Public Health ThenandNow '0" ,• •' A 'Gift of God'?: The Public Health Controversy over Leaded Gasoline during the 1920s
DAVID ROSNER, PHD, MSPH, and GERALD MARKOWITZ, PHD
Introduction this substance by the automobile industry, the broader question became: What was the level of acceptable risk that A recent article in the American Journal of Public society should be willing to assume for industrial progress'? Health noted the high correlatio n between the lead content By examining this controversy. we will illustrate how, at of soil in urban areas and the elevated bl ood-lead levels of every stage of the debate, the political, economic, and children in these cities.' An editorial in the same issue of the scientific issues were inextricably intertwined. Journal suggested that the "use of leaded gasoline and [high] traffic density" helped explain this observation.2 For most Leaded Gasolin e Developed public health experts, the controversy over the possible adverse effects of leaded gasoline began in the 1970s. What Before the 1920s. the automobile industry was expand· we intend to show in this paper is that as earl y as the 1920s ing and highly competitive. In addition to national manufac~ public health experts, government officials, scientists, cor turers such as Ford, General Motors, and Studebaker, there porate leaders, labor, and the public were acutely aware of were local companies, sometimes arising out of former the dangers posed by the introduction of lead into gasoline. bicycle manufacturers, that competed for special markets. The depth of concern was manifested by the fact that leaded Ford dominated the pre ~ 19 2 0 market, however, producing gasoline was banned in New York Cit y for over three years nearly half of all the cars bought by Americans. It s Model T, and in many states and other municipalities for shorter small and cheaply produced, was the standard for the periods of time. In 1925, the production of leaded gasoline industry. In the 1920s. General Motors developed a number was halted for over nine months, of marketing and styli sti c innovations that al10wed it to During the 1920s, the petrochemical and automobile replace Ford as the number one producer by the end of that industries emerged as the corporate backbone of the United decade. Alfred Sloan, presid ent of General Motors, ex States. Because the acceptance or rejection of leaded gaso~ plained that their strategy called for creating demand "not line had profound implications for these industries. a spirited for basic transportation, but for progress in new cars for and often heated controversy arose. Public health profes comfort , conveni ence, power and style. " Central to the sionals found themselves under intense pressure to sanction creation of powerful and large automobiles was the develop and minimize the hazards associated with the manufacture ment of a more efficient fue l capable of driving cars at and use of this new potentially (oxic substance and the pages greater speed. In 1922, Thomas Midgley and co-workers at of the American Journal of Public Health were compro the General Motors Research Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio mi sed during the months and years when the fate of leaded di scovered that adding tetraethyl lead to gasoline raised the gasoline was being decided. The debates of that era centered compression and hence, speed, by eliminating the engine on issues of health and public policy that remai n current " knock". This all owed for the development of the " mod today. Numerous questions arose regarding the evaluation ern" automobile produced over the next 50 years.) of health hazards associated with new and potentially h arm ~ General Motors, which had an interlocking directorship fu l substances, including: How can scientists evaluate the with the DuPont Chemical Company, quickly contracted relative importance of acute and chronic effects of toxic with DuPont and Stand ard Oil of New Jersey to produce substances? What should constitute adequate proof of safety tetraethyl lead. Leaded gasoline was placed on sale in or harm? What busin ess, professio nal, or government age n ~ selected markets on February I, 1923. In 1924, DuPont and des should be responsible for evaluating possibl y dangerous General Motors created the Ethyl Corporation to market and substances? How does one study potentially toxic s ub~ produce its final product. This was done in spite of the fact stances while protecting the right to health of human sub that industrial hygienists such as Alice Hamilton had long jects? Does industry have to prove a new substance safe or since identified lead as an industrial toxin ..... ' do public health experts have to prove it dangerous? In the face of scientific uncertainty concerning the safety or dan Scientisls Question Safety gers posed by leaded gasoline , and the perceived need for In the very year that Midgley and his co-workers at Address reprint requests to David Rosner, PhD. MSPH, Associate General Motors Research Corporation herald ed the discov Proressor. Health Administration, Baruch ColJegelMt. Sinai Sc hool or Medi· ery of this powerful an t i~k n ock compound , scientists in and cine, City Uni versity of New York . Box 313. 17 Lexington Ave nue. New outside of government warned that telr'dethyllead might be a York. NY 10010. Dr. Markowitz is Professor of History. John Jay College of potent threat to the public's health. Wil.li am Mansfi eld Clark, Criminal Justice . CUNY. Editor's Note: See aJso related editorial p 338 this issue. a professor of chemistry, wrote to A. M. Stimson, Assistant Surgeon General at the Public Health Service, in October of C 1985 American Journal of Public Health 1J09O..OO361 1985$UO 1922 warning of "a serious menace to the public health." He
344 AJPH April 1985. Vol . 75. NO . 4 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW noted that in the earl y production of tetraethyl lead. "several 'lead' in the in terbureau correspondence" was intentional very serious cases of lead poisoning have resulted." He because of leaks to the newspapers. Si nce the Bureau had feared that its use in gasoline would result in environmental agreed to a blackout of information, he asserted that " if it pollution, theorizing that "on busy thoroughfares it is highly shoul d happen to get some publicity accidentally, it would probable that the lead oxide dust will remain in the lower not be sa bad if the word 'lead' were .omitted as this term is stratum. "8.9 apt to prejudice somewhat against its use, " 16.17 Stimson believed that " the possibilities of a real health The willingness of the Bureau of Mines to avoid publici menace do exist in the use of such a fu el and it is deemed ty and even accurate scientific terminology in favor of a advisable that the Service be provided with some experimen· trade name reHected the Bureau's weak position vis-a-vis tal evidence lending to support this opinion. " He suggested the giant corporations, GM and DuPont. Thi s was further that it was in the province of the Division of Chemi stry and evident in the ubsequent agreements developed between Pharmacology to conduct investigations of the dangers,lO·11 the government , OM, DuPont, and the newly created Eth yl The director of that division opposed this suggestion because Gasoline Corparation. The first agreement in September such an investigation would take " a considerable period of 1923 between the General Mators Research Corporatian and time, perhaps a year," and that the results would be of little the Bureau allowed relative freedom farthe Bureau ta report " practical use since the trial of the material under ordinary its final conclusions, IS However, by June 1924, General conditions [of useJ should show whether there is a risk to Motors saught much greater control over the final product. man." He recommended in stead that the Public Health Not only had the corporation demanded that no publicity Service depend upon industry it self to provide them with cancerning the research be given to the popular press, it now relevant data. 12 added ta the contract the stipul ation that "all manu scri pts, One month later, H . S. Cumming, the Surgeon General, before publication, will be submitted to the Company for wrote to P. S. DuPont , Chairman of the Board of the DuPont camment and criticism."ISI Two months after the Bureau Company, asking whether the public health effects of tetra acquiesced ta this new stipulation, tbe newly created Ethyl ethyl lead manufacturing and use had been taken into Corporation asked thai their proposed contract be modified account. He was answered by Thomas Midgley himself who so that " before publication of any papers or articles by your allowed that although the question " had been given very Bureau, they should be submitted to them [Ethyl] for serious consideration . .. no actual experimental data has comment. criticism, and approval." These changes were been taken." Despite the lack of experimental data, OM and incorporated into the new contract givi ng the Ethyl Corpara DuPont were confident that " the average street will proba tian veta power aver the research of the U niled States bly be so free from lead that it will be impossible to detect it Government.10 or its absorption . "13. 1" Despite the insistence of OM, DuPont, and the US DuPont and General Motors recognized that, in view of Gavernment that na information should be released before the apprehension about the potential health hazards of completion of the study, it is clear from the unpublished tetraethyl lead, a purely private in-house study of its safety correspondence thai this agreement was vialated when it would be met by skepticism and rejecti on. Therefore. rather appeared that the preliminary results painted taward a than conduct its own investigations, it worked a ut an agree vindicatian of the companies' faith in tetraethyllead. In July ment with the US Bureau of Mines. The agreement called for 1924-twa years after leaded gasoline was fi rst put on the the General Motors Research Corporation to provide fund market in the mid-west and the east coast and five months ing fo r an investigation of the dangers of tetraethyllead and befare the preliminary report was released-the GM director for the Bureau of Mines to provide the faci lities and the of research. Oraham Edgar, wrote to Dr. Paul Leech of the imprimatur of the US Government on the results of such an American Medical Association that the results of the Bureau investigation. GM . through its prime negotiator, Charles .of Mines' research wauld show "that there is no danger of Kettering, requested one other proviso: that " the Bureau acquiring lead paisoning through even prolanged expasure refrain from givi ng out the usual press and progress reports to exhaust gases .of cars using Ethyl Gas." He further during the course of the work, as [OM] feels that the assured the AMA that I'poisoning [rom carban manaxide newspapers are apt to give scare headlines and false impres wauld ari se long before the concentration of lead wauld sions before we definitel y know what the influence of the reach a point where even cumul ati ve poisaning is to be material will be,"13 feared. " 2 1
Corporate Veto and Censorship Oil Company Disaster
It was clear t.o many that this was a politicall y explosive The industry'S assurances of the safety of leaded gaso· inquiry. For example, the chief chemist, S. C, Lind, wrote line were undermined by a horrifying disaster that occurred to the superintendent of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Mines in the Standard Oil Company' s experimental labaratorie s in Field Station where the investigation was being carried out Elizabeth. New Jersey. Between October 26 and October 30, objecting to the government's use .of the trade name "ethyl" 1924, five workers died and 35 others experienced severe when referring to tetraethyl lead gasoline, saying, "Of palsies, tremars, hallucin ations, and ather serious neurolagi course their [G M's] abject in doing so are fairly clear, and cal symptams of organic lead poisaning. Thus, of 49 warkers among other things they are nat particularly desirous .of in the tetraethyllead processing plant, aver 80 per cent died having the name ' lead' appear in this case, That is alright or were severel y poisaned. On the first day, the New York from the standpoint of the General Matars Campany but it is Times quated the company doctor who suggested that quite a questian in my mind as to whether the Bureau of " nothing aught to be said abaut this matter in the public Mines wauld be justified in adopting this name so earl y in the interest," and .o ne of the supervisars at the Bayway facility game before it has had the support of popular usage." The who said " these men probably went insane because they superintendent replied that the avaidance of "the use .of worked lOa hard." The father of the dead man, however,
AJPH April t 985, Vol. 75 , No. 4 345 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
"was bitter in denunciation of conditions at the plant" and upon which a great deal of inexact data has already ap told reporters that .. Ernest was told by the doctors at the peared, the report is inadequate," l3-).1 Alice Hamilton con· plant that working in the laboratory wouldn 't hurt him. curred with Drinker's position and noted the " desirability of Otherwise he would have quit. They said he'd have to get having an investigation made by a public body which will be used to it.' '22.23 beyond suspicion. " ) 11 After this initial revelation, every major newspaper in New York began to report on conditions at the plant. Day after day, the Times. the New York World, and other newspapers revealed deaths and occupationally related in sanity due to what the newspapers called " Iooney gas" , 2. The company continually sought to deny management 's responsibility for the tragedy. At a press conference, Thom as Midgley asserted that true responsibility for the crisis rested with the workers. He said that at another plant "the men, regardless of warnings and provision for their protec· tion, had failed to appreciate the dangers of constant absorp· tion of the fluid by their hands and arms,"n Despite Stan dard Oil's attempt to shift blame to workers, others were reaching different conclusions. The Union County (New Jersey) prosecutor asserted th at he was "satisfied many of Dr. Allee Ilamiiton, (left) one of the country's foremost authorities on lead, the workers did not know the danger they were running. I opposed tetraethyllead In gasoline, while R. R. Sayers (right), who headed the also believe some of the workers were not masked nor told Bureau of Mines, Issued the preliminary report exone.ratlng tetraethyllead as a to wear rubber gloves and rubber boots. "26.27 The New hazard 10 the public. lersey Commissioner of Labor said he had never been informed that the workers in the Bayway plant were poten Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Bureau of Mines' tiaJly in danger. " Secrecy surrounding the experiments was report came from the Workers' Health Bureau and one of its responsible for the Labor Department's lack of knowledge of chief scientific advisors, Yandell Henderson, Professor of them," an official said.28 Applied Physiology at Yale University. Even before the These deaths and the continuing controversy stimulated report was issued, the Workers' Health Bureau-an organi renewed concern about the potential public health dangers zatio n of pro-labor activitists devoted to investigating and from the exhaust produced by leaded gasoline. Despite organizing around occupational safety and health issues Standard Oil's assurance that no "perils existed in the use of called for a united stand to oppose lead in gasoline. They this gas in automobiles," New York City, New York State, pointed out that the crisis at Bayway indicated tbat both Philadelphia, and many other municipalities and states workers and the general public were in danger of lead banned the sale of leaded gasoline. 29 poisoning, if lead were allowed to remain in gasoline. )7. )8 Henderson, upon whom the Workers' Health Bureau de· Bureau of Min es Report Issued pended for much of their information about the dangers of On the day after the fifth and last victim died , and in the tetraethyl lead, voiced the public health profession' s nagging midst of growing public skepticism about this new chemical, fear regarding the fact that "this investigation is financed by the Bureau of Mines released its preliminary findi ngs on the the Ethyl Gas Corporation" and that in spite of many possible dangers of leaded gasolin e to th e general pUbli c. protests "the in vestigators in the Bureau of Mines have used The New York Times headline summed up the report: experimental conditions which are fundamentally unsuited to afford information on the real issues. " ) 9 In addition, he " No Peril to Public Seen in Ethyl Gas/ Bureau of Mines said, " it seems to me extremely unfortunate that the experts Reports after Long Experiments with Motor Exhausts! More of the United States Government should be carrying out this Deaths Unlikely. JI investigation on a grant from the General MOlors." He felt The Times also reponed " the investigation carried out " very strongly that there is the most urgent need for an indicates the danger of sufficient lead accumulation in the absolutely unbiased investigation."40 C. W. Deppe, owner streets through the discharging of scale from automobile of a competing molor car company, was much more blunt in motors to be seem ingly remote." In short, the report exoner· his criticism of the government's relationship to GM , saying: ated tetraethyl lead.)ODespite the desire of the manufactur· "May I be pardoned if I ask you frankly now, does the ers to use the report to reassure the public, the circum Bureau of Mines exist for the benefit of Ford and the G.M. stances of the workers' deaths only served to undermine the Corporation and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and credibility of the Bureau of Mines' findings. Specific criti other oil companies parties to the distribution of the Ethyl cisms came from a number of different sources. Scientists Lead Dopes, or is the Bureau supposed to be for the public and labor activists alike found fault with the report. E. E. benefit and in protection of life and health?"'" Free, editor of the prestigious Scientific: American magazine, was skeptical ofR. R. Sayers' assurances that the Bureau of Propaganda Efforts Mines could find no evidence of lead poisoning in experi. mental animals .)1.l2 Cecil K. Drinker, editor of the Journal This attack by scientists, public heaJth experts, and of Industrial Hygiene and professor of public health at activists on the quality and integrity of the report forced Harvard, and Dr. David Edsall, Dean of the Harvard Medi those who favored the introduction of lead into gasoline to cal School, were also critical. In early January 1925, Drinker begin a counter offensive. Emery Hayhurst, a noted industri· wrote a pointed letter to Sayers in which he concluded, "As al hygienist with the Ohio Department of Health, emerges as an investigation of an important problem in public health one of the key figures in the attempt to "sell " tetraethyllead
346 AJPH April 1985, Vol. 75. No. 4 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW to the American public. Hayhurst was important in the about DUfr's death was because we couldn 't get it. They foUowing months and years because of his established [DuPonl] suppress things aboul th e lead planl al Deepwaler. reputation as a respected and independent industrial hygien· Whatever we print, we pick up from the workers." The ist. But what was not known about Dr. Hayhurst during the Times went on to describe the control that DU.Pont exercised months of struggle around this is sue was the dual role he over the local hospital to which its poisoned workers were played in the controversy; at the same time he was advisi ng sent, indicating that it was almost impossible to get informa· organizations like the Workers· Health Bureau about indus· tion from the hospital about the source of the workers' trial hygiene matters. he was also working as a consultant for problems. Despite this. the Times was able to uncover the the Ethyl Corporation."2 It is also evident from correspon· fact that there had been over 300 cases of lead poisoning dence between Hayhurst and the Public Health Service that among workers at the Deepwater plant during the past two Hayhurst was supplying advocates of tetraethyl lead with years. Workers at the DuPont facility ) knowing something information regarding the tactics to be used by their oppo· was amiss, had dubbed the plant '·lhe House of the BUller nents. Indeed, even before the Bureau of Mines had issued flies" because so many of their colleagues had hallucinations its report, Hayhurst had decided thattelraethyllead was not of insects during their bouts of lead poisoning: "The Victim an environmental toxin. He had advised th e Bureau of Mines pauses, perhaps while at work or in a rational conversation, lo include a slalemenl that " lhe finished producl, Ethyl gazes intently at space and snatches at something not Gasoline, as marketed and used both pure or diluted in there." The Times reported th at "aboul 80% of all who gasoline retains none of the poisonous characteristics of the worked 'the House of the Butterflies; or who went into it to ingredients concerned in its manufacture and blending. ""2.0 make repairs were poisoned, some repeatedly. "jO Even more damning evidence is found in another letter to Sayers-when the attacks on the report were mounting Surgeon General Convenes Conference wherein Hayhurst secretly sent to the Public Health Service copies of the critici sms that the Workers' Health Bureau had As a result of these continuing revelations and public developed, so that the federal government could be prepared disquiet over the Bureau of Mines report , the Surgeon to repl y. Although the Workers' Health Bureau had specifi General of the Public Health Service contemplated calling a cally refrained from sending these comments to the govern national conference to assess the tetraethyllead situation. In ment, Hayhurst violated their trusL""-'" Hayhurst and Say· a frank letter to the Surgeon General , Haven Emerson, the ers a1so worked together to build public and professional eminent public health leader, spelled out the concerns of support for the Bureau of Mines' and the Elhyl Corpora public health officers. Emerson stated that the Bureau of tion's position th at tetraethyl lead was not a public health Mines' report was having "a widespread, and to my mind danger. Sayers urged4S that Hayhurst counter the criticisms harmful , influence on public opinion and the actions of of Drinker and Edsall with a review or editorial of his own in public agencies" and that it would be "well worthwhile to support of the report. Hayhursl replied" lhal he had pre call those whom you intend to a conference promptly." He pared an editorial for the American Journal of Public feared that there was a growing impression that the interests Healt"· that proclaimed, "ObservationaJ evidence and re· of those who may expecl profit from the public sale of tetraethyl lead compounds have been influential in postpon· ports to various health officials over the country ... so far j, as we have been able to find out. corroborated the statement ing such a meeting. Despite some indication that R. R. of 'complele safety· so far as the public heallh has been Sayers opposed such a conference and may have delayed concerned.'·"9 Printed as an unsigned editorial, it gave it,j2 the Surgeon General announced at the end of April 1925 that he was calJing together experts from business, labor, Journal readers the impression that public health profession 5 als had delermined that leaded gasoline posed no lhreal to and pubHc health to assess the tetraethyl lead situation . ) the public's health. The conference convened on May 20, 1925 in Washing Nevertheless, lhis propaganda e!fort did not quell the ton. DC, with every major party represented. At the confer· doublS aboul the safely of leaded gasoline or the inlegrilY of ence, the ideologies of the different participants were clearly the Bureau of Mines' report. It also became apparent that and repeatedly laid out, thus providing an important forum the companies were engaging in a cover·up of other deaths by which we can evaluate the scientific, political, economic, and illnesses among their workers in other plants. In light of and intellectual issues surrounding this controversy. In the the publicity over Bayway, it was soon reported th at other words of one participant, the conference gathered together workers had died handling letraethyllead at bOlh the DuPont in one room " two diametrically opposed conceptions. The chemical plant at Deepwater, New Jersey and the General men engaged in industry, chemists, and engineers. take it as Motors research division site in Dayton. Ohio. The Workers' a matter of course that a little thing like industrial poisoning Heallh Bureau, for example, began 10 catalogue the dealhs should not be allowed to stand in the way of a greal induslrial and illn esses of workers at these plants showing that, since advance. On the other hand, the sanitary experts take it as a September 1923 , al least lwo men had died al Daylon and matter of course that the first consideration is the health of four olhers at Deepwater. 211 ."1 The Times later reported that the people. "54 editors and reporters had difficulties in following up on the 'Industrial Progress' Invoked story. For example, the Times noted that there was nothing The conference opened with statements from General in the local paper about the dealh of Frank W. (Happy) Durr Motors, DuPonl. Slandard Oil , and the Elhyl Corporalion who had worked for DuPont for 25 years. Durr had literally outlining the history of the development of leaded gasoline given his life to the company; he had begun working for and the reasons why they believed its continued production DuPont as a 12·year·old child and died from exposure to was essential. Three themes emerge as central arguments by lelraethyllead at the age of 37. The edilor oflhe Record told the companies. First, the manufacturers maintained that the Times: " I guess the reason we didn 't print anything leaded gasoline was essential to the industrial progress of America. Second, they maintained that any innovation en· -He was a member or the Joumal's Editorial Committee at the time. tails certain risks. Third, they stated that the major reason
AJPH Aprit 1985, Vot . 75, No.4 347 PU BLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
that is "a certain means of saving petroleum? Because some animals di e and some do not die in some experiments, shall ~OUjes we give this thing up entirely?"S!I.s6 The stark portrayal of tetraethyl lead as a key to the industrial future of the nation led naturally into industry's ETHYL GASOLINE second argument that any great advance required some sacrifice. Dr. H. C. Parmelee, editor of Chemical and Mewl lurgicai Engineering. stated, "The research and develop ··and why? ment th at produced tetraethyl lead were conceived in a fine nn-LG,\SOl..Jl'>F..i" ",ul"r~a".,linc spirit of industrial progress looking toward the conservation E IrUled wlln Ethyl brand "I" aUli· kno..:k ... ,,,np"lIn
a.\ C I ~<; CAn that the lesson that the companies had learned out of this -_._-R~"":~_'"':::""'t:'i...... _... - ...... _. ... whole experience was that "the essential thing necessary to -.- ...... I~_ • safely handle [tetraethyl lead] was careful discipline of our ..... ,.,,~ ... .. _ .. I>o, ... --...._ ...... "',.. . men ... [tetraethyl lead] becomes dangerous due to care le ssness of the men in handling it." In an earli er statement to the New York World. Midgley explai ned what this discipline consisted of: "The minute a man shows signs of exhilaration he is laid off. If he spills the stuff on himself he is fired. Because he doesn't want to lose his job, he doesn't spiH it." Midgley's own recklessness was revealed at a news confer ence in which he sought to downplay the toxicity oftetraeth yllead. When asked by a reporter if it was dangerous to spill This ad, appearing In a 1927 issue of Lift! magazine, never mentions lead. Photo credit: The Ohio Historical Society the chemical on one's hands. Midgley dramatica lly "had an attendant bring in a quantity of pure tetraethyl" with which he " washed hi s hands thoroughl y in the fluid and dried them that deaths and il lnesses occurred at their plants was that the on hi s hankerchief. 'I'm not taking any chance whatever; he men who worked with the materials were careless and did said . 'Nor would r take any chance doing that every day.' .. not foHow in structions. He did this act in spite of the fact that only a year before he C. F. Keltering, of GM and Ethyl, and Robert Kehoe, had laken a prolonged vacation in Florida in order to cure scientific consultant to the industry, both stressed the impor himself of Le ad poisoning .!I8·60·61 tance of tetraethyllead as a means of conserving motor fuel. But Frank Howard, representing the Ethyl Gasoline Corpo A Public Health/Environmental Issue ration, provided the most complete rationale for the contin Those who opposed the introduction of leaded gasoline ued use of tetraethyl lead in gasoline. He noted that it was disagreed with every fundamental position of industry repre not possibl e to abstract the quest ions of public health from sentatives. First. opponent s pointed out that what we would broader economic and political issues. "You have but one now denote as inorganic lead compounds were already problem," he remarked rhetorically. " Is this a public health known to be a slow, cu mul ative poison that should not be hazard?" He answered that " unfortunately, our problem is introduced into the general environment. Second, they be not that simple." Rather he posited that automobiles and oil lieved because of industry'S reckless disregard for workers' were central to the industrial progress of the nation, if not and th e public's health the federal government had to the world. "Our continued development of motor fuels is assume re sponsi bility for protecting the health of the nation. essential in our civ ilization." he proclaimed. Noting that at Third, they rejected the notion that the workers were the least a decade of re search had gone into th e effort to identify ones responsible for their own poisoning. Fourth. and most tetraethyl lead, he called its discovery an "apparent gift of importantly, because they believed that the public's health God." By casting the issue in this way, Howard put the should take precedence over the needs of industry, they opposition on the defensive, making them appear to be argued that the burden of proof should be on the companies reactionaries whose limited vision of the country's future to prove tetraethyllead was safe rather than on opponents to could permanently retard progress and harm future genera prove that tetraethyl lead was dangerous. tions. " What is our duty under the circumstances?", he Dr. Yandell Henderson, Yale physiologist, was the asked. " Should we say, 'No, we will not use' .. a material strongest and most authoritative critic of industry. He told
348 AJPH April 1985, Vol. 75. NO.4 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW the conference that lead was a serious public health menace cratic occurrence of lead poisoning. Even the medical direc that coul d be equated to the serious infectious diseases then tor of Reconstructio n Hospital in New York , probably Ihe affecting the nation's healt h. Unl ike industry spokespeople only fac il ity at that time devoted exclusively 10 the study and who defined the problem as one of occupational health and treatment of occupational disease and accide nts, could not maintained th at individual vigilance on the part of workers explai n the strange manifestations of chronic tetraethyllead could solve the problem, Hend erson believed that leaded poisoning. Of the 39 patients he treated arler the Bayway gasoline was a public health and environmental healt h issue disaster, he said , " some of these individuals gave no physi th at required federal action. He expressed horror at the cal evidence and no symptom or any evidence that could be thought that hundreds of thousand s of pound s of lead would found by a ph ysical examin ation that would indicate that be deposited in the streets of every major ci ty in America. th ey were ill , but at th e same time showed lead in Ihe His warning to the conference of the long-term dangers stools." He conclud ed th at " perhaps a man may be poi proved to be an accurate prediction: " condi tions would soned from the tetraethyl lead without showing clinical grow worse so graduall y and the development of lead evidence and that therefore, the re may be a considerable poisoning will come on so in sidiously . . . that leaded number of in dividuals so poisoned who have not come under gasoline will be in nearly universal use and large numbers of observation." The policy implications for him were that cars will have been sold . . , before the public and the leaded gasoline "should be withheld from public consump government awaken to the situation. " 62,-64 tion unt il it is conclusively shown th at it is not poisonous. "69 To meet such a public healt h menace, Henderson and Dr. Alice Hamilton, one of the country 's foremost oth er critics believed that it was essential for the federal authorities on lead, agreed with those opposed to tetraethyl government to take an active role in controlling leaded lead. At the confe rence she expressed he r belief that the gasoline. Harriet Silve rm an of the Workers' Health Bu reau enviro nmental health issues were far more important than attacked the idea put forth by industry that th e wo rkers were the occupational health and safety issues, adding that she responsible for their own poisoning, saying " I ask you doubted that any effective measures could be implemented gentlemen to consider the fact that you are asked to allow a to protect the general public from the hazards ofwid epsread man to be subjected to contact with a poison whi ch is use of leaded gasoline. " You may control cond itions within consid ered hazardous by the leading scientists of the coun a fac tory," she said, " but how are you goi ng to control th e try. And when you ex pose them to the poison out of which whole count ry?" In an extended commenta ry after the the manufacturers are making profits. the manufactu r conference on th e issues that it raised, Hamilton stated, " I ers penali ze those men by maki ng them forfeit a day's am not one of those who believe that the use of this leaded wage. "flS-61 gasolin e can ever be made safe. No lead industry has ev er, Opponent we re most concerned , however, about the even un der the strictest control, lost all its dangers. Where industry propagand a that equ ated the use of lead wi th there is lead some case of lead poisoning sooner or later industrial progress, and th e survival of our civili za tio n itself. develops, even under the strictest supervision. " 10-12 Reacting to the Ethyl Corporation representative's state ment th at tetraethyl lead was a " gift of God", Grace Furlher Tesls. Siudies Urged Burnham of the Workers' Health Bureau said it " was not a Most public healt h professionals did not agree with gift of God when those 11 men were killed or those 149 were Henderson and Hamilton, however. Many took th e position poisoned ." She angril y qu estioned the priorities of " this age that it wa s unfair to ban thi s new gasol.ine additi ve until of speed and ru sh and efficiency and mechanics" and said defin itive proof existed th at it was a real danger. In the face that " the thing we are interested in the long run is not of indu stry argument s that oil supplies were limited and that mechanics or machinery, but men ." A. L. Berres, secretary there was an extraordinary need to conserve fu el by making of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation combustion more effi cient , most public health workers be of Labor (AFL). also rejected the prevalent conception of lieved that there should be overwhelming evidence that the 1920s that " th e business of America was business." He leaded gasoline actuall y harmed people before it was told the conference th at the AFL opposed the use of bann ed. Dr. Henry F. Vaughan, president of the American tetraeth yl lead, saying, " We feel that wh ere the health and Pu blic Health Association, said that such evidence did not ge neral welfare of humanit y is concern ed , we ought to step exist. "Cen ainl y in a stud y of the statistics in our large cities slowl y." But it was Yand ell Henderson who sum marized the there is nothing which would warrant a health commi ssioner opponent s' positi on and delineated the course for future in saying that you could not sell ethyl gasoline," he pointed policy makers. In a pri vate letter to R. R. Sayers of the out. Vaughan acknowledged that there should be further Bureau of Min es, he said, " In the past, Ihe position ta ken by tests and studies of the problem bu t th at " so far as Ihe the authorities has been th at nothing could be prohibited present situation is concerned, as a health administrator I until it was proved to have kill ed a number of people. I trust feel that it is enti rely negative." Emery Hayhurst also th at in the future. especiall y in a matter of th is sort, the argued this point at the Surgeon General's Confe rence, posit io n will be that a sub stance like tetraethyl lead can not mai ntaining that th e widespread use of leaded gasoline for 27 be introduced for ge neral use until it is proved harm months " should have sufficed to bring out some mi shaps and less. "68,M poisonings , suspected to have been caused by tetraethyl For the vast majority of public health experts at th e lead."1 3-1S conference, the problem was how to reconci le the opposing While Hayhurst and oth er ex pert s pu blicly supported views of advocates of industrial progress and those fright th e use of leaded gasoline, many of them voiced serious ened by the potential for di saster. Although everyone hoped doubts in pri vate. One investigator from Columbia Uni versi that science itself would provide an answer to this imponder ty. Frederick Flinn, articulated his fears in a personal able dilemma, the reaJ ity was that 311 evidence to this point commu nication to R. R. Sayers of the United States Public was ambiguous. One major problem was th at. in the 1920s. Health Service and the Bureau of Mines, saying " The more I no one had a model for explaining the apparently idiosyn- work with the materi al [tetraethyl lead] th e more I am
AJPH April 1985, Vol. 75. No. 4 349 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
confused as to whether it is a real public health hazard." He felt that much depended upon the special conditions of exposure in industry and on the street but in the end stated he was "convinced that there is some hazard-the extent of which must be studied around garages and fiUing stations over a period of time and by unprej udi ced persons." Given the fact that Flinn did his study for the Ethyl Corporation, it is not surprising that he ended his letter by saying, "of course, you mu st understand that my remarks are confiden tial." Emery Hayhurst was even more candid in hi s private correspondence to Sayers. He told Sayers of a leller he received from Dr. Thompson of the Public Health Service saying th at " lead has no business in the human body .... That everyone agrees lead is an undesirable hazard and the only way to control it is to stop its use by the general C.·E. A. Winslow (Itn) served on Blue Ribbon Panel appoinltd by Surgeon General Hugh Smilh Cumming (righl) co conduct investigation or leaded public." Hayhurst acknowledged to Sayers, however) that gasoline. Phot() t:ndit: Nati()nal Library of M~djt:in~ political and economic considerations influenced hi s scien tific judgment. " PersonaJl y I can quite agree with Dr. Thompson's wholesome point of view, but still I am afraid very limited , study of garage and filling station attendants human progress cannot go on under such restrictions and and chauffeurs in Dayton and Ci ncinnati. The study consist thaI where things can be handled safely by proper supervi ed of four groups of workers, 252 people in all. Of Ihese, 36 sion and regulation they mu st be allowed to proceed if we are men were controls employed by the CilY of Dayton as to survive among the nations. Dr. Thompson's arguments chauffeurs of cars using gasoline wi thout lead while 77 were might also be applied to gasoline and to the thousand and one chauffeurs using leaded gasoline over a period of two years. other poisons and hazards which characterize our modern Also, 21 olhers were controls employed as garage workers or civilization. "76.77 filling station attendants where unleaded gasoline was used and 57 were engaged in si milar work where tetraethyl gas Company Suspends Manufacture. Sales was used. As another means of comparison, 61 men were tested in two industrial plants known to have serious expo Blue Ribbon Commiltee 10 Investigate sure to lead du st. As a result of their study , th e committee Despite the widespread ambivalence on the pan of concluded seven months after the conference that "in its public health professionals and the opposition to any curbs opi nion there are at present no good grounds for prohibiting on production on the part of industry spokespeople, the the use of ethyl gasoli ne ... provided that its distribution public suspicions aroused by the preceding year's events led and use are controlled by proper regulations. " They suggest to a significant victory for those who opposed the sale of ed that the Surgeon General formulate specific regulations leaded gasoline. AI Ihe end of the conference, the Ethyl with enforcement by the stales.' '-'''' Ahhough it appears thaI Corporation announced that it was suspending the produc the committee rushed to judgment in only seven months, it tion and distribution of leaded gasoline until the scientific must be pointed out that this group saw their study as only and public heahh issues involved in its manufacture could be an interim repOrl , to be followed by longer range follow-up resolved. The conference also called upon the Surgeon studies in ensuing years. In their final report to the Surgeon Ge neral to organize a blue ribbon committee of the nation's General, the committee warned: foremost public health scientists to conduct an investigation "it remains possible thai if the use of leaded gasoline of leaded gasoline. Among those asked to participate were becomes widespread conditions may arise very different from David Edsall of Harvard University, Julius Steiglitz of the those studied by us which would render its use more of a University of Chicago, C.-E. A. Winslow of Yale UniversilY hazard than would appear to be the case from this investiga and the American Public Health Association. For Alice tion. Longer experience may show that even such slight Hamilton and other opponents of leaded gasoline, the con storage of lead as was observed in these studies may lead eventuall y in susceptible ind ividuals to recogni zable or to ference appeared to be a major victory for it wrested from chronic degenerative diseases of a less obvious character." industry the power to decide on the future of an important industrial poison, and placed it in the hand s of uni versity Recognizing that their short-term investigation was in scientists. "To anyone who had followed the course of capable of detecting such danger, the committee concluded industrial medicine for as much as ten years," Alice Hamil th at further study by the government was essential: ton remarked one month after the conference, "this confer " In view of such possibilities the committee feels that ence marks a great progress from the days when we used to the investigalion begun under their direction must not be meet the underlings of the great munition makers [during aJ lowed 10 lapse ... . It should be possible to follow closely World War J] and coax and plead with them to put in the the outcome of a more extended use of this fuel and to precautionary measures .... This time it was possible to determine whether or not it may constitute a menace 10 Ihe bring together in the office of the Surgeon General the health of the general public after prolonged use or other foremost men in indu strial medic ine and public health and conditions not now foreseen . ... The vast increase in the the men who are in real authority in industry and to have a number of automobiles throughout the country makes the study of all such questions a matter of real importance from blaze of publicity turned on their deliberations. " 7' the standpoint of public health and the committee urges The initial euphoria over tbe apparent victory of"objec strongly that a suitable appropriation be requested from tive" science over political and economic self-interest was Congress for the continuance of these investigations under short lived. The blue ribbon committee, mandated to deliver the supervision of the Surgeon General of the Public Health an early decision, designed a short-term and, in retrospect, Service. "&1-8<1
350 AJPH April 1985. Vol. 75. NO. 4 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
These suggestions were never carried out and subse· 12 . Memorandum. G.W. McCoy to Surgeon General, Nov. 23. 1922, NA , RG quent studies of the use of tetraethyllead were conducted by 90, 13 . H.S. Cumming to P.S. DuPont. Dec. 20. 1922 . NA, RG 90. USPHS. 8 the Ethyl Corporation and scientists employed by them. ' .86 14. Thomas Midgley. Jr. to Cumming, Dec 30. 1922. ibid. In direct contradiction to the recommendations of the com· 15 . A.C. Fieldner to Dr. Sain, September 24. 1923. NA. RG 70 (Bureau of mittee, Robert Kehoe who carried out the studies for Ethyl, Mines). 101869, File 725. wrote: "as it appeared from their investigation that there 16. S. C. Lind . Chi ef Chemist. to Superintendent Fieldner. Pittsburgh. Nov . 3, 1923 . NA. RG 70, 101&69. File 725 . was no evidence of immediate danger to the public health, it 17 . Reply. Fieldner to Lind. Nov. 5, 1923. ibid . was thought that these necessarily extensive studies should 18. A.C. Fieldner to Dr. Bain. September 24. 1923, NA, RG 70 Bureau of not be repeated at present, at publi c expense. but that they Mines. 101869. File 725. should be continued at the expense of the industry most 19. Agreement between the Department of lnterior and General Motors Chemical Company, Dayton, Ohio, NA. RG 70, 101869 . fi le 725 . concerned, subject, however, to the supervision of the 20. C.A. Straw to Sayers. Aug. 22. 1924, NA . RG 70, 101869. File 725. Public Health Service." It should not be surprisi ng that 21. Graham Edgar to Dr. Paul Nicholas Leech. July 18 . 1924. NA . RG 70 . Kehoe concluded that his study "fails to show any evidence 101869 . File 725. 22 . New York Tim es, Oct. 27, 1924. P I. for the existence of such hazards. "117 2J. NY World. Oct. 27 , 1924. pp 1 & 6: " When M.D. Mann. head of the research department ... was asked ... he denied the men had been Whllf Weill Wrong? affected by the gas .. · 24 . New York Tim es. OCI. 28. 1924. P I. Today, looking back at the controversy ofthe 1920s , we 2.5 . Nt .... York Tim es. 0<:1. 31, 1924 , P I. may be tempted to look askance at public health profession 26. New York Tim es. Oct. 29 , 1924. P 23 . als of the period who put their faith in the ability of scientific 27 . New York World, Oct. 29. 1924 , P I. 28 . Nt w York Tim es. Oct. 30. 1924 , P I. investigations to settle this thorny political and economic 29. NY Stale Department of Health: "Heallh News", Feb. 2. 1925, NA. RG issue , After all , those like Alice Hamilton and Yandell 90 . General Files. 1924- 1935, 1340-216, Tetraethyl Lead. Henderson who fought the introduction of lead into gasoline 30. New York Tim es. Nov. I. 1924. P 1. were the strongest advocates of governmentally sponsored 31. E.E. Free to R.R. Sayers. October 21. 1924. NA. RG 70. 5445. File 437 . 32. Reports of In vestigations, Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. scientific study to determine the safety or dangers of tetra· R.R. Sayers. (' ( til: Exhaust Gases from Engines Using Ethyl Gasoline. ethyl lead, What went wrong? Why is tetraethyl lead still a NA . RG 443 . General Records. 0425T. prime source of lead in the environment? Of course. there 33. C. K. Drinker to Sayers. Jan 12. 1925 . NA , RG 70. 10t869. File 725. were those who had such an ideological commitment to 34. Saye rs to Drinker. Jan. 15. 1925. ibid. 35 . Drinker to Sayers. Jan. 19, 1925. ibid . to industrial progress that they were willing put their science 36. Hamilton to Surgeon General Cumming, Feb_ 12. 1925. NA. RG 90, aside to meet the demands of corporate greed. But, more General Files. 1924- 1935, 1340-216, Tetraethyl Lead. importantly, we should look at those who considered them 37. Workers' Heallh Bureau to Emery Hayhurst. Oct. 29. 1924 . NA . RG 70, selves to be objective scientific investigators. Ultimately, it 101869. File 725. was impossible to separate their "science" from the de· 38. Hayhu rst to Workers' Health Bureau, Oct 29. 1924 , ibid . 39. Ne ..... York Times . Apr. 22 . 1925. mands of an economy and society that was being built 40. Yandell Henderson to R.R. Sayers . Sept. 27. 1924. NA . RG 70. 101869, around the automobil e. How else, then, do we explain public File 725. health scientists' willingness to conduct a short·term study 41. C.W. Deppe to Hubert Work . Oct. 31. 1924 , NA. RG 70.101869, File 775. 42. Hayhurst to Sayers, Sept. 29. 1924 , NA, RG 70, 101869. File 725 in which that could not resolve the long·term healt h issues. By he signs hi s letter " Con sultant to Ethyl Gasoline Corporation." agreeing to provide quick answers they guaranteed that this 43. Hayhu rs t to Yant. Oct. 4. 1924 , ibid. vital industry would not be disrupted, The symptoms of lead 44. Hayhurst to Sa yers. February 7. 1925 . NA . RG 70.101869, File 725. accumulation due to exhaust em issions would be unlike 45 . Sayers to Hayhurst. February 13. 1925. ibid . 46. Hayhurst to Sayers. February 13. 1925. ibid . anything they had previously encountered in industrial popu· 47. C.- E.A. Winslow ··The Workers' Health Bureau Report on the Hazards lations. In the long run, th ose most affected would not be In volved in the Manufacture, Distribution and Sale ofTetra·Elhyl Lead". adults. but children, slowly accumulating lead. Their suffer· April 1925 Manuscript, Yale Univel1iity. Box 102. Folder 1838. ing speaks more to the interlocking relationships between 48 . Hayhurst to Sayers. February 24 , 1925, NA. RG 70. 101869 File 725. 49 . Ethyl Gasoline. (editorial) Am J Public Health 1925; 15:239- 240. science and society than to the absence of a link between 50. New York Times. June 22 , 1925 , P 3: the Timer reported that 8 workel1i lead and disease. had died in the Deepwater plant. 51. Haven Emerson to Cumming. Feb. 9, 1925. NA . RG 90, General Files. 1924-35. 1340-2 16, Tetraethyl Lead. REFERENCES 52. Cumming, Memorandum for Dr. Stimson. Feb. 13 . 1925. ibid . I. Mielke GW, et al: Lead concentrations in inner-city soils as a fa ctor in the 53. New York World. May I. 1925. P I. child lead problem . Am J Public Health 1983; 73: 1366-1369. 54. US Public Health Service: Public lIealth Bulletin *158. ' "Proceedings of 2. Mahaffey KR: Sources of lead in the urban environment. (editorial) Am J a Conference to Determine Whether or Not there is a Public Health Public Health 1983; 73 :1357- 1358. Question in lhe Manufacture. Di stribution or Use of Tetraethyl Lead 3. Epstein R; The Automobile Industry. New York and Chicago: A.W. Gasoline." Washington, D.C .. GPO. 1925 ; 62. Shaw. 1928. 55. US Public Health Service: Publir lIealth Bulletin *158. " Proceedings of 4. William Mansfield Clark to A.M . Stimson . Ot: tober 11. 1922. National a Conference to Determine Whether or Not there is a Public Health Archi ves, Record Group 90. United States Public Health Service, Wash Question in the Manufacture. Distribution or Use of Tetraethyl Lead ington. IX. Gasoline ,'· Washington D.C., GPO , 192-5: pp 4. 69. 105-107. {Howard 5. Sloan AP Jr: My years with General Motors. In : Paul Goodman and Frank went on to raise the question of how to resolve the problems inherent in Gatell (eds); America in the Twenties. New York ; 1972 ; 34-50. the publi C" health dangers of TEL. He called for the Public Health Service 6. Kettering CF: The New Necessit y. Baltimore ; 1932: 73-79. to decide on the future course of research and de velopment.! 7. Robert JC: Ethyl. Charlott esville , VA : Uni versity of Virginia Press. 1983_ 56. T. Midgley: Tetraethyl Lead Poison Hazards. Industrial and Engineering 8. William Mansfield Clark: Memomndum to assistant Surgeon General Chemistry. Aug. 1925. 17:827-828. A.M. Stim son. (through the ACting Director. Hygieni c Laborawry) Oct. 57. Nell' York Tim es. May 7. 1925. II. 1922. NA. RG 90. US Pu blic Health Service. 58. Ne .... York Times. October 28. 1924 . 9. N. Roberts to Surgeon General. Nov. 13 , 1922. NA . RG 443 (National 59. Sober Facts about Tetra-Ethyl Lead. Literary Digest 1924: 83 :25- 26. Institutes of Health ) General Records. 0425T Sox 23 for further statc 60. US Public Health Service: Bulletin #158. 12. ment s on the fears of TEL contamination. 61. Ntw York World. May 9, 1925: see also. Ne .... York Times Nov . 27 . 1924 . P 10. A.M. Stim son to R.N. Dycr. October 13 . 1922 . NA RG 90. USPHS. 14 for statement by the American Chemical Society: [" Perhaps the II . Dye r fa Su rgeon Gencr.tl . Oct. 18, 1922. ibid . greatest hazard is the indifference which not only wo rk men but even
AJPH April t 985, Vol. 75, No, 4 351 PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW
1&»-3.723 Cars P roduced
1909--126.593 Cars P roduced 1904- 21.69> Cars Produced
1914-450.000 Cars Produ chemists come to have for dangerous work with which thcy are famil· SO. Ethyl gasoline given clean bill thus far. (editorial) Am J Public Health iar. "J 1926: 16:295-296. 62. USPHS, Bulletin #158. p 62 . 81. Nell' York Tim e.f. Jan, 20. 1926, P 13. 63. N t'w York Times, April 22 . 1925. 82. Win slow's handwri tten comments on the draft of the committee's report: 64 . Henderson to Sayers, Jan. 20. 1925, NA RG 70. 10 1869, File 725. [He. He wanted a specific statement that "a more ex tensive study was not points oul the known dangers of lead to printers. painters and other possible in view of the limited time allowed to the committee." Wins low industrial workers: " 1 read your paper on ' Exhaust Gases from Engines MSS. Box 101 , Folder 1805, Yale Universit y. Using Ethyl Gasoline' with much interest. I nOle that you compare the 8], See also . other committee members responses to the draft . ibid . Folders risk to that which is faced by painters. I think this comparison is very well 1800 and 180 1. taken. for practically all painters suffer. at one time or another. and in 84. For a copy of this report itself. see: Treasury Department, USPHS; The some cases repeatedly, from lead poisoning" : See also, Grace M. Use of Tetraethyl Lead Gasoline in its Relarion to Public Health. Public Burnham, Director. Workers' Hcahh Bureau. to the Editor, New York Health Blllletin *'63. Washington: GPO. 1926. Times. July 6, 1925 [" If the expectations of Standard Oil officials that 85. See Graebner W, (n : Rosner D, Markowitz G (cds): Workers' Health and 15,000,000,000 gallons would be sold in the next year proves true, it would Industrial Organization: The Historical Nexus. Bloomington. IN: Univer· mean that 50.000 tons of lead would be distributed over the st reets of the sity of Indiana Press. (forthcoming) 1986. country."J 86. For further elaboration of the Committee members' positions. see: 65 . US PHS. Bulletin #158. pp 60,109. "Confere nce of Tetraethyl Lead Gasoline Committee·Afternoon Ses· 66. American Fcdcrdlion of Labor's concern; American Federationisl. Aug. sion." Dec. 22 , 1925. NA, RG 90. Gener.d Files, 1924-1935, Box 109. See 1923; 30:632-33. also Graebner W. The Surgeon Geneml May be Hazardous to your 67. D. Rosner. G. Markowitz: Safety and Heahh on the Job as a Class Issue Health: The Political Economy of Lead Poisoning. 1900-1966. paper The Workers' Health Bureau of America. 1921-1927, Science and Socie· delivered at the Hastings Center: Institute on Society. Ethics and the Life ty. Winter 1984 , Sciences, May. 1984 . 68 . USPHS, Bltlletin #158. pp log, %. 87. Kehoe. l'f (1/ : A Study of the Health Hazard s Associated wit h the 69. USPHS, Buffetin #158. p 79. Distribution and Use of Ethyl Gasoline. April 1928. from the Eichberg 70. USPHS, Bulletin #158, p 98 . Laboratory of Physiology. University of Ci ncinnati , Cineinat ti. OH. NA, 71. Alice Hamilton: What price safety. tetraethyl lead reveals a flaw in our RG 70, 101869 , File 725 . defences. The Survey Mid·Monthly 1925; 54:333- 334. 72 . N!'w York World. May 22. 1925, P I. 73. USPHS. BIiI/!'tin #158, pp 86-87, 89. 74. Peril s and Benefits of Ethyl Gas. Literl/f}' Digest. 1925; 85: 17 . 75. Shrader JH : Tetrd·ethyllead and the public health, Am J Public Health ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1925: 15 :213-214. We would li ke to thank David Kotelchuck, Tony Bale. Blanche Cook 76. Flinn to Sayers. May 11. 1925 . NA RG 70. 101 869, File 725. Lori n Kerr. Barbara Rosenkranl1.. and Ruth Heifetz for their very helpful 77. Hayhurst to Sayers, May 14. 1925. NA RG 70, 101869, File 725, suggestions and comments on earlier draft s of this article. William Graebne r 78. For further elaboration of the commitlec members' positions. see: "Con was especially hetpful in sharing hi s own research and ideas with us. We ference of Tetraethyl Lead," Automotive Industries, May 7, 1925 : 52:835. would also li ke to acknowledge the support of a PSC..cUNY Grant. and of the 79. Tetraethyl Lead Sales Are Suspended. National Petroleum News, May National Endowment of the Humanities a nd the Hastings Center which 27. 1925: 17 :]7, provided support for the academic year 1982-83. 352 AJPH April 1985, Vol. 75, No. 4