by personalities than by mechanisms of revealing the cogs of a relationship in the but also how debate and dis- transition—a transition in which U.S. agreement are a natural and potentially strategists lacked a coherent grand productive form of discourse between strategy and British leadership fought allies. to retain strategic independence. The meshing of key factors relevant to Challenging our common understanding time and geography is another strength about the early days of the modern liberal of Leebaert’s work. The core discus- international order and the personalities sion of crises across the Atlantic, Middle attempting to navigate it allows us to East, Asia, and Africa is interwoven with assess and interpret the present more the themes of diplomatic, strategic, and clearly as the global order again shifts economic history. Each subchapter is or- between Great Powers. With that in ganized in a fashion that truly reinforces mind, joint force officers, national and builds on the previous arguments strategists, and historians should take a and evidence, resulting in a compel- close look at Grand Improvisation. JFQ ling prism through which to view this moment of historical competition and transition among Great Powers. Professor Daniel Marston is the Director of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers One small quibble is the lack of a Program in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced formal bibliography. While the notes are International Studies at The Johns Hopkins detailed and add another layer of con- University. text, the author must have consulted a considerable number of sources. The fact that these works have not been identi- Restoring : fied is a drawback for any serious reader Testing Familiar Lessons interested in learning more about this and Deriving New Ones period. I would recommend JFQ read- By Andrew R. Novo and Jay M. Parker ers seek out and read some of the works Cambria Press, 2020 Leebaert uses as counterarguments and 218 pp. $39.99 (Paperback) evaluate how they stand up to his criti- ISBN: 978-1621964742 cisms. Doing so will allow the reader to Reviewed by Robert D. Spessert identify the strengths and deficiencies that are inherent in any book, as well as reinforce the reality that history is “gray,” hucydides’s The History of the rather than black and white. Excellent Peloponnesian War offers national sources for an in-depth historical analysis security pundits a plethora of per- include the British Documents on the End T suasive “dead man quotes.” However, of Empire Project, as well as the archives they and their audiences have rarely of Presidents Harry S. Truman and digested, and infrequently understood, Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Office of the context and history surrounding the Historian at the Department of State. the phrases they employ. Professors In its totality, I suspect readers will walk Andrew Novo and Jay Parker of the away from Grand Improvisation with a National Defense University provide much richer understanding of a complex an insightful remedy for students moment in history, one fraught with im- of history and strategy in Restoring mense geostrategic change that strategists Thucydides. on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to The authors adeptly address the use adapt to. and abuse of The History, claiming it Grand Improvisation challenges the is “mis-read, under-read, or unread.” notion of an acquiescent British global They assert that students of Thucydides power giving way to a confident United should consider the text as a whole, States with a clear schematic of a new know the historical context, and perceive global order on the drawing board. What the consequences of the Peloponnesian Leebaert does so successfully is challenge War in the years following Thucydides’s this myth with solid historical research,

118 Book Reviews JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 death. Restoring Thucydides reveals that for instance, sought to support one to Restoring Thucydides serves two the application of this additional evidence weaken the other. Novo and Parker, distinct audiences. First, it is an asset permits distinguishing between necessary consequently, reject the theory that to students of history and strategy who and sufficient causes, understanding the determinants within a bipolar structure seek a more robust understanding of the importance of domestic politics and its made war between Athens and Sparta Peloponnesian War and its applicability to influence on foreign affairs, and challeng- inevitable. modern geopolitical issues. Second, this ing deterministic “conventional wisdom.” Another key and often overlooked outstanding book offers those involved Early chapters concisely capture the aspect the authors underscore is the in revelations about historical narrative of the Peloponnesian depiction in The History of leaders who individual agency, domestic politics, the War and address the “polarity” trap. At considered the domestic operational international security environment, and the heart of the book, a chapter titled environment, as they made security strategy. It also arms readers with the “Power and Fear” examines Thucydides’s decisions and pursued the acquisition evidence and background to accept or most popularized ideas, such as that the or retention of power, glory, wealth, challenge how others employ the oft- war arose because of “the growth of and fame, whether for themselves, their quoted maxims of Thucydides. Athenian power and the fear this caused families, or their factions. His depiction The History of the Peloponnesian War in Sparta.” Later chapters discern how of speeches, debates, and deliberations captivates those who seek to understand allies and shifting alliances affect Great emphasize that leaders had choices contemporary geopolitical struggles. Power competition and explore the and retained agency. While The History Rather than rereading the original, joint internal and external politics of the vari- focuses on state-versus-state conflict, its force operators, planners, practitioners, ous city-states as well as offering context pages also provide evidence of internal and strategists will find an exceptionally for the Melian Dialogue and the Sicilian politics, domestic strife, and . valuable and educational alternative in expedition. Novo and Parker conclude Novo and Parker dial in on how these Restoring Thucydides. JFQ by expounding on the dynamics of Great clashes shaped and propelled numerous Power competition in the search for se- wartime decisions that ran the spectrum curity and reflect on the defeat of Athens, from whether to support allies, initiate Robert D. Spessert, JD, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and which changed the Hellenic balance of conflict, promote or accept peace offers, Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army’s power and permitted new challengers to recognize treaty violations, and submit Command and General Staff School satellite at usurp Sparta. to demands. For example, in the Melian Fort Gordon, Georgia. Restoring Thucydides refutes the Dialogue, the oligarchs on Melos re- conventional wisdom that Athens and fused to permit the Athenian emissaries Sparta existed in a bipolar system and to present their proposal to the public. that this structure created conditions in Unstated in the dialogue is that the auto- which war was inevitable. Sparta, with the crats likely sought to retain their position largest territory in Greece, was powerful of power and wealth and, therefore, and attracted allies, but its demographics, denied the populace an opportunity to economics, and government precluded it hear Athenian demands. Perhaps they from becoming hegemonic. Three other presumed the people would accept them, entities at this time also had the ability resulting in a loss of power. Assumptions to project power: Athens, with the larg- about whether Athens would use force or est navy; Corinth, which had the second if Sparta would intercede may have arisen largest navy; and the Persian Empire, from the desire to retain their power. with a population and land mass that sur- This book is a noteworthy addition passed Athens and Sparta combined but to the field studying Thucydides’s work. had failed twice to conquer Greece. Two The 1954 Penguin Classic edition of The major city-states remained neutral at the History of the Peloponnesian War runs start of the war: Argos, a historical foe of 648 pages and uses unfamiliar syntax and Sparta; and Syracuse, which encompassed uncommon names for people and places. the second largest territory in the Greek Novo and Parker provide extensive con- world. Accordingly, the Hellenic world text to this original text, challenge classic was actually multipolar. While Athens and “lessons,” and offer numerous other Sparta displayed some hegemonic charac- insights. It is also a worthy complement teristics, other powerful actors populated to those who have read Graham Allison’s the region and influenced the balance of Destined for War and offers greater power. They entered alliances, switched dimension to the strategist’s favorite con- loyalties, and remained neutral. Persia, struct, the “Thucydides Trap.”

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Book Reviews 119