Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics 13 (2): 134–136 DOI: 10.2478/jef-2019-0020

WHEN SACRED SITES BECOME SYMBOLS OF NATIONHOOD*

Turkestan is a place of pilgrimage for Mus- as Kozha Akhmet Yasaui’s. The main pilgrim- lims in southern Kazakhstan close to the bor- age place, it is a huge mosque that includes der with Uzbekistan. It is a few hours by car several prayer rooms and a kitchen where from Shymkent, the most important city in historically food for pilgrims was cooked. southern Kazakhstan. The sacred site is actu- The building functions as a pilgrimage site ally just outside of the small city of Turkestan combined with a museum. Kozha Akmet was and is an impressive complex of mausoleums, born at the beginning of the 12th century BC graves and mosques. A museum of Kazakh and died in the second half of the century ‘ethno-history’ and guest houses for pil- in Turkestan, and in those times was called grims complete the site. The buildings – apart Yasawi or Yasau. He was the founder of one from some mausoleums and grand Muslim of the three most influential Central Asian tombs – are new and in excellent condition. Sufi orders – Yasawiyya, who included sha- Clean, well swept pavements connect the dif- manic rituals into their practices (Roy 2000: ferent buildings distributed around the com- 147). Kozha Akhmet Yasaui is considered a pounds. Trees are planted to provide protec- saint by most Central Asian Turkic peoples tion from the hot Central Asian sun and the and Kazakhs are proud that Turkestan is cur- pathways are lined with benches. Numerous rently an international pilgrimage site. This memorial buildings are clearly indicated and assumption is confirmed by a sign at the signs along the pavements usher visitors on entrance of his mausoleum with Kazakh and their way. Later, examining the photos I took Turkish flags announcing that these states on site, I discovered that the signs were only cooperated in establishing the ‘visual history in Kazakh and English. Russian was totally room’ within the mausoleum. There is also a absent. I have visited the site twice, in April plate announcing that some renovations were 2016 and September 2018, and was involved carried out as a joint project between Azer- in discussions with my colleagues, students baijan and Kazakhstan. In the room is a plate and informants about the meaning of Turke- with words of the President of the Republic of stan for Kazakhs. It must be noted that there Kazakhstan saying that without Islam there is no one coherent interpretation of this topic would be no Kazakhs. and my discussion partners’ positions dif- Despite the claim that Turkestan is an fered according to their regional origin, occu- international pilgrimage site for (mainly) pation, age and sex. Central Asian Turkic people, for Kazakhs this The centre of the pilgrimage complex is place is a national treasure. The mausoleums the mausoleum of Sufi poet Kozha (Hodja) of the Kazakh khans reflect the political sig- Akhmet Yasaui, which he shares with Abi- nificance of the site. This is also symbolised lai Khan, a Kazakh khan in the 18th century. by a small monument in honour of 550 years Around his resting place stand a few mausole- of Kazakh statehood at the entrance of the ums of Kazakh khans. Their mausoleums­ are pilgrimage site. Many Kazakhs still resent the also impressive, although none is as splendid words of Russian president Vladimir Putin,

* This research was supported by institutional research funding grant IUT34-32 Cultural Heritage As a Socio-cultural Resource and Contested Field from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.

134 JOURNAL OF ETHNOLOGY AND FOLKLORISTICS 13 (2) who said in 2014 that “Kazakhs had never language of the titular ethnic group is simul- had statehood” (Osharov 2014), and were taneously the only or first national language. greatly offended when he repeated them in And here Kazakhstan is no exception. Not- 2018. At the entrance of the complex is a huge withstanding the fact that the constitution marble wall where all Kazakh khans and fixes Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnic nature and sultans are listed chronologically, a smaller gives an official position to the Russian lan- version of which hangs in the mausoleum. guage as the “language of interethnic com- First on the list is Kozha Akhmet Yasaui, so munication”, one encounters strong feelings it becomes clear that he is not only a spiritual among Kazakhs that this does not correspond figure but someone who symbolises the very with their view on the ethnic and linguistic beginning of Kazakh statehood. situation in the country. Without doubt the Turkestan pilgrimage As one of my Almaty colleagues said, “it site symbolises the interconnection between is the duty of every Kazakh to visit Turkestan the politics, religion and identity of the at least once in their lifetime”. Nevertheless, Kazakh people. Academically, it is assumed she was also very critical of what the state has that Kazakh ethnic identity is strongly con- turned the pilgrimage site into. It is not very nected with Islam and that the independence unusual to encounter an opinion among more of Kazakhstan gave a free reign to a religion conservative Kazakhs that Turkestan is ‘too previously oppressed during the Soviet touristic’. For them, the ‘real’ pilgrimage site period (Hiro 1994; Hann and Pelkmans 2009). is the mausoleum of Arystan Bab, the teacher Historically, at the beginning of the 1990s the of Kozha Akhmet Yasaui, located half way Republic of Kazakhstan was seen as a state between Shymkent and Turkestan. Turkestan of and for Kazakhs, a status that was slowly is, according to that more conservative view, reshaped by Nursultan Nazarbayev into a a ‘built space’ (Casey 1997: 309) where a well multi-ethnic state. During the early 1990s organised and luxuriously built compound Nazarbayev tried to emphasise the Islamic decreases the sacral authenticity of the site. component of Kazakh national identity, only Arystan Bab’s mausoleum, with its non-reno- to give it up later for the concept of the repub- vated buildings and wells of holy salty water lic as a secular state (Dave 2007; Aitken 2009; corresponds more with the idea of a sacred Cummings 2009). Therefore, Turkestan’s offi- pilgrimage site. The international profile of cial status is site of national heritage. It is a visitors, quotes of Nazarbayev at the entrance museum complex not a destination for pil- of Kozha Akhmet Yasaui’s mausoleum, and grimage. The underlying line is, however, the lack of Russian on the signs, hints that the that this place is linked to Kazakh statehood state wants to deliver a certain message with and Turkic heritage and symbolises Kazakh- Turkestan. Religious Kazakhs seem to be stan’s membership of the Islamic world. It right because Turkestan has been converted seems to me that the state emphasises this into an ‘other space’ in the Foucauldian sense, line surreptitiously in order to avoid ethnic where the political meaning dominates the and confessional tension with Russians and religious. The message is that Kazakhstan is a Russified non-Muslims like Ukrainians, Ger- legitimate state with several centuries of his- mans or Belorussians. tory. The downplaying of Russian strength- As researchers suggest, in Central Asian ens this message. The architecture of the com- states there is a certain discrepancy between pound and choice of languages signals that the ethnic and the national identity (see Roy the Kazakh state is part of the Muslim Turkic 2000: 177). For most titular ethnic groups this world and belongs to, by definition, Central is one and the same thing and they consider Asia. In this way the Kazakhs and their state the state ‘their own’. This assumption is in all are legitimised and anchored in what many cases legitimised with the situation that the people call the Muslim or Turkic civilisation.

Notes and Reviews 135 In general, one can argue that this is the mes- state. This is the discrepancy that one encoun- sage that both foreign pilgrims and Kazakhs ters in Kazakhstan almost everywhere. One want to hear. sees billboards hailing Kazakhstan as a nation Turkestan used to be a town with an of the Great Steppe next to other billboards Uz­bek majority. Currently Kazakhs are the depicting interethnic friendship in the coun- majority (40 % of population) but Uzbeks try. The salient message of the state’s interest consist of the largest minority, approximately in its sacred geography is to make clear that one third of the town’s population. For many Kazakhstan is a Kazakh country where eve- of my Astana and Almaty colleagues, Shym- rybody is welcome, but where non-Kazakhs kent and Turkestan are the ‘deep south’, too should acknowledge their status as guests. backwards and too Uzbek. This opinion, as a rule, changes when people visit the region Aimar Ventsel and see that the lifestyle is not much differ- (University of Tartu) ent from the way people live in the northern regions of the country. The pilgrimage site References is, nevertheless, a strong national symbol. It Aitken, Jonathan. 2009. Nazarbayev and the Making is interesting to observe how ethnic Kazakhs of Kazakhstan. London; New York, NY: Con- perceive the Uzbek influence of the region tinuum. Casey, Edward S. 1997. The Fate of Place: A Philo- when it comes to the pilgrimage site. As for- sophical History. Berkley, MI; Los Angeles, CA; mer nomads and nationals of the most suc- London: University of California Press. cessful Central Asian state, Kazakhs have cer- Cummings, Sally N. 2009. Inscapes, Land- tain prejudices towards Uzbeks, who are tra- scapes and Greyscapes: The Politics of Sig- ditionally agriculturalists and provide cheap nification in Central Asia. – Europe-Asia migrant labour within Kazakhstan. Without Studies 61 (7): 1083–1093. DOI: https://doi. any doubt, Uzbeks have contributed to cre- org/10.1080/09668130903068616. Dave, Bhavna. 2007. Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language ating the conservative religious reputation of and Power. London, New York, NY: Routledge. Kazakhstan’s southern regions. It is believed DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203014899. that Uzbeks are more conservative and reli- Hann, Chris and Mathijs Pelkmans. 2009. Realign- gious, hence the large number of beautiful ing Religion and Power in Central Asia: Islam, mosques in Shymkent and Turkestan. The Nation-State and (Post)Socialism. – Europe-Asia image of the ‘traditionalistic’ south has, how- Studies 61 (9): 1517– 1541. DOI: https://doi. ever, been ‘nationalised’ in popular percep- org/10.1080/09668130903209111. Hiro, Dilip. 1994. Between Marx and Muhammad: The tion and the region is often seen as a ‘genuine’ Changing Face of Central Asia. London: Harper Kazakh counterweight to Russified northern Collins. Kazakhstan, where Soviet architecture domi- Osharov, Roman. 2014. Putin o Kazakhstane: “U nates, the Soviet era economy is still appar- kazakhov ne bylo gosudarstvennosti”. – Golos ent, and where a large proportion of the local Ameriki. https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/ Kazakh population has changed to speaking putin-­about-kazahstan-osharov/2434090.html Russian. The meaning of the Turkestan pil- (accessed November 6, 2019). [Ошаров, Роман. 2014. Путин о Казахстане: «У казахов не grimage site with the graves of Kazakh khans было государственности». – Голос Америки. has gained political importance as proof of https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/putin-about- the long history of the Kazakh nation. In a kazahstan-osharov/2434090.html.] paradoxical way the pilgrimage site merges Roy, Olivier. 2000. The New Central Asia: The Crea- religion with nationalism, emphasising the tion of Nations. London: I. B.Tauris. importance of Islam in the modern Kazakh identity, something that contradicts the offi- cial rhetoric and politics that attempts to depict Kazakhstan as a secular multi-ethnic

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