reflected in a state's striving for environmental technologies (albott, 1997: regional coordination and cooperative secu- 75). In May 1998, the Clinton Administra- rity. It should emphasize not exclusivity and tion put forward its first comprehensive plan bilateralism in relations but inclusivity and to combat world crime, identifying drug-traf- multilateralism as the best way to solve secu- ficking, transfer of sensitive technology and rity problems. At the extreme end of the WMD, and trafficking of women and chil- spectrum, globalization might downplay the dren as threats to the USA (EWashington Post, importance of eternal iron-clad alliances and 1998).21 One might also expect to see foreign encourage the growth of select transnational service bureaucracies placing greater empha- 'policy coalitions' among national govern- sis on international organizations and NGOs ments, nongovernmental organizations in terms of representation, placement, and (NGOs), and individuals specific to each leadership if these are recognized as the key problem (Reinicke, 1997: 134). vehicles of security and politics in a glo- In conjunction with multilateralism, globalized world. balized conceptions of security should be Implicit in each of these examples is the reflected in norms of diffuse reciprocity and trend toward greater specialization in the international responsibility. This is admit- pursuit of security. As globalization makes tedly more amorphous and harder to security problems more complex and operationalize. While some self-serving diverse, national security structures need to instrumental motives lie behind most diplo- be re-oriented, sometimes through elimina- macy, there must be a strong sense of global tion of anachronistic bureaucracies or responsibility and obligation that compels through rationalization of wasteful and over- the state to act. Actions taken in the national lapping ones. In the US system, for example, interest must be balanced with a basic princi- while combating the spread of weapons of ple that contributes to a universal, globalized mass destruction is widely acknowledged as value system underpinning one's own values. a key security objective in the 21st century, various branches of the government operate autonomously in dealing with these threats. Bureaucratic Innovation Hence, there are greater calls for renovation The globalization literature has not done jus- and coordination to eliminate the overlap, tice to the role bureaucratic innovation plays inefficiency, and lack of organization among in response to the new challenges of globali- State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA, zation. On this point, indeed, the literature and FBI in combating proliferation.22 has not kept pace with the empirics. For Another trend engendered by the security example, in the USA, the Clinton Adminis- challenges of globalization is greater cross- tration created the position of Undersecre- tary for Global Affairs, whose portfolio A1 The degree to which this is 'spin' or substantive included environmental issues, promotion of remains to be seen. .2 For a detailed set of recommendations on how to ren- democracy and human rights, population ovate and create institutions to deal with these problems, 20 See comments by President Clinton and UN Secretary- see Carter & Perry (1999: 143-174). See also Schmitt General Kofi Annan as cited in Crossette (1998). (1999).

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fertilization between domestic law enforce- With globalization, specialized 'communi- ment and foreign policy agencies. This rela- ties of choice' (e.g. landmine ban) are tionship, at least in the USA (less the case inempowered to organize transnationally and Europe), is at worst non-existent because penetrate the national security agendas with domestic law enforcement has operated tra- issues that might not otherwise have been ditionally in isolation from national security paid attention to (Guehenno, 1999: 9; and diplomatic concerns, or at best is a Mathews, 1997). mutually frustrating relationship because the two have neither inclination nor interest in Aggregating Capabilities cooperating. States that understand the challenges of globalization, particularly on issues The globalization literature remains relatively of drug-trafficking, environmental crimes, silent on how globalization processes sub- and technology transfer, will seek to bridge stantially alter the way in which states calcu- this gap, creating and capitalizing on syner- late relative capabilities. The single most gies that develop between the two groups. important variable in this process is the dif- Foreign policy agencies will seek out greater fusion of technology (both old and new). In interaction with domestic agencies, not only the past, measuring relative capabilities was on a pragmatic short-term basis employing largely a linear process. Higher technology law enforcement's skills to deal with a partic- generally meant qualitatively better weapons ular problem, but also on a longer-term and and hence stronger capabilities. States could regular basis cultivating familiarity, transpar- be assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-for- ency, and common knowledge. On the tank, jet-for-jet comparison in terms of the domestic side, agencies such as the FBI, threat posed and their relative strength based Customs, and police departments (of major on such linear measurements. However, the cities) would find themselves engaged in for- diffusion of technology has had distorting eign policy dialogues, again not only at the effects. While states at the higher end tech- practitioner's level, but also in academia and nologically still retain advantages, globaliza- think-tank forums.23 tion has enabled wider access to technology One of the longer-term effects of special- such that the measurement process is more ization and cross-fertilization is that security dynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilities also becomes more 'porous.' Specialization are more frequent and have occurred in cer- will often require changes not just at the tain cases much earlier than anticipated. Sec- sovereign national level, but across borders ond, and more significant, the measurement and with substate actors. 'Boilerplate' secu- process is no longer one-dimensional in the rity (e.g. dealt with by 'hardshell' nation- sense that one cannot readily draw linear states with national resources) becomes associations between technology, capabili- increasingly replaced by cooperation and ties, and power. For example, what gives coordination that may still be initiated by the local, economically backward states regional national government but with indispensable and even global influence in the 21 st century partners (depending on the issue) such as is their ability to threaten across longer dis- NGOs, transnational groups, and the media. tances. Globalization facilitates access to The obverse of this dynamic also obtains. select technologies related to force projec- tion and weapons of mass destruction, which 23 In this vein, it might not be unusual in the future to see in turn enable states to pose threats that are the commissioner of New York City Police or the head of asymmetric and disproportionate to their the FBI participating in discussions of the Council on For- eign Relations or the Brookings Institution. size. Moreover, these threats emanate not

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from acquisition of state-of-the-art but world, old traditional modes of deterrence and outdated technology. Thus countries become like less relevant. Nuclear deterrence North Korea, which along most traditional throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War measurements of power could not compare, eras, for example, was based on certain can with old technology (SCUD and rudi- assumptions. First, the target of the strategy mentary nuclear technology) pose threats was another nation-state. Second, this and affect behavior in ways unforeseen in the deterred state was assumed to have a degree past (Bracken, 1998). of centralization in the decisionmaking process over nuclear weapons use. Third, and most important, the opponent possessed Strategies and Operational both counterforce and countervalue targets Considerations that would be the object of a second strike. Finally, the literature on globalization is nota- While this sort of rationally based, existen- bly silent on the long-term impact of globali- tial deterrence will still apply to interstate zation processes on time-tested modes of security, the proliferation of weaponized strategic thinking and fighting. In the former non-state and substate actors increasingly vein, the widening scope of security engen- renders this sort of strategic thinking obso- dered by globalization means that the defini- lete. They do not occupy sovereign territo- tion of security and the fight for it will occur rial space and therefore cannot be targeted not on battlefields but in unconventional with the threat of retaliation. They also may places against non-traditional security adver- operate as self-contained cells rather than an saries. As noted above, when states cannot organic whole which makes decapitating deal with these threats through sovereign strikes at a central decisionmaking structure means, they will encourage multilateralism ineffective. In short, you cannot deter with and cooperation at the national, transna- the threat of retaliation that which you can- tional, and international levels. However, the not target. nature of these conflicts may also require Governments may respond to this in a new ways of fighting, i.e. the ability to engage variety of ways. One method would be, as militarily with a high degree of lethality noted above, greater emphasis on the spe- against combatants, but low levels of collat- cialized utilization of whatever state, sub- eral damage. As a result, globalization's wid- state, and multilateral methods are necessary ening security scope dictates not only new to defend against such threats. A second strategies (discussed below) but also new likely response would be greater attention forms of combat. Examples include incapac- and resources directed at civil defense prep- itating crowd control munitions such as aration and 'consequence' management to blunt projectiles (rubber balls), non-lethal minimize widespread panic and pain in the crowd dispersal cartridges, 'stick 'em' and event of an attack. A third possible response 'slick 'em' traction modifiers, or 'stink' is unilateral in nature. Governments may bombs. 'Smart' non-lethal warfare that inca- increasingly employ pre-emptive or preven- pacitates equipment will also be favored, tive strategies if rational deterrence does not including rigid foam substances, and radio apply against non-state entities. Hence one frequency and microwave technologies to might envision two tiers of security in which disable electronics and communications stable rational deterrence applies at the (CFR Task Force, 1999). state-state level but unstable pre-emptive/ Regarding strategy, as the agency and preventive strategies apply at the state-non- scope of threats diversifies in a globalized state level.

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Conclusion References

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