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Routledge Handbook of Security Studies
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Thierry Balzacq
Liberalism: a Theoretical and Empirical Assessment
Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 Thomas C. Walker, David L. Rousseau Published online on: 13 Jul 2016
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The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 six strands of liberal international theory.six strandsofliberal international Keohane (2002) andMoravcsik (1997)employ the evidence. toassessingliberalclaimsin lightoftheempirical considerable effort asanexclusivelyism cannotbecharacterized normative, utopianproject. We willtherefore devote 2005).Morton Given theprevalence studiestestingliberalhypotheses inIR, ofempirical liberal eses in IR have come to outnumber (Walker realist studies published in leading IR journals and and predict inter-state relations. By one recent account, quantitative studiestestingliberalhypoth be. action sotochangeit’. provides Butliberaltheory much aworld more thanimagining asit profoundly other thanitshouldbe, andwhohave inthepower faith ofhumanreason andhuman ism. Howard (1978: 11)oncedefined ‘liberals’ as ‘all thosethinkers whobelieve theworld tobe liberalism: theassociationbetween andnormative-laden versions ofideal liberalinternationalism national organizations. inthepacifyingeffectsofpolitical liberty,faith economicfreedom, interdependence, andinter institutions. While there are significantdifferences between liberalthinkers, allshare ageneral Third, democratic states are more likely to seek cooperative solutions through international Second, trade. ininternational conflictwill bereduced amongstatesengaging international likely to initiate and escalate conflicts with other democracies (i.e. the inter-democratic peace). free trade, organizations. ininternational andmembership First, democraticstateswillbeless peaceful world order isacentraltheme ofliberalismandwillserve asthe focusofthisreview. is possible, they over oftendisagree thepaceandeaseofthisprogress. Advancing toward amore beings’ (Keohane 2012: 127). While liberals contend that progress toward peace and prosperity provides arationaleforbuilding cooperative betterlives institutionsthatcanfacilitate forhuman Enlightenment, liberalism ‘strives for, andbelieves in, improvement ofthehumanconditionand son, progress, freedom, topeaceandsecurity. cancontribute andindividual rights ofthe Born 1997: 206). Relations(IR), InthestudyofInternational liberalismfocusesonhow humanrea- participation, private property, andequalityofopportunity’ topoliticalstability(Doyle contribute multiple meanings(Bell2014: 682). Liberalismemphasizeshow ‘individual freedom, political In thestudyofpolitics, liberalism ‘has beenemployed ofways’ inadizzyingvariety andcarries Like realist theory, liberalismprovides andpropositions acoherent thatexplain setofprinciples Liberalism can be categorized inanumber ofways.Liberalism canbecategorized ZacherandMatthew (1995: 121)present Before proceeding, we myth must of dispelonepersistent thathascloudedunderstandings willincrease withdemocracy, peaceandsecurity positthatinternational Most liberaltheorists EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT A THEORETICAL AND Thomas C.WalkerandDavidL.Rousseau LIBERALISM: 2 22 should should - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 institutions maytotherecent decrease allbecontributing intheseverity ofglobalwars. the core liberalclaimsthatdemocraticinstitutions, economicinterdependence, andinternational able. After surveying theclassicalorigins, we evaluate evidence supporting mountingempirical both shared andcompetingpreferences thatmake but cooperationmore stillattain challenging cooperation, preferences ensuring assumes harmonious Kant’s evolutionary liberalismrecognizes Thomas Paine’s subsection. revolutionaryliberalism inafirst While Paine’s revolutionary liberalism drawing from Walker (2008), Immanuel we Kant’s by comparing begin more conventional of ideational, categories commercial, and republican liberalism. In this chapter, seeking democraticregimes. the yoke ofoppressive governments, reasonable, uptoform willrapidlyrise just, andpeace- lience rests onanextremely optimisticview ofhumannature. Individuals, oncefreed from confident thatthey would avoid thecostsofwar andchoosepeace. Paine’s democraticebul that ofwar andpeaceisinthenation.’‘The right Byallowing thepeopletodecide, Paine was swell withforeign‘into arupture powers’. In results from thedemocratictendencyto ‘negotiate themistake’ ratherthanlettingregal pride pointed out that the republics (i.e. democracies) of the world tended to be peaceful. This behave more peacefully, especiallytoward oneanother. In liberalism. Paine and Kant were why to articulate democratic states may among the first Just asthebalanceofpower commandsrealist thought, thedemocraticpeaceiscentralto (Russett andOneal2001: 35). conflict,pendence reduces military conflict institutions reduce military and (3) international of the liberal peace are:pillars conflict, (1) democracy reduces military (2)economicinterde In thischapter, we tracethemostsignificantliberalclaimstoworks ofPaine andKant. The of anotherstate.’ Suchanactwould be of anindependentpeople’. ‘a violationoftherights (1795: that 96) determined ‘No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government cannot beforced actors. by external Inoneofhis ‘Preliminary Articles’ oftheseinterventions sincedemocraticinstitutionsdevelopliberals are critical and gradually 2012: 685). However, liberalshave over longdisagreed thequestionofintervention. Evolutionary These interventions are often cast as ‘a core aspect of the foreign policy of liberal states’ ( national security.Whentheseattitudesaresharedbetweenpeoples, peacewilloccur. as doallliberals,thatfreepeopleswillberational,cooperative, andtransparentinmattersof Despite theirdisagreementsoverthepacethatdemocratization maytake,theybothbelieved, evolutionary liberal,Kant(1784:42)envisionedaslow,grinding progresstowarddemocracy. ‘enlightened nationsofEurope’withinsevenyears,Kantwas scepticalofrapidtransitions.Asan quick andeasy.WhilePaine(1791/2:119)anticipatedtheemergence ofdemocracyinallthe however, didnotsharePaine’sconfidencethattransitionsto democracyandpeacewouldbe an enterprise.Forthiswouldmeancallingdownonthemselves allthemiseriesofwar.’Kant, declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous claiming thatif‘theconsentofthecitizensisrequiredtodecide whetherornotwaristobe circulated. Kant(1795:100)tookupthesamethemes,includingdemocraticpeace,pro Kant publishedPerpetualPeacein1795,threeyearsafterPaine’s Liberal enthusiasm for democracy can encourage military interventions tospreadLiberal enthusiasmfordemocracycanencouragemilitary democracy. Classical liberals:evolutionaryvs.revolutionaryliberalism Liberalism: a theoretical and empirical assessment empirical and theoretical a Liberalism: Democratic peaceandintervention Rights ofMan,Paine (1791/2: 47)acknowledged 23 Common Sense, Paine (1776: 80, 95) Rights ofMan
evolutionary liberalism Perpetual Peace,in Perpetual Kant became widely became widely
J ahn to to - - - -
Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 has beenalongstandingsourceofdisagreement. While democraticruleisthecoreofliberaltheory,spreadingitthroughmilitaryintervention democracy. Revolutionaryliberalscastsuchinterventionsintheinterestsofalldemocracies. ocratic peacewouldbeabetweendemocraticstatesandnotenjoyedbyanysingle France shallbesurroundedwithrevolutions,shewillinpeaceandsafety.’ForPaine,thedem Campaign’ againstPrussia.Suchacampaignwasjustifiedonnationalsecuritygrounds:‘When In empirical literature strongly theseliberalclaims. empirical supports ing subsections, we examinethebalanceoffindingsforthesethree centralclaims. Overall, the case studies (Layne 1994)andcomputer simulationshistorical (Rousseau2005). Inthe follow titative analysis(Huthand (Geva experiments andHanson 1999)to Allee 2002)andlaboratory fromscrutiny sympatheticliberalsandscepticalrealists. testshave Empirical rangedfrom quan Over century, thelastquarter the three oftheliberalpeacehave pillars comeunderintense like Grotius as comforters’. ‘sorry ism ‘laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despot- Peace, stateswould maintaintheirsovereignty. Kant(1795: 113)feared globalgovernance because leading actors. While Kantexplored a ‘voluntary confederationofrepublican states’ in see theseorganizationsasonesource ofglobalorder, but sovereign stateswould remain the especially inreducing thenumber ofwarships. law.ing international Suchanorganizationwould alsoplay akey reductions, role inglobalarms of Nationsbeformed.’ Headvocated globalgovernance withpower tosanctionany stateviolat liberals placetheminhigherregard. Paine (1801: 2)thoughtit thata ‘absolutely necessary law andorganizationconstituteathirdWhile international pillarofliberalism, revolutionary threat ofwarbreakingout,they[tradingstates]willtrytopreventitbymediation.’ cause ofpeace,thoughnotexactlyfrommotivesmorality.Andwhereverintheworldthereisa in original).He(1795:114)alsoarguedthat‘statesfindthemselvescompelledtopromotethenoble means) atthedisposalofpowerstate,financialcanprobablybereliedonmost’(emphasis or latertakesholdofeverypeople,anditcannotexistsidebywithwar.Andallthepowers(or of internationalfinanciersandbusinessmen.Kant(1795:114)claimedthat‘thespiritcommercesooner less utopianandmorepragmaticKantpositedthattrademayleadtopeacebecauseofsharedinterests universal extentitiscapable, itwouldthesystemofwar.’ extirpate nations, aswell asindividuals, usefultoeachother that free tradecreates172) asserted ‘a pacific system, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering economic interactionswould reduce thatmightleadtoconflict. misunderstandings He(1791/2: The peacefuleffectoftradeisthesecondpillarliberalism. Paine frequently pointedtohow Rights ofMan, Revolutionary liberals like Paine, however, advocate military action to spread democracy. Revolutionary liberalslikePaine,however,advocatemilitaryactiontospreaddemocracy. Evolutionary liberals view international lawEvolutionary liberalsview andorganizationwithmore international scepticism. They While Kantalsosawtradeleadingtopeace,hisreasoningwassomewhatdistinctfromPaine’s.A
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will finallylapseintoanar
Part II, Paine (1791/2: 115) pledged to join the French general in a ‘Spring Paine (1791/2:115)pledgedtojointheFrenchgeneralina‘Spring International lawandorganization Thomas C. Walker andDavid L. Rousseau Empirical testsofliberalism chy.’ Kant(1795: law proponents 103)referred tointernational Peace throughtrade 24
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If commer ce were toactthe permitted Perpetual Perpetual Law - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 grated economies maygrated explain the peace between democratic states better than the democracy provides abetterexplanation(Mousseau2000; Gartzke 2007). Free market attitudes andinte situation callsforit. racies willbehave justlike autocracies: they willbalanceagainstthestrong anduseforce ifthe because thesepowerful agentsrepresent athreat toastateresiding inanarchy. For realists, democ states willbalance(e.g. increase defencespendingorestablish alliances)againstallstronger states force thannon-democraticstates. tomilitary out resorting andpredict Realistsdisagree that Liberals predict thatdemocraticstatesare betterable toresolve disputeswith international Mesquita et statistical evidence in support of the hypothesisstatistical evidence in support (Schultz 2001; Huth and Allee 2002; Bueno de forthismonadicargument,much support anumber ofmore recent studieshave produced strong Schwebach 1992; deMesquitaandSiverson 1994). Although theearly research didnotprovide (and even costlysuccesses)canbepolitically(MorganandCampbell1991; Morganand political oppositionmakes more democraticleaders risk-averse becauseforeign policy failures ofconflictresolution.constrained by domesticinstitutionsandnorms The existence ofdomestic dispute. Rather, democraciesare because they lesslikely are toinitiatedisputesandescalatecrises causal mechanismdoesnotfocusonexpectationsaboutthebehaviour inthe oftheotherparty peaceful regardless oftheopposition(referredtoas ‘monadic’ democraticpeace). Here the 1986; MaozandRussett1993; RussettandOneal2001; Rousseau2005). analysis hasbeenproduced forthedyadic, inter-democraticpeace(Babst1972; Doyle 1983, bluffing, dampensspiralsofhostility, andslows themobilizationprocess. Extensive empirical side knows domesticconstraintsontheuseofforce. thattheotherfaces This expectationlimits behave differently toward oneanother? betweenWhen adisputeerupts two democracies, each analysishascentered onthecausalmechanisms:Most oftheempirical why dodemocracies 2003), nonehaschallengedthefindingthatnotwo established democracieshave gonetowar. comes ascloseanything we have relations.’ law ininternational toanempirical democratic peace. According to Levy (1988: 662), ‘the absence of war between democratic states might’ (Doyle 1986: 1151). Doyle’s path-breaking work anavalanche triggered ofstudiesonthe argued they would, andhave alsodiscovered liberalreasons foraggression, ashefeared they war againstoneanother. Heconcludedthat ‘liberal stateshave created aseparatepeace, asKant state wars from 1816 to 1980, Doyle found that no two democracies had engaged in a full scale target ofconflict. After compiling alistofliberalsocietiesfrom 1700to1982andalistofinter ofboththeinitiatorconflictand reframed thedebateby lookingatthecharacteristics reflected thegeneralconsensusinearly1980s. the democratic peace emerged (Babst 1972;supporting Rummel 1983), the realist position tative datasets. analysistechniquesandlarge cross-national times-series Although someevidence the following decade, Chan(1984)and Weede (1984)reached asimilarconclusionusingquanti concluded thatdemocracieshadnotbeennoticeably peacefulover the1816–1965period. In statistical analysisoftherelationship between war type, andregime SmallandSinger(1976: 67) war thatbothencourageanddiscouragewar. becausedemocraciespossessattributes Inanearly dictions. (1942:Wright type has little impact onthe frequency 841)concluded that regime of The most persistent critiques ofthedemocraticpeacecomefrom thoseclaiming capitalism critiques The mostpersistent Early empirical research therealist onthebehaviorEarly empirical pre ofdemocraciesseemedtoconfirm A second explanation falls atthestate levelA secondexplanationfalls ofanalysisandclaimsthatdemocracies are more Although there have oftheclaim(e.g. beensomecritiques Layne 1994; Gowa 1999; Oren by ofarticles DoyleThe realist (1983; consensuscameunderattackinaseries 1986). Doyle
al. 2003; BennettandStam2004; Rousseau2005). Claim 1:democracyreducesmilitaryconflict Liberalism: a theoretical and empirical assessment empirical and theoretical a Liberalism: 25 ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 empirical evidence linking the expansion of political liberty toareductionconflict. evidence ininterstate linkingtheexpansionofpoliticalliberty empirical 1914. While capitalism is anelement of peace, as liberalspredict, it does not discredit the strong fought between capitalist states engaged in high levels of trade, in and Britain notably Germany by Dafoeet peaceful interactionwithsimilareconomicsystems. These claims, however, have beenchallenged variable. Mousseau (2009), for instance, argues that ‘contract-intensive’ economies will generate contributed tothe contributed ‘long peace’ theCold during War. 138). For example, Gaddis(1986: 110)arguesthateconomicisolationbetween theEastand West probability ofconflictby expandingthenumber ofissueareas undercompetition(Waltz 1979: these flows willencouragepeace. Realistspredict thateconomicinterdependence increases the are connectedby flows ofgoods, services, capital, labor, andtechnology. Liberalspredict that Economic interdependence towhichtwo istraditionallydefinedasthedegree (ormore) states than thedemocratic peaceclaim. that trade and interdependence are associated with peace. These findings, however, are less robust with thefindingsofcapitalist peace, theliberalclaim evidence supports significantempirical in1936. oftheRhinelandCrisis in1914andtheRemilitarization Combined the July Crisis powers amonggreat crises during for thecostsofinterdependence intheiranalysisofhistorical the theoretical expectations. For example, Ripsman andBlanchard (1996/7)find littleconcern should alsobenotedthatthefindingsfrom qualitative casestudiesare ofteninconsistentwith testing two claims: conflictdecreases trade military conflict).AND tradedecreases military It different measures ofinterdependence andamodelofreciprocal causation (i.e., simultaneously Kim andRousseau(2005)findthatthepacifyingimpactoftrade evaporates whenusingseveral interdependence (ordemocracy) reduces violenceinthepost-Second World War era. Similarly, example, Gartzke (2007)provides statisticalevidence thatmarket opennessratherthantrade or markets are readily available, dramatically. therelationship canfall thecostofdisrupting goods (e.g., oilornitrates)whichcannotbesuppliedfrom alternative sources. Ifsubstitutegoods (1996/7) contendthatinterdependence shouldonlyinhibitconflictifthetradeinvolves strategic trade tocontinue (orincrease) are they lesslikely touseforce. Finally, RipsmanandBlanchard the expectationofcontinuing tradeisthekey conditionalvariable. expect Onlyifstateleaders manipulate behaviour 1945). (alsoseeHirschman Inasimilarvein, Copeland(1996)arguesthat trade andinvestment, interdependence invites asymmetrical attemptstoexploitweakness and dependent onstate A). interdependence creates amutualWhile symmetrical desire forcontinued interdependence (i.e.,asymmetrical state A isvery dependentonstateB, but stateBisnotvery interdependencebetween (i.e. symmetrical bothstatesare equally dependentoneachother)and thescopeofclaim.restrict For example, Keohane andNye (1977: 10)make acleardistinction 1986; Polachek andMcDonald 1992; Mansfield 1994; RussettandOneal 2001). theinterdependencevides significantevidence claim(Wallensteen supporting 1973; Gasiorowski causalmechanisms,disentangled thesedistinct(but complementary) literature pro theempirical - between tradingpartners.de-escalate disputesthatarise Although research hasnotdecisively tradeandinvestmentbenefiting from international willpressure government representatives to decision-makers will be less likely to use force. Second, as Kant emphasized, and workers firms late thecostsofescalatingadisputewithtradingpartner. Iftwo statesare highlyinterdependent, Liberals positseveral causalmechanisms inthisrelationship. First, decision-makers willcalcu Some argue that the empirical relationship betweenSome arguethattheempirical tradeandconflictmay bespurious. For haveSome scholars qualified the liberal interdependence claimby specifying conditions that
al. Claim 2:economicinterdependencereducesmilitaryconflict (2013). alsocannoteasilyexplainthedestructive Capitalistpeacescholars wars Thomas C. Walker andDavid L. Rousseau 26 - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 and collectively intheOPCW). punishingofdefectors tion in the OPCW), and altercost-benefitcalculations (e.g., increasing trade ties inthe WTO (e.g.,norms promoting economicliberalisminthe WTO andbanningweapons ofmassdestruc Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW)adjudicatedisputes, monitorcompliance, encourage several ofthesemechanismssimultaneously. For example, the WTO andthe Organization forthe 1989; andFinnemore 1999). Barnett institutionsreduce Manyconflictthrough international can promote andalteridentitiesrelated interests conflict-reducing (Wendt norms andDuvall reduce transactioncostsforfollow-up accords (Keohane 1984). Fourth, institutions international of Justice).Court Third, and institutions can monitor compliance with agreements international (e.g., general)orprovide thegoodofficesofUNsecretary forarbitration(e.g. International (Huth and Allee 2002: 278). Second, institutionscanmediatedisputes andregional international orintervening aggression tohaltaconflict tions andalliancescanpromote peaceby deterring security, howinstitutionspromote peace?First, dointernational collective organiza security environment andgenderequality. tohumanrights domainofpeaceand Inthemore restricted bankingregime. the debt-crisis institutions suchasthe World Trade institutionssuchas Organization(WTO) andinformal 2002).within anissuearea (seeSimmonsandMartin governThese rules behavior informal broadly thatgovern asasetofrules how cooperateandcompetewitheachother actors Following (1994/95: theleadofMearsheimer 9), weinstitutions candefineinternational the ‘informal’ created regime by banksseekingcooperationwitheachother(Lipson1986). Lipson’s analysisofthebankingsector’s inthe1980semphasizes response tothedebtcrisis more generally, includingbroad conceptualizationsof ‘global governance.’ For example, institutions(e.g.,within formal UNvotingandtoward patterns) institutions’‘international time theresearch programme expandedbeyond analysisofrules, procedures, andoutcomes years (e.g., Shankset institutionshasgrown thatthenumberagree ofinternational exponentiallyover thelast100 causal impact, 1994/5; Mearsheimer Organski1968). Although mostrealists andliberalswould tive ofpowerful ortheinstruments states(i.e., institutionshave international noindependent of conflict. In contrast, realists institutions as eithergenerally ineffec tend to view international institutionsdecreaseThe third theprobability pillaroftheliberalpeaceclaimsthatinternational that organizations with greater institutionalstructure,that organizations withgreater mandate those withasecurity particularly organizations vary withrespect toreducingargue thatinternational conflict. They demonstrate organizations,international theprobability conflictdeclines. ofmilitary Boehmeret thepost-Second growth intradeduring World War (Heldet period Brazil and et Argentina (Cirincione International Atomic Energy proliferationAgency (IAEA)incurtailing amongrivals suchas institutions and conflict was quite direct. For example, studieshave highlighted the role of the of cooperation.tutions helped foster adegree In some cases, the link between international the Cold Despite the intensity of the superpower conflictduring War, insti new international conflict(Onealet institutionsreduce predictions military thatinternational ports eral terms, RussettandOneal(2001: 170–1)find thatastwo statesincreasein theirmembership on Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT) andthe WTO to theexplosive withcontributing tions was and indirect (Dorussen Ward 2008). For example, credit mostobservers theGeneral Although thispillaroftheliberalpeacehasproduced mixed results, extensive evidence sup These institutionspromote cooperationinawiderangeofissueareas, from tradeandthe Early studiesfocusedonformal organizations’‘international suchastheUN. However, over Claim 3:internationalinstitutionsreducemilitaryconflict
al. 1996), they over disagree theirimpact. Liberalism: a theoretical and empirical assessment empirical and theoretical a Liberalism:
al. 2005). Inothercases, institu therole ofinternational 27
al. 1999: 175). Inmore gen
al. al. (2004) 2003). ------
Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 these institutionsappeartoreduce ofconflicts. awidevariety effect. Although noliberalwouldinstitutionsare sufficientforpeace, claimthatinternational organizationshasbothadirect andindirect ininternational pacifying onstrate thatmembership conflicts.the lengthofinternational Usingnetwork analysis, and Dorussen Ward (2008)dem to thedurationofconflict, Shannonet and low levels ofmembercontentiousness, are more likely toreduceconflict. interstate Shifting the absolute numbers of peopledyingfromthe absolutenumbers politicalconflictremain high. Third, thefactors population, bloody oftheworld, conflictsstillrageinmany parts activity isrising, terrorist and is relative. While the probability of deathfrom political conflicthasdecreased for theworld inthewakeoccurred ofalong, of peaceinEurope. unprecedented period Second, thistrend caveatsimportant are inorder. First, trends are oftenreversed. World War I, forinstance, sign ofprogressthatfitstheliberalexpectations. conflict todayisfarlessthanatanytimeforwhichwehave data.Thisdeclineisonetangible War ended.’Takencollectively,thesestudiesshowthatthe probabilityofdyinginapolitical claim that‘therehasbeenamarkeddecreaseinwarfaresince 1945,especiallysincetheCold has beenadeclineinviolence.InreviewofGoldstein,Mearsheimer (2013:570)acceptsthe of thepossiblecauses.Evenarealistnaysayerprogresslike Mearsheimerconcedesthatthere (2011) furtherdocumentsthisdeclineandarguesthatinternational peacekeepingeffortsareone far-reaching workalsoshowsadeclineinviolenceacross a numberofmeasures.Goldstein claim thatarmedconflictshavedecreasedintheyearsfollowing theColdWar.Pinker’s(2010) in thefrequencyandseverityofwarmaynotbetrue’.Mack’s (2005)reportsupportedthe tion thatthespreadofethno-nationalandcivilwarsin 1990s hascontributed to an increase the mostpeacefulten-yearperiodsinceWorldWarII.’Theynotethat‘thecommonassump Programme, Levyet expectations. RelyingondatafromtheCorrelatesofWarProjectandUppsalaConflictData of warandviolenceinthepost-ColdWarworldhavecontinuedtodecline,contraryrealist this liberaloptimism.However,inthequarter-centurysinceendofColdWar,levels peace enjoyedbetweenwealthystateswouldspreadtotherestofworld.Realistschallenged Paine andKant: reason prevailed toavoid tolearn andpeople are beginning large, costlywars. ingly foundwar tobedisgusting, ridiculous, andunwise’. Mueller’s explanationcoincideswith that inthedeveloping‘peoples andleaders world –where war was onceendemic–have increas (Levy, 1981). a progressive,Articulating liberalexplanation for thispeace, Mueller(1989: x)argues ofpeacebetween powers great longest period since1495, statesystememerged whenthemodern light onquestionsofprogress towards amore peacefulworld. While thiscontentionmay never beresolved, we trends toshed canlookto recent empirical system’ andthere is ‘no easy way competitionandwar’. world toescapetheharsh ofsecurity progress ‘clashes withtherealist elementoflifeintheinternational belief thatwar isanintrinsic isnotprogressive’.that history For realists like (2001: Mearsheimer 24, 17), thisliberalnotionof ‘liberalism believes inatleastthe possibilityofcumulative progress, whereas realism assumes and provides apointofcontentionbetween realists and liberals. Keohane (2002: 45) notedhow ferent ofdifficulty. ratesanddegrees Progress remains thebedrock of all liberalapproaches to IR Classical liberalsprovide ofhow theworld theories mightprogress towards peace, albeitatdif While we should not ignore how this trend toward peace fits liberal expectations, a few With theendofColdWarandriseglobalization,liberalswereconfidentthat The declineofgreat-power wars hasbeenwidelyacknowledged. We are living amidstthe Patterns ofprogress:chartingthedeclineinseveritywar
al. (2001:22)demonstratethatthe‘decadefrom1986to1995hasbeen Thomas C. Walker andDavid L. Rousseau
al. (2010) find that international organizationsdecrease (2010)findthatinternational 28 - - - -
Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:01 01 Oct 2021; For: 9781315753393, chapter2, 10.4324/9781315753393.ch2 important questionsforstudentsofIR. important other classicalliberals. research Liberalismremains programme arich andwillcontinue toraise tinue tobuild uponandchallengetheclaimsmademore than200years agoby Paine, Kant, and Moreover, these threeoftheliberalpeaceare pillars interwoven. research willcon Empirical can reduce conflictbut theassociationislessconvincing thandemocracy andinterdependence. dependence have tothisdeclineinviolence. alsocontributed Fourth, institutions international reduction inconflict, especiallybetween democracies. Third, openeconomies, trade, andinter violence hasdeclinedmarkedly. Second, democraticgovernance hasbeenassociatedwiththis levels ofviolentconflict. Recenttrends show thattheprobability ofdyingasaresult ofpolitical byarticulated classicalliberals. First, theworld ofreducing hasseeminglyprogressed interms along withmany others, research demonstratethewide-ranging withinliberalism. more likely towinwars, intheclassicalthoughtofPaine. anotherideaoriginating These studies, by Fordham and Walker (2005). ReiterandStam(2002)present evidence thatdemocraciesare a claimmadeby both Paine andKant, by supported Goldsmith (2003) and hasbeenempirically evolution ofthejustwar tradition. The ideathatdemocracieswilldevote budgets, lesstomilitary humanrights.influence oncontemporary appliedKant’sWilliams (2012)critically thoughttothe theoretical andempirical, couldhave beenelaborated. For instance, Lamb(2015)surveyed Paine’s reflect thecore oftheliberal research programme inIR. Several otherelementsof liberalism, both sions ofdemocracy, free trade, organization, andinternational by articulated Paine first andKant, overviewNo brief canexamineallthe claims withinthebroadof liberalism. theory Our discus remains inorder. inliberaltriumphalism,engaging continued analysisofliberalism’s forpeace three majorfactors thisdecline in violent wars havedriving not yet beenclearlyidentified. Therefore, insteadof Chan, S.(1984)‘Mirror,MirrorontheWall Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., and Morrow, J. (2003) Bueno deMesquita,B.andSiverson,R.(1995)‘WartheSurvival ofPoliticalLeaders:AComparative Bennett, D.andStam,A.(2004)TheBehavioralOriginsofWar,AnnArbor:UniversityMichiganPress. Bell, D.(2014)‘WhatisLiberalism?’,PoliticalTheory42(6):682–715. Barnett, M.andFinnemore,(1999)‘ThePolitics,PowerPathologies ofInternationalOrganizations’, Babst, D.(1972)‘AForceforPeace’,IndustrialResearch(April):55–8. Cirincione, J.,WolfsthalandRajkumar,M.(2011[2005]) Copeland, D. (1996) ‘Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations’, Doyle, M.(1983)‘Kant,LiberalLegacies, andForeignAffairs’Parts12, Dorussen, H.andWard,(2008) ‘IntergovermentalOrganizationsandtheKantianPeace:ANetwork Dafoe, A.,Oneal,J.,andRussett, B. (2013)‘TheDemocraticPeace:WeighingtheEvidenceandCautious Analysis ofRegimeTypeandAccountability’,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 89(4):841–55. International Organization49(2):699–732. Cambridge, MA:MITPress. Resolution 28(4):617–48. Overall, we have shown that there several evidence is strong supporting empirical claims first Chemical Threats,Washington,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace. Perspective’, JournalofConflictResolution 52(2):189–212. Inference’, InternationalStudiesQuarterly 57(1): 201–14. Security 20(4):5–41. 12(3–4): 205–35, 323–53. Liberalism: a theoretical and empirical assessment empirical and theoretical a Liberalism:
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