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New Evidence on North Korea Introduction COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15 New Evidence on North Korea Introduction By Kathryn Weathersby mong the states that played a key role in the Cold War, none has been, or remains, more enigmatic than Athe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). To its allies within the communist world, North Korea’s secretiveness, its cult of Kim Il Sung, and its violent provo- cations against the South were a source of exasperation, embarrassment, and unease. Nonetheless, North Korea’s fraternal allies never permanently withdrew their patronage from the Pyongyang regime, without which the DPRK could not survive. As O.B. Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the Inter- national Department of the Central Committee of the Commu- nist Party of the Soviet Union, explained to an East German party official in February 1973, “in the interest of our common tasks, we must sometimes overlook their stupidities. None of us agree with the idolatry of Kim Il Sung.” 1 For the United States and its allies, North Korea’s insis- tence on maintaining an outsized, forward deployed military force, its refusal to moderate its hostile rhetoric against Seoul and Washington, and its unpredictable outbursts of violence against South Korea, coupled with its extreme secretiveness and highly idiosyncratic version of communism, created the longest lasting and one of the most acute security problems of the Cold War era. With no history of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and few sources of information on this un- usually closed country, it has been, and remains, difficult for North Korea North Korea analysts in the non-communist world to assess the intentions behind the DPRK’s troublesome actions, whether they are working with or without classified informa- spoke with striking candor about the international and do- tion. As former CIA officer in Korea and Ambassador to Seoul mestic problems facing his embattled state. Thus, as long as Donald P. Gregg recently noted, “North Korea remains one of the DPRK’s own archives remain inaccessible, the records of the longest-running intelligence failures in the history of US its close allies provide the best available view from inside espionage. North Koreans were difficult to approach and North Korea. almost impossible to recruit and control.” 2 This special section of the Bulletin presents the results In an effort to fill part of this significant information gap, of the first two years of the Korea Initiative, during which the CWIHP has launched a special effort, begun with generous project has focused on the East German and Hungarian support from the Korea Foundation, to mine the archives of archives, as well as on Chinese sources that are available for the DPRK’s former allies for insights into North Korean analysis by selected researchers, though not for photocopy- policymaking. The Korea Initiative is combing East Euro- ing or translation in full. pean and Russian archives, and to a more limited extent those In part one, the Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua of China, to uncover and analyze the documentary record of examines Chinese archival and memoir evidence regarding North Korea’s relations with its fraternal allies. We have the serious tensions that complicated relations between China discovered that although Pyongyang’s communist allies also and North Korea during the Korean War. His analysis suffered from the unusual secretiveness of Kim Il Sung’s reveals that the characteristics of the Kim Il Sung regime that regime, their extensive dealings with the DPRK nonetheless caused friction with its allies in the postwar period cannot be provided them with a far more intimate view of North Korea attributed solely to the impact of the devastating war of 1950- than that enjoyed by persons outside the communist world. 53, since they had, in fact, been prominent as early as 1949- Moreover, in his communications with his East and Central 50. Shen adds an important new perspective to the debate European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung over the relative influence of China and the Soviet Union on 5 NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA North Korea’s war plans against South Korea. He demon- German Democratic Republic (GDR) based on a large body of strates that Mao Zedong’s government was quick to offer records available in the archives of the Foreign Ministry and military support to the DPRK, but the North Korean leader- the Socialist Unity Party, as well as on the published memoir ship refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do of the last GDR ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki. so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel. Shen attributes Viewing North Korea’s history within the context of the his- Kim’s reluctance to overconfidence in his military judgments tory of other small states within the communist camp, Schäfer and the long history of Chinese interference in Korean af- pinpoints the distinctive features of the DPRK. After fairs. Kim’s concerns over national sovereignty also led him Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality at to resist Chinese efforts to create a joint Sino-Korean com- the 20th Party Congress in 1956, GDR officials strongly disap- In his communications with his East European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung spoke with striking candor about the international and domestic problems facing his embattled state. mand after Chinese troops entered the war. It was only under proved of the ongoing cult of Kim Il Sung. They were Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily shocked by the scale of Korean demands for economic assis- necessary joint command. He likewise resisted placing North tance and were offended by Pyongyang’s refusal to acknowl- Korean railroads under Chinese military management, agree- edge the considerable aid it received from its allies. After the ing to this important step only after he was pressured to do Sino-Soviet split erupted into the open, Pyongyang enjoyed so by the Soviets—a capitulation that, in Shen’s estimate, the anomalous position of being wooed by both its giant “left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il Sung.” neighbors. Since the GDR had to remain absolutely faithful In part two, the Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai ana- to the Soviet Union, East German representatives in lyzes North Korean relations with the Soviet Union during Pyongyang banded together with their Soviet counterparts the Khrushchev years, drawing on extensive research in the to exchange information and discuss the disturbingly unpre- Hungarian archives. Although Hungarian leaders did not dictable actions of the North Koreans. East German docu- develop a special relationship with Kim Il Sung comparable ments therefore provide important insight into Soviet atti- to that of the East Germans, their diplomats were able to gain tudes toward the Kim Il Sung regime as Moscow attempted excellent information on the internal workings of the Kim to exert leverage over Pyongyang. Schäfer traces the twists regime thanks to communications from Koreans who had and turns in the DPRK’s foreign policy as Kim turned back been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with Hun- toward Moscow in the wake of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, garian embassy personnel after returning to the DPRK. Com- and then opened negotiations with Seoul in response to the paring North Korea to other communist countries, Szalontai Sino-American rapprochement of 1972. The warm personal singles out the DPRK’s dependence on foreign relations that Kim developed with Erich Honecker following assistance, despotic political system, and isolationism as its the East German leader’s visit to the DPRK in 1977 led to what distinguishing characteristics. In addition, Pyongyang’s Schäfer terms “reciprocal byzantinism,” the record of which continued rivalry with Seoul shaped North Korea’s domestic reveals the autocratic delusions of both leaders. Transla- and foreign policies in distinctive ways. Attributing tions of selected documents follow the article. Moscow’s failure to ensure de-Stalinization in the DPRK to Part four presents translations of additional documents Kim Il Sung’s skill at exploiting events such as the Hungarian from the Hungarian National Archives, provided to the Ko- Revolution of 1956 and Khrushchev’s purge of 1957, as well rea Initiative by Csaba Békés of the Cold War History Re- as to Soviet arrogance, Szalontai presents a persuasive and search Center in Budapest, and a letter from Kim Il Sung to original analysis of the roots of North Korea’s remarkable Wladyslaw Gomu lka found in the Modern Records Archive autonomy. He examines in detail the conflict with Moscow in in Warsaw by KI advisory board member Vojtech Mastny. A 1959-60 over Pyongyang’s unification plans and the sharp meeting with Hungarian Minister Károly Pásztor in March deterioration in relations following the Sino-Soviet split. 1953, during the final phase of the Korean War, provides a Szalontai concludes that Kim’s victory over the Soviet and starting point by revealing the warm relations that existed Yenan factions in 1959 marked a turning point in Soviet-North between the two countries during the war, buttressed by the Korean relations, after which Pyongyang pursued an increas- material, technical, and educational aid provided by Hun- ingly independent and despotic course. Translations of gary, and the increased stature Kim Il Sung had gained by the selected documents follow the article. end of the war, despite his humiliating submission to Chinese In part three, the German historian Bernd Schäfer pre- military control. A meeting with Hungarian Ambassador Pál sents a cogent history of North Korea’s relations with the Szarvas in June 1955 suggests the extent to which domestic 6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15 political affairs of any one state were at that time regarded as Dr.
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