16.03.2010 MERGER OR ACQUISITION? IDEATIONAL AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM AND THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF GERMANY'S GRAND COALITION Prof. Dr. Sebastian Harnisch / Raimund Wolf, M.A. Institute for Political Science Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg 69115 Heidelberg Phone: +49-6221-54-2859 E-Mail:
[email protected] /
[email protected] Web: http://harnisch.uni-hd.de Abstract This paper suggests a dialogue between different strands of liberalism and veto player theory in order to explain the ambivalence in German Grand Coalition’s European policy. We argue that veto player theory can contribute analytical clarity to the republican liberalism without losing parsimony. By specifying the republican liberalism, the significance of the ideational liberalism as constitutive for veto player creation and conditional for veto player activation becomes evident. Furthermore, taking on ideational liberalism seriously advances our concept of “policy interdependence” that links societal (and veto player) preferences and inter-state cooperation. The illustrative case study of German policy on ESDP and EU constitutional reform reveals the constraining effect of anticipated and actual veto playing by ideational motivated actors. We conclude that republican and ideational liberalism are powerful explanatory tools, but that they should be integrated to advance their potential for a combination of causal and constitutive reasoning. 1 1. Introduction German European policy is something of a paradox. While there is a strong public and political commitment towards European integration, Germany’s European policy also exhibits a marked tendency towards domestication, a process by which domestic veto players – the legislators and the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) – limit the delegation of authority to supranational institutions (Harnisch 2006; 2009).